U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 27, JULY 3, 1995
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:

1. The United Nations at 50: Renewing the Vision--President Clinton, 
Secretary Christopher, Madeleine K. Albright  
2. Sustained U.S. Assistance to Africa--Anthony Lake 
3. Narcotics Control in Asia--Robert S. Gelbard
4. U.K. Foreign Secretary Hurd To Retire 
5. Focus on 4WCW: Update on Preparations    
6. Treaty Actions 


ARTICLE 1:

The United Nations at 50:  Renewing the Vision 
President Clinton, Secretary Christopher, Madeleine K. Albright

President Clinton, Secretary Christopher
Addresses at celebration marking the 50th anniversary of the UN Charter, 
San Francisco, California, June 26, 1995.

Secretary Christopher. Fifty years ago this spring, I was a 19-year-old 
naval ensign assigned to San Francisco awaiting the repair of my ship--
one of 12 million Americans called to arms to defend our country and its 
allies in history's greatest and most terrible war. I was billeted in 
the Bachelor Officers Quarters on one of the few floors of the St. 
Francis Hotel not turned over to the UN.

I remember seeing such renowned figures as Arthur Vandenberg, Edward 
Stettinius, Anthony Eden, and Andrei Gromyko. They had come to San 
Francisco to devise a framework that they hoped would keep the peace as 
effectively as they had prosecuted the war. Walter Cronkite captured 
their spirit well:  "We were not isolated in war; we could not be 
isolated in peace."

The world has been a dangerous and often violent place in the last half-
century. But the institutions that the post-war generation built have 
worked--from the UN, to the IMF and the World Bank, to the Atlantic 
alliance. We have avoided global war and forged the greatest era of 
global prosperity the world has ever seen.

We are here to rededicate ourselves to the ideals of the United Nations 
Charter--among the greatest achievements of the post-war generation. The 
Charter was inspired above all by the spirit and wisdom of Franklin 
Roosevelt, who died just days before the conference began. "Never 
again," Roosevelt had said in his last presidential campaign, "after 
cooperating with other nations in a world war to save our way of life, 
can we wash our hands of maintaining the peace for which we fought."

The American framers of the Charter remembered our refusal to join the 
League of Nations and the League's ultimate failure to uphold 
international norms. They remembered how places such as Manchuria, 
Ethiopia, and Czechoslovakia fell victim to fascist aggression. When 
President Truman spoke before the Senate to urge ratification of the 
Charter, he said: "The Charter comes from the reality of experience in a 
world where one generation has failed twice to keep the peace."

The UN has had its share of setbacks, but, nevertheless, it has helped 
to make an imperfect world more peaceful, more prosperous, and more 
free. From the Golan Heights, to El Salvador, to Cambodia and Namibia, 
the UN took on assignments that no nation would undertake alone--and 
carried them out admirably. And it allowed the United States to marshal 
international support for goals that reinforce our common values as well 
as our common interests. 

Just yesterday in Haiti, the United Nations, the United States, and the 
people of Haiti took an important step for democracy. Democracy is still 
a work in progress in Haiti, but what is significant is that democratic 
elections were held where less than a year ago a brutal dictatorship 
ruled. President Clinton, without your leadership and determination, the 
people of Haiti would not have the chance to build their own future. 

Haiti is an example of why every American President since Harry Truman 
has worked with the UN to advance our interests. That is why we look to 
it to address the great transnational issues of the post-Cold War era: 
proliferation, environmental degradation, terrorism, narcotics, crime, 
and sustainable development. 

Superpower confrontation no longer paralyzes the possibility of change 
at the UN. Our task today is to take the UN and all the great global 
institutions that our predecessors left us and to make them work better 
in a changed world. When these institutions succeed, lives are saved, 
children are educated, diseases are cured, refugees are given shelter, 
and economies are lifted. When they fail, people suffer and nations 
decline. That is a measure of their importance and of the need to ensure 
that they measure up to the challenge of the times. Powers great and 
small have a responsibility to insist on reform. 

President Kennedy often told the story of the French Marshal Lyautey, 
who, upon asking his gardener to plant a tree, was informed that the 
tree would not reach maturity for 100 years. "In that case," the Marshal 
replied, "there is no time to lose. Plant it this afternoon." Our post-
war institutions have been maturing for 50 years now. There is still 
much to be done to raise them to their full potential. But that goal is 
worth striving for, and we must begin without delay.

President Clinton is the first American President to have been born 
after World War II ended and the UN was established. President Kennedy's 
proverbial torch has been passed to him and to his generation. And so 
has the necessary task of renewal in our nation--and in the United 
Nations. Ladies and gentlemen, it is my honor to present to you the 
President of the United States.


President Clinton. From the beginning of our Administration I have 
worked hard to make the global economy work for the American people. We 
live and work in a global market. Our living standards depend upon our 
ability to compete and to keep one step ahead of economic change. 

In the past 21/2 years, we have fought at home for a comprehensive 
economic strategy that would create jobs and lift the incomes of our 
people, focusing on reducing the deficit  but investing in our people--
in their education and their future. My new budget proposal continues to 
reflect these priorities. 

At the same time, we have worked to open more markets around the world 
to our products in free and fair competition with others, through NAFTA, 
GATT, our work with the Asia-Pacific countries, and with the countries 
of the Americas. We also have worked hard to encourage the global trend 
toward market democracy in the former communist countries. 

I am pursuing this strategy, above all, for one reason: to renew the 
promise of America in the 21st century. But I also want to preserve the 
leadership of America as a force for peace and freedom, for democracy 
and prosperity. 

This G-7 meeting has moved us a step closer to these goals. We've taken 
concrete steps to strengthen the international financial system--
something we promised to do last year in Naples. And let me give you 
one--and perhaps the most important--example. 

Earlier this year, we in the United States were confronted with a 
serious financial crisis in Mexico. It posed a risk to markets 
throughout the world, and it certainly threatened our own economic 
health, as well as our long-term relationships with Mexico, involving a 
number of other issues. We led the effort to stabilize Mexico, and, from 
all signs, it seems to be working. President Zedillo and his team have 
worked hard to live within the discipline the markets have imposed and 
to move Mexico to a brighter and better future. 

We learned two important lessons in dealing with the Mexico crisis. 
First, the world clearly needs better tools to identify problems such as 
this so that they can be prevented; and second, the international system 
must have a stronger way of resolving these crises once they do occur. 

We were fortunate in the Mexico instance that the United States had 
access to a fund which would permit us to make some guarantees and move 
to put together an international approach to this problem. But the U.S. 
will not be able to be the lender of last resort in other crises of this 
kind. So here in Halifax, we have begun to forge the tools to deal with 
these kinds of problems in the future. 

We agreed to create an early warning system that will sound the alarm 
when nations begin to encounter real problems, before the severity of 
the Mexico crisis develops. We call for early and full disclosure of 
critical monetary and financial information. We'll establish tougher 
reporting standards for nations so that markets will react more quickly 
and nations will be pressed to implement sound policies in a timely 
manner. This may be the best discipline for preventing future crises. 

When these problems do occur, we must respond decisively. Leaders of the 
G-7 have taken crucial steps toward that end. We've called upon the 
International Monetary Fund to establish a new mechanism to ensure that 
we can act swiftly when one nation's economic crisis threatens the world 
economy. We propose to double the funds available for this purpose to 
more than $50 billion from those nations with a stake in a stable 
international financial system. That will require loans from the United 
States which must be authorized by Congress. I know a lot of you are 
thinking about that, but they are scored as cost-free to the American 
taxpayers because they're viewed as risk-free because they go to the 
international institutions. 

The G-7 leaders also have agreed that the international financial 
institutions--the World Bank, the IMF--and the agencies of the United 
Nations must continue on a path of reform. These institutions have 
served us well for half a century, and we will continue to support them, 
but they must adapt for a new era. We put forward new principles that 
will focus their work on addressing vital human needs--alleviating 
poverty, supporting private sector development, and promoting 
sustainable development and environmental protection along side economic 
growth. The resulting economic growth will bolster democracy and 
stability in developing nations and, of course, create future markets 
for American exports. 

The leaders at Halifax are also discussing new security threats that no 
nation should face alone. We'll have more to say about that tomorrow. 
But let me say that we have agreed that the G-7 must work together far 
more energetically and comprehensively to counter the growing dangers 
posed by terrorists, international criminals, nuclear smugglers, and 
drug traffickers. We must cooperate and work closely to counter 
terrorism and criminal activities sponsored by states, groups, and 
individuals. These are among the foremost challenges of the post-Cold 
War world. 

These are issues which affect the lives of the American people in a very 
direct way. How we deal with them, whether and how we strengthen the 
international financial system and reform its institutions, and how we 
fight challenges such as terrorism will in no small way determine our 
citizens' future prosperity and security and how they feel about 
themselves and the future their children will enjoy. 

