U.S DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH   
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 32, AUGUST 7, 1995   
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS   
   
   
   
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:   
   
1.  The U.S. and Korea: Renewing a Historic Alliance--President Clinton,   
South Korean President Kim   
2.  Working Toward a Secure and Prosperous Asia-Pacific--Secretary   
Christopher, Chinese Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen,   
Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono   
3.  American Engagement in the Post-Cold War World--Deputy Secretary   
Talbott    
4.  Arms Embargo Against Bosnia and Herzegovina    
5.  Assessment of U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in Asia--Robert S.   
Gelbard    
6.  Charting Further Gains in the Status and Rights of Women--Madeleine   
K. Albright    
   
   
   
ARTICLE 1:   
   
The U.S. and South Korea: Renewing a Historic Alliance   
President Clinton, South Korean President Kim   
Opening remarks at a press conference, Washington, DC, July 27, 1995   
   
President Clinton. On this day, as we remember the sacrifice of those   
who built the great alliance between the United States and Korea,   
President Kim has come back to the White House to look forward. In our   
discussions, we focused on the clear and common goals that our nations   
have pursued together for decades--to strengthen our alliance, to stand   
together against threats to our shared ideals and interests, and to   
increase the safety and prosperity of our people.   
   
Over the past three years, President Kim and I have worked closely   
together to advance these goals. In him I have found an ally whose   
courage is matched only by his commitment to freedom.   
   
Our talks centered on the critical strategic challenges facing Korea and   
the United States. Forty-two years have passed since the Korean war   
ended, but for the people of South Korea the threat is present every   
day. Through all these years, America's commitment to South Korea has   
not wavered. And today, I reaffirmed our nation's pledge to keep   
American forces in Korea as long as they are needed, and the Korean   
people want them to remain.   
   
President Kim and I discussed the strategy our nations, along with   
Japan, are using to confront a new, but no less terrible, threat to his   
people--North Korea's dangerous nuclear program. Already, thanks to our   
efforts, North Korea has frozen its existing program under international   
inspection. Today, President Kim reaffirmed his strong support for the   
Framework and for the understanding reached in Kuala Lumpur that   
confirmed South Korea's central role in helping the North acquire less   
dangerous light-water reactors.   
   
I also told President Kim that the United States regards North Korea's   
commitment to resume dialogue with the South as an integral component of   
the Framework. President Kim expressed to me his determination to enter   
into meaningful dialogue with the North, and the United States stands   
ready to support his efforts. As North Korea fulfills its nuclear   
commitments and addresses other concerns, it can look forward to better   
relations with the community of nations. I emphasized to President Kim,   
however, that until South and North Korea negotiate a peace agreement,   
the armistice regime will remain in place.   
   
President Kim and I also touched on a number of regional and global   
security issues--efforts to ensure stability in Northeast Asia, Korea's   
commitment to peacekeeping, and our commitment to work together on   
issues facing the United Nations Security Council. Finally, we reviewed   
a wide range of economic issues, including APEC, and we talked about   
efforts to expand our bilateral trade. Korea is already our country's   
sixth-largest export market.   
   
One hour from now, the President and I will look to the past as we   
dedicate the new Korean War Veterans Memorial on the Mall. This monument   
is a long overdue reminder of what Americans, fighting alongside the   
people of South Korea, sacrificed in the defense of freedom. Today's   
meetings remind us that the people of South Korea have built a nation   
truly worthy of that sacrifice--the 11th-largest economy in the world   
and a thriving, vital, vibrant democracy. It is a country America is   
proud to claim as an equal partner and ally, a reminder that the   
strength of democracy and the power of a free people to pursue their own   
dreams are the strongest forces on earth.   
   
Let me now invite President Kim to make opening remarks.   
   
President Kim. Today, President Clinton and I exchanged wide-ranging   
views and opinions on the situation in the Korean Peninsula and in   
Northeast Asia, and agreed to further strengthen cooperation between our   
two countries to preserve the peace and stability of the region.   
   
President Clinton reaffirmed the United States' firm commitment to the   
security of the Republic of Korea, and I supported the U.S. policy of   
forward deployment of U.S. troops to maintain peace in East Asia.   
President Clinton and I reconfirmed that maintaining and strengthening a   
firm, joint Korean-U.S. defense posture is essential to safeguarding the   
peace and stability not only of the Korean Peninsula, but also of the   
Northeast Asian region.   
   
We share the view that improvement of relations between the United   
States and North Korea should proceed in harmony and parallel with the   
improvement of relations between the Republic of Korea and North Korea.   
We also agreed that our two countries will cooperate closely with each   
other in encouraging North Korea to open its doors in order to ease   
tensions on the Korean Peninsula and promote peace in Northeast Asia.   
   
With regard to this issue, I noted that the issue of establishing a   
permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula should be pursued through   
dialogue between South and North Korea, under the principle that the   
issues should be resolved between the parties directly concerned.   
President Clinton expressed total U.S. support and resolve to cooperate   
with the Republic of Korea regarding this issue.   
   
The Korean Government supports the results of the Geneva agreement and   
Kuala Lumpur agreement. And President Clinton and I affirmed that the   
governments of our two countries, while maintaining close coordination   
with regard to the implementation of the U.S.-North Korea agreement,   
will continue to provide the support needed by the Korean Peninsula   
Energy Development Organization.   
   
President Clinton and I expressed satisfaction over the fact that the   
economic and trade relations between our two countries have entered a   
mature phase in terms of the size of our bilateral trade, the trade   
balance, and bilateral investments, and should continue to develop   
further on a well-balanced basis. At the same time, we reaffirmed that   
our two nations will further expand mutually beneficial bilateral   
cooperation under the new international economic conditions being   
created by the inauguration of the World Trade Organization. We also   
agreed that any bilateral trade issues arising out of increasing volumes   
of trade between two countries will be resolved smoothly through   
working-level consultations.   
   
President Clinton and I concurred that our two countries need to further   
improve bilateral relations, both in terms of quality and quantity, so   
that in the forthcoming Asia-Pacific era of the 21st century, our two   
nations can assume leading roles in enhancing cooperation and the   
development of the Asia-Pacific region. In this context, President   
Clinton and I agreed to coordinate closely with each other to ensure   
that the upcoming APEC Summit Conference in November of this year in   
Osaka will be a success. Furthermore, we agreed that our two countries   
will bolster multi-pronged collaboration in the United Nations and other   
international organizations.   
   
We are fully satisfied with the results of our talk, which we believe   
will provide added momentum to the efforts to develop the five-decade-  
old Korean-U.S. relations forged in blood further into a future-oriented   
partnership between allies for the next half-century. I would like to   
express my appreciation once again to President Clinton and the U.S.   
Government for their warm hospitality and kindness extended to me and my   
delegation. Thank you.     
   
(###)   
   
   
   
ARTICLE 2:   
   
Working Toward a Secure and Prosperous Asia-Pacific   
Secretary Christopher, Chinese Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian   
Qichen, Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono   
   
Intervention at ASEAN Regional Forum   
Opening intervention by Secretary Christopher at ASEAN Regional Forum   
Ministerial, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, August 1, 1995.   
   
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great pleasure to join you today at the   
second meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum. Through the forum's   
development, the nations of ASEAN are once again demonstrating their   
commitment to creating an Asia-Pacific community. Brunei, in particular,   
deserves great credit for the work it has done as chairman and host to   
make this year's meeting a success.   
   
The end of the Cold War has brought profound change to the Asia-Pacific   
region. After a half-century that saw three wars involving almost every   
country represented here today, Asia has an unprecedented opportunity to   
provide its people with lasting security and prosperity. Our region is   
now remarkably free of conflict. But while no major power views any   
other as an immediate military threat, there is a danger that old   
rivalries could be rekindled or new ones could develop. Moreover, many   
Asian powers are in a period of transition. All our nations face new   
challenges such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the   
emergence of narcotics networks, and severe pressures on the   
environment. These challenges underscore the importance of the potential   
of the ASEAN Regional Forum.   
   
In this time of change, a stable U.S. presence is especially important.   
Indeed, that presence is widely welcomed in the region. Moreover, on the   
50th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, American engagement   
in Asia remains as essential to our own security and prosperity as ever   
before. That is why President Clinton has renewed and reinforced our   
commitment to remain a Pacific power.   
   
Our strategy for a peaceful and prosperous Asia-Pacific region starts   
with our core alliances. Security must always come first. Our five   
treaty alliances with Japan, Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the   
Philippines will continue to provide the foundation for our security   
commitment, with the U.S.-Japan alliance as its cornerstone. The United   
States will keep approximately 100,000 troops in the region--roughly   
equivalent to the level we will maintain in Europe. In addition to the   
U.S. troops stationed in the region through our treaty alliances, we   
will maintain other forward-deployed forces through access arrangements   
with other countries in the region.   
   
We will also pursue a policy of engagement with the other leading powers   
in the region, including former Cold War adversaries. Few nations are   
poised to play as large a role in shaping the future of Asia as China.   
While we are now experiencing a period of difficulty in this important   
relationship, we are convinced that the policy of engagement we have   
carried out for more than two decades is in the interest of the United   
States, China, and the other countries of the Asia-Pacific region.   
   
I am committed to this policy of regular involvement with Chinese   
leaders and will have my ninth meeting with Foreign Minister Qian Qichen   
this evening. In my meeting, I intend to review the fundamentals of the   
U.S.-P.R.C. relationship, to reiterate the continuity of our so-called   
"one-China" policy, to address candidly areas where our policies   
diverge, and to seek to restore positive momentum to the relationship.   
We have no desire to contain or isolate China. I believe that both the   
United States and China have a responsibility to maintain constructive   
relationships with each other and with the entire Pacific community.   
   
On Saturday, I will travel to Vietnam to carry out President Clinton's   
historic decision to open full diplomatic relations between our two   
countries. In addition to promoting regional stability, this step will   
further the United States' priority goal of securing the fullest   
possible accounting of our prisoners of war and missing-in-action. The   
President's decision is a further manifestation of our engagement in   
Asia. We also will continue to engage with Russia, recognizing that a   
stable, democratic, and prosperous Russia can be a force for security   
and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific as well as in Europe.   
   
To reinforce our treaty alliances and our policy of engagement, we will   
work with others in the region to build a sound architecture for   
regional cooperation. The ASEAN Regional Forum will have a central place   
in this work. The regional forum--only one year old--can make an   
important contribution. Just glance around this table. In no other   
governmental forum does the Pacific community gather to address key   
security issues. Given its membership, the forum can play a useful role   
in conveying intentions, promoting constructive dialogue, and   
restraining potential arms races. In its first year, the forum has   
already made significant progress in building consensus on possible   
confidence-building measures and in identifying areas for cooperation.   
   
Today's meeting gives us the opportunity to develop the ASEAN forum's   
potential. Allow me to mention briefly some regional security issues   
that we believe are particularly important.   
   
-- No issue has been more important than the challenge posed by North   
Korea's nuclear program. We are on the road to resolving this issue. We   
urge the nations of the Asia-Pacific region to support the Korean   
Peninsula Energy Development Organization that will play a key role in   
implementing the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework.  
   
-- Maintaining freedom of navigation is a fundamental interest of the   
United States. We urge all claimants  in the South China Sea to solve   
their disputes through dialogue, and we reiterate our willingness to   
assist in any way they deem helpful. We welcome China's statement that   
it will act in accordance with international law, including the Law of   
the Sea, in its efforts to resolve this dispute.  
   
-- The United States welcomes Cambodia's membership in the ASEAN   
Regional Forum. We call on its members and the international community   
to continue to support the efforts of the Cambodian people to overcome   
their tragic past.   
   
The forum Chairman's statement should show that we had a constructive   
discussion of these and other issues in the spirit of mutual respect   
that has already served the forum so well. I also hope that we can agree   
on a work program for our first series of intergovernmental meetings   
over the coming year. Never have the prospects for a secure and   
prosperous Asia-Pacific region seemed brighter. Our successful efforts   
today will help ensure that the current favorable environment will   
endure. Thank you very much.   
   
