1. Establishing a Basis for Peace In Bosnia-Herzegovina--President 
Clinton, Secretary Christopher 
2. The Case for the United States In the United Nations--Acting 
Secretary Talbott   
3. Background Notes:  Portugal  
4. Treaty Actions  
Establishing a Basis for Peace In Bosnia-Herzegovina 
President Clinton, Secretary Christopher 
President Clinton  
Statement released by the White House, Office of the Spokesman, 
Washington, DC, September 8, 1995. 
Today's successful meeting in Geneva of the Foreign Ministers of Bosnia, 
Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is an important 
milestone on the road to peace in the former Yugoslavia. As a result of 
intensive mediation by Ambassador Holbrooke and his team--supported by 
our Contact Group partners in the European Union and Russia--the three 
Foreign Ministers have endorsed a set of Agreed Basic Principles that 
will serve as the framework for a political settlement to the conflict 
in Bosnia. The Foreign Ministers of Croatia and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia also have agreed to work actively toward a peaceful solution 
in Eastern Slavonia--the Serb-controlled area of the Republic of 
Croatia, also known as UN Sector East. 
The Agreed Basic Principles commit all three governments to support a 
settlement consistent with the goals  we have long sought in Bosnia. 
Most importantly, for the first time, all three have agreed that Bosnia-
Herzegovina will continue as a single state, with its present borders 
and with continuing international recognition. Consistent with the 
Contact Group plan, under the terms of a settlement all three agree that 
Bosnia-Herzegovina will consist of two entities: the Federation 
established under last year's Washington Agreements and the Serb 
Republic. The 51:49 parameter of the Contact Group's territorial 
proposal will be the basis for a settlement, subject to any adjustments 
that the parties make by mutual agreement. The two entities will have 
the right to establish relationships with neighboring states, but these 
must be consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The parties have pledged to adhere to international 
human rights standards, to ensure freedom of movement and the right of 
displaced persons to return to their homes, and to collaborate on joint 
economic projects that will promote transportation links and 
communication among all of Bosnia's people. These are important 
principles around which we now can move toward intensive negotiations 
for a full peace agreement. 
I want to congratulate the three Foreign Ministers, Secretary of State 
Christopher, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake, Ambassador 
Holbrooke and his team, and our Russian and other European partners for 
today's impressive achievement. Much work remains to be done in 
translating these principles into a final peace agreement. All the 
parties will need to display the same flexibility and statesmanship that 
made today's agreement possible if we are to turn away from war and 
achieve our common goal of a durable peace in the Balkans. 

Secretary Christopher 
Opening statement at a press briefing, Washington, DC, September 8, 
Good afternoon. Today in Geneva, the Foreign Ministers of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia agreed to 
take an important step away from the path of war and toward the path of 
peace. They made a commitment to pursue a political, not a military 
solution to the tragic conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Agreed Basic 
Principles that they have endorsed are consistent with the approach that 
the United States and the international community have been urging for 
over a year. 
Most significantly, each of the parties has accepted the continuation of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single state within its current internationally 
recognized borders. Within that state, the parties have agreed on basic 
principles that will govern their domestic affairs. They have accepted 
for the first time the basic 51:49 territorial parameters set out by the 
Contact Group more than a year ago. 
The parties have agreed to protect human rights throughout Bosnia-
Herzegovina as well as the freedom of movement of all of Bosnia's people 
and the right of displaced people to return to their homes. The parties 
agreed to develop mechanisms and procedures to ensure that all of these 
rights are protected. Of course, today's agreement is just a first step, 
and many difficult issues remain to be resolved over the future days and 
I want to commend Assistant Secretary Holbrooke and his team for the 
determined effort that they have made over the past several weeks which 
today resulted in this important agreement. Let me add that we also owe 
a deep debt of gratitude to Bob Frasure, Joe Kruzel, and Nelson Drew--
the courageous American diplomats who lost their lives in the efforts 
that made this agreement possible. 
After a few days of consultations here in Washington, Assistant 
Secretary Holbrooke and his team will return to the region to resume 
their shuttle among the parties sometime next week. 
Today's agreement demonstrates that when the world confronts intractable 
problems, American leadership is absolutely essential. As I have 
emphasized time and again this year, it is a pure illusion to think that 
America can lead if we are not willing to spend what we must to maintain 
our diplomatic capability around the world. 
That is why yesterday's decision by the Senate Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and State would, if it were 
ultimately enacted, deal a devastating blow to the President's ability 
to sustain American leadership around the world. Funding for 
international affairs was cut by this subcommittee almost 25% from the 
President's requested levels of more than $1 billion. At these levels, 
the Department of State would be forced to cut many additional posts 
around the world, to cut back on vital diplomatic and commercial 
activities, and to drastically reduce its support for United States 
agencies abroad. 
Imagine where we would be today if we did not have diplomatic missions 
in Zagreb, in Belgrade, and also in Sarajevo. 
The actions that this subcommittee has taken are just not responsible. 
You cannot say that you are in favor of American leadership and then set 
out to undermine it in the way that the subcommittee did in the levels 
that they established. I will continue to make the case for adequate 
funding for our diplomatic activities, spurred on by experiences such as 
we have had over the last week which show so dramatically the importance 
of adequate diplomatic engagement and adequate diplomatic facilities 
around the world. 

Agreed Basic Principles 
Text of the Agreed Basic Principles endorsed by members of the Contact 
Group 1 and Foreign Ministers Muhamed Sacirbey of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Mate Granic of Croatia, and Milan Milutinovic of Serbia and 
Montenegro, September 8, 1995. 
1. Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue its legal existence with its 
present borders and continuing international recognition. 
2. Bosnia and Herzegovina will consist of two entities, the Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina as established by the Washington Agreements, 
and the Republica Srpska (RS). 
2.1 The 51:49 parameter of the territorial proposal of the Contact Group 
is the basis for a settlement. This territorial proposal is open for 
adjustment by mutual agreement. 
