US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 23, JUNE 5, 1995
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:

1.  Charting a Transatlantic Agenda for the 21st Century -- Secretary 
Christopher
2.  Reinforcing NATO's Strength in the West and Deepening Coopeeration 
With the East--Secretary Christopher
3.  UN-NATO Launch Airstrikes Against Bosnian Serbs -- President Clinton 
4.  Russia Crosses the Threshold into Active Engagement With NATO -- 
Secretary Christopher
5.  Broadening and Deepening the Partnership for Peace -- Secretary 
Christopher
6.  Contact Group Ministers Urge Strengthening of UNPROFOR -- Secretary 
Christopher, Contact Group Statement
7.  Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council:  Final Communique
8.  NAC Ministerial Statement on the Situation in Former Yugoslavia
9.  Reaffirming Close Relations Between the U.S. and Portugal -- 
Secretary Christopher
10.Fact Sheets--
     North Atlantic Treaty Organization
     NATO Partnership for Peace
     Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
     NATO Information Sources



ARTICLE 1:

Charting a Transatlantic Agenda for the 21st Century
Secretary Christopher
Address at Casa de America, Madrid, Spain, June 2, 1995

Thank you, Director Remiro, for that kind introduction. Since its 
founding several years ago, CERI has already established itself as a 
leader in foreign policy research. I also want to thank Ambassador 
Garrigues and the Casa de America for co-hosting this event. I feel at 
home here--not only because of the name and purpose of this respected 
institution, but because the Ambassador served as Spain's Consul General 
in my home city of Los Angeles.

There is no more appropriate place to discuss the transatlantic 
partnership than Spain--a true Atlantic nation. As a member of both NATO 
and the European Union, you have placed your future in the vibrant 
mainstream of Europe and the transatlantic community of democracies. The 
spirit of renewal so evident here in Madrid is a tribute to King Juan 
Carlos, to Spain's democratic leadership, and to the determination of 
the Spanish people.

For half a century, the transatlantic partnership between the United 
States and Europe has been the leading force for peace and prosperity, 
not only in our countries, but around the globe. Together, the Old World 
and the New World have created a better world.

Together we helped transform former adversaries into allies and 
dictatorships into democracies. We built the institutions that ensured 
our security and economic strength--most important, NATO and the EU. We 
created the great institutions of global cooperation--the UN, the IMF 
and the World Bank, the OECD, the GATT, and now the WTO. By standing 
steadfast through the Cold War, we have brought a democratic, undivided 
Europe within reach
.
These are truly epic achievements. But at the threshold of the new 
century, there is another new world to shape--with challenges no less 
critical than those faced by our counterparts half a century ago. 
Terrorism, international crime, aggressive nationalism, and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction threaten our security. 
Global problems like environmental degradation, unsustainable population 
growth, and mass movements of refugees undermine emerging democracies 
and the prosperity of all nations. The new global economy offers great 
prospects for growth but also brings wrenching dislocation as our 
industries and workers seek to adapt
.
Although the world remains a dangerous place, our opportunities are 
enormous. Open societies and open markets are on the march. We have the 
opportunity to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons, enhance our 
prosperity, and, for the first time in history, build an integrated, 
undivided, peaceful Europe.

Nevertheless, there are those who question whether Europe and the United 
States have the will to maintain our partnership to meet these new 
dangers and seize these opportunities. In the absence of a single 
unifying threat, and at a time of understandable focus on domestic 
concerns, some argue that the ties that bind us are fraying and that 
America and Europe will inevitably drift apart.

I reject that view. From World War II to our strong support for German 
unification, the United States and Europe have shared a common destiny. 
But we must not take this relationship for granted. It cannot be 
sustained by nostalgia. Every generation must renew the partnership by 
adapting it to meet the challenges of its time. It is our responsibility 
to build the partnership that will ensure that, by working together, our 
next 50 years will be as great as the last. To achieve this goal, we 
must widen our horizons and lift our aspirations.

I believe this goal is shared on both sides of the Atlantic. In recent 
months, a number of European leaders have set forth their ideas on this 
very theme. President Clinton and Prime Minister Major discussed this 
issue when they met earlier this spring. 

