US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 23, JUNE 5, 1995
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1. Charting a Transatlantic Agenda for the 21st Century -- Secretary
Christopher
2. Reinforcing NATO's Strength in the West and Deepening Coopeeration
With the East--Secretary Christopher
3. UN-NATO Launch Airstrikes Against Bosnian Serbs -- President Clinton
4. Russia Crosses the Threshold into Active Engagement With NATO --
Secretary Christopher
5. Broadening and Deepening the Partnership for Peace -- Secretary
Christopher
6. Contact Group Ministers Urge Strengthening of UNPROFOR -- Secretary
Christopher, Contact Group Statement
7. Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council: Final Communique
8. NAC Ministerial Statement on the Situation in Former Yugoslavia
9. Reaffirming Close Relations Between the U.S. and Portugal --
Secretary Christopher
10.Fact Sheets--
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATO Partnership for Peace
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
NATO Information Sources
ARTICLE 1:
Charting a Transatlantic Agenda for the 21st Century
Secretary Christopher
Address at Casa de America, Madrid, Spain, June 2, 1995
Thank you, Director Remiro, for that kind introduction. Since its
founding several years ago, CERI has already established itself as a
leader in foreign policy research. I also want to thank Ambassador
Garrigues and the Casa de America for co-hosting this event. I feel at
home here--not only because of the name and purpose of this respected
institution, but because the Ambassador served as Spain's Consul General
in my home city of Los Angeles.
There is no more appropriate place to discuss the transatlantic
partnership than Spain--a true Atlantic nation. As a member of both NATO
and the European Union, you have placed your future in the vibrant
mainstream of Europe and the transatlantic community of democracies. The
spirit of renewal so evident here in Madrid is a tribute to King Juan
Carlos, to Spain's democratic leadership, and to the determination of
the Spanish people.
For half a century, the transatlantic partnership between the United
States and Europe has been the leading force for peace and prosperity,
not only in our countries, but around the globe. Together, the Old World
and the New World have created a better world.
Together we helped transform former adversaries into allies and
dictatorships into democracies. We built the institutions that ensured
our security and economic strength--most important, NATO and the EU. We
created the great institutions of global cooperation--the UN, the IMF
and the World Bank, the OECD, the GATT, and now the WTO. By standing
steadfast through the Cold War, we have brought a democratic, undivided
Europe within reach
.
These are truly epic achievements. But at the threshold of the new
century, there is another new world to shape--with challenges no less
critical than those faced by our counterparts half a century ago.
Terrorism, international crime, aggressive nationalism, and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction threaten our security.
Global problems like environmental degradation, unsustainable population
growth, and mass movements of refugees undermine emerging democracies
and the prosperity of all nations. The new global economy offers great
prospects for growth but also brings wrenching dislocation as our
industries and workers seek to adapt
.
Although the world remains a dangerous place, our opportunities are
enormous. Open societies and open markets are on the march. We have the
opportunity to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons, enhance our
prosperity, and, for the first time in history, build an integrated,
undivided, peaceful Europe.
Nevertheless, there are those who question whether Europe and the United
States have the will to maintain our partnership to meet these new
dangers and seize these opportunities. In the absence of a single
unifying threat, and at a time of understandable focus on domestic
concerns, some argue that the ties that bind us are fraying and that
America and Europe will inevitably drift apart.
I reject that view. From World War II to our strong support for German
unification, the United States and Europe have shared a common destiny.
But we must not take this relationship for granted. It cannot be
sustained by nostalgia. Every generation must renew the partnership by
adapting it to meet the challenges of its time. It is our responsibility
to build the partnership that will ensure that, by working together, our
next 50 years will be as great as the last. To achieve this goal, we
must widen our horizons and lift our aspirations.
I believe this goal is shared on both sides of the Atlantic. In recent
months, a number of European leaders have set forth their ideas on this
very theme. President Clinton and Prime Minister Major discussed this
issue when they met earlier this spring.
I have come to Madrid, on behalf of the President, to say that the
United States welcomes this transatlantic dialogue. It is timely. It is
constructive. And it should be intensified--to reaffirm our common
purpose, to advance a common vision, and to forge a common transatlantic
agenda for the 21st century. Today I want to suggest goals for our
common agenda and how we might strengthen our ability to achieve them
together.
A Comprehensive Strategy for European Security
In this year in which we commemorate the 50th anniversary of V-E Day, we
cannot forget that security comes first. It is the bedrock of our
partnership and the guarantor of our freedom. That is why President
Clinton is pursuing a comprehensive strategy for European security based
on America's continuing commitment to remain engaged on the continent.
That strategy has five key elements: adapting and enlarging NATO;
strengthening the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe;
supporting Europe's integration and EU enlargement; enhancing a European
security and defense identity complementary to NATO; and engaging Russia
in Europe's security structures.
NATO remains the central security pillar for Europe and the core
institution for linking the security of North America to Europe. In the
last five years, NATO has undertaken sweeping changes to match the sweep
of Europe's transformation.
I have just come from the NATO ministerial meeting in the Netherlands,
where we took important steps to advance these goals. Russia's decision
at that meeting to cross the threshold into active engagement with NATO
puts into place an important element of our comprehensive strategy. We
also reviewed the great progress made in just a year-and-a-half by the
Partnership for Peace--NATO's mechanism to deepen cooperation with
Europe's new democracies. And we reaffirmed that the alliance remains on
a steady course toward enlargement.
These efforts are strengthening the security pillar of the transatlantic
relationship to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War world. But for
our partnership to thrive, it must be comprehensive. That means taking
specific steps in the economic and political arenas that will complement
and reinforce our security relationship.
The Economic Dimension
Deepening our economic relationship is central to this agenda; it
undergirds not only our prosperity, but also our security. Although our
ties have expanded with the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America, it is
important to recall that the United States and Europe enjoy the largest
combined external trade and investment relationship in the world today.
American exports to EU countries and European investment in the United
States support over 7 million American workers. All told, Europe
accounts for almost half the foreign revenues of American firms. Our
investment in Europe alone roughly equals that in the rest of the world
put together. And since the Berlin Wall fell, the United States has
become the top foreign investor in Central and Eastern Europe.
Together, the United States and Europe have led the world toward open
markets and greater prosperity. Our cooperation made possible every
global trade agreement from the Kennedy Round to the Uruguay Round.
Through the G-7, we work to stimulate global growth. And at the OECD, we
are developing strategies to overcome structural unemployment and adapt
to demographic change.
A hallmark of the Clinton presidency is its focus on global economic
growth and expanding trade. Indeed, President Clinton is advancing the
most ambitious international economic agenda of any American President
in half a century.
In addition to implementing the North American Free Trade Agreement, his
efforts include leading the way to the Miami agreement to complete
negotiations on a free trade area in the Americas by the year 2005. He
also helped forge APEC's decision to achieve free and open trade and
investment in the Asia-Pacific region by 2020. None of these efforts
will raise barriers to nonparticipants or exclude any economic sector.
And they will meet the requirements of the new World Trade Organization.
Our vision for the economic relationship between Europe and the United
States must be no less ambitious. The long-term objective is the
integration of the economies of North America and Europe, consistent
with the principles of the WTO.
We should undertake a transatlantic economic initiative to multiply
trade and investment and create new, high-paying jobs on both sides of
the Atlantic. It will make us an even more powerful engine of the global
economy. It will align our efforts to promote transatlantic integration
with the forces of integration around the world. And it will, like our
other efforts, reinforce the open global trading system to the benefit
of all nations.
Thoughtful observers from Europe, Canada, and the United States have
proposed that we seek a Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement. EU
Commissioner Leon Brittan has launched a study of this proposal, and we,
too, intend to give it the serious study it deserves, with its
considerable potential to form an element of our overall strategy. There
are, of course, important issues that need to be addressed. For example,
any free trade agreement must advance our overriding objective of global
trade liberalization, be consistent with an effective WTO, and not
disadvantage less-developed countries.
Even as we undertake these studies, there are concrete measures that we
can take in the near term to eliminate trade barriers progressively and
deepen our integration, building on the momentum we achieved in the
Uruguay Round.
First, we can create a comprehensive investment regime. The vast region
from Honolulu to Helsinki is essentially a common investment area
without common ground rules. We should promptly negotiate a Multilateral
Agreement on Investment as agreed by OECD ministers last month.
Second, the United States and the EU need to develop more flexible rules
to widen market access and spur innovation in information technology
fields. At stake is open competition in one of the most dynamic sectors
of the global economy.
Third, the United States and the EU should work to eliminate barriers to
trade that result from differences in product standards and testing
systems--and do so without compromising health or safety. Incompatible
standards inhibit billions of dollars in new trade.
Fourth, we should open our skies. The aviation agreements we will soon
complete with nine European countries will make transatlantic travel
easier and cheaper and will spur trade and investment.
The United States and the EU should also work together to complete the
unfinished business of the Uruguay Round. We must move forward to reach
agreements to liberalize financial services within the next month--and
telecommunications within the next year. And we must work to overcome
our differences in key sectors such as audiovisual products and
services.
Trade means competition--and vigorous competition is healthy for our
relationship and for our economies as well. But that competition must be
fair. American businesses operate under the appropriate constraints of
legislation barring bribery of foreign officials. Our nations made a
commitment to address this problem multilaterally through the OECD last
year. We must make progress now.
The private sector is the driving force in our economic relationship,
and its leaders should have a larger voice in shaping our agenda. The
Pacific Business Forum has helped propel the APEC process; the
Transatlantic Business Dialogue launched by Commerce Secretary Ron Brown
and Commissioners Bangemann and Brittan can do the same for
transatlantic economic integration. I know that this is a special
interest of Foreign Minister Solana, with whom I discussed this issue
last night.
Global Political Cooperation
The United States and Europe are partners not only for prosperity, but
in promoting stability, human dignity, and opportunity around the world.
We share common interests and a common responsibility to lead. The
political dimension of our proposed agenda will allow us to shape a
world more conducive to our interests and consistent with our ideals.
First, we must intensify our efforts to halt the spread of weapons of
mass destruction and their delivery systems. The indefinite extension of
the Non-Proliferation Treaty last month would not have happened without
the leadership of the United States and our European partners. The same
leadership will be needed to achieve a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and
a global ban on the production of fissile materials; to bring the
Chemical Weapons Convention into force; and to strengthen the Biological
Weapons Convention. We must also bolster our common support for
dismantling nuclear weapons and safeguarding nuclear materials in the
former Soviet states.
Second, we must strengthen our cooperation against international crime,
terrorism, and narcotics trafficking. The United States and Europe have
collaborated to combat money laundering through the Financial Action
Task Force. Regular meetings of top American and European anti-narcotics
officials could strengthen our arsenal in the fight against drugs. Those
who traffic in weapons, narcotics, and human lives recognize no national
borders. We must make sure they have nowhere to hide.
Third, we must coordinate our humanitarian and development assistance
more effectively. Ninety percent of all global humanitarian assistance
is provided by the United States, the European Commission, and the
member states of the EU. We need to build on our successful joint
experience, providing food relief to the Caucasus and technical
assistance to Central Europe to develop a common strategy and to
coordinate priorities, especially at a time when we all face financial
constraints. More generally, we need to broaden our cooperation to
address a range of emerging global problems. Our joint efforts in Cairo
made the International Conference on Population and Development a
success. And our annual high-level environmental dialogue has helped
pave the way for multilateral initiatives like the Berlin Climate
Conference and major agreements such as the Montreal Protocol. The joint
program for cooperation between the United States and Japan--"the Common
Agenda" embracing issues ranging from population to health, the
environment, science and technology--provides a model of the concrete
and high-impact opportunities for collaboration. I hope we can forge a
comparable common agenda in the transatlantic area. Human rights, too,
is an area where, working together, we can enhance our impact. We can
maximize our effectiveness by cooperating closely.
