US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 25, JUNE 19, 1995
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:

1. New Steps Toward a Comprehensive Peace in the Middle East --Secretary 
Christopher, Israeli Foreign Minister Peres, Israeli Prime Minister 
Rabin, Egyptian President Mubarak,  Syrian President Asad, PLO Chairman 
Arafat,  Jordanian King Hussein 
2. American Leadership And the New Europe--Deputy Secretary Talbott
3. President Clinton Welcomes U.S.-D.P.R.K. Agreement
4. Fact Sheet: Independent States and Dependencies



ARTICLE 1

New Steps Toward a Comprehensive Peace in the Middle East

Secretary Christopher, Israeli Foreign Minister Peres, Israeli Prime 
Minister Rabin, Egyptian President Mubarak, Syrian President Asad, PLO 
Chairman Arafat, Jordanian King Hussein

Secretary Christopher, Israeli Foreign Minister Peres
Remarks upon the Secretary's arrival in Jerusalem, June 8, 1995.

Foreign Minister Peres. I would like to welcome the Secretary of State, 
Warren Christopher, on his visit to Israel, Jerusalem, and to the 
region. He is coming at a very important moment, and his contribution 
can be of great meaning to all of us. I say this is an important time, 
and the contribution can be great because we have had, simultaneously, 
three momentums moving together. We are beginning, apparently very 
seriously, our negotiations with a new party--the Syrian party. As you 
know, we attach a great deal of importance to the negotiations with the 
Syrians, because this may be the last part for a complete peace in the 
Middle East. If he should be successful in reaching an understanding 
with the Syrians and the Lebanese, maybe for the first time, the Middle 
East will have no reason to go to war and can even reduce its arms race 
and turn much of its means and energies toward peaceful purposes. 

If Syria is a new country for the peaceful negotiations, we also have a 
second chapter on the negotiations with the Palestinians.

May I say one word--and carefully: Despite all the skepticism, we can 
see the beginning of a real change for the better in the Gaza Strip. In 
the double meaning of the word, the Palestinian Authority took more 
measures to establish itself as a security-responsible authority. On the 
other hand, we can see a drive for building an economic recovery in Gaza 
itself. 

The third new part is to open a new page with Egypt. Egypt was the first 
to make peace; Egypt remains the most important country in the Middle 
East. The contribution of Egypt is great and meaningful and permanent, 
and we are over some arguments.

I can't remember a more fruitful cooperation for the purpose of peace in 
the Middle East than the one that exists between the United States of 
America and ourselves. The layer of complete trust, of complete 
devotion, of complete creative thinking--and I attribute it very much to 
the personality of the Secretary of State of the United States. The 
trust that he has collected all over the place is, in a very strange 
way, even stronger than the mistrust that we have been used to over many 
years. So looking ahead to these true new beginnings and building on the 
credibility of the Secretary, we welcome you, Mr. Secretary, to Israel.


Secretary Christopher. Foreign Minister Peres, thank you very much. It's 
a pleasure to be with you again, and I am just delighted that we are 
able to arrange to meet here as I arrive and you are ready to depart. It 
gives new meaning to the concept of an exchange. I am delighted to be 
back here in Israel as I always am. I am looking forward to meetings 
later today with President Weizman and Prime Minister Rabin. Then, of 
course, in the next few days I will be meeting the leaders of not only 
Israel, but Syria and Egypt and Jordan as well.  As Shimon has 
indicated, I come here at a time when there is a great opportunity for 
new steps forward to progress toward a comprehensive peace. There are 
obstacles ahead, of course, but I think we can take a great deal of 
satisfaction and encouragement from the developments we see here.

The process of reconciliation between the Israelis and the Palestinians 
seems to be moving ahead, as the Foreign Minister has said, with renewed 
confidence on the part of both sides. They're working toward an 
implementation of the Declaration of Principles by July 1.

I'm particularly heartened, as the Foreign Minister has said, by the 
fact that the situation has improved on the ground, that it has remained 
calm, and that the closure has eased in Gaza. I think this provides an 
environment in which the parties can make good and early progress. 

I'm also encouraged, to echo the Foreign Minister, by the progress 
achieved in negotiations between Israel and Syria. For the first time 
since the Madrid process began four years ago, there has been a 
framework for discussion of security issues reached between Israel and 
Syria, and that's a very desirable step forward which will make it 
possible for military-to-military talks to begin before the end of this 
month--and on a serious and significant basis. Of course, this process 
will require great creativity and flexibility, and it will certainly 
entail great risks. But the United States stands ready--as always--to 
stand behind those parties who are prepared to take risks where 
creativity is needed. Serious endeavors are needed. Of course, there is 
no one in the world, I believe, who has greater capability and 
flexibility and greater talent than the Foreign Minister.

I am also pleased to be able to announce here, at the present time, that 
there will be a meeting between President Mubarak, Prime Minister Rabin, 
and myself in Cairo tomorrow. Those arrangements have been worked out, 
and I think that can be an important step forward, a new page between 
Egypt and Israel, who have such a strong capacity to work together to 
help move the peace process forward. As a result of many efforts, I 
believe the landscape is really being transformed here. Progress is not 
yet complete; the transformation is not complete. But, no doubt, I think 
we all see over the horizon tremendous opportunities: the cycle of war 
and terror ending; political cooperation across boundaries; and, for 
Israel, a chance to assume, in an era of security, its rightful place as 
a very strong force for peace, progress, and democracy in the region. In 
short, peace will bring what President Clinton has referred to as "the 
quiet miracle of a normal life."

The United States remains, of course, a close partner with Israel in 
this great undertaking. I want to underscore that we stand behind Israel 
and are prepared to help it as it undertakes the great risks that peace 
entails. Our commitment to Israel's security is, as always, unshakable, 
and will remain that way. We'll continue to do everything we can to 
maintain the momentum toward a comprehensive peace in this region.

Before I conclude, I'd like to say how happily we welcome the rescue of 
Capt. Scott O'Grady through the night in Bosnia. We rejoice with his 
family. It was an excellent military operation, and it has been a cause 
of considerable joy as we learned the news just within the last few 
hours.

Shimon, I am delighted to be here. Thank you so much for being here at 
the airport so we could have this conversation.


Secretary Christopher, Israeli Prime Minister Rabin
Remarks following their meeting at the Prime Minister's office, 
Jerusalem, June 8, 1995.

Prime Minister Rabin. Mr. Secretary, the peace team that came with you 
is most welcome here in assisting us to move ahead with the peace 
process. Tomorrow, we will meet with President Mubarak, the leader of 
the Arab country that started the peace process and signed a peace 
treaty with Israel. Today, we are engaged in a more meaningful peace 
process that brought about the agreement with the Palestinians--
represented by the PLO--and the signing of a peace treaty with Jordan. I 
believe that as a result of your visit, we will find ways to improve the 
overall atmosphere in the region by visiting Egypt, by your visit to 
Damascus on Saturday, and that will, hopefully, bring about the 
resumption of the talks with Syria. We see today an improved mood, 
without underestimating still the obstacles that we have to remove from 
the road to achieve a comprehensive peace.

Mr. Secretary, the President of the United States, President Clinton, 
phoned yesterday before you came and described to me his talks with 
President Asad. He conveyed to me his impressions of the improved mood 
on the part of the Syrians. Let us hope that the good mood will be 
translated to the practical negotiations that we have with the 
Palestinians and, hopefully, when the negotiations with Syria are 
resumed. Again, Mr. Secretary, we appreciate your personal efforts to 
serve the cause of peace in the region. Welcome to Israel.


Secretary Christopher. Mr. Prime Minister, thank you. As always, I am 
delighted to be back in Jerusalem. I come here at a time of renewed 
opportunity to seek and achieve a comprehensive peace in the region. The 
Prime Minister and I had a good opportunity to review the ways in which 
we might take advantage of this moment when there is a renewed 
opportunity. 

On the Palestinian track, it is clear to me that the negotiations are 
going forward in a very serious way with a sharpness of  focus needed to 
reach an agreement on phase two of the Declaration of Principles. The 
negotiations are obviously very complicated and difficult, with a lot at 
stake. But most of the parties know, I think, that these negotiations 
can succeed. It will provide a critical path for moving toward 
reconciliation between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

On the Syrian track, I believe there is an opportunity now to move into 
a new and important phase. A commitment by the parties to hold senior-
level military talks in Washington this month shows the seriousness of 
the parties on one of the key issues--in many ways the most difficult 
issue--an issue that I think is so critical to ensuring the future 
security of Israel. This is a time of unusual opportunity for real 
peace, for enduring security for Israel, with the United States, as 
before, with a renewed commitment now to be steadfast in its support of 
Israel as it takes risks for peace. 