I have come to Madrid, on behalf of the President, to say that the 
United States welcomes this transatlantic dialogue. It is timely. It is 
constructive. And it should be intensified--to reaffirm our common 
purpose, to advance a common vision, and to forge a common transatlantic 
agenda for the 21st century. Today I want to suggest goals for our 
common agenda and how we might strengthen our ability to achieve them 
together.

A Comprehensive Strategy for European Security

In this year in which we commemorate the 50th anniversary of V-E Day, we 
cannot forget that security comes first. It is the bedrock of our 
partnership and the guarantor of our freedom. That is why President 
Clinton is pursuing a comprehensive strategy for European security based 
on America's continuing commitment to remain engaged on the continent.

That strategy has five key elements: adapting and enlarging NATO; 
strengthening the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; 
supporting Europe's integration and EU enlargement; enhancing a European 
security and defense identity complementary to NATO; and engaging Russia 
in Europe's security structures.

NATO remains the central security pillar for Europe and the core 
institution for linking the security of North America to Europe. In the 
last five years, NATO has undertaken sweeping changes to match the sweep 
of Europe's transformation.

I have just come from the NATO ministerial meeting in the Netherlands, 
where we took important steps to advance these goals. Russia's decision 
at that meeting to cross the threshold into active engagement with NATO 
puts into place an important element of our comprehensive strategy. We 
also reviewed the great progress made in just a year-and-a-half by the 
Partnership for Peace--NATO's mechanism to deepen cooperation with 
Europe's new democracies. And we reaffirmed that the alliance remains on 
a steady course toward enlargement.

These efforts are strengthening the security pillar of the transatlantic 
relationship to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War world. But for 
our partnership to thrive, it must be comprehensive. That means taking 
specific steps in the economic and political arenas that will complement 
and reinforce our security relationship.

The Economic Dimension

Deepening our economic relationship is central to this agenda; it 
undergirds not only our prosperity, but also our security. Although our 
ties have expanded with the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America, it is 
important to recall that the United States and Europe enjoy the largest 
combined external trade and investment relationship in the world today.

American exports to EU countries and European investment in the United 
States support over 7 million American workers. All told, Europe 
accounts for almost half the foreign revenues of American firms. Our 
investment in Europe alone roughly equals that in the rest of the world 
put together. And since the Berlin Wall fell, the United States has 
become the top foreign investor in Central and Eastern Europe.

Together, the United States and Europe have led the world toward open 
markets and greater prosperity. Our cooperation made possible every 
global trade agreement from the Kennedy Round to the Uruguay Round. 
Through the G-7, we work to stimulate global growth. And at the OECD, we 
are developing strategies to overcome structural unemployment and adapt 
to demographic change.

A hallmark of the Clinton presidency is its focus on global economic 
growth and expanding trade. Indeed, President Clinton is advancing the 
most ambitious international economic agenda of any American President 
in half a century.

In addition to implementing the North American Free Trade Agreement, his 
efforts include leading the way to the Miami agreement to complete 
negotiations on a free trade area in the Americas by the year 2005. He 
also helped forge APEC's decision to achieve free and open trade and 
investment in the Asia-Pacific region by 2020. None of these efforts 
will raise barriers to nonparticipants or exclude any economic sector. 
And they will meet the requirements of the new World Trade Organization.

Our vision for the economic relationship between Europe and the United 
States must be no less ambitious. The long-term objective is the 
integration of the economies of North America and Europe, consistent 
with the principles of the WTO.

We should undertake a transatlantic economic initiative to multiply 
trade and investment and create new, high-paying jobs on both sides of 
the Atlantic. It will make us an even more powerful engine of the global 
economy. It will align our efforts to promote transatlantic integration 
with the forces of integration around the world. And it will, like our 
other efforts, reinforce the open global trading system to the benefit 
of all nations.

