US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 25, JUNE 19, 1995
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1. New Steps Toward a Comprehensive Peace in the Middle East --Secretary
Christopher, Israeli Foreign Minister Peres, Israeli Prime Minister
Rabin, Egyptian President Mubarak, Syrian President Asad, PLO Chairman
Arafat, Jordanian King Hussein
2. American Leadership And the New Europe--Deputy Secretary Talbott
3. President Clinton Welcomes U.S.-D.P.R.K. Agreement
4. Fact Sheet: Independent States and Dependencies
ARTICLE 1
New Steps Toward a Comprehensive Peace in the Middle East
Secretary Christopher, Israeli Foreign Minister Peres, Israeli Prime
Minister Rabin, Egyptian President Mubarak, Syrian President Asad, PLO
Chairman Arafat, Jordanian King Hussein
Secretary Christopher, Israeli Foreign Minister Peres
Remarks upon the Secretary's arrival in Jerusalem, June 8, 1995.
Foreign Minister Peres. I would like to welcome the Secretary of State,
Warren Christopher, on his visit to Israel, Jerusalem, and to the
region. He is coming at a very important moment, and his contribution
can be of great meaning to all of us. I say this is an important time,
and the contribution can be great because we have had, simultaneously,
three momentums moving together. We are beginning, apparently very
seriously, our negotiations with a new party--the Syrian party. As you
know, we attach a great deal of importance to the negotiations with the
Syrians, because this may be the last part for a complete peace in the
Middle East. If he should be successful in reaching an understanding
with the Syrians and the Lebanese, maybe for the first time, the Middle
East will have no reason to go to war and can even reduce its arms race
and turn much of its means and energies toward peaceful purposes.
If Syria is a new country for the peaceful negotiations, we also have a
second chapter on the negotiations with the Palestinians.
May I say one word--and carefully: Despite all the skepticism, we can
see the beginning of a real change for the better in the Gaza Strip. In
the double meaning of the word, the Palestinian Authority took more
measures to establish itself as a security-responsible authority. On the
other hand, we can see a drive for building an economic recovery in Gaza
itself.
The third new part is to open a new page with Egypt. Egypt was the first
to make peace; Egypt remains the most important country in the Middle
East. The contribution of Egypt is great and meaningful and permanent,
and we are over some arguments.
I can't remember a more fruitful cooperation for the purpose of peace in
the Middle East than the one that exists between the United States of
America and ourselves. The layer of complete trust, of complete
devotion, of complete creative thinking--and I attribute it very much to
the personality of the Secretary of State of the United States. The
trust that he has collected all over the place is, in a very strange
way, even stronger than the mistrust that we have been used to over many
years. So looking ahead to these true new beginnings and building on the
credibility of the Secretary, we welcome you, Mr. Secretary, to Israel.
Secretary Christopher. Foreign Minister Peres, thank you very much. It's
a pleasure to be with you again, and I am just delighted that we are
able to arrange to meet here as I arrive and you are ready to depart. It
gives new meaning to the concept of an exchange. I am delighted to be
back here in Israel as I always am. I am looking forward to meetings
later today with President Weizman and Prime Minister Rabin. Then, of
course, in the next few days I will be meeting the leaders of not only
Israel, but Syria and Egypt and Jordan as well. As Shimon has
indicated, I come here at a time when there is a great opportunity for
new steps forward to progress toward a comprehensive peace. There are
obstacles ahead, of course, but I think we can take a great deal of
satisfaction and encouragement from the developments we see here.
The process of reconciliation between the Israelis and the Palestinians
seems to be moving ahead, as the Foreign Minister has said, with renewed
confidence on the part of both sides. They're working toward an
implementation of the Declaration of Principles by July 1.
I'm particularly heartened, as the Foreign Minister has said, by the
fact that the situation has improved on the ground, that it has remained
calm, and that the closure has eased in Gaza. I think this provides an
environment in which the parties can make good and early progress.
I'm also encouraged, to echo the Foreign Minister, by the progress
achieved in negotiations between Israel and Syria. For the first time
since the Madrid process began four years ago, there has been a
framework for discussion of security issues reached between Israel and
Syria, and that's a very desirable step forward which will make it
possible for military-to-military talks to begin before the end of this
month--and on a serious and significant basis. Of course, this process
will require great creativity and flexibility, and it will certainly
entail great risks. But the United States stands ready--as always--to
stand behind those parties who are prepared to take risks where
creativity is needed. Serious endeavors are needed. Of course, there is
no one in the world, I believe, who has greater capability and
flexibility and greater talent than the Foreign Minister.
I am also pleased to be able to announce here, at the present time, that
there will be a meeting between President Mubarak, Prime Minister Rabin,
and myself in Cairo tomorrow. Those arrangements have been worked out,
and I think that can be an important step forward, a new page between
Egypt and Israel, who have such a strong capacity to work together to
help move the peace process forward. As a result of many efforts, I
believe the landscape is really being transformed here. Progress is not
yet complete; the transformation is not complete. But, no doubt, I think
we all see over the horizon tremendous opportunities: the cycle of war
and terror ending; political cooperation across boundaries; and, for
Israel, a chance to assume, in an era of security, its rightful place as
a very strong force for peace, progress, and democracy in the region. In
short, peace will bring what President Clinton has referred to as "the
quiet miracle of a normal life."
The United States remains, of course, a close partner with Israel in
this great undertaking. I want to underscore that we stand behind Israel
and are prepared to help it as it undertakes the great risks that peace
entails. Our commitment to Israel's security is, as always, unshakable,
and will remain that way. We'll continue to do everything we can to
maintain the momentum toward a comprehensive peace in this region.
Before I conclude, I'd like to say how happily we welcome the rescue of
Capt. Scott O'Grady through the night in Bosnia. We rejoice with his
family. It was an excellent military operation, and it has been a cause
of considerable joy as we learned the news just within the last few
hours.
Shimon, I am delighted to be here. Thank you so much for being here at
the airport so we could have this conversation.
Secretary Christopher, Israeli Prime Minister Rabin
Remarks following their meeting at the Prime Minister's office,
Jerusalem, June 8, 1995.
Prime Minister Rabin. Mr. Secretary, the peace team that came with you
is most welcome here in assisting us to move ahead with the peace
process. Tomorrow, we will meet with President Mubarak, the leader of
the Arab country that started the peace process and signed a peace
treaty with Israel. Today, we are engaged in a more meaningful peace
process that brought about the agreement with the Palestinians--
represented by the PLO--and the signing of a peace treaty with Jordan. I
believe that as a result of your visit, we will find ways to improve the
overall atmosphere in the region by visiting Egypt, by your visit to
Damascus on Saturday, and that will, hopefully, bring about the
resumption of the talks with Syria. We see today an improved mood,
without underestimating still the obstacles that we have to remove from
the road to achieve a comprehensive peace.
Mr. Secretary, the President of the United States, President Clinton,
phoned yesterday before you came and described to me his talks with
President Asad. He conveyed to me his impressions of the improved mood
on the part of the Syrians. Let us hope that the good mood will be
translated to the practical negotiations that we have with the
Palestinians and, hopefully, when the negotiations with Syria are
resumed. Again, Mr. Secretary, we appreciate your personal efforts to
serve the cause of peace in the region. Welcome to Israel.
Secretary Christopher. Mr. Prime Minister, thank you. As always, I am
delighted to be back in Jerusalem. I come here at a time of renewed
opportunity to seek and achieve a comprehensive peace in the region. The
Prime Minister and I had a good opportunity to review the ways in which
we might take advantage of this moment when there is a renewed
opportunity.
On the Palestinian track, it is clear to me that the negotiations are
going forward in a very serious way with a sharpness of focus needed to
reach an agreement on phase two of the Declaration of Principles. The
negotiations are obviously very complicated and difficult, with a lot at
stake. But most of the parties know, I think, that these negotiations
can succeed. It will provide a critical path for moving toward
reconciliation between the Palestinians and the Israelis.