We talked about the determination that we have to try to move forward in 
this process. As the Prime Minister has said, the trip to Cairo tomorrow 
will bring together two countries that have been the earliest in this 
process, and both have a very strong stake in its success. We look 
forward to being with you tomorrow, Mr. Prime Minister, and to talking 
with you throughout the course of this visit. Thank you so much for 
welcoming me here, Mr. Prime Minister.


Secretary Christopher, President Mubarak, Prime Minister Rabin
Opening remarks at a press conference, Cairo, Egypt, June 9, 1995.

President Mubarak. I welcome Prime Minister Rabin and Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher to Egypt. I think the need is to meet to solve 
problems and meet together in a very good atmosphere. 

I had long discussions with Prime Minister Rabin about bilateral 
relations, and we discussed the peace process and how it is going--and 
it was a very positive negotiation with the Prime Minister. I say that 
whenever there are problems in the peace process, I think it is better 
to meet face-to-face and discuss with each other--and we are used to 
this. I have met Mr. Rabin several times and Mr. Christopher several 
times. This is the only way to sit--face-to-face--and face the problems 
and see how we could manage to make the process continue. 

We are convinced of peace; we   signed a peace treaty with Israel about 
18 years ago. We supported the Madrid conference, and we made tremendous 
efforts so that conference could convene. We made tremendous efforts-- 
and I think Mr. Rabin and Secretary Christopher know that--with the 
Palestinians until they reached the signatures on the Declaration of 
Principles, which we appreciated. We still are supporting the peace 
process until peace prevails all over the area. Our negotiations were 
very positive--with a very good atmosphere, and I hope--and I am sure 
that all will continue on the same line until peace prevails all over 
the area. Thank you.


Prime Minister Rabin. Mr. President, Secretary of State: Allow me first 
to thank you for hosting this meeting in a very good atmosphere, because 
we are all committed to achieve comprehensive peace in the region. Egypt 
showed courage, vision, and imagination in being in the lead of changing 
the Middle East by signing a peace treaty with Israel--by maintaining 
this peace--and has served as a model of what can be achieved in the 
Middle East if comprehensive peace is achieved. It took too long after 
the signing of the peace treaty until the Madrid peace conference was 
convened and negotiations started. As the Prime Minister of Israel, I 
believe that what has been achieved in the last two years is no doubt a 
tremendous achievement--the mutual recognition between Israel and the 
PLO, looking at the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people, 
signing the Declaration of Principles, signing the Cairo agreement that 
brought about the implementation of the first phase of the DOP. 

Gaza and Jericho were first, and now we are in a very deep, serious 
negotiation with the PLO--with the Palestinian Authority about the 
implementation of the second phase of the DOP--it is to say of the West 
Bank, Judea, and Samaria. It is more complicated. We set as a target 
date the first of July, and we will make on our part the most serious 
effort to meet this date. There are some problems, but there is no doubt 
in my mind we have crossed the point of no return in the implementation 
of the whole DOP all over the area which the DOP refers to. 

I hope that the negotiations with Syria will be resumed, but this is 
more up to the Americans to tell because we do not have the direct 
contacts and dialogue as we have with Egypt, the Palestinians, and the 
Jordanians. We are busy now consolidating the second peace treaty that 
we signed, after Egypt, with Jordan, and I believe we are moving ahead 
in the consolidation of the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel. For 
me, its a tremendous change that--no doubt in my mind--promises we will 
do the utmost, as soon as possible; we will see a different Middle East-
-a Middle East in peace--in which each country will live in peace 
without the threat of war and, hopefully, without the threat of violence 
and terrorism. No doubt, today, the main obstacle on the road to 
solution of the problem between the Palestinians and us is the terrorism 
carried out by the enemies of peace--the enemies of the agreement signed 
between the PLO and Israel. We hope that what was started by the 
Palestinian Authority to control this terror--and we appreciate the 
efforts of the Palestinians in doing so--no doubt will facilitate our 
capability to reach an agreement and to see a different situation in the 
region. 

Again, I would like to thank you Mr. President--the atmosphere in our 
talks--we went into details of our discussion with the Palestinians, 
what we see vis-a-vis the Syrians, and we appreciate very much your 
efforts and assistance in advancing the peace process in the whole 
region with the purpose of achieving a comprehensive peace. Thank you 
very much. Thank you very much Mr. Secretary for your assistance and the 
United States' assistance.


Secretary Christopher. Mr. President and Prime Minister: Mr. President, 
may I join in thanking you for hosting this event and also for the 
leadership that you continue to provide in the pursuit of peace here in 
the Middle East. Mr. Prime Minister, I want to add a word of thanks to 
you for the tremendous leadership you have shown, and the courage you 
have shown in seeking peace in the Middle East. 

Today's meeting reflects a rejuvenation of the Israeli-Egyptian 
partnership--a partnership that is so vital in the development of peace, 
cooperation, and stability here in the Middle East. Today, Egypt and 
Israel stand as bastions of peace--the region's pillars of peace. When 
the two countries and their leaders come together in a partnership, they 
can achieve an enormous amount of progress in the pursuit of peace. This 
is that kind of time. Today's meeting comes at a time of renewed efforts 
and renewed hopes for the pursuit of peace here in the Middle East. 

First, the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations have regained their momentum 
with renewed confidence on the part of both sides. The parties are 
making a good faith effort to reach an agreement on the second phase of 
the Declaration of Principles with a target date of  July 1 and a very 
serious negotiation going on. Second, the negotiations between Israel 
and Syria have moved to a new phase--a commitment of  the parties to 
hold senior-level military talks at the end of the year is a very 
encouraging sign, and I will be pursuing that when I go to Damascus 
tomorrow. More must be done to take advantage of this great current 
opportunity. One of the things we must do is to find an economic base 
for the peaceful steps that have been taken. The Amman summit this 
October will provide an opportunity to pursue that and provide real 
economic opportunity for the people of the Middle East as they begin to 
enjoy the fruits of peace. Today, I believe we turned a new page in the 
Egyptian-Israeli relationship, one that is promising as we build for the 
future. We have taken another step to transform the region toward peace 
and to make peace irreversible. Our hope is to achieve something that 
President Clinton once called "the quiet miracle of a normal life." That 
is what the people of the Middle East deserve, and I think this step 
today, with the generosity and commitment of the President and the Prime 
Minister, moves us a step closer to that normal life. Thank you very 
much.


Secretary Christopher
Opening remarks of a press briefing following his meeting with President 
Asad, Damascus, Syria, June 10, 1995.

President Asad and I had a very productive meeting today--about three 
hours long. We had a thorough and constructive discussion of the next 
steps to be taken to move the Syrian-Israeli track to a new and more 
intensive phase.

Based on my conversation earlier this week with Prime Minister Rabin and 
those that I had here just a few moments ago with President Asad, we 
have an agreement to begin a sequence of steps along the following 
lines. First, Syrian Chief of Staff Shihabi and Israeli Chief of Staff 
Shahak will come to Washington for discussions, under U.S. auspices, on 
the security arrangements to be covered by the Israeli-Syrian peace 
agreement when and if it is completed. These discussions will commence 
in Washington on June 27, and will continue for two or three days. We 
have also invited the two Chiefs of Staff to come to Washington a few 
days in advance for informal bilateral discussions with us, to provide 
us with an opportunity to carry forward the discussions Ambassador 
Dennis Ross had with the security chiefs while he was out here in the 
region.

After the initial meeting of the Chiefs of Staff, starting on June 27, 
we anticipate about a two-week interval to allow both sides to review 
the results  of those discussions and to digest the results. During this 
interval of two weeks, I plan to send Dennis Ross back to the region so 
he can discuss the next steps with President Asad and Prime Minister 
Rabin. After this two-week interval, the Israeli and Syrian military 
officials--below the Chief of Staff level--will reconvene in Washington 
under our auspices as part of the ambassadorial channel. With continued 
discussions in that channel, we expect that series of discussions 
between the ambassadors and the military officials to take about two 
weeks. That would carry us through approximately the end of July, by my 
estimate.

The agreement that we have reached on this rather detailed and   
ambitious work plan confirms the determination of the parties to seek an 
early peace. The experience of the months since my visit to the region 
in March--particularly the agreement that was reached on a set of 
principles or a framework--demonstrates what we have been saying for 
some time: that progress on this track will not be easy but that 
progress can be made when the parties set their minds to it. They have 
reflected good will, determination, and flexibility, and that has 
brought us to the point where we are today.