2.2 Each entity will continue to   exist under its present constitution 
(amended to accommodate these basic principles). 
2.3 Both entities will have the right to establish parallel special 
relationships with neighboring countries, consistent with the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
2.4 The two entities will enter into reciprocal commitments (a) to hold 
complete elections under international auspices; (b) to adopt and adhere 
to normal international human rights standards and obligations, 
including the obligation to allow freedom of movement and enable 
displaced persons to repossess their homes or receive just compensation; 
(c) to engage in binding arbitration to resolve disputes between them. 
3. The entities have agreed in principle to the following: 
3.1 The appointment of a Commission for Displaced Persons authorized to 
enforce (with assistance from international entities) the obligations of 
both entities to enable displaced persons to repossess their homes or 
receive just compensation. 
3.2 The establishment of a Bosnia and Herzegovina Human Rights 
Commission, to enforce the entities' human rights obligations. The two 
entities will bide by the Commission's decisions. 
3.3 The establishment of joint Bosnia and Herzegovina public 
corporations, financed by the two entities, to own and operate 
transportation and other facilities for the benefit of both entities. 
3.4 The appointment of a Commission to Preserve National Monuments. 
3.5 The design and implementation of a system of arbitration for the 
solution of disputes between the two entities. 

The Case for the United States In the United Nations 
Acting Secretary Talbott 
Remarks to the National Assembly on the United States and the United 
Nations, Washington, DC, September 1, 1995 
My thanks to the United Nations Association and the other organizations 
who have joined in sponsoring this Assembly. I am told that the 
representatives of nearly 100 national and community groups are here 
today--ranging from the AFL-CIO and the American Bar Association, to the 
Girl Scouts and the Grey Panthers, to the Sierra Club and the Salvation 
Army, to the U.S. Catholic Conference and the Union of Concerned 
The participation of these and other organizations--everyone here at 
this event--is an encouraging testament to the quantity, quality, and 
diversity of grass-roots backing that the UN has among the American 
As you know, this has been quite an eventful week for UN as well as for 
American diplomats and for NATO military forces in the former 
Yugoslavia. The week began with a murderous Serb mortar attack against 
civilians in Sarajevo on Monday. That outrage demanded an international 
response, which the UN has authorized and NATO has delivered. The 
message to the Bosnian Serbs and to all the parties to this conflict is 
clear and it is simple: Now is the time to stop killing and start 
talking about the terms of a lasting peace. With that message and that 
objective in mind, Assistant Secretary of State Dick Holbrooke and his 
team have made real progress, although much remains to be done.   
Earlier today, we announced that the foreign ministers of Croatia, 
Bosnia, and Serbia have agreed to meet for talks next week in Geneva, 
under the auspices of the Contact Group--the United States, Great 
Britain, France, Germany, and Russia. Others, including UN diplomats and 
representatives of the European Union, will also attend.  
Thus, a week that began with an all-too-familiar act of wanton carnage 
is coming to a close with a development that could augur an all-too-rare 
breakthrough for diplomacy. After four years of brutal war, the United 
States is committed to helping the people of that region face the 
responsibility of peace. One thing is certain: Our diplomatic effort 
will go forward, and we will persist in our pursuit of peace at the 
negotiating table--in Geneva and beyond.  
Whether this process unfolds against a backdrop of continued air-strikes 
or a continued suspension depends on whether the Bosnian Serb leaders 
commit themselves to end the shelling of the UN safe areas, end all 
attacks on representatives of the international community, including 
those representing the UN, and end their strangulation and intimidation 
of Sarajevo. My boss, Warren Christopher, has frequently said that 
diplomacy must often be backed by force. That is the case in the Balkans 
Because of the complexity and delicacy of the moment at which we find 
ourselves, I am afraid that I am the man who cannot stay for dinner. But 
my colleague, George Ward, our Assistant Secretary for International 
Organizations, is here this evening, and, if you promise to feed him 
first, he will be available to join in what I am sure will be a very 
good discussion when coffee is served. 
In my short time with you, I will address the subject of our 
Administration's policy with regard to the UN. But first, I would like 
to put that subject in a broader context.  
We as a nation face some fundamental choices. We are just beginning a 
great national debate. At issue is whether we are prepared to do what it 
takes--and that means spending what it takes--to have a foreign policy 
worthy of our aspirations and our interests as a world leader--indeed, 
as the world leader.  
We are facing these choices and conducting this debate now because  we 
have entered a new era. It began  10 years ago--in 1985--when Mikhail 
Gorbachev took control of the Kremlin. He ushered in a series of reforms 
that he hoped would revitalize the Soviet communist system. As it 
happened, perestroika and glasnost led not just to reform, but to a 
democratic revolution. That revolution helped, in turn, to trigger a 
stunning series of triumphs for democracy around the globe. 
In recent years, we have seen Germans tear down the Berlin Wall, we have 
seen South Africans free Nelson Mandela from prison and elect him their 
President, and we have seen Cambodians cross minefields and defy death 
threats to vote against the Khmer Rouge. Over the past decade, nearly 2 
billion people in some 70 nations on five continents--from Brazil to 
Ghana to Poland to Bangladesh to the Philippines--have moved decisively 
toward democracy and free markets.  
A decade ago, we routinely, unquestioningly spoke of there being three 
worlds: the free world, the communist world, and the Third World. The 
organizing principle of international politics was a global ideological 
struggle: the heirs of Vladimir Lenin versus those of Thomas Jefferson, 
the proponents of the ideas of Karl Marx versus those of Adam Smith.  
Now, to an extent few of us ever expected to see in our lifetimes, there 
is one world--joined in a loose, imperfect, incomplete, but still 
extraordinary consensus in favor of open societies and open markets. 
During this dramatic transformation, America has not been a bystander. 