Thoughtful observers from Europe, Canada, and the United States have 
proposed that we seek a Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement. EU 
Commissioner Leon Brittan has launched a study of this proposal, and we, 
too, intend to give it the serious study it deserves, with its 
considerable potential to form an element of our overall strategy. There 
are, of course, important issues that need to be addressed. For example, 
any free trade agreement must advance our overriding objective of global 
trade liberalization, be consistent with an effective WTO, and not 
disadvantage less-developed countries.

Even as we undertake these studies, there are concrete measures that we 
can take in the near term to eliminate trade barriers progressively and 
deepen our integration, building on the momentum we achieved in the 
Uruguay Round.

First, we can create a comprehensive investment regime. The vast region 
from Honolulu to Helsinki is essentially a common investment area 
without common ground rules. We should promptly negotiate a Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment as agreed by OECD ministers last month.

Second, the United States and the EU need to develop more flexible rules 
to widen market access and spur innovation in information technology 
fields. At stake is open competition in one of the most dynamic sectors 
of the global economy.

Third, the United States and the EU should work to eliminate barriers to 
trade that result from differences in product standards and testing 
systems--and do so without compromising health or safety. Incompatible 
standards inhibit billions of dollars in new trade.

Fourth, we should open our skies. The aviation agreements we will soon 
complete with nine European countries will make transatlantic travel 
easier and cheaper and will spur trade and investment.

The United States and the EU should also work together to complete the 
unfinished business of the Uruguay Round. We must move forward to reach 
agreements to liberalize financial services within the next month--and 
telecommunications within the next year. And we must work to overcome 
our differences in key sectors such as audiovisual products and 
services.

Trade means competition--and vigorous competition is healthy for our 
relationship and for our economies as well. But that competition must be 
fair. American businesses operate under the appropriate constraints of 
legislation barring bribery of foreign officials. Our nations made a 
commitment to address this problem multilaterally through the OECD last 
year. We must make progress now.

The private sector is the driving force in our economic relationship, 
and its leaders should have a larger voice in shaping our agenda. The 
Pacific Business Forum has helped propel the APEC process; the 
Transatlantic Business Dialogue launched by Commerce Secretary Ron Brown 
and Commissioners Bangemann and Brittan can do the same for 
transatlantic economic integration. I know that this is a special 
interest of Foreign Minister Solana, with whom I discussed this issue 
last night.

Global Political Cooperation

The United States and Europe are partners not only for prosperity, but 
in promoting stability, human dignity, and opportunity around the world. 
We share common interests and a common responsibility to lead. The 
political dimension of our proposed agenda will allow us to shape a 
world more conducive to our interests and consistent with our ideals.

First, we must intensify our efforts to halt the spread of weapons of 
mass destruction and their delivery systems. The indefinite extension of 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty last month would not have happened without 
the leadership of the United States and our European partners. The same 
leadership will be needed to achieve a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and 
a global ban on the production of fissile materials; to bring the 
Chemical Weapons Convention into force; and to strengthen the Biological 
Weapons Convention. We must also bolster our common support for 
dismantling nuclear weapons and safeguarding nuclear materials in the 
former Soviet states.

Second, we must strengthen our cooperation against international crime, 
terrorism, and narcotics trafficking. The United States and Europe have 
collaborated to combat money laundering through the Financial Action 
Task Force. Regular meetings of top American and European anti-narcotics 
officials could strengthen our arsenal in the fight against drugs. Those 
who traffic in weapons, narcotics, and human lives recognize no national 
borders. We must make sure they have nowhere to hide.

Third, we must coordinate our humanitarian and development assistance 
more effectively. Ninety percent of all global humanitarian assistance 
is provided by the United States, the European Commission, and the 
member states of the EU. We need to build on our successful joint 
experience, providing food relief to the Caucasus and technical 
assistance to Central Europe to develop a common strategy and to 
coordinate priorities, especially at a time when we all face financial 
constraints. More generally, we need to broaden our cooperation to 
address a range of emerging global problems. Our joint efforts in Cairo 
made the International Conference on Population and Development a 
success. And our annual high-level environmental dialogue has helped 
pave the way for multilateral initiatives like the Berlin Climate 
Conference and major agreements such as the Montreal Protocol. The joint 
program for cooperation between the United States and Japan--"the Common 
Agenda" embracing issues ranging from population to health, the 
environment, science and technology--provides a model of the concrete 
and high-impact opportunities for collaboration. I hope we can forge a 
comparable common agenda in the transatlantic area. Human rights, too, 
is an area where, working together, we can enhance our impact. We can 
maximize our effectiveness by cooperating closely.