In the weeks ahead, as the two Chiefs of Staff and the others focus on 
security issues, the ambassadors in Washington will also renew their 
discussions of the non-security issues, which will be essential if we 
are to ultimately reach a peace agreement. We have already narrowed the 
differences on a number of these non-security issues, but there is a 
good deal of work to do. I strongly feel that if we can make progress on 
the security issues, then that will have a favorable effect on the 
environment and will affect the non-security issues as well. Our 
attention over the next several months will be focused on both security 
and non-security issues.


Secretary Christopher, Chairman Arafat
Remarks following their meeting, Jericho, June 11, 1995.

Chairman Arafat. We are very happy to have this opportunity for the 
participation of His Excellency Mr. Christopher and his team here in 
Jericho. We had a very fruitful and very positive and very important 
discussion today, to push forward the peace process and the 
implementation of what has been agreed upon and signed. I repeat my 
thanks from my heart to His Excellency President Clinton and to Mr. 
Christopher for what they are doing to push the peace process. We hope 
that through their help we will achieve what we are looking for.

At the same time, we hope that by the first of July, we will have 
something concrete concerning the redeployment and empowerment and, 
after that, the election. At the same time, we cannot forget this very 
strong push and active role of His Excellency, through which we can have 
now a very strong, active role in the Syrian track. Because our aim is 
to have a comprehensive, lasting, peaceful solution in the Middle East--
as has been done with Palestinians and Jordanians, also with the Syrians 
and the Lebanese. Again, I have to thank His Excellency for what he is 
doing, and I hope that through this continuous support, we will be able 
to continue in the peace process in an accurate way. Thank you.


Secretary Christopher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be 
here in Jericho again for the second time and to note the progress that 
has been made since my first visit here, which was only two or three 
days after the Chairman returned to this area. My coming here is a 
reflection of the importance the United States attaches to the 
Palestinian Authority. 

Based upon the talks that I had with Prime Minister Rabin on Thursday 
and Friday and with Chairman Arafat today, I have found on both their 
parts a renewed determination to move ahead. They are both determined to 
reach an agreement--within the timeframe--on the issues in phase two  of 
the Declaration of Principles--community must take steps to do more. If 
the elections are held, it will be a big boost to the credibility of the 
area, and it will be much easier to get commitments from public donors 
as well as investments by private parties. There can be no illusion 
about the difficulty of the issues that remain and the pressure on the 
negotiators. But based upon my visit here and my being in the region for 
some time, I have confidence that the process and the progress can be 
sustained.

The United States will continue to support the peacemakers in this area-
-including the Palestinian Authority-- and I want to once again thank 
the Chairman and his colleagues for the hard work that I know that is 
going into the progress that has been made. Thank you very much.


Secretary Christopher, King Hussein
Opening remarks at a press conference, Amman, Jordan, June 11, 1995.

King Hussein. Ladies and gentlemen: I would like once again to say how 
delighted we are--myself and the government, and the people of Jordan--
to receive the Secretary of State and his able colleagues and to welcome 
a very dear friend back to Jordan. It has become almost part of the 
scene, and it reflects very much the commitment and the interest of the 
United States in helping all of us in this region achieve a 
comprehensive peace and contribute our share for a more stable future 
for the coming generations, one where there, hopefully, will be every 
chance for them to fulfill themselves and to achieve what is worthy of 
them.

I would like to say that on this occasion I have this chance to talk 
again about everything as we do--as friends do--and I am extremely 
optimistic by all I have heard. If the Secretary of State would permit 
me a private local Jordanian joke--whenever we see our Minister of 
Finance smiling here, we are very happy because it suggests we are out 
of trouble and the future looks good. And I have seen the Secretary 
smiling more on this visit than on any other. I hope that I am justified 
in my optimism, and I hope that this smile will always be there; I hope 
that we will achieve--with the help of our friends and the dedication 
and commitment of our friends and all partaking positions of 
responsibility in this part of the world--our goal of a peaceful area 
and a happy future for all our people.

Secretary Christopher. Your Majesty: Thank you. Let me say how pleased I 
am to be here again as a guest of His Majesty with his vision and 
courage and leadership. A warm peace is taking shape between Israel and 
Jordan, and I think it is much to his everlasting credit. The United 
States recognizes the risks that the King and Jordan have taken for 
peace and, of course, there is an underlying reason why President 
Clinton has been determined to work with the Congress to forgive all of 
Jordan's debt to the United States and encouraging this trip to the 
region. There has been significant progress and renewed momentum on the 
various tracks. I briefed the King on the status of the Israeli-
Palestinian negotiations in light of the meetings I have had in just the 
last two or three days with Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat. 
Based upon those discussions, I told him of the determination of both 
sides to reach an agreement implementing phase two of the Declaration of 
Principles and to do so within the time-frame the parties have set. I 
also told the King about my meetings with President Asad in Syria. The 
fact that a date has now been set for the Chiefs of Staff in Washington 
to kick off the military-to-military talks is, I think, a reflection of 
the fact that on that track, we are reaching a new and more intensive 
phase. 

Finally, I conveyed to the King a brief sense of the meeting that took 
place in Cairo last Friday between Prime Minister Rabin and President 
Mubarak--a meeting that I think rejuvenated their friendship and 
partnership which meant so much for the cause of peace in this region. 

Serious problems remain to be solved and much, much work remains to be 
done. I think this trip has reinforced my feeling that there is a 
tremendous opportunity to move now toward the goal of a comprehensive 
peace, perhaps a better opportunity than any time during the 21/2 years 
that I have been in office. The United States counts on the aid of 
Jordan but, especially, on the wise counsel of King Hussein, which we 
frequently call on and always give great heed to. 

Your Majesty, as we try to maintain the momentum for peace, we want to 
work very closely with you here in Jordan.  (###)

(###)



ARTICLE 2

American Leadership And the New Europe
Deputy Secretary Talbott
Address before the City Club, Cleveland, Ohio, June 9, 1995 
[introductory remarks deleted]

My topic this afternoon is, I believe, one on which there is actually a 
lot of agreement in Washington--and, I hope, throughout the country. It 
is the opportunity and the obligation the United States has to play a 
key role--a  leadership role--in building a new Europe. I have chosen 
that topic not only because of its intrinsic importance and timeliness, 
but also because of the strong ties this city has with the many nations 
of Europe.  

I was reminded of this signal feature of Cleveland's identity last 
evening, driving in from the airport and seeing all those church spires. 
There are more than 1,200 houses of worship in this city, and many of 
them serve to keep alive Clevelanders' roots in one old country or 
another, especially in countries that have suffered through much of this 
century under communism. There is St. George's on Superior Avenue, which 
is a center of the Lithuanian community and has been since 1895; both of 
the St. Savas--one on the West Side and one in Broadview Heights; St. 
Nicholas', which Croatians founded in 1901; St. Peter and Paul's  on 
West 7th Street, established by immigrants from Ukraine in 1902; and, on 
Mayfield Road, there's the Park Synagogue, founded by Polish Jews in 
1857. 

When my wife and I lived in Eastern Europe as journalists in the early 
1970s, I used to hear in Ljubljana echoes of the snippets of Slovene 
that   I had heard while shopping on upper Euclid Avenue; or in Krakow, 
echoes of the Polish I had heard on the West Side and--in some fairly 
colorful, easy-to-decipher idioms--at Indians' games.  When reporting 
assignments took me to Budapest--as they did with some frequency in 
those years nearly a quarter of a century ago--I frequently pointed out 
to my hosts that my hometown, over 4,000 miles away, was the second-
largest Hungarian city in the world, which, of course, is one of the 
many reasons why Cleveland is a great American city.

For all Americans--not just those lucky enough to be Clevelanders--
Europe has had a special place in our national sense of our role and 
responsibility in the world. Among other things, America and Europe are 
linked by a fundamental difference. Let me explain what I mean by that 
rather paradoxical statement: Our melting-pot society, our multi-ethnic 
democracy, and our sense of national unity were all made possible, in 
large measure, by a steady influx to these shores of immigrants who were 
escaping the divisions and the disintegration, the intolerance, and the 
outbreaks of inhumanity that Europe has experienced--both as victim and 
perpetrator--in this century.

