U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 34, AUGUST 21, 1995
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1. FY 1996 Refugee Admissions Program -- Acting Secretary Tarnoff 
2. UN Security Council Adopts Resolution 1009 on Croatia -- Madeleine K. 
Albright, UNSC Resolution 
3. Bosnia-Herzegovina Arms Embargo -- President Clinton
4. UN Security Council Adopts Resolution 1010 on Bosnian Serbs -- 
Madeleine K. Albright, UNSC Resolution
5. U.S. Policy Toward Iraq -- Madeleine K. Albright 
6. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty -- President Clinton  
7. Taiwan and the United Nations -- Kent Wiedemann  
8. Treaty Actions 




ARTICLE 1:

FY 1996 Refugee Admissions Program
Acting Secretary Tarnoff
Statement before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Washington, DC, 
August 1, 1995

I appreciate this opportunity to reaffirm the President's deep 
commitment to the United States refugee program as well as to outline 
for the committee and to present to you the President's specific 
proposal for the Fiscal Year 1996 refugee admissions program.

Perhaps more than at any time since 1980--when the Refugee Act was 
enacted--the question of to whom and in what numbers this country should 
offer permanent resettlement is generating considerable national 
interest. There are, no doubt, many reasons for the renewal of this 
debate, but the changed circumstances of global migration in the post-
Cold War period and its impact on the United States is one of the most 
significant. We are not alone. Many other countries are wrestling with 
the same issues. But it is clear that we, the United States, must 
provide the necessary leadership within the international community to 
ensure that refugee resettlement remains available to those for whom 
there is no other viable alternative.

Refugee resettlement embodies who we are and what we stand for as a 
nation. Throughout our history, flight from tyranny has caused millions 
of people to seek refuge in our land of freedom. In a decade dominated 
by ethnic tensions, ethnic cleansing, and ethnically inspired violence 
and killing, it is essential that America remain an example of tolerance 
and compassion. Given the numerous volatile situations in the world 
today, we believe that the United States must retain maximum flexibility 
to offer resettlement opportunities, when needed, and to be in a 
position to encourage other countries to accept their international 
responsibilities. It is for this reason that we oppose any legislated 
numerical cap on annual refugee admissions.

Having said this, let me emphasize that we concur that the use of 
resettlement as a durable solution should evolve to match changing 
requirements. Since the end of World War II, refugees resettled in the 
United States have--in the main--been persons fleeing communism. In most 
cases, communism became synonymous with persecution. While we continue 
to admit members of certain groups to whom commitments were made before 
the demise of most communist states, we are in a period of transition 
which is resulting in adjustments of worldwide admissions numbers over 
time.

We will also use our position to ensure that resettlement needs are 
viewed as a shared international responsibility. Recognizing the changed 
circumstances in the world, the Administration--with our NGO partners--
has begun to revise criteria for the United States refugee admissions 
program.

This fiscal year, new priorities were established to determine who among 
the world's refugees would be given primary consideration for United 
States resettlement. Without sacrificing our ability to act 
unilaterally, these new priorities allow for far greater coordination 
with the efforts of the international community and other resettlement 
countries. Working with the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees--UNHCR, we are moving away from a Cold War 
framework and toward a system with greater emphasis on refugees 
recognized as having both a well-founded fear of persecution and a need 
for third-country resettlement. Where necessary, refugee admissions 
resources can be used as an instrument to ensure the preservation of the 
practice of first asylum.

Turning to the specifics of the admissions program for FY 1996, a copy 
of which I believe the committee has received, the President proposes an 
overall refugee admissions ceiling of 90,000. This represents an 18% 
decrease from the current fiscal year ceiling of 110,000.

Much of the reduction will result from a decline in the need for 
admissions numbers in the East Asia region. The 25,000 numbers proposed 
for this region will allow us to resettle the last group of Vietnamese 
re-education camp prisoners and Highlanders from Laos, to whom we have 
firm commitments, as well as a small number of non-Indochinese refugees. 
In addition, in an effort to accelerate voluntary repatriation from 
first asylum camps in Southeast Asia and ensure the successful 
conclusion of the Comprehensive Plan of Action--CPA, we are discussing 
with our CPA partners a proposal to provide opportunities for 
resettlement interviews upon return to Vietnam to those Vietnamese now 
in camps who agree to return to their homes voluntarily. The exact 
details of this proposal would be determined, in part, as a result of 
consultations with those governments whose cooperation would be required 
for its successful implementation.

In the former Soviet Union, religious minorities with close family ties 
in the United States will continue to receive significant refugee 
admissions slots under the European ceiling of 45,000. Unfortunately, 
the situation of Bosnian refugees not only continues unresolved in many 
locations but may even be deteriorating. We are working closely with 
UNHCR and in FY 1996 we will admit at least 15,000 Bosnians--almost 
double the number expected to arrive during FY 1995. We will continue to 
monitor events in Bosnia, and will be prepared to consult with Congress 
if further adjustments appear necessary.

In Africa, we have embarked on a new approach to refugee processing to 
ensure we take in those people truly in need of resettlement. This 
effort involves not only the U.S. Government and U.S. Government-funded 
non-governmental organizations--NGOs, but also many UNHCR offices whose 
primary focus is on basic humanitarian assistance. This year, traveling 
teams of voluntary agency and Immigration and Naturalization Service 
staff members will interview African refugees in more than double the 
number of first-asylum countries traditionally visited for this purpose. 
To their credit, most African countries honor first-asylum and refugee 
protection obligations. With the financial assistance of the 
international community, many diverse groups of African refugees--
Mozambicans in Malawi, Ethiopians in the Sudan, Somalis in Kenya--have 
been allowed to remain in neighboring countries until repatriation was 
possible. Third-country resettlement opportunities, therefore, are 
needed for relatively few cases in each of these locations. The 
President's proposed 7,000 African admissions will be available for 
Sudanese, Somalis, Zairians, Liberians, and numerous other 
nationalities.

The U.S.-Cuban Migration Agreement calls for the safe, orderly, and 
legal admission of 20,000 Cubans annually. One component of this effort 
involves the admission of persons approved in our in-country refugee 
admissions program. Individuals who have been jailed or harassed for 
their political or religious beliefs or activities are examples of those 
included in this program. Given the prevalence of democratically elected 
governments in this hemisphere, Cubans are the only nationality 
designated for refugee processing and 6,000 numbers are recommended for 
their use.

For the Near East/South Asia region we are proposing 4,000 numbers for 
FY 1996. Resettlement in the U.S. for refugees from this region is 
closely coordinated with UNHCR. Many referrals for United States 
resettlement are persons who fled Iraq but cannot remain in first asylum 
countries such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Turkey, or Syria. Religious 
minorities from Iran--particularly Baha'is and Jews-- also require 
third-country resettlement. As in the Africa program, we are working 
closely with UNHCR to bring United States processing to those who are 
most in need. In the coming fiscal year we will interview refugees in 
regional capitals that had been rarely, if ever, visited by our 
processing teams.

Given the unpredictability of world events, the President's proposal 
includes a reserve of 3,000 numbers which are not assigned to any 
region. As situations develop during the year, additional numbers for 
existing programs or numbers for new refugee groups may be required. The 
availability of an unallocated reserve allows the program the 
flexibility necessary to operate effectively in this constantly changing 
environment.

By current UNHCR estimates, there are some 20 million refugees in the 
world and an even greater number of persons displaced within the borders 
of their own countries. In addition, millions of migrant workers and 
asylum-seekers are on the move around the globe. In the face of these 
growing numbers, the international community now rarely views large-
scale permanent resettlement as an appropriate or manageable solution 
for refugee crises. As with the Kurds on the Turkish border after the 
Gulf War, or Rwandans fleeing the massacres of last year, the first 
concern for refugees is protection and assistance in place, followed by 
the hope of eventual voluntary repatriation.