Fourth, we must bolster our cooperation in regions where the United 
States and Europe share common interests and historic ties--for example, 
the Middle East. With EU support, the 1991 Madrid Conference launched 
the most promising opportunity for Arab-Israeli peace in two 
generations. Now is the time to make that promise real by more 
effectively coordinating our economic assistance and working together to 
bring into being the Middle East Development Bank proposed by Egypt, 
Jordan, Israel, and the PLO. And at the Amman summit this October, 
together we can build on the start we made in Casablanca last year to 
generate the private investment that is so essential to lasting peace 
and prosperity in the region. 

We should also expand our cooperation in the Mediterranean, an area of 
vital interest to the EU and the United States. Spain has played a key 
role in advancing the EU's initiative on this important region, and we 
look forward to cooperating with you as the Barcelona Conference 
approaches. We can also explore new ways to work together to sustain 
democracy in the Americas, an area where Spain is an especially valuable 
partner.

Cooperation in Europe

Of course, nowhere is our regional cooperation more important than 
meeting the new challenges and opportunities facing Europe itself. We in 
the United States know too well that our security is at risk when 
Europe's is imperiled. And we have a common interest in assuring that 
the historic transformations now underway in Central Europe and the 
former Soviet Union are consolidated--and that these countries become 
integrated into our transatlantic community.

We have worked closely together to coordinate our assistance through the 
G-24, the World Bank, and the IMF. Our financial and technical 
assistance is helping countries like Russia, Ukraine, and Poland to free 
prices, privatize industry, and ease the pain of dislocation. Our 
economic assistance efforts are complemented by our support for durable 
democratic institutions throughout Central and Eastern Europe and the 
New Independent States. Together, the European Union and the United 
States are a vital force for stability in the region.

We are also advancing European integration by extending our economic and 
security relations to the east. Our steady program for enlarging NATO is 
reinforced by the steps being taken by the EU. The prospects for 
stability in Europe's new democracies are unmistakably linked to their 
potential for prosperity--and to our willingness to open our markets to 
their goods.

The EU does more than open its markets to the new economies of the 
region, however. It provides incentive and shelter for the development 
of civil societies that are the surest guarantee for stability and 
security. And it encourages the resolution of ancient enmities, today in 
Central Europe as after World War II between France and Germany.

As we look to the future, the United States and the EU should work 
together to develop new areas for common action aimed at assisting the 
new democracies of Central Europe. For example:

-- We could help these states to cope better with the scourge of 
organized crime through efforts such as the International Law 
Enforcement Academy in Budapest;

-- We could promote the development of citizens groups and NGOs that can 
help build democratic societies from the ground up; and

-- We could refocus our technical assistance to ensure that the basic 
structures of a modern market economy are fully in place as the Central 
European countries make the transition from aid to trade.

The United States and the EU also have a special interest in supporting 
a democratic Turkey, integrated into the transatlantic community. Turkey 
is at the strategic crossroads of the Balkans, the Middle East, and the 
former Soviet states. We hope that the European Parliament will ratify 
the critically important customs union agreement between the EU and 
Turkey. At the same time, we strongly encourage Turkey to move ahead 
with democratic reform and strengthen the protection of human rights. We 
are also redoubling our efforts to achieve a political settlement--long 
overdue--in Cyprus prior to the start of EU accession talks.