To create new high-wage jobs, to raise incomes, and to expand economic 
opportunity, the United States must continue to lead, even as we work 
hard on these matters at home. We cannot--I will say again--we cannot 
walk away from our global leadership responsibilities. In Halifax, we 
have taken another solid step along that road. It will make the economy 
work better for the American people, and I believe it will help us 
prevent future Mexicos and deal with those crises in a much more 
effective way when they do occur.


Madeleine Albright
Remarks at celebration marking the 50th anniversary of the UN Charter, 
San Francisco, California, June 26, 1995.

When the delegates gathered here 50 years ago, they carried with them 
the expectations of children from around the world. In classrooms from 
Santiago to San Francisco to Seoul, the vision behind this bold 
experiment was explained. Teenagers met in mock debates, reciting with 
passion the views of various delegations, while their younger sisters 
and brothers put down in crayon and water color the images they could 
only imagine of a world without war.

To say that children are naturally peaceful is to deny all parental 
experience. But to say that children dream is to recognize the origin of 
all human progress.  

Yes, the United Nations Charter was authored by a world emerging from a 
nightmare, but it was also a world determined to dream again; determined 
to provide the means, not through words alone, but through concrete 
action, to ensure that the horrors just past would not be relived.

To the generation that were children then, that gift was nobly given and 
gratefully received. To the generation that are children now, that 
legacy we must with honor and interest bequeath.

Let us vow, together, to go forward from this ceremony of honored memory 
and shared resolve--to reject outright the forces of faction and fear 
that divide us; and to celebrate our diverse cultures and histories 
without denying the common humanity that binds us, and by so doing to 
breathe new life into the unifying dream that is the UN Charter--so that 
the children living on this beautiful city's highest hill and those in 
the deepest valley in the most remote land will have something precious 
to share and safeguard and by which they may to lives of boundless 
accomplishment be inspired.

Let us heed the instruction of our own lives. If Nelson Mandela and 
Vaclav Havel could envision from jail the freedom not only of 
themselves, but of their peoples; if Aung San Suu Kyi can--as we speak--
hold firm to the conviction that lies must inevitably give way to truth; 
if Anne Frank, a child surrounded by evil, could believe nonetheless in 
the fundamental decency of human beings, then we, too, can believe in 
the dream begun here 50 years ago.  We, too, can believe in ourselves. 
(###)



ARTICLE 2:

Sustained U.S. Assistance to Africa 
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Remarks to roundtable on sustained U.S. assistance to Africa, 
TransAfrica Forum, Washington, DC, June 29, 1995

I am delighted to be here today,  especially with a group of people who 
care so deeply about Africa, a place that captured my imagination three 
decades ago when I first traveled there as a young foreign service 
officer.

Much has changed since then--both in Africa and here in America. Almost 
two-thirds of Africa's nations are moving toward democracy and free 
market economies, and American leadership and assistance has played a 
major role in that effort. But our success in helping Africa press ahead 
is in danger. Foreign assistance is under attack by new isolationists 
from both the left and the right, and American leadership is at risk.

African countries that have bravely chosen the path of democracy and 
economic reform are asking why the United States appears to be on the 
verge of retreat at exactly the moment that they are doing what we have 
asked of them for decades. When I traveled to nine African states last 
December, presidents, opposition leaders, and individuals from all walks 
of life told me that the people of Africa do not want our charity. They 
want a partnership--a partnership in peace, in democracy, and in 
economic growth. U.S. economic assistance is a vital link in that 
partnership.

This partnership benefits us. We spend money on foreign assistance not 
out of the goodness of our hearts but out of the conviction that it 
serves America's best interests. The United States has a strong stake in 
Africa in political and security issues, in promoting democracy and 
human rights, and in establishing the rule of law. But what fewer people 
know is that we also have important economic interests in Africa, and 
our economic support for these developing countries is essential to 
promoting our political and other objectives on the continent.

The return on our foreign assistance investment--in increased security 
and greater prosperity for the American people--is substantial. For 
example, last year we supported South Africa's historic elections. 
Today, we all know that nation has a strong democratic government under 
the leadership of President Nelson Mandela, and the United States has a 
thriving new friendship with South Africa. I was surprised to learn that 
South Africa's free market economy now absorbs more American exports 
than all of Eastern Europe combined.

Americans know that the world is growing closer, and that to lead, our 
nation must be engaged. Your presence here shows that you share this 
belief. Your actions demonstrate a commitment to maintaining the 
involvement abroad that is essential for our nation's future.

This Administration also recognizes that, as we work to cut the federal 
deficit, foreign assistance must also be reduced. But there is a right 
way and a wrong way to make these reductions. Let me tell you about the 
wrong way. The House may soon vote to cut the Development Fund for 
Africa by fully one-third--considerably more than it may reduce 
assistance to other parts of the world. Funding for the World Bank's 
International Development Association--which provides half of its loans 
to Africa--may be cut by almost two-thirds. Singling out Africa is not 
only unfair, it's unwise. These drastic cuts will come back to haunt us. 
They will erode support for free markets-- ones that produce jobs for 
American workers. They will undermine our efforts to prevent conflicts 
and humanitarian crises before they happen. In short, these cuts put our 
leadership in peril at a time when we can make a difference.

Staying engaged in Africa is in America's interest. Today, the nearly 
700 million people who live south of the Sahara comprise a major 
emerging market, and Africa's wealth of resources--from oil and uranium 
to cocoa and coffee--are in permanent demand here in America. Yet we 
have barely begun to explore all the possibilities that trade with 
Africa holds for U.S. companies and consumers.

U.S. exports to Africa totaled $4.4 billion last year, and more than 
80,000 American jobs depend on them. These exports--which exceed those 
to the former Soviet Union by nearly a quarter--can be vastly increased. 
But to do so, we must continue to help stability take hold and democracy 
take root throughout the continent.

Indeed, investment is even more important than exports because it is the 
real engine of growth and job creation for any economy. As Africa 
progresses toward democracy and free markets, Washington should--as the 
Corporate Council on Africa has recommended--pursue policies that will 
encourage American investment in Africa and strengthen the continent's 
private sector. U.S. investment will spur demand for American exports in 
areas such as capital goods, services, and high-tech products and will 
create good, high-wage jobs. As Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown said at 
last month's African-African American Summit in Dakar, "The United 
States no longer concedes Africa's markets to European suppliers."

Through the Commerce Department's promotion efforts and the Trade and 
Development Agency, as well as through the work of EXIM bank and OPIC, 
the Administration has been a catalyst for American trade and investment 
with Africa. We must intensify those efforts. What has worked in East 
Asia could also work in Africa--but only if we stay engaged. It will not 
happen if the new isolationists have their way and cut funds for 
building democracy, sustainable development, and peacekeeping.

Today in Africa, we face challenges and opportunities that we cannot 
walk away from. We cannot be indifferent to a continent to which so many 
Americans trace their roots. And the plain truth is that helping Africa 
contend with its internal problems--along with nurturing its tremendous 
economic potential--is in America's interest.

Our security demands that we stay engaged. Sudan, for example, has 
worked its way into the "big league" of countries that support 
international terrorism. It poses a direct threat to our interests. Or 
take Nigeria--some 40% of the heroin that enters the United States 
passes through that nation. Left unchecked, the problems that plague 
many African countries today--over-population, disease, and 
environmental decay--could overflow borders and be the international 
crises of tomorrow.

The small fraction of our spending that we devote to Africa--less than 
one-tenth of 1% of the Federal budget--can help contain these problems 
and even turn some of them around. Resources such as our Development 
Fund for Africa are crucial for maintaining the remarkable progress that   
so many nations in Africa have already achieved. It helps create stable, 
democratic societies of consumers--not masses of victims in need of 
relief. It helps reduce disparities of wealth and privilege that blight 
the lives of individuals and nations--improving health care education 
and the standard of living across Africa. The DFA, along with the 
African Development Foundation, promote sustainable development on a 
broad front--development that is essential to preventing the conflicts 
that explode into tragedy.

Consider some of the ways our foreign assistance has helped make a 
difference not only in Africa but throughout the developing world.

-- Over the past 50 years, infant and child mortality rates in the 
developing world have been reduced by half, and life expectancy has 
increased by nearly a third. 

-- In the past two decades, the number of the chronically undernourished 
in developing nations has been halved. 

-- Average real incomes in those nations have doubled since World War 
II.

In a range of African nations, U.S. foreign assistance in recent years 
has established a solid record of success. For example:

-- USAID democratization programs played an important role in South 
Africa's historic elections last April and in Mozambique's polling in 
November--educating voters, election officials, and the media. 

-- Our assistance has fostered the opening of stock markets in Botswana, 
Mauritius, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Kenya.

-- On a continent where radio provides the most effective way of 
reaching people, Voice of America broadcasts more than 80 hours a week 
of first-run programming in six different languages. 

-- Our programs in Ghana helped remove regulatory bottlenecks and revise 
the investment code, which helped spur a 73% jump in American exports 
between 1992 and 1993 alone.