Seven-Plus-Seven Session   
Remarks by Secretary Christopher at the Seven-Plus-Seven Session of the   
ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, August   
2, 1995.   
   
It is a great honor for me to represent the United States at this ASEAN   
Post-Ministerial Conference. Two years ago, when I joined you at the PMC   
in Singapore, President Clinton had just proposed that America work with   
our allies and friends to create a New Pacific Community--a community   
based on shared security, shared prosperity, and a shared commitment to   
democratic values.   
   
For almost three decades, ASEAN has been the model of community building   
in the Asia-Pacific. In 1967, amid the turmoil of the Vietnam war,   
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand set aside   
their differences to issue their historic Bangkok declaration. Thanks in   
part to ASEAN's efforts "to promote regional peace and stability," the   
wheel has now come full circle, and Vietnam has joined ASEAN's ranks. As   
the only existing intergovernmental organization in the Pacific Basin,   
ASEAN also helped lay the groundwork for the formation of APEC in 1989.   
Today, ASEAN remains at the forefront of APEC and is spurring regional   
growth and integration through the ASEAN Free Trade Area. The ASEAN way   
of consultation, consensus, and cooperation is gradually becoming the   
way of the Asia-Pacific.   
   
The United States sees a strong partnership with ASEAN as essential to   
our engagement in the Asia-Pacific and to the creation of a Pacific   
community. Indeed, on the 50th anniversary of the end of the Second   
World War, our engagement in Asia is as essential to our security and   
prosperity as ever before.   
   
The United States is and will remain a Pacific power--militarily,   
economically, and politically. Since we last met, the United States has   
reaffirmed our engagement and military force levels in the region. We   
have worked with the Republic of Korea and other nations to put the   
North Korean nuclear issue on the road to resolution. We have reinforced   
our bedrock alliance with Japan and have concluded a series of   
agreements that strengthen our economic relationship. We have sought to   
engage China on a range of issues important to regional stability. We   
have worked hard to make progress on regional and global non-  
proliferation, including this year's unconditional, indefinite extension   
of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.    
   
We have deepened our cooperation with Australia and rejuvenated our ties   
with New Zealand. We have bolstered our support for a democratic   
Cambodia and for the promotion of democracy in Burma. We have opened up   
a new chapter in our relations with Vietnam. We have made clear our   
interest in a peaceful resolution of disputes in the South China Sea. We   
have supported the ARF and the development of a Northeast Asia Security   
Dialogue as valuable supplements to our five treaty alliances and   
forward military presence.   
   
Our strategy in the region advances our enduring interests but also   
recognizes the new opportunities and challenges posed by the post-Cold   
War world. The region is now remarkably free of conflict. But while no   
major power in the region views any other as an immediate military   
threat, there is a danger that age-old rivalries could be rekindled.   
Dynamic economic growth is spurring integration, but competition for   
resources and markets is creating new tensions. With development and the   
spread of technology have come problems such as the proliferation of   
weapons of mass destruction, the emergence of sophisticated narcotics   
networks, and severe pressures on the environment.   
   
No nation in the Asia-Pacific can confront these complex transnational   
challenges on its own. They can be met only by a community of nations   
acting together--a diverse community, to be sure, but one increasingly   
linked by shared interests and values.   
   
Of these shared interests, none is greater than security. The United   
States believes that a strong U.S. security presence remains the   
foundation for regional stability and prosperity. We will stand by our   
commitment to security in the Pacific in peacetime no less than we did   
in the three wars in Asia that took almost 200,000 American lives.   
   
Our five treaty alliances with Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Thailand,   
and Australia will continue to anchor our security commitment. The   
United States will keep approximately 100,000 troops in the region--  
roughly equivalent to the level we will maintain in Europe. In addition   
to our arrangements with our treaty allies, we will also maintain other   
forward-deployed forces through formal and informal access arrangements   
with countries in the region--many of them ASEAN members--who welcome   
our continued presence.   
   
On the foundation of our forward presence and our treaty alliances, we   
will deepen our engagement with other leading powers in the Asia-  
Pacific. Few nations are poised to play as large a role in shaping the   
future of the region than China. As two great powers with very different   
political systems, the United States and China will inevitably have   
differences. But neither the United States nor China can afford the   
luxury of walking away from our responsibility to manage those   
differences--in the interests of our nations, the Asia-Pacific, and the   
entire world.   
   
The United States continues to believe that a strong, stable, open, and   
prosperous China can be a strong partner and a responsible leader of the   
international community. Within the region, China's economic development   
and military posture will inevitably have a major impact on the   
perceptions and actions of other nations.   
   
Later this week, I will travel to Vietnam to formally open diplomatic   
relations between our two countries. Since taking office, President   
Clinton has worked to achieve the fullest possible accounting of our   
prisoners of war and missing-in-action. We have been encouraged by the   
results of Hanoi's cooperation. We are convinced that normalizing   
relations is the best way to achieve further results. That is why, after   
a decade of war and two decades of estrangement, President Clinton made   
the courageous decision to establish diplomatic relations between our   
two countries. Closer engagement is in America's interest because   
Vietnam is a vibrant country in a region of strategic importance to the   
United States. We welcome its admission to ASEAN.   
   
Russia is another power in the Pacific that we continue to engage. Since   
this Administration took office, we have supported democratic reform in   
Russia as the best investment we can make in our nation's security and   
prosperity. We have been joined in this effort by Japan and South Korea,   
which recognize that a stable, democratic, and prosperous Russia can be   
a force for security and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific as well as in   
Europe.   
   
We will engage China, Vietnam, Russia, and other powers through our   
bilateral relationships and through the ASEAN Regional Forum and other   
multilateral dialogues. We believe that the ARF can play a constructive   
role in conveying intentions, easing suspicions, building confidence,   
and, ultimately, averting conflicts. The decision at yesterday's second   
ARF Ministerial to approve a governmental work program has created a   
firm basis for the development of the ARF in the coming year.   
Yesterday's meeting also provided an especially useful forum for   
discussing regional security concerns.   
   
None of these security concerns has been more urgent that North Korea's   
nuclear program. That is why the United States, consulting closely with   
the Republic of Korea, Japan, and other nations, concluded the U.S.-  
D.P.R.K. Agreed Framework. The United States is committed to faithful   
implementation of the Framework. We will work patiently to resolve   
outstanding issues as long as the North maintains the freeze on its   
nuclear program and fulfills its other Framework obligations.   
   
But implementation will require continued close coordination among the   
United States, South Korea, and Japan. Moreover, just as the North   
Korean nuclear issue affects the security of the entire Asia-Pacific,   
the entire Asia-   Pacific has the ability--indeed, the responsibility--  
to help in its lasting resolution. Many of the nations here today are   
already contributing to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development   
Organization--KEDO--that will play a central role in implementing the   
Framework. KEDO deserves strong and continuing support from all who   
share an interest in the security of this region. After all, the Agreed   
Framework is an important step in a process by which the region can   
achieve the goal of lasting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.   
The resumption of a broader dialogue between North and South--especially   
on the issue of a nuclear-free peninsula--offers the only meaningful   
hope for ultimate reconciliation.   
   
North Korea's quest for nuclear weapons highlights the wider threat   
posed to this region and the world by the proliferation of weapons of   
mass destruction. That is why the indefinite extension of the Non-  
Proliferation Treaty is a historic achievement for the region and the   
international community. The United States is committed to negotiating a   
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by 1996, and will continue its testing   
moratorium until September 1996. We regret the decisions by China and   
France to continue testing during this period. Today, I reiterate our   
call for a testing moratorium.   
   
There are additional steps our nations can and should take to limit the   
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We should carry out the   
decision taken at the NPT Review and Extension Conference on the   
immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-  
discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the   
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. I would also urge   
ASEAN states to implement responsible technology transfer policies,   
including export controls on sensitive transfers.   
   
Like proliferation, many of the security challenges now facing the   
region defy the bounds of geography and ideology and require a strong   
collective response. Stopping the flow of narcotics is an important   
example. All of our nations are affected by this scourge, but no one   
nation alone can stop poppies from being grown and refined into heroin   
in Burma and then shipped through Thailand, China, and other countries   
to users in Asia, in Europe, and in the United States.   
   
The United States is working to reduce domestic demand for illicit   
narcotics. We are also supporting alternative development and drug   
enforcement in the ASEAN region. We are continuing our bilateral   
counternarcotics assistance programs in Laos and Thailand. We look   
forward to working closely with Vietnam and Cambodia on drug control   
efforts. We also hope to join with all countries of the ASEAN region in   
a coordinated effort to stem the flow of heroin from Burma. As with   
narcotics, we must also collectively confront the challenges of   
protecting the environment and controlling unsustainable population   
growth.   
   
As our discussions at the ASEAN Regional Forum brought out, the nations   
of the Asia-Pacific face another shared security challenge: ensuring   
stability and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and the   
Spratly Islands. Almost 25% of the world's ocean freight passes through   
these vital sea lanes. The United States continues to urge claimants to   
the Spratlys to intensify diplomatic efforts to manage this issue   
peacefully. We welcome China's statement that it will act in accordance   
with international law, including the Law of the Sea, in its efforts to   
resolve this dispute.   
   
These new approaches to regional security complement the economic   
integration that is helping to fuel the Asia-Pacific's economic   
dynamism. Our region is united in its understanding of the critical   
contribution that the opening of markets and the reduction of trade and   
investment barriers can make to the prosperity of our people. Two years   
ago, the leaders of APEC gave a strong impetus to the successful   
conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations. Now our region must help   
to ensure rapid and full implementation of the Uruguay Round agreement   
and the success of the World Trade Organization we launched last   
January.   
   
We must also work through APEC to promote regional economic growth and   
integration. The United States remains committed to APEC as the   
cornerstone of economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. Indeed,   
our ability to cooperate within APEC is one of the vital signs of   
community building in the Pacific. Intensive cabinet-level meetings this   
year between APEC's finance, telecommunications, and transportation   
ministers have deepened the patterns of consultation that have developed   
among APEC nations over the last six years.   
   
By convening the first-ever APEC Leaders' Meeting two years ago on Blake   
Island outside Seattle, the President helped shape a shared vision for a   
New Pacific Community. Last year in Bogor, the leaders committed to   
achieve free and open trade and investment in the region by 2020. This   
year in Osaka, we expect APEC leaders to turn their historic vision into   
a blueprint for liberalization. That blueprint should set forth shared   
principles, specific goals for liberalization, and a process for   
achieving them.   
   
In addition to our global and regional efforts, the United States will   
continue to work bilaterally to promote economic growth and open   
markets. Under our Framework for an Economic Partnership with Japan, for   
example, we have reached 16 agreements with wide-ranging benefits for   
our two economies and that of the region and the world. While we may   
have differences with our trading partners, we see those differences as   
a normal part of bilateral relations and will not allow them to   
undermine our cooperation in other areas.   
   
The Asia-Pacific region has benefited enormously from the growth of   
global financial markets that have provided capital to help finance   
investment and trade. The recent Mexican financial crisis demonstrated   
the interdependence of the global financial system and the need for   
greater international efforts to prevent and to manage crises through   
greater disclosure and transparency and through a coordinated emergency   
response. Similarly, the recent problems at Barings Bank in Singapore   
and London also demonstrated our shared stake in more coordinated   
supervision of international financial institutions. At Halifax in June,   
the G-7 nations took significant steps in both these areas. We look to   
the ASEAN nations to strongly support these important initiatives as   
they are considered by the International Monetary Fund.   
   
If open markets and open sea lanes promote prosperity and security in   
the Pacific, so, too, do open societies. Business people in Shanghai and   
San Francisco may speak different languages, but they agree that   
enterprise thrives when ideas and information are exchanged freely. The   
experiences of Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, much of Southeast   
Asia, Australia, and New Zealand tell us that accountable government and   
the rule of law are the bedrock of stability and prosperity. The reality   
of Burma and North Korea tells us that repression entrenches poverty and   
insecurity.   
   