Fourth, we must bolster our cooperation in regions where the United
States and Europe share common interests and historic ties--for example,
the Middle East. With EU support, the 1991 Madrid Conference launched
the most promising opportunity for Arab-Israeli peace in two
generations. Now is the time to make that promise real by more
effectively coordinating our economic assistance and working together to
bring into being the Middle East Development Bank proposed by Egypt,
Jordan, Israel, and the PLO. And at the Amman summit this October,
together we can build on the start we made in Casablanca last year to
generate the private investment that is so essential to lasting peace
and prosperity in the region.
We should also expand our cooperation in the Mediterranean, an area of
vital interest to the EU and the United States. Spain has played a key
role in advancing the EU's initiative on this important region, and we
look forward to cooperating with you as the Barcelona Conference
approaches. We can also explore new ways to work together to sustain
democracy in the Americas, an area where Spain is an especially valuable
partner.
Cooperation in Europe
Of course, nowhere is our regional cooperation more important than
meeting the new challenges and opportunities facing Europe itself. We in
the United States know too well that our security is at risk when
Europe's is imperiled. And we have a common interest in assuring that
the historic transformations now underway in Central Europe and the
former Soviet Union are consolidated--and that these countries become
integrated into our transatlantic community.
We have worked closely together to coordinate our assistance through the
G-24, the World Bank, and the IMF. Our financial and technical
assistance is helping countries like Russia, Ukraine, and Poland to free
prices, privatize industry, and ease the pain of dislocation. Our
economic assistance efforts are complemented by our support for durable
democratic institutions throughout Central and Eastern Europe and the
New Independent States. Together, the European Union and the United
States are a vital force for stability in the region.
We are also advancing European integration by extending our economic and
security relations to the east. Our steady program for enlarging NATO is
reinforced by the steps being taken by the EU. The prospects for
stability in Europe's new democracies are unmistakably linked to their
potential for prosperity--and to our willingness to open our markets to
their goods.
The EU does more than open its markets to the new economies of the
region, however. It provides incentive and shelter for the development
of civil societies that are the surest guarantee for stability and
security. And it encourages the resolution of ancient enmities, today in
Central Europe as after World War II between France and Germany.
As we look to the future, the United States and the EU should work
together to develop new areas for common action aimed at assisting the
new democracies of Central Europe. For example:
-- We could help these states to cope better with the scourge of
organized crime through efforts such as the International Law
Enforcement Academy in Budapest;
-- We could promote the development of citizens groups and NGOs that can
help build democratic societies from the ground up; and
-- We could refocus our technical assistance to ensure that the basic
structures of a modern market economy are fully in place as the Central
European countries make the transition from aid to trade.
The United States and the EU also have a special interest in supporting
a democratic Turkey, integrated into the transatlantic community. Turkey
is at the strategic crossroads of the Balkans, the Middle East, and the
former Soviet states. We hope that the European Parliament will ratify
the critically important customs union agreement between the EU and
Turkey. At the same time, we strongly encourage Turkey to move ahead
with democratic reform and strengthen the protection of human rights. We
are also redoubling our efforts to achieve a political settlement--long
overdue--in Cyprus prior to the start of EU accession talks.
The terrible conflict in Bosnia remains the single-greatest threat to
our vision of an integrated Europe at peace. The United States and
Europe are working together, although it is clear to all that we have
not achieved the results we seek. We have sought to contain the
conflict, to alleviate suffering, and find a lasting peaceful settlement
to the war. On behalf of the American people, I want to thank our
European allies, Spain among them, who have put their troops and
personnel in harm's way to help the people of the former Yugoslavia and
to uphold the principles of the international community. We believe that
a strengthened UNPROFOR is the best insurance against an even worse
humanitarian disaster that would follow its withdrawal. That is why this
week, the Contact Group and others have undertaken efforts to reinforce
UNPROFOR's ability to carry out its mission safely and effectively. The
United States will continue to coordinate closely, through NATO, the
United Nations, and the Contact Group.
One of the few bright spots in the midst of the Bosnian tragedy has been
the agreement of the Muslim and Croat communities to end their conflict
and establish a bicommunal federation. The United States and the EU have
joined forces to help support this enterprise through the Friends of the
Federation--helping to keep alive hopes for preserving a multi-ethnic
society in Bosnia. This is a model for the joint initiatives that we
should develop for the future.
The Way Ahead
To achieve the ambitious agenda I have set forth today, we must enhance
our ability to work together more effectively. This will require
commitment on three fronts.
First, the United States and Europe must remain engaged in the world, on
our own and as partners. Our nations have the unique capacity to provide
global leadership. We must resist the siren songs heard in so many
capitals of isolation and withdrawal.
Second, the United States looks to Europe to be a strong partner for the
United States and a capable actor on the world stage. Of course, the
choice of mechanisms is for EU members themselves to decide. But the
United States has a clear interest in Europe's continued integration and
its enhanced ability in foreign and security policy. And the EU should
move ahead with its historic process of enlargement.
Forty years ago today, six European foreign ministers gathered in a
monastery in Messina to launch a process that ultimately led to the
Treaty of Rome and the establishment of the European Communities.
Tomorrow, history will be made in Messina once again, as the EU under
Spanish Chairmanship meets to plan the ambitious Intergovernmental
Conference. The objective, as President Truman's Under Secretary of
State Robert Lovett said in 1948, "should continue to be the
progressively closer integration, both economic and political, of
presently free Europe, and eventually of as much of Europe as becomes
free."
Finally, we must strengthen the mechanisms of our cooperation. We must
take advantage of immediate opportunities, such as the upcoming summit
between President Clinton and Presidents Chirac and Santer, to define
common goals and to advance them more systematically. In the next six
months, the United States looks forward to working closely with the
Spanish presidency of the European Union to develop more fully our
common agenda. By the end of the year, we should have developed a broad-
ranging transatlantic agenda for the new century--an agenda for common
economic and political action to expand democracy, prosperity, and
stability. Between now and the end of the year, we are prepared to
engage seriously with representatives of the EU to forge this agenda.
Closer government ties are essential, but in a time of generational
change on both sides of the Atlantic, we need to deepen our interaction
at every level. We should call on business leaders to tell us what must
be done to tear down barriers to trade and investment in Central and
Eastern Europe and between North America and Western Europe. We should
encourage our elected representatives to intensify their contacts, from
parliamentary exchanges to sister cities. We should broaden the academic
and cultural exchanges to enrich our deepest ties of all--those between
our people.
We must act now, for as President Kennedy told a European audience in
1963, "time and the world do not stand still. Change is the law of life.
And those who look only to the past are certain to miss the future." I
know that the partnership that brought us to this hopeful point in
history will continue to shape the future as boldly as it shaped the
past.
Thank you very much. (###)
ARTICLE 2:
Reinforcing NATO's Strength in the West and Deepening Cooperation With
the East
Secretary Christopher
Opening statement at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting,
Noordwijk, The Netherlands, May 30, 1995
Mr. Secretary General, distinguished colleagues and friends: I am
honored to join you once again as President d'Honneur of the North
Atlantic Council. I would like to welcome those ministers who have
joined us since our last meeting in December. On behalf of all the
members of the council, let me extend to you the assurance of the close
cooperation that is the strength of this alliance.
Fifty years since the end of World War II, our ministerial meeting marks
an important occasion for reflection. We have begun to put in place a
comprehensive security architecture that will advance peace and
stability across Europe.
NATO remains the central security pillar of Europe and the core
institution for linking the security of North America to Europe. In the
last five years, NATO has undertaken sweeping changes to match the sweep
of Europe's transformation.
While maintaining NATO's core defensive role, we are adapting its
military forces to address the new demands of crisis management and
peacekeeping. We are supporting a capable European defense identity and
a broader role for the Western European Union. We are building enduring
ties between NATO and the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe.
And tomorrow, the alliance will take an important step to develop its
dialogue with Russia.
Three weeks ago in Moscow, Russia agreed to proceed with its
participation in the Partnership for Peace and to move ahead with a
broader dialogue with NATO. We welcome that development. Russia's
decision to deepen its cooperation with Europe and North America
enhances our ability to achieve our common goal of a truly integrated
Europe.
Under the Partnership for Peace, Russia and the allies will conduct
military exchanges, hold joint military exercises, and train together
for peacekeeping. Beyond the Partnership, we will pursue an extensive
dialogue on vital security issues, including non-proliferation and
nuclear security. At tomorrow's 16-plus-1 meeting with Russia's Foreign
Minister Kozyrev, and in the months ahead, we will launch this dialogue
to define the framework for an expanded relationship with Russia.
The NATO-Russia relationship we are pursuing complements the other
elements of our strategy: strengthening the Partnership for Peace,
further strengthening the OSCE, and maintaining steady progress toward
enlargement of both NATO and the European Union.
The Partnership for Peace gives form and substance to the new
cooperative relationship between the alliance and its former
adversaries. The Partnership has made impressive progress since last
December. In my intervention today, I will put forward several proposals
to strengthen the Partnership for the future.
Since its creation, NATO has always been open to adding new members. The
process of enlargement is moving forward along the same steady,
transparent course the allies set last year. We have begun to examine
how enlargement will occur and its implications for European security.
We will present our conclusions to interested partners this fall.
Each of these steps is an essential part of our effort to build a
comprehensive security architecture for Europe. As we continue to adapt
NATO, we must also continue our support for other institutions of
security and economic cooperation. European integration, bolstered by
the European Union, is helping to extend prosperity to all of Europe.
And the strengthened Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
can and should play a central role in conflict prevention and crisis
management.
This comprehensive strategy for European security will strengthen our
ability in the future to prevent the kind of conflicts we are witnessing
in the former Yugoslavia. Later today, we will have an opportunity to
discuss in detail recent events in Bosnia. We look forward to discussing
with all our NATO allies, including many valued troop contributors, the
very important understandings we reached last night in the Contact
Group. These include our conviction that UNPROFOR should remain in
Bosnia, with the means to ensure it can carry out its mission safely and
effectively. We also emphasized the need to sustain our vigorous
diplomatic efforts. In the meantime, we unanimously agreed that the
Bosnian Serbs must end their violations of UN resolutions and release
all detained UN personnel immediately.
Our entire agenda today reminds us of the great importance of European
integration--a process that has been fundamentally linked to the broader
transatlantic relationship since the Marshall Plan years. Over the last
several months, several of my colleagues in this room have made
important contributions to our dialogue on reinforcing the bonds between
Europe and the United States. I intend to address this timely set of
issues later this week in Madrid. I will emphasize America's willingness
to bolster the transatlantic relationship by taking additional steps to
strengthen our political consultations and economic ties.
I will also reaffirm the unshakable commitment of the United States to
remain engaged in Europe--through this alliance and through our
involvement in the other great institutions of security and economic
cooperation. President Clinton is determined that America will continue
to stand by its commitments to its European allies and to its friends
around the world.
Thank you.
Intervention at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting,
Noordwijk, The Netherlands, May 30, 1995
Mr. Secretary General, distinguished colleagues: Eighteen months ago in
Brussels, I said this alliance had to make a historic choice: whether to
embrace innovation or risk irrelevance. The choice that we made weeks
later at the January 1994 Brussels Summit was clear, and today, so is
the record.
At that summit, the alliance took a series of momentous decisions,
building on the landmark London Summit of 1990. As 16 allies, united by
common values and purpose, we reinforced NATO's strength in the West and
extended a hand of cooperation to the East.
Today, we continue our historic enterprise. We also broaden our
endeavor, as Russia becomes a full participant in the Partnership for
Peace, and we inaugurate a new NATO-Russia dialogue.
Earlier this morning, I outlined my views on the key areas of action for
this North Atlantic Council ministerial.
First, we will review the progress of the Partnership for Peace and
prepare a plan of action for the future.