On the Syrian track, I believe there is an opportunity now to move into
a new and important phase. A commitment by the parties to hold senior-
level military talks in Washington this month shows the seriousness of
the parties on one of the key issues--in many ways the most difficult
issue--an issue that I think is so critical to ensuring the future
security of Israel. This is a time of unusual opportunity for real
peace, for enduring security for Israel, with the United States, as
before, with a renewed commitment now to be steadfast in its support of
Israel as it takes risks for peace.
We talked about the determination that we have to try to move forward in
this process. As the Prime Minister has said, the trip to Cairo tomorrow
will bring together two countries that have been the earliest in this
process, and both have a very strong stake in its success. We look
forward to being with you tomorrow, Mr. Prime Minister, and to talking
with you throughout the course of this visit. Thank you so much for
welcoming me here, Mr. Prime Minister.
Secretary Christopher, President Mubarak, Prime Minister Rabin
Opening remarks at a press conference, Cairo, Egypt, June 9, 1995.
President Mubarak. I welcome Prime Minister Rabin and Secretary of State
Warren Christopher to Egypt. I think the need is to meet to solve
problems and meet together in a very good atmosphere.
I had long discussions with Prime Minister Rabin about bilateral
relations, and we discussed the peace process and how it is going--and
it was a very positive negotiation with the Prime Minister. I say that
whenever there are problems in the peace process, I think it is better
to meet face-to-face and discuss with each other--and we are used to
this. I have met Mr. Rabin several times and Mr. Christopher several
times. This is the only way to sit--face-to-face--and face the problems
and see how we could manage to make the process continue.
We are convinced of peace; we signed a peace treaty with Israel about
18 years ago. We supported the Madrid conference, and we made tremendous
efforts so that conference could convene. We made tremendous efforts--
and I think Mr. Rabin and Secretary Christopher know that--with the
Palestinians until they reached the signatures on the Declaration of
Principles, which we appreciated. We still are supporting the peace
process until peace prevails all over the area. Our negotiations were
very positive--with a very good atmosphere, and I hope--and I am sure
that all will continue on the same line until peace prevails all over
the area. Thank you.
Prime Minister Rabin. Mr. President, Secretary of State: Allow me first
to thank you for hosting this meeting in a very good atmosphere, because
we are all committed to achieve comprehensive peace in the region. Egypt
showed courage, vision, and imagination in being in the lead of changing
the Middle East by signing a peace treaty with Israel--by maintaining
this peace--and has served as a model of what can be achieved in the
Middle East if comprehensive peace is achieved. It took too long after
the signing of the peace treaty until the Madrid peace conference was
convened and negotiations started. As the Prime Minister of Israel, I
believe that what has been achieved in the last two years is no doubt a
tremendous achievement--the mutual recognition between Israel and the
PLO, looking at the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people,
signing the Declaration of Principles, signing the Cairo agreement that
brought about the implementation of the first phase of the DOP.
Gaza and Jericho were first, and now we are in a very deep, serious
negotiation with the PLO--with the Palestinian Authority about the
implementation of the second phase of the DOP--it is to say of the West
Bank, Judea, and Samaria. It is more complicated. We set as a target
date the first of July, and we will make on our part the most serious
effort to meet this date. There are some problems, but there is no doubt
in my mind we have crossed the point of no return in the implementation
of the whole DOP all over the area which the DOP refers to.
I hope that the negotiations with Syria will be resumed, but this is
more up to the Americans to tell because we do not have the direct
contacts and dialogue as we have with Egypt, the Palestinians, and the
Jordanians. We are busy now consolidating the second peace treaty that
we signed, after Egypt, with Jordan, and I believe we are moving ahead
in the consolidation of the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel. For
me, its a tremendous change that--no doubt in my mind--promises we will
do the utmost, as soon as possible; we will see a different Middle East-
-a Middle East in peace--in which each country will live in peace
without the threat of war and, hopefully, without the threat of violence
and terrorism. No doubt, today, the main obstacle on the road to
solution of the problem between the Palestinians and us is the terrorism
carried out by the enemies of peace--the enemies of the agreement signed
between the PLO and Israel. We hope that what was started by the
Palestinian Authority to control this terror--and we appreciate the
efforts of the Palestinians in doing so--no doubt will facilitate our
capability to reach an agreement and to see a different situation in the
region.
Again, I would like to thank you Mr. President--the atmosphere in our
talks--we went into details of our discussion with the Palestinians,
what we see vis-a-vis the Syrians, and we appreciate very much your
efforts and assistance in advancing the peace process in the whole
region with the purpose of achieving a comprehensive peace. Thank you
very much. Thank you very much Mr. Secretary for your assistance and the
United States' assistance.
Secretary Christopher. Mr. President and Prime Minister: Mr. President,
may I join in thanking you for hosting this event and also for the
leadership that you continue to provide in the pursuit of peace here in
the Middle East. Mr. Prime Minister, I want to add a word of thanks to
you for the tremendous leadership you have shown, and the courage you
have shown in seeking peace in the Middle East.
Today's meeting reflects a rejuvenation of the Israeli-Egyptian
partnership--a partnership that is so vital in the development of peace,
cooperation, and stability here in the Middle East. Today, Egypt and
Israel stand as bastions of peace--the region's pillars of peace. When
the two countries and their leaders come together in a partnership, they
can achieve an enormous amount of progress in the pursuit of peace. This
is that kind of time. Today's meeting comes at a time of renewed efforts
and renewed hopes for the pursuit of peace here in the Middle East.
First, the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations have regained their momentum
with renewed confidence on the part of both sides. The parties are
making a good faith effort to reach an agreement on the second phase of
the Declaration of Principles with a target date of July 1 and a very
serious negotiation going on. Second, the negotiations between Israel
and Syria have moved to a new phase--a commitment of the parties to
hold senior-level military talks at the end of the year is a very
encouraging sign, and I will be pursuing that when I go to Damascus
tomorrow. More must be done to take advantage of this great current
opportunity. One of the things we must do is to find an economic base
for the peaceful steps that have been taken. The Amman summit this
October will provide an opportunity to pursue that and provide real
economic opportunity for the people of the Middle East as they begin to
enjoy the fruits of peace. Today, I believe we turned a new page in the
Egyptian-Israeli relationship, one that is promising as we build for the
future. We have taken another step to transform the region toward peace
and to make peace irreversible. Our hope is to achieve something that
President Clinton once called "the quiet miracle of a normal life." That
is what the people of the Middle East deserve, and I think this step
today, with the generosity and commitment of the President and the Prime
Minister, moves us a step closer to that normal life. Thank you very
much.
Secretary Christopher
Opening remarks of a press briefing following his meeting with President
Asad, Damascus, Syria, June 10, 1995.
President Asad and I had a very productive meeting today--about three
hours long. We had a thorough and constructive discussion of the next
steps to be taken to move the Syrian-Israeli track to a new and more
intensive phase.
Based on my conversation earlier this week with Prime Minister Rabin and
those that I had here just a few moments ago with President Asad, we
have an agreement to begin a sequence of steps along the following
lines. First, Syrian Chief of Staff Shihabi and Israeli Chief of Staff
Shahak will come to Washington for discussions, under U.S. auspices, on
the security arrangements to be covered by the Israeli-Syrian peace
agreement when and if it is completed. These discussions will commence
in Washington on June 27, and will continue for two or three days. We
have also invited the two Chiefs of Staff to come to Washington a few
days in advance for informal bilateral discussions with us, to provide
us with an opportunity to carry forward the discussions Ambassador
Dennis Ross had with the security chiefs while he was out here in the
region.