Consider a Galician city where quite a few Clevelanders have roots--
L'viv. I call it Galician because any other designation has been a 
sometime-thing--a function of the ebb-and-flow  of empires, conquering 
armies, and revolutions.  A typical 80-year-old resident of L'viv has 
personally been governed from five different capitals. She has lived 
under Austrian, Polish, German, Soviet, and, now, Ukrainian rule--all 
without ever leaving her home. Walking down the streets of her hometown, 
which she remembers being known as Lvov and Lemberg, she can see 
reminders of the tumultuous past everywhere: in the marble steps of the 
Habsburgs; in the German names engraved on public fixtures; in the 
baroque church erected during the Polish commonwealth; in the cracked 
window of the synagogue or the courtyard of the Armenian church; in the 
once-grand mansions built by Hungarian merchants; in the Hebrew, Roman, 
and Cyrillic inscriptions in the cemeteries. Her memories and her 
surroundings testify not only to the lost opportunities and faded 
glories of her city's multi-ethnic past, but also to some of Europe's--
and the 20th century's--worst nightmares, from which many of her 
relatives escaped--some, no doubt, to settle in Cuyahoga County.

Three times in this century, Americans have come to Europe's rescue--
twice in hot wars, once in a cold one--and each time we did so for 
reasons that reflected not just our national generosity and our sense of 
international obligation, but also a hard-headed, forward-looking 
recognition of our vital self-interest.

We, the United States, have had to keep sending our armies over there--
across the Atlantic--because we, the transatlantic community as a whole-
-Americans and Europeans alike--have had so much difficulty defining and 
putting in place a set of rules and institutions that would keep the 
peace on which our own security and prosperity, to a large extent, 
depend. In short, we have had a lot of trouble in the 20th century 
getting it right in Europe.

World War I was in many ways a double disaster. It resulted not only in 
the slaughter of a generation, but also in the squandering of the 
opportunity that came at Versailles. The United States, which 
contributed so much to the Allied success on the battlefields of that 
war, also bears responsibility for the failure that followed the peace. 
In 1919, the U.S. Congress rejected American participation in the League 
of Nations. Then, in 1930, Congress enacted the Smoot-Hawley Act, a 
monument to protectionism. That legislation, it has often been said, 
helped put the "Great" in the Great Depression. These and other follies 
of the inter-war period created an international climate all too 
conducive to the rise of fascism and to another conflagration.

The leaders of the great coalition that defeated Hitler learned several,    
if not all, of the lessons from the aftermath of World War I. Instead of 
humiliating and impoverishing their defeated enemies, the Allies helped 
rebuild Germany and Japan. Through the Marshall Plan, NATO, GATT, and 
the international financial institutions born at Bretton Woods, they 
established the basis for a community of Western democracies and for an 
increasingly interdependent and prosperous global economy. 

But while these post-war institutions helped produce unparalleled peace 
and prosperity for half a century, their benefits in Europe extended to 
only half a continent. Exactly 50 years ago, in the spring of 1945, most 
of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe ended up on the wrong side 
of the dividing line marked by the westward advance of the Red Army. 
That was the real beginning--and the primary cause--of the Cold War.  

Now the Cold War is over. With its end, it is not only possible but 
imperative that we help extend to all of Europe the benefits, and the 
obligations, of the political and economic partnerships that have been 
such a source of strength for the West.

Victory in the Cold War came not just because one group of states banded 
together to resist another; rather, one set of ideas won out over 
another. There were adherents and proponents of those victorious ideas 
on both sides of what used to be the Iron Curtain.  

But while democracy and market economics are ascendent, they are not 
everywhere firmly or perhaps even permanently established. In many 
European nations that have begun the transition, the necessary 
institutions are still in their infancy--and some are in jeopardy. It is 
precisely newborn democracies that are most in need of international 
support. As President Clinton put it when he spoke here in Cleveland in 
January: "If the forces of reform are embattled, we must renew, not 
retreat from, our support for them." 

That is why our Administration has focused so much of our country's 
foreign policy resources on political and economic assistance programs 
for the emerging market democracies of Central Europe and for the New 
Independent States of the former Soviet Union. These U.S. assistance 
programs are helping these countries to overcome the economic legacy of 
all those years under communism, and to build new institutions based on 
the free market. Let me cite just a few examples.

--  In Ukraine, we are giving a major boost to the emerging private 
sector by helping Leonid Kuchma's reformist government begin the mass 
privatization of 8,000 large state enterprises. 

--  In Hungary, U.S. advisers are working with the government to 
restructure and privatize the banking system, and our Hungarian-American 
Enterprise Fund is playing a key role in the creation of the Budapest 
Stock Exchange.

--  The Czech- and Slovak-American Enterprise Fund is now the second-
largest foreign investor in Slovakia.  The largest investor, by the way, 
is K-Mart.

--  In Russia, our support for liberalization and privatization has 
helped break the stranglehold of central economic planning. Thanks in 
large part to our efforts, the Russian economy, for all its troubles, is 
being shaped today not solely by top-down decrees, but by the combined 
forces of some 2,500 commercial banks, 600 investment funds, and 40 
million private shareholders.

Throughout the former communist world, we are also spurring the 
involvement of the American private sector, through our Enterprise Funds 
and through events such as the Conference on Trade and Investment that 
brought President Clinton and Secretary of Commerce Brown to Cleveland 
in January. 

We are also addressing a related challenge: the pandemic of criminal 
activities in the newly emerging market democracies. This is a crucial 
aspect of our policy, because crime is a threat both to reform and to 
our ability to support reformers. If the citizens of these nations 
equate reform with protection rackets and kickbacks and gangland 
murders, they will be more likely to vote for reconstructed communists 
or unreconstructed communists and ultranationalistic, authoritarian 
demagogues who offer superficially attractive law-and-order nostrums.  
Moreover, crime and corruption discourage the foreign investment that is 
so vital for economic development.  

That is why we have made it a top priority of our policy to help post-
communist governments establish competent, professional, civilian-
controlled justice systems. We are using professional law enforcement 
and judicial experts from the United States to train local police, 
prosecutors, and judges across the region. For example, for the past 
three years, members of the Ohio state judiciary have been helping to 
train their Ukrainian counterparts. This effort is being led on the 
American side by Chief Justice Thomas Moyer of the Supreme Court of 
Ohio--whom we are honored to have with us today--and it includes Judges 
David Snow and Jerry Hayes from here in Cleveland.  

Of course, every one of the programs I have mentioned--whether to 
promote democracy or private enterprise or law enforcement in post-
communist societies--costs money; your money, in tax dollars. There is, 
as you know, a brutal budget battle going on right now on Capitol Hill. 
Many in Congress are tempted by the dangerous idea that we can have a 
foreign policy on the cheap. That shortsightedness is all too evident in 
the foreign affairs bill passed by the House last night. President 
Clinton and Secretary Christopher are determined to prevail in the 
debate which will now move to the Senate. More specifically, they are 
committed to continue to fund our assistance programs for Central Europe 
and the New Independent States. 

Those assistance programs are a dramatic example of a basic proposition 
underlying our foreign policy as a whole: American engagement abroad is 
rooted in American self-interest. Our ability to live, trade, and travel 
in a safer world depends on whether other countries, particularly other 
democracies--and that includes fledgling democracies--are stable and 
secure.  

Let me, in that connection, say a few words about President Clinton's 
vision of an expanded European security architecture that meets the 
opportunities and challenges of the post-Cold War era.

The anchor of American engagement in Europe, and the linchpin of 
transatlantic security, is our commitment to NATO. President Clinton has 
reaffirmed that commitment and reaffirmed our determination to keep 
100,000 American soldiers stationed on the continent.  

NATO is, fundamentally, a military alliance. At the same time, the past 
five decades, and especially the past five years, have demonstrated that 
the enduring benefits of NATO are political as well as military. As 
Secretary Christopher puts it, NATO has helped to reconcile old 
adversaries, to embed free countries in strong and solid institutions, 
and to create an enduring sense of shared purpose in one another's 
security.  

Now that the Cold War has ended, we must work with our NATO allies to 
bring the new democracies of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union 
into a new European security order, of which NATO will continue to be a 
key part.  

The alliance took a historic step in the right direction in January 
1994, when it approved President Clinton's proposal for a Partnership 
for Peace--a framework for practical, military-to-military cooperation 
between NATO and a broad range of non-NATO European states. Twenty-six 
countries--as of two weeks ago, including Russia--have joined the 
Partnership.  Already, this American-led innovation has produced the 
remarkable spectacle of former adversaries from NATO and the old Warsaw 
Pact conducting military exercises together in Poland and the 
Netherlands. 

The January 1994 NATO summit also determined that NATO would expand to 
admit new members. Then, last December, again at President Clinton's 
initiative, the alliance began the formal process of NATO enlargement. 
Potential members will be judged openly and individually, according to 
their commitment to NATO's goals and their ability to strengthen the 
alliance.  