Deep cuts in our assistance would endanger all of these successes. 
Consider some possible results if the congressional cuts in our spending 
in Africa go through.

-- As many as 4 million children may not be inoculated against 
infectious disease, and some of them will die. 

-- Nearly 100,000 children will risk death from lack of oral rehydration 
therapy. 

-- Our ability to track and limit the spread of HIV will be sharply 
diminished. 

-- Declining population growth rates in some countries--a key to stable 
development--could increase again. USAID is the foremost sponsor of 
family planning in Africa. But without the funds to continue its work, 
the progress in slowing Africa's high population growth rates could 
evaporate. That would increase the chances for epidemics, malnutrition, 
environmental degradation, and political instability.

The congressional budget axe is not just aimed at bilateral programs. 
The World Bank's International Development Association may suffer a 
worse blow. IDA is essential--it is the seed money for capitalism. It 
provides loans to the poorest reforming countries--those whose progress 
is too fragile to qualify for commercial loans. Half of IDA's funding 
goes to Africa. For these countries poised to make the transition to 
long-term growth, IDA is a lifesaver. Take away our contribution to the 
IDA and the United States loses one of its most effective means of 
spurring economic reform and opening new markets. Begun under the 
Eisenhower Administration--and backed by both parties for decades--IDA 
directly reduces these nations' trade and investment barriers, supports 
private sector growth, and provides new opportunities for American 
exports and investment.

Deep cuts in IDA would diminish opportunities for U.S. business. The IDA 
recipients of yesterday include South Korea, Indonesia, and Chile. The 
IDA recipients of today imported $20 billion in U.S. goods in 1993-- 
about a third more than in 1988. These are the markets of tomorrow.

Other multilateral efforts will suffer as well. Congressional cuts in 
our contribution to the IMF's Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility--
which also provides loans to the poorest nations while they implement 
economic reforms--will set back efforts to foster growth and market-
development in Africa. A sharp reduction in funds for international debt 
relief means one of the most crushing burdens will continue to weigh on 
these struggling nations. Many agencies of the United Nations also stand 
to lose as Congress cuts U.S. contributions--agencies that operate on 
the front lines to improve the health of Africa's people and help them 
move forward.

UN peacekeeping is another tool that Congress must not discard. In 
Mozambique, UN peacekeepers played a key role in persuading longtime 
enemies to end a war in which more than 1 million people were killed. 
And in Angola, blue helmet troops are arriving now--as we see real signs 
that a 33-year-old conflict is coming to an end. The developments in 
these two countries mean that soon, for the first time in decades, all 
of Southern Africa could be at peace. UN peacekeeping helps us produce 
progress like this without committing U.S. forces or bearing the entire 
bill. This is burden-sharing at its best.

As with our foreign assistance, peacekeeping is often an investment in 
prevention. We can pay now--or we can pay a lot more later. In Africa, 
as in other parts of the world, we have learned that working early to 
avert a crisis is far less expensive than mounting a large humanitarian 
effort or sending in our troops after tragedy has struck. Because of 
congressional decisions over the last few years, we cannot make some 
small but critical investments in prevention. For example, with a 
relatively small sum, we could offer more to help peacekeepers in 
Liberia, where 1 million people are at risk from renewed civil war.

Looking and acting ahead, we can protect lives, defend our interests, 
and save money. We know that when the all-seeing eye of CNN finds real 
suffering abroad, Americans want their government to act--as they should 
and we should. By then, the issue is not a small investment but an 
expensive, major operation. Nickel-and-dime policies always cost more in 
the end. 

American leadership in the world is not a luxury; it is a necessity. We 
know from experience that democracy and free markets are the best means 
to the ends to which people all over the world aspire--security, 
freedom, and prosperity. And we know that when others embrace democracy 
and free markets, America becomes more secure, more free, and, 
eventually, more prosperous.

If we are to remain a great nation, we must maintain our focus abroad, 
and Africa must be an important part of that focus. That is why 
President Clinton sponsored last summer's White House Conference on 
Africa and why I took my first and only official visit to Africa. And 
that is why Commerce Secretary Ron Brown has made three trips to Africa 
and is preparing to launch a major trade mission to the continent within 
the next year. This Administration knows that significant cuts in 
programs that benefit Africa will undermine our ability to promote 
sustainable development, increase U.S. exports, and prevent deadly 
conflicts.

President Clinton is committed to fighting the proposed cuts in foreign 
assistance. We welcome your efforts to support assistance to programs 
for Africa, and, on behalf of the President, I applaud you for this 
effort.

This is a moment of extraordinary hope for democracy and free markets--
in Africa and around the world. But nothing is inevitable. If we want to 
seize all the opportunities of our day, we must continue to reach out 
and not retreat. We must pay the price to maintain American leadership 
in the world. To keep the tide of history running our way, this is a 
price well worth paying.  (###)



ARTICLE 3:

Narcotics Control in Asia  
Robert S. Gelbard, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement Affairs
Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the House 
International Relations Committee, Washington, DC, June 21, 1995

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: Thank you for inviting me to 
appear before your committee today. I greatly welcome this opportunity 
to open a frank and productive dialogue with the members on our response 
to the Asian narcotics threat. These are the first such hearings this 
committee has held during my tenure and they come at an auspicious time. 
The Administration has been working to develop a new, comprehensive, 
international heroin control policy and has sent it to the President for 
approval.

I also have just returned from my second trip to Asia as Assistant 
Secretary. I visited Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Hong Kong 
where I conducted a comprehensive assessment of the heroin threat and 
our counternarcotics efforts in that region. My first visit to Asia was 
in January 1994. That was my first major trip abroad as Assistant 
Secretary and it underscored our concern about the heroin threat. The 
two trips have provided excellent bench marks for evaluating our 
progress and needs.

I can report that there have been advances in some important areas since 
early 1994, particularly in law enforcement efforts in Thailand and 
opium crop control in Laos. But I must candidly tell you that we cannot 
take comfort in this. The United States still faces today a worldwide 
heroin threat of unprecedented magnitude, and we are beginning to feel 
the repercussions in terms of greater domestic addiction. Asia--the 
source of an estimated two-thirds of the heroin in the United States--is 
our biggest concern. We can get ahead of this threat before we face a 
crisis. Today, I would like to review the drug threat from Asia, our 
policy to combat it, and the resources we need to accomplish this task.

The Threat

Mr. Chairman, allow me to outline briefly the nature of the 
international narcotics threat that we have presented in greater detail 
in this year's International Narcotics Control Strategy Report--the 
INCSR.

The spread of international narcotics trafficking constitutes one of the 
most persistent and pernicious challenges to America's foreign and 
domestic interests in the post-Cold War era. In his January address at 
Harvard University, Secretary Christopher identified the need to attack 
international narcotics trafficking and crime as one of the five key 
objectives of our foreign policy.

From a domestic perspective, it is increasingly clear that we cannot 
sustain a reduction in drug use without attacking foreign supplies. The 
National Drug Control Strategy includes three international goals. The 
strategy supports source country programs designed to assist host 
nations in destroying drug production and trafficking and developing 
alternative development projects to lessen dependency on drug crops. We 
have worked hard to reduce consumption with some success: Cocaine use 
among casual users fell significantly between 1985 and 1992, and heroin 
addiction remained stable for a long time. But recent data indicate that 
drug use in the United States is again rising, confirming what we have 
all known for years--a successful anti-drug strategy must address both 
supply and demand. With respect to heroin, the key indicators are all 
moving in the wrong direction: Prices are down, purity is up, and 
overdose hospital admissions and deaths are increasing.

On the foreign front, the wealth and power of the international 
narcotics trade pose additional challenges. Most of you are familiar 
with these problems as they are reflected in the sensational but true 
headlines from South America. But they apply to Asia as well.

The Asian heroin trade is generating hundreds of millions of unregulated 
dollars that cause enormous disruptions to national economic planning 
and growth. It is a political threat--trafficker corruption and 
intimidation can destroy democratic institutions and their leaders. It 
inflicts staggering social costs, condemning millions of drug users to 
painful, sick, and unproductive lives.

The potential for the problem to get worse is great. The rapid expansion 
and growth in communications and trade are making it easier for 
contraband, dirty money, and smugglers to move across borders 
undetected. The breakdown of central authority and the disruption of 
social order, particularly in Central Asia, are producing safehavens for 
new and established criminal organizations to base their operations. It 
is against this backdrop that we must ensure that we have a 
comprehensive policy that addresses the wide range of narcotics-related 
security threats.

The Trends

Mr. Chairman, allow me to focus on the salient facts as they relate to 
Asia.

First, opium production is out of control. It has more than doubled in 
the past decade. Our estimate for worldwide opium production in 1994 was 
more than 3,400 metric tons, with 98% of that--3,350 tons--produced in 
Asia. This is enough opium to produce over 340 tons of heroin. I cannot 
tell you   how much of this comes to the United States. But I can tell 
you that a decade ago, when the trade was smaller and heroin was less 
pure, U.S. drug abuse experts believed that the United States had 
500,000 addicts and that they used only five tons of heroin--50 tons of 
opium. Worldwide opium production was down about 10% in 1994, but the 
decline occurred primarily because bad weather hurt Burma's crop; much 
of this loss was offset by increased production in Afghanistan, the 
second- largest producer.