Second, we should reaffirm our agreed timetable for completing our study
on enlargement and for presenting its results to partners. Our goal
should be to complete the presentations in time to permit thorough
analysis of the results before our next ministerial in December.
Third, we will launch tomorrow the beginning of a new era in NATO-Russia
relations--a critical component of Europe's evolving security
architecture.
Let me begin by reviewing the progress of the Partnership for Peace. Two
years ago, the Partnership was a vision--in part, the vision of my late
colleague, Les Aspin. Today, it is action. It is British soldiers
exercising on Polish soil. It is Czechs and Belgians working side-by-
side in Partnership offices. This summer it will be soldiers from the
Baltics in the bayous of Louisiana. With 26 members, the Partnership for
Peace has become a vibrant and integral part of Europe's security
structure.
At our last meeting in December, we called for establishment of a
defense planning and review process by early 1995. We have met that
goal; indeed, 14 partners are already participating. This process will
promote greater openness in defense planning and budgeting among our
nations. It will improve the ability of partners to work with allies in
future joint missions. Moreover, it will provide aspiring NATO members
with valuable experience in allied practices and procedures.
The alliance also agreed in December on a substantial exercise program
that will build toward more complex and varied training scenarios. Here,
too, we have made impressive progress. The rigorous agenda for 1995
includes 11 joint exercises and more than 100 other activities. Partners
are working with NATO on many aspects of peacekeeping and humanitarian
operations, from delivery of assistance by air to search-and-rescue at
sea. The United States will be hosting a major exercise at Fort Polk,
Louisiana, this August, that will include a significant number of allies
and partners. And even as we meet, American soldiers are in Ukraine,
training with Ukrainian forces in the spirit of the Partnership. We
believe there are a number of promising areas in which we could
intensify the political and military relationship between NATO and its
partners.
First, agreement on a set of principles for civilian and democratic
control of the military could help guide our partners in their national
reform efforts.
Second, a joint defense planning and review process committee could help
us explore the possibility of expanding the Partnership's focus to
include all armed forces of the partners, not just those dedicated to
peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks. The committee could also recommend
measures for adapting partners' military doctrine and forces to NATO's.
Third, we can find ways to enable partners to play a more active,
substantive role in the planning of partnership activities and
exercises.
Fourth, we can engage partners more routinely in the substantive
activities of the NAC and NATO senior committees.
Finally, the resources that NATO dedicates to the Partnership could be
increased significantly.
In order to maintain the Partnership's momentum, NATO must provide
sufficient resources. NATO has taken the important first step of
adopting a comprehensive funding policy for this purpose. We need to do
more.
We expect each partner to undertake the long- and short-term planning
necessary to ensure its own participation in Partnership activities.
Several partners have already included the Partnership for Peace in
their national budgets and made other adjustments reflecting their firm
commitment to the partnership and to relations with NATO. Others should
follow.
Even though partners must bear the responsibility for their
participation in the Partnership, we must recognize that some will need
assistance getting started. If we want the Partnership to succeed--a
goal that serves all our interests--each NATO member must be willing to
do its part to help.
This fiscal year, the United States is providing $30 million in
bilateral assistance directly related to the Partnership. As President
Clinton pledged in Warsaw last July, his budget request for fiscal year
1996 designates $100 million to help our new partners work with us to
advance the partnership's goals.
The Partnership for Peace is firmly established as a central feature of
Europe's new security architecture. In less than two years, the
Partnership is achieving its broad purposes. It is providing its members
a permanent association with NATO, a vital link to virtually all that
NATO is and does. And for those partners that aspire to join the
alliance, it is helping to develop the common standards and practices
that will enable a smooth transition to becoming an effective ally.
In January 1994, at President Clinton's initiative, the alliance
launched a historic process that will lead to admission of new members
from the democracies to the east. That process is now moving forward
according to schedule. NATO's study on how enlargement will occur is
making good progress and should be completed this summer. This will
allow us to complete presentations on the study in Brussels and partner
capitals in time to thoroughly assess the way forward at our December
meeting.
NATO enlargement remains an essential part of our strategy to build a
more integrated Europe of democracies at peace. It is essential that our
efforts to integrate these states remain open and inclusive. Each
prospective member should be considered individually, on a case-by-case
basis. Above all, we must not let one set of arbitrary lines across
Europe be replaced with another.
Clearly, it is in the interest of every NATO ally and partner that
Russia participate constructively in building a more secure and
integrated Europe. We welcome Russia's decision to proceed with its
participation in the Partnership for Peace and to move ahead to fashion
a broader relationship with the alliance.
An enhanced NATO-Russia relationship is the next important element of
our overall strategy for European security. This relationship can
reinforce European security and contribute to NATO's fundamental goals.
The first component of this relationship will be the Partnership for
Peace. As it does with our other partners, the Partnership for Peace
will help build our cooperation with the Russian military. Russia's
Individual Partnership Program envisions continued exchanges in both
directions. Russian and allied troops will participate in multinational
exercises and train together for real-world peacekeeping operations.
Outside the Partnership, we will hold political consultations with
Russia on a number of critical security issues where Russia has special
interests or capabilities. These include nuclear non-proliferation,
implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention, building confidence in the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, as well as nuclear safety and
the prevention of nuclear smuggling.
We should be prepared to go beyond these initial elements and develop
the NATO-Russia relationship further. To this end, we welcome tomorrow's
16-plus-1 meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev. We urge an
immediate start to the dialogue on the direction our relationship should
take. I hope we can define a framework of goals and objectives for an
expanded relationship by the time of our next ministerial meeting in
Brussels. This process should proceed in rough parallel with NATO's
enlargement. As Russia progresses with democratic reform and
demonstrates respect for international norms, we can deepen this
relationship even further.
Ukraine is also critical. With its size and position, and its history of
subjugation and upheaval, it is a linchpin of European security. NATO's
strategy and evolution must take into account this country's strategic
importance as well as its historic decision to give up nuclear weapons,
to build democratic institutions, and to pursue free market reform. The
United States believes that the door to greater cooperation and
integration with the West should be open to countries that take the bold
and difficult steps that Ukraine has taken.
We must also sustain our important progress in another new area of focus
for NATO--fighting the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The
diplomacy that members of this alliance brought to bear made a decisive
contribution to the indefinite extension of the nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty last month. We welcome the development of new
channels for consultation on non-proliferation matters with Russia and
other NACC partners.
NATO is at the core of our strategy for strengthening security in
Europe, but it is not the exclusive forum. Our comprehensive strategy
envisions strong, interlocking institutions of security and economic
cooperation, each with special and complementary strengths. That is why,
last December, our heads of state and government took important steps to
bolster the effectiveness of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe.
With its broad membership and extensive commitments on human rights, the
OSCE is uniquely equipped to address the root causes of conflict in
Europe. Its potential is especially evident in Chechnya--where it
represents the only official international presence. As our communique
will emphasize, we are profoundly troubled by the continued war in
Chechnya. This tragedy has killed thousands of innocent civilians,
damaged reform, and hurt Russia's standing in the international
community. We urge the Russian authorities to cooperate with the OSCE
mission to permit the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian relief and to
reach a genuine political solution to that conflict.
Let me also emphasize the continuing support of the United States for a
more capable European defense identity--one that will strengthen our
flexibility, support European integration, and result in a more balanced
sharing of burdens. The alliance should continue to strengthen its
relations with the Western European Union. The benefits of improved
cooperation are already evident in the conduct of the joint NATO-WEU
Operation Sharp Guard. Similarly, we should redouble our efforts to
complete development of the Combined Joint Task Force concept. CJTF will
enable NATO to conduct the full range of its missions more efficiently,
allow the WEU to make use of alliance assets, and facilitate operations
with non-members of the alliance.
As I said this morning, this comprehensive strategy for European
security will strengthen our ability in the future to prevent the kind
of tragic conflict we are witnessing in the former Yugoslavia. Let me
say first that our allies with personnel on the ground have shown
remarkable courage and leadership in standing firm in conditions of
great threat and adversity. We all owe a debt of gratitude to our NATO
allies and all the nations that have placed their troops and personnel
in harm's way to uphold the principles of the international community.
Later today, we will all have an opportunity to discuss the
understandings that the Contact Group ministers reached last night in
five key areas:
First, we agreed that UNPROFOR should remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina to
carry out its important mission.
Second, we agreed that UNPROFOR should move rapidly to reduce the
vulnerability of its forces, by regrouping units and avoiding activities
that could unduly endanger their safety.
Third, we should take steps to assure the freedom of movement and safety
of UNPROFOR personnel. We intend to ask our military experts to examine
promptly the specific proposals of France, the United Kingdom, and
others with a view toward achieving that objective.
Fourth, we agreed on the need to enhance the capability and strength of
UNPROFOR to assure that it can carry out its mission safely and
effectively--and the United States intends to provide appropriate
support to that end.
Fifth, we agreed to continue to pursue our efforts to obtain recognition
of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Serbia and to achieve an effective closure of
the border between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The diplomatic efforts of the Contact Group remain the basis for
achieving a political solution to this conflict. The United States will
continue to lend its vigorous support to those efforts.
Speaking as the representative of President Clinton and the American
people, let me assure you that America's engagement in Europe and in
NATO is as firm and unshakable as ever. The United States has enduring
political, security, economic, and cultural links to Europe that must
and will be preserved. NATO will remain the anchor of American power and
purpose in Europe. We will continue to maintain approximately 100,000
American troops on European soil. We will continue to help preserve
peace and prosperity for the next 50 years and beyond--this time for the
entire continent.
Thank you very much. (###)
ARTICLE 3:
UN-NATO Launch Airstrikes Against Bosnian Serbs
Statement by President Clinton released by the White House, Office of
the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, May 25, 1995.
I welcome the decision of the UN and NATO to launch airstrikes today
against a Bosnian Serb ammunition site following the violence of the
past several days in and around Sarajevo. This action was taken in
response to Bosnian Serb defiance of yesterday's UNPROFOR demand for the
return of heavy weapons to designated weapons' collection points in
accord with existing agreements.
This action should help NATO and the UN sustain their ability to ease
suffering in the region. I hope that today's airstrikes will convince
the Bosnian Serb leadership to end their violations of the exclusion
zone and comply with their other agreements with the UN.
I appreciate the courage and dedication of the UN forces on the ground
in the former Yugoslavia and trust that this evidence of UN and NATO
determination will serve to enhance the ability of these forces to
remain and perform their missions. (###)
ARTICLE 4:
Russia Crosses the Threshold Into Active Engagement With NATO
Secretary Christopher
Statement at the North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting with Russian
Foreign Minister Kozyrev, Noordwijk, The Netherlands, May 31, 1995
Mr. Secretary General, it is a great pleasure to join our NATO
colleagues and Foreign Minister Kozyrev to mark this important moment in
NATO's relationship with Russia--and to set a course for its further
development.
It is in the interest of every member of the alliance--and of each of
our partners--that Russia participate fully and constructively in
Europe's emerging security architecture. For the United States, Russia's
decision to cross the threshold into active engagement with NATO puts
into place an important element of our comprehensive strategy for
broader European security and integration. For Russia, for NATO, and for
Europe, this is a historic choice with enormously positive implications.
This moment has not come without a great deal of hard work. We met
almost one year ago in Brussels to welcome Russia to the Partnership for
Peace. We pledged then that we would seize the opportunity to build an
undivided, peaceful, and democratic Europe. We agreed that cooperative
relations between the alliance and Russia are essential to this task.
In the last year, we have worked hard to follow up on that mandate. The
road has not always been smooth, but I believe that the process has been
constructive. We have learned where we disagree, but, as important, that
disagreements in some areas need not be an obstacle to moving ahead.