The vast majority of the millions of refugees worldwide will never be 
resettled anywhere but, rather, will remain in first asylum under the 
care of the international community until they can return home in safety 
and dignity. It is to these vital programs that some $430 million of 
Department of State funds are devoted in the current fiscal year. We 
believe the U.S. commitment to generous levels of overseas assistance 
represents money very well spent.

In recent years, United States leadership--be it in the form of 
financial resources, food aid, diplomatic intervention, or the unique 
assets of the U.S. military--has made the difference between catastrophe 
and the preservation of human life. As the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees recently told me, in today's world, there simply is no 
substitute for U.S. leadership. This view is shared as well by the 
American people who, through their elected representatives, have 
continued to demonstrate their support for these programs.

There are many examples. The ethnic tensions in Central Africa that led 
to genocide in Rwanda last year and still threaten to plunge Burundi 
into bloodshed and chaos elicited an outpouring of American concern and 
resources despite the limited United States strategic interests in that 
part of the world. Since April 1994, the U.S. Government has provided 
over $500 million in emergency relief for refugees, the internally 
displaced, and other conflict victims in this region. When nearly 1 
million Rwandans arrived in the Goma area of Zaire within a matter of 
days, the UNHCR reached the outer limits of what it could implement even 
on an emergency basis, and appealed to governments to provide services 
directly to the refugees. United States leadership was instrumental in 
mobilizing resources and contributions from other nations. Our response 
was possible because of the military's capabilities and our political 
will to use them in such unique circumstances.

Rwanda illustrates another aspect of this country's contribution to 
handling humanitarian crises--that of the private sector. The community 
of NGOs reported an unprecedented fund-raising response from the 
American people to the Rwandan tragedy, and many American and other 
voluntary agencies provided life-saving work throughout the region. The 
NGO community has also stepped forward to devise community-based 
conflict prevention programs. These are a necessary complement to the 
government's effort on the diplomatic and political front in saving 
Burundi from a similar cataclysm.

The relief activities of American NGOs have also made a substantial 
difference in alleviating suffering in the ongoing tragedy of Bosnia. 
Since 1992, NGOs have assisted the millions of people uprooted in this 
agonizing ethnic conflict. Often without regard to their own personal 
security, they have ensured the provision of food and shelter to victims 
of ethnic cleansing and violence both within and outside of Bosnia's 
borders. They have also provided life-sustaining medical treatment, 
medicines, and medical supplies to Bosnian refugees and displaced 
persons throughout the region.

Mr. Chairman, the people of the United States continue to demonstrate an 
enormous capacity and willingness to reach out to those in need--both at 
home and abroad. Americans want to be part of the solution. In recent 
years, it has been made abundantly clear that the United States retains 
the will, creativity, and willingness to "take charge" when necessary in 
assisting the victims of natural or man-made disasters. In addition, our 
track record as a multicultural society--even in light of the current 
debate on appropriate levels of new immigration--is excellent and can 
serve as a positive example to other nations. The President's proposal 
for the admission of 90,000 refugees in FY 1996 reflects his intention 
to maintain America's leadership, while at the same time recognizing 
that changed circumstances demand new and flexible approaches.(###)



ARTICLE 2:

UN Security Council Adopts Resolution 1009 on Croatia
Madeleine K. Albright, UNSC Resolution


Madeleine K. Albright
Statement by the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations 
before the UN Security Council, New York City, August 10, 1995.

Mr. President, my government supports this resolution as an expression 
of continued commitment by this Council to peace and to the relief of 
human suffering in the former Yugoslavia.

We regret the decision by the Government of Croatia to launch an 
offensive against the Krajina region. We also urge all parties to 
refrain from further attacks, whether within Croatia or Bosnia-
Herzegovina.

The latest round of violence has produced yet another flow of civilian 
refugees within the former Yugoslavia. By tractor, truck, car, and cart, 
tens of thousands have fled the current military operations. The 
protection of those civilians must be a priority for all parties 
concerned. The rights of Serbs who choose to remain in Croatia must also 
be respected.

History warns us that the failure to safeguard innocent lives leads only 
to more hatred, killing, and destruction. For this reason, it is 
essential that international agencies have unimpeded access to observe 
conditions in Krajina and to provide humanitarian relief where needed.

Mr. President, the turbulence of the past week's events coupled with 
restrictive policies imposed by the Government of Croatia have made it 
difficult to assess the extent to which Croatian forces or their Bosnian 
allies may have been guilty of violations of international humanitarian 
law. My government expects the war crimes tribunal to investigate 
allegations of abuse against unarmed civilians, including reports that 
five elderly Serbs were killed and refugees were bombed in the village 
of Dvor--and we will fully support the tribunal's work.

We join as well in condemning in strong terms the wrongful acts 
committed against UN peacekeeping forces and in the Council's extension 
of condolences to the families of the Czech and Danish peacekeepers who 
were killed.

In this regard, let me welcome the statement of the representative of 
Croatia accepting responsibility for attacks on UN peacekeepers, 
committing to investigating these incidents, and promising cooperation 
with UNCRO and other international organizations.

Many in Croatia have hailed the recent military actions as a great 
victory. But it is difficult to see how any society can derive real 
satisfaction from the defeat and flight of hundreds of thousands of its 
own citizens. This resolution reminds Croatia of its obligation to 
create conditions conducive to the safe return of those persons who have 
left their homes. And it stresses the importance of granting access by 
the International Committee of the Red Cross to those who have been 
taken prisoner or detained.

At the same time, while we regret the means used, we must also recognize 
that the safe area of Bihac is now open to humanitarian relief. For the 
citizens of Bihac, the long siege is over. Let it remain so. The events 
of this past week have not changed the overriding imperative for all 
parties in the former Yugoslavia, which is to cease the conduct of war 
and explore instead-- with seriousness and good faith--the options that 
exist for achieving peace. That is the one path toward real security; 
that is the only way to bring to an end the cycle of disruption and 
tragedy that has affected all the people of the region.

Finally, Mr. President, let me categorically deny the allegation that I 
was told was made by Mr. Djokic--that the United States gave tactical 
advice or logistical support to the Government of Croatia's military 
operation. This baseless charge can only make it harder for my 
government to see the day when Serbia/Montenegro can rejoin the 
community of nations.



Resolution 1009
(August 10, 1995)

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on the conflicts in the territory 
of the former Yugoslavia and in particular resolutions 981 (1995) of 31 
March 1995, 990 (1995) of 28 April 1995 and 994 (1995) of 17 May 1995,

Reaffirming the statements of its President of 3 and 4 August 1995 
(S/PRST/1995/37 and S/PRST/1995/38) and deeply concerned that the 
demands set out therein have not yet been fully complied with by the 
Government of the Republic of Croatia,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 3 August 1995 
(S/1995/650) and his letter of 7 August 1995 (S/1995/666),

Noting with concern reports of violations of resolution 713 (1991) of 25 
September 1991 as reflected in the Secretary-General's report of 3 
August 1995,

Deeply regretting the breakdown of the talks which began in Geneva on 3 
August 1995,

Affirming its commitment to the search for an overall negotiated 
settlement of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia ensuring the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the States there within 
their internationally recognized borders, stressing the importance it 
attaches to the mutual recognition thereof, and in this context 
welcoming all international efforts to facilitate a negotiated solution 
to the conflict in the Republic of Croatia,

Strongly deploring the broad military offensive launched on 4 August 
1995 by the Government of the Republic of Croatia, thereby unacceptably 
escalating the conflict, with the risk of further consequent attacks by 
whatever party,

Condemning the shelling of civilian targets,

Deeply concerned at the grave situation of persons displaced from their 
homes as a result of the conflict and at reports of violations of 
international humanitarian law,

Stressing the need to protect the rights of the local Serb population,

Condemning in the strongest terms the unacceptable acts by Croatian 
Government forces against personnel of the United Nations peacekeeping 
forces, including those which have resulted in the death of a Danish 
member of those forces and two Czech members and expressing its 
condolences to the Governments concerned,

Noting the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the United 
Nations Peace Forces signed on 6 August 1995 (S/1995/666, annex III) and 
stressing the need for the Government of the Republic of Croatia to 
adhere strictly to its provisions,