Second, production is spreading; more countries are involved. While 
Burma, with 2,030 tons, and Afghanistan, with 950 tons, continue to be 
the dominant producers of illicit opium, at least seven other Asian 
countries are also producers: Laos, Thailand, Pakistan, Iran, Vietnam, 
India, and China. Although we lack solid estimates, we are concerned 
about production in the newly independent Central Asian states.

Third, production is increasingly occurring beyond the effective reach 
of U.S. and central governments. In Southeast and Southwest Asia, most 
opium and heroin is produced in areas controlled by semi-autonomous, 
well-armed, and, often, violence-prone tribal, ethnic-based, or narco-
insurgent groups. Many profit greatly from narcotics production and some 
view efforts to control it as a direct challenge to their autonomy. They 
are often militarily strong enough to block government attempts to halt 
production and trafficking.

Fourth, worldwide consumption is increasing, boosting the incentives for 
production. Users in opium-producing countries such as Pakistan and 
Thailand are switching from opium to heroin. Meanwhile, heroin addiction 
is spreading to key transit countries such as India and China. Heroin 
remains the primary drug of abuse in Europe, and we are increasingly 
alarmed by signs of growing heroin use in Russia, Central Europe, and 
other states of the former Soviet Union.

Fifth, purity levels are up. In the streets of America and Europe today, 
we see a degree of purity in heroin undreamed of 10 years ago. And it no 
longer requires a needle to inject. Highly potent heroin is now being 
snorted and smoked.

Finally, trafficking networks are proliferating. New markets and sources 
have created an increasingly complex web of routes and organizations 
that span virtually every continent. Countries that were once on the 
periphery of the trade, such as Nigeria, now play central brokering and 
distribution roles. These constantly changing and complex trafficking 
patterns place enormous pressure on customs and law enforcement agencies 
just to keep pace.

Policy Framework

These are grim trends. But they should not mask the fact that we can 
point to areas of progress against the heroin trade in the past, and 
these examples shed light on where our efforts should be headed. The 
simple fact is that where we have had access and opportunity to 
implement sustained programs to counter the heroin trade, they work. Let 
me cite three examples.


First is Thailand--home of our longest-running counternarcotics program 
in Asia. In the early 1970s, we started efforts to combat opium 
production in that country when it was one of the leading sources for 
Southeast Asian heroin. Through a variety of programs tailored to meet 
cultural, political, and geographic aspects of Thai opium production, 
Thailand is now a marginal opium producer. We are now readjusting our 
counternarcotics program in Thailand, shifting the focus away from 
relatively expensive crop control programs to less expensive enforcement 
efforts to target the organizations that run heroin processing and 
distribution operations out of Thailand.

Second is Laos. Laos became a major concern to us when opium production 
began to increase rapidly in the mid- to late 1980s, in part a reaction 
to our success in Thailand. In 1989, production reached nearly 400 
metric tons, up from possibly as little as 50 tons in the early 1980s. 
Concerned about government corruption and commitment, we denied counter-
narcotics certification to Laos in 1989, yet moved ahead with bilateral 
efforts on crop control and other counter-narcotics programs. The pay-
off has been remarkable: Opium production has tumbled every year since 
1989--a total of 80%--to 85 tons in 1994. While some of this decline is 
due to bad weather and we remain concerned about a possible rebound in 
production this year, the long-term trend is encouraging.

Finally, Pakistan. In 1978, Pakistan was the world's leading producer of 
illicit opium, with 800 tons. The long-term production trend since then 
has been down, despite annual variations. Last year, production was only 
160 tons. The decline came about due to a number of factors, but most 
important were the government's commitment to prohibit production in 
areas under its complete control and a U.S.-funded program to eradicate 
crops and create alternative development in areas under nominal 
government control. Most opium production in Pakistan is now 
concentrated in areas which have a high degree of autonomy under 
Pakistan's constitution and are controlled by well-armed Pathan 
tribesmen. Crop control progress there is slow and dangerous. 
Increasingly, we are focusing our counternarcotics efforts in Pakistan 
on its newer drug reality: the organizations that run international 
heroin distribution networks.

Mr. Chairman, it is against this backdrop of past efforts and current 
trends that we recently undertook a comprehensive review of our 
international heroin control policy and strategy. Some clear facts 
emerged from that assessment.

-- We can implement effective programs if we have an opportunity and the 
resources to work with committed governments;

-- We must keep our efforts focused on the most critical--not the 
easiest--parts of the trade; and

-- We must be committed to a sustained effort--fundamental progress 
requires time.

With these points in mind, Mr. Chairman, let me review four key areas 
our policy focuses on: Burma, broader international support, attacking 
the leading organizations, and more stringent use of certification.

Burma. This discussion must start with Burma. Burma's role in the heroin 
trade dwarfs that of any other country. For the past several years, it 
alone has produced about two-thirds of the world's illicit opium. 
Staggering levels of Burmese opium and heroin production are the main 
reasons why Southeast Asia is now the principal source of heroin for the 
U.S. market. If we do not derail this trade, we stand little chance of 
reducing heroin supplies to the United States.

But to address the Burma problem, we are starting at a very low base. We 
rightly suspended bilateral assistance in 1988 following the Burmese 
military's brutal suppression of the pro-democracy movement, and the 
United States has denied counternarcotics certification to Burma every 
year since 1989. Furthermore, the need to sustain sanctions against one 
of the world's most egregious violators of human rights, as well as 
skepticism about the regime's seriousness of purpose on counternarcotics 
issues, further limits cooperation with the government on 
counternarcotics.

As Burmese heroin continues to flow into the United States, however, we 
must find new approaches to the Burmese heroin challenge. We will not 
undercut our democracy and human rights goals in Burma. Indeed, the 
State Law and Order Restoration Council--SLORC--is one of the world's 
most brutal and repressive regimes. That said, we believe a vigorous 
counternarcotics policy is not incompatible with a democracy and human 
rights policy. Moreover, we strongly believe that, in the long run, an 
accountable Burmese Government that enjoys legitimacy in opium-growing 
areas will be more willing and able to crack down on the drug trade.

First, we intend to continue to provide in-country training for 
carefully selected and vetted special counternarcotics units. This will 
be on a case-by-case basis and subject to the same U.S. standards and 
safeguards observed in other countries in which the U.S. has a 
counternarcotics relationship. This will help raise the government's 
awareness of and responsiveness to the narcotics problem, while helping 
to put in place trained officials who can address the threat over the 
long term.

Second, we want to continue our exchange of law enforcement information 
to support Burmese counter-narcotics operations. In particular, we, the 
Burmese people, and the region as a whole have a mutual interest in 
seeing authorities step up effective operations against the narcotics 
production and trafficking activities of the Shan United Army and its 
leader, Khun Sa. Of Burma's dominant heroin-producing and trafficking 
organizations, this is the one with the most extensive international 
ties.

Third, meaningful crop control efforts must begin, and we need to press 
the government to intensify such efforts in areas under its control. We 
call upon Rangoon to press the ethnic groups with which it has political 
accommodations to undertake vigorous eradication programs and to pursue 
law enforcement efforts against all of the country's major traffickers. 
Absent a major setback in human rights, we also intend to increase 
support for regional alternative development projects administered by 
the UN Drug Control Program--UNDCP--to reduce and prevent opium 
cultivation in ethnically controlled areas of Burma. At our insistence, 
the UN is conditioning this assistance on the requirement that poppy 
cultivation be reduced in the project areas. In addition, we believe 
that such alternative development projects serve a positive human rights 
goal by improving the lives of desperately poor farmers in ethnic 
minority areas. We would also like to support NGO-run counternarcotics 
programs targeted at ethnic minority areas outside government control.

Finally, we will continue to encourage Burma's neighbors--particularly 
China and Thailand--to work more closely with us and increase their 
pressure on the Burmese regime to intensify counternarcotics efforts. 
With so much heroin exiting Burma by way of China and Thailand and with 
the transshipment trade creating increasingly serious addiction and 
crime problems in both countries, they have a strong interest in 
encouraging the Government of Burma to crack down harder on drugs.

Mr. Chairman, the narcotics situation in Burma presents a difficult set 
of political, security, and geographic challenges. The steps I have 
outlined here are by no means a panacea. They are, however, a useful 
component of our overall effort and will not compromise our human rights 
policy. If these modest steps produce the progress we anticipate, and 
there is progress on our human rights and democracy concerns, we will be 
in a stronger position to make real gains in reducing the narcotics 
threat from Southeast Asia. And we will have begun to develop 
institutions for serious cooperation when the SLORC is finally replaced 
by a democratic government.