The terrible conflict in Bosnia remains the single-greatest threat to 
our vision of an integrated Europe at peace. The United States and 
Europe are working together, although it is clear to all that we have 
not achieved the results we seek. We have sought to contain the 
conflict, to alleviate suffering, and find a lasting peaceful settlement 
to the war. On behalf of the American people, I want to thank our 
European allies, Spain among them, who have put their troops and 
personnel in harm's way to help the people of the former Yugoslavia and 
to uphold the principles of the international community. We believe that 
a strengthened UNPROFOR is the best insurance against an even worse 
humanitarian disaster that would follow its withdrawal. That is why this 
week, the Contact Group and others have undertaken efforts to reinforce 
UNPROFOR's ability to carry out its mission safely and effectively. The 
United States will continue to coordinate closely, through NATO, the 
United Nations, and the Contact Group.

One of the few bright spots in the midst of the Bosnian tragedy has been 
the agreement of the Muslim and Croat communities to end their conflict 
and establish a bicommunal federation. The United States and the EU have 
joined forces to help support this enterprise through the Friends of the 
Federation--helping to keep alive hopes for preserving a multi-ethnic 
society in Bosnia. This is a model for the joint initiatives that we 
should develop for the future.

The Way Ahead

To achieve the ambitious agenda I have set forth today, we must enhance 
our ability to work together more effectively. This will require 
commitment on three fronts.

First, the United States and Europe must remain engaged in the world, on 
our own and as partners. Our nations have the unique capacity to provide 
global leadership. We must resist the siren songs heard in so many 
capitals of isolation and withdrawal.

Second, the United States looks to Europe to be a strong partner for the 
United States and a capable actor on the world stage. Of course, the 
choice of mechanisms is for EU members themselves to decide. But the 
United States has a clear interest in Europe's continued integration and 
its enhanced ability in foreign and security policy. And the EU should 
move ahead with its historic process of enlargement. 

Forty years ago today, six European foreign ministers gathered in a 
monastery in Messina to launch a process that ultimately led to the 
Treaty of Rome and the establishment of the European Communities. 
Tomorrow, history will be made in Messina once again, as the EU under 
Spanish Chairmanship meets to plan the ambitious Intergovernmental 
Conference. The objective, as President Truman's Under Secretary of 
State Robert Lovett said in 1948, "should continue to be the 
progressively closer integration, both economic and political, of 
presently free Europe, and eventually of as much of Europe as becomes 
free."

Finally, we must strengthen the mechanisms of our cooperation. We must 
take advantage of immediate opportunities, such as the upcoming summit 
between President Clinton and Presidents Chirac and Santer, to define 
common goals and to advance them more systematically. In the next six 
months, the United States looks forward to working closely with the 
Spanish presidency of the European Union to develop more fully our 
common agenda. By the end of the year, we should have developed a broad-
ranging transatlantic agenda for the new century--an agenda for common 
economic and political action to expand democracy, prosperity, and 
stability. Between now and the end of the year, we are prepared to 
engage seriously with representatives of the EU to forge this agenda.

Closer government ties are essential, but in a time of generational 
change on both sides of the Atlantic, we need to deepen our interaction 
at every level. We should call on business leaders to tell us what must 
be done to tear down barriers to trade and investment in Central and 
Eastern Europe and between North America and Western Europe. We should 
encourage our elected representatives to intensify their contacts, from 
parliamentary exchanges to sister cities. We should broaden the academic 
and cultural exchanges to enrich our deepest ties of all--those between 
our people.

We must act now, for as President Kennedy told a European audience in 
1963, "time and the world do not stand still. Change is the law of life. 
And those who look only to the past are certain to miss the future." I 
know that the partnership that brought us to this hopeful point in 
history will continue to shape the future as boldly as it shaped the 
past.

Thank you very much. (###)



ARTICLE 2:

Reinforcing NATO's Strength in the West and Deepening Cooperation With 
the East 
Secretary Christopher
Opening statement at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, 
Noordwijk, The Netherlands, May 30, 1995

Mr. Secretary General, distinguished colleagues and friends: I am 
honored to join you once again as President d'Honneur of the North 
Atlantic Council. I would like to welcome those ministers who have 
joined us since our last meeting in December. On behalf of all the 
members of the council, let me extend to you the assurance of the close 
cooperation that is the strength of this alliance.