During this same period, the Partnership for Peace has made impressive
progress in strengthening our cooperation with the countries of Central
Europe and the former Soviet Union. The Partnership for Peace is now
established as an integral European security structure in its own right.
A full program of Partnership exercises is now in progress. We look
forward to Russian participation in exercises and other Partnership
activities scheduled for this year.
Beyond the Partnership, we look forward to political consultations with
Russia on a number of important security matters where Russia has
special interests or capabilities, including non-proliferation and
nuclear security. The United States is firmly committed to a broad,
enhanced dialogue between the alliance and Russia.
Yesterday, we agreed that our immediate objective should be to define a
framework for developing the NATO-Russia dialogue further. Today, we
welcome the beginning of that process. We are looking forward to working
with Russia in building a European security structure in which a
productive NATO-Russia relationship plays an indispensable role.
That relationship will complement the other elements of our strategy:
strengthening the Partnership for Peace; further strengthening the OSCE;
and maintaining our steady, transparent progress toward the enlargement
of NATO and the European Union. The objective of this strategy is the
integration of all of Europe into a series of mutually supporting
institutions and relationships that ensure that there will be no return
to division or confrontation.
The United States looks forward to working with our allies and with
Russia in the coming months to make this process a success and to ensure
that it serves the interests we all share. (###)
ARTICLE 5:
Broadening and Deepening the Partnership for Peace
Secretary Christopher
Statement at the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) Ministerial
meeting, Noordwijk, The Netherlands, May 31, 1995
It is a pleasure to join you today for this sixth ministerial meeting of
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. In my remarks today, I will
focus on the Partnership for Peace. Let me begin by congratulating all
partner governments for helping the Partnership get off to such a strong
start. This political support and active participation are what has made
the Partnership's early success possible.
At the 1994 NATO summit in Brussels, President Clinton proposed a
practical program that would build on the dialogue and consultation
initiated so successfully by the NACC. Already, that program--the
Partnership for Peace--has evolved from a mere concept to a key
component of Europe's security structures. Though the Partnership for
Peace is barely 16 months old, the principles and objectives upon which
it is built are at least as old as NATO itself: shared values and
interests, mutual commitment, and close cooperation.
Since we last met in December, allies and partners have made substantial
progress in broadening and deepening the Partnership.
-- Austria, Belarus, and Malta have joined, raising the number of
Partners to 26.
-- Four more partners--Albania, Estonia, Latvia, and Russia--have
concluded Individual Partnership Programs with NATO, and several other
partners are already updating previous IPPs.
-- Detailed planning is well under way for our robust program of
PFP activities in 1995, which includes a first-ever Partnership training
exercise in the United States, involving forces from 12 partner and 3
allied states.
-- NATO and 14 partners have begun participating in a PFP Defense
Planning and Review Process aimed at improving transparency and
interoperability.
-- And NATO has approved a comprehensive PFP funding policy and
taken other steps to ensure that the Partnership has the resources it
needs to meet its objectives.
The success of the Partnership depends on both partners and allies. As
the Partnership Framework Document sets forth, partners must ensure
their own participation in PFP activities. This will require each
partner to make the budgetary and other adjustments necessary to achieve
a level of participation commensurate with its national objectives.
At the same time, allies recognize that we must do our part to help. The
United States is providing $30 million in this fiscal year in direct
support of partner participation. As President Clinton pledged in Warsaw
last July, he has requested $100 million for this purpose in fiscal year
1996. Other allies are making contributions, and yesterday I urged them
to do more. But such aid can only supplement, not replace, partner
efforts.
While participation in PFP activities has been very strong, we must work
to advance the political objectives of the Partnership as well. This
includes ensuring democratic control of defense forces and promoting
transparency in national defense planning and budgeting.
Many partners have made significant progress in these and other areas.
NATO can and should do more to help. In drafting or refining their
Individual Partnership Programs, partners should place due emphasis on
these objectives.
We are very pleased with the progress allies and partners have made in
developing a PFP planning and review process. So far, 14 partners are
participating. These partners have set specific goals for improving the
ability of their forces to work alongside NATO forces in exercises and
future joint operations. The planning and review process is also a
valuable mechanism for exchanging information on overall defense and
financial planning. Finally, the process can help partners interested in
joining NATO improve and monitor their compatibility with allied
practices, including with respect to military doctrine. Next week in
Brussels, our defense ministers will meet to consider practical next
steps to invigorate the planning and review process.
Our objective now must be to maintain the Partnership's impressive
momentum and to broaden and deepen our cooperation. The development of
the Partnership is a dynamic process. As partner needs and circumstances
evolve, the Partnership must be adapted and upgraded accordingly. Just
as NATO is adapting itself to post-Cold War realities, the Partnership
must rise to meet new challenges.
Yesterday, I outlined--on behalf of the United States--a number of areas
where I believe we can intensify the relationship between NATO and its
partners. These include working on ways to ensure democratic and
civilian control of the military, widening the Partnership's focus, and
working more closely together in the planning of Partnership exercises.
The alliance remains fully committed to the Partnership as an important
and lasting part of Europe's new security structures. For those partners
interested in joining the alliance, it is the best path to membership.
For all, it remains a dynamic and practical link to NATO and a channel
for close cooperation. Whether seeking to join NATO or not, whether
interested in one area of cooperation or many, partners should aim to
forge strong ties with NATO that will help achieve their particular
goals. Allies are committed to strengthening the Partnership even after
NATO begins to admit new members.
The stark Cold War lines of confrontation that once defined security
relations are gone. The peoples of your nations played a crucial role in
bringing us to this hopeful point. We now share an unparalleled
opportunity to build a comprehensive and inclusive security architecture
for Europe.
NATO enlargement and the Partnership for Peace are key components of
this architecture. Our broad approach to security also envisions a
strengthened OSCE, an enlarged EU, and a strong NATO-Russia
relationship.
All of us should be proud of what we have already achieved in the
Partnership for Peace. We have demonstrated that countries that for
generations stood on opposite sides of a dangerous line of distrust
could together obliterate that line and cooperate for their common
security. But we must not rest on our laurels or limit our aspirations.
Working together, we can build a safer, more integrated, more democratic
Europe for the next 50 years and beyond. (###)
ARTICLE 6:
Contact Group Ministers Urge Strengthening of UNPROFOR
Secretary Christopher, Contact Group Statement
Secretary Christopher
Statement at a press conference following Contact Group Ministerial, The
Hague, The Netherlands, May 29, 1995.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I want to begin by expressing my
appreciation to the British and French Governments. They've shown a
courageous determination to stay in Bosnia and not allow the outrageous
behavior of the Bosnian Serbs to deter them from their work on behalf of
the international community. Their leadership has made possible the
understandings that we reached tonight. All of us strongly condemn the
action of the Bosnian Serbs in violating the UN Security Council
resolutions and in detaining UN personnel. UN personnel from many
countries are being held tonight in blatant violation of international
law. We hold the Bosnian Serbs and their leadership accountable for the
safety of all of these UN forces and demand their immediate release. I
want to highlight five areas of common understanding that were reached
among the Contact Group countries here.
First, we all agreed on the importance of UNPROFOR's mission and that
UNPROFOR should remain in Bosnia.
Second, we agreed that UNPROFOR should move rapidly to reduce the
vulnerability of its forces by grouping units and avoiding activities
that unduly endanger their safety.
Third, we agreed that we should take steps to ensure the freedom of
movement and safety of UNPROFOR personnel in carrying out their
important mission. We intend to ask our military experts to examine
promptly the specific proposals of France, the United Kingdom, and
others with a view toward achieving these objectives. In this respect, I
want to reiterate our view that the use of airpower must remain an
option
Fourth, we agreed on the need to enhance the capability and strength of
UNPROFOR so that it can carry out its mission safely and effectively.
The United States intends to provide appropriate support to that end,
and we will be consulting with the troop-contributing countries to
determine what additional U.S. equipment may be of use to them.
Fifth, we will continue to pursue our efforts to obtain recognition of
Bosnia-Herzegovina and to achieve an effective closure of the border
between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is anticipated that U.S.
Ambassador Frasure will be pursuing these discussions again in Belgrade
in the near future.
Of course, all of these matters must be discussed with our colleagues in
NATO and in the other troop-contributing countries and with the United
Nations. We will begin these discussions at the United Nations and at
NATO tomorrow. I want to stress the importance of the continued work of
the Contact Group as the best means of achieving our common efforts to
arrive at a peaceful solution to the conflict. The difficulties we now
face will not cause us to cease our efforts to obtain these necessary
results. We continue to believe that the Contact Group plan continues to
provide the most appropriate and, indeed, the only satisfactory and
feasible basis for a political resolution of this conflict and, finally,
an end to the killing.
Contact Group Statement
Text of statement issued following Contact Group Ministerial,
The Hague, The Netherlands, May 29, 1995.
The foreign ministers of France, Spain, Germany and the European Union
Commissioner for external affairs (representing the Troika of the
European Union), the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom and of
Russia and the US Secretary of State, together with the co-chairmen of
the international conference on the former Yugoslavia, met in The Hague
on May 29th 1995.
They condemned the escalation of violence by the parties and any hostile
act against UN personnel.
They most strongly condemned the shelling by the Bosnian Serbs of the
safe areas, in particular in Tuzla on May 25th 1995. They consider that
the outrageous acts against UNPROFOR members and UN observers are
unacceptable. They hold Pale leaders accountable for the security of UN
personnel taken hostage and warn them that they will bear the
consequences if these personnel are not correctly treated and returned
unharmed to their units.
The ministers once again strongly urge the Bosnian Serb authorities to
accept the Contact Group plan as a starting point for negotiations.
The ministers agreed on the need to reinforce UNPROFOR. To this effect,
they have decided on the need to secure UNPROFOR's right of freedom of
movement, in general, and the right of access to Safe Areas in
particular and to provide the UN with a capacity for rapid reaction.
They requested the UN commanders to urgently consider the modalities of
these measures. They stress the importance of a renewal of the cessation
of hostilities agreement.
The ministers agreed to give a new impetus to the diplomatic process in
order to reach a political settlement of the conflict, which they
consider as the only possible solution. They support mutual recognition
among the states of the former Yugoslavia. In that respect, they agreed
to make a new effort with a view to the earliest possible FRY (Serbia-
Montenegro) recognition of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the strengthening of
the borders closure. A resolution on sanctions suspension should be
finalised in the security council.
Ministers will meet again in the near future in order to examine
UNPROFOR's situation in the light of progress made by then in the above
mentioned military and political fields. (###)
ARTICLE 7:
Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council: Final Communique
Text of final communique issued by the NAC, Noordwijk, The Netherlands,
May 30, 1995.
1. Earlier this month, we commemorated the 50th anniversary of the end
of the Second World War in Europe. We remain convinced that democracy,
the rule of law, respect for human rights, and a strong transatlantic
link are key to maintaining a lasting peace. Over the past fifty years,
the countries of Western Europe and North America have forged lasting
bonds of peace and friendship, as embodied in our Alliance. Today, we
have a unique opportunity to build cooperation and partnership in the
whole Euro-Atlantic area. We reaffirm our commitment to work for a
peaceful, secure, stable, and undivided Europe.
2. As our Alliance approaches the fifth anniversary of its London
Summit, it is opportune to assess the progress we have already made in
transforming NATO, and our future course in helping to build the safe
and prosperous Europe which has been our Alliance's goal since its
inception. We have worked to make the Alliance an agent of change, even
as it promoted security and stability throughout Europe.
Throughout that time, we have worked to help build the structures of a
more united continent by extending the hand of friendship and
cooperation across former dividing lines. Our leaders initiated profound
changes in NATO's approach to defence in a new, undivided Europe and
began the hard work of re-orienting NATO's military strategy and re-
structuring our military forces.