Increased International Efforts

A second key element of our policy is to increase the involvement and 
effectiveness of multilateral organizations in counternarcotics. The 
sheer size of the trade and lack of government access to or influence in 
key producing areas limits what we can accomplish unilaterally or 
bilaterally and requires that we find other ways to have an effect on 
these regions. The UN and other multilateral organizations can play a 
much greater role in support of our interests. They often have access 
where we do not, their programs can complement ours, and they can 
attract additional financial and operational support for anti-drug 
programs. In addition to Burma, we have designated UNDCP funds to begin 
projects in Afghanistan's major opium producing regions once political 
situations there stabilize.

In a related area, we are, for the first time, engaging international 
financial institutions and multilateral development banks in serious 
counternarcotics initiatives. A largely untapped resource, these 
organizations can play a valuable role in supporting sustainable 
development programs that are crucial to developing income and 
employment alternatives to narcotics production. The World Bank and 
other lending institutions are ready to support these types of projects, 
and we will be working to encourage key opium producing countries to 
submit proposals for using such assistance.

We are looking for Europe and Japan and other Asian donors to play 
greater roles in this area, too. I recently returned from Vienna, where 
I held extensive consultations on narcotics-related development issues 
with the UN and our Dublin Group partners. The Dublin Group also met 
last month in Washington. The Dublin Group was formed by the United 
States and the 15 EU members  and Norway, Canada, Japan, and Australia 
to coordinate their counternarcotics assistance and programs. The 
feedback in Vienna was positive, particularly with regard to our 
initiatives to seek greater involvement by the multilateral development 
banks. The UN and the Dublin Group members acknowledged the key roles 
they can play in some Asian nations where our influence is limited. In 
all these cases, we stressed that assistance comes with a price: The 
recipient countries must take steps to eradicate drug crops if 
development projects alone do not cause growers to abandon and destroy 
their fields.

Intensified Law Enforcement Operations

The third element is to intensify law enforcement operations against 
major trafficking organizations that are based in areas where we and 
central authorities have access and influence. These groups, which 
effectively link the remote processors with U.S. markets through their 
brokering, distribution, and money-laundering operations, play a 
critical role in the trade. For too long, they have operated with 
impunity, thriving through corruption and, quite frankly, a lack of 
government will and ability to attack them.

We cannot continue to accept these excuses for inaction. The leaders of 
these organizations are vulnerable. They are known; many are within 
reach of law enforcement; and countries around the world are 
increasingly developing the institutional capabilities to identify, 
investigate, apprehend, and prosecute them.

I do not want to leave the impression that this is an easy challenge for 
police and judicial institutions. It is not. But over the last several 
years we have worked hard and invested significantly to help countries 
build the foundation for more effective police action, and we now expect 
to see them applying these skills. We know they can do it; we see the 
evidence. Last year in Thailand, Operation Tiger Trap identified, 
located, and apprehended an entire network of key traffickers, without 
operational compromise. In response to a stiff U.S. challenge, Pakistan 
recently showed that it, too, can apprehend, detain, and extradite 
important traffickers to the United States.

There will be setbacks--traffickers will continue to exploit legal 
loopholes, corrupt officials, and apply new technologies and methods of 
operations--and we will continue to work on strengthening host-nation 
institutions to overcome them. But both the Thailand and Pakistan 
examples show that the capabilities for enhanced enforcement action are 
there--and I believe in other countries as well--if only governments 
have the will to apply them.

Certification

The question of will brings me to the fourth and final element of our 
policy: more stringent use of the certification process.

Mr. Chairman, I reserved my discussion of certification until now for 
emphasis. Certification is one of the most powerful tools this 
government has to focus international attention on the narcotics threat 
and achieve results. The Foreign Assistance Act requires that each year 
the President identify the major drug-producing and drug-transit 
countries and determine whether they have fully cooperated with the 
United States or taken adequate steps on their own in narcotics control. 
The United States must cut off most foreign assistance to those 
countries that are not certified and also must vote against their 
requests for loans from multilateral development banks. For countries 
found not to be fully cooperating or taking adequate steps on their own, 
the President may grant a national interest certification if the vital 
interests of the United States require continued foreign assistance.

Last year, I reported to Congress that President Clinton issued the 
toughest certification decision ever: 10 of the 26 major producing and 
transit countries were either denied certification or granted a national 
interest certification. This year, the process was even tougher and much 
of that toughness focused on Asia. We expanded the "majors list" to 29 
countries, adding two from Asia in the process--Taiwan and Vietnam. And, 
in his decision on March 1, the President denied certification to five 
countries and granted a national interest certification to six others--a 
total of 11 countries, one more than last year.

These were difficult decisions based strictly on the 1994 
counternarcotics performance of the countries and our national 
interests. There were no "rubber stamp" decisions. The President made 
his determinations on the basis that Congress intended--the facts of the 
case. Indeed, many countries with whom we have strong bilateral 
relations were affected. Let me summarize these decisions.

-- Two countries that had been granted national interest certifications 
last year--Laos and Panama--were moved to the fully certified category 
because of their improved performance and cooperation.

 -- Three countries were given national interest certifications for the 
first time: Pakistan, for not taking significant actions in 1994 against 
opium crops, heroin producers, and kingpins, although Pakistan has made 
significant progress in 1995; Colombia, primarily for its failure to 
take promised actions against the Cali cartels; and Paraguay, for lack 
of credible action against official corruption.

-- Afghanistan, which had been granted a national interest certification 
in 1994, was denied certification owing to a substantial rise in opium 
production.

-- Burma, Iran, Nigeria, and Syria were denied certification again, and 
Lebanon, Bolivia, and Peru were given national interest certifications 
again.

Mr. Chairman, the President informed Congress of these decisions on 
March 1 and we have published a full explanation for each in our 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. I would like to focus a 
few comments, however, on Burma, Afghanistan, and Pakistan--the three 
Asian countries that were not fully certified. Before turning to them 
individually, however, let me say that the President's certification 
message this year to foreign and domestic audiences alike is strong and 
unambiguous: Certification is an honest process and is meant to produce 
meaningful international narcotics control results. We will recognize 
and support those countries that respond positively. Two years of 
increasingly tough decisions, however, should be enough to convince 
countries that doubt our resolve, or believe that piecemeal, 
misdirected, or last-minute efforts to enhance counternarcotics 
performance will satisfy us. It will not. We expect sustained 
cooperation focused on the core challenges.

Burma. Mr. Chairman, I have already highlighted Burma's central 
importance to our overall narcotics control policy in Asia. The size of 
Burma's drug problem makes it imperative that the government do more to 
combat it. In 1994 and 1995, the Burmese Army launched limited 
operations against Khun Sa's Shan United Army--SUA--that resulted in the 
capture of some SUA strongholds, the closure of some heroin refineries, 
and the disruption of drug caravan movements. The operations, however, 
had no lasting impact on the thriving drug economy.

Since signing a peace agreement with many of the largest drug 
trafficking insurgent groups in Burma in 1989, the government has not 
aggressively pursued drug enforcement measures. Reduction in opium 
cultivation was supposed to follow economic development. Neither 
development nor a reduction in opium cultivation, however, has occurred. 
Eradication remains so limited it has had no impact on the massive 
amounts of opium produced.

The government had the capability and opportunity to do more in 1994. It 
did not and, therefore, did not warrant certification.

Afghanistan. The decision to deny certification to Afghanistan reflects 
a substantial deterioration in the country's narcotics situation in 
1994. No country experienced a greater increase in drug production. 
Poppy cultivation and opium production both rose nearly 40% to record 
levels--29,180 hectares and 950 metric tons, respectively. Owing to its 
lack of control over the countryside, the nominal central government was 
limited in what it could do directly to combat the problem. Very few 
provincial leaders, however, made meaningful efforts to stop production 
or eradicate crops. Heroin processing operations on the Afghanistan side 
of the border with Pakistan reportedly expanded. Narcotics, meanwhile, 
are flowing out of Afghanistan in all directions: south and east to 
Pakistan, which was the preferred route through much of the 1980s; west 
into Iran; and, increasingly, north into the newly independent Central 
Asian states. The result is that the entire Southwest Asia narcotics 
threat is growing larger and more complex, and the immediate prospects 
of attacking it at its source remain bleak. I recognize that the nominal 
central government does not exercise control over much of the country. 
But we could not recommend anything but denial of certification in the 
face of such a performance.

Pakistan. Our decision to issue a vital national interest certification 
to Pakistan reflects its failure to take action against opium 
production, heroin laboratories, and kingpins in 1994. By 1994, the 
United States Government and the Government of Pakistan had made 
considerable investments in creating and strengthening Pakistan's 
counternarcotics forces, especially to orient them to the new and 
expanding threats of heroin processing and international trafficking.