After the initial meeting of the Chiefs of Staff, starting on June 27,
we anticipate about a two-week interval to allow both sides to review
the results of those discussions and to digest the results. During this
interval of two weeks, I plan to send Dennis Ross back to the region so
he can discuss the next steps with President Asad and Prime Minister
Rabin. After this two-week interval, the Israeli and Syrian military
officials--below the Chief of Staff level--will reconvene in Washington
under our auspices as part of the ambassadorial channel. With continued
discussions in that channel, we expect that series of discussions
between the ambassadors and the military officials to take about two
weeks. That would carry us through approximately the end of July, by my
estimate.
The agreement that we have reached on this rather detailed and
ambitious work plan confirms the determination of the parties to seek an
early peace. The experience of the months since my visit to the region
in March--particularly the agreement that was reached on a set of
principles or a framework--demonstrates what we have been saying for
some time: that progress on this track will not be easy but that
progress can be made when the parties set their minds to it. They have
reflected good will, determination, and flexibility, and that has
brought us to the point where we are today.
In the weeks ahead, as the two Chiefs of Staff and the others focus on
security issues, the ambassadors in Washington will also renew their
discussions of the non-security issues, which will be essential if we
are to ultimately reach a peace agreement. We have already narrowed the
differences on a number of these non-security issues, but there is a
good deal of work to do. I strongly feel that if we can make progress on
the security issues, then that will have a favorable effect on the
environment and will affect the non-security issues as well. Our
attention over the next several months will be focused on both security
and non-security issues.
Secretary Christopher, Chairman Arafat
Remarks following their meeting, Jericho, June 11, 1995.
Chairman Arafat. We are very happy to have this opportunity for the
participation of His Excellency Mr. Christopher and his team here in
Jericho. We had a very fruitful and very positive and very important
discussion today, to push forward the peace process and the
implementation of what has been agreed upon and signed. I repeat my
thanks from my heart to His Excellency President Clinton and to Mr.
Christopher for what they are doing to push the peace process. We hope
that through their help we will achieve what we are looking for.
At the same time, we hope that by the first of July, we will have
something concrete concerning the redeployment and empowerment and,
after that, the election. At the same time, we cannot forget this very
strong push and active role of His Excellency, through which we can have
now a very strong, active role in the Syrian track. Because our aim is
to have a comprehensive, lasting, peaceful solution in the Middle East--
as has been done with Palestinians and Jordanians, also with the Syrians
and the Lebanese. Again, I have to thank His Excellency for what he is
doing, and I hope that through this continuous support, we will be able
to continue in the peace process in an accurate way. Thank you.
Secretary Christopher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be
here in Jericho again for the second time and to note the progress that
has been made since my first visit here, which was only two or three
days after the Chairman returned to this area. My coming here is a
reflection of the importance the United States attaches to the
Palestinian Authority.
Based upon the talks that I had with Prime Minister Rabin on Thursday
and Friday and with Chairman Arafat today, I have found on both their
parts a renewed determination to move ahead. They are both determined to
reach an agreement--within the timeframe--on the issues in phase two of
the Declaration of Principles--community must take steps to do more. If
the elections are held, it will be a big boost to the credibility of the
area, and it will be much easier to get commitments from public donors
as well as investments by private parties. There can be no illusion
about the difficulty of the issues that remain and the pressure on the
negotiators. But based upon my visit here and my being in the region for
some time, I have confidence that the process and the progress can be
sustained.
The United States will continue to support the peacemakers in this area-
-including the Palestinian Authority-- and I want to once again thank
the Chairman and his colleagues for the hard work that I know that is
going into the progress that has been made. Thank you very much.
Secretary Christopher, King Hussein
Opening remarks at a press conference, Amman, Jordan, June 11, 1995.
King Hussein. Ladies and gentlemen: I would like once again to say how
delighted we are--myself and the government, and the people of Jordan--
to receive the Secretary of State and his able colleagues and to welcome
a very dear friend back to Jordan. It has become almost part of the
scene, and it reflects very much the commitment and the interest of the
United States in helping all of us in this region achieve a
comprehensive peace and contribute our share for a more stable future
for the coming generations, one where there, hopefully, will be every
chance for them to fulfill themselves and to achieve what is worthy of
them.
I would like to say that on this occasion I have this chance to talk
again about everything as we do--as friends do--and I am extremely
optimistic by all I have heard. If the Secretary of State would permit
me a private local Jordanian joke--whenever we see our Minister of
Finance smiling here, we are very happy because it suggests we are out
of trouble and the future looks good. And I have seen the Secretary
smiling more on this visit than on any other. I hope that I am justified
in my optimism, and I hope that this smile will always be there; I hope
that we will achieve--with the help of our friends and the dedication
and commitment of our friends and all partaking positions of
responsibility in this part of the world--our goal of a peaceful area
and a happy future for all our people.
Secretary Christopher. Your Majesty: Thank you. Let me say how pleased I
am to be here again as a guest of His Majesty with his vision and
courage and leadership. A warm peace is taking shape between Israel and
Jordan, and I think it is much to his everlasting credit. The United
States recognizes the risks that the King and Jordan have taken for
peace and, of course, there is an underlying reason why President
Clinton has been determined to work with the Congress to forgive all of
Jordan's debt to the United States and encouraging this trip to the
region. There has been significant progress and renewed momentum on the
various tracks. I briefed the King on the status of the Israeli-
Palestinian negotiations in light of the meetings I have had in just the
last two or three days with Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat.
Based upon those discussions, I told him of the determination of both
sides to reach an agreement implementing phase two of the Declaration of
Principles and to do so within the time-frame the parties have set. I
also told the King about my meetings with President Asad in Syria. The
fact that a date has now been set for the Chiefs of Staff in Washington
to kick off the military-to-military talks is, I think, a reflection of
the fact that on that track, we are reaching a new and more intensive
phase.
Finally, I conveyed to the King a brief sense of the meeting that took
place in Cairo last Friday between Prime Minister Rabin and President
Mubarak--a meeting that I think rejuvenated their friendship and
partnership which meant so much for the cause of peace in this region.
Serious problems remain to be solved and much, much work remains to be
done. I think this trip has reinforced my feeling that there is a
tremendous opportunity to move now toward the goal of a comprehensive
peace, perhaps a better opportunity than any time during the 21/2 years
that I have been in office. The United States counts on the aid of
Jordan but, especially, on the wise counsel of King Hussein, which we
frequently call on and always give great heed to.
Your Majesty, as we try to maintain the momentum for peace, we want to
work very closely with you here in Jordan. (###)
(###)
ARTICLE 2
American Leadership And the New Europe
Deputy Secretary Talbott
Address before the City Club, Cleveland, Ohio, June 9, 1995
[introductory remarks deleted]
My topic this afternoon is, I believe, one on which there is actually a
lot of agreement in Washington--and, I hope, throughout the country. It
is the opportunity and the obligation the United States has to play a
key role--a leadership role--in building a new Europe. I have chosen
that topic not only because of its intrinsic importance and timeliness,
but also because of the strong ties this city has with the many nations
of Europe.
I was reminded of this signal feature of Cleveland's identity last
evening, driving in from the airport and seeing all those church spires.
There are more than 1,200 houses of worship in this city, and many of
them serve to keep alive Clevelanders' roots in one old country or
another, especially in countries that have suffered through much of this
century under communism. There is St. George's on Superior Avenue, which
is a center of the Lithuanian community and has been since 1895; both of
the St. Savas--one on the West Side and one in Broadview Heights; St.
Nicholas', which Croatians founded in 1901; St. Peter and Paul's on
West 7th Street, established by immigrants from Ukraine in 1902; and, on
Mayfield Road, there's the Park Synagogue, founded by Polish Jews in
1857.
When my wife and I lived in Eastern Europe as journalists in the early
1970s, I used to hear in Ljubljana echoes of the snippets of Slovene
that I had heard while shopping on upper Euclid Avenue; or in Krakow,
echoes of the Polish I had heard on the West Side and--in some fairly
colorful, easy-to-decipher idioms--at Indians' games. When reporting
assignments took me to Budapest--as they did with some frequency in
those years nearly a quarter of a century ago--I frequently pointed out
to my hosts that my hometown, over 4,000 miles away, was the second-
largest Hungarian city in the world, which, of course, is one of the
many reasons why Cleveland is a great American city.