Reaffirming its determination to ensure the security and freedom of 
movement of the personnel of the United Nations peacekeeping operations 
in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and, to these ends, acting 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Demands that the Government of the Republic of Croatia cease 
immediately all military actions and that there be full compliance with 
all Council resolutions, including resolution 994 (1995);

2. Demands further that the Government of the Republic of Croatia, in 
conformity with internationally recognized standards and in compliance 
with the agreement of 6 August 1995 between the Republic of Croatia and 
the United Nations Peace Forces (a) respect fully the rights of the 
local Serb population including their rights to remain, leave or return 
in safety, (b) allow access to this population by international 
humanitarian organizations, and (c) create conditions conducive to the 
return of those persons who have left their homes;

3. Reminds the Government of the Republic of Croatia of its 
responsibility to allow access for representatives of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross to members of the local Serb forces who are 
detained by the Croatian Government forces;

4. Reiterates that all those who commit violations of international 
humanitarian law will be held individually responsible in respect of 
such acts;

5. Requests the Secretary-General in cooperation with the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, the International Committee of the Red Cross and other 
relevant international humanitarian institutions to assess the 
humanitarian situation of the local Serb population including the 
problem of refugees and displaced persons, and to report thereon as soon 
as possible;

6. Demands that the Government of the Republic of Croatia fully respect 
the status of United Nations personnel, refrain from any attacks against 
them, bring to justice those responsible for any such attacks, and 
ensure the safety and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel at 
all times, and requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council 
informed of steps taken and decisions rendered in this regard;

7. Urges the parties and others concerned to exercise maximum restraint 
in and around Sector East and requests the Secretary-General to keep the 
situation there under review;

8. Reminds all parties of their obligation to comply fully with the 
provisions of resolution 816 (1993) of 31 March 1993;

9. Reiterates its call for a negotiated settlement which guarantees the 
rights of all communities and urges the Government of the Republic of 
Croatia to resume talks under the auspices of the Co-Chairmen of the 
Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former 
Yugoslavia;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within three 
weeks of the adoption of this resolution on the implementation of this 
resolution and on the implications of the situation for UNCRO and 
expresses its readiness to consider promptly his recommendations in 
relation to UNCRO;

11. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter and to consider 
further measures to achieve compliance with this resolution.

VOTE: Unanimous (15-0).(###)



ARTICLE 3:

Bosnia-Herzegovina Arms Embargo
President Clinton

Statement by President Clinton released by the White House, Office of 
the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, August 11, 1995.

I am announcing today my decision to veto legislation that would 
unilaterally lift the arms embargo against Bosnia-Herzegovina.

I know that Members of Congress share my goals of reducing the violence 
in Bosnia and working to end the war. But their vote to unilaterally 
lift the arms embargo is the wrong step at the wrong time. The American 
people should understand the consequences of such action for our nation 
and for the people of Bosnia.

First, our allies have made clear that they will withdraw their troops 
from Bosnia if the United States unilaterally lifts the arms embargo. 
The United States, as the leader of the NATO alliance, would be obliged 
to send thousands of American ground troops to assist in that difficult 
operation.

Second, lifting the embargo now could cause the fighting in Bosnia to 
escalate. The Serbs will not delay their assaults while the Bosnian 
Government receives new arms and training. Getting humanitarian aid to 
civilians will only get harder.

Third, unilaterally lifting the embargo will lead to unilateral American 
responsibility. If the Bosnian Government suffered reverses on the 
battlefield, we--not the Europeans--would be expected to fill the void 
with military and humanitarian aid.

Fourth, intensified fighting in Bosnia would risk provoking a wider war 
in the heart of Europe.

Fifth, for this bill to become law now would undercut the new diplomatic 
effort we are currently engaged in, and withdrawal of the UN mission 
would virtually eliminate chances for a peaceful, negotiated settlement 
in the foreseeable future.

Finally, unilateral lift would create serious divisions between the 
United States and its key allies, with potential long-lasting damage to 
the NATO alliance.

This is an important moment in Bosnia. Events in the past few weeks have 
opened new possibilities for negotiations. We will test these new 
realities, and we are now engaged with our allies and others in using 
these opportunities to settle this terrible war by agreement. This is 
not the time for the United States to pull the plug on the UN mission.

There is no question that we must take strong action in Bosnia. In 
recent weeks, the war has intensified. The Serbs have brutally assaulted 
three of the UN safe areas. Witnesses report widespread atrocities--
summary executions, systematic rape, and renewed ethnic cleansing in 
Bosnia. Tens of thousands of innocent women and children have fled their 
homes. Now the Croatian Army offensive has created new dangers and 
dramatically increased the need for humanitarian aid to deal with 
displaced citizens in the region. But these events also create 
opportunities.

Along with our allies, we have taken a series of strong steps to 
strengthen the UN mission, to prevent further attacks on safe areas, and 
to protect innocent civilians.

-- NATO has decided it will counter an assault on the remaining safe 
areas with sustained and decisive use of air power. Our response will be 
broad, swift, and severe, going far beyond the narrow attacks of the 
past;

-- For the first time, military commanders on the ground in Bosnia have 
been given operational control over such actions, paving the way for 
fast and effective NATO response; and

-- Well-armed British and French troops are working to ensure access to 
Sarajevo for convoys carrying food, medicine, and other vital supplies.

Despite these actions, many in Congress are ready to close the books on 
the UN mission. But I am not--not as long as that mission is willing and 
able to be a force for peace once again.

I recognize that there is no risk-free way ahead in Bosnia. But 
unilaterally lifting the arms embargo will have the opposite effect of 
what its supporters intend. It would intensify the fighting, jeopardize 
diplomacy, and make the outcome of the war in Bosnia an American 
responsibility. 

Instead, we must work with our allies to protect innocent civilians, to 
strengthen the UN mission, to bring NATO's military power to bear if our 
warnings are defied, and to aggressively pursue the only path that will 
end the conflict--one that leads to a negotiated peace. (###)



ARTICLE 4:

UN Security Council Adopts Resolution 1010 on Bosnia
Madeleine K. Albright, UNSC Resolution

Madeleine K. Albright
Statement by the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations 
before the UN Security Council, New York City, August 10, 1995.

Mr. President, although the military action in Croatia has preoccupied 
us in recent days, we must not forget the tragedy and outrages 
perpetrated earlier in Bosnia against the eastern enclaves of Srebrenica 
and Zepa.

We must not forget these Bosnian Serb attacks because the magnitude of 
the suffering they have caused is enormous, even in the grim context of 
the former Yugoslavia. As many as 13,000 men, women, and children were 
driven from their homes and forced to seek refuge in already heavily 
burdened cities under government control--some even across the border in 
Serbia.

We must not forget Srebrenica and Zepa because these are areas for which 
this Council assumed a special responsibility. These were UN-protected 
"safe areas." These were areas we hoped our authority and legitimacy as 
the voice of the international community would protect from violence and 
attack. Tragically, the authority of this Council and the good opinion 
of the world appear to mean little to the leadership of the Bosnian 
Serbs.

We must not forget what happened in Srebrenica and Zepa because the 
story of what happened there is not over--it certainly has not been 
fully told--and innocent lives remain at stake.

Some 10,000 civilians from Srebrenica and about 3,000 from Zepa are 
missing and unaccounted for. Some may be in hiding. Some may be in 
detention. Some are most certainly dead. We have a responsibility to 
investigate; to find out what we can; to see that those in hiding are 
granted safe passage, that those in detention are well-treated or 
released, that the names of those who died or who have been killed are 
made known to their families, and that those responsible for illegal and 
outrageous activities are brought to justice.

We must not forget what happened in Srebrenica and Zepa because there 
are strong grounds to believe, especially with respect to Srebrenica, 
that the Pale Serbs beat, raped, and murdered many of those fleeing the 
violence. These dead were not killed in the "heat of battle;" they were 
not killed in self-defense; they were not killed by accident: They were 
systematically slaughtered on the instructions of the Bosnian Serb 
leadership.