Fifty years since the end of World War II, our ministerial meeting marks 
an important occasion for reflection. We have begun to put in place a 
comprehensive security architecture that will advance peace and 
stability across Europe.

NATO remains the central security pillar of Europe and the core 
institution for linking the security of North America to Europe. In the 
last five years, NATO has undertaken sweeping changes to match the sweep 
of Europe's transformation.

While maintaining NATO's core defensive role, we are adapting its 
military forces to address the new demands of crisis management and 
peacekeeping. We are supporting a capable European defense identity and 
a broader role for the Western European Union. We are building enduring 
ties between NATO and the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. 
And tomorrow, the alliance will take an important step to develop its 
dialogue with Russia.

Three weeks ago in Moscow, Russia agreed to proceed with its 
participation in the Partnership for Peace and to move ahead with a 
broader dialogue with NATO. We welcome that development. Russia's 
decision to deepen its cooperation with Europe and North America 
enhances our ability to achieve our common goal of a truly integrated 
Europe.

Under the Partnership for Peace, Russia and the allies will conduct 
military exchanges, hold joint military exercises, and train together 
for peacekeeping. Beyond the Partnership, we will pursue an extensive 
dialogue on vital security issues, including non-proliferation and 
nuclear security. At tomorrow's 16-plus-1 meeting with Russia's Foreign 
Minister Kozyrev, and in the months ahead, we will launch this dialogue 
to define the framework for an expanded relationship with Russia.

The NATO-Russia relationship we are pursuing complements the other 
elements of our strategy: strengthening the Partnership for Peace, 
further strengthening the OSCE, and maintaining steady progress toward 
enlargement of both NATO and the European Union. 

The Partnership for Peace gives form and substance to the new 
cooperative relationship between the alliance and its former 
adversaries. The Partnership has made impressive progress since last 
December. In my intervention today, I will put forward several proposals 
to strengthen the Partnership for the future.

Since its creation, NATO has always been open to adding new members. The 
process of enlargement is moving forward along the same steady, 
transparent course the allies set last year. We have begun to examine 
how enlargement will occur and its implications for European security. 
We will present our conclusions to interested partners this fall.

Each of these steps is an essential part of our effort to build a 
comprehensive security architecture for Europe. As we continue to adapt 
NATO, we must also continue our support for other institutions of 
security and economic cooperation. European integration, bolstered by 
the European Union, is helping to extend prosperity to all of Europe. 
And the strengthened Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
can and should play a central role in conflict prevention and crisis 
management.

This comprehensive strategy for European security will strengthen our 
ability in the future to prevent the kind of conflicts we are witnessing 
in the former Yugoslavia. Later today, we will have an opportunity to 
discuss in detail recent events in Bosnia. We look forward to discussing 
with all our NATO allies, including many valued troop contributors, the 
very important understandings we reached last night in the Contact 
Group. These include our conviction that UNPROFOR should remain in 
Bosnia, with the means to ensure it can carry out its mission safely and 
effectively. We also emphasized the need to sustain our vigorous 
diplomatic efforts. In the meantime, we unanimously agreed that the 
Bosnian Serbs must end their violations of UN resolutions and release 
all detained UN personnel immediately. 

Our entire agenda today reminds us of the great importance of European 
integration--a process that has been fundamentally linked to the broader 
transatlantic relationship since the Marshall Plan years. Over the last 
several months, several of my colleagues in this room have made 
important contributions to our dialogue on reinforcing the bonds between 
Europe and the United States. I intend to address this timely set of 
issues later this week in Madrid. I will emphasize America's willingness 
to bolster the transatlantic relationship by taking additional steps to 
strengthen our political consultations and economic ties. 

I will also reaffirm the unshakable commitment of the United States to 
remain engaged in Europe--through this alliance and through our 
involvement in the other great institutions of security and economic 
cooperation. President Clinton is determined that America will continue 
to stand by its commitments to its European allies and to its friends 
around the world.

Thank you.