We are convinced that NATO enlargement can advance two related 
overarching objectives: One is to keep Europe undivided; the other is to 
integrate into the institutions of the West those post-communist 
countries that are willing and able to consolidate their commitment to 
multi-ethnic democracy, civil society, open markets, respect for their 
neighbors, and respect for their own national minorities.  

In short, while NATO will remain a collective defense pact, it will, as 
it expands, also serve as an inducement for democratization and regional 
peace.  This is not an abstract hope; it is already happening. The very 
prospect of future membership in NATO has, just this year, had a 
salutary effect in Central Europe. Leaders of both Hungary and Slovakia 
have said that   it was with an eye to making their countries eligible 
for NATO and the European Union that they recently signed a treaty 
ironing out some of their differences.

As we pursue our own policies in Europe--through our leadership of NATO 
and the Partnership for Peace, our work within the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, and our cooperation with the 
European Union and the Council of Europe--we will continue to look for 
ways of using those institutions to prevent crises before they break out 
and, when prevention fails, to settle them peacefully.

We, and the Europeans, have our work cut out for us. Some ethnic and 
national conflicts, such as those in the Transdniester region of 
Moldova, in Nagorno-Karabakh, and, of course, in Chechnya, have already 
exploded to devastating effect. There are also varying degrees of 
tension between Athens and Tirana, between Athens and Skopje, Budapest 
and Bucharest, Bucharest and Kiev, Kiev and Moscow, and even between 
Rome and Ljubljana.

But the most urgent and dangerous situation in Europe is, of course, the 
one that has erupted in the former Yugoslavia. While the history of this 
dreadful episode is tangled, and while there is, to be sure, plenty of 
blame to go around, part of the problem was that when the Cold War so 
suddenly ended, we, the transatlantic community, did not have in place 
institutions with the mandate and the means to deal with Europe's first 
major post-Cold War conflict. In other words, once again we didn't get 
it right because--let's face it--we weren't ready. We had, in NATO, the 
most successful military alliance in history, which had deterred the 
U.S.S.R. and the Warsaw Pact without firing a shot. But we did not have, 
in NATO or the United Nations, or the CSCE, or any other entity, the 
means to deal with the threat to humanity and to international order 
posed by the conflict in Yugoslavia.

That conflagration has already lasted as long as World War I--and longer 
than America's involvement in World War II. It has its roots in the 
bloody history of that region. It has multiple causes and multiple 
dimensions. But the worst, most dangerous aspect of the current conflict 
is the ruthless, determined attempt by one ethnic group, the Serbs, to 
carve out their own state--Greater Serbia--from the flank of two other 
states--Bosnia and Croatia--and to do so through a combination of 
military aggression, mass rape, mass murder, and ethnic cleansing.

The campaign for Greater Serbia carries with it the threat of a 
spreading conflict. If the fighting in Bosnia were to spread, the 
political disruption, if not the military conflict, could reach out to 
all points of the compass, including south and east, which carries with 
it the peril that two of our NATO allies--Greece and Turkey--could be 
drawn in as well--on opposite sides.

America's number one strategic interest in the Balkans is to contain the 
war--to stop it from escalating and spreading. To that end, we have 
stationed troops in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and have 
made clear that we will take actions in the event of Serb-incited 
violence in Serbia's ethnic Albanian region of Kosovo. We have also 
conducted the biggest, most sustained humanitarian airlift in history, 
while providing air support for our European and United Nations allies 
who have troops and personnel on the ground in Bosnia. 

The whole situation has grown  even more complicated in the last two 
weeks. What has happened boils down to this: The Bosnian Serbs are 
trying, literally as well as figuratively, to use the international 
presence in Bosnia as a hostage, as a human shield, so that they can 
consolidate their territorial gains. We are working with our partners to 
maintain a presence on the ground there, since its withdrawal would 
likely trigger an escalation of the fighting and an even worse 
humanitarian disaster. That is why the Europeans are forming a Rapid 
Reaction Force that will substantially make the presence of the UN 
peacekeepers in Bosnia more tenable.

I will not pretend--and you would not believe me if I tried--that the 
ending of this episode is clear or in sight. But this much I can say 
with total confidence and conviction: In Bosnia, as elsewhere, our 
European allies look to the United States to stand with them, just as we 
have stood with them three times before in this century. They look to us 
not just for solidarity and support, but also for leadership. 

There are at least two lessons to be drawn from the terrible conflict in 
the former Yugoslavia. The first, as I have already said, is that we 
must move briskly and boldly to expand and strengthen the institutions 
and patterns of cooperation that served us so well during the Cold War--
to update and upgrade existing arrangements, and where necessary, create 
from scratch new ones to deal with post-Cold War challenges.

The second lesson is more general but just as important. It concerns our 
attitude toward seemingly intractable conflicts like the one in the 
Balkans. In the final analysis, of course, the onus for solving these 
problems is up to the locals. They must stop wanting to kill each other. 
If the people of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union are to take 
advantage of the opportunity for freedom that has come to them with the 
end of the Cold War, they must be prepared for one final act of 
liberation. They must liberate themselves from the unresolved legacies 
of their own tragic past. Some of these nations have already taken 
courageous steps in this direction that can be a model for others, who 
still have far to go.

But we have a role to play too; we can help; and we must not let 
ourselves get discouraged. The word hopeless does not belong in the 
vocabulary of our diplomacy. Nor should we credit the pernicious 
concepts of historical or geographical determinism, the notion that some 
nations or would-be nation-states are forever cursed, nor the notion 
that there is something in the air or the water of the Balkans that 
dooms each new generation to refight the battles of its forebears. Of 
course, history and geography are hugely important factors in any 
society's identity and destiny--in Europe, in America, and elsewhere. 
But we should beware of stereotypes about national character, 
particularly ones that would, if they become the basis of our policy, 
consign whole nations of people to tyranny or civil war or unending 
chaos on the perverse theory that that is the fate they deserve, or that 
that fate is encoded in their genes.

Just as there were brave champions of freedom in Gdansk and Prague in 
the 1970s--men like Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel--who went from being 
persecuted dissidents to being the presidents of their countries today, 
there are individuals in Belgrade and Pale and Banja Luka today whose 
basic humanity we hope will ultimately prevail over the rapacity of 
Milosevic, Mladic, and Karadzic.

In 1915, the great British historian Norman Angell said that every 
England--every country in Europe--has its Ireland, and every Ireland has 
its Ulster. By the way, not too long ago, Ulster was, like Bosnia today, 
a place name that stood for a murderously insoluble problem. Yet, today, 
the people of Northern Ireland are finally within reach of peace; that 
is thanks mostly to themselves. But it is also thanks to their desire to 
belong to an increasingly integrated Europe, and it is thanks as well to 
American statesmanship.

While we are keeping the big picture in view, let us not lose sight of 
the larger European context in which these regional conflicts have 
arisen. Let us not forget another confrontation that was expected to 
continue indefinitely, or at least well into the next century--a 
struggle that few of us here today believed we would see end in our 
lifetimes. I am referring, of course, to the conflict between the 
communist East and the capitalist West that began 50 years ago this 
spring.  

With the end of the Cold War, we have, despite Bosnia and all the other 
troubles that beset us, a unique opportunity to build, for the first 
time in history, a Europe that is not only undivided, but a Europe that 
is increasingly united by a shared commitment to the values that have 
made our own country--and, as a local boy, let me say our own city--
great and strong. This time we can, and must, get it right.  (###)

(###)



ARTICLE 3

President Clinton Welcomes U.S.-D.P.R.K. Agreement
Statement released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 
Washington, DC, June 13, 1995.

I welcome the agreement reached between the United States and the 
Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea in Kuala Lumpur on key issues 
related to implementation of the U.S.-D.P.R.K. Agreed Framework. 
Achieved through close consultation with our friends and allies in the 
Republic of Korea and Japan, the agreement keeps North Korea's dangerous 
nuclear facilities frozen and confirms that the Korean Peninsula Energy 
Development Organization--KEDO--will select the reactor model and prime 
contractor for the light-water reactor project. At the same time, KEDO 
has confirmed that both the reactor model and prime contractor will be 
South Korean.

In addressing these and other issues, today's understandings are an 
important step on the road toward full implementation of the U.S.-
D.P.R.K. Agreed Framework, which provides the international community 
with assurance against a North Korean nuclear threat and North Korea 
with opportunity to rejoin the community of nations. We also continue to 
believe that the resumption of North-South dialogue is essential not 
only to the full implementation of the Agreed Framework, but also to the 
continuing effort to build lasting prosperity and a stable peace on the 
Korean Peninsula.  