Far from it. From South America to Eastern Europe to Central Asia to the 
Pacific Rim, our foreign policy has helped nation after nation to emerge 
from totalitarianism--and to keep moving in the right direction. Thanks 
in large part to American leadership, the political and economic 
principles that we have nurtured here in the United States for over 200 
years are now ascendant around the globe. 
An important moral of the end of the Cold War--a story that is still 
unfolding and will be for a long time--is that the United States must 
maintain its position of international leadership. Only if we do that 
can we take advantage of historic opportunities, not just to combat 
threats and enemies, but also to build a world that reflects our ideals 
and promotes our interests--a world that will be more peaceful and 
provide better economic opportunities not only for our generation, but 
for our children's and grandchildren's as well. 
The flip side of that proposition is just as important to recognize 
clearly: If we do not provide international leadership, then there is no 
other country that can or will step in and lead in our place as a 
constructive, positive influence. Make no mistake about that. And make 
no mistake that there are plenty of other forces that will fill the 
vacuum we leave, and they will do so in ways not at all to our liking or 
to our advantage or in keeping with our interests. For instance, thanks 
to American leadership, the enemies of the Middle East peace process--in 
Iran, Iraq, Sudan, and Libya--are now more isolated than ever before. 
But if we let down our guard, the leaders of those rogue states can 
still make trouble by menacing their neighbors, sponsoring terrorism, 
and stockpiling weapons of mass destruction. 
Whether deterring threats or seizing opportunities, the United States 
needs to remain fully engaged in the world. That point should be self-
evident, but unfortunately it is increasingly controversial--or at least 
it is increasingly obscured by other controversies. There is, in our 
country, a resurgence of the view that our vital  interests in some 
sense end at the water's edge. I say "resurgence" because we have heard 
that argument before. In the aftermath of the Cold War, just as after 
other great struggles earlier in our nation's history, there is a 
temptation to draw back into ourselves, to devote more of our attention 
and our resources to fixing our own problems--to let foreign countries 
fend for themselves.  
That temptation, if over-indulged, would turn the American eagle into an 
ostrich. Today's isolationists echo the narrow-visioned naysayers of the 
1920s and 1930s, who rejected the League of Nations, embraced 
protectionism, and were complacent about the rise of Mussolini, Hitler, 
and Stalin; who thought that Lend Lease and the Marshall Plan were 
costly give-aways; who opposed help to the victims of aggression and 
inadvertently endangered our security--chanting all the while the crowd-
pleasing mantra  "America first."   
Part of the problem, no doubt, is that today, as in the 1920s and 1930s, 
we suffer from a collective lack of confidence in our democratic 
institutions. Many Americans think that government spending is virtually 
synonymous with waste and abuse, resulting not so much in public welfare 
as in public debt, not so much in national security as in rising taxes, 
which is to say, personal insecurity. 
In this atmosphere, our foreign policy is especially vulnerable. Why? 
Because the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of Soviet 
communism mean that there is no longer a single, world-class dragon for 
us to slay. It is easier to justify drawing inward and, conversely, 
harder to justify engagement overseas. Well, maybe not really harder, 
but it takes more words than you can fit on a bumper sticker. 
Thus, when Congress returns to debate these issues next week--10 blocks 
from here, on Capitol Hill--the foreign affairs budget of our 
government--your government--will be under a two-pronged attack. It is 
under attack from those who think we can afford to withdraw from that 
very complicated world, and also from those who think we can 
significantly reduce the federal deficit by reducing our spending 
But the fact is, those who would slash foreign spending in the name of 
fiscal responsibility are deluding themselves. The deficit, as we all 
know, began to mushroom out of control in the early 1980s. But the 1980s 
saw no corresponding boom in our international budget. Quite the 
contrary: Over the past decade, the amount of money that the U.S. 
Government spends each year on foreign policy has actually declined 
nearly 40% in real dollars--adjusted for inflation--and is now at its 
lowest level in over half a century. Even if we were to eliminate our 
foreign affairs spending altogether, it would make very little 
difference to the cause of deficit reduction.  
The current international affairs budget is only about 1.3% of total 
federal spending. That tiny fraction pays for all our embassies and 
diplomats overseas, our foreign aid and economic assistance programs, 
and our participation in international organizations. It pays for our 
support of multinational peacekeeping operations, many of our arms 
control initiatives, and our overseas public information services. We 
have long since cut most of the fat out of our foreign affairs budget, 
and we are now in danger of cutting into muscle and bone and vital 
Let me put it as simply and bluntly as I can: Every single foreign 
policy initiative and program we have underway in the world today--from 
our support of new democracies and market economies in the former Soviet 
Union and Central Europe, to our support for the Middle East peace 
process, to our fight against international crime and narcotics 
trafficking, to the battle against further genocide and famine in 
Africa, to our commitment to assure the safe dismantlement of nuclear 
weapons that have been aimed at our cities--every single one of those 
efforts and countless more are in dire jeopardy. This is the danger 
facing us now: not next year or next month--but next week, when the 
Congress returns and misguided members pick up the meat cleaver with 
which they are hacking away at the American people's ability to defend 
and advance their national security interests. 
Let me now turn to the United Nations. It, too, is on the chopping 
block--not just our position in the UN, but the UN itself.  
Throughout the Cold War, our nation's leaders--Republicans and Democrats 
alike, in both the executive and legislative branches--viewed the UN as 
the key instrument for advancing U.S. interests. Whether it was fighting 
communist aggression in Korea or smallpox in Africa, we turned to the UN 
to help us achieve our goals and further the cause of freedom.  
But today, the bipartisan consensus in support of the UN has frayed 
badly. The UN is "the longtime nemesis of millions of Americans," says 
one leader on Capitol Hill. It is "a totally incompetent instrument 
anyplace that matters," says another. Some in Congress would all but 
eliminate U.S. funding for UN operations, meaning that the United States 
Government would be forced to default on its fundamental treaty 
obligations under the UN Charter. If we further reduce our payments to 
the UN, others will surely follow, undermining the financial viability 
of the UN. If Congress pulls the plug on basic UN activities such as 
conflict resolution, as some of its members wish, then the UN might very 
quickly join the League of Nations on the ashheap of history.  