As a result, the missions of today's NATO have evolved and its forces
are being significantly reduced and re-structured. These smaller and
more flexible forces which include multinational elements are not
directed against any country and can better address the range of
security challenges in the post-Cold War environment.
We accelerated NATO's transformation at the Brussels Summit in January
1994, where Alliance leaders gave new directions to adapt further the
Alliance's political and military structures and procedures. They made
even more concrete NATO's new role through the adoption of a broad
strategy of practical cooperation throughout Europe. They approved the
CJTF concept as a means to facilitate the conduct of the Alliance's
missions and in order to provide separable but not separate military
capabilities that could be employed by NATO or the WEU. They further
strengthened NATO's outreach to its East by adopting the Partnership for
Peace initiative and inviting all the new democracies to join us in new
political and military efforts to work alongside the Alliance. They also
decided that the Alliance expects and would welcome NATO enlargement
that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an
evolutionary process, taking into account political and security
developments in the whole of Europe.
The Summit reaffirmed the enduring value of a strong transatlantic
partnership in sustaining the Alliance's core functions and enabling the
Alliance to contribute to security and stability in the whole of Europe.
In implementing the Summit decisions, we will further strengthen the
transatlantic link between North America and a Europe which is
developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy and taking on greater
responsibility on defence matters and give our full support to the
development of a European Security and Defence Identity. We support
strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance through the Western
European Union, which is being developed as the defence component of the
European Union. The Alliance's organisation and resources will be
adjusted so as to facilitate this. The Alliance and the European Union
share common strategic interests. A strengthened, renewed, and balanced
transatlantic partnership will underline the Alliance's essential role
for security and stability in Europe and its determination to intensify
cooperation with the countries to our East.
3. With the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for
Peace, we are building lasting ties of cooperation in the political and
military fields between each Partner and NATO and among Partners. The
Partnership for Peace has already become a permanent feature of European
security. We are determined to develop this initiative to its full
potential. It will become increasingly important as an enduring
instrument for active relations and practical cooperation with the
Alliance for all Partners, as well as helping to prepare those countries
which aspire to membership in the Alliance. The relationship between
NATO and its Partners is developing on a broad scale, fostering the
ability of Partners to join in possible future action with the Alliance
in dealing with common security problems.
We are encouraged by the solid progress in the implementation of
Partnership for Peace achieved since our last meeting in December. We
welcome Austria, Belarus, and Malta as new Partners, bringing the
number of Partners to twenty-six. Implementation of Individual
Partnership Programmes has quickly progressed in accordance with our
instructions of December 1994. We are pleased that the Planning and
Review Process has attracted such wide interest. Fourteen Partner
countries participated in the first round, which has just been
completed. Based on a biennial planning cycle, this process will advance
interoperability and increase transparency among Allies and Partners.
Other encouraging developments include:
-- The increasing number of major NATO/PfP exercises with Partners,
including the first one outside Europe in the United States, together
with preparatory training activities;
-- The wide Partner participation in the Partnership Coordination Cell,
which is now playing a key role, in particular in coordinating
exercises;
-- The increasing number of regional and bilateral activities in the
spirit of PfP;
-- The elaboration of a more focused and graduated PfP exercise concept;
-- The completion of a PfP Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA);
-- The adoption of a PfP funding policy;
-- The launching of a regular process of information exchange on
activities which support the Partnership; and
-- Ongoing efforts of Partners engaged in reform processes in
establishing effective democratic and civilian control over their
militaries.
We are looking forward to tomorrow's meeting with our Partners in the
North Atlantic Cooperation Council to discuss the state of our
cooperation and to consult on topical security issues. The NACC provides
a valuable forum for common consultations between all Partner countries.
In order to strengthen our cooperation, we have instructed the Council
in Permanent Session to explore the scope for integrating our existing
cooperative structures and procedures for NACC and the Partnership for
Peace.
4. As recognised by our Heads of State and Government in January last
year, the admission of new members will take place as part of an
evolutionary process, taking into account political and security
developments in the whole of Europe. When the members of the Alliance
decide to invite new members, their objective will be to enhance
security for all countries in Europe, without creating dividing lines.
Enlargement will be part of a broad European security architecture based
on genuine partnership and cooperation in the whole of Europe. It will
complement the enlargement of the European Union, a parallel process
which also, for its part, contributes significantly to extending
security and stability to the new democracies in the East.
We are satisfied with the progress achieved to date in the internal
study on NATO enlargement, which we set in train at our last meeting in
December to determine how NATO will enlarge, the principles to guide
this process, and the implications of membership. We are well on course
and will continue to make steady, measured progress. In this context, we
will complete the study in accordance with the agreed timetable, and the
results will be presented to all interested Partners collectively in
Brussels and where requested, individually, including in Partner-country
capitals, sufficiently in advance of our December meeting for us at that
meeting to assess thoroughly the results of our presentations and
consult on the way forward in our examination of enlargement.
5. The Alliance welcomes Russia's acceptance of its Individual
Partnership Programme under the PfP and of our dialogue and cooperation
beyond PfP and looks forward to their implementation. This dual step
paves the way for renewed and extended cooperation between the Alliance
and Russia which we believe will enhance stability and security in
Europe.
We also affirmed our belief that it is desirable to develop the NATO-
Russia relationship even further as part of our broad approach to
developing a cooperative security architecture in Europe. We propose
that NATO and Russia initiate a dialogue, to be pursued in our newly
established relationship beyond the PfP, on the future direction our
relationship should take. Our aim would be to achieve by the end of this
year a political framework for NATO-Russia relations elaborating basic
principles for security cooperation as well as for the development of
mutual political consultations.
We reaffirm our strong support for the political and economic reforms in
Russia. We trust that the scheduled legislative and Presidential
elections will strengthen the democratic process in that country. This
would underpin security and stability in Europe and reinforce the basis
for our cooperation.
The construction of a cooperative European security architecture
requires the active participation of Russia. In this context, it is our
desire to have Russia play its proper, important role. We are committed
to a close relationship with Russia, based on mutual respect and
openness. This relationship can only flourish if it is rooted in strict
compliance with international commitments and obligations.
6. While respecting the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation,
we remain deeply concerned about the developments in Chechnya, which are
causing so much suffering and so many casualties in the civilian
population. We welcome the establishment of an OSCE assistance group for
Chechnya, which is assisting the civilian population and supporting a
political settlement of the conflict under OSCE auspices. We call for an
immediate ceasefire and urge the parties to pursue negotiations. We urge
Russia to facilitate the free passage of humanitarian assistance and
hold elections.
7. We want to develop further the relationship with all newly
independent states, whose independence and democracy constitute an
important factor of security and stability for Europe. We look forward
to the fullest possible use of established NACC and PfP mechanisms in
enhancing our relations with these states.
We attach particular importance to our relations with Ukraine which we
will further develop. We welcome progress achieved in Ukraine's economic
and political reforms. We hope that Ukraine will pursue this course, to
which we lend our support. We welcome the fact that Ukraine chose to
participate in the Partnership Planning and Review Process and look
forward to the early completion of Ukraine's Individual Partnership
Programme. Along with the accessions of Belarus and Kazakhstan, we value
greatly Ukraine's accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) as an expression of a responsible security policy. This was a
significant contribution to the recent agreement on the Treaty's
unlimited extension.
8. We attach great significance to the strengthening of the relations
between NATO and the WEU, based on the agreed principles of comple-
mentarity and transparency, including through joint Council sessions and
improved cooperation in a number of fields. We are pleased at the way in
which our organisations work together in the conduct of the joint NATO-
WEU Operation SHARP GUARD.
We welcome the decisions of the WEU Council of Ministers in Lisbon of
May 1995 on the improvement of the WEU's operational capabilities
through the creation of new decision-making and planning mechanisms and
structures, including the progress achieved in defining the conditions
in which a WEU Humanitarian Task Force would undertake humanitarian
operations. We also follow with interest WEU's ongoing "Common
Reflection on the New European Security Conditions", which could lead to
a "White Paper" on European security, and look forward to using our
regular consultations with the WEU to exchange views on this project.
The Allies support initiatives to develop multinational operational
arrangements and force structures which would strengthen the European
pillar of our Alliance while enabling the European Allies to take
greater responsibility for the common security and defence and,
accordingly, took note of the initiative taken by France, Italy, and
Spain to organise a land force (EUROFOR) and a maritime force
(EUROMARFOR). We also took note that these forces would be open to WEU
member states, that they would be declared "forces answerable to WEU",
and employed as a priority in this framework, and could likewise be
employed in the framework of NATO. This initiative was announced on the
occasion of the recent WEU Ministerial Meeting in Lisbon where an
agreement was also reached on the participation of Portugal in those
forces. We look forward with interest to a high-level briefing on this
initiative and to the expeditious definition of the relationship of
these forces with the WEU and NATO.
9. An essential part of the Alliance's continuing effort to adapt and
adjust its structures and procedures to the new strategic environment
lies in the development of the CJTF concept endorsed at the Summit in
January 1994. This concept is primarily designed to facilitate
contingency operations, including operations with participating nations
outside the Alliance. In coordination with the WEU, work has started to
develop this concept. A worthwhile and extensive exchange of views has
taken place to identify the essential issues and to develop a political-
military framework for the CJTF concept. We have made progress but more
remains to be done to adapt Alliance structures and procedures and to
develop the CJTF concept. We have therefore tasked the Council in
Permanent Session to complete, as a matter of urgency, its work in
developing the CJTF concept to the full satisfaction of all Allies and
look forward to a final report at our next meeting.
10. An important element of the evolving European security architecture
is the unique framework provided by the OSCE. Its combination of
democratic standards of human rights with the political, economic, and
military aspects of security establishes a special credibility in
dealing with the new challenges of the post-Cold War era. In particular,
its ability to apply human rights standards operationally in conflicts
has enabled the OSCE to develop into a primary instrument for early
warning, conflict prevention, and crisis management in its region.
Decisions at the Budapest meeting significantly enhanced the ability of
the OSCE, as a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the
United Nations Charter, to contribute to the maintenance of common
security in Europe. We welcome the enhancement of the operational role
of the OSCE and will support its goals. We tasked the Council in
Permanent Session to review the current pattern of contacts between NATO
and the OSCE and to improve it as appropriate. We will strongly support
discussion within the OSCE of the Russian proposal for a common and
comprehensive security model for Europe in the 21st century, to which
all Allies will actively contribute. We welcome also the agreement of
the OSCE to help implement the Pact on Stability in Europe, which
supports development of good neighbourly relations among its
participants. We reiterate our pledge made at the OSCE Budapest Summit
to provide the OSCE with the political support as well as the human and
financial resources and needs to fulfil its tasks, and call upon other
OSCE participating states to do likewise.
We value the OSCE's role in preventive diplomacy through, inter alia,
conflict prevention missions and the activities of the High Commissioner
on National Minorities, and commend the Chairman-in-Office for his
efforts to ensure that OSCE principles and commitments are respected in
the conflict in Chechnya. We call on Russia to observe agreed OSCE
documents, such as the Vienna Document and the Code of Conduct on
Security Matters.
The situation in the Southern Caucasus continues to be of special
concern. We welcome the fact that the ceasefire in the area of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict continues to be generally effective. We
support the efforts of the Minsk Group to achieve a political settlement
of the conflict in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, which would, along with
other conditions, allow the deployment of an OSCE multinational
peacekeeping force, as agreed at the Budapest Summit.
11. We want to achieve better mutual understanding with the countries to
our South and to contribute to the strengthening of stability in the
Mediterranean region. We are pleased that our initiative for dialogue
has been met with a positive response and that exploratory discussions
have been launched with five Mediterranean states outside the Alliance.
We hope further discussions will lead to the establishment of a fruitful
dialogue with these and other Mediterranean countries. Such exchanges
will foster transparency and a better understanding of security issues
of mutual interest. In addition, we mean to make the Alliance's aims and
objectives better understood, also with regard to its new missions of
peacekeeping under the authority of the UN or the responsibility of the
OSCE.