(###)



ARTICLE 4

Fact Sheet: Independent States and Dependencies
*Diplomatic relations with the United States
+Member of United Nations


Independent States(1)

STATE---------------------------------------------------------- 
Short-form name        Long-form name         Code 2   Capital 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Afghanistan *+    Islamic State of Afghanistan  AF     Kabul 
Albania *+        Republic of Albania           AL     Tirana 
Algeria *+        Democratic and Popular 
                        Republic of Algeria     AG     Algiers 
Andorra *+        Principality of Andorra       AN     Andorra la 
                                                       Vella 
Angola *          Republic of Angola            AO     Luanda 
-- 
Antigua and Barbuda *+(no long-form name)       AC     Saint John's 
Argentina *+      Argentine Republic            AR     Buenos Aires 
Armenia *+        Republic of Armenia           AM     Yerevan 
Australia *+      Commonwealth of Australia     AS     Canberra 
Austria *+        Republic of Austria           AU     Vienna 
-- 
Azerbaijan *+     Azerbaijani Republic          AJ     Baku 
Bahamas, The *+   Commonwealth of The Bahamas   BF     Nassau 
Bahrain *+        State of Bahrain              BA     Manama 
Bangladesh *+     People's Republic of  
                    Bangladesh                  BG     Dhaka 
Barbados *+       (no long-form name)           BB     Bridgetown 
-- 
Belarus *+        Republic of Belarus           BO     Minsk 
Belgium *+        Kingdom of Belgium            BE     Brussels 
Belize *+         (no long-form name)           BH     Belmopan 
Benin *+          Republic of Benin             BN     Porto-Novo 
Bhutan +          Kingdom of Bhutan             BT     Thimphu 
-- 
Bolivia *+        Republic of Bolivia           BL     La Paz  
                                                 (administrative)
                                                       Sucre  
                                          (legislative/judiciary) 
Bosnia and Herzegovina *+ 
                  Republic of Bosnia and        BK     Sarajevo 
                     Herzegovina  
Botswana *+       Republic of Botswana          BC     Gaborone 
Brazil *+         Federative Republic of Brazil BR     Brasilia 
Brunei *+         Negara Brunei Darussalam      BX     Bandar Seri
                                                        Begawan 
-- 
Bulgaria *+       Republic of Bulgaria          BU     Sofia 
Burkina *+        Burkina Faso                  UV     Ouagadougou 
Burma *+          Union of Burma                BM     Rangoon 
Burundi *+        Republic of Burundi           BY     Bujumbura 
Cambodia *+       Kingdom of Cambodia           CB     Phnom Penh 
-- 
Cameroon *+       Republic of Cameroon          CM     Yaounde 
Canada *+         (no long-form name)           CA     Ottawa 
Cape Verde *+     Republic of Cape Verde        CV     Praia 
Central African  
     Republic *+  Central African Republic      CT     Bangui 
Chad *+           Republic of Chad              CD     N'Djamena 
-- 
Chile *+          Republic of Chile             CI     Santiago 
China *+(note 3)  People's Republic of China    CH     Beijing 
Colombia *+       Republic of Colombia          CO     Bogota 
Comoros *+        Federal Islamic Republic 
                    of the Comoros              CN     Moroni 
Congo *+          Republic of the Congo         CF     Brazzaville 
-- 
Costa Rica *+     Republic of Costa Rica        CS     San Jose 
Cote d'Ivoire 
  (Ivory Coast) *+ Republic of Cote d'Ivoire    IV     Yamoussoukro 
Croatia *+        Republic of Croatia           HR     Zagreb 
Cuba +            Republic of Cuba              CU     Havana 
Cyprus *+         Republic of Cyprus            CY     Nicosia 
Czech Republic *+ Czech Republic                EZ     Prague 
Denmark *+        Kingdom of Denmark            DA     Copenhagen 
Djibouti *+       Republic of Djibouti          DJ     Djibouti 
Dominica *+       Commonwealth of Dominica      DO     Roseau 
Dominican Republic *+  
                  Dominican Republic            DR     Santo Domingo 
-- 
Ecuador *+        Republic of Ecuador           EC     Quito 
Egypt *+          Arab Republic of Egypt        EG     Cairo 
El Salvador *+    Republic of El Salvador       ES     San Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea *+   
                  Republic of Equatorial Guinea EK     Malabo 
Eritrea *+        State of Eritrea              ER     Asmara 
-- 
Estonia *+        Republic of Estonia           EN     Tallinn 
Ethiopia *+       (no long-form name)           ET     Addis Ababa 
Fiji *+           Republic of Fiji              FJ     Suva 
Finland *+        Republic of Finland           FI     Helsinki 
France *+         French Republic               FR     Paris 
-- 
Gabon *+          Gabonese Republic             GB     Libreville 
Gambia, The *+    Republic of The Gambia        GA     Banjul 
Georgia *+        Republic of Georgia           GG     T'bilisi 
Germany *+        Federal Republic of Germany   GM     Berlin 
Ghana *+          Republic of Ghana             GH     Accra 
-- 
Greece *+         Hellenic Republic             GR     Athens 
Grenada *+        (no long-form name)           GJ     Saint George's 
Guatemala *+      Republic of Guatemala         GT     Guatemala
Guinea *+         Republic of Guinea            GV     Conakry 
Guinea-Bissau *+  Republic of Guinea-Bissau     PU     Bissau 
-- 
Guyana *+         Co-operative Republic of  
                     Guyana                     GY     Georgetown 
Haiti *+          Republic of Haiti             HA     Port-au-Prince 
Holy See *        Holy See                      VT     Vatican City 
Honduras *+       Republic of Honduras          HO     Tegucigalpa 
Hungary *+        Republic of Hungary           HU     Budapest 
-- 
Iceland *+        Republic of Iceland           IC     Reykjavik 
India *+          Republic of India             IN     New Delhi 
Indonesia *+      Republic of Indonesia         ID     Jakarta 
Iran +            Islamic Republic of Iran      IR     Tehran 
Iraq +            Republic of Iraq              IZ     Baghdad 
-- 
Ireland *+        (no long-form name)           EI     Dublin 
Israel *+         State of Israel               IS     (see note 4) 
Italy *+          Italian Republic              IT     Rome 
Jamaica *+        (no long-form name)           JM     Kingston 
Japan *+          (no long-form name)           JA     Tokyo 
-- 
Jordan *+         Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan   JO     Amman 
Kazakhstan *+     Republic of Kazakhstan        KZ     Almaty 
Kenya *+          Republic of Kenya             KE     Nairobi 
Kiribati *        Republic of Kiribati          KR     Tarawa 
Korea, North +    Democratic People's Republic 
                      of Korea                  KN     P'yongyang 
-- 
Korea, South *+   Republic of Korea             KS     Seoul 
Kuwait *+         State of Kuwait               KU     Kuwait 
Kyrgyzstan *+     Kyrgyz Republic               KG     Bishkek 
Laos *+           Lao People's Democratic 
                    Republic                    LA     Vientiane 
Latvia *+         Republic of Latvia            LG     Riga 
Lebanon *+        Republic of Lebanon           LE     Beirut 
Lesotho *+        Kingdom of Lesotho            LT     Maseru 
Liberia *+        Republic of Liberia           LI     Monrovia 
Libya *+          Socialist People's Libyan 
                     Arab Jamahiriya            LY     Tripoli 
Liechtenstein *+  Principality of Liechtenstein LS     Vaduz 
-- 
Lithuania *+      Republic of Lithuania         LH     Vilnius 
Luxembourg *+     Grand Duchy of Luxembourg     LU     Luxembourg 
Macedonia, The Former Yugoslav Republic of+    
                  The Former Yugoslav Republic 
                    of Macedonia                MK     Skopje 
Madagascar *+     Republic of Madagascar        MA     Antananarivo 
Malawi *+         Republic of Malawi            MI     Lilongwe 
-- 
Malaysia *+       (no long-form name)           MY     Kuala Lumpur 
Maldives *+       Republic of Maldives          MV     Male 
Mali *+           Republic of Mali              ML     Bamako 
Malta *+          (no long-form name)           MT     Valletta 
Marshall Islands *+ 
               Republic of the Marshall Islands RM     Majuro 
-- 
Mauritania *+     Islamic Republic of  
                      Mauritania                MR     Nouakchott 
Mauritius *+      Republic of Mauritius         MP     Port Louis 
Mexico *+         United Mexican States         MX     Mexico 
Micronesia, Federated States of *+ 
                  Federated States of Micronesia FM    Palikir 
Moldova *+        Republic of Moldova           MD     Chisinau 
-- 
Monaco *+         Principality of Monaco        MN     Monaco 
Mongolia *+       (no long-form name)           MG     Ulaanbaatar 
Morocco *+        Kingdom of Morocco            MO     Rabat 
Mozambique *+     Republic of Mozambique        MZ     Maputo 
Namibia *+        Republic of Namibia           WA     Windhoek 
-- 
Nauru *           Republic of Nauru             NR     Yaren 
                                                       District
                                                      (no capital
                                                        city)
Nepal *+          Kingdom of Nepal              NP     Kathmandu 
Netherlands *+    Kingdom of the Netherlands    NL     Amsterdam 
                                                      The Hague 
                                                   (seat of gov't) 
New Zealand *+   (no long-form name)            NZ     Wellington 
Nicaragua *+     Republic of Nicaragua          NU     Managua 
-- 
Niger *+         Republic of Niger              NG     Niamey 
Nigeria *+       Federal Republic of Nigeria    NI     Abuja 
Norway *+        Kingdom of Norway              NO     Oslo 
Oman *+          Sultanate of Oman              MU     Muscat 
Pakistan *+      Islamic Republic of Pakistan   PK     Islamabad 
-- 
Palau *+         Republic of Palau              PS     Koror 
Panama *+        Republic of Panama             PM     Panama 
Papua New Guinea *+ 
                 Independent State of 
                   Papua New Guinea             PP     Port Moresby 
Paraguay *+       Republic of Paraguay          PA     Asuncion 
Peru *+           Republic of Peru              PE     Lima 
-- 
Philippines *+    Republic of the Philippines   RP     Manila 
Poland *+         Republic of Poland            PL     Warsaw 
Portugal *+       Portuguese Republic           PO     Lisbon 
Qatar *+          State of Qatar                QA     Doha 
Romania *+        (no long-form name)           RO     Bucharest 
-- 
Russia *+         Russian Federation            RS     Moscow 
Rwanda *+         Republic of Rwanda            RW      Kigali 
Saint Kitts and   Federation of Saint Kitts   
  Nevis *+         and Nevis                    SC     Basseterre 
Saint Lucia *+    (no long-form name)           ST     Castries 
Saint Vincent and the 
  Grenadines *+   (no long-form name)           VC     Kingstown 
San Marino *+     Republic of San Marino        SM     San Marino 
Sao Tome and      Democratic Republic of Sao    TP     Sao Tome 
  Principe *+      Tome and Principe 
Saudi Arabia *+   Kingdom of Saudi Arabia       SA     Riyadh 
Senegal *+        Republic of Senegal           SG     Dakar 
Seychelles *+     Republic of Seychelles        SE     Victoria 
-- 
Sierra Leone *+   Republic of Sierra Leone      SL     Freetown 
Singapore *+      Republic of Singapore         SN     Singapore 
Slovakia *+       Slovak Republic               LO     Bratislava 
Slovenia *+       Republic of Slovenia          SI     Ljubljana 
Solomon Islands *+(no long-form name)           BP     Honiara 
-- 
Somalia *+        (no long-form name)           SO     Mogadishu 
South Africa *+   Republic of South Africa      SF     Pretoria 
                                                   (administrative)
                                            Cape Town (legislative)
                                            Bloemfontein (judiciary)
Spain *+          Kingdom of Spain              SP     Madrid 
Sri Lanka *+      Democratic Socialist Republic 
                    of Sri Lanka                CE     Colombo 
Sudan *+          Republic of the Sudan         SU     Khartoum 
-- 
Suriname *+       Republic of Suriname          NS     Paramaribo 
Swaziland *+      Kingdom of Swaziland          WZ     Mbabane  
                                                  (administrative) 
                                             Lobamba (legislative) 
Sweden *+         Kingdom of Sweden             SW     Stockholm 
Switzerland *     Swiss Confederation           SZ     Bern 
Syria *+          Syrian Arab Republic          SY     Damascus 
-- 
Tajikistan *+    Republic of Tajikistan         TI     Dushanbe 
Tanzania *+      United Republic of Tanzania    TZ     Dar es Salaam 
Thailand *+      Kingdom of Thailand            TH     Bangkok 
Togo *+          Republic of Togo               TO     Lome 
Tonga *          Kingdom of Tonga               TN     Nuku'alofa 
-- 
Trinidad and     Republic of Trinidad and       TD     Port-of-Spain 
  Tobago *+        Tobago 
Tunisia *+       Republic of Tunisia            TS     Tunis 
Turkey *+        Republic of Turkey             TU     Ankara 
Turkmenistan *+  (no long-form name)            TX     Ashgabat 
Tuvalu *         (no long-form name)            TV     Funafuti 
-- 
Uganda *+         Republic of Uganda            UG     Kampala 
Ukraine *+        (no long-form name)           UP     Kiev 
United Arab       United Arab Emirates          TC     Abu Dhabi 
  Emirates *+ 
United Kingdom *+ United Kingdom of Great       UK      London 
                   Britain and Northern Ireland 
United States +   United States of America      US      Washington, 
                                                         DC 
-- 
Uruguay *+        Oriental Republic of Uruguay  UY      Montevideo 
Uzbekistan *+     Republic of Uzbekistan        UZ      Tashkent 
Vanuatu *+        Republic of Vanuatu           NH      Port-Vila 
Venezuela *+      Republic of Venezuela         VE      Caracas 
Vietnam +         Socialist Republic of Vietnam VM      Hanoi 
-- 
Western Samoa *+  Independent State of          WS      Apia 
                    Western Samoa 
Yemen *+ (note 5) Republic of Yemen             YM      Sanaa 
Zaire *+          Republic of Zaire             CG      Kinshasa 
Zambia *+         Republic of Zambia            ZA      Lusaka 
Zimbabwe *+       Republic of Zimbabwe          ZI      Harare 
------------- 
 