I should say a word about UN peacekeeping, since that is the area  where 
UN activities and costs have increased most dramatically in recent 
years, and where the UN has come under the heaviest criticism from its 
opponents on Capitol Hill. Since the end of the Cold War, the United 
Nations has taken on peacekeeping assignments that no nation would 
undertake alone--and conducted most of them admirably. It has 
demonstrated a unique ability to bolster the confidence of parties who 
have had enough of war, but who are fearful of what might happen if they 
lay down their arms. 
--  In El Salvador, where America spent more than $4 billion in economic 
and military aid during the 1980s, the UN brokered an end to the civil 
war, disarmed and reintegrated the rebel forces into society, monitored 
human rights and elections, and oversaw the creation of a new civilian 
--  In Cambodia, the UN has succeeded in clearing mines, repatriating 
refugees, and organizing elections,  thus making an astonishing 
transition to democracy possible. 
--  In Cyprus, UN troops have played an essential role in keeping the 
peace between Greece and Turkey--two NATO allies that are also regional 
--  In Haiti, the UN, under the exemplary on-the-scene leadership of a 
splendid international public servant,  Lakhdar Brahimi, is quietly, 
persistently, and effectively helping the people and the government 
restore security and democracy. 
--  Even in Somalia, which is another one of those place names that has 
become a synonym for failure, the UN went a long way toward fulfilling 
its humanitarian mandate; its operations have saved hundreds of 
thousands of lives.  
As then-Secretary of State James Baker put it when he testified in 
Congress in 1992, "UN peacekeeping is a pretty good buy and we ought to 
recognize that . . .  . We spent trillions of dollars to win the Cold 
War and we should be willing to spend millions of dollars  to secure the 
peace."  My own boss, Secretary Christopher has said much the same 
thing--and done so more recently--but I thought I would quote his 
predecessor here to underscore that support for UN peacekeeping is a 
tenet of American foreign policy that ought to enjoy bipartisan backing. 
UN peacekeeping, like the United Nations as a whole, is a good bargain 
for the United States. The U.S. share of UN peacekeeping costs us an 
amount equal to less than half of one percent of our defense budget. The 
per capita price to Americans, for the entire UN system--from blue 
helmets for peacekeepers to polio vaccines for babies, is less than $7 
per year--about the price of a ticket to our nation's most popular 
movie, which currently is something called Mortal Kombat.  
Some American critics of the United Nations have focused not so much on 
cost, but on concerns about the effectiveness of UN operations, 
decision-making, and management. In the current political environment, 
the only target that is juicier for rhetorical and budgetary attack than 
big government is world government. The United Nations is, of course, no 
such thing, but it does represent an attempt--welcome, admirable, and 
promising--to concert the energies of sovereign states on a variety of 
common causes, and as such it is vulnerable to demagoguery, particularly 
these days. 
We all know that it is easy to caricature the United Nations 
bureaucracy. In truth, the UN has sometimes resembled a corporation with 
185 members of the board. But throughout its history, the UN's universal 
membership has also been its greatest asset--albeit one that requires 
adroit management. 
But in assessing the future potential of the UN, we should keep in mind 
the handicaps under which it worked, and often worked quite well, for 
most of its 50-year history. The Cold War   divided not just the world, 
but the Security Council. Now, the old ideological and political 
polarization has either narrowed or vanished completely. The UN still 
does not work as well as it should, but UN-member nations share a 
renewed and intensified interest in fixing it.  
The Clinton Administration came to Washington with a vision of a United 
Nations that makes a difference in the lives of ordinary people around 
the world. That is why Vice President Gore went to Cairo for the 
Conference on Population and Development that began on Labor Day last 
year; that is why the Vice President and First Lady went to the Social 
Summit in Copenhagen this March; that is why Under Secretary of State 
Tim Wirth went to the Climate Change Conference in Berlin in April; that 
is why President Clinton made reform of UN economic and social agencies 
a top priority at the G-7 Conference in Halifax in June; and that is why 
Madeleine Albright will go straight from her daughter's wedding tomorrow 
to join the First Lady and Health and Human Services Secretary Donna 
Shalala for the Fourth World Women's Conference in Beijing. 
In our determination to make sure  that American taxpayers' dollars are 
better spent at the UN, we have worked to streamline the bureaucracy and 
empower those who are working at the grassroots and on the front lines. 
Under Secretaries General Karl Paschke and Joseph Connor have embarked 
on an aggressive campaign to change the entire management culture of the 
UN and to crack down on waste, fraud, and abuse. We are confident that 
they will get the job done. At least, they will get it done if we stay 
involved ourselves--with our funds and our leadership. 
But in spite of these efforts, and the relatively low cost of the UN as 
a whole, some American critics of the UN still feel that the United 
States is somehow being played for a sucker; that we are turned to 
constantly for help by those who are unwilling to pay their own way or 
to take their own fair share of risks. Such feelings are understandable, 
and sometimes play well at home. But America is not just another 
country. We are a global power with global interests, and if we do not 
lead,  we cannot expect that others will. Our position in the world may, 
to some, be grounds for complaint, but to most Americans, it is grounds 
for pride and a sense of security.  
So by all means let's get on with the great debate. But let its starting 
point be a shared recognition of our nation's three greatest strengths:  
First, the strength and global appeal of our democratic values and 
Second, the strength of our economy, which depends on global peace and 
stability--on open societies and open markets; and  
Third, the strength of our military power.  
In short, we have the heart, the brains, the wallet, and the muscle to 
exercise international leadership and to do so on behalf of our own 
interests as well as those of humanity as a whole.  Thank you.  

Background Notes: Portugal 
Official Name: Republic of Portugal 


Area: 94,276 sq. km. (36,390 sq. mi.), including the Azores and Madeira 
Islands; about the size of Indiana. 