We know this from the credible accounts of refugees who witnessed these 
crimes, including persons interviewed by our government. We know it from 
sensitive information shared earlier today with members of this Council-
-unique information obtained by the United States. The combination of 
these eyewitness accounts and our intelligence data provides compelling 
evidence of barbarous and systematic murder by the Bosnian Serbs.

The resolution we approved today demands that the Bosnian Serbs give 
immediate access to persons displaced from Srebrenica and Zepa and who 
are in areas under Bosnian Serb control. The resolution demands further 
that access be granted to persons detained against their will. It 
requires that the rights of persons detained be respected. And it 
reiterates that those who commit violations of international 
humanitarian law will be held accountable--as individuals--for those 
acts.

Representatives from the appropriate international organizations are 
ready now--today--to travel to the areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina where 
those displaced by the violence in Srebrenica and Zepa are most likely 
to be. This resolution makes clear that the Bosnian Serbs have a 
responsibility to permit them safe passage and to allow them to do their 
jobs.

The United States Government strongly supports this resolution. It is 
important that we focus international attention on the plight of the 
refugee population from Srebrenica and Zepa. We do not know all that has 
happened to them. But we do know that we all have a responsibility to 
find out. 

Mr. President, we cannot allow ourselves--nor can we allow others--
simply to shrug off the crimes committed in the aftermath of Srebrenica 
as an inevitable side effect of ethnic conflict. We cannot accept the 
rape or beating or murder of civilians as legitimate tactics of war. I 
am reminded of the words of the poet Archibald MacLeish, who wrote in 
1940 of the world's passive response to the rise of fascism:
 
Murder is not absolved of immorality by committing murder. Murder is 
absolved of immorality by bringing men to think that murder is not evil. 
This only the perversion of the mind can bring about. And the perversion 
of the mind is only possible when those who should be heard in its 
defense are silent . . .

Establishing the truth about what has happened in Srebrenica and 
throughout the Balkans war is essential not only to justice but to 
peace. Responsibility for the atrocities committed does not rest with 
the Serbs or any other people as a group: It rests with the individuals 
who ordered and committed the crimes. True reconciliation will not be 
possible in this region until the perception of collective guilt is 
expunged and personal responsibility is assigned.



Resolution 1010
(August 10, 1995)

The Security Council,

Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions, and reaffirming its 
resolution 1004 (1995) of 12 July 1995,

Reaffirming also the statements of its President of 20 and 25 July 1995 
(S/PRST/1995/33 and S/PRST/1995/34), and deeply concerned that the 
demands set out therein have not been fully complied with by the Bosnian 
Serb party,

Reiterating the unacceptability of the violation of the safe areas of 
Srebrenica and Zepa by Bosnian Serb forces,

Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Affirming its commitment to the search for an overall negotiated 
settlement of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia ensuring the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the States there within 
their internationally recognized borders, and stressing the importance 
it attaches to the mutual recognition thereof,

Deeply concerned at reports of grave violations of international 
humanitarian law in and around Srebrenica and at the fact that many of 
the former inhabitants of Srebrenica cannot be accounted for, 

Concerned also at the plight of the civilian population and other 
persons protected under international humanitarian law, originating in 
the Zepa area,

Expressing its strong support for the efforts of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in seeking access to displaced persons 
and condemning the failure of the Bosnian Serb party to comply with 
their commitments to the ICRC in respect of such access,

1. Demands that the Bosnian Serb party give immediate access for 
representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
the ICRC and other international agencies to persons displaced from 
Srebrenica and Zepa who are within the areas of the Republic of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces, and that the 
Bosnian Serb party permit representatives of the ICRC to visit and 
register any persons detained against their will, including any members 
of the forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina;

2. Also demands that the Bosnian Serb party respect fully the rights of 
all such persons and ensure their safety, and urges that any persons 
detained be released; 

3. Reiterates that all those who commit violations of international 
humanitarian law will be held individually responsible in respect of 
such acts;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council as soon as 
possible, and no later than 1 September 1995 with any information 
available to United Nations personnel regarding compliance with this 
resolution and concerning violations of international humanitarian law;

5. Decides to remain seized of the matter. 

VOTE: Unanimous (15-0).(###)



ARTICLE 5:

U.S. Policy Toward Iraq
Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations
Statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian 
Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 
August 3, 1995

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. I welcome 
this timely opportunity to discuss with you United States policy toward 
Iraq, with particular attention on the aspects of that policy that are 
carried out through the United Nations.

As members of the subcommittee know, the United States has been 
determined, in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf war, to prevent Iraq 
from once again developing weapons of mass destruction or threatening 
its neighbors with aggression. In this effort, the tool of economic and 
weapons sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council has been of 
singular value.

Over the past year, we have worked hard to gain and maintain support for 
our view that sanctions should remain in place until Iraq is in overall 
compliance with all relevant Security Council resolutions. This effort 
has been successful. In March, May, and again in July the sanctions were 
extended without controversy or change.

Iraqi officials have said publicly in recent days that if the sanctions 
are not lifted in September--when they next come up for review--Iraq 
will cease to cooperate with the United Nations Special Commission, or 
UNSCOM, which is the body established to monitor Iraqi compliance. Such 
statements are harmful both to the interests of the Iraqi people and to 
the world at large.

The reintegration of Iraq into the world community is a goal we all 
share, but there is only one path to that objective and that path 
requires full cooperation with UNSCOM and full compliance with the 
requirements of the Security Council. The regime in Baghdad must 
understand that it is not involved in a negotiation; it is under an 
obligation brought on by its own transgressions.

The United States is insisting, as is a majority of Security Council 
members, that before there is serious discussion of lifting sanctions, 
Iraq must comply not only with its obligations concerning weapons of 
mass destruction but with other obligations established under Security 
Council resolutions. These include the return of stolen property, 
accounting for those missing in action, and ending support for terrorism 
and repression of the Iraqi people.

In his speech on July 17, Saddam Hussein characterized the UN sanctions 
as "cruel, harsh, and repressive" and said that they were causing "great 
suffering" among the Iraqi people. Unfortunately, the sincerity of this 
statement of concern is belied by Saddam's refusal to accept the terms 
of Security Council Resolution 986, which would permit Iraq to sell up 
to $1 billion of oil every three months in order to purchase 
humanitarian supplies. It is belied, as well, by the "putting people 
last" spending priorities of the Iraqi Government, by Saddam's campaign 
of terror against minorities in the north and south, and by the barbaric 
treatment given Iraqis suspected of disloyalty to the regime.

For four years, Iraqi officials have sought alternatives to full 
compliance with Security Council resolutions: They have delayed and 
obfuscated, they have demanded concessions in return for small steps, 
they have threatened and bullied UNSCOM, and they have lied. Last fall, 
they even attempted to intimidate the Council by threatening military 
maneuvers directed toward Kuwait. These tactics have not worked. And in 
the interests of stability and justice, they must not be allowed to 
work.

Last month's decision by the Iraqi Government to release two American 
citizens who had been detained since March was welcome but irrelevant to 
the sanctions issue. The two Americans should not have been jailed in 
the first place. We congratulate Representative Bill Richardson for his 
successful effort to gain their release, but his was strictly a 
humanitarian endeavor. There was no message of any kind from the 
Administration and no authorization to negotiate. The Richardson trip 
did not represent the opening of a new channel of communication between 
Iraq's Government and our own, and it has not and will not influence 
U.S. policy with respect to sanctions. Let me describe now, more 
specifically, what that policy is and why we feel so strongly about it.

U.S. Sanctions Policy

We are insisting that Iraq meet fully all obligations established by the 
Security Council because we remain highly distrustful of the Iraqi 
regime and because that regime remains a potential threat to a region of 
great strategic importance to the U.S. and to the world. It was five 
years ago this week that Iraq invaded Kuwait. Hundreds of thousands of 
American soldiers put their lives at risk to halt and reverse that act 
of blatant aggression. We should not allow Saddam Hussein to regain in 
the Security Council what he forfeited through his own ambition and 
miscalculation on the battlefield.