OTHER---------------------------------------------------------- 
Short-form name        Long-form name         Code 2   Capital 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Taiwan (note 6)   (no long-form name)           TW      Taipei 
 
 
 
NOTES------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Note 1:  In this listing, the term "independent state" refers to a 
people politically organized into a sovereign state with a definite 
territory recognized as independent by the US. 
 
Note 2:  Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 10-4 codes. 
 
Note 3:  With the establishment of diplomatic relations with China on 
January 1, 1979, the US Government recognized the People's Republic of 
China as the sole legal government of China and acknowledged the Chinese 
position that there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China. 
 
Note 4:  In 1950 the Israel Parliament proclaimed Jerusalem as the 
capital.  The US, like most other countries that have Embassies in 
Israel, maintains its Embassy in Tel Aviv. 
 
Note 5:  The US view is that the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia has dissolved and no successor state represents its 
continuation.  Serbia and Montenegro have asserted the formation of a 
joint independent state, but this entity has not been formally 
recognized as a state by the US. 
 
Note 6:  Claimed by both the Government of the People's Republic of 
China and the authorities on Taiwan.  Administered by the authorities of 
Taiwan.  (see note 3) 
  

 
 
Dependencies and Areas of Special Sovereignty 
 
 
Short-form name                        Geopolitical 
Long-form name               Sovereignty  Code 1   Capital 
 
01. American Samoa 
Territory of American Samoa 
                             United States  AQ   Pago Pago 
 
02. Anguilla 
(no long-form name) 
                             United Kingdom AV   The Valley 
 
03. Antarctica 
(no long-form name) 
                             None 2         AY   None 
 
04. Aruba 
(no long-form name) 
                             Netherlands    AA   Oranjestad 
 
05. Ashmore and Cartier Islands 
Territory of Ashmore and Cartier Islands 
                             Australia      AT   Admin. fr. Canberra 
-- 
 
06. Baker Island      
(no long-form name) 
                            United States  FQ   Admin. fr. Wash. D.C.  
 
07. Bermuda           
(no long-form name) 
                            United Kingdom BD   Hamilton 
 
08. Bouvet Island     
(no long-form name) 
                            Norway         BV   Admin. fr. Oslo 
 
09. British Indian Ocean Territory3   
British Indian Ocean Territory 
                            United Kingdom IO   None 
 
10. Cayman Islands    
(no long-form name) 
                            United Kingdom CJ   George Town 
-- 
 
11. Christmas Island 
Territory of Christmas Island 
                            Australia       KT   The Settlement 
                                               (Flying Fish Cove) 
 
12. Clipperton Island 
(no long-form name) 
                            France          IP   Admin. fr. Fr.  
                                                  Polynesia 
 
13. Cocos (Keeling) Island 
Territory of Cocos Islands (Keeling) 
                            Australia       CK   West Island 
 