12. We welcome the agreement reached at the Conference in New York to
extend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) indefinitely. This is
a decisive step in strengthening the international nuclear non-
proliferation system and, thus, international security.
13. We continue to attach great importance to full compliance with and
fulfilment of all obligations resulting from existing arms control
agreements. They remain fundamental to European security and stability,
providing an essential foundation of confidence and mutual trust among
European countries. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
(CFE) is central to the cooperative security structure we have begun to
build in Europe and to stability and security for parties and non-
parties to the Treaty alike. Its integrity must, therefore, be
preserved. We will abide by the commitments we have undertaken. We
expect all other States Parties to implement fully the CFE Treaty, which
serves the interests of all parties to the Treaty and is fundamental to
European security. Full implementation of the Treaty by 15 November 1995
will provide the essential basis for a constructive and comprehensive
review process at the CFE Review Conference in 1996, as foreseen in the
Treaty, in the spirit of cooperative security.
We reiterate our hope that all signatories to the Open Skies Treaty who
have not yet ratified the Treaty will do so and that all instruments of
ratification necessary for the entry into force of the Treaty will be
deposited at the earliest possible time.
We also attach great importance to:
-- The negotiations on a universal and verifiable Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty;
-- A universal ban on the production of fissile material for weapon
purposes;
-- The early entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention;
-- Completion of work to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention;
-- The full implementation of START I and the early ratification of
START II.
14. We attach high importance to the ongoing work inside the Alliance on
the Summit initiative on the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and their delivery means. We took note of the report of the
Alliance's Joint Committee on Proliferation on the activities in the
Senior Political-Military Group on Proliferation and the Senior Defence
Group on Proliferation. We welcome the progress made in intensifying and
expanding NATO's political and defence efforts against proliferation
which remains one of the greatest concerns for the Alliance. We have
instructed the Groups to continue their work, without replacing or
duplicating efforts underway in other international fora, and to report
again to us at our next meeting. We welcome the consultations with
Cooperation Partners in the NACC and the consultations with Russia on
proliferation issues.
15. International terrorist crimes constitute a serious threat to peace,
security, and stability which can threaten the territorial integrity of
states. They cannot be justified under any circumstances. We condemn all
acts, methods and practices of international terrorism regardless of
their origins, causes, and purposes. We reiterate our strong commitment
to combat this scourge.
16. We remain committed to the Alliance's common-funded programmes. We
consider these programmes vital elements in underpinning our military
structures, providing essential operating capability and strengthening
Alliance cohesion. We need to ensure that appropriate human and
financial resources are directed towards those programmes which will
have the highest priority. We welcome that work has begun on the
examination of Alliance budgetary management, structures and procedures
which we set in hand last December, and look forward to progress being
made towards a successful conclusion of this exercise by the time we
next meet.
17. We express our deep appreciation for the gracious hospitality
extended to us by the Government of The Netherlands. (###)
ARTICLE 8:
NAC Ministerial Statement on the Situation in Former Yugoslavia
Text of statement issued by the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial
Session, Noordwijk, The Netherlands, May 30, 1995.
We regard with the utmost seriousness the further deterioration of the
situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and condemn the escalation of violence
by the parties and the hostile acts against UN personnel. We also
condemn in the strongest terms the outrageous behaviour of the Bosnian
Serbs in shelling safe areas and killing and seizing UN peacekeepers. We
demand that the shelling of safe areas be stopped and that UNPROFOR
members and UN observers held hostage by the Bosnian Serbs be released
unharmed, unconditionally. We hold the Bosnian Serb leaders fully
accountable for their safe return. We pay tribute to the outstanding
courage being shown by UNPROFOR and UN personnel in this difficult
situation.
We stress the importance and urgency of a renewal of the cessation of
hostilities agreement and call upon all the parties to the conflict to
seek solutions through negotiation rather than war. We strongly support
the continued efforts of the international community, including those of
the Contact Group, to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia through the
diplomatic process.
NATO air power remains available to help protect the safe areas and UN
Peace Forces, in accordance with existing arrangements with the United
Nations. We will continue to enforce the No-Fly Zone over Bosnia-
Herzegovina. We will also continue, together with the WEU, the maritime
embargo enforcement operations in the Adriatic.
We strongly support the continued presence of UN forces in former
Yugoslavia, with their safety assured and a strengthened capability to
carry out their mission in the pursuit of clear objectives. All parties
must ensure that UN troops have freedom of movement and are unharmed,
and remove any obstacles to the delivery of humanitarian aid to the
needy. We are ready to support efforts towards the reinforcement of UN
Peace Forces in former Yugoslavia, with the aim of reducing their
vulnerability and strengthening their capability to act and react. (###)
ARTICLE 9:
Reaffirming Close Relations Between the U.S. and Portugal
Secretary Christopher
Remarks at signing of the U.S.-Portuguese Agreement on Cooperation and
Defense, Lisbon, Portugal, June 1, 1995
Good morning, Mr. Minister, distinguished representatives from the
Azores, ladies and gentlemen: I am just delighted to be here in Lisbon
on this beautiful spring morning and to have an opportunity to sign this
Agreement on Cooperation and Defense between the United States and
Portugal.
The agreement that we signed here today is, of course, the product of a
long period of hard work and dedication. The Minister and I had talked
frequently, in our earlier meetings, about the agreement and tried to
find ways to resolve the last remaining issues and I am delighted that
that has now been done. This treaty reaffirms the close relations that
have long existed between our two countries, relations that have been
augmented, as the Minister said, in the last year by the signing of the
tax treaty and the customs agreement as well. This agreement bolsters
our security relationship and enhances our already excellent bilateral
relationships in a number of ways.
As one of the founding members of NATO, Portugal is a highly valued ally
and friend of the United States. Portugal is one that can always be
counted on in events as momentous as the Gulf war, as complex as the
crisis in the former Yugoslavia, or as simple as the emergency landing
of a distressed aircraft in the Atlantic.
We are very proud to be partners with Portugal in the search for
regional and global security in the post-Cold War world. The agreement
we signed today ensures continued United States use of the strategic air
base facilities in the Azores. In this post-Cold War world, with all of
its turbulence, the projection of conventional forces at great distance
remains a vital aspect of our security, and, certainly, the base that is
reflected in this agreement is a very important link in that security.
The agreement also calls for annual bilateral political and political-
military consultations, and it establishes an important Standing
Bilateral Commission which will develop programs of cooperation in the
military field between defense-sector industries and in science and
technology. The commission will also reinforce the economic and
commercial relationships between our two countries and provide for
cooperation with the autonomous region of the Azores. I have asked our
ambassador here--Ambassador Frawley Bagley--to be my personal
representative to work with the Portuguese Government to design and
activate the commission that is called for in the treaty.
Of course, Portugal is a very important player in a variety of
international institutions. As President of the Western European Union,
Portugal has mobilized the examination and improvement of that
organization's operational capabilities.
The Minister and I had an interesting discussion of the important steps
that Portugal, under his leadership, has been taking in the Western
European Union. Portugal is one of the most active members of the United
Nations, and, of course, we cooperate very closely and constructively.
I want to emphasize that the document we signed today will fulfill the
broad vision of its framers to provide not only a legal basis for
continued United States presence in the Azores, but to invigorate--to
really enliven--our overall relationship. For example, now that the
Lajes Agreement has been signed, we can pursue initiatives that were
identified by the negotiators which can further our bilateral
cooperation. This should include initiatives in the scientific,
technological, and space exploration fields, as well as to find the
right way to commemorate the upcoming 500th anniversary of Vasco da
Gama's world-changing voyage.
I look forward to continued work with the Minister on many of the issues
and many of the great opportunities that we have together, such as the
Exposition planned here in 1998.
So, Mr. Minister, it is a pleasure to be here and an honor to join you
in signing this important agreement. (###)
ARTICLE 10:
Fact Sheets: NATO, Partnership for Peace, OSCE, and NATO Information
Sources
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATO Today
NATO remains the core of American engagement in Europe and at the heart
of European security. It is the member nations' most effective
instrument for coordinating defense and arms control and maintaining
stability throughout Europe. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the progress of European integration
have not ended the need for NATO's essential commitment to safeguard the
freedom and security of all its members by political and military means
in accordance with UN principles. The London Declaration on a
Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, issued after the summit meeting of
the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in July 1990, signaled the vitality of
the alliance in adapting to security needs in a post-Cold War world. At
that meeting, NATO allies announced a fundamental review of strategy and
invited the Soviet Union and the countries of Central Europe to
establish regular diplomatic liaison and to develop a new partnership.
The November 1991 Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation further
underlined NATO's intention to redefine its objectives in light of
changed circumstances. The declaration took into account the broader
challenges to alliance security interests, such as the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, regional instability, and terrorism. It
outlined its future tasks in the context of a framework of interlocking
and mutually reinforcing institutions--including the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), now the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); the Western European Union
(WEU); the European Community, now the European Union; and the Council
of Europe--working together to build a new European security system. The
"New Strategic Concept" announced at the meeting stressed the alliance's
mission in crisis management and mandated a more flexible force
structure and reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. The Rome meeting also
created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to develop an
institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political
and security issues between NATO and its former adversaries. This
initiative culminated in the participation of Foreign Ministers and
representatives from the 16 NATO countries, six Central European
countries, and the three Baltic states at the inaugural meeting of the
NACC in December 1991. At the second NACC meeting in March 1992, the New
Independent States of the former Soviet Union became members, except
Georgia, which was admitted the following month. Albania joined the NACC
in June 1992.
This alliance of sovereign states pledges, through a combination of
political solidarity and military force, to preserve its mutual
security. Reaffirming faith in the principles of individual and
collective self-defense embodied in the UN Charter, the parties to the
treaty pledge to defend the common heritage and civilization of their
peoples and to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic
area. While recognizing the need to maintain adequate military strength
to safeguard the security of its members, the alliance also resolves to
work toward the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in
Europe.
NATO Foreign Ministers affirmed their readiness to support peacekeeping
activities under the auspices of the CSCE on a case-by-case basis in
June 1992. The following month, the North Atlantic Council agreed on a
NATO maritime operation in the Adriatic, in coordination with the WEU,
to monitor compliance with the UN embargo against Serbia and Montenegro-
-upgraded to enforcement in November 1992 following UN Security Council
resolutions to tighten economic sanctions. On June 8, 1993, agreement
was reached to place the NATO/WEU Adriatic task force under the
operational command of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.
On December 17, 1992, NATO foreign ministers agreed that NATO would be
prepared to support a UN Security Council resolution on enforcement of
the ban on military flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina. NATO has been
enforcing the no-fly zone over that country since April 12, 1993. In the
spring of 1993, NATO planned for a peace settlement in Bosnia under UN
auspices once an equitable agreement is reached by all of the parties
and put into effect.
On September 2, 1992, the NAC approved UN humanitarian relief efforts in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. In June 1993, NATO agreed to provide its air power
to protect UNPROFOR forces in case of attack. In August 1993, in
extraordinary session, the NAC agreed that air strikes could be used, as
authorized by the UN Secretary General, to support UNPROFOR's overall
mandate; to assist in the relief of Sarajevo, the safe areas, and other
threatened areas in Bosnia; and to relieve the widescale interference
with the UNPROFOR mandate and humanitarian assistance operations. NATO
remains willing to consider positively any further requests by the UN
for assistance in enforcing Security Council resolutions.
In June 1993, the U.S. proposed a NATO Summit to discuss the Clinton
initiative, which set an agenda for NATO's future work. The initiative
included strengthening cooperation among the allies, developing
relations with the former Warsaw Pact states, improving NATO's links
with other institutions, and addressing threats to security that arise
from outside the North Atlantic Treaty area. The January 1994 NATO
Summit endorsed several of the President's proposals that advance NATO's
adaptation to the post-Cold War European security environment.