It should be obvious that a premature return to business as usual with 
this regime would entail grave and unacceptable risks. If past is 
prologue, we could expect the Iraqi Government to resume the development 
and production of weapons of mass destruction as rapidly as possible; we 
could expect it to test repeatedly the limits of what could be gained 
through the intimidation of its neighbors; we could expect a halt to 
progress in resolving humanitarian and financial issues arising out of 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait; and we could expect continued brutal 
repression of the Iraqi people.

Accordingly, we are determined to maintain sanctions until we are 
convinced by Iraq's behavior that it no longer constitutes a threat to 
peace and stability in the Persian Gulf. Iraq can demonstrate that by 
proving--through its compliance with the resolutions--that it is no 
longer an outlaw state. Only when its peaceful intentions are proven 
will there be grounds for modifying the sanctions regime.

Experience tells us that Saddam Hussein's Iraq will respond 
constructively only to a policy of firmness and steady resolve. Last 
fall, when Iraqi troops once again threatened Kuwait, President Clinton 
responded immediately, forcefully, and effectively. As a result, Baghdad 
not only pulled back its troops, but it agreed at long last to formally 
recognize its legal border with Kuwait.

The central question, of course, is whether Iraq is, in fact, complying 
with the terms of the relevant Security Council resolutions. The answer, 
unfortunately, is that Iraqi compliance has been grudging, slow, 
sporadic, and insufficient.

During the next few minutes, with the help of the National Intelligence 
Council, I would like to review with you the facts and the evidence that 
supports them. Mr. Andrew Liepman of the CIA is here to assist in 
answering any questions you may have. I will speak first with respect to 
weapons of mass destruction.

Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Biological Warfare. On July 3, the Security Council was notified by 
UNSCOM Chairman Ekeus that Iraq had finally admitted that it had, 
indeed, possessed an offensive biological warfare program. The Iraqis 
said that the program was conceived in 1985 and that the production of 
biological warfare agents began at the Al Hakam facility in 1989 and 
continued until 1990. They claimed that the biological warfare agents 
produced were destroyed in October 1990 in view of the imminence of 
hostilities.

The Iraqis have now undertaken to draft a complete report on their 
biological warfare program. We understand that an initial draft has been 
prepared, and that it is--as we speak--being reviewed in Baghdad by 
UNSCOM. If past efforts by Iraq are any precedent, we can expect the 
process of explanation and verification to consume a considerable amount 
of time. In the area of chemical weapons, for example, Iraqi 
obfuscation, deception, and sloppiness caused a delay measured not in 
days or months but in years. The sad fact is that no initial Iraqi 
weapons declaration has been truthful.

There are, moreover, ample grounds for continued skepticism. Iraq 
claims--we believe falsely--that the biological warfare agents produced 
were never weaponized. We believe that the Iraqis began their biological 
warfare program much earlier than they have admitted and that more 
biological agents were manufactured and many more facilities and people 
involved than Iraq has revealed.

Iraq has not acknowledged to the UN anywhere near the number of people 
normally associated with a research effort of this size. Iraq will have 
to cooperate with UNSCOM in showing the location of its biological 
warfare facilities and the equipment used in production. UNSCOM also 
will need a full explanation of the disposition of the more than 17 tons 
of biological growth media that remain unaccounted for and of the ways 
and means by which the produced biological agents were allegedly 
destroyed.

We should not forget that, until five weeks ago, Iraq denied outright 
the existence of an offensive biological warfare program. The story 
changed only after irrefutable evidence was made available to UNSCOM and 
members of the Security Council that such a program had existed. In 
other words, Iraq only admitted what we already knew. We cannot count on 
Iraqi officials to volunteer accurate information, and, in this context, 
the importance of obtaining complete, accurate, and verifiable data is 
critical.

Consider that the Iraqis have admitted to producing more than 500,000 
liters of anthrax and botulinum toxin at the Al Hakam facility. Anthrax, 
in doses of a millionth of a gram, is fatal within five to seven days 
nearly 100% of the time. Botulinum is 100,000 times more toxic than the 
chemical warfare agent sarin that was used by terrorists in the Japanese 
subway tragedy earlier this year. Although weather conditions and 
limitations on delivery capability would limit potency, it is at least 
theoretically true that the amount of biological warfare agents that 
Iraq admitted producing is more than enough to kill every man, woman, 
and child on earth.

Other Weapons of Mass Destruction. Discrepancies between the 
intelligence community's assessments of the scale of Iraqi weapons of 
mass destruction--WMD--efforts and Iraqi declarations to the UN lead us 
to believe that Iraq is still hiding equipment and materials belonging 
to its other WMD programs. For example, the U.S. intelligence community 
estimates that as many as several dozen Scud missiles remain unaccounted 
for.

We are concerned, moreover, that if the oil embargo is lifted 
unconditionally, Baghdad could well order the departure of UN 
inspectors. Under those circumstances, Iraq could then rebuild its 
weapons of mass destruction programs, a process that would take:

-- Less than a year for Iraq's biological weapons program;
-- Two to three years for its chemical warfare--CW--program; and
-- Five to seven years, with foreign help, for a first nuclear device.

Lest there be doubt about its intentions, Iraq continues to devote money 
and manpower to rebuilding its infrastructure for its weapons of mass 
destruction and conventional weapons programs. The Al Kindi missile 
research and development facility, for example, supported many Iraqi 
weapons programs before the war. The facility was damaged heavily during 
Operation Desert Storm but has been largely rebuilt and even expanded 
since then. The facility has been under UN supervision, but if UN 
inspectors were forced to leave, it could easily be converted to support 
prohibited weapons programs.

The Habbaniyah II facility produced CW agent precursor chemicals before 
Desert Storm. The Iraqis have rebuilt the main production building and 
the chlorine plant and have added a phenol production line as well as a 
ferric chloride line. These production lines contain dual-use equipment 
that, in the absence of UNSCOM, could easily be converted to CW agent or 
precursor chemical production.

Return of Captured Kuwaiti Military Equipment

The Security Council has required that Iraq return to Kuwait the 
military equipment it stole during the invasion. Iraq's claim to have 
complied with this requirement is laughable.

Baghdad says that it retains only a few pieces of damaged Kuwaiti combat 
equipment. The truth is that Iraq has integrated a variety of this 
equipment into its own military. For example:

-- Iraq claims that it has only four of the BMP-2 infantry fighting 
vehicles that it stole from Kuwait; we estimate it has more than 200.

-- Prior to the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq had only single-carry, heavy-
lift transporters in its inventory. They stole about 100 Kuwaiti 
transporters capable of carrying two APCs each. The Iraqis even used 
them to move pieces of equipment, including the stolen Kuwaiti BMP-2s, 
that were used to threaten the emirate last October.

-- Much of what Iraq actually has returned is not Kuwaiti equipment at 
all but, rather, is derelict Iranian equipment captured during the Iran-
Iraq war, complete with documents written in Farsi and painted-over 
pictures of the Ayatollah Khomeini.

Terrorism

Iraq also has continued to use terror as an instrument of state policy. 
We believe Iraqi security services were behind a highly suspicious auto 
accident last summer that resulted in the death of the son of the late 
spiritual leader of Iraqi Shi'a. In April 1994, Iraqi intelligence 
officers murdered Talib al-Suhayl, an Iraqi oppositionist in Beirut. The 
officers were arrested and are still being held by Lebanese authorities. 
Iraq also remains in contact with terrorist groups such as the Abu Nidal 
Organization and the Palestine Liberation Front.

Repression of the Iraqi People

Security Council Resolution 688 requires that the Government of Iraq 
cease its brutal repression of the Iraqi people. Here, as elsewhere, the 
record of Iraqi compliance is dismal. The Special Rapporteur of the UN 
Commission on Human Rights, Max van der Stoel, reports that repression 
continues, including political killings, mass executions, and state-
sponsored terrorism. 