Nevertheless, Pakistan made only modest counternarcotics progress in 
1994. It extended its drug laws to the tribal areas where most opium 
production and heroin refining occur but undertook no significant 
enforcement operations there. Authorities arrested no new major 
traffickers, and, although the government initiated a dozen new asset 
seizure cases, it did not prosecute any. The government failed to arrest 
any of the major traffickers whose extradition has been sought by the 
United States since 1993, and it continued to move slowly in the 
prosecution of a major trafficker who was arrested in 1993. In other 
cases that reflect problems with corruption, key traffickers were 
released shortly after apprehension with no disciplinary action taken 
against the officials who allowed this to happen. At best, corrupt 
officials tend to be removed from their assignments but not prosecuted 
or otherwise penalized.

There has been a substantial turn-around in Pakistan's counternarcotics 
commitment and performance in 1995, in part, I submit, because the 
certification process drew the government's attention to this difficult 
problem. I acknowledge, here, before this committee, Pakistan's improved 
performance. Building on a foundation laid in 1994 and previous years, 
Pakistan intensified its anti-narcotics efforts in early 1995. The 
government began to eradicate opium poppies in previously off-limits 
tribal agencies along the Afghanistan border. Also, in January, it froze 
$68 million in trafficker assets and it conducted two major raids on 
heroin laboratories in the North-West Frontier Province. It also 
conducted a raid on another drug warehouse and reportedly seized 132 
metric tons of drugs, primarily hashish. In response to long-standing 
requests, it extradited three major traffickers to the United States.

These are major breakthroughs. I wish they had occurred earlier. I 
strongly believe they occurred now, Mr. Chairman, in part because of the 
certification process. I view these steps as a strategic start in a 
critical heroin source and trafficking country. We will continue with 
our important counter-narcotics programs in Pakistan and will watch 
closely to see if the government sustains this commitment.

On-site Observations

Before concluding, Mr. Chairman, I would like to share with you my 
personal observations about the Southeast Asian countries that DEA 
Deputy Administrator Greene and I just visited. The challenge is 
daunting, but I am encouraged by much of what I saw.

Laos. As I noted earlier, there are a number of encouraging trends in 
Laos. Opium production has been steadily declining over the past five 
years. This is due, in part, to the success of alternative development 
projects undertaken by us; the UNDCP; and other donors in ethnic- 
minority, opium producing areas. While weather is a major factor and we 
remain concerned about a possible rebound this year, the long-term trend 
is positive.

In the area of law enforcement, there also have been encouraging 
developments. The special police anti-narcotics unit, which we helped 
establish, train, and fund, has had a number of notable successes. In 
one recent case, the unit seized several kilos of heroin based on 
information it developed unilaterally and, in a subsequent textbook 
follow-up investigation, seized an additional 28 kilos of heroin and 
arrested a number of traffickers. However, Laos needs to increase its 
penalties for drug trafficking--the current maximum is five years--if it 
wants to avoid becoming a haven for traffickers.

Laos has formulated a comprehensive narcotics control master plan that 
calls for the complete elimination of commercial opium production by the 
year 2000. This plan requires relatively modest contributions of $35 
million over five years. Unfortunately, because of its financial crisis, 
the UNDCP has had to scale back its program in Laos, and other donors 
have been slow to step forward.

While in Laos, I visited our Lao-American alternative development 
project in remote Houaphan Province near the Vietnamese border. We have 
constructed roads, small dams for irrigation and hydro-electricity, 
health care clinics, and other facilities there to bring the nomadic 
hill tribe people down from the mountains--where they slash and burn the 
forest to grow opium--into the valleys where they can grow rice and 
other crops. These programs have achieved their goal. Commercial 
production of opium has essentially been eliminated in our project area, 
which until recently had been a major producing region. I am told that 
UNDCP projects have experienced similar success. However, to achieve our 
goal of completely eliminating commercial opium production, we and other 
donors need to sustain our assistance.

Thailand. Our oldest counter-narcotics program in Asia is located in 
Thailand, and, as indicated earlier, it is a model of what can be 
achieved on a long-term basis through alternative development. Our focus 
now is on law enforcement, and I must say that the cooperation on 
counternarcotics between our two governments and law enforcement 
agencies truly has been  outstanding. The arrest of 10 major suspected 
narco-traffickers associated with the SUA is the most recent and best 
example of this. Senior Thai Government officials told me that they hope 
to extradite these individuals to the United States in the near future 
to face trial on major heroin smuggling charges. The Thai courts also 
seriously are considering our extradition request for a well-known 
former member of parliament wanted in the United States for smuggling 
shiploads of marijuana.

We also have been pleased by the efforts of the Royal Thai Government 
and army to seal the border with Burma to constrict the flow of supplies 
going to the SUA. While I was in Thailand, for example, Thai police 
seized three SAM-7 missiles destined for the SUA.

Cambodia. There are indications that narcotics trafficking through 
Cambodia is becoming an increasingly significant problem as Thai law 
enforcement efforts and capabilities have improved and traffickers have 
shifted to new routes. During the visit, I met with most of the senior 
leadership of the country, including both Prime Ministers, both Defense 
Ministers, the Interior Minister, and numerous police and other 
officials. All with whom I spoke expressed great eagerness to cooperate 
with us on narcotics control. However, Cambodia currently has virtually 
no counter-narcotics capability. Narcotics trafficking is currently not 
even a crime in Cambodia. When drugs are discovered, there is no 
laboratory to analyze the content. The anti-narcotics police do not even 
have basic office furniture, telephones, or other equipment. I promised 
to provide assistance in all of these areas within the severe 
constraints imposed by our budget limitations. Customs has already 
provided some training and DEA is currently conducting the first basic 
law enforcement training course. We will provide advice and assistance 
on drafting legislation and will help with drug testing and other 
equipment to the extent we can.

Vietnam. I was very impressed by the political will and commitment to 
narcotics control that I found in my discussions with senior Vietnamese 
officials. They acknowledge that they have a serious trafficking and 
domestic drug-abuse problem, and the potential exists for that problem 
to get much worse. Vietnam also produces a substantial amount of opium 
in the remote, mountainous, ethnic-minority areas near the Lao and 
Chinese borders. For these reasons, Vietnam was added to the list of 
major drug producing or transit countries last year. There is already 
excellent cooperation between DEA and Vietnamese law enforcement 
officials, and both sides are committed to broadening that cooperation.

Vietnam has drafted counter-narcotics legislation, and I agreed to 
provide expert advice and assistance in reviewing it. Vietnamese 
officials also indicated their intention to sign the three UN narcotics 
control conventions.

The UN Drug Control Program has been assisting the Vietnamese in 
drafting a comprehensive narcotics control master plan. We anticipate 
providing training and other counternarcotics assistance both 
bilaterally and through UNDCP in the areas of demand reduction and law 
enforcement. A U.S. Customs team visits Vietnam this week to conduct a 
needs assessment, and we anticipate a DEA training team will conduct a 
similar survey soon.

Vietnam is clearly prepared to undertake vigorous narcotics control 
efforts. Just as clearly, it is in our interest to cooperate and assist 
them with their efforts.

China. While I did not visit China on this trip, I did briefly visit 
Hong Kong, and I paid an extensive visit to China last year. 
Counternarcotics cooperation with Hong Kong has been truly outstanding, 
and we continue to work closely on all aspects of the issue with the 
Hong Kong authorities.

I would like to see a greater degree of counternarcotics cooperation 
with China. Clearly, China has a very serious narcotics problem, and it 
has taken some stringent measures to deal with it. Over the past several 
years, more heroin has been seized by China than by any other country, 
and narcotics traffickers caught there are dealt with severely. Despite 
the strict measures adopted by Chinese authorities, we would like to see 
our counter- narcotics cooperation broadened and enhanced. For example, 
the exchange of timely information on drug trafficking investigations 
needs to be improved. DEA hopes to open an office in Beijing in the near 
future. With the reversion of Hong Kong to Chinese authority in 1997, 
this is a matter of some urgency. We hope that the necessary 
arrangements can be completed soon.

India. While India was not on the itinerary of my recent trip, any 
review of the narcotics situation in Asia would be incomplete without a 
reference to the situation there. India is far and away the largest 
producer of licit opium in the world. It supplies a very large portion 
of the U.S. market. Last year, India undertook a long-overdue inventory 
of its licit opium stockpile and discovered a 600-metric-ton discrepancy 
between the book tally and actual stocks on hand. As a result, India has 
had difficulty fulfilling its contracts.

Diversion from the licit crop is also a serious concern. The extent of 
diversion is unknown because of the lack, to date, of an opium-yield 
survey. We very much hope to conduct a joint yield survey with Indian 
officials during the next growing season.

Under the so-called "80-20" rule, 80% of the U.S. market for licit opium 
is reserved for India and Turkey. We are currently engaged in a two-year 
review of this regulation to determine whether it serves the purpose of 
limiting diversion and securing a stable supply.