In Burma, the efforts of each of our nations helped to lead to the   
recent release of Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the movement that won   
that country's 1990 elections. We warmly welcome the Nobel laureate's   
release. It gives us reason to hope that Burma's fundamental problems   
can be resolved. But we should remember that those problems continue,   
including grave human rights violations, massive forced labor, and drug   
trafficking.   
   
We believe the true significance of Aung San Suu Kyi's release depends   
on whether it leads to real movement toward the restoration of a   
government accountable to Burma's people. We should make clear to   
Rangoon that only progress on democracy, human rights, and   
counternarcotics will make it possible for Burma to rejoin the Southeast   
Asian mainstream. In the absence of further progress, we must heed Aung   
San Suu Kyi's call to maintain a principled stand on behalf of   
democratic change.   
   
Cambodia has already embarked on the process of democratic renewal. This   
week, as the first American Secretary of State to travel to Cambodia in   
40 years, I will reaffirm America's support for its efforts to build a   
stable and prosperous democracy. That nation's remarkable progress is a   
tribute to its people, as well as a tribute to the international   
community's efforts over the past several years in which ASEAN played a   
key role. We warmly welcomed its participation yesterday at the ARF. But   
Cambodia's future cannot be taken for granted. It will need continued   
international support. It will need the continued determination of its   
government and people to consolidate reform and to strengthen the rule   
of law.   
   
Cambodia's progress and Vietnam's admission to ASEAN are but two of the   
most striking examples of the fading of Cold War divisions and the   
closer integration of the Pacific. Currents of commerce and culture are   
carrying our nations toward a common destiny. Building on the advances   
we have already made, and drawing on the unique characteristics of the   
region, we hope to work with our neighbors to create a Pacific community   
that will be safe, prosperous, and free. Thank you very much.   
   
Seven-Plus-One Session   
Remarks by Secretary Christopher at the Seven-Plus-One Session of the   
ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, August   
2, 1995.   
   
It is a pleasure to have this opportunity to exchange views with my   
ASEAN colleagues. Our meeting this afternoon gives us a chance to   
reinforce and extend our constructive relationship.   
   
For three decades, ASEAN has been a driving force for dialogue and   
cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. Created in a period of regional strife,   
ASEAN has long recognized the value of a common approach to common   
challenges. By acting together, the six diverse ASEAN nations have made   
a singular contribution to shaping a strong regional identity based on   
the pursuit of converging interests.   
   
Through ASEAN, the region's first inclusive security grouping was   
launched last year, signaling a commitment to consultation instead of   
confrontation on contentious issues such as the Spratly Islands. Through   
ASEAN, old rivals have learned to work together in areas ranging from   
combating drug trafficking to building transportation networks. Through   
ASEAN, the circle of regional peace and prosperity has been expanded to   
reflect the changing face of Southeast Asia with Vietnam's admission as   
a full member. I look forward to my visit to Hanoi this weekend.    
   
Strong ties with ASEAN are an essential element of America's engagement   
in the Asia-Pacific. The United States is committed to working with   
ASEAN in a full and equal partnership that covers a broad range of   
shared security, economic, and political interests.   
   
The United States is and will remain a Pacific power. We will continue   
to maintain our security engagement in the region through our forward-  
deployed presence and our five bilateral treaty alliances. In Northeast   
Asia, our alliances with Japan and the Republic of Korea are the   
keystones of our commitment. Our alliances with Thailand and the   
Philippines, together with Australia, anchor that commitment in   
Southeast Asia. We hold extensive military exercises with Thailand,   
including the Pacific Command's largest joint exercise--Cobra Gold. In   
the post-bases era, we are renewing our military-to-military   
relationship with the Philippines. We also continue to develop bilateral   
defense ties with our other ASEAN partners, supporting our forward-  
deployed military presence through access to host government facilities   
and commercial arrangements.   
   
The United States and ASEAN work together to bolster security in   
Southeast Asia and around the world. The indefinite and unconditional   
extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was a landmark   
achievement. The Agreed Framework between the United States and North   
Korea helped avert an immediate nuclear crisis in ASEAN's neighborhood--  
and a future threat to global security.   
   
I want to thank the Government of Malaysia for hosting the United States   
and North Korea during our talks in May and June. As implementation of   
the Agreed Framework moves ahead, the United States will look to ASEAN   
for continued financial and political support for the Korean Economic   
Development Organization. Such support will be essential for successful   
implementation.   
   
Security and stability in the entire Asia-Pacific are necessary to   
undergird Southeast Asia's remarkable prosperity. Just as the long-term   
U.S. security presence has helped to keep the peace, America's   
longstanding determination to keep its markets open has helped the ASEAN   
countries to transform themselves "from dominos to dynamos." With some   
of the highest savings, investment, and growth rates in the world, the   
development of ASEAN's economies is a spectacular achievement. The ASEAN   
nations comprise a nearly half-trillion-dollar regional economy that is   
expected to double in size over the next 10 years.   
   
Indeed, the economies of the United States and the ASEAN nations have   
grown together. Already, ASEAN, as a whole, is America's fourth-largest   
trading partner. Two-way trade reached $84 billion in 1994--a 15%   
increase over 1993. We expect that trade to reach $100 billion within   
the next few years. And U.S. investment in the region has grown to more   
than $20 billion.   
   
With rising per capita incomes, a burgeoning middle class, growing   
consumer sophistication, and enormous infrastructure demands, the ASEAN   
economies are the latest addition to the roster of Big Emerging Markets   
that American business and the U.S. Government believe are the most   
dynamic in the world. That addition also reflects our judgment that   
ASEAN's economic integration has moved forward so rapidly that a   
regional economic entity is fast emerging. The Clinton Administration   
will take concrete steps to reinforce its support for American investors   
and exporters in each of the ASEAN nations.   
   
The commitment by your nations  to reduce or eliminate tariffs   
throughout the ASEAN Free Trade Area-- AFTA--by 2003 or even earlier,   
and to address a number of non-tariff barriers, will help to inspire   
further liberalization and even greater prosperity for the Asia-Pacific.   
At the same time, ASEAN's ability to meet several specific challenges   
will make it an even stronger magnet for investment and trade.   
   
First, we are encouraged that AFTA is already addressing intellectual   
property rights--to ensure protection for the innovation that is the   
lifeblood of all our economies. We also look to individual ASEAN nations   
to take additional steps on their own. Last November, Thailand enacted a   
new copyright law that we believe can serve as a model for the region.   
We hope that a patents law will be enacted as well. We are also   
encouraged by Malaysia's rigorous enforcement of its intellectual   
property rights laws.   
   
Second, we would also welcome region-wide agreements on trade in   
services, especially financial services. While we were unable to come to   
closure during recent discussions in Geneva, I want to stress that the   
United States does want to work with ASEAN to find ways to open   
financial markets to foreign participation.   
   
Third, the issue of government procurement merits a sharper ASEAN focus.   
The region's infrastructure needs are so large that governments are   
expected to award contracts that could exceed $30 billion a year. We   
urge ASEAN to establish transparent and consistent guidelines for the   
tendering and award process. Adherence to such guidelines will best   
serve the development needs of your nations and help to ensure fair   
practices in these intensely competitive markets.    
   
Finally, we urge concerted international attention, in this and in every   
region of the world, to the problem of illicit payments. Bribery and   
corruption distort development, discourage foreign investors, and   
undermine the rule of law. That is why I have led an effort, on behalf   
of the United States, to strengthen multilateral disciplines through the   
OECD. As booming, competitive economies, the ASEAN nations also have a   
responsibility for promoting competition that is fair and transparent.   
   
ASEAN, of course, provided much of the impetus behind the creation of   
APEC six years ago as a framework for economic cooperation across the   
Asia-Pacific. APEC continues to strengthen patterns of economic   
integration and contribute to growth. Since the last APEC ministerial in   
Jakarta, intensive cabinet-level meetings between APEC's finance,   
transportation, and telecommunications ministers have spurred our   
cooperation across a broad range of issues.    
   
At the first-ever Leaders' Meeting that President Clinton convened two   
years ago at Blake Island, APEC endorsed a shared vision for a New   
Pacific Community. Last year in Bogor, the APEC leaders pledged to   
achieve free and open trade and investment in the region by 2020. Our   
challenge is to transform their vision into action when we meet in Osaka   
this November.   
   
In our view, there are three key elements for an action agenda at Osaka.   
   
-- The first and most important priority is to produce a specific   
blueprint for achieving the Bogor vision of free and open trade and   
investment. Such a blueprint would set forth shared principles, specific   
goals for liberalization, and a process for achieving them. We look   
forward to working constructively with this year's chair--Japan--and   
with other APEC members to meet this goal.   
   
As we look ahead to the Manila meetings in 1996, the United States is   
ready to work closely with the Philippines and the other ASEAN nations--   
along with Japan and our APEC partners--to sustain the momentum we hope   
to achieve in Osaka.  
   
-- The second and complementary  element for action is for APEC-member   
economies to commit to take very specific liberalizing steps of their   
own. Such steps might be to widen market access in a particular sector,   
to improve rules for foreign investors, or to accelerate implementation   
of a particular Uruguay Round provision. Cumulatively, these steps can   
be an initial "downpayment" for achieving the wider Bogor commitment--a   
down-payment that will demonstrate a willingness to act and generate   
momentum for further steps.  
   
-- The third key element is to take immediate measures to lower   
transaction costs for business and to build APEC's credibility in the   
business community. Simplifying technical standards and harmonizing   
customs procedures would be appropriate areas to make early progress. In   
the final analysis, the real test of APEC's success will be whether or   
not its work has practical relevance--whether it removes barriers to   
trade, fosters competitive markets, and supports growth. We also hope   
that APEC leaders will endorse the establishment of a new, permanent   
business sector advisory body that will help APEC focus its goals.   
   
From the launching of the Uruguay Round to its conclusion and approval,   
the United States and ASEAN have been catalysts for action in the global   
economic arena. Now we must work together to ensure that the new World   
Trade Organization upholds rules and disciplines essential to the open   
global trading system.   
   
By stimulating open trade and investment in the region, groupings such   
as APEC and AFTA complement our liberalization efforts around the globe.   
By finding and advancing common interests, they contribute to the   
Pacific community that is taking shape--nowhere more so than in   
Southeast Asia.   
   
Tomorrow, I will leave Brunei for Malaysia, an increasingly valuable   
economic and security partner of the United States. With that visit, and   
my subsequent trip to Vietnam, I will have traveled to every ASEAN   
partner country. In each of my trips, I have been impressed not only by   
your individual achievements, but by your collective resolve. As ASEAN   
takes on larger responsibilities, it is the objective of the United   
States to reinforce our partnership for the benefit of our people, the   
region, and the world.   
   
We have a full agenda before us  today. I appreciate this opportunity to   
advance our common interests and aspirations.   
   
Secretary Christopher   
Remarks at a press conference, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, August 1,   
1995.    
   
I am here with a colleague and friend, Andrei Kozyrev. One of the   
benefits of this ASEAN Regional Forum is that it enables us to get   
together with our partners, including Russia, to discuss the security   
situation here in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as to talk about   
other bilateral and regional matters. It is well known that the United   
States believes that a stable, democratic, and prosperous Russia can be   
a vital force for security and prosperity throughout this region and   
around the world. In the past few years, Russia has acted to help to   
reduce tensions in this area, particularly on the Korean Peninsula, as   
well as in Cambodia. In addition to our cooperation in the ASEAN   
Regional Forum, the United States and Russia share an interest in   
developing a separate security dialogue relating to Northeast Asia, and   
I think that can be very useful as well in trying to quell tensions in   
the area.   
   
Our agenda this morning, as usual, will be quite global in scope. We   
will begin by talking about the very good, recent communications between   
President Clinton and President Yeltsin, and we will be talking about   
preparations for the meeting between the two leaders this fall. We will   
discuss Russia's participation in the Partnership for Peace and the   
overall NATO-Russia relationship, as well as the situation with the CFE.   
One particular matter I have been talking with the Foreign Minister   
about each time we meet is our search for the American, Fred Cuny, who   
is still missing. I hope that perhaps progress in the Chechnya area will   
make it possible to intensify that search. Let me say that the United   
States welcomes the negotiation on Chechnya, and we urge both the   
Russian Government and the Chechens to move forward with the political   
discussions which, I understand, are to resume this week after the   
interim steps have been taken on the military level.   
   