Cities: Capital--Lisbon (pop. 1.9 mil-lion). Other major city--Oporto 
(1.7 million).  
Terrain: Mountainous in the north; rolling plains central south.  
Climate: Maritime temperate.  

Nationality: Noun and adjective--Portuguese (sing. and pl.).  
Population:  9.8 million. 
Annual growth rate:  0.06%.  
Ethnic groups: Homogeneous Mediterranean stock with small black African 
Religion: Roman Catholic 97%.  
Language: Portuguese.  
Education: Years compulsory--nine. Attendance--60%. Literacy--87%. 
Health:  Infant mortality rate-- 
10/1,000. Life expectancy--75 yrs.  
Work force (4.6 million): Government, commerce, and services--55%. 
Industry--33%. Agriculture--12%.  

Type: Parliamentary democracy. Constitution: Effective April 25, 1976; 
revised October 30, 1982, and June 1, 1989. 
Branches: Executive--president (chief of state), Council of State 
(presidential advisory body), prime minister (head of government), 
Council of Ministers. Legislative--unicameral Assembly of the Republic 
(between 230 and 235 deputies). Judicial--Supreme Court, district 
courts, appeals courts, Constitutional Tribunal.  
Major political parties: Social Democratic Party, Socialist Party, 
Portuguese Communist Party, Popular Party (formerly Social Democratic 
Suffrage: Universal at age 18. 
Subdivisions: 18 districts, two autonomous regions, and one dependency. 

GDP (1994): $88 billion.  
Annual  growth rate (1994): 1.1%. 
Per capita GDP (1994): $8,925. 
Natural resources: Fish, cork, tungsten, iron, copper, tin, and uranium 
Agriculture (5% of GDP): Forestry, fisheries.  
Industry (34% of GDP): Types--textiles, clothing, footwear, 
construction, food, beverages, tobacco. 
Services (61% of GDP): Commerce, government, housing, banking, and 
Trade (1994): Exports--$17.5 billion: clothing, footwear, electrical 
machinery and appliances, automobiles. Imports--$24 billion: electrical 
and non-electrical machinery, automobiles, fuel, appliances. Major 
partners--European Union, U.S., European Free Trade Association (EFTA). 
Official exchange rate (August 1995):  
U.S. $1 = 150 escudos. 

The United States encourages a stable and democratic Portugal that is 
closely associated with the industrial democracies of Western Europe and 
NATO; it has supported Portugal's successful entry into the West 
European economic and defense mainstream. Portugal's commitment to 
democratic values is demonstrated by the country's transition from 
authoritarian rule to constitutional democracy following a nearly 
bloodless 1974 coup and its excellent human rights record.  
Bilateral ties date from the earliest years of the United States. On 
February 21, 1791, President George Washington opened formal diplomatic 
relations, naming Col. David Humphreys as U.S. minister. Portugal's 
history of looking toward the Atlantic rather than continental Europe 
and the U.S. position as an Atlantic power have fostered close contact 
between the two nations. Emigration and sizable Portuguese communities 
in the United States contribute to a strong cultural bond. 
The U.S. and Portugal share a mutually beneficial economic relationship, 
with bilateral trade of $1.8 billion in 1994. While total Portuguese 
trade has increased dramatically over the last 10 years, the U.S. 
percentage of it--both exports and imports--has declined. The Portuguese 
Government is seeking to increase exports of textiles and footwear to 
the United States and is encouraging greater bilateral investment. 
U.S.-Portuguese defense cooperation continues to be excellent. The 
Agreement on Cooperation and Defense, signed June 1, 1995, provides for 
continued U.S. access to the Lajes Air Base in the Azores as well as 
cooperation in non-military endeavors. The air base provides valuable 
service, as illustrated most recently by Operation Desert Storm and by 
Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. The United States and other NATO 
allies provide equipment and training to the Portuguese military. 
From 1975 through 1992, U.S. economic assistance to Portugal managed by 
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was $1.3 billion, 
including refugee and disaster assistance, agriculture, schools and 
rural education, health, low-income housing and housing guaranties, 
basic sanitation, consultants and training, balance-of-payments loans, 
PL 480 loans, and Economic Support Funds (ESF) cash transfers. The 
economically underdeveloped Azores Islands group was a major recipient 
of targeted USAID assistance. All forms of economic assistance ended by 
1993; Portugal continues to participate in U.S. military training 
Principal U.S. Embassy Officials 
Ambassador--Elizabeth Frawley Bagley 
Deputy Chief of Mission--Sharon Wilkinson 
Political Affairs--Julien LeBourgeois 
Economic Affairs--Donald Cooke 
Consular Affairs--David Bocskor 
Administrative Affairs--Raymond Boneski 
Public Affairs--Kathleen Brion 
Commercial Affairs--Daniel Thompson 
Agricultural Affairs--Franklin Lee 
Defense and Air Attache--Col. David Bell 
Army Attache--Lt. Col. Rudolph Garcia 
Navy Attache--Capt. James Ponzo 
Office of Defense Cooperation--Col. Jesse Perez 
Consul, Ponta Delgada--Luis Espada-Platet 
The U.S. embassy is at Avenida Forcas Armadas, Lisbon 1600 (tel. 
7266600). The Ponta Delgada consulate is at Avenida Infante D. Henrique, 
Ponta Delgada, Sao Miguel, Azores 9502 (tel. 22216). The consular agent 
in Funchal, Madeira is Antonio Drummond Borges (tel. 47429). 

Portugal's economy is based on traditional industries such as textiles, 
clothing, footwear, cork and wood products, beverages (wine), porcelain 
and earthenware, and glass and glassware. Portugal will strengthen its 
position in the automobile industry in 1995 when the multibillion-dollar 
AutoEuropa project begins producing the Ford "Galaxy" and Volkswagen 
"Sharan" vans at a state-of-the-art plant in Setubal for export to 
European markets. The country is also a major European tourist 
destination: In 1994, more than 21 million tourists arrived in Portugal 
from Spain, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and the United States. 