Budget

Mr. Chairman, through certification, our efforts with multilateral 
organizations, and other aspects of our policy, we have set the stage 
for significantly improved international narcotics control efforts in 
1995. In Southeast Asia, I had frank discussions with countries that 
have been working with us. They want to work with us. We have a 
foundation for progress. But we must be prepared to buttress these 
efforts by providing assistance to countries that demonstrate their 
commitment to narcotics control. We submitted a budget to do that. We 
are also mindful of the need to practice fiscal restraint: The 
President's proposal for the international affairs budget--a mere 1.3% 
of total Federal spending for the next fiscal year--is already austere. 
It reflects important initiatives to streamline our activities and save 
where we can.

As I noted at the beginning of my statement, our international narcotics 
control program is an integral part of the National Drug Control 
Strategy and is vital to our broader international efforts to advance 
America's interests. Today, America faces a choice between the concrete 
benefits of international engagement and the illusory appeal of 
isolationism. Those who say they are for a strong America must help keep 
America strong. We cannot have it both ways. We cannot be the world's 
most powerful nation if we do not marshal the resources to stand by our 
commitments. We cannot lead if we do not have all the tools of 
leadership at our disposal.

For a program that is as small as ours--yet so closely linked to the 
health and safety of the American people--we have borne our share of 
recent budget cuts. We have cut our programs to the bone, closing our 
least-critical foreign operations, wiping out most of our funding 
pipelines, and shrinking our airwing operations. We continue to postpone 
the implementation of new programs and, to the extent safety 
considerations permit, delay upgrades and maintenance. Lack of funds 
slows our response to the growing heroin threat.

We simply cannot sustain a credible international narcotics control 
program at current FY 1995 funding levels. We certainly cannot sustain 
it at the level recently reported out by the House Appropriations 
Committee for the next fiscal year. We are seeking to consolidate 
funding from economic and military counternarcotics assistance programs 
and the traditional international narcotics control budget into one 
account. We desperately need these funds to follow through on the 
source- country crop-control and enforcement programs that are crucial 
to the success of our strategy. Moreover, the consolidated budget 
ensures that the economic and military support funds in particular go 
strictly for counter-narcotics objectives. This is a practical way of 
tightening counternarcotics oversight and providing program flexibility. 
It makes good fiscal, policy, and national security sense.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, in the post-Cold War era you can hardly find a foreign 
policy issue that has such an immediate and direct detrimental effect on 
so many Americans as the international drug trade. There should be no 
question that the resources we spend on combating this problem abroad 
serve first and foremost the American people. I strongly believe that if 
we do not get ahead of this problem overseas, it will eventually 
overwhelm our best domestic efforts to combat narcotics abuse, crime, 
and poverty.

As I briefly have outlined here, we have a policy and strategy designed 
to strike at the heart of the international narcotics trafficking 
problem. It contains no magic bullets or quick solutions. Nor does it 
pretend to go after the easy targets--the easy targets are often the 
least consequential. Instead, it seeks to put pressure on the most 
important parts of the trade--the producers and the powerful traffickers 
who run it.

By taking this approach, we challenge the key countries and the rest of 
the international community to undertake more aggressive and effective 
anti-drug efforts. We are running into political resistance from some 
countries. But we can work through this resistance with carefully 
designed assistance programs, effective institution-building, and honest 
use of the certification process. Your support will clearly strengthen 
our hand and accelerate the progress that recent events have shown can 
be achieved through focused and sustained efforts. (###)



ARTICLE 4:

U.K. Foreign Secretary Hurd To Retire 
Secretary Christopher
Statement released by the Office of the Department Spokesman,  
Washington, DC, June 23, 1995

President Clinton and I learned with deep regret that British Foreign 
Secretary Hurd has decided to retire. I spoke earlier today with the 
Foreign Secretary and conveyed the appreciation of the United States for 
his wise counsel and resolute support over the past six years.

One of the things I have valued the most during the last 21/2 years has 
been my relationship with Douglas Hurd. We have become close friends. 
His dedication, judgment, and leadership will be missed. Perhaps the 
Councils of State will most miss his stature, civility, and wit. I know 
I will.

Douglas Hurd has worked very closely with the Clinton and Bush 
Administrations on the enormous range of challenges our two countries 
have faced during a remarkable period of world history. He has made a 
major contribution to strengthening the ability of the Atlantic Alliance 
to meet the challenges that have arisen following the end of the Cold 
War.

Achievements such as building a new European security architecture, 
creating NATO's Partnership for Peace, supporting reform in Russia and 
the other New Independent States, standing together against aggression 
in Operation Desert Storm, and securing the indefinite extension of the 
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty--these are just a few of the areas 
where Foreign Secretary Hurd has played a key role in advancing our 
common security interests. We also have worked closely together in the 
continuing effort to end the war in Bosnia.

Our partnership has reflected in every way the deep bonds between the 
United States and the United Kingdom, which will continue even as we 
salute the long and distinguished service of Douglas Hurd. (###)



ARTICLE 5:

Focus on 4WCW
Update on Preparations

The UN Fourth World Conference on Women (4WCW), to be held in Beijing, 
China, September 4-15, 1995, is intended to stimulate increased activity 
at all levels--from local to global--to improve the status of women and 
promote equality between women and men. At the conference, the U.S. 
delegation will be discussing ways to ensure that women are full 
partners in their families, communities, and nations, as well as on a 
worldwide basis. 

The UN Fourth World Conference on Women is important to Americans 
because women everywhere want strong families, economic security, access 
to basic and better education and health care, participation in all 
levels of decision-making, personal safety, legal rights, and basic 
equality. 

U.S. Priorities

At the conference, the United States aims to promote the advancement and 
empowerment of women and to build on the commitments made at other 
important UN conferences: the 1985 Women's Conference in Nairobi, the 
1992 Environment and Development Conference in Rio, the 1993 Vienna 
Human Rights Conference, the 1994 Cairo Population and Development 
Conference (ICPD), and the 1995 Copenhagen Social Summit (WSSD).

The U.S. will provide leadership on the following issues:

--  Human rights of women, including actions to end violence against 
women;

--  A life-span approach to health and education;

--  Efforts to balance work and family responsibilities of both women 
and men;

--  Economic security;

--  The importance of the participation of the non-governmental sector 
as partner in building communities--locally, nationally, and 
internationally; and 

--  The full participation of women in political and economic decision-
making.

U.S. Delegation

The U.S. Government has appointed a strong team to lead the official 
delegation to the UN Fourth World Conference on Women. First Lady 
Hillary Rodham Clinton will serve as Honorary Chair of the Delegation; 
no decision has been made about her attendance at the conference. 
Ambassador Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Permanent Representative to the 
United Nations, will chair the Delegation; Donna Shalala, U.S. Secretary 
for Health and Human Services is Co-chair. Under Secretary of State for 
Global Affairs Timothy Wirth is Alternate Chair, and former Member of 
Congress Marjorie Margolies-Mezvinsky is Deputy Chair/Director of the 
Delegation. Veronica Biggins, former assistant to the President, will 
serve as Vice Chair. 

Other members of the delegation currently include Lynn Cutler of 
Washington, DC, Maria Antonietta Berriozabal of Texas, Arthenia Joyner 
of Florida, Dorothy Lamm of Colorado, and Linda Tarr-Whelan of 
Washington, DC. The White House is expected to name the full delegation 
by early summer. 

Global Prepcom

The final preparatory committee negotiating session, or "Prepcom," 
concluded its pre-conference work in New York City on April 7, 1995. 
During the three-week session, delegates discussed the platform, to 
which they added a section on girls and young women and a one-page 
Declaration to accompany the draft Platform for Action.

The current draft of the Platform for Action contains distinct elements 
that reflect a developing worldwide consensus that the only way to bring 
about equality, development, and peace is to empower women by 
integrating them into mainstream society where they can work in 
partnership with men. Such a consensus did not exist 10 years ago at the 
Nairobi conference.

Non-governmental organization (NGO) accreditation to the conference also 
was deliberated at the prepcom. There are now more than 2,700 NGOs 
eligible to send representatives to observe the World Conference. The 
status of the additional 1,500 NGOs still seeking accreditation will be 
determined at the 1995 Substantive Session of the UN Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC) meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, during June and July.

NGO Forum Site

Traditionally, there has been an effective working relationship between 
NGOs and governmental delegations at intergovernmental world 
conferences. In recent years, NGOs have organized parallel meetings 
known as "NGO Fora" that are held in conjunction with these conferences. 
The fora normally are located near official conference sites, thus 
facilitating dialogue among governmental and non-governmental 
representatives, and resulting in strengthened action plans.

On June 8, Supatra Masdit, Convener of the NGO Forum, signed an 
agreement with the China Organizing Committee finalizing the site 
details for the NGO Forum. The official opening will take place at the 
Olympic Stadium (located across from the Beijing International 
Convention Center, site of the 4WCW) on August 30. The majority of NGO 
Forum activities will take place in Huairou at the Scenic Tourist Area, 
about 33 miles from Beijing. The agreement also calls for a satellite 
facility in Beijing near the conference site for participants at the NGO 
Forum to meet with Observer NGOs to the conference and government 
delegates.