On Bosnia, the Foreign Minister and I will follow up on the conversation   
held last week between President Clinton and President Yeltsin   
discussing the overall situation there with particular emphasis on the   
safe areas. Naturally, we will touch on the deteriorating situation in   
the Bihac area, as well as efforts to get humanitarian supplies. I want   
to commend the Foreign Minister for diplomatic efforts that he has made   
on behalf of the Contact Group to try to obtain a peaceful resolution of   
the crisis, and I look forward to hearing from him first-hand. We have   
exchanged correspondence on that subject, but I am very anxious to hear   
of his recent trip to the region. We welcome Russia's offer to provide   
peacekeepers for the Gorazde area, if that is something that can be   
worked out in a satisfactory way by the UN commander.   
   
In Bosnia, I think the aim that he and I both have is to try to find   
some way to invigorate the peace process, to move forward with   
Belgrade's recognition of Bosnia and the closure of the border between   
Serbia and Bosnia. But most of all, I think we want to try to see if we   
can move forward on the diplomatic process to try to reinvigorate   
negotiations on the basis of--or with the Contact Group map as a   
starting point for--a political settlement. Andrei, it is nice to see   
you here as always.   
  
   
Secretary Christopher, Chinese Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian   
Qichen   
Remarks at a press conference prior to their bilateral meeting, Bandar   
Seri Begawan, Brunei, August 1, 1995.    
   
Vice Premier Qian. This is the second meeting this year between   
Secretary Christopher and me. Regrettably, this meeting takes place at a   
time when Sino-U.S. relations are faced with serious difficulties. We   
hope that China and the United States maintain a normal and sound   
relationship, for this serves not only the interests of the two   
countries, but also peace and stability in the world--and the Asia-  
Pacific region in particular. However, the growth of Sino-U.S. relations   
is based on principles; that is, the principles signed in the three   
Sino-U.S. joint communiques, the core of which is the question of   
Taiwan.   
   
In his statement in New York on July 28, Mr. Secretary reaffirmed that   
the United States has not and it does not intend to change the   
longstanding one-China policy; that it recognizes that the Government of   
the P.R.C. is the sole legal government of China, and there is but one   
China and that Taiwan is part of China. We, of course, attach great   
importance to these statements. Meanwhile, nevertheless, I would like to   
point out--as an old Chinese saying goes to the fact--that "Words must   
count and deeds must yield results. Words have their values only when   
they are honored in deeds." In what direction Sino-U.S. relations   
develop will depend on the actual deeds in implementing the three joint   
communiques. I am ready to have serious discussions and a frank and   
pragmatic attitude with Secretary Christopher on how to remove the   
serious damage to Sino-U.S. relations caused by Lee Teng-hui's visit to   
the United States. I hope that this meeting of ours will be a useful and   
a constructive one. Thank you all.   
  
   
Secretary Christopher. Thank you very much. I, too,welcome this   
opportunity to meet again with Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian   
Qichen. This is our ninth meeting over the last two years, and, as he   
said, our second meeting this year. The Vice Premier and I have worked   
together on a number of issues, including notably our efforts to achieve   
and implement the U.S.-North Korean Framework Accord. I very much   
appreciate his insight, and I look forward to a useful discussion with   
him of the matters that he mentioned.   
   
Our meeting today comes at an important and challenging time in our   
relationship. I believe that a strong, able, open, and prosperous China   
can be a valuable partner for the United States and a responsible member   
of the international community. I also believe that China has as great a   
stake as we do in maintaining a productive relationship. Regular   
dialogues and contacts at all levels are essential if the United States   
and China are to maximize our cooperation in the many areas where we   
agree and to manage our differences in those areas where our views   
diverge.   
   
This evening, the Vice Premier and I will discuss the fundamentals of   
the United States-China relationship. We will talk about how we can work   
to restore the positive momentum in our relationships. President Clinton   
and I are committed to maintaining the one-China policy that has served   
as the basis for the United States engagement with China during the   
administration of the past six Presidents--both Democrat and Republican.   
   
As I made clear in my speech at the National Press Club in Washington   
last Friday, that policy has not changed. Starting in 1972, the United   
States has followed the basic principles contained in the three   
communiques, and we will continue to do so. In our view, we have all   
benefited from the official relations we have maintained with China   
since 1979 and the unofficial but friendly relationships we have   
maintained with Taiwan during the same period. It is critical for China,   
for Taiwan, and for the United States to reflect on the strong interest   
that we share in maintaining the continuity of the set of relationships   
that are set forth in the three communiques in the U.S.-Taiwan Relations   
Act.   
   
Indeed, at a time when the Asia-Pacific region is remarkably free of   
conflict, we must work hard to ensure that these favorable conditions   
continue. The ASEAN Regional Forum, for example, which we have just come   
from and where we both participated, can contribute to that security and   
stability. Let me add that all the members of the forum were reassured   
by the constructive nature of the Vice Premier's comments today on the   
South China Sea situation. Our work together in APEC, to take another   
example, also contributes to the growth and integration of this region   
and the stability and prosperity of the region.   
   
The United States staunchly supports China's accession to the World   
Trade Organization on commercially acceptable terms. We believe that   
China's membership in that organization will widen and strengthen the   
world trading system. The importance of the U.S.-China relationship   
obliges all of us to address and manage our differences and concerns   
with an eye to the long-term interest of both countries. In that vein,   
we must address and will be discussing today such issues as non-  
proliferation and human rights. We will also discuss our concern over   
American citizen Harry Wu. I look forward to discussing the many matters   
that we have before us in a positive, constructive way. Thank you very   
much.   
  
   
Secretary Christopher, Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono   
Remarks at a press conference, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, August 2,   
1995.   
   
Secretary Christopher. Good afternoon. I am very pleased to have another   
chance to meet with my friend, Foreign Minister Kono. Today marks the   
fourth time we have met this year, and, Mr. Minister, several times that   
many friendly and very useful telephone calls. I think these close   
consultations I have with the Minister are a reflection of the very   
close relationship between our two countries. As I said at the Press   
Club in Washington last Friday, our relationship with Japan is the   
cornerstone of our engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. Our alliance   
with a prosperous, democratic Japan is certainly one of the great   
successes of the post-war era.   
   
Last November, the United States and Japan initiated a new dialogue on   
security ties. I look forward to talking with the Foreign Minister about   
that today. This September, he and I and our two Defense Ministers will   
be meeting in New York to move this security dialogue forward. The close   
consultations that Minister Kono and I have had were very important to   
the achievement of the implementation of the U.S.-North Korea Framework.   
We will be discussing that today, as we have been in the meetings of the   
PMC as well as the ARF. The participation of other nations in the world   
is absolutely essential to the implementation of the U.S.-North Korea   
Framework, and, of course, Japan, together with the Republic of Korea,   
are playing essential roles in that. Just as we have reaffirmed the   
importance of our security ties, we have also made very important   
progress in strengthening the economic leg of our relationship.   
   
Last month, the United States and Japan concluded, as you all know, a   
new arrangement on autos and auto parts, opening up access to the   
Japanese markets in a new and unprecedented way. Two weeks ago, our two   
countries concluded a dispute with respect to air cargo. The Minister   
and I both played quiet but very significant roles in reaching those   
agreements, and I want to pay tribute to you, Mr. Minister, for the very   
constructive attitude you played behind the scenes in making those two   
agreements possible. These two agreements, with the 16 others under the   
framework between the United States and Japan, are very significant   
accomplishments. I know one of the things the Minister and I will be   
discussing today is the means to effectively implement these agreements.   
Agreements are only as good as their implementation, and I know it is   
common ground between us that we need to work hard on implementation.    
   
We will be talking about preparations for the APEC meeting in Osaka   in   
November where APEC parties are determined to set forth a blueprint for   
implementing the Bogor Declaration of last year, looking toward open   
trade in the region by 2020. I think, perhaps most important of all, we   
are going to begin planning for the summit meeting between Prime   
Minister Murayama and President Clinton immediately after the APEC   
meeting in November. Ours is a rich and multi-faceted relationship, and   
I could not hope for a better colleague than Minister Kono in carrying   
out our responsibilities. Mr. Minister--welcome; it is nice to be with   
you again.   
   
  
Foreign Minister Kono. I think Mr. Secretary has covered every ground   
that must be mentioned, but if I may, I would like to add a few words.   
   
As Mr. Secretary pointed out, this is our fourth meeting from the   
beginning of this year, but looking back a little bit more to the past,   
it has been a year since I was inaugurated as Foreign Minister. This is   
our seventh meeting of this kind; that means us meeting about once every   
two months.   
   
Mr. Secretary, who is my senior colleague in our partnership, and I have   
borne the responsibility of being in charge of the overall relationship   
between Japan and the United States. We have made sure that although   
there  exist a variety of problems and issues at hand between Japan and   
the United States, we take a larger look and we approach issues from a   
larger prospective when dealing with these issues. I have always   
appreciated the leadership that Mr. Secretary has shown in working   
together on various issues, and I have, from time to time, expressed my   
very frank views on where our relationship should go. I am very happy   
that our working relationship has been very successful for the past   
year.   
   
We are expecting President Clinton's visit to Japan this fall, and we   
will be working closely so that this visit by President Clinton will   
provide an impetus for further promotion of the existing good   
relationship between Japan and the United States. We will make all our   
very best effort to make sure that the visit will be successful.  As Mr.   
Secretary pointed out, after the Halifax summit meeting, we have been   
able to resolve several economic issues and problems after dialogue   
between the two governments, and we have been able to work closely   
together. I am very much looking forward to my discussion with Mr.   
Secretary.   
   
(###)  
  
   
   
ARTICLE 3:   
   
American Engagement in the Post-Cold War World   
Deputy Secretary Talbott   
Remarks at a town meeting on U.S. foreign policy, Wilmington, Delaware,   
July 26, 1995   
   
Thank you, Dr. Winn. I also want to thank People to People International   
and the other organizations that have co-sponsored today's event. I'm   
told that the representatives of some 50 national and community groups   
are here. That makes this a town hall meeting in the most genuine sense   
and in the finest American tradition--a tradition of participatory   
democracy that in Delaware dates back at least to 1656, when the colony   
was only 25 years old. In November of that year, the residents of New   
Castle gathered at the local fort to appoint tobacco inspectors, plan   
for the construction of a local bridge, and elect monitors to ensure   
that each family kept its fields properly fenced.   
   
So since the 17th century, the citizens of this state have been coming   
together when the community faces important choices. Some of those   
choices have been local in scope--like the ones on the agenda of that   
first meeting in New Castle 339 years ago-- but others have involved the   
American republic as a whole--decisions about whether to go to war, or   
amend the Constitution, or admit new states to the Union, all the more   
reason that I am glad to be with you today, because the American people   
now face some fundamental choices that will determine the future of U.S.   
foreign policy.    
   
For good reason, much of the nation's attention is currently focused on   
the terrible carnage and the vexing dilemmas in the former Yugoslavia.   
When I left my office earlier this morning, that was the issue on the   
mind of Secretary Christopher and many of my other colleagues: How can   
the United States and its allies promote peace and curb the killing in   
that troubled region?    
   
I will address that difficult subject later in these remarks, but first   
I want to put it in a much larger context. How our nation deals with   
Bosnia will depend in large measure on how we define America's role in   
the world. For the third time in this century, we are engaged in a great   
national debate. At issue is whether we, as a nation, are prepared to do   
what it takes and spend what it takes to have a foreign policy worthy of   
our aspirations and our interests as a world leader--indeed, as the   
world leader.    
   
We are adjusting to a new era in human history. It began 10 years ago,   
when Mikhail Gorbachev took control of the Kremlin. He ushered in a   
series of reforms that he hoped would revitalize the Soviet communist   
system. As it happened, perestroika and glasnost led not just to reform,   
but to a democratic revolution--and to the end of the Soviet system,   
both in Russia and throughout what had been the Soviet empire. That   
revolution helped, in turn, to trigger a stunning series of triumphs for   
democracy around the globe.   
   