Portugal traditionally runs a merchandise trade deficit, which it 
finances through net receipts from tourism, remittances from Portuguese 
workers abroad, and net transfers from the European Union (EU). Net EU 
transfers in 1995 are expected to be $2.8 billion, or 3% of GDP. During 
1989-93, its current account was broadly in balance and foreign direct 
investment averaged close to $2 billion per year. 
The country's entry into the EC--now the EU--in 1986 and the 
accompanying obligations to open its markets and compete freely with its 
EU partners stimulated economic reforms and continue to influence 
economic policy and business strategy. 
Portugal's privatization program has reduced the state presence in the 
economy and yielded substantial revenues to the government. It is the 
third-largest privatizer in the OECD, after the United Kingdom and New 
Zealand. The first phase of privatization--"de-nationalization" of the 
banking and insurance sector--is virtually complete. The state presence 
is now concentrated in oil refining, shipbuilding, steel, cement, basic 
chemical products, and public utilities such as telecommunications and 
energy. The second phase of privatization will focus on parastatals in 
many of these areas. 
Unemployment has become a greater problem in recent years. The 1993 
recession and deepening structural change in agriculture and industry 
caused unemployment to increase from 4.1% in 1992 to 6.8% in 1994. This 
is still low compared to the EU average of 10.8% and is expected to come 
down as the economy strengthens in 1995. Nevertheless, the concern 
remains that unemployment may settle at a higher rate in the coming 
years as economic change and international competition eliminate lower-
skilled jobs. 
Real wages are flexible--contractual wages have declined in recent years 
in both nominal and real terms--but high social costs and severance make 
labor resemble a fixed rather than a variable cost in many instances, 
slowing the recovery in employment. 

Portugal's April 25, 1976, constitution reflected the country's 1974-76 
move from authoritarian rule to provisional military government to a 
parliamentary democracy with some initial communist and left-wing 
influence. The 1976 constitution, which defined Portugal as a "Republic 
. . . engaged in the formation of a classless society," was revised in 
1982 and  in 1989. 
The 1982 revision placed the military under strict civilian control, 
trimmed the powers of the president, and abolished the Revolutionary 
Council (a non-elected committee with legislative veto powers). The 1989 
revision eliminated much of  the remaining Marxist rhetoric of the 
original document, abolished the communist-inspired "agrarian reform," 
and laid the groundwork for further privatization of nationalized firms 
and the government-owned communications media. 
The constitution provides for progressive administrative 
decentralization and calls for future reorganization on a regional 
basis. The Azores and Madeira Islands have constitutionally mandated 
autonomous status: A regional autonomy statute promulgated in 1980 
established the Government of the Autonomous Region of the Azores, and 
the Government of the Autonomous Region of Madeira operates under a 
provisional autonomy statute in effect since 1976. Apart from the Azores 
and Madeira, the country is divided into 18 districts, each headed by a 
governor appointed by the Minister of Internal Administration. Macau--a 
dependency which will revert to Chinese sovereignty in 1999--is headed 
by a presidentially nominated governor general. 
The four main organs of the national government are the presidency, the 
prime minister and Council of Ministers (the government), the Assembly 
of the Republic (parliament), and the courts. 
The president, elected to a five-year term by direct, universal 
suffrage, is also commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Presidential 
powers include appointing the prime minister and Council of Ministers 
(in which the president must be guided by the assembly election 
results), dismissing the prime minister, dissolving the assembly to call 
early elections, vetoing legislation (which may be overridden by the 
assembly), and declaring states of war or siege. 
The Council of State, an advisory body to the president, is composed of 
the incumbents of six senior civilian offices, any former presidents 
elected under the 1976 constitution, five members chosen by the 
assembly, and five chosen by the president himself. 
The government is headed by the presidentially appointed prime minister, 
who names the Council of Ministers. A new government is required to 
define the broad outline of its policy in a program and present it to 
the assembly for a mandatory period of debate. Failure of the assembly 
to reject the program by a majority of deputies confirms the government 
in office. 
The Assembly of the Republic is a unicameral body composed of up to 235 
deputies. Elected by universal suffrage according to a system of 
proportional representation, deputies serve terms of office of four 
years, unless the president dissolves the assembly and calls for new 
The national Supreme Court is the court of last appeal. Military, 
administrative, and fiscal courts are designated as separate court 
categories. A nine-member Constitutional Tribunal reviews the 
constitutionality of legislation. 
Current Administration 
The most recent presidential elections were held in January 1991. Mario 
Soares of the Socialist Party--first elected President in 1986--was re-
elected in a landslide victory, garnering a full 70% of the popular 
vote. The October 1991 general election produced a victory for Anibal 
Cavaco Silva's Social Democratic Party, which received just over 50% of 
the popular vote. 
Prime Minister Cavaco Silva--now in his second four-year term--has been 
committed to privatizing and modernizing the economy. His government and 
the Socialist Party have cooperated over the years to encourage 
privatization of public sector enterprise. The Cavaco Silva government 
has implemented economic and social reforms designed to help Portugal 
compete with other European nations.  
General elections are scheduled for October 1995 and presidential 
elections for February 1996. 