The summit launched the Partnership for Peace (PFP), which expands and
intensifies practical political and military cooperation between NATO
and the former Soviet bloc--as well as some of Europe's traditionally
neutral countries--and allows them to consult with NATO in the event of
a direct threat to their security. PFP does not extend NATO security
guarantees.
As of May 1995, 26 countries have joined PFP: Albania, Armenia, Austria,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland,
Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,
Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. The central organs of the
Partnership are the Steering Committee at NATO Headquarters and a
planning organ, the Partnership Coordination Cell, at Mons, Belgium (at
the same location as Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe).
PFP has thus become a permanent and central feature of the transatlantic
security system. PFP military exercises began in fall 1994: Poland
hosted the first PFP field exercise in a former communist state, and a
PFP maritime exercise took place in the North Sea. The Netherlands
hosted a PFP field exercise in late October 1994. NATO allies also have
invited observers from PFP countries to a number of previously scheduled
bilateral and multinational exercises.
At the January 1994 summit, NATO leaders welcomed an evolutionary
expansion of NATO membership to include new democracies in the region.
Participation in PFP does not guarantee entry into NATO, but it is the
best preparation for states interested in becoming NATO members. For
those countries that do not aspire to NATO membership, PFP will remain
as a primary link to the alliance.
The summit also endorsed a concept of "Combined Joint Task Forces"
designed to make NATO military structures more flexible and to encourage
the development of "separable but not separate" European military
capabilities that could undertake operations under the auspices of the
WEU when an alliance response was not required. NATO and the WEU are
working to develop this concept.
Finally, the summit directed immediate work to intensify and expand
NATO's political and defense efforts against the spread of weapons of
mass destruction. This led to agreement on a political framework for
NATO actions which was approved at the North Atlantic Council
ministerial meeting in June 1994. Consultations proceed on specific
allied political and defense steps to combat and defend against the
proliferation of such weapons.
Following on the summit's commitment to NATO expansion, the Foreign
Ministers established a process in December 1994 to study NATO
enlargement and to brief PFP partners on the conclusions of the study.
NATO's role as a forum for political consultation and an association of
nations committed to collective defense remains unchanged, even as its
new responsibilities in the areas of peacekeeping and crisis management
continue to evolve.
U.S.-NATO Relations: The Transatlantic Partnership
The decision of the United States after World War II to participate in a
regional peacetime, defensive alliance represented a fundamental change
in American foreign policy. The United States recognized that its
interests no longer could be confined to the limits of the Western
Hemisphere: U.S. security was linked inextricably to the future of the
West European democracies. Concepts of individual liberty and the rule
of law, coupled with those of a common heritage and shared values,
provided the foundation for the NATO alliance. These ideals, as well as
the ongoing goal of each member country to achieve a just and lasting
peaceful order in Europe, continue to link the fate of America to that
of its NATO allies.
The history of U.S. engagement in NATO has been one of commitment by
America and its allies to reduce tensions in Europe and to improve East-
West relations. They have pursued a series of initiatives designed to
lower levels of personnel and equipment and increase mutual confidence,
while adhering to a policy of political cohesion and military strength.
Arms control measures aimed at enhancing stability have included the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987 and the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in 1990.
The CFE Treaty between the allies and the nations and successor states
of the former Warsaw Pact provides for an unprecedented level of
transparency in the security field through an information exchange and
obligatory inspections. Most importantly, it mandates a sharp reduction
in conventional weapons throughout Europe. The NATO allies coordinate
closely to meet their own obligations under the treaty and to ensure
full compliance in its information, verification, and reduction
provisions.
NATO has played a leading role in developing far-reaching proposals for
CSCE's Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC). Alliance proposals on force
planning, non-proliferation, and harmonization of existing arms control
commitments already are being developed.
United States supports the development of a greater European security
identity and defense role as a means of strengthening the integrity and
effectiveness of NATO. At the NATO summit in Rome, the alliance welcomed
the prospect of a European political union with a greater security and
defense dimension but underlined that this would not diminish the need
for NATO. The alliance's "New Strategic Concept" also reaffirmed the
essential nature of the transatlantic partnership, recognizing as a
basic principle the indivisibility of security of all its members. The
U.S. proposed, and the January 1994 NATO Summit agreed, that "separable
but not separate" European capabilities be made available to undertake
independent European missions, drawing as necessary on NATO collective
assets when NATO-wide actions are not necessary.
The North Atlantic alliance and the American presence in Europe have
helped keep peace for more than 40 years. Having helped to forge
successful policies toward the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact
since the foundation of NATO, the U.S. with its European allies must
play a central role in building the framework of the new Euro-Atlantic
architecture.
NATO Strategy
NATO collective security strategy was mainly based on the principle of
deterrence. Defense capabilities were created to deter military
aggression or other forms of pressure. Parties to the treaty agreed to
consult whenever the territorial integrity, political independence, or
security of any party was threatened. They further pledged to maintain
their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and,
should such deterrence fail, to defend the territory of the alliance.
As a purely defensive alliance, NATO maintained only a level of military
strength sufficient to be credible. Given the marked inferiority of
allied conventional strength in Europe, the NATO guarantee rested
primarily on the nuclear superiority of the United States.
At the conclusion of a 1967 comprehensive review of NATO strategy, the
alliance adopted a revised approach to the common defense, based on a
balanced range of responses--conventional and nuclear--to all levels of
aggression or threats of aggression. This reassessment of the nature of
the potential threat to member countries prompted the realization that
the alliance must increasingly look to the dangers of more limited forms
of aggression beyond the possibility of a massive Soviet attack. The
basis of the new concept of "flexible response" was the belief that NATO
should be able to deter and counter military force with a range of
responses designed to defend directly against attack at an appropriate
level, or, if necessary, to escalate the attack to the level necessary
to persuade an aggressor to desist.
At the same time, the alliance accepted the recommendations of the
report written by former Belgium Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel and
titled "Future Tasks of the Alliance," which outlined the need to work
toward the achievement of disarmament and balanced force reductions. The
maintenance of adequate military forces would be coupled with efforts at
improving East-West relations.
Soviet deployment of new mobile theater nuclear missiles (SS-20s) called
into question the accepted NATO strategy of deterrence based on the
concepts of forward defense and flexible response and lead to a decision
in 1979 to modernize its defensive capability. The resulting "dual-
track" decision by the alliance combined pursuing arms control
negotiations with responding appropriately to the increased imbalance
created by the new Soviet systems. Alliance governments agreed to deploy
U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles in Western Europe.
The successful conclusion of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
Treaty in 1987, while eliminating all Soviet and U.S. land-based,
intermediate-range missiles, required a new appraisal of NATO policy. In
response, the alliance developed its "Comprehensive Concept of Arms
Control and Disarmament," which provided a framework for alliance policy
in nuclear, conventional, and chemical fields of arms control and tied
defense policies to progress in arms control.
In July 1990, the NAC issued the "London Declaration on a Transformed
North Atlantic Alliance" to adapt to the new realities in Europe. The
ministers pledged to intensify political and military contacts with
Moscow and with Central and East European capitals and to work not only
for the common defense but to build new partnerships with all the
nations of Europe. They underlined the need to undertake broader arms
control and confidence-building agreements to limit conventional armed
forces in Europe. In recognition of the radical political changes in
Europe and the improved security environment, the ministers mandated a
fundamental review of the alliance's political and military strategy.
The "New Strategic Concept" was outlined at the meeting of the North
Atlantic Council in November 1991. The threat of a massive full-scale
Soviet attack, which had provided the focus of NATO's strategy during
the Cold War, had disappeared after the end of the political division of
Europe. The alliance acknowledged that the risks to its security, such
as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and acts of terrorism
and sabotage, were now less predictable and beyond the focus of
traditional concerns. The new strategy adopts a broader approach to
security, centered more on crisis management and conflict prevention. It
assumes completion of the planned withdrawal of military forces from
Central Europe and the Baltics and the full implementation of arms
control agreements limiting conventional forces in Europe.
In the context of changed circumstances, the alliance will maintain a
mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe, although at
significantly lower levels. To ensure effectiveness, alliance forces
will be increasingly mobile to respond to a range of contingencies.
Forces will be organized for flexible buildup to react to regional
instability and crises. Collective defense arrangements will rely
increasingly on multinational forces within the integrated military
structure. Nuclear forces will continue to play an essential role in
allied strategy but will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient
to preserve stability.
The new strategy reaffirms the principle of common commitment and mutual
cooperation in support of the indivisibility of security for all
alliance members and underscores the essential political and military
link between European and North American members provided by the
presence of nuclear forces in Europe.
[BOX]
NATO Background
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed against the backdrop
of emerging post-war tensions engendered by the threat of Soviet
expansionism and concern over political and economic instability in
Western Europe. On April 4, 1949, in Washington, DC, the Foreign
Ministers of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, and United
States signed the North Atlantic Treaty, the political framework for an
international alliance designed to prevent aggression, or, if necessary,
to resist attack against any alliance member. In 1952, Greece and Turkey
acceded to the treaty, followed by the Federal Republic of Germany in
1955 and by Spain in 1982.
[END BOX]
[BOX]
NATO Structure
North Atlantic Council
The NAC is the principal forum for consultation and cooperation between
NATO member governments on all issues affecting their common security.
Its decisions are based on consensus, with each member having an equal
right to express its views. The NATO Secretary General is chair. The NAC
meets at least twice a year in ministerial session. It also meets
weekly at the level of Permanent Representatives, who hold ambassadorial
rank.
Defense Planning Committee (DPC)
The DPC deals with overall issues of defense and is composed of
represen-tatives of all countries except France, which withdrew from
NATO's integrated military structure in 1966. Like the NAC, it meets
regularly at ambassadorial level and twice yearly, when member countries
are represented by their defense ministers.
Nuclear Planning Group
This group has authority for nuclear matters. All countries except
France participate. Iceland participates as an observer.
Military Committee
The highest military authority in the alliance, it is composed of the
chiefs of staff of each country except France, which is represented by a
military mission. Iceland, which has no military forces, is represented
by a civilian member. The Military Committee advises the NAC and the DPC
on military measures necessary for the common defense and provides
guidance to the NATO commanders.
Regional Commands
The strategic area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty is divided into
three regional commands: Allied Command Europe, Allied Command Atlantic,
and Allied Command Channel, with a regional planning group for North
America. With the exception of France and Iceland, all countries assign
forces to the integrated military command structure. The NATO Defense
area covers the territories of member nations in North America, in the
Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer, and in Europe, including
Turkey. However, events occurring outside the area which affect the
preservation of peace and security in the treaty area also may be
considered by the NAC.
North Atlantic Cooperation Council
The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established in
November 1991 to conduct NATO's outreach program to the former Warsaw
Pact states. Current members include the 16 NATO allies, seven Central
European states--Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Romania, and Slovakia--the 12 former Soviet republics, and the three
Baltic states. It meets in ministerial session at least once a year.
Finland, Slovenia, and Sweden attend as observers.
[END BOX]
NATO Partnership for Peace
What It Is
-- A U.S. initiative, Partnership for Peace (PFP) was launched by the
January 1994 NATO Summit to establish strong links between NATO, its new
democratic partners in the former Soviet bloc, and some of Europe's
traditionally neutral countries to enhance European security.
-- It provides a framework for enhanced political and military
cooperation for joint multilateral crisis management activities, such as
humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping.
-- It enables PFP members to consult with NATO when faced with a direct
threat to its security but does not extend NATO security guarantees.
Participation in PFP does not guarantee entry into NATO, but it is the
best preparation for states interested in becoming NATO members.
Who Has Joined
-- 26 countries: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Poland,
Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkmeni- stan, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan.