For all Americans--not just those lucky enough to be Clevelanders--
Europe has had a special place in our national sense of our role and
responsibility in the world. Among other things, America and Europe are
linked by a fundamental difference. Let me explain what I mean by that
rather paradoxical statement: Our melting-pot society, our multi-ethnic
democracy, and our sense of national unity were all made possible, in
large measure, by a steady influx to these shores of immigrants who were
escaping the divisions and the disintegration, the intolerance, and the
outbreaks of inhumanity that Europe has experienced--both as victim and
perpetrator--in this century.
Consider a Galician city where quite a few Clevelanders have roots--
L'viv. I call it Galician because any other designation has been a
sometime-thing--a function of the ebb-and-flow of empires, conquering
armies, and revolutions. A typical 80-year-old resident of L'viv has
personally been governed from five different capitals. She has lived
under Austrian, Polish, German, Soviet, and, now, Ukrainian rule--all
without ever leaving her home. Walking down the streets of her hometown,
which she remembers being known as Lvov and Lemberg, she can see
reminders of the tumultuous past everywhere: in the marble steps of the
Habsburgs; in the German names engraved on public fixtures; in the
baroque church erected during the Polish commonwealth; in the cracked
window of the synagogue or the courtyard of the Armenian church; in the
once-grand mansions built by Hungarian merchants; in the Hebrew, Roman,
and Cyrillic inscriptions in the cemeteries. Her memories and her
surroundings testify not only to the lost opportunities and faded
glories of her city's multi-ethnic past, but also to some of Europe's--
and the 20th century's--worst nightmares, from which many of her
relatives escaped--some, no doubt, to settle in Cuyahoga County.
Three times in this century, Americans have come to Europe's rescue--
twice in hot wars, once in a cold one--and each time we did so for
reasons that reflected not just our national generosity and our sense of
international obligation, but also a hard-headed, forward-looking
recognition of our vital self-interest.
We, the United States, have had to keep sending our armies over there--
across the Atlantic--because we, the transatlantic community as a whole-
-Americans and Europeans alike--have had so much difficulty defining and
putting in place a set of rules and institutions that would keep the
peace on which our own security and prosperity, to a large extent,
depend. In short, we have had a lot of trouble in the 20th century
getting it right in Europe.
World War I was in many ways a double disaster. It resulted not only in
the slaughter of a generation, but also in the squandering of the
opportunity that came at Versailles. The United States, which
contributed so much to the Allied success on the battlefields of that
war, also bears responsibility for the failure that followed the peace.
In 1919, the U.S. Congress rejected American participation in the League
of Nations. Then, in 1930, Congress enacted the Smoot-Hawley Act, a
monument to protectionism. That legislation, it has often been said,
helped put the "Great" in the Great Depression. These and other follies
of the inter-war period created an international climate all too
conducive to the rise of fascism and to another conflagration.
The leaders of the great coalition that defeated Hitler learned several,
if not all, of the lessons from the aftermath of World War I. Instead of
humiliating and impoverishing their defeated enemies, the Allies helped
rebuild Germany and Japan. Through the Marshall Plan, NATO, GATT, and
the international financial institutions born at Bretton Woods, they
established the basis for a community of Western democracies and for an
increasingly interdependent and prosperous global economy.
But while these post-war institutions helped produce unparalleled peace
and prosperity for half a century, their benefits in Europe extended to
only half a continent. Exactly 50 years ago, in the spring of 1945, most
of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe ended up on the wrong side
of the dividing line marked by the westward advance of the Red Army.
That was the real beginning--and the primary cause--of the Cold War.
Now the Cold War is over. With its end, it is not only possible but
imperative that we help extend to all of Europe the benefits, and the
obligations, of the political and economic partnerships that have been
such a source of strength for the West.
Victory in the Cold War came not just because one group of states banded
together to resist another; rather, one set of ideas won out over
another. There were adherents and proponents of those victorious ideas
on both sides of what used to be the Iron Curtain.
But while democracy and market economics are ascendent, they are not
everywhere firmly or perhaps even permanently established. In many
European nations that have begun the transition, the necessary
institutions are still in their infancy--and some are in jeopardy. It is
precisely newborn democracies that are most in need of international
support. As President Clinton put it when he spoke here in Cleveland in
January: "If the forces of reform are embattled, we must renew, not
retreat from, our support for them."
That is why our Administration has focused so much of our country's
foreign policy resources on political and economic assistance programs
for the emerging market democracies of Central Europe and for the New
Independent States of the former Soviet Union. These U.S. assistance
programs are helping these countries to overcome the economic legacy of
all those years under communism, and to build new institutions based on
the free market. Let me cite just a few examples.
-- In Ukraine, we are giving a major boost to the emerging private
sector by helping Leonid Kuchma's reformist government begin the mass
privatization of 8,000 large state enterprises.
-- In Hungary, U.S. advisers are working with the government to
restructure and privatize the banking system, and our Hungarian-American
Enterprise Fund is playing a key role in the creation of the Budapest
Stock Exchange.
-- The Czech- and Slovak-American Enterprise Fund is now the second-
largest foreign investor in Slovakia. The largest investor, by the way,
is K-Mart.
-- In Russia, our support for liberalization and privatization has
helped break the stranglehold of central economic planning. Thanks in
large part to our efforts, the Russian economy, for all its troubles, is
being shaped today not solely by top-down decrees, but by the combined
forces of some 2,500 commercial banks, 600 investment funds, and 40
million private shareholders.
Throughout the former communist world, we are also spurring the
involvement of the American private sector, through our Enterprise Funds
and through events such as the Conference on Trade and Investment that
brought President Clinton and Secretary of Commerce Brown to Cleveland
in January.
We are also addressing a related challenge: the pandemic of criminal
activities in the newly emerging market democracies. This is a crucial
aspect of our policy, because crime is a threat both to reform and to
our ability to support reformers. If the citizens of these nations
equate reform with protection rackets and kickbacks and gangland
murders, they will be more likely to vote for reconstructed communists
or unreconstructed communists and ultranationalistic, authoritarian
demagogues who offer superficially attractive law-and-order nostrums.
Moreover, crime and corruption discourage the foreign investment that is
so vital for economic development.
That is why we have made it a top priority of our policy to help post-
communist governments establish competent, professional, civilian-
controlled justice systems. We are using professional law enforcement
and judicial experts from the United States to train local police,
prosecutors, and judges across the region. For example, for the past
three years, members of the Ohio state judiciary have been helping to
train their Ukrainian counterparts. This effort is being led on the
American side by Chief Justice Thomas Moyer of the Supreme Court of
Ohio--whom we are honored to have with us today--and it includes Judges
David Snow and Jerry Hayes from here in Cleveland.
Of course, every one of the programs I have mentioned--whether to
promote democracy or private enterprise or law enforcement in post-
communist societies--costs money; your money, in tax dollars. There is,
as you know, a brutal budget battle going on right now on Capitol Hill.
Many in Congress are tempted by the dangerous idea that we can have a
foreign policy on the cheap. That shortsightedness is all too evident in
the foreign affairs bill passed by the House last night. President
Clinton and Secretary Christopher are determined to prevail in the
debate which will now move to the Senate. More specifically, they are
committed to continue to fund our assistance programs for Central Europe
and the New Independent States.
Those assistance programs are a dramatic example of a basic proposition
underlying our foreign policy as a whole: American engagement abroad is
rooted in American self-interest. Our ability to live, trade, and travel
in a safer world depends on whether other countries, particularly other
democracies--and that includes fledgling democracies--are stable and
secure.
Let me, in that connection, say a few words about President Clinton's
vision of an expanded European security architecture that meets the
opportunities and challenges of the post-Cold War era.