Principal Government Officials 
President of the Portuguese Republic--Mario Soares  
Prime Minister--Anibal Cavaco Silva 
Ambassador to the United States--Fernando Antonio Andresen Guimares 
Portugal maintains an embassy in the United States at 2125 Kalorama Road 
NW, Washington, DC 20008 (tel. 202-328-8610); consulates general in New 
York City, Boston, and San Francisco; consulates in Providence, RI; 
Newark, NJ; and New Bedford, MA; and honorary consulates in Honolulu, 
Los Angeles, Houston, New Orleans, Chicago, Philadelphia, Miami, Puerto 
Rico, and Waterbury, CT. The Portuguese National Tourist Office in the 
United States is located at 548 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10036 (tel: 
Travel  and Business Information 
The U.S. Department of State's Consular Information Program provides 
Travel Warnings and Consular Information Sheets. Travel Warnings are 
issued when the Department of State recommends that Americans avoid 
travel to a certain country. Consular Information Sheets exist for all 
countries and include information on immigration practices, currency 
regulations, health conditions, areas of instability, crime and security 
information, political disturbances, and the addresses of the U.S. 
embassies and consulates in the subject country. They can be obtained by 
telephone at (202) 647-5225 or by fax at (202) 647-3000.  To access the 
Consular Affairs Bulletin Board by computer, dial (202) 647-9225, via a 
modem with standard settings. Bureau of Consular Affairs' publications 
on obtaining passports and planning a safe trip abroad are available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, DC 20402 (202) 783-3238. 
Emergency information concerning  Americans traveling abroad may be 
obtained from the Office of Overseas Citizens Services at (202) 647-
While planning a trip, travelers can check the latest information on 
health requirements and conditions with the U.S. Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention in Atlanta, Georgia. A hotline at (404) 332-4559 
provides telephonic or fax information on the most recent health 
advisories, immunization recommendations or requirements, and advice on 
food and drinking water safety for regions and countries. A booklet 
entitled Health Information for International Travel (HHS publication 
number CDC-94-8280, price $7.00) is available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402, tel. 
(202) 512-1800. 
Information on travel conditions, visa requirements, currency and 
customs regulations, legal holidays, and other items of interest to 
travelers also may be obtained before your departure from a country's 
embassy and/or consulates in the U.S. (for this country, see "Principal 
Government Officials" listing in this publication). 
Upon their arrival in a country, U.S. citizens are encouraged to 
register with the U.S. embassy (see "Principal U.S. Embassy Officials" 
listing in this publication). Such information might assist family 
members in making contact en route in case of an emergency. 
Further Electronic Information: 
Consular Affairs Bulletin Board (CABB). Available by modem, the CABB 
provides Consular Information Sheets, Travel Warnings, and helpful 
information for travelers. Access at (202) 647-9225 is free of charge to 
anyone with a personal computer, modem, telecommunications software, and 
telephone line. 
Department of State Foreign Affairs Network. Available on the Internet, 
DOSFAN provides timely, global access to official U.S. foreign policy 
information. Updated daily, DOSFAN includes Background Notes; Dispatch, 
the official weekly magazine of U.S. foreign policy; daily press 
briefings; directories of key officers of foreign service posts; etc. 
DOSFAN is accessible three ways on the Internet: 
URL:  gopher:// 
U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-ROM (USFAC). Published on a quarterly basis 
by the U.S. Department of State, USFAC archives information on the 
Department of State Foreign Affairs Network, and includes an array of 
official foreign policy information from 1990 to the present. Priced at 
$80 ($100 foreign), one-year subscriptions include four discs (MSDOS and 
Macintosh compatible) and are available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 37194, Pittsburgh, 
PA 15250-7954. To order, call (202) 512-1800 or fax (202) 512-2250. 
Federal Bulletin Board (BBS). A broad range of foreign policy 
information also is carried on the BBS, operated by the U.S. Government 
Printing Office (GPO). By modem, dial (202) 512-1387. For general BBS 
information, call (202) 512-1530. 
National Trade Data Bank (NTDB). Operated by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, the NTDB contains a wealth of trade-related information, 
including Country Commercial Guides. It is available on the Internet 
(gopher. and on CD-ROM. Call the NTDB Help-Line at (202) 
482-1986 for more information. 

Chemical Weapons  
Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, 
stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction, with 
annexes. Done at Paris Jan. 13, 1993. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 103-21(1). 
Ratifications: Denmark, July 13, 1995; Peru, July 20, 1995. 
Convention on protection of children and cooperation in respect of 
intercountry adoption.  Done at The Hague May 29, 1993. Entered into 
force May 1, 1995(4). 
Signatures: Luxembourg, June 6, 1995; Poland, June 12, 1995. 
Ratifications: Poland, June 12, 1995. 
Convention on the rights of the child. Done at New York Nov. 20,1989. 
Entered into force Sept. 2, 1990(4.) 
Accessions: Botswana, Mar. 14, 1995; Solomon Islands, Apr. 10, 1995; 
Palau, Aug. 4, 1995. 
Ratifications: Qatar, Apr. 3, 1995; Turkey, Apr. 4, 1995; South Africa, 
June 16, 1995. 
Berne convention for the protection of literary and artistic works of 
Sept. 9, 1886, as revised. Done at Paris July 24, 1971, amended in 1979. 
Entered into force Mar. 1, 1989 for the U.S. 
Accessions: Moldova, Aug. 1, 1995(2); Ukraine, July 25, 1995(3). 
Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. 
Adopted by the UN General Assembly at Paris Dec. 9, 1948.  Entered into 
force Jan. 12, 1951; for the U.S. Feb. 23, 1989. 
Accession: Singapore, Aug. 18, 1995. 
Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations. Done at Washington June 19, 
1970. Entered into force Jan. 24, 1978. TIAS 8733; 28 UST 7645. 
Accession: Lesotho, July 21, 1995. 
Strasbourg agreement concerning the international patent classification. 
Done at Strasbourg Mar. 24, 1971. Entered into force Oct. 7, 1975.  TIAS 
8140; 26 UST 1793. 
Accession: Malawi, July 24, 1995. 
Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of Mar. 
20, 1883, as revised.  Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967.  Entered into 
force Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S. Sept. 5, 1970; except for Articles 1-
12 which entered into force May 19, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1973. 
TIAS 6923, 7727; 21 UST 1583, 24 UST 2140. 
Accession: Costa Rica, July 28, 1995. 
Nice agreement concerning the international classification of goods and 
services for purposes of the registration of marks of June 15, 1957, as 
revised. Done at Geneva May 13, 1977.  Entered into force Feb. 6, 1979; 
for the U.S. Feb. 29, 1984. 