14. Cook Islands      
(no long-form name)     
                            New Zealand     CW   Avarua 
 
15. Coral Sea Islands 
Coral Sea Islands Territory 
                            Australia       CR   Admin. fr. Canberra 
-- 
 
16. Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) 
Colony of the Falkland Islands 
                            United Kingdom4 FK    Stanley 
 
17. Faroe Islands   
(no long-form name) 
                            Denmark         FO    Torshavn 
 
18. French Guiana   
Department of Guiana 
                            France          FG    Cayenne 
 
19. French Polynesia  
Territory of French Polynesia 
                            France          FP    Papeete  
 
20. French Southern and Antarctic Lands5  
Territory of the French Southern and Antarctic Lands 
                            France          FS    Admin. fr. Paris 
-- 
 
21. Gibraltar       
(no long-form name) 
                            United Kingdom  GI    Gibraltar 
 
22. Greenland       
(no long-form name) 
                            Denmark         GL    Nuuk (Godthab) 
 
23. Guadeloupe 6    
Department of Guadeloupe  
                            France          GP    Basse-Terre 
 
24. Guam            
Territory of Guam 
                            United States   GQ    Agana 
 
25. Guernsey        
Bailiwick of Guernsey 
                            British Crown   GK Saint Peter Port 
                            Dep. 
-- 
26. Heard Island and McDonald Islands  
Territory of Heard Island and McDonald Islands 
                            Australia       HM  Admin. fr. Canberra 
 
27. Hong Kong     
(no long-form name) 
                            United Kingdom7 HK    Victoria 
 
28. Howland Island 
(no long-form name) 
                            United States   HQ  Admin. fr. Wash. D.C. 
 
29. Jan Mayen      
(no long-form name) 
                            Norway          JN  Admin. fr. Oslo 8 
 
30. Jarvis Island  
(no long-form name) 
                            United States   DQ  Admin. fr. Wash. D.C. 
-- 
31. Jersey         
Bailiwick of Jersey 
                            British Crown   JE  Saint Helier 
                            Dep. 
 
32. Johnston Atoll 
(no long-form name) 
                            United States   JQ  Admin. fr. Wash. D.C. 
 
33. Kingman Reef  
(no long-form name) 
                            United States   KQ  Admin. fr. Wash. D.C. 
 
34. Macau        
(no long-form name) 
                            Portugal 9      MC  Macau 
 
35. Man, Isle of  
(no long-form name) 
                            British Crown   IM  Douglas 
                            Dep. 
-- 
 
36. Martinique 
Department of Martinique 
                            France          MB  Fort-de-France 
 
37. Mayotte       
Territorial Collectivity of Mayotte 
                            France          MF  Mamoutzou 
 
38. Midway Islands      
(no long-form name) 
                            United States   MQ  Admin. fr. Wash. D.C. 
 
39. Montserrat   
(no long-form name) 
                            United Kingdom  MH  Plymouth 
 
40. Navassa Island 
(no long-form name) 
                            United States   BQ  Admin. fr. Wash. D.C. 
 
-- 
41. Netherlands Antilles 10 
(no long-form name) 
                            Netherlands     NT  Willemstad 
 
42. New Caledonia  
Territory of New Caledonia and Dependencies 
                            France          NC  Noumea  
 
43. Niue         
(no long-form name) 
                            New Zealand     NE  Alofi 
44. Norfolk Island  
Territory of Norfolk Island 
                            Australia       NF  Kingston 
 
45. Northern Mariana Islands  
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands 
                            United States   CQ  Saipan 
 
46. Palmyra Atoll  
(no long-form name) 
                            United States   LQ  Admin. fr. Wash. D.C. 
 
47. Paracel Islands  
(no long-form name) 
                            undetermined 11 PF  None 
 
48. Pitcairn Islands  
Pitcairn, Henderson, Ducie, and Oeno Islands 
                            United Kingdom  PC  Adamstown 
 
49. Puerto Rico  
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico  
                            United States  RQ  San Juan 
 
50. Reunion 12   
Department of Reunion 
                            France          RE  Saint-Denis 
-- 
51. Saint Helena 13 
(no long-form name) 
                            United Kingdom  SH  Jamestown 
 
52. Saint Pierre and Miquelon 
Territorial Collectivity of Saint Pierre and Miquelon 
                            France         SB  Saint-Pierre 
 
53. South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands  
South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands 
                          United Kingdom4   SX  None 
 
54. Spratly Islands 
(no long-form name) 
                          undetermined14   PG  None 
 
55. Svalbard    
(no long-form name) 
                          Norway           SV  Longyearbyen 
-- 
56. Tokelau 
 (no long-form name) 
                          New Zealand      TL  None 
 
57. Turks and Caicos Islands  
(no long-form name) 
                          United Kingdom   TK  Grand Turk 
 
58. Virgin Islands  
Virgin Islands of the United States 
                          United States    VQ  Charlotte Amalie 
 
59. Virgin Islands, British  
(no long-form name) 
                          United Kingdom   VI  Road Town 
 
60. Wake Island  
(no long-form name) 
                          United States    WQ  Admin. fr. Wash. D.C. 
 
-- 
61. Wallis and Futuna  
Territory of the Wallis and Futuna Islands 
                          France           WF  Mata'utu 
 
62. Western Sahara  
(no long-form name) 
                          undetermined     WI  None 
 
NOTES:-------------   
Note 1:  Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 10-4 codes. 
 
Note 2:  Antarctica consists of the territory south of 60 degrees south  
latitude.  This area includes claims by Argentina, Australia, Chile,  
France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom, the legal status of  
which remains in suspense under the terms of the Antarctic Treaty of  
1959.  The United States recognizes no claims to Antarctica. 
 
Note 3:  Chagos Archipelago (including Diego Garcia). 
 
Note 4:  Also claimed by Argentina. 
 
Note 5:  "French Southern and Antarctic Lands" includes le Amsterdam, le  
Saint-Paul, les Crozet, and les Kerguelen in the southern Indian Ocean,  
along with the French-claimed sector of Antarctica, "Terre Adelie."  The  
United States does not recognize the French claim to "Terre Adelie" (See  
note 2). 
 
Note 6:  The Department of Guadeloupe includes the nearby islands of  
Marie-Galante and la Desirade and les des Saintes, as well as Saint  
Barthelemy and the northern three-fifths of Saint Martin (the rest of  
which belongs to Netherlands Antilles). 
 
Note 7:  Under a Sino-British declaration of September 1984, Hong Kong  
will revert to China on July 1, 1997, the expiration of the UK's 99-year 
lease on the New Territories. 
 
Note 8:  Administered from Oslo, Norway, through a governor resident in  
Longyearbyen, Svalbard. 
 
Note 9:  Under a Sino-Portuguese declaration of April 1987, Macau will  
revert to China on December 20, 1999. 
 
Note 10:  Netherlands Antilles comprises two groupings of islands:   
Curacao and Bonaire are located off the coast of Venezuela; Saba, Sint  
Eustatius, and Sint Maarten (the Dutch two-fifths of the island of Saint  
Martin) lie 800 km to the north. 
 
Note 11:  South China Sea islands occupied by China but claimed by  
Vietnam. 
 
Note 12:  Bassas da India (BS), Europa Island (EU), Glorioso Islands  
(GO), Juan de Nova Island (JU), and Tromelin Island (TE) are controlled  
by France and are administered from Reunion. (These islands are claimed  
by Madagascar; Tromelin Island is also claimed by Mauritius and  
Seychelles). 
 
Note 13:  The territory of Saint Helena includes the Island group of  
Tristan da Cunha; Saint Helena also administers Ascension Island. 
 
Note 14:  South China Sea islands claimed in entirety by China and  
Vietnam and in part by the Philippines and Malaysia; each of these  
states occupies some part of the islands.


[BOX]

The Independent States in the World list and the Dependencies and Areas 
of Special Sovereignty list are available on the Department of State 
Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) on the Internet and are accessible in 
the following ways: 

1. GOPHER: dosfan.lib.uic.edu
2. UNIVERSAL RESOURCE LOCATOR (URL): gopher://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/
3. WORLD WIDE WEB (WWW): http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/dosfan.html

Please select the menu item "General Foreign Policy" under which you 
will find entries for "Independent States in the World" and 
"Dependencies and Areas of Special Sovereignty." 

The lists also are accessible through the Department of State, Bureau of 
Public Affairs' Fax-on-Demand system. For access information call (202) 
736-7720. 

(###)


[END OF DISPATCH VOL. 6, NO. 25]

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