In recent years, we have seen Germans tear down the Berlin Wall, South   
Africans free Nelson Mandela and dismantle apartheid, and Cambodians   
walk through the land mines of the Killing Fields to vote against the   
Khmer Rouge. Over the past decade, nearly 2 billion people in some 70   
nations on five continents--from Brazil to Ghana to Poland to Bangladesh   
to the Philippines--have moved decisively toward democracy and free   
markets.    
   
A decade ago we spoke of there being three worlds--the free world,  the   
communist world, and the third world. The organizing principle of   
international politics was a global ideological struggle: the heirs of   
Vladimir Lenin versus those of Thomas Jefferson; the proponents of Karl   
Marx versus those of Adam Smith. Now, to an extent few of us ever   
expected to see in our lifetimes, there is one world--joined in a loose,   
imperfect, incomplete but still extraordinary consensus in favor of open   
societies and open markets.   
   
During this dramatic trans formation, America has not been a bystander--  
far from it. Our foreign policy has helped nation after nation emerge   
from totalitarianism and keep moving in the right direction. Thanks in   
large part to American leadership, the political and economic principles   
that we have nurtured here in the United States for over 200 years are   
now ascendant around the globe.   
   
I know that you had a chance this morning to hear from two of my   
colleagues--Arturo Valenzuela, about the Clinton Administration's   
support for political and economic reform in Mexico and David   
Satterfield, about the Middle East peace process. Those are just two of   
many examples of how American leadership continues to make a difference   
by promoting stability and freedom in areas where we have vital economic   
and security interests.    
   
Nowhere are our foreign policy efforts more vital to our national   
security than in the 12 New Independent States of the former Soviet   
Union. The future of democracy in that vast region, which spans two   
continents and 11 time zones, will have a dramatic impact on the safety   
and prosperity of the entire planet.    
   
In Russia, our support for economic liberalization and privatization has   
helped break the stranglehold of central economic planning. Thanks in   
large part to our efforts, the Russian economy is being shaped today not   
solely by top-down decrees; rather, it is shaped by the combined forces   
of some 2,500 commercial banks, 600 investment funds, and 40 million   
private shareholders. A majority of Russians now accept the idea that   
political combat should be waged on the floor of the parliament, in a   
free press, and on the hustings, rather than in the Gulag or in the   
torture chambers of the old KGB.    
   
Despite recent setbacks and uncertainties about the future, political   
and economic reform in the former Soviet Union has made that region far   
less of a threat to us and our allies. Over the last two years,   
President Clinton has concluded landmark agreements with Russia,   
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan to reduce the Soviet nuclear arsenal. As   
a result, there will be only one nuclear weapons state, rather than   
four, on the territory of the former U.S.S.R. Americans can go to bed at   
night knowing that nuclear weapons are no longer aimed at our cities.   
Together with the Russians, Ukrainians, and others, we have been   
dismantling rockets and destroying nuclear warheads at an unprecedented   
rate. We are also helping the former Soviet states improve security over   
their bomb-making materials. As a result, it is far less likely that   
those materials will someday end up in suitcase bombs available to   
nuclear terrorists.    
   
These non-proliferation efforts, along with the other success stories   
that I have just mentioned and that you heard about from Arturo and   
David, are dramatic examples of a basic proposition underlying our   
foreign policy as a whole: American engagement abroad is rooted in   
American self-interest. We are engaged in the former U.S.S.R., in Latin   
America and the Caribbean, and in the Middle East because what happens   
there matters to us. It affects our safety and our prosperity.   
   
An important moral of the end of the Cold War--a story that is still   
unfolding and will be for a long time--is that the United States must   
maintain a position of international leadership. Only if we do that can   
we take advantage of historic opportunities, not just to combat threats   
and enemies, but also to build a world that reflects our ideals and   
promotes our interests; a world that will be more hospitable not only   
for our generation, but for our children's as well.   
   
The flip side of that proposition is just as important to recognize   
clearly: If we do provide such leadership, then there is no other   
country that can or will step in and lead in our place as a   
constructive, positive influence. Make no mistake about that. And make   
no mistake that there are plenty of other forces that will fill the   
vacuum we leave, and they will do so in ways not at all to our liking or   
to our advantage or in keeping with our interests. For instance, the   
enemies of the Middle East peace process--in Iran, Iraq, Sudan, and   
Libya--are now more isolated than ever before. But if we let down our   
guard, those rogue states can still make trouble by menacing their   
neighbors, sponsoring terrorism, and stockpiling weapons of mass   
destruction.    
   
At stake here is not just our diplomatic leverage in the peace process,   
but our domestic well-being. International criminals--whether they   
traffic in drugs or high explosives, whether their motive is fanaticism   
or just a fast buck--are a threat to us here at home. Countering that   
threat is a high priority of our foreign policy, which has produced   
tangible successes. We have recently been able to arrest those   
responsible for the World Trade Center bombing. We have stopped another   
attack in New York before it happened and thwarted a plan to blow up   
American airliners over the Pacific. Each of these operations depended   
on having a vigorous presence abroad. We must be able to track villains   
on their home turf before they can strike on ours.    
   
In short, whether dealing with threats or opportunities, we need to   
remain fully engaged in the world. That point should be self-evident,   
but, unfortunately, it is increasingly controversial--or at least it is   
increasingly obscured by other controversies. There is, in our country,   
a resurgence of the view that our vital interests, in some sense, end at   
the water's edge.    
   
I say "resurgence" because we have heard that argument before. In the   
aftermath of the Cold War, just as after other great struggles earlier   
in our nation's history, there is a temptation to draw back into   
ourselves, to devote more of our attention and our resources to fixing   
our own problems--a temptation to let foreign countries fend for   
themselves.    
   
That temptation, if over-indulged, would turn the American eagle into an   
ostrich. Today's isolationists echo the narrow-visioned naysayers of the   
1920s and 1930s, who rejected the League of Nations, embraced   
protectionism, and were complacent about the rise of Mussolini, Hitler,   
and Stalin; who opposed help to the victims of aggression and   
inadvertently endangered our security--chanting all the while the crowd-  
pleasing mantra "America first."     
   
Today, as in the 1920s and 1930s, we suffer from a simmering crisis of   
confidence in our institutions, notably including our institutions of   
governance. Many Americans think that government spending is virtually   
synonymous with waste and abuse,  resulting not so much in public   
welfare as in public debt; not so much in national security as in rising   
taxes, which is to say, personal insecurity.    
   
In this atmosphere, our foreign policy is especially vulnerable. Why?     
Because the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of Soviet   
communism mean that there is no longer a single, world-class dragon for   
us to slay. It is easier to justify drawing inward and, conversely,   
harder to justify engagement overseas.   
   
Thus, back in my hometown of Washington, DC, the foreign affairs budget   
of our government--your government--is under a two-pronged attack. It is   
under attack from those who think we can afford to withdraw from that   
very complicated world and also from those who think we can   
significantly reduce the federal deficit by reducing our spending   
overseas.   
   
But the fact is, those who would slash foreign spending in the name of   
fiscal responsibility are deluding themselves. The deficit, as we all   
know, began to mushroom out of control in the early 1980s. But the 1980s   
saw no corresponding boom in our international budget. Quite the   
contrary, over the past decade the amount of money that the U.S.   
Government spends each year on foreign policy actually declined nearly   
40% in real dollars--adjusted for inflation--and is now at its lowest   
level in over a half-century.    
   
Even if we were to eliminate our foreign affairs spending altogether, it   
would make very little difference to the cause of deficit reduction. The   
current international affairs budget is only about 1.3% of total federal   
spending. That 1.3% pays for all our embassies and diplomats overseas,   
our foreign   aid and economic assistance programs, and our   
participation in international organizations. It pays for our support of   
multinational peacekeeping operations, many of our arms control   
initiatives, and our overseas public information services. We have long   
since cut most of the fat out of our foreign affairs budget, and we are   
now in danger of cutting into muscle and bone and vital arteries.    
   
Nevertheless, some members of the 104th Congress have proposed cutting   
the foreign affairs budget by an additional 40% over the next seven   
years. If these proposed cuts are imposed, then every single program   
that I have mentioned in these re-marks will be in jeopardy, if not out   
of business altogether. That goes for our support for democracy and open   
markets, our fight against nuclear non-proliferation and terrorism, and   
our leadership in the Middle East peace process. So I would hope, and   
ask you to join me in hoping, that these considerations prevail in that   
town meeting that is more or less permanently in session up the street   
from where I work--on Capitol Hill.   
   
Now, I recognize--as I'm sure you do, too--that there is yet another   
reason why American foreign policy is on the defensive these days--in   
Congress and elsewhere--and it can be summed up in one word: Bosnia. The   
headlines in the newspapers and the film clips on the evening news make   
it hard to feel immensely confident or self-congratulatory about the   
post-Cold War millennium.   
   
Every day there is another reminder of how much trouble the   
international community--the United Nations, NATO, the European Union,   
Western civilization--call it whatever you want--is having sorting out   
the dreadful, depressing, infuriating mess that has befallen the former   
Yugoslavia. In fact, the horror in the Balkans came about in part   
because of the end of the Cold War. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a   
communist state collapsed, unleashing pent-up hatreds and fears and   
irredentist ambitions. The result has been the worst violence in Europe   
since the end of World War II, and the worst failure of European   
collective security since the 1930s.      
   
Let me, in my remaining few minutes of these remarks, take it as a given   
that there is a lot that American policymakers and diplomats would do   
differently if we had the last five years of our involvement in Bosnia   
to do over--and that goes, I'm sure, for those who were in the Bush   
Administration as well as those of us in the Clinton Administration. But   
we do not have the luxury of reliving the past. What we do have is an   
obligation to move forward in as hard-headed and determined a fashion as   
we can--with a clear sense of our national interests. What are those   
interests?     
   
We have a humanitarian interest in helping the innocent victims of this   
war. That is why the United States has conducted the biggest, most   
sustained humanitarian airlift in history, allowing us to feed 1.4   
million Bosnians a day.    
   
We have an interest in promoting a peaceful settlement of the war. That   
is why a year-and-a-half ago we mediated an end to the conflict between   
the Muslims and Croats in Bosnia. We went on to broker a federation   
between them, which has enabled both groups   to focus their efforts on   
defending themselves from the Serbs.    
   
But our overwhelming interest--our No. 1 strategic interest--is to   
prevent the spread of the fighting. Bad as the situation in the former   
Yugoslavia is today, imagine how much worse it would be if there were an   
escalating, widening conflict. Such a war might involve not only the   
current combatants, but neighboring countries like Hungary and Albania,   
as well as two of our NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, who could end up   
on opposite sides. That is why we have stationed U.S. troops in The   
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and have made clear that we will   
take actions in the event of Serb-incited violence in Serbia's ethnic   
Albanian region of Kosovo.    
   
I will not pretend--and you would not believe me if I tried--that a   
peaceful end of this episode is in sight. But this much I can say with   
confidence and conviction: In Bosnia, as elsewhere, the U.S. must remain   
engaged. What happens in the Balkans will help determine the shape of   
Europe as we move into the next century, and it will dramatically affect   
our own economic and security interests there. That is why our European   
allies look to the United States to stand with them, just as we have   
stood with them three times before in this century.    
   
In Europe, as on every other continent around the globe, the United   
States still has a vital leadership role to play in promoting freedom   
and stability. But we will be able to lead only if our Congress   
allocates the resources that a robust foreign policy requires. That is,   
as I said at the outset, the subject of a great national debate.   
   
For that debate to lead to the right policies and to the right national   
consensus, it must take place not just inside the Capitol Beltway, or on   
the floor of the Congress, or on the 1996 campaign trail, on which, of   
course, a number of candidates are already embarked. Rather, the debate   
must also take place at gatherings like this one. So, on that note, let   
me express again my appreciation for your hospitality and attention and   
invite you to join me, for whatever time we have left, in a discussion   
of the issues I have touched on here.    
   