Accession: Malawi, July 24, 1995. 
Convention on the safety of the United Nations and associated personnel. 
Done at New York Dec. 9, 1994(1). 
Ratification: Norway, July 3, 1995. 
Weapons, Conventional 
Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain 
conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or 
to have indiscriminate effects, with annexed protocols. Adopted at 
Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983. 
Protocol on non-detectable fragments (Protocol I) to the convention on 
prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons 
which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have 
indiscriminate effects. Adopted at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into 
force Dec. 2, 1983. 
Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby-
traps, and other devices (Protocol II) to the convention on prohibitions 
or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be 
deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. 
Adopted at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983. 
Accession: Malta, June 26, 1995. 
Enters into force for the U.S.:  Sept. 24, 1995. 
Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of incendiary 
weapons (Protocol III) to the convention on prohibitions or restrictions 
on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be 
excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. Adopted at 
Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983(4). 
Accession: Malta, June 26, 1995. 
Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against 
women. Adopted by the UN General Assembly Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into 
force Sept. 3, 1981(4). [Senate] Ex. R, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 
Accession: Azerbaijan, July 10, 1995. 
Agreement amending the air transport services agreement of Oct. 22, 
1985, as amended and extended. Effected by exchange of notes at Buenos 
Aires Apr. 11 and July 3, 1995. Entered into force July 3, 1995. 
Agreement for cooperation in the Global Learning and Observations to 
Benefit the Environment (GLOBE) program, with appendices. Signed at 
Buenos Aires June 28, 1995. Entered into force June 28, 1995. 
Postal money order agreement.  Signed at Yerevan and Washington June 28 
and Aug. 3, 1995.  Entered into force Sept. 1, 1995. 
Agreement amending the air services agreement of Mar. 16, 1989. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Vienna June 14, 1995.  Entered into force Aug. 
1, 1995. 
Memorandum of understanding concerning counterterrorism research and 
development, with annex. Signed at Washington and Ottawa June 12 and 23, 
1995.  Entered into force June 23, 1995. 
Dominican Republic 
Postal money order agreement.  Signed at Washington and Santo Domingo 
Aug. 6 and 14, 1995.  Entered into force Sept. 1, 1995. 
Grant agreement for private sector import program. Signed at Cairo Aug. 
12, 1995.  Entered into force Aug. 12, 1995. 
Agreement extending the annex to the air transport agreement of July 12, 
1989, as extended.  Effected by exchange of notes at Washington July 6 
and 12, 1995.  Entered into force July 12, 1995. 
Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 13, 1993, concerning the 
provision to the Republic of Kazakstan of material and services for the 
establishment of a government-to-government communications link. Signed 
at Almaty June 30, 1995. Entered into force June 30, 1995. 
Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 13, 1993, concerning the 
provision of material, services, and related training to the Republic of 
Kazakstan in connection with the destruction of silo launchers of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles and associated equipment and 
components. Signed at Almaty July 1, 1995. Entered into force July 1, 
Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 13, 1993, related to the 
establishment of export control systems to prevent the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. Signed at Almaty June 30, 1995. Entered 
into force June 30, 1995. 
Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 13, 1993, concerning control, 
accounting, and physical protection of nuclear material to promote the 
prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation.  Signed at Almaty June 30, 
1995.  Entered into force June 30, 1995. 
Agreement amending and extending the air transport services agreement of 
Dec. 16, 1986. Effected by exchange of notes at Lima June 7 and July 3, 
1995. Entered into force July 3, 1995. 
Memorandum of understanding on cooperation relating to the Space 
Biomedical Center for Training and Research in the Russian Federation. 
Signed at Moscow June 30, 1995. Entered into force June 30, 1995. 
Agreement to cooperate on national protection, control, and accounting 
of nuclear materials.  Signed at Moscow June 30, 1995.  Entered into 
force June 30, 1995. 
Agreement for cooperation in enhancing the safety of Russian nuclear 
fuel cycle facilities and research reactors. Signed at Moscow June 30, 
1995. Entered into force June 30, 1995. 
Interim agreement for the conduct of activities leading to Russian 
partnership in the detailed design, development, operation, and 
utilization of the permanently manned civil space station.  Signed at 
Washington June 23, 1994. Entered into force June 30, 1995. 
Slovak Republic  
Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official 
government employees.  Effected by exchange of notes at Bratislava Apr. 
8, 1994, Feb. 17 and July 12, 1995. Entered into force July 12, 1995. 
Agreement for cooperation in the Global Learning and Observations to 
Benefit the Environment (GLOBE) Program, with appendices. Signed at 
Washington July 27, 1995. Entered into force July 27, 1995. 
Agreement concerning cooperation in the elimination of infrastructure 
for weapons of mass destruction through provision to Ukraine of 
material, services, and related training. Signed at Kiev June 27, 1995. 
Entered into force June 27, 1995. 
Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 5, 1993, as amended, concerning 
the provision of material, services, and related training to Ukraine in 
connection with the elimination of strategic nuclear arms. Signed at 
Kiev June 27, 1995. Entered into force June 27, 1995. 
Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 5, 1993, as amended, concerning 
the provision of assistance to Ukraine related to the establishment of 
an export control system to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction from Ukraine.  Signed at Kiev June 27, 1995.  Entered into 
force June 27, 1995. 
Agreement amending the Mar. 21, 1994 agreement concerning the conversion 
of enterprises of the military-industrial complex.  Signed at Kiev June 
27, 1995.  Entered into force June 27, 1995. 
Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 18, 1993, as amended, 
concerning development of state systems of control, accounting, and 
physical protection of nuclear materials to promote the prevention of 
nuclear weapons proliferation from Ukraine. Signed at Kiev June 27, 
1995. Entered into force June 27, 1995. 
1 Not in force.  
2 With statement.  
3 With declaration.  
4 Not in force for the U.S. 


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