How It Works
-- Once a country has joined the PFP, it submits a Presentation Document
to NATO explaining what resources it will contribute to PFP activities
and the steps that it will take to meet PFP political goals, such as
democratic control of the military. To date, Albania, Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia,
Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden,
and Ukraine have submitted Presentation Documents.
-- A unique Individual Partnership Program (IPP) is then agreed to with
the alliance. IPPs set forth shared objectives (for instance,
establishing democratic control over military forces, developing
transparency in defense planning and budgetary processes, and developing
interoperability with NATO forces) and list activities planned to meet
those objectives.
-- NATO has reached agreement on IPPs with Albania, Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia, and Sweden. IPPs for several other partners are under
consideration.
-- Partners can assign personnel on a full-time basis to NATO
Headquarters in Brussels and to the Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC)
at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium.
-- Partners may participate in an optional Defense Planning and Review
Process (PARP) designed to evaluate and enhance a partner nation's
inter- operability with NATO. Participating states work with NATO to
develop interoperability objectives, which can be used to help refine
IPPs. As of May 12, 14 partners--Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Sweden, and Ukraine--are participating in PARP.
PFP Joint Military Exercises
-- 1994. Three joint military exercises were held, including
"Cooperative Bridge" in Poland, marking the first time NATO forces had
joined with former adversaries on the territory of a former Warsaw Pact
state.
-- 1995. Eleven exercises are planned in field, maritime, search and
rescue, and command-post functions. The U.S. will host a PFP field
training exercise at Fort Polk, Louisiana in August.
[BOX]
U.S. Policy in Brief
NATO's Partnership for Peace will strengthen its ties to Central Europe
and to the New Independent States. NATO will move forward with its
steady and deliberate process to accept new members, following the
approach laid out by the NATO ministers last December. And we will seek
a stronger relationship between NATO and Russia in parallel with NATO
expansion. In the process of NATO expansion, each potential member will
be judged individually, according to its capabilities and its commitment
to the principles of the NATO Treaty. The fundamental decisions will be
made by NATO, in consultation with potential members. The process will
be transparent to all and there will be no vetos by third parties.
--Secretary Christopher,
March 29,1995
[END BOX]
Organization for Security And Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
From Vancouver to Vladivostok, the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) brings a new kind of diplomacy--one built
on respect for human rights and regional cooperation as the bases for
security among Atlantic, European, and Eurasian countries.
Renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe at the
December 1994 Budapest Summit to reflect its increased role in European
security, the OSCE furthers European security and cooperation by
defining and protecting human rights. OSCE also fosters these goals
through programs centered on press and culture, economics, conflict
prevention, and military security. OSCE is committed to developing
democratic institutions at the grass-roots level, through local
officials and activities, and through non-governmental organizations.
Evolution of the OSCE
The OSCE began during the Cold War as a way to promote dialogue and
decrease tensions between East and West and was originally known as the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In August 1975,
35 nations signed the Helsinki Final Act, which outlines democratic
principles governing relations among nations. The act contained a
provision to continue regular discussions on a broad range of concerns--
from migration and military security to the environment and media
relations--in what became known as the "Helsinki process."
During the 1980s, follow-on meetings in Madrid, Stockholm, and Vienna
reviewed implementation of the then-CSCE agreements and continued the
opportunity for discussion. Although CSCE had no permanent headquarters
and no enforcement capability, important progress was made to establish
firm standards for the protection of human rights and to increase
confidence through the advance notification of military activities and
the exchange of military information.
With the end of the Cold War, all CSCE states for the first time
accepted the principles of pluralism and free markets as the basis for
their cooperation. This made it possible for CSCE to explore ways to act
on its rigorous principles and to ensure that they were upheld. To do
this CSCE, in 1990, established the Secretariat in Prague, Conflict
Prevention Center in Vienna, and Office for Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights in Warsaw. A decision to create an office of Secretary
General was made at the December 1992 Stockholm meeting of CSCE Foreign
Ministers.
During 1992, the decision to move from principle to action was most
marked in a new Helsinki document which established a number of
practical tools that help OSCE work with NATO, the European Union (EU),
and other international bodies to defend human rights and manage the
unprecedented changes now taking place in Europe. In particular, it sets
out an ambitious role for the OSCE in conflict resolution and
"preventive diplomacy."
The OSCE also is an important framework for conventional arms control in
Europe. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, signed in
November 1990, limits non-nuclear ground and air forces from the
Atlantic to the Urals. A separate political agreement, concluded in July
1992, covers personnel in the same region. Through continued
negotiation, confidence-building measures have been extended, and higher
expectations for treaty compliance and verification have been set. A new
security negotiation--the Forum for Security Cooperation--opened in
Vienna on September 22, 1992.
OSCE and European Conflicts
The OSCE is in the forefront of conflict resolution in various European
conflicts through preventive diplomacy and human rights monitoring.
-- Under OSCE auspices, the Minsk Group--11 nations, including
Azerbaijan and Armenia--is the focus of international efforts to solve
the crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh.
-- The OSCE mission in Georgia assesses the political and human rights
situations in the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia. It also
monitors peacekeeping forces and participates in political negotiations
in South Ossetia.
-- In December 1993, the then-CSCE established a mission to Tajikistan
in order to foster confidence-building, democracy, and human rights. In
addition, rapporteur missions have been sent to other new Central Asian
republics to assess the governmental and human rights situations.
-- The OSCE missions to Latvia and Estonia are mandated to promote
integration and better understanding between communities there.
-- In Moldova, the OSCE mission assists in seeking a solution to the
problems of the Transdniester region.
-- The OSCE mission to Ukraine, established in 1994, focuses on the
Crimea issue by enhancing dialogue and fostering a peaceful solution.
-- The OSCE mission in Bosnia supports the Ombudsmen of the federation.
-- Along with other international fora, such as the Contact Group and
the UN, the OSCE makes an important contribution to efforts to stop the
fighting in the former Yugoslavia and to help prevent any further spill-
over of hostilities. To this end, the OSCE has established a preventive
diplo-macy mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. OSCE
missions to Kosovo, Sandzak, and Vojvodina were established in 1992, but
were expelled by Belgrade authorities in July 1993. The OSCE also
assists in monitoring sanctions compliance in the countries around
Serbia and Monte-negro. There are now sanctions monitoring missions in
Hungary, Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, The Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, Romania, and Ukraine.
-- In April 1995, the OSCE established a long-term presence in Grozny to
promote human rights and a political settlement to the Chechnya
conflict.
As a charter member of the OSCE, the United States has been central in
the promotion of uncompromising humanitarian standards and their
practical implementation. This effort has embodied America's hopes for a
unified, democratic, and prosperous Europe. Americans continually have
worked to ensure that the OSCE process remains flexible, innovative, and
unbureaucratic. By establishing the first permanent delegation to the
then-CSCE in Vienna in August 1992, the United States charted the course
which other nations have followed.
[BOX]
OSCE Participating States
Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, The Holy See,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia,
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, San Marino,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan,
Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States,
Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia*
* Excluded from all OSCE meetings
[END BOX]
NATO Information Sources
NATO Information On-Line
NATO official documents and publications--communiques, press releases,
fact sheets, speeches, and newsletters--are available electronically on
the Internet through the NATO Integrated Data Service (NIDS). The
service also includes documentation from other NATO agencies and the
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). Information is
available on the Internet either by daily automatic electronic mail
distributions or through World Wide Web or "gopher" searches, as
follows:
-- For e-mail NATO general information: send the message SUB NATODATA
(followed by your first and last name) to:
LISTSERV@CC1.KULEUVEN.AC.BE
-- For e-mail NATO scientific and environmental information: send the
message SUB NATOSCI (followed by your first and last name) to:
LISTSERV@CC1.KULEUVEN.AC.BE
-- For NATO documents on the Internet gopher:
URL://GOPHER.NATO.INT:70/1
-- For NATO documents through the World Wide Web:
HTPP://WWW.NATO.INT/
Internet connections are widely available commercially, at low cost, on
subscription. All data provided by NATO through the NIDS is free of
charge. For further information, contact the NATO Integrated Data
Service, NATO Headquarters, 1110 Brussels, Belgium. Tel: (Int'l-32-2)
728. 4599. Fax: (Int'l-32-2) 728.4579. E-mail: NATODOC@ hq.nato.int.
NATO Publications
NATO Review. Published under the authority of the Secretary General,
NATO Review is a colorful and informative magazine which contributes to
the constructive discussion of Atlantic problems. Articles provide
insight into the changing nature of the NATO alliance and do not
necessarily represent official opinion or policy of member governments
or NATO.
The NATO Review is published six times a year in English, and also is
available in French--Revue de l'Otan; German--NATO Brief; Italian--
Notizie NATO; Danish--NATO Nyt; Dutch--NATO Kroniek; and Spanish--
Revista de la OTAN. Quarterly editions are published in Norwegian--NATO
Nytt; Greek--Deltio NATO; Portuguese--Noticias da OTAN; and Turkish--
NATO Dergisi.
The NATO Review is free of charge for persons or institutions who inform
the public about NATO affairs or who have a professional interest in
NATO information, including libraries, research institutions,
educational institutions--including school librarians and teachers--and
journalists.
NATO Handbook. A pocket-sized booklet covering all aspects of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Handbook is published as needed. It is
not a formal NATO document and does not, therefore, necessarily
represent the official opinion or position of member governments on all
policy issues involved. The NATO Handbook is free of charge to qualified
applicants of the NATO Review (see above).
U.S. Department of State Sources of NATO Information
The U.S. Department of State includes NATO information on its Internet,
CD-ROM, and print publication resources, as follows:
Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN). On the Internet,
DOSFAN provides global access to a timely array of official U.S. foreign
policy information, including speeches and testimony by senior
officials, plus the official weekly publication, Dispatch; Background
Notes on countries and international organizations; congressional
reports; daily press briefing transcripts; and much more. To access
DOSFAN:
Gopher: dosfan.lib.uic.edu
URL: gopher://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/
WWW: http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/dosfan.html
U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-ROM (USFAC). USFAC is a compact, fully
searchable foreign policy library, offering more than 4,000 official
documents from 1990 through the present. USFAC archives DOSFAN and is
published quarterly. One-year subscriptions for USFAC (four discs per
year) are priced at $80 ($100 foreign) per year and also are available
from the U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh,
PA 15250-7954. To order, call (202) 512-1800 or fax: (202) 512-2250.
U.S. Department of State Dispatch. Dispatch is the official record of
U.S. foreign policy and includes major speeches and congressional
testimony by the President, Secretary of State, and senior U.S.
officials, plus fact sheets, treaty actions, and more. Subscriptions,
which include all supplemental issues and six-month indexes, are priced
at $91 domestic third-class postage; $144 domestic first-class; $113.75
foreign and are available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954.
To order, call (202) 512-1800 or fax: (202) 512-2250.
[BOX]
How to Order
Readers in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom may obtain
copies of the NATO Review and the NATO Handbook from the addresses
below. Requests should indicate how the magazine will be used to inform
the public about NATO. Readers in other countries who desire copies of
the English-language or other editions of the NATO Review, as well as
other NATO publications, should contact the NATO Office of Information
and Press (see below) or by e-mail:
NATODOC @HQ.NATO.INT
United States
NATO Review
U.S. Mission to NATO
PSC-81, Box 200
APO-AE 09724
Canada
Domestic Communications Division
Department of External Affairs
125 Sussex Drive
Ottawa, Ontario K1A OG2
United Kingdom
Assistant Chief
Public Relations Central
Ministry of Defence
Room 0384 Main Building
London SW1A 2HB
Other Countries
NATO Office of Information and Press
1110 Brussels, Belgium
Fax: (Int'l-32-2) 728-4579 (###)
[End Box]
[END OF DISPATCH VOL 6, NO 23]
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