(###)   
   
   
   
ARTICLE 4:   
   
Arms Embargo Against Bosnia and Herzegovina   
Statement by White House Press Secretary Mike McCurry, Washington, DC,   
August 1, 1995.   
   
The President is disappointed with today's vote in the House to   
unilaterally lift the arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina. He   
repeats his pledge to veto the bill and is confident that his veto will   
be upheld in Congress. The President noted that the strength of the   
unilateral lift vote, although still substantial, diminished from the   
earlier June vote.   
   
Unilateral lift of the arms embargo will drive the UN force out of   
Bosnia and oblige the U.S. to send in ground forces, as part of NATO, to   
assist in that withdrawal. It will divide NATO and increase American   
responsibility for the outcome of the war in Bosnia.   
   
Now is not the time to Americanize the conflict. Supporting a   
strengthened UN mission is our best course to a negotiated peace. We   
should test this course of action.   
   
Today, the NATO alliance took another important decision to strengthen   
the UN mission and halt Bosnian Serb aggression by extending the threat   
of decisive NATO air strikes, previously extended to Gorazde and to the   
other safe areas of Sarajevo, Bihac, and Tuzla.   
   
At a time when the international community is showing new resolve to   
stabilize the situation in Bosnia and get negotiations back on track, it   
does not make sense to take action that could undermine these efforts   
and encourage the UN mission to withdraw.     
   
(###)   
   
   
   
ARTICLE 5:   
   
Assessment of U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in Asia    
Robert S. Gelbard, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and   
Law Enforcement Affairs   
Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the Senate   
Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC, July 24, 1995   
   
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: Thank you for inviting me to   
appear before your committee today. I greatly welcome this opportunity   
for an open, frank, and productive dialogue with members on our   
narcotics concerns in Burma. In June, I traveled to Southeast Asia for a   
second time as Assistant Secretary to update our assessment of the   
heroin threat and our counternarcotics efforts in that region. Before   
turning to Burma, I'd like to provide some insights from my recent visit   
to Southeast Asia on our narcotics control efforts there.   
   
I can report that there have been advances in some important areas since   
early 1994, particularly in law enforcement efforts in Thailand and   
opium crop control in Laos. But I must candidly tell you that we cannot   
take comfort in this. The United States still faces today a worldwide   
heroin threat of unprecedented magnitude, and we are beginning to feel   
the repercussions in terms of greater domestic addiction. Southeast   
Asia--the source for an estimated two-thirds of the heroin in the United   
States--is our biggest concern.   
   
The Threat   
   
The spread of international narcotics trafficking constitutes one of the   
most persistent and pernicious challenges to America's foreign and   
domestic interests in the post-Cold War era. In his January address at   
Harvard, Secretary Christopher identified the need to attack   
international narcotics trafficking and crime as one of the five key   
objectives of our foreign policy.   
   
From a domestic perspective, it is increasingly clear that we cannot   
sustain a reduction in drug use without attacking foreign supplies. The   
National Drug Control Strategy includes three international goals. The   
strategy supports source country programs designed to assist host   
nations destroy drug production and trafficking and  develop alternative   
development projects to lessen dependency on drug crops. We have worked   
hard to reduce consumption with some success. Cocaine use among casual   
users fell significantly between 1985 and 1992, and heroin addiction   
remained stable for a long time. But recent data indicate that drug use   
in the United States is again rising, confirming what we have all known   
for years--a successful anti-drug strategy must address both supply and   
demand. With respect to heroin, the key indicators are all moving in the   
wrong direction: prices are down; purity is up; and overdose hospital   
admissions and deaths are increasing.   
   
On the foreign front, the wealth and power of the international   
narcotics trade pose additional challenges. Most of you are familiar   
with these problems as they are reflected in the sensational but true   
headlines from South America. But they apply to Asia as well.   
   
-- The Asian heroin trade is generating hundreds of millions of   
unregulated dollars that cause enormous disruptions to national economic   
planning and growth.   
-- It is a political threat: Trafficker corruption and intimidation can   
destroy democratic institutions and their leaders.   
-- It inflicts staggering social costs, condemning millions of drug   
users to painful, sick, and unproductive lives.   
   
The rapid expansion and growth in communications and trade are making it   
easier for contraband, dirty money, and smugglers to move across borders   
undetected. The breakdown of central authority and the disruption of   
social order, particularly in Central Asia, are producing safehavens for   
new and established criminal organizations to base their operations. It   
is against this backdrop that we must ensure that we have a   
comprehensive policy that addresses the wide range of narcotics-related   
security threats.   
   
The Trends   
   
Mr. Chairman, allow me to focus on the salient facts as they relate to   
Asia.   
   
First, opium production is out of control. It has more than doubled in   
the past decade. Our estimate for worldwide opium production in 1994 was   
more than 3,400 metric tons, with 98% of that--3,350 tons--produced in   
Asia. This is enough opium to produce over 340 tons of heroin. I cannot   
tell you   how much of this comes to the United States, but I can tell   
you that a decade ago, when the trade was smaller and heroin was less   
pure, U.S. drug abuse experts believed that the United States had   
500,000 addicts and that they used only 5 tons of heroin--50 tons of   
opium. Worldwide opium production was down about 10% in 1994, but the   
decline occurred primarily because bad weather hurt Burma's crop, and   
much of this loss was offset by increased production in Afghanistan, the   
second- largest producer.   
   
Second, production is spreading; more countries are involved. While   
Burma, with 2,030 tons and Afghanistan, with 950 tons continue to be the   
dominant producers of illicit opium, at least seven other Asian   
countries are also producers: Laos, Thailand, Pakistan, Iran, Vietnam,   
India, and China. Although we lack solid estimates, we are concerned   
about production in the newly independent Central Asian states.   
   
Third, significant production is occurring beyond the effective reach of   
governments. In Southeast and Southwest Asia, most opium and heroin is   
produced in areas controlled by semi-autonomous, well-armed groups. Many   
profit greatly from narcotics production, and some view efforts to   
control it as a direct challenge to their autonomy. They are often   
militarily strong enough to block government attempts to halt production   
and trafficking.   
   
Fourth, worldwide consumption is increasing, boosting the incentives for   
production. Users in opium-producing countries such as Pakistan and   
Thailand are switching from opium to heroin. Meanwhile, heroin addiction   
is spreading to key transit countries such as India and China. Heroin   
remains the primary drug of abuse in Europe, and we are increasingly   
alarmed by signs of growing heroin use in Russia, Central Europe, and   
other states of the former Soviet Union.   
   
Fifth, purity levels are up. In the streets of America and Europe today,   
we see a degree of purity in heroin undreamed of 10 years ago. And it no   
longer requires a needle to inject. Highly potent heroin is now being   
snorted and smoked.   
   
Finally, trafficking networks are proliferating. New markets and sources   
have created an increasingly complex web of routes and organizations   
that span virtually every continent. Countries that were once on the   
periphery of the trade, such as Nigeria, now play central brokering and   
distribution roles. These constantly changing and complex trafficking   
patterns place enormous pressure on customs and law enforcement agencies   
just to keep pace.   
   
U.S. Policy Framework   
   
Areas of Progress   
   
These are grim trends, but they should not mask the fact that we can   
point to areas of progress against the heroin trade. Where we have had   
access and opportunity to implement sustained programs to counter the   
heroin trade, they work. Let me cite three examples.   
   
Thailand. In the early 1970s, we started efforts to combat opium   
production in that country when it was one of the leading sources for   
Southeast Asian heroin. Through a variety of programs tailored to meet   
cultural, political, and geographic aspects of Thai opium production,   
Thailand is now a marginal opium producer. We are now readjusting our   
counternarcotics program in Thailand, shifting the focus away from   
relatively expensive crop control programs to less expensive enforcement   
efforts to target the organizations that run heroin processing and   
distribution operations out of Thailand.   
   
Laos. Laos became a major concern to us when opium production began to   
increase rapidly in the mid- to late- 1980s, in part a reaction to our   
success in Thailand. In 1989, production reached nearly 400 metric tons,   
up from possibly as little as 50 tons in the early 1980s. Concerned   
about government corruption and commitment, we denied counternarcotics   
certification to Laos in 1989, yet moved ahead with bilateral efforts on   
crop control and other counternarcotics programs. The results have been   
encouraging. Opium production has fallen every year since 1989, to 85   
tons in 1994. Some of this decline is due to bad weather, and we remain   
concerned about a possible rebound in production this year, but the   
long-term trend is encouraging.   
   
Pakistan. In 1978, Pakistan was the world's leading producer of illicit   
opium, with 800 tons. The long-term production trend since then has been   
down, despite annual variations. Last year, production was only 160   
tons. The decline came about due to a number of factors, but most   
important were the government's commitment to prohibit production in   
areas under its complete control and a U.S.-funded program to eradicate   
crops and create alternative development in areas under nominal   
government control. Most opium production in Pakistan is now   
concentrated in areas which have a high degree of autonomy under   
Pakistan's constitution and are controlled by well-armed Pathan   
tribesmen. Crop control progress there is slow and dangerous.   
Increasingly, we are focusing our counternarcotics efforts in Pakistan   
on the organizations that run international heroin distribution   
networks.   
   
Mr. Chairman, it is against this backdrop of past efforts and current   
trends that we recently undertook a comprehensive review of our   
international heroin control policy and strategy. Some clear facts   
emerged from that assessment.   
   
-- We can implement effective programs if we have an opportunity and the   
resources to work with committed governments.   
-- We must keep our efforts focused on the most critical--not the   
easiest--parts of the trade.   
-- We must be committed to a sustained effort because fundamental   
progress requires time.   
   
With these points in mind, Mr. Chairman, let me review four key areas   
our policy focuses on: Burma, broader international support, attacking   
the leading organizations, and more stringent use of certification.   
   
Four Key Areas of U.S. Focus   
   
Burma   
   
Burma is central to this discussion; even more so, given recent   
political developments in the country. Burma's role in the heroin trade   
dwarfs that of any other country. For the past several years, Burma has   
produced more than half of the world's illicit opium. Staggering levels   
of Burmese opium and heroin production are the main reasons why   
Southeast Asia is now the principal source of heroin for the U.S.   
market. If we do not stem the outflow of Burma's heroin, we stand little   
chance of reducing heroin supplies to the United States.   
   
The scale of the narcotics problem in Burma is enormous, and there are   
significant limitations on our ability to undertake counternarcotics   
efforts in Burma. We suspended all bilateral narcotics assistance to   
Burma when the State Law and Order Restoration Council--SLORC--seized   
power in 1988. We have grave doubts about the political will of the   
SLORC to address the drug problem. The drug control efforts made by the   
SLORC have not convinced us that they have a serious commitment to   
combating heroin trafficking and reducing opium production. As a result,   
the President has denied narcotics cooperation certification to Burma   
every year since 1989.   
   
Our interests in democracy and drug control are profoundly related. From   
a law enforcement standpoint, we have an interest in working with a   
government in Rangoon that respects the rule of law. We also have an   
interest in working with a government which devotes its energy and   
resources to the fight against crime and drugs rather than the fight   
against dissent.   
   
Nevertheless, as Burmese heroin continues to flow into the United   
States, we must find new ways to address the problem. The circumstances   
we face in Burma are daunting. The abysmal record of the SLORC in human   
rights and democratization severely limits our ability to directly   
engage the Rangoon regime. The enormous drug problem in Burma is   
complicated by the Rangoon government's inability to exercise legitimate   
control over most of the principal opium production areas. Most poppy   
cultivation and heroin refining are done in areas controlled by well-  
armed ethnic militias, some of which, it should be noted, have reached   
accommodations with the SLORC which allow them to engage in the drug   
trade. We have adopted a strategy that calls for a coordinated approach   
to advance all of our policy concerns in Burma--human rights,   
democratization, and counternarcotics. Advances in the process of   
political reconciliation and democratization should make advances in   
counternarcotics easier.   
   
Our present strategy toward Burma emphasizes training, enforcement,   
information sharing, multilateral efforts in alternative development,   
and diplomatic efforts to urge action in Burma and foster cooperation   
with neighboring countries to combat the regional heroin trade. We have   
already vigorously delivered our message to Burma that we expect them to   
do more, and we have also talked to Burma's neighbors to urge them to   
deliver a similar message to Rangoon.   
   