The U.S. Government is pleased that the UN, China, and NGO planners have 
reached agreement on what promises to be the largest gathering of its 
kind ever held. Recognizing a successful NGO Forum as an integral part 
of the World Conference, the U.S. will continue to work together with 
the UN, other member states, and the NGO community to encourage this 
outcome.

Conference Logistics And Contact Information

NGOs eligible to send representatives to the World Conference are 
receiving notification from the UN. After receiving notification, groups 
should immediately forward the names and addresses of designated 
individuals (up to two for national NGOs and five for international) to 
the Secretariat for the World Conference (see address below). The UN 
will mail confirming letters to all individual representatives in mid-
August.

All deadlines for application for accreditation to the official 
conference and registration for the NGO Forum have passed. 

NGO observer representatives can register for photo identification 
badges near the Beijing International Convention Center beginning August 
28 upon presentation of a photo ID and individual confirmation letter 
from the UN. A photocopy of the UN's letter stating that the NGO has 
been accredited along with an original letter from the NGO stating that 
the individual is one of the group's designated representatives will 
also suffice.

Visas to China will be issued by the Chinese embassy and consulates. 
Visas are valid only for three months and, therefore, should not be 
requested until late June at the earliest for NGO Forum attendees; early 
July for those participating in the conference. See box for  information 
about visas to China.

It is recommended that Forum and Conference participants consider 
purchasing travelers insurance to cover all reasonable contingencies for 
canceling their trip.

Due to the change of site to Huairou, all Forum participants are 
required to fill out a "New Hotel Reservation Form" that is being sent 
out by the NGO Forum. The deadline for returning this new form to the 
China Organizing Committee is July 5, 1995.  The address for the 
committee is:


China Organizing Committee
Fourth World Conference on Women and NGO Forum on Women
Beijing '95
No. 15 Jianguomen St.
Beijing 100730
P.R. China
Phone: 861-5221133, ext: 3006
Fax: 861-5225329 

State Department. Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs Timothy 
Wirth established the Global Conference Secretariat to coordinate all 
U.S. Government preparations and follow-up for the conference. Ms. 
Theresa Loar is the Director of the Global Conference Secretariat. 
Contact:

Global Conference Secretariat
Room 1318
2201 C St. NW
Department of State
Washington, DC 20520
Phone: 202-647-3129

United Nations. Ms. Gertrude Mongella of Tanzania is the Secretary 
General of the Conference. Contact :

UN Secretariat of the Fourth World Conference on Women
Division for the Advancement of Women
DC2-1234
Two United Nations Plaza
New York, NY 10017
Phone: 212-963-8385
Fax: 212 963-3463

NGO Forum. Ms. Supatra Masdit is the Convenor of the NGO Forum. Contact:

NGO Forum on Women, Beijing '95
211 E. 43rd St., Suite 1500
New York, NY  10017
Phone: 212-922-9267 or 922-9268
Fax: 212-922-9269 (###)



[BOX]

Other Information Sources

Information Hotline. Department of State Global Conference Secretariat 
hotline for recorded information on public meetings and other special 
events related to the 4WCW is 202-663-3070 or, for the hearing impaired, 
TDD 202-647-3750. 

Special Needs Information. U.S. participants with special needs should 
contact the Global Conference Secretariat on 202-647-3129 several weeks 
prior to scheduled events so that reasonable accommodation can be made.

Print Sources. Copies of the draft Platform for Action are available 
from the Conference Secretariat at the United Nations. Requests may be 
made by fax (dial 212-963-3463) or by writing to:

Secretariat for the Fourth World Conference on Women
Division for the Advancement of Women, Room DC2-1234
United Nations
New York, NY 10017

Visa Information. The Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs 
publication "Foreign Entry Requirements" lists the address of the 
Chinese embassy along with all consulates in the United States. To 
request a copy by fax, dial 202-647-3000 and enter publication number 
10007 at the appropriate prompt. Copies of this publication are also 
available at U.S. passport offices, listed in the blue pages of your 
local telephone directory.

Electronic Access. Other information about the 4WCW is available 
electronically through the Department of State Foreign Affairs Network 
(DOSFAN) under the heading "UN Fourth World Conference on Women" under 
the Bureau of International Organization Affairs/United Nations section 
of the Global Affairs listing. Visa information is available in the 
Consular and Travel Information section. DOSFAN is accessible three ways 
on the Internet:

Gopher: dosfan.lib.uic.edu
URL: gopher://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/
WWW: http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/dosfan.html

DOSFAN is also accessible from most commercial on-line services. For 
additional technical information about DOSFAN, contact John Shuler by e-
mail at john.a.shuler@uic.edu. or by phone on 312-996-2738. 

Copies of the draft Platform for Action are also available via e-mail 
under the Association for Progressive Communications (APC) network at 
the following addresses:


un.wcw.doc.eng (English)
un.wcw.doc.esp (Spanish)
un.wcw.doc.fra (French)
fourth_wcw@Together.org 

(###)



ARTICLE 6:

Treaty Actions

Multilateral


Children 
Convention on protection of children and cooperation in respect of 
intercountry adoption.  Done at The Hague May 29, 1993. Entered into 
force May 1, 19951. Signatures: France, Apr. 5, 1995; Spain, Mar. 27, 
1995.

Consular Relations
Convention on consular relations.  Done at Vienna Apr. 24,1963.  Entered 
into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820; 21 UST 
77. Accession: Sudan, Mar. 23, 1995.

Judicial Procedure
Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in civil or commercial 
matters. Done at The Hague Mar. 18, 1970. Entered into force Oct. 7, 
1972. TIAS 7444; 23 UST 2555. Accession: Latvia, Mar. 28, 1995.

Convention on the service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents 
in civil or commercial matters. Done at The Hague   Nov. 15, 1965. 
Entered into force Feb. 10, 1969. TIAS 6638; 20 UST 361. Accession: 
Latvia, Mar. 28, 1995.

Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction.  Done 
at The Hague Oct. 25, 1980.  Entered into force Dec. 1, 1983; for the 
U.S. July 1, 1988. TIAS 11670. Accession: Zimbabwe, Apr. 4, 1995.

Narcotics
United Nations convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances, with annex and final act. Done at Vienna Dec. 
20, 1988. Entered into force Nov. 11, 1990. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 101-4. 
Ratification: Algeria, May 9, 1995. Accession: Cape Verde, May 8, 1995.

Property 
Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization.  
Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967.  Entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for 
the U.S. Aug. 25, 1970. TIAS 6932; 21 UST 1749.
Accession: Cambodia, Apr. 25, 1995.

Terrorism
Convention on the safety of United Nations and associated personnel. 
Done at New York Dec. 9, 19942. Open for signature at United Nations 
Headquarters until Dec. 31, 1995. Ratification: Denmark, April 11, 1995.

Torture
Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment. Adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations Dec. 10, 1984. Entered into force June 26, 1987; for the U.S.  
Nov. 20, 1994.  [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-20. Accessions: Georgia, Oct. 
26, 1994; Namibia, Nov. 28, 1994. Succession: Macedonia, Dec. 12, 1994.

UNIDO 
Constitution of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 
with annexes. Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. Entered into force June 
21, 1985. Accession: Turkmenistan,  Feb. 16, 1995.

Weapons, Conventional
Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain 
conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or 
to have indiscriminate effects, with annexed protocols. Adopted at 
Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983.

Protocol on non-detectable fragments (Protocol I) to the convention on 
prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons 
which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have 
indiscriminate effects. Adopted at Geneva  Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into 
force Dec. 2, 1983.

Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby-
traps, and other devices (Protocol II) to the convention on prohibitions 
or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be 
deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. 
Adopted at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983. Will 
enter into force for the U.S.:  Sept. 24, 1995.

Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of incendiary 
weapons (Protocol III) to the convention on prohibitions or restrictions 
on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be 
excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. Adopted at 
Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 19831. Ratifications: 
Belgium, Feb. 7. 1995; Italy, Jan. 20, 1995; United Kingdom, Feb. 13, 
1995. Accession:  Israel, Mar. 22, 1995.


Bilateral

Canada 
Agreement regarding the sharing of forfeited assets and equivalent 
funds. Signed at Ottawa Mar. 22, 1995. Entered into force Mar. 22, 1995.

Finland 
Agreement relating to scientific and technological cooperation, with 
annexes. Signed at Washington May 16, 1995. Enters into force 30 days 
after the date when the parties have notified each other that their 
respective requirements have been fulfilled.

Mexico 
Memorandum of understanding concerning scientific and technical 
cooperation on biological data and information, with annex. Signed at 
Washington May 16, 1995.  Entered into force May 16, 1995.

Panama 
Treaty on mutual assistance in criminal matters, with annex and 
appendices. Signed at Panama Apr. 11, 1991. Senate advice and consent to 
ratification:  May 16, 19953.

_______

1  Not in force for the U.S. 
2  Not in force. 
3  With provisos.   (###)


[END OF DISPATCH VOL. 6, NO. 27]

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