The anchor of American engagement in Europe, and the linchpin of
transatlantic security, is our commitment to NATO. President Clinton has
reaffirmed that commitment and reaffirmed our determination to keep
100,000 American soldiers stationed on the continent.
NATO is, fundamentally, a military alliance. At the same time, the past
five decades, and especially the past five years, have demonstrated that
the enduring benefits of NATO are political as well as military. As
Secretary Christopher puts it, NATO has helped to reconcile old
adversaries, to embed free countries in strong and solid institutions,
and to create an enduring sense of shared purpose in one another's
security.
Now that the Cold War has ended, we must work with our NATO allies to
bring the new democracies of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union
into a new European security order, of which NATO will continue to be a
key part.
The alliance took a historic step in the right direction in January
1994, when it approved President Clinton's proposal for a Partnership
for Peace--a framework for practical, military-to-military cooperation
between NATO and a broad range of non-NATO European states. Twenty-six
countries--as of two weeks ago, including Russia--have joined the
Partnership. Already, this American-led innovation has produced the
remarkable spectacle of former adversaries from NATO and the old Warsaw
Pact conducting military exercises together in Poland and the
Netherlands.
The January 1994 NATO summit also determined that NATO would expand to
admit new members. Then, last December, again at President Clinton's
initiative, the alliance began the formal process of NATO enlargement.
Potential members will be judged openly and individually, according to
their commitment to NATO's goals and their ability to strengthen the
alliance.
We are convinced that NATO enlargement can advance two related
overarching objectives: One is to keep Europe undivided; the other is to
integrate into the institutions of the West those post-communist
countries that are willing and able to consolidate their commitment to
multi-ethnic democracy, civil society, open markets, respect for their
neighbors, and respect for their own national minorities.
In short, while NATO will remain a collective defense pact, it will, as
it expands, also serve as an inducement for democratization and regional
peace. This is not an abstract hope; it is already happening. The very
prospect of future membership in NATO has, just this year, had a
salutary effect in Central Europe. Leaders of both Hungary and Slovakia
have said that it was with an eye to making their countries eligible
for NATO and the European Union that they recently signed a treaty
ironing out some of their differences.
As we pursue our own policies in Europe--through our leadership of NATO
and the Partnership for Peace, our work within the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, and our cooperation with the
European Union and the Council of Europe--we will continue to look for
ways of using those institutions to prevent crises before they break out
and, when prevention fails, to settle them peacefully.
We, and the Europeans, have our work cut out for us. Some ethnic and
national conflicts, such as those in the Transdniester region of
Moldova, in Nagorno-Karabakh, and, of course, in Chechnya, have already
exploded to devastating effect. There are also varying degrees of
tension between Athens and Tirana, between Athens and Skopje, Budapest
and Bucharest, Bucharest and Kiev, Kiev and Moscow, and even between
Rome and Ljubljana.
But the most urgent and dangerous situation in Europe is, of course, the
one that has erupted in the former Yugoslavia. While the history of this
dreadful episode is tangled, and while there is, to be sure, plenty of
blame to go around, part of the problem was that when the Cold War so
suddenly ended, we, the transatlantic community, did not have in place
institutions with the mandate and the means to deal with Europe's first
major post-Cold War conflict. In other words, once again we didn't get
it right because--let's face it--we weren't ready. We had, in NATO, the
most successful military alliance in history, which had deterred the
U.S.S.R. and the Warsaw Pact without firing a shot. But we did not have,
in NATO or the United Nations, or the CSCE, or any other entity, the
means to deal with the threat to humanity and to international order
posed by the conflict in Yugoslavia.
That conflagration has already lasted as long as World War I--and longer
than America's involvement in World War II. It has its roots in the
bloody history of that region. It has multiple causes and multiple
dimensions. But the worst, most dangerous aspect of the current conflict
is the ruthless, determined attempt by one ethnic group, the Serbs, to
carve out their own state--Greater Serbia--from the flank of two other
states--Bosnia and Croatia--and to do so through a combination of
military aggression, mass rape, mass murder, and ethnic cleansing.
The campaign for Greater Serbia carries with it the threat of a
spreading conflict. If the fighting in Bosnia were to spread, the
political disruption, if not the military conflict, could reach out to
all points of the compass, including south and east, which carries with
it the peril that two of our NATO allies--Greece and Turkey--could be
drawn in as well--on opposite sides.
America's number one strategic interest in the Balkans is to contain the
war--to stop it from escalating and spreading. To that end, we have
stationed troops in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and have
made clear that we will take actions in the event of Serb-incited
violence in Serbia's ethnic Albanian region of Kosovo. We have also
conducted the biggest, most sustained humanitarian airlift in history,
while providing air support for our European and United Nations allies
who have troops and personnel on the ground in Bosnia.
The whole situation has grown even more complicated in the last two
weeks. What has happened boils down to this: The Bosnian Serbs are
trying, literally as well as figuratively, to use the international
presence in Bosnia as a hostage, as a human shield, so that they can
consolidate their territorial gains. We are working with our partners to
maintain a presence on the ground there, since its withdrawal would
likely trigger an escalation of the fighting and an even worse
humanitarian disaster. That is why the Europeans are forming a Rapid
Reaction Force that will substantially make the presence of the UN
peacekeepers in Bosnia more tenable.
I will not pretend--and you would not believe me if I tried--that the
ending of this episode is clear or in sight. But this much I can say
with total confidence and conviction: In Bosnia, as elsewhere, our
European allies look to the United States to stand with them, just as we
have stood with them three times before in this century. They look to us
not just for solidarity and support, but also for leadership.
There are at least two lessons to be drawn from the terrible conflict in
the former Yugoslavia. The first, as I have already said, is that we
must move briskly and boldly to expand and strengthen the institutions
and patterns of cooperation that served us so well during the Cold War--
to update and upgrade existing arrangements, and where necessary, create
from scratch new ones to deal with post-Cold War challenges.
The second lesson is more general but just as important. It concerns our
attitude toward seemingly intractable conflicts like the one in the
Balkans. In the final analysis, of course, the onus for solving these
problems is up to the locals. They must stop wanting to kill each other.
If the people of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union are to take
advantage of the opportunity for freedom that has come to them with the
end of the Cold War, they must be prepared for one final act of
liberation. They must liberate themselves from the unresolved legacies
of their own tragic past. Some of these nations have already taken
courageous steps in this direction that can be a model for others, who
still have far to go.
But we have a role to play too; we can help; and we must not let
ourselves get discouraged. The word hopeless does not belong in the
vocabulary of our diplomacy. Nor should we credit the pernicious
concepts of historical or geographical determinism, the notion that some
nations or would-be nation-states are forever cursed, nor the notion
that there is something in the air or the water of the Balkans that
dooms each new generation to refight the battles of its forebears. Of
course, history and geography are hugely important factors in any
society's identity and destiny--in Europe, in America, and elsewhere.
But we should beware of stereotypes about national character,
particularly ones that would, if they become the basis of our policy,
consign whole nations of people to tyranny or civil war or unending
chaos on the perverse theory that that is the fate they deserve, or that
that fate is encoded in their genes.
Just as there were brave champions of freedom in Gdansk and Prague in
the 1970s--men like Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel--who went from being
persecuted dissidents to being the presidents of their countries today,
there are individuals in Belgrade and Pale and Banja Luka today whose
basic humanity we hope will ultimately prevail over the rapacity of
Milosevic, Mladic, and Karadzic.
In 1915, the great British historian Norman Angell said that every
England--every country in Europe--has its Ireland, and every Ireland has
its Ulster. By the way, not too long ago, Ulster was, like Bosnia today,
a place name that stood for a murderously insoluble problem. Yet, today,
the people of Northern Ireland are finally within reach of peace; that
is thanks mostly to themselves. But it is also thanks to their desire to
belong to an increasingly integrated Europe, and it is thanks as well to
American statesmanship.