The release of Nobel Prize laureate and human rights activist Aung San   
Suu Kyi has created a mood of cautious optimism that additional moves by   
the SLORC toward political reconciliation may be possible. Despite this   
most welcome event, our fundamental assessment of the situation in Burma   
has not changed. We believe, however, that modest levels of   
counternarcotics engagement with Burma can serve as an incentive to the   
regime to take further steps toward the restoration of democracy in   
Burma. In addition, our own national interest requires us to do what we   
can under present circumstances to combat the Burmese heroin trade. Our   
strategy to combat the narcotics problem calls for the following   
actions.   
   
First, we intend to continue to provide in-country training for   
carefully selected and vetted special counternarcotics units. This will   
be on a case-by-case basis and subject to the same U.S. standards and   
safeguards observed with other countries in   which the U.S. has a   
counternarcotics relationship. This will help raise the government's   
awareness of and responsiveness to the narcotics problem while helping   
to put in place trained officials who can address the threat over the   
long term.   
   
Second, we want to continue our exchange of law enforcement information   
to support Burmese counternarcotics operations. In particular, we, the   
Burmese people, and the region as a whole have a mutual interest in   
seeing authorities step up effective operations against the narcotics   
production and trafficking activities of the Shan United Army--SUA--and   
its leader Khun Sa. Of Burma's dominant heroin-producing and -  
trafficking organizations, this is the one with the most extensive   
international ties. Needless to say, we also have an interest in   
effective action against other drug traffickers in Burma.   
   
Third, we also intend to increase support for regional alternative   
development projects administered by the UN Drug Control Program--UNDCP-  
-to reduce and prevent opium cultivation in ethnically controlled areas   
of Burma. At our insistence, the UN is conditioning this assistance on   
the requirement that poppy cultivation be reduced in the project areas.   
In addition, we believe that such alternative development projects serve   
a positive human rights goal by improving the lives of desperately poor   
farmers in ethnic minority areas. We would also like to support non-  
governmental organization-run counternarcotics programs targeted at   
ethnic minority areas outside government control.   
   
Fourth, meaningful crop control efforts must begin, and we need to press   
the government to intensify such efforts in areas under its control. We   
call upon Rangoon to press the ethnic groups with which it has political   
accommodations to reduce opium poppy cultivation.   
   
Finally, we will continue to encourage Burma's neighbors--particularly   
China and Thailand--to work more closely with us and increase their   
pressure on the Burmese regime to intensify counternarcotics efforts.   
With so much heroin exiting Burma by way of China and Thailand and with   
the transshipment trade creating increasingly serious addiction and   
crime problems in both countries, they have a strong interest in   
encouraging the Government of Burma to crack down harder on drugs.   
   
Mr. Chairman, the narcotics situation in Burma presents a difficult set   
of political, security, and geographic challenges. The steps I have   
outlined here are by no means a panacea. They are, however, a useful   
component of our overall effort. If these modest steps produce the   
progress we anticipate and there is progress on our human rights and   
democracy concerns, we will be in a stronger position to make real gains   
in reducing the narcotics threat from Southeast Asia. We are watching   
political developments in Burma carefully, following the release of Aung   
San Suu Kyi. We are heartened, too, that she has said she believes that   
foreign narcotics control assistance to Burma can be positive as long as   
it remains limited and does not strengthen the SLORC.   
   
Increased International Efforts   
   
A second key element of our policy is to increase the involvement and   
effectiveness of multilateral organizations in counternarcotics. The   
sheer size of the trade and lack of government access to or influence in   
key producing areas limits what we can accomplish unilaterally or   
bilaterally and requires that we find other ways to have an effect on   
these regions. The UN and other multilateral organizations can play a   
much greater role in support of our interests. They often have access   
where we do not, their programs can complement ours, and they can   
attract additional financial and operational support for anti-drug   
programs. In addition to Burma, we have designated UNDCP funds to begin   
projects in Afghanistan's major opium-producing regions, once political   
situations there stabilize.   
   
In a related area, we are for the first time engaging international   
financial institutions and multilateral development banks in serious   
counternarcotics initiatives. A largely untapped resource, these   
organizations can play a valuable role in supporting sustainable   
development programs that are crucial to developing income and   
employment alternatives to narcotics production. The World Bank and   
other lending institutions are ready to support these types of projects,   
and we will be working to encourage key opium-producing countries to   
submit proposals for using such assistance.   
   
We are looking for Europe, Japan, and other Asian donors to play greater   
roles in this area, too. Not long ago, I was in Vienna where I held   
extensive consultations on narcotics-related development issues with the   
UN and our Dublin Group partners. The Dublin Group also met in May in   
Washington. The Dublin Group was formed by the United States and the 15   
European Union members and Norway, Canada, Japan, and Australia to   
coordinate their counternarcotics assistance and programs. The feedback   
in Vienna was positive, particularly with regard to our initiatives to   
seek greater involvement by the multilateral development banks. The UN   
and the Dublin Group members acknowledged the key roles they can play in   
some Asian nations where our influence is limited. In all these cases,   
we stressed that assistance comes with a price: The recipient countries   
must take steps to eradicate drug crops if development projects alone do   
not cause growers to abandon and destroy their fields.   
   
Intensified Law Enforcement Operations   
   
The third element is to intensify law enforcement operations against   
major trafficking organizations that are based in areas where we and   
central authorities have access and influence. These groups, which   
effectively link the remote processors with U.S. markets through their   
brokering, distribution, and money-laundering operations, play a   
critical role in the trade. For too long they have operated with   
impunity, thriving through corruption and, quite frankly, a lack of   
government will and ability to attack them.   
   
We cannot continue to accept these excuses for inaction. The leaders of   
these organizations are vulnerable. They are known; many are within   
reach of law enforcement; and countries around the world are   
increasingly developing the institutional capabilities to identify,   
investigate, apprehend, and prosecute them.   
   
I do not want to leave the impression that this is an easy challenge for   
police and judicial institutions; it is not. But over the last several   
years we have worked hard and invested significantly to help countries   
build the foundation for more effective police action, and we now expect   
to see them applying these skills. We know they can do it; we see the   
evidence. Last year in Thailand, Operation Tiger Trap identified,   
located, and apprehended an entire network of key traffickers without   
operational compromise. In response to a stiff U.S. challenge, Pakistan   
recently showed that it, too, can apprehend, detain, and extradite   
important traffickers to the United States.   
   
There will be setbacks--traffickers will continue to exploit legal   
loopholes, corrupt officials, and apply new technologies and methods of   
operations--and we will continue to work on strengthening host nation   
institutions to overcome them. But both the Thailand and Pakistan   
examples show that the capabilities for enhanced enforcement action are   
there--and I believe in other countries as well--if only governments   
have the will to apply them.   
   
More Stringent Use of the Certification Process   
   
The question of will brings me to the fourth and final element of our   
policy: more stringent use of the certification process.   
   
Mr. Chairman, I reserved my discussion of certification until now for   
emphasis. Certification is one of the most powerful tools this   
government has to focus international attention on the narcotics threat   
and achieve results. The Foreign Assistance Act requires that each year   
the President identify the major drug-producing and drug-transit   
countries and determine whether they have fully cooperated with the   
United States or taken adequate steps on their own in narcotics control.   
The United States must cut off most foreign assistance to those   
countries that are not certified and vote against their requests for   
loans from multilateral development banks. For countries found not to be   
fully cooperating or taking adequate steps on their own, the President   
may grant a national interest certification if the vital interests of   
the United States require continued foreign assistance.   
   
Last year, I reported to Congress that President Clinton issued the   
toughest certification decision ever: Ten of the 26 major producing and   
transit countries were either denied certification or granted a national   
interest certification. This year, the process was even tougher, and   
much of that toughness focused on Asia. We expanded the "majors list" to   
29 countries, adding two from Asia in the process--Taiwan and Vietnam.   
And, in his decision on March 1, the President denied certification to   
five countries and granted a national interest certification to six   
others--a total of 11 countries, one more than last year.   
   
These were difficult decisions based strictly on the 1994   
counternarcotics performance of the countries and our national   
interests. There were no "rubber stamp" decisions. The President made   
his determinations on the basis that Congress intended--the facts of the   
case. Indeed, many countries with whom we have strong bilateral   
relations were affected. Let me summarize these decisions.   
   
-- Two countries that had been granted national interest certifications   
last year--Laos and Panama--were moved to the fully certified category   
because of their improved performance and cooperation.   
-- Three countries were given national interest certifications for the   
first time: Pakistan, for not taking significant actions in 1994 against   
opium crops, heroin producers, and kingpins, although Pakistan has made   
significant progress in 1995; Colombia, primarily for its failure to   
take promised actions against the Cali cartels; and Paraguay, for lack   
of credible action against official corruption.   
-- Afghanistan, which had been granted a national interest certification   
in 1994, was denied certification owing to a substantial rise in opium   
production.   
-- Burma, Iran, Nigeria, and Syria were denied certification again, and   
Lebanon, Bolivia, and Peru were given national interest certifications   
again.   
   
Mr. Chairman, the President informed Congress of these decisions on   
March 1, and we have published a full explanation for each in our   
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. I would like to focus a   
few comments, however, on Burma, Afghanistan, and Pakistan--the three   
Asian countries that were not fully certified. Before turning to them   
individually, however, let me say that the President's certification   
message this year to foreign and domestic audiences alike is strong and   
unambiguous: Certification is an honest process and is meant to produce   
meaningful international narcotics control results. We will recognize   
and support those countries that respond positively. Two years of   
increasingly tough decisions, however, should be enough to convince   
countries that doubt our resolve or believe that piecemeal, misdirected,   
or last-minute efforts to enhance counternarcotics performance will   
satisfy us. It will not. We expect sustained cooperation focused on the   
core challenges.   
   
Burma. Mr. Chairman, I have already highlighted Burma's central   
importance to our overall narcotics control policy in Asia. The size of   
Burma's drug problem makes it imperative that the government do more to   
combat it. In 1994 and 1995, the Burmese army launched limited   
operations against Khun Sa's Shan United Army that resulted in the   
capture of some SUA strongholds, the closure of some heroin refineries,   
and the disruption of drug caravan movements. The operations, however,   
had limited impact on the thriving drug economy.   
   
Since signing a peace agreement with many of the largest drug   
trafficking insurgent groups in Burma in 1989, the government has not   
aggressively pursued drug enforcement measures. Reduction in opium   
cultivation was supposed to follow economic development. Neither   
development nor a reduction in opium cultivation, however, has occurred.   
Eradication remains so limited that it has no impact on the massive   
amounts of opium production.   
   
The government had the capability and opportunity to do more in 1994. It   
did not warrant and, therefore, did not get certification.   
   
Afghanistan. The decision to deny certification to Afghanistan reflects   
a substantial deterioration in the country's narcotics situation in   
1994. No country experienced a greater increase in drug production.   
Poppy cultivation and opium production both rose nearly 40% to record   
levels--29,180 hectares and 950 metric tons, respectively. Owing to its   
lack of control over the countryside, the nominal central government was   
limited in what it could do directly to combat the problem. Very few   
provincial leaders, however, made meaningful efforts to stop production   
or eradicate crops. Heroin processing operations on the Afghanistan side   
of the border with Pakistan reportedly expanded. Narcotics, meanwhile,   
are flowing out of Afghanistan in all directions: south and east to   
Pakistan, which was the preferred route through much of the 1980s, west   
into Iran, and, increasingly, north into the newly independent Central   
Asian states. The result is that the entire Southwest Asian narcotics   
threat is growing larger and more complex, and the immediate prospects   
of attacking it at its source remain bleak. I recognize that the nominal   
central government does not exercise control over much of the country,   
but we could not recommend anything but denial of certification in the   
face of such a performance.   
   