In the north, Saddam's economic blockade of the three Kurdish provinces 
is now in its third year, and Baghdad's shut-off of electrical power to 
Dahuk province is in its second year. In the south, at least 700 hamlets 
have been destroyed by government forces since 1991. More have been 
destroyed this year. Government attacks against Shi'a communities have 
been accompanied over the past two years by the draining of the southern 
marshes. This has produced catastrophic results for local animal species 
and for the marsh Arabs whose unique and ancient culture now verges on 
extinction.

The Special Rapporteur has asserted that the Government of Iraq has 
engaged in war crimes and crimes against humanity and may have committed 
violations of the 1948 Genocide Convention. The Special Rapporteur 
continues to call on the Government of Iraq to permit the stationing of 
monitors inside the country to improve the flow of information and to 
provide independent reporting of alleged human rights abuses. We 
continue to support Mr. van der Stoel's work and his call for monitors.

Coping With Sanctions: Palaces First, People Last

In April, the Security Council approved Resolution 986, to simplify 
procedures for Iraq to sell a limited amount of oil to purchase 
humanitarian goods for its people. Iraq has rejected this resolution, 
demonstrating again that Saddam Hussein desires not to ease his people's 
suffering but to use that suffering to gain sympathy for getting 
sanctions lifted.

Neither war nor sanctions nor diplomatic isolation have altered Saddam's 
priorities; he continues to devote considerable resources to rebuilding 
the Iraqi military and his own palaces: Iraq has built 50 new palaces or 
luxury residences since the end of Desert Storm, at a cost of over $1.5 
billion. There are now 78 such palaces or residences in Iraq for use by 
Saddam, his family, or close supporters.

For example, the Mosul Palace complex includes two areas--one with five 
palaces and two offices or apartment buildings, the other with three 
completed palaces and a fourth under construction on a newly excavated, 
man-made lake. The estimated post-war cost of expanding this complex is 
$170-$230 million. 

One of the largest and most elaborate palaces in Iraq is in the Lake 
Tharthar complex. Its estimated size of about 300,000 square feet is 
about five times the size of the White House and 11/2 times the size of 
Versailles. Other buildings on the compound, including residences and 
service and security facilities, add at least another 150,000 square 
feet to the complex. The estimated cost of this complex is $180-$240 
million. An additional $230-$310 million has been spent since the end of 
the war adding new wings with elaborate archways to the Baghdad 
Republican Palace, a building which serves as the official palace and 
symbol of the regime.

In addition to diverting scarce resources away from needed purchases of 
humanitarian goods, Saddam and his family capitalize on their official 
positions in Iraq for personal profit, often at the expense of their own 
citizens. For example, members of Saddam's family, particularly his son 
Uday, control extensive business interests in Iraq. Some family members 
exploit the economic distortions caused by UN sanctions by importing 
goods into Iraq for resale at exorbitant prices. Saddam's relatives also 
are involved in illicit oil exports from Iraq and use the proceeds, in 
part, to line their own pockets. Finally, relief supplies donated by the 
international community also have ended up for sale in stores reserved 
for the elite friends of the regime.

A Look Ahead

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to stress several points.

First, UN sanctions against Iraq have accomplished much. Iraq's capacity 
to produce weapons of mass destruction has been dismantled, weapons have 
been destroyed, the border with Kuwait has been recognized, and there 
are clear constraints on what Iraq can do to intimidate its neighbors. 
The effectiveness of sanctions is directly attributable to their 
multilateral nature. Here, the value of the United Nations and the 
importance of international cooperation in defense of common interests 
are clear.

Second, the continued effectiveness of sanctions cannot be taken for 
granted. We have indicated that we would use the veto, if necessary, to 
prevent sanctions from being lifted prematurely. But to be most 
effective, sanctions must be enforced and that is much harder to do 
unilaterally. This is a major reason we have argued so strongly--in the 
context of Bosnia and elsewhere--that the integrity of UN sanctions must 
be respected.

Third, the value to our interests in sharing appropriate but sensitive 
information with United Nations bodies has been demonstrated clearly in 
this case. Those who lapse into derisive generalities about the quality 
and capabilities of UN organizations should recognize that UNSCOM has 
performed its complex tasks extremely well despite difficult and, at 
times, dangerous conditions.

America's position on Iraq sanctions has been consistent, principled, 
and grounded in a realistic and hard-won understanding of the nature of 
the Iraqi regime. U.S. policy will not change until and unless Iraq does 
everything the UN Security Council says it must. As President Clinton 
stated in his most recent report to Congress on this subject:

Iraq is still a threat to regional peace and security. . . . I continued 
to be determined to see Iraq comply fully with all its obligations under 
the UNSC resolutions. I will oppose any relaxation of sanctions until 
Iraq demonstrates its overall compliance with the relevant resolutions. 
Iraq should adopt democratic processes, respect human rights, treat its 
people equitably and adhere to basic norms of international behavior.

I should add that the Administration appreciates the strong and 
bipartisan support it has had from Congress with respect to our policy 
toward Iraq. This has been and will remain an essential ingredient to 
that policy's success. Thank you once again for the opportunity to be 
here today. (###)



ARTICLE 6:

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
President Clinton

Statement by President Clinton released by the White House, Office of 
the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, August 11, 1995.

One of my Administration's highest priorities is to negotiate a 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to reduce the danger posed by 
nuclear weapons proliferation. To advance that goal and secure the 
strongest possible treaty, I am announcing today my decision to seek a 
"zero" yield CTBT. A zero yield CTBT would ban any nuclear weapon test 
explosion or any other nuclear explosion immediately upon entry into 
force. I hope it will lead to an early consensus among all states at the 
negotiating table.

Achieving a CTBT was a goal of both Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. 
Now, as then, such a treaty would greatly strengthen U.S. and global 
security and create another barrier to nuclear proliferation and nuclear 
weapons development. At the conclusion of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty Review Conference in May, all parties to that treaty agreed to 
work to complete a CTBT no later than 1996. Today, I want to reaffirm 
our commitment to do everything possible to conclude the CTBT 
negotiations as soon as possible so that a treaty can be signed next 
year.

As part of our national security strategy, the United States must and 
will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future 
hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from 
acting against our vital interests and to convince it that seeking a 
nuclear advantage would be futile. In this regard, I consider the 
maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile to be a supreme 
national interest of the United States.

I am assured by the Secretary of Energy and the directors of our nuclear 
weapons labs that we can meet the challenge of maintaining our nuclear 
deterrent under a CTBT through a Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship 
program without nuclear testing. I directed the implementation of such a 
program almost two years ago, and it is being developed with the support 
of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. This program will now be tied to a new certification procedure. 
In order for this program to succeed, both the Administration and the 
Congress must provide sustained bipartisan support for the stockpile 
stewardship program over the next decade and beyond. I am committed to 
working with the Congress to ensure this support.

While I am optimistic that the stockpile stewardship program will be 
successful, as President, I cannot dismiss the possibility--however 
unlikely--that the program will fall short of its objectives. Therefore, 
in addition to the new annual certification procedure for our nuclear 
weapons stockpile, I am also establishing concrete, specific safeguards 
that define the conditions under which the United States can enter into 
a CTBT.

In the event that I were informed by the Secretary of Defense and 
Secretary of Energy--advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council, the 
Directors of DOE's nuclear weapons laboratories, and the Commander of 
U.S. Strategic Command--that a high level of confidence in the safety or 
reliability of a nuclear weapons type which the two Secretaries consider 
to be critical to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified, I 
would be prepared, in consultation with Congress, to exercise our 
"supreme national interests" rights under the CTBT in order to conduct 
whatever testing might be required. Exercising this right, however, is a 
decision, I believe, I or any future president will not have to make. 
The nuclear weapons in the United States arsenal are safe and reliable 
and I am determined our stockpile stewardship program will ensure they 
remain so in the absence of nuclear testing.

I recognize that our present monitoring systems will not detect, with 
high confidence, very low-yield tests. Therefore, I am committed to 
pursuing a comprehensive research and development program to improve our 
treaty monitoring capabilities and operations.