While we are keeping the big picture in view, let us not lose sight of
the larger European context in which these regional conflicts have
arisen. Let us not forget another confrontation that was expected to
continue indefinitely, or at least well into the next century--a
struggle that few of us here today believed we would see end in our
lifetimes. I am referring, of course, to the conflict between the
communist East and the capitalist West that began 50 years ago this
spring.
With the end of the Cold War, we have, despite Bosnia and all the other
troubles that beset us, a unique opportunity to build, for the first
time in history, a Europe that is not only undivided, but a Europe that
is increasingly united by a shared commitment to the values that have
made our own country--and, as a local boy, let me say our own city--
great and strong. This time we can, and must, get it right. (###)
(###)
ARTICLE 3
President Clinton Welcomes U.S.-D.P.R.K. Agreement
Statement released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary,
Washington, DC, June 13, 1995.
I welcome the agreement reached between the United States and the
Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea in Kuala Lumpur on key issues
related to implementation of the U.S.-D.P.R.K. Agreed Framework.
Achieved through close consultation with our friends and allies in the
Republic of Korea and Japan, the agreement keeps North Korea's dangerous
nuclear facilities frozen and confirms that the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization--KEDO--will select the reactor model and prime
contractor for the light-water reactor project. At the same time, KEDO
has confirmed that both the reactor model and prime contractor will be
South Korean.
In addressing these and other issues, today's understandings are an
important step on the road toward full implementation of the U.S.-
D.P.R.K. Agreed Framework, which provides the international community
with assurance against a North Korean nuclear threat and North Korea
with opportunity to rejoin the community of nations. We also continue to
believe that the resumption of North-South dialogue is essential not
only to the full implementation of the Agreed Framework, but also to the
continuing effort to build lasting prosperity and a stable peace on the
Korean Peninsula.
(###)
ARTICLE 4
Fact Sheet: Independent States and Dependencies
*Diplomatic relations with the United States
+Member of United Nations
Independent States(1)
STATE----------------------------------------------------------
Short-form name Long-form name Code 2 Capital
---------------------------------------------------------------
Afghanistan *+ Islamic State of Afghanistan AF Kabul
Albania *+ Republic of Albania AL Tirana
Algeria *+ Democratic and Popular
Republic of Algeria AG Algiers
Andorra *+ Principality of Andorra AN Andorra la
Vella
Angola * Republic of Angola AO Luanda
--
Antigua and Barbuda *+(no long-form name) AC Saint John's
Argentina *+ Argentine Republic AR Buenos Aires
Armenia *+ Republic of Armenia AM Yerevan
Australia *+ Commonwealth of Australia AS Canberra
Austria *+ Republic of Austria AU Vienna
--
Azerbaijan *+ Azerbaijani Republic AJ Baku
Bahamas, The *+ Commonwealth of The Bahamas BF Nassau
Bahrain *+ State of Bahrain BA Manama
Bangladesh *+ People's Republic of
Bangladesh BG Dhaka
Barbados *+ (no long-form name) BB Bridgetown
--
Belarus *+ Republic of Belarus BO Minsk
Belgium *+ Kingdom of Belgium BE Brussels
Belize *+ (no long-form name) BH Belmopan
Benin *+ Republic of Benin BN Porto-Novo
Bhutan + Kingdom of Bhutan BT Thimphu
--
Bolivia *+ Republic of Bolivia BL La Paz
(administrative)
Sucre
(legislative/judiciary)
Bosnia and Herzegovina *+
Republic of Bosnia and BK Sarajevo
Herzegovina
Botswana *+ Republic of Botswana BC Gaborone
Brazil *+ Federative Republic of Brazil BR Brasilia
Brunei *+ Negara Brunei Darussalam BX Bandar Seri
Begawan
--
Bulgaria *+ Republic of Bulgaria BU Sofia
Burkina *+ Burkina Faso UV Ouagadougou
Burma *+ Union of Burma BM Rangoon
Burundi *+ Republic of Burundi BY Bujumbura
Cambodia *+ Kingdom of Cambodia CB Phnom Penh
--
Cameroon *+ Republic of Cameroon CM Yaounde
Canada *+ (no long-form name) CA Ottawa
Cape Verde *+ Republic of Cape Verde CV Praia
Central African
Republic *+ Central African Republic CT Bangui
Chad *+ Republic of Chad CD N'Djamena
--
Chile *+ Republic of Chile CI Santiago
China *+(note 3) People's Republic of China CH Beijing
Colombia *+ Republic of Colombia CO Bogota
Comoros *+ Federal Islamic Republic
of the Comoros CN Moroni
Congo *+ Republic of the Congo CF Brazzaville
--
Costa Rica *+ Republic of Costa Rica CS San Jose
Cote d'Ivoire
(Ivory Coast) *+ Republic of Cote d'Ivoire IV Yamoussoukro
Croatia *+ Republic of Croatia HR Zagreb
Cuba + Republic of Cuba CU Havana
Cyprus *+ Republic of Cyprus CY Nicosia
Czech Republic *+ Czech Republic EZ Prague
Denmark *+ Kingdom of Denmark DA Copenhagen
Djibouti *+ Republic of Djibouti DJ Djibouti
Dominica *+ Commonwealth of Dominica DO Roseau
Dominican Republic *+
Dominican Republic DR Santo Domingo
--
Ecuador *+ Republic of Ecuador EC Quito
Egypt *+ Arab Republic of Egypt EG Cairo
El Salvador *+ Republic of El Salvador ES San Salvador
Equatorial Guinea *+
Republic of Equatorial Guinea EK Malabo
Eritrea *+ State of Eritrea ER Asmara
--
Estonia *+ Republic of Estonia EN Tallinn
Ethiopia *+ (no long-form name) ET Addis Ababa
Fiji *+ Republic of Fiji FJ Suva
Finland *+ Republic of Finland FI Helsinki
France *+ French Republic FR Paris
--
Gabon *+ Gabonese Republic GB Libreville
Gambia, The *+ Republic of The Gambia GA Banjul
Georgia *+ Republic of Georgia GG T'bilisi
Germany *+ Federal Republic of Germany GM Berlin
Ghana *+ Republic of Ghana GH Accra
--
Greece *+ Hellenic Republic GR Athens
Grenada *+ (no long-form name) GJ Saint George's
Guatemala *+ Republic of Guatemala GT Guatemala
Guinea *+ Republic of Guinea GV Conakry
Guinea-Bissau *+ Republic of Guinea-Bissau PU Bissau
--
Guyana *+ Co-operative Republic of
Guyana GY Georgetown
Haiti *+ Republic of Haiti HA Port-au-Prince
Holy See * Holy See VT Vatican City
Honduras *+ Republic of Honduras HO Tegucigalpa
Hungary *+ Republic of Hungary HU Budapest
--
Iceland *+ Republic of Iceland IC Reykjavik
India *+ Republic of India IN New Delhi
Indonesia *+ Republic of Indonesia ID Jakarta
Iran + Islamic Republic of Iran IR Tehran
Iraq + Republic of Iraq IZ Baghdad
--
Ireland *+ (no long-form name) EI Dublin
Israel *+ State of Israel IS (see note 4)
Italy *+ Italian Republic IT Rome
Jamaica *+ (no long-form name) JM Kingston
Japan *+ (no long-form name) JA Tokyo
--
Jordan *+ Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan JO Amman
Kazakhstan *+ Republic of Kazakhstan KZ Almaty
Kenya *+ Republic of Kenya KE Nairobi
Kiribati * Republic of Kiribati KR Tarawa
Korea, North + Democratic People's Republic
of Korea KN P'yongyang
--
Korea, South *+ Republic of Korea KS Seoul
Kuwait *+ State of Kuwait KU Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan *+ Kyrgyz Republic KG Bishkek