Pakistan. Our decision to issue a vital national interest certification   
to Pakistan reflects its failure to take action against opium   
production, heroin laboratories, and kingpins in 1994. It did extend its   
drug laws to the tribal areas where most opium production and heroin   
refining occur but undertook no significant enforcement operations   
there. Authorities arrested no new major traffickers, including those   
whose extradition has been sought by the United States, and it continued   
to move slowly in the prosecution of a major trafficker who was arrested   
in 1993. In other cases that reflect problems with corruption, key   
traffickers were released shortly after apprehension, with no   
disciplinary action taken against the officials who allowed this to   
happen. At best, corrupt officials tend to be removed from their   
assignments but not prosecuted or otherwise penalized.   
   
There has been a substantial turn-around in Pakistan's counternarcotics   
commitment and performance in 1995, in part, I submit, because the   
certification process drew the government's attention to this difficult   
problem. I acknowledge, here before this committee, Pakistan's improved   
performance. Building on a foundation laid in 1994 and previous years,   
Pakistan intensified its anti-narcotics efforts. The government   
eradicated opium poppies in previously off-limits tribal agencies along   
the Afghanistan border, froze $68 million in trafficker assets, and   
conducted two major raids on heroin laboratories in the North-West   
Frontier Province. In response to longstanding requests, it extradited   
three major traffickers to the United States.   
   
These are major breakthroughs. I wish they had occurred earlier. I   
strongly believe they occurred now, Mr. Chairman, in part because of the   
certification process. I view these steps as a strategic start in a   
critical heroin source and trafficking country. We will continue with   
our important counternarcotics programs in Pakistan and will watch   
closely to see if the government sustains this commitment.   
   
Budget   
   
Mr. Chairman, through certification, our efforts with the multilateral   
organizations, and other aspects of our policy, we have set the stage   
for significantly improved international narcotics control efforts in   
1995. In Southeast Asia, we have a foundation for progress. But we must   
be prepared to buttress these efforts by providing assistance to   
countries that demonstrate their commitment to narcotics control. We   
submitted a budget to do that. We are also mindful of the need to   
practice fiscal restraint: The President's proposal for the   
international affairs budget--a mere 1.3% of total federal spending for   
the next fiscal year--is already austere. It reflects important   
initiatives to streamline our activities and save where we can.   
   
As I noted at the beginning of my statement, our international narcotics   
control program is an integral part of the National Drug Control   
Strategy and is vital to our broader international efforts to advance   
America's interests. Today, America faces a choice between the concrete   
benefits of international engagement and the illusory appeal of   
isolationism. Those who say they are for a strong America must help keep   
America strong. We cannot have it both ways. We cannot be the world's   
most powerful nation if we do not marshal the resources to stand by our   
commitments. We cannot lead if we do not have all the tools of   
leadership at our disposal.   
   
For a program that is as small as ours--yet so closely linked to the   
health and safety of the American people--we have borne our share of   
recent budget cuts. We have cut our programs to the bone, closing our   
least-critical foreign operations, wiping out most of our funding   
pipelines, and shrinking our air-wing operations. We continue to   
postpone the implementation of new programs and, to the extent safety   
considerations permit, delay upgrades and maintenance. Lack of funds   
slows our response to the growing heroin threat.   
   
We simply cannot sustain a credible international narcotics control   
program at current FY 1995 funding levels. We certainly cannot sustain   
it at the level recently reported out by the House Appropriations   
Committee for the next fiscal year. We desperately need these funds to   
follow through on the source country crop control and enforcement   
programs that are crucial to the success of our strategy and allow us to   
build on the momentum we have achieved. This subcommittee's support is   
crucial to its success.   
   
Conclusion   
   
Mr. Chairman, in the post-Cold War era you can hardly find a foreign   
policy issue that has such an immediate and direct detrimental effect on   
so many Americans as the international drug trade. There should be no   
question that the resources we spend on combating this problem abroad   
serve first and foremost the American people. I strongly believe that if   
we do not get ahead of this problem overseas, it will eventually   
overwhelm our best domestic efforts to combat narcotics abuse, crime,   
and poverty.   
   
Our policy and strategy contain no magic bullets nor does it pretend to   
go after the easy targets; the easy targets are often the least   
consequential. Instead, it seeks to put pressure on the most important   
parts of the trade--the producers and the powerful traffickers who run   
it.   
   
By taking this approach, we challenge the key countries and the rest of   
the international community to undertake more aggressive and effective   
anti-drug efforts. We are running into political resistance from some   
countries, but we can work through this resistance with carefully   
designed assistance programs, effective institution-building, and honest   
use of the certification process. Your support will clearly strengthen   
our hand and accelerate the progress that recent events have shown can   
be achieved through focused and sustained efforts.    
   
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ARTICLE 6:   
   
Charting Further Gains in the Status and Rights of Women   
Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United   
Nations   
Remarks at the Center for National Policy breakfast, Washington, DC,   
August 2, 1995   
   
Good morning. I am pleased to be here. I may be prejudiced, but I think   
the Center for National Policy is a great organization, and I appreciate   
its willingness to sponsor this timely event.   
   
The Fourth World Conference on Women will convene in China in 33 days   
and, let there be no doubt, the United States will be there. We will be   
there because this conference is a rare opportunity to chart further   
gains in the status and rights of more than half the people on earth.   
   
As leader of the American delegation, I am confident that U.S. goals   
will have strong support. These include:   
   
--  Promoting and protecting the human rights of women and ending   
violence against women;   
--  Expanding the participation of women in political and economic   
decisionmaking;   
--  Assuring equal access for women to education and health care   
throughout their lives;   
--  Strengthening families through efforts to balance the work and   
family responsibilities of both women and men; and   
--  Recognizing the increased role of non-governmental organizations--  
NGOs--in building strong communities at the local, national, and   
international levels.   
   
The conference in Beijing will be  the fourth in a series begun 20 years   
ago in Mexico City. These gatherings have spurred legal, social, and   
political reforms that have enhanced the lives of women and girls around   
the globe. Our goal now is to build on past gains and to hasten the   
removal of continuing obstacles to the full and equal participation of   
women in society.   
   
As someone whose family was driven from its home twice when I was a   
child--first by Hitler, then by Stalin--I believe it is the   
responsibility of every free person to do what he or she can to advance   
the freedom of others. I also intend to see that the U.S. delegation to   
the Women's Conference serves as an unabashed advocate for freedom and   
human rights.   
   
Unfortunately, today, in countries around the world, appalling abuses   
are being committed against women. These include coerced abortions and   
sterilizations, children sold into prostitution, ritual mutilations,   
dowry murders, and official indifference to violence.   
   
The Clinton Administration will use the conference in Beijing to   
underline the truth that violence against women is no one's prerogative;   
it is not a cultural choice; it is not an inevitable consequence of   
biology--it is a crime that we all have a responsibility to condemn,   
prevent, punish, and stop.   
   
Now there are those who say that we should withdraw from the Women's   
Conference because of the human rights policies of the host country;   
those suggestions are well-motivated, but they miss the main point.   
American withdrawal would not stop the conference or cause it to be   
moved; it would lead, instead, to a conference in which 130 million   
American women would be unrepresented and in which American influence   
and leadership would not be felt. It just does not make sense--in the   
name of human rights--to boycott a conference that has, as a primary   
purpose, the promotion of human rights.   
   
The way to help women in China and elsewhere is not to abandon the field     
to others, but rather to attend this conference, to debate head-on the   
differences of philosophy and ideology that exist, to lay out before the   
world the abuses we want to halt and the obstacles to progress we want   
to remove, and to gain commitments to change from the societies most in   
need of change. That is what leadership and a commitment to free and   
open discussion are all about.   
   
With respect to Harry Wu, our position is clear: He should be released   
immediately and unharmed. His case is a top priority for the United   
States. I can understand why some would want to tie conference   
participation to Mr. Wu's release, but that falsely assumes that our   
attendance would be some sort of favor to Beijing. We have no cause  to   
believe that our approach to the conference will have any impact on   
China's decisions concerning Mr. Wu. We do have reason, however, to hope   
that the conference will have a positive effect on the status of women   
in China.   
   
Conference preparations already have contributed to a heightened   
awareness within China of women's issues. There is public discussion of   
previously taboo subjects, including violence against women. Chinese   
returning from the preparatory meetings have described their heightened   
sensitivity to the treatment of women in the media and to the economic   
exploitation of women. It matters a great deal that more than 5,000   
Chinese women will participate in the NGO forum and will take their   
impressions back to their communities.   
   
Given the nature of China's human rights record, I do not mean to   
exaggerate the impact of this one conference. But as a former board   
member of the National Endowment for Democracy, I know that one of the   
best ways to promote democratic thinking is to expose people to new   
ideas on matters that relate directly to their own lives.   
   
Exposure to such thinking matters to us not only in China, but around   
the world, because countries in which women have a fair share of power   
tend to be more stable, democratic, prosperous, and just than those in   
which women are marginalized and repressed.   
   
The Women's Conference will contribute to a freer and more equitable   
world. As its recommendations are implemented, it will also strengthen   
families around the world. We know from our own experience that when   
families are strong, children are cared for, socially constructive   
values are taught, and an environment is created in which civility and   
law may thrive.   
   
So we want momentum to build around the idea that women and men should   
share fairly in the responsibilities of family life; we want to see   
girls valued to the same degree as boys; we want parents and prospective   
parents to be able to make informed judgments as they plan their   
families; and we want to see domestic violence curtailed and condemned.   
Each of these is a central element of the Conference draft Platform for   
Action. Effective action on each will help families and communities   
everywhere.   
   
Despite recent gains, women remain an undervalued and underdeveloped   
human resource. This is not to say that women have trouble finding work;   
in many societies--especially in rural, agriculturally based areas--they   
do the vast majority of the work. But they do not own the land; they are   
not taught to read; they cannot obtain personal or business loans; and   
they are denied equal access to the levers of political decisionmaking.   
   
It is no accident that most of those in the world who are abjectly poor   
are women--often caring for children without the help of the children's   
father; many trapped from an early age in a web of abuse,   
discrimination, ignorance, and powerlessness from which only a few are   
able to escape.   
   
We cannot be indifferent. It is reported that, in Angola, one-third of   
all homicides are perpetrated against women, usually by their spouse. In   
Thailand, child prostitution is growing because clients believe older   
prostitutes are more likely to be infected by HIV. In Senegal, females   
receive less than one-third the schooling received by males. In Sierra   
Leone, women perform much of the subsistence farming and all of the   
child-rearing and have little opportunity for education. Almost   
everywhere, women are restricted by discriminatory attitudes and social   
and economic structures that are unjust.   
   
The Women's Conference will not solve these problems overnight, but it   
will call attention to them and promote remedial action. Women the world   
over are prepared to be full partners in sustainable development, but   
they need access to education and health care; they need access to   
credit; and they need equality under the law. Releasing the productive   
capacity of women is one key to breaking the cycle of poverty, and that   
will contribute, in turn, to higher standards of living for all nations.   
   
Since the first Women's Conference 20 years ago, opportunities for women   
have expanded throughout the world. It is no longer a question of   
whether women from all countries will have a strong voice in controlling   
their destinies but only when and how that goal will be achieved.   
   
But building inclusive societies is still a work in progress. The United   
States has been working on it for two centuries. For more than half our   
nation's history--until 75 years ago this month--American women could   
not even vote. Many traditional or authoritarian societies still have a   
very long way to go. The Fourth Women's Conference will offer guidelines   
and promote commitments for every state to move forward, whatever   
current practices and policies may be.   
   
In preparing for this conference, I was reminded of an old Chinese poem   
in which a father says to his young daughter:   
   
We keep a dog to watch the house;   
A pig is useful, too;   
We keep a cat to catch a mouse;   
But what can we do   
With a girl like you?   
   
For me, the Women's Conference will be a success if it brings us even a   
little closer to the day when girls all over the world will be able to   
look ahead with confidence that their lives will be valued, their   
individuality respected, their rights protected, and their futures   
determined by their own abilities and character. In such a world, the   
lives of all of us--men and women, boys and girls--will be enriched.   
   
It is to make progress toward such  a world that the United States will   
be participating actively, forcefully, and proudly in Beijing. Thank you   
very much.     
   
   
[END OF DISPATCH VOL 6, NO 23]  
  
   
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