Thirty-two years ago, President Kennedy called the completion of the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty in Moscow a "shaft of light cut into the 
darkness" of the Cold War. With it, he said, the nation could "step back 
from the shadows of war and seek out the way of peace." We did, and the 
world is a safer place because of it. I believe that we are ready to 
take the next step and lead the world to a comprehensive test ban. This 
would be a fitting tribute to all those--Republicans and Democrats--who 
have worked for a CTBT over the past four decades. (###)



ARTICLE 7:

Taiwan and the United Nations
Kent Wiedemann, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs

Statement before the House International Relations Committee, 
Washington, DC, August 3, 1995

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: I welcome the opportunity to 
appear before you today to discuss one of the United States' most 
important relationships in Asia. We may have only unofficial ties with 
the people of Taiwan, but today I will describe a relationship that has 
strengthened and prospered under a unique set of circumstances. I will 
explain why the Administration cannot support Taiwan's participation in 
the UN and the Administration's view that only by maintaining the 
unofficial character of our ties with Taiwan can we ensure that the 
people of Taiwan and the U.S. continue to enjoy a stable and peaceful 
future.

The "One China" Policy

I would like to begin by reviewing U.S. policy toward Taiwan. Our policy 
is often simply described as "one China," but too rarely is the full 
definition of this position set out. The key elements of our policy are 
as follows:

-- Since 1979, the United States has recognized the Government of the 
People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China.

-- Since 1972, the U.S. has acknowledged the Chinese position that there 
is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. The Reagan Administration, 
in 1982, clarified that the U.S. has no intention of pursuing a policy 
of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan."

-- Within this context, the people of the U.S. will maintain cultural, 
commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

-- The U.S. has consistently held that resolution of the Taiwan issue is 
a matter to be worked out by the Chinese themselves. Our sole and 
abiding concern is that the resolution be peaceful.

These elements of our policy are set out in the three joint U.S.-P.R.C. 
communiques of 1972, 1979, and 1982, and the legal framework for our 
unofficial relations with Taiwan is provided by the Taiwan Relations Act 
of 1979. The Act also stipulates that the U.S. will make available to 
Taiwan such defensive arms as necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a 
sufficient self- defense capability. The Clinton Administration is 
committed to fully implementing this and all other elements of the 
Taiwan Relations Act--TRA, which is consistent with the three 
communiques. In our view, the TRA and the 1982 communique are 
complementary, both serving our goal of maintaining peace and stability 
in the Taiwan Strait area.

The foundations of our China policy have been supported by six 
administrations of both parties. All administrations since 1972 have 
shared these basic objectives: peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait 
area, constructive engagement with China, continuation of strong 
economic and cultural relations with the people of Taiwan, and peaceful 
resolution of the Taiwan issue by the Chinese people. This "one China" 
policy has worked exceptionally well and has enabled us to achieve 
progress toward all of our objectives. I will briefly discuss that 
progress.

Peace and Stability

First, peace and stability. Without a doubt, our China policy has been a 
key factor in the reduction of tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan's 
defense capability is as strong as it has ever been. We cannot overlook 
the recent P.R.C. missile exercise near Taiwan--which is clearly not 
helpful to a peaceful and stable atmosphere in the Strait--but we do not 
believe China poses an imminent military threat to Taiwan. In fact, we 
believe Taiwan has never been more secure. What has this meant for the 
people of Taiwan and for our relations with them? A great deal, in both 
political and economic terms.

The shift from a belligerent to a peaceful and stable climate in the 
Strait has had a direct impact on Taiwan's tremendous political 
transformation. Martial law was ended on Taiwan in 1987, setting the 
stage for democracy. In 1992, the legislature was directly elected by 
the people of Taiwan, and the second election will be held in December. 
Last year, the governor of Taiwan Province and the mayors of Taipei and 
Kaohsiung were, for the first time, directly elected. This movement 
toward democracy will culminate next year with the first direct 
presidential election.

Peace and stability in the Strait also created the foundation for 
Taiwan's economic miracle. The people of Taiwan now enjoy an average 
annual income of U.S. $11,600--up from less than $2,000 in 1979. Taiwan 
holds about $100 billion in foreign exchange--the second-highest reserve 
level after Japan. Taiwan is a major force in the global high-tech 
market as a producer of PCs and the world's largest supplier of computer 
monitors. Just over 25 years ago, the U.S. was providing aid to Taiwan. 
Now, Taiwan is an important aid donor to others.

Another objective of our China policy is engagement with China. In 
recent testimony, Assistant Secretary Winston Lord and I have described 
the importance of the President's policy of pursuing a constructive, 
cooperative relationship with the P.R.C. Our strategic goal is to help 
China integrate further into the international community and to 
encourage it to accept both the benefits and obligations that come with 
interdependence and cooperation. Under the engagement strategy, this 
Administration has secured China's cooperation on security issues such 
as North Korea, Cambodia, the NPT, narcotics trafficking, alien 
smuggling, and regional security dialogues. We have also reached 
important economic agreements. At the same time, we have had ongoing 
problems in other areas, notably human rights, where the situation is 
distressing and disturbing. We hope to overcome our current difficulties 
and to make progress in this very important relationship.

Cross-Strait Relations

Mr. Chairman, I would also like to focus today on another important 
relationship--the ties between Taiwan and China. These ties have grown 
at a phenomenal pace during the last 21/2 years. New exchanges in the 
fields of commerce, science, and culture take place virtually every 
week. This year, trade across the Strait is expected to reach almost $20 
billion--nearly double the level of 1992. China may, this year, replace 
the U.S. as Taiwan's largest export market. Since 1987, Taiwan is 
estimated to have invested more than $20 billion in the mainland. 
Delegations from academic and business communities cross the Strait for 
meetings, and nuclear scientists from the mainland have visited Taiwan 
to discuss power plant operation and disposal of low-level waste. Taiwan 
residents may take as many as 1.5 million trips to the mainland this 
year. Last month's P.R.C. missile exercise may have slowed, at least 
temporarily, the pace of these exchanges, but they are expected to 
continue because they are in the interests of both sides. China recently 
suspended high-level meetings of the unofficial cross-Strait dialogue, 
indicating that this was tied to Lee Teng-hui's private visit to the 
U.S. We urge that these meetings resume soon.

Given Taiwan's important role in the global economy, it strikes some as 
anachronistic that the U.S.--and all but 30 countries around the world--
maintain only unofficial relations with Taipei. I agree that it is an 
unusual, indeed unique relationship. The key point is that our policy 
works.

U.S.-Taiwan Ties

Let me quickly review the extent of our unofficial relationship with 
Taiwan:

-- U.S. economic ties with Taiwan have grown stronger since 1979. Taiwan 
is our seventh-largest trading partner. It is the fifth-largest importer 
of U.S. agricultural products. We have a $10 billion trade deficit with 
Taiwan, but that has declined from the high of $17 billion in 1987. 
Cumulative U.S. investment in Taiwan now stands at over $5 billion, 
representing a quarter of all foreign investment there.

-- We are selling to Taiwan the material necessary for it to maintain a 
sufficient self-defense capability, consistent with the TRA and the 1982 
joint communique with China.

-- Under the auspices of the American Institute in Taiwan--AIT--our 
unofficial link to Taipei--senior Administration officials regularly 
meet with Taiwan representatives. Most recently, Under Secretary Summers 
and his Taiwan counterpart met, at the Department of the Treasury, to 
discuss a broad range of economic issues.

-- AIT has signed 90 agreements with its Taiwan counterpart. These 
agreements call for U.S.-Taiwan cooperation on issues such as protection 
for the environment and endangered species, copyright protection, 
textile trade, safeguards for nuclear power plants, and disease 
prevention.

-- Cultural ties also have expanded. In 1981, AIT processed about 70,000 
non-immigrant visas. Last year, there were more than 300,000. More than 
37,000 Taiwan students are in the U.S., and American institutions are 
the top choice for Taiwan's post-graduate students--by now, everyone 
knows that Lee Teng-hui earned a Ph.D. at Cornell. Complementing that 
flow, more than 25,000 Americans are living in Taiwan.