Laos *+ Lao People's Democratic
Republic LA Vientiane
Latvia *+ Republic of Latvia LG Riga
Lebanon *+ Republic of Lebanon LE Beirut
Lesotho *+ Kingdom of Lesotho LT Maseru
Liberia *+ Republic of Liberia LI Monrovia
Libya *+ Socialist People's Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya LY Tripoli
Liechtenstein *+ Principality of Liechtenstein LS Vaduz
--
Lithuania *+ Republic of Lithuania LH Vilnius
Luxembourg *+ Grand Duchy of Luxembourg LU Luxembourg
Macedonia, The Former Yugoslav Republic of+
The Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia MK Skopje
Madagascar *+ Republic of Madagascar MA Antananarivo
Malawi *+ Republic of Malawi MI Lilongwe
--
Malaysia *+ (no long-form name) MY Kuala Lumpur
Maldives *+ Republic of Maldives MV Male
Mali *+ Republic of Mali ML Bamako
Malta *+ (no long-form name) MT Valletta
Marshall Islands *+
Republic of the Marshall Islands RM Majuro
--
Mauritania *+ Islamic Republic of
Mauritania MR Nouakchott
Mauritius *+ Republic of Mauritius MP Port Louis
Mexico *+ United Mexican States MX Mexico
Micronesia, Federated States of *+
Federated States of Micronesia FM Palikir
Moldova *+ Republic of Moldova MD Chisinau
--
Monaco *+ Principality of Monaco MN Monaco
Mongolia *+ (no long-form name) MG Ulaanbaatar
Morocco *+ Kingdom of Morocco MO Rabat
Mozambique *+ Republic of Mozambique MZ Maputo
Namibia *+ Republic of Namibia WA Windhoek
--
Nauru * Republic of Nauru NR Yaren
District
(no capital
city)
Nepal *+ Kingdom of Nepal NP Kathmandu
Netherlands *+ Kingdom of the Netherlands NL Amsterdam
The Hague
(seat of gov't)
New Zealand *+ (no long-form name) NZ Wellington
Nicaragua *+ Republic of Nicaragua NU Managua
--
Niger *+ Republic of Niger NG Niamey
Nigeria *+ Federal Republic of Nigeria NI Abuja
Norway *+ Kingdom of Norway NO Oslo
Oman *+ Sultanate of Oman MU Muscat
Pakistan *+ Islamic Republic of Pakistan PK Islamabad
--
Palau *+ Republic of Palau PS Koror
Panama *+ Republic of Panama PM Panama
Papua New Guinea *+
Independent State of
Papua New Guinea PP Port Moresby
Paraguay *+ Republic of Paraguay PA Asuncion
Peru *+ Republic of Peru PE Lima
--
Philippines *+ Republic of the Philippines RP Manila
Poland *+ Republic of Poland PL Warsaw
Portugal *+ Portuguese Republic PO Lisbon
Qatar *+ State of Qatar QA Doha
Romania *+ (no long-form name) RO Bucharest
--
Russia *+ Russian Federation RS Moscow
Rwanda *+ Republic of Rwanda RW Kigali
Saint Kitts and Federation of Saint Kitts
Nevis *+ and Nevis SC Basseterre
Saint Lucia *+ (no long-form name) ST Castries
Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines *+ (no long-form name) VC Kingstown
San Marino *+ Republic of San Marino SM San Marino
Sao Tome and Democratic Republic of Sao TP Sao Tome
Principe *+ Tome and Principe
Saudi Arabia *+ Kingdom of Saudi Arabia SA Riyadh
Senegal *+ Republic of Senegal SG Dakar
Seychelles *+ Republic of Seychelles SE Victoria
--
Sierra Leone *+ Republic of Sierra Leone SL Freetown
Singapore *+ Republic of Singapore SN Singapore
Slovakia *+ Slovak Republic LO Bratislava
Slovenia *+ Republic of Slovenia SI Ljubljana
Solomon Islands *+(no long-form name) BP Honiara
--
Somalia *+ (no long-form name) SO Mogadishu
South Africa *+ Republic of South Africa SF Pretoria
(administrative)
Cape Town (legislative)
Bloemfontein (judiciary)
Spain *+ Kingdom of Spain SP Madrid
Sri Lanka *+ Democratic Socialist Republic
of Sri Lanka CE Colombo
Sudan *+ Republic of the Sudan SU Khartoum
--
Suriname *+ Republic of Suriname NS Paramaribo
Swaziland *+ Kingdom of Swaziland WZ Mbabane
(administrative)
Lobamba (legislative)
Sweden *+ Kingdom of Sweden SW Stockholm
Switzerland * Swiss Confederation SZ Bern
Syria *+ Syrian Arab Republic SY Damascus
--
Tajikistan *+ Republic of Tajikistan TI Dushanbe
Tanzania *+ United Republic of Tanzania TZ Dar es Salaam
Thailand *+ Kingdom of Thailand TH Bangkok
Togo *+ Republic of Togo TO Lome
Tonga * Kingdom of Tonga TN Nuku'alofa
--
Trinidad and Republic of Trinidad and TD Port-of-Spain
Tobago *+ Tobago
Tunisia *+ Republic of Tunisia TS Tunis
Turkey *+ Republic of Turkey TU Ankara
Turkmenistan *+ (no long-form name) TX Ashgabat
Tuvalu * (no long-form name) TV Funafuti
--
Uganda *+ Republic of Uganda UG Kampala
Ukraine *+ (no long-form name) UP Kiev
United Arab United Arab Emirates TC Abu Dhabi
Emirates *+
United Kingdom *+ United Kingdom of Great UK London
Britain and Northern Ireland
United States + United States of America US Washington,
DC
--
Uruguay *+ Oriental Republic of Uruguay UY Montevideo
Uzbekistan *+ Republic of Uzbekistan UZ Tashkent
Vanuatu *+ Republic of Vanuatu NH Port-Vila
Venezuela *+ Republic of Venezuela VE Caracas
Vietnam + Socialist Republic of Vietnam VM Hanoi
--
Western Samoa *+ Independent State of WS Apia
Western Samoa
Yemen *+ (note 5) Republic of Yemen YM Sanaa
Zaire *+ Republic of Zaire CG Kinshasa
Zambia *+ Republic of Zambia ZA Lusaka
Zimbabwe *+ Republic of Zimbabwe ZI Harare
-------------
OTHER----------------------------------------------------------
Short-form name Long-form name Code 2 Capital
---------------------------------------------------------------
Taiwan (note 6) (no long-form name) TW Taipei
NOTES------------------------------------------------------------
Note 1: In this listing, the term "independent state" refers to a
people politically organized into a sovereign state with a definite
territory recognized as independent by the US.
Note 2: Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 10-4 codes.
Note 3: With the establishment of diplomatic relations with China on
January 1, 1979, the US Government recognized the People's Republic of
China as the sole legal government of China and acknowledged the Chinese
position that there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China.
Note 4: In 1950 the Israel Parliament proclaimed Jerusalem as the
capital. The US, like most other countries that have Embassies in
Israel, maintains its Embassy in Tel Aviv.
Note 5: The US view is that the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia has dissolved and no successor state represents its
continuation. Serbia and Montenegro have asserted the formation of a
joint independent state, but this entity has not been formally
recognized as a state by the US.
Note 6: Claimed by both the Government of the People's Republic of
China and the authorities on Taiwan. Administered by the authorities of
Taiwan. (see note 3)
Dependencies and Areas of Special Sovereignty
Short-form name Geopolitical
Long-form name Sovereignty Code 1 Capital
01. American Samoa
Territory of American Samoa
United States AQ Pago Pago
02. Anguilla
(no long-form name)
United Kingdom AV The Valley
03. Antarctica
(no long-form name)
None 2 AY None
04. Aruba
(no long-form name)
Netherlands AA Oranjestad
05. Ashmore and Cartier Islands
Territory of Ashmore and Cartier Islands
Australia AT Admin. fr. Canberra
--
06. Baker Island
(no long-form name)
United States FQ Admin. fr. Wash. D.C.