-- We have actively supported Taiwan's membership in international 
economic organizations open to entities other than states. For example, 
we ensured that Taiwan, under the name "Chinese Taipei," is a member of 
APEC. We are also strongly supporting Taiwan's accession to the WTO.

All of this adds up to an unofficial relationship that is closer and 
more productive than the official, diplomatic ties we have with many 
countries. Our current China policy has made this possible.

Taiwan and the UN

The question before us today is, should the U.S. support Taiwan's 
participation in the United Nations, and can it do so without harm to 
its highly successful policy of the past 16 years? The Administration's 
answer is no. Let me be clear: The U.S. could accept any solution to 
this issue which is consistent with the UN Charter and is agreed upon by 
the people on both sides of the Strait. Until Taiwan and the P.R.C. 
reach such an agreement, however, we believe that no good--and 
considerable harm--would come from U.S. support of Taiwan's 
participation in the UN. We should not seek to insert the U.S. into the 
middle of this issue.

Let's look at this question from a practical perspective. Last year, 12 
countries supported a UN resolution for Taiwan participation. The UN 
General Committee dropped it without a vote. This year, 15 countries 
support a similar resolution: Burkina Faso, the Central African 
Republic, Costa Rica, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, 
Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Nicaragua, Niger, Panama, Solomon Islands, and Swaziland.

Outside of these co-sponsors, there is almost no support for the 
resolution among UN members, and China has made clear its intention to 
block or veto UN consideration of the Taiwan issue. With a permanent 
seat on the Security Council, China can accomplish this.

Even if a motion for Taiwan's participation in the UN is an effort 
doomed to fail, why shouldn't the U.S. lend its support? U.S. support 
for this pyrrhic effort would come at great cost to our relations with 
China. Support for Taiwan participation in the UN--an organization of 
states--would contradict our policy, since 1979, of recognizing the 
P.R.C. as the sole legal government of China. The P.R.C. has said it 
would view U.S. support as our abandoning one of the most fundamental 
elements of the U.S.-China relationship, an element reaffirmed by the 
commitment in 1982, under President Reagan, not to pursue a policy of 
"two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." It is important to note that 
Taiwan continues to have a "one China" policy.

U.S. support for Taiwan's UN effort could also jeopardize China's 
support for a broad range of important issues in the UN--issues of 
importance to the American people, such as democracy-building in Haiti 
and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Without Chinese cooperation, the 
UN would be significantly weakened.

Most importantly, U.S. support for Taiwan participation in the UN would 
jeopardize peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. We would put at 
risk the economic and political progress achieved by the people of 
Taiwan. We would also risk the growing peaceful exchanges between Taiwan 
and the mainland, exchanges that benefit people on both sides of the 
Strait.

In the end, our support for an effort that clearly will not succeed 
could put at risk U.S. interests in the Strait area, as well as the 
interests of the people of Taiwan. Until Taipei and Beijing can reach 
agreement on this issue, supporting Taiwan participation in the UN is 
not in the U.S. national interest, and we believe it is also not in the 
interest of the people of Taiwan, nor the people of the entire region, 
who would not benefit from a destabilized situation.

So, where do we go from here? As I stated at the outset of my testimony, 
we continue to maintain that the question of Taiwan's relationship to 
the P.R.C. is an issue to be resolved by the Chinese people themselves. 
Our abiding interest is that the resolution come about peacefully. This 
will obviously not happen overnight. We urge Beijing and Taipei to 
patiently continue the talks and economic interchange that they have 
successfully initiated. This--not U.S. support for a quixotic resolution 
in the UN--is the way toward a secure and prosperous future for the 
people of Taiwan. (###)



ARTICLE 8:

Treaty Actions

Chemical Weapons 
Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, 
stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction, with 
annexes. Done at Paris Jan. 13, 19931. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 103-21.
Ratifications: Croatia, May 23, 1995; Monaco, June 1, 1995.

Children 
Convention on the rights of the child. Adopted at New York
Nov. 20, 1989. Entered into force Sept. 2, 19902.
Ratification: Haiti, June 8, 1995.

Copyrights 
Berne convention for the protection of literary and artistic works of 
Sept. 9, 1886, as revised. Done at Paris July 24, 1971, amended in 1979. 
Entered into force for the U.S. Mar. 1, 1989. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-
27.
Accessions: Latvia, May 11, 1995; St. Vincent and the Grenadines, May 
29, 1995.

Judicial Procedure
Convention abolishing the requirement of legalization for foreign public 
documents, with annex. Done at The Hague Oct. 5, 1961. Entered into 
force Jan. 24, 1965; for the U.S. Oct. 15, 1981. TIAS 10072; 33 UST 883.
Accessions: Latvia, May 11, 1995; Liberia, May 24, 1995.

Patents 
Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations. Done at Washington June 19, 
1970. Entered into force Jan. 24, 1978. TIAS 8733; 28 UST 7645.
Accession: The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, May 10, 1995.

Phonograms 
Convention for the protection of producers of phonograms against 
unauthorized duplication of their phonograms. Done at Geneva Oct. 29, 
1971. Entered into force Apr. 18, 1973; for the U.S. Mar. 10, 1974. TIAS 
7808; 25 UST 309.
Accession: Bulgaria, May 31, 1995.

Property 
Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. 
Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force Apr. 26 1970; for 
the U.S. Aug. 25, 1970. TIAS 6932; 21 UST 1749.
Accession: St. Vincent and the Grenadines, May 29, 1995.

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of Mar. 
20, 1883, as revised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into 
force Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S. Sept. 5, 1970. TIAS 6923, 7727; 24 UST 
2140.
Accessions: St. Vincent and the Grenadines, May 29, 1995; Venezuela, 
June 9, 1995.

Narcotics
United Nations convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances, with annex and final act. Done at Vienna Dec. 
20, 1988. Entered into force Nov. 11, 1990. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 101-4.
Accession: St. Kitts and Nevis, Apr. 19, 1995.

Terrorism
Convention on the safety of United Nations and associated
personnel. Done at New York Dec. 9, 19941. Open for signature at United 
Nations Headquarters until Dec. 31, 1995.
Signatures: Honduras, May 17, 1995; Japan, June 6, 1995; Luxembourg, May 
31, 1995.
Acceptance: Japan, June 6, 1995.

Torture
Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment. Adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations Dec. 10, 1984. Entered into force June 26, 1987; for the U.S. 
Nov. 20, 1994. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-20.
Ratification: Cuba, May 17, 1995.

Treaties 
Vienna convention on the law of treaties, with annex. Done at
Vienna May 23, 1969. Entered into force Jan. 27, 19802.
Accession: Georgia, June 8, 1995.

Women
Convention on the political rights of women. Done at New York
Mar. 31, 1953. Entered into force July 7, 1954; for the United States 
July 7, 1976. TIAS 8289; 27 UST 1909.
Accession: Zimbabwe, June 5, 1995.

World Heritage
Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and material 
heritage. Done at Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force Dec. 17, 1975. 
TIAS 8226; 27 UST 37.
Ratification: Dominica, Apr. 4, 1995.

Croatia
Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official 
government employees. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 24 
and June 20, 1995. Entered into force June 20, 1995.

Georgia
Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official 
government employees. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Dec. 
5, 1994 and June 20, 1995. Entered into force June 20, 1995.

Mali 
Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official 
government employees. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Mar. 6 
and June 20, 1995. Entered into force June 20, 1995.

Mexico
Guarantee agreement. Signed at Washington Feb. 21, 1995.
Entered into force Feb. 21, 1995.

Medium-term exchange stabilization agreement. Signed at Washington Feb. 
21, 1995. Entered into force Feb. 21, 1995.

Framework agreement for Mexican economic stabilization, with annexes. 
Signed at Washington Feb. 21, 1995. Entered into force Feb. 21, 1995.
_______

1Not in force. 
2Not in force for the U.S. (###)



[END OF DISPATCH VOL. 6, NO. 34]

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