07. Bermuda
(no long-form name)
United Kingdom BD Hamilton
08. Bouvet Island
(no long-form name)
Norway BV Admin. fr. Oslo
09. British Indian Ocean Territory3
British Indian Ocean Territory
United Kingdom IO None
10. Cayman Islands
(no long-form name)
United Kingdom CJ George Town
--
11. Christmas Island
Territory of Christmas Island
Australia KT The Settlement
(Flying Fish Cove)
12. Clipperton Island
(no long-form name)
France IP Admin. fr. Fr.
Polynesia
13. Cocos (Keeling) Island
Territory of Cocos Islands (Keeling)
Australia CK West Island
14. Cook Islands
(no long-form name)
New Zealand CW Avarua
15. Coral Sea Islands
Coral Sea Islands Territory
Australia CR Admin. fr. Canberra
--
16. Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas)
Colony of the Falkland Islands
United Kingdom4 FK Stanley
17. Faroe Islands
(no long-form name)
Denmark FO Torshavn
18. French Guiana
Department of Guiana
France FG Cayenne
19. French Polynesia
Territory of French Polynesia
France FP Papeete
20. French Southern and Antarctic Lands5
Territory of the French Southern and Antarctic Lands
France FS Admin. fr. Paris
--
21. Gibraltar
(no long-form name)
United Kingdom GI Gibraltar
22. Greenland
(no long-form name)
Denmark GL Nuuk (Godthab)
23. Guadeloupe 6
Department of Guadeloupe
France GP Basse-Terre
24. Guam
Territory of Guam
United States GQ Agana
25. Guernsey
Bailiwick of Guernsey
British Crown GK Saint Peter Port
Dep.
--
26. Heard Island and McDonald Islands
Territory of Heard Island and McDonald Islands
Australia HM Admin. fr. Canberra
27. Hong Kong
(no long-form name)
United Kingdom7 HK Victoria
28. Howland Island
(no long-form name)
United States HQ Admin. fr. Wash. D.C.
29. Jan Mayen
(no long-form name)
Norway JN Admin. fr. Oslo 8
30. Jarvis Island
(no long-form name)
United States DQ Admin. fr. Wash. D.C.
--
31. Jersey
Bailiwick of Jersey
British Crown JE Saint Helier
Dep.
32. Johnston Atoll
(no long-form name)
United States JQ Admin. fr. Wash. D.C.
33. Kingman Reef
(no long-form name)
United States KQ Admin. fr. Wash. D.C.
34. Macau
(no long-form name)
Portugal 9 MC Macau
35. Man, Isle of
(no long-form name)
British Crown IM Douglas
Dep.
--
36. Martinique
Department of Martinique
France MB Fort-de-France
37. Mayotte
Territorial Collectivity of Mayotte
France MF Mamoutzou
38. Midway Islands
(no long-form name)
United States MQ Admin. fr. Wash. D.C.
39. Montserrat
(no long-form name)
United Kingdom MH Plymouth
40. Navassa Island
(no long-form name)
United States BQ Admin. fr. Wash. D.C.
--
41. Netherlands Antilles 10
(no long-form name)
Netherlands NT Willemstad
42. New Caledonia
Territory of New Caledonia and Dependencies
France NC Noumea
43. Niue
(no long-form name)
New Zealand NE Alofi
44. Norfolk Island
Territory of Norfolk Island
Australia NF Kingston
45. Northern Mariana Islands
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
United States CQ Saipan
46. Palmyra Atoll
(no long-form name)
United States LQ Admin. fr. Wash. D.C.
47. Paracel Islands
(no long-form name)
undetermined 11 PF None
48. Pitcairn Islands
Pitcairn, Henderson, Ducie, and Oeno Islands
United Kingdom PC Adamstown
49. Puerto Rico
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
United States RQ San Juan
50. Reunion 12
Department of Reunion
France RE Saint-Denis
--
51. Saint Helena 13
(no long-form name)
United Kingdom SH Jamestown
52. Saint Pierre and Miquelon
Territorial Collectivity of Saint Pierre and Miquelon
France SB Saint-Pierre
53. South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands
South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands
United Kingdom4 SX None
54. Spratly Islands
(no long-form name)
undetermined14 PG None
55. Svalbard
(no long-form name)
Norway SV Longyearbyen
--
56. Tokelau
(no long-form name)
New Zealand TL None
57. Turks and Caicos Islands
(no long-form name)
United Kingdom TK Grand Turk
58. Virgin Islands
Virgin Islands of the United States
United States VQ Charlotte Amalie
59. Virgin Islands, British
(no long-form name)
United Kingdom VI Road Town
60. Wake Island
(no long-form name)
United States WQ Admin. fr. Wash. D.C.
--
61. Wallis and Futuna
Territory of the Wallis and Futuna Islands
France WF Mata'utu
62. Western Sahara
(no long-form name)
undetermined WI None
NOTES:-------------
Note 1: Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 10-4 codes.
Note 2: Antarctica consists of the territory south of 60 degrees south
latitude. This area includes claims by Argentina, Australia, Chile,
France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom, the legal status of
which remains in suspense under the terms of the Antarctic Treaty of
1959. The United States recognizes no claims to Antarctica.
Note 3: Chagos Archipelago (including Diego Garcia).
Note 4: Also claimed by Argentina.
Note 5: "French Southern and Antarctic Lands" includes le Amsterdam, le
Saint-Paul, les Crozet, and les Kerguelen in the southern Indian Ocean,
along with the French-claimed sector of Antarctica, "Terre Adelie." The
United States does not recognize the French claim to "Terre Adelie" (See
note 2).
Note 6: The Department of Guadeloupe includes the nearby islands of
Marie-Galante and la Desirade and les des Saintes, as well as Saint
Barthelemy and the northern three-fifths of Saint Martin (the rest of
which belongs to Netherlands Antilles).
Note 7: Under a Sino-British declaration of September 1984, Hong Kong
will revert to China on July 1, 1997, the expiration of the UK's 99-year
lease on the New Territories.
Note 8: Administered from Oslo, Norway, through a governor resident in
Longyearbyen, Svalbard.
Note 9: Under a Sino-Portuguese declaration of April 1987, Macau will
revert to China on December 20, 1999.
Note 10: Netherlands Antilles comprises two groupings of islands:
Curacao and Bonaire are located off the coast of Venezuela; Saba, Sint
Eustatius, and Sint Maarten (the Dutch two-fifths of the island of Saint
Martin) lie 800 km to the north.
Note 11: South China Sea islands occupied by China but claimed by
Vietnam.
Note 12: Bassas da India (BS), Europa Island (EU), Glorioso Islands
(GO), Juan de Nova Island (JU), and Tromelin Island (TE) are controlled
by France and are administered from Reunion. (These islands are claimed
by Madagascar; Tromelin Island is also claimed by Mauritius and
Seychelles).
Note 13: The territory of Saint Helena includes the Island group of
Tristan da Cunha; Saint Helena also administers Ascension Island.
Note 14: South China Sea islands claimed in entirety by China and
Vietnam and in part by the Philippines and Malaysia; each of these
states occupies some part of the islands.
[BOX]
The Independent States in the World list and the Dependencies and Areas
of Special Sovereignty list are available on the Department of State
Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) on the Internet and are accessible in
the following ways:
1. GOPHER: dosfan.lib.uic.edu
2. UNIVERSAL RESOURCE LOCATOR (URL): gopher://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/
3. WORLD WIDE WEB (WWW): http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/dosfan.html
Please select the menu item "General Foreign Policy" under which you
will find entries for "Independent States in the World" and
"Dependencies and Areas of Special Sovereignty."
The lists also are accessible through the Department of State, Bureau of
Public Affairs' Fax-on-Demand system. For access information call (202)
736-7720.
(###)
[END OF DISPATCH VOL. 6, NO. 25]
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