Intervention at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting,
Noordwijk, The Netherlands, May 30, 1995

Mr. Secretary General, distinguished colleagues: Eighteen months ago in 
Brussels, I said this alliance had to make a historic choice: whether to 
embrace innovation or risk irrelevance. The choice that we made weeks 
later at the January 1994 Brussels Summit was clear, and today, so is 
the record.

At that summit, the alliance took  a series of momentous decisions, 
building on the landmark London Summit of 1990. As 16 allies, united by 
common values and purpose, we reinforced NATO's strength in the West and 
extended a hand of cooperation to the East. 

Today, we continue our historic enterprise. We also broaden our 
endeavor, as Russia becomes a full participant in the Partnership for 
Peace, and we inaugurate a new NATO-Russia dialogue.

Earlier this morning, I outlined my views on the key areas of action for 
this North Atlantic Council ministerial.

First, we will review the progress of the Partnership for Peace and 
prepare a plan of action for the future.

Second, we should reaffirm our agreed timetable for completing our study 
on enlargement and for presenting its results to partners. Our goal 
should be to complete the presentations in time to permit thorough 
analysis of the results before our next ministerial in December.

Third, we will launch tomorrow the beginning of a new era in NATO-Russia 
relations--a critical component of Europe's evolving security 
architecture.

Let me begin by reviewing the progress of the Partnership for Peace. Two 
years ago, the Partnership was a vision--in part, the vision of my late 
colleague, Les Aspin. Today, it is action. It is British soldiers 
exercising on Polish soil. It is Czechs and Belgians working side-by-
side in Partnership offices. This summer it will be soldiers from the 
Baltics in the bayous of Louisiana. With 26 members, the Partnership for 
Peace has become a vibrant and integral part of Europe's security 
structure.

At our last meeting in December, we called for establishment of a 
defense planning and review process by early 1995. We have met that 
goal; indeed, 14 partners are already participating.  This process will 
promote greater openness in defense planning and budgeting among our 
nations. It will improve the ability of partners to work with allies in 
future joint missions. Moreover, it will provide aspiring NATO members 
with valuable experience in allied practices and procedures.

The alliance also agreed in December on a substantial exercise program 
that will build toward more complex and varied training scenarios. Here, 
too, we have made impressive progress. The rigorous agenda for 1995 
includes 11 joint exercises and more than 100 other activities. Partners 
are working with NATO on many aspects of peacekeeping and humanitarian 
operations, from delivery of assistance by air to search-and-rescue at 
sea. The United States will be hosting a major exercise at Fort Polk, 
Louisiana, this August, that will include a significant number of allies 
and partners. And even as we meet, American soldiers are in Ukraine, 
training with Ukrainian forces in the spirit of the Partnership. We 
believe there are a number of promising areas in which we could 
intensify the political and military relationship between NATO and its 
partners.

First, agreement on a set of principles for civilian and democratic 
control of the military could help guide our partners in their national 
reform efforts.

Second, a joint defense planning and review process committee could help 
us explore the possibility of expanding the Partnership's focus to 
include all armed forces of the partners, not just those dedicated to 
peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks. The committee could also recommend 
measures for adapting partners' military doctrine and forces to NATO's.

Third, we can find ways to enable partners to play a more active, 
substantive role in the planning of partnership activities and 
exercises.

Fourth, we can engage partners more routinely in the substantive 
activities of the NAC and NATO senior committees.

Finally, the resources that NATO dedicates to the Partnership could be 
increased significantly. 

In order to maintain the Partnership's momentum, NATO must provide 
sufficient resources. NATO has taken the important first step of 
adopting a comprehensive funding policy for this purpose. We need to do 
more.

We expect each partner to undertake the long- and short-term planning 
necessary to ensure its own participation in Partnership activities. 
Several partners have already included the Partnership for Peace in 
their national budgets and made other adjustments reflecting their firm 
commitment to the partnership and to relations with NATO. Others should 
follow.

Even though partners must bear the responsibility for their 
participation in the Partnership, we must recognize that some will need 
assistance getting started. If we want the Partnership to succeed--a 
goal that serves all our interests--each NATO member must be willing to 
do its part to help.

This fiscal year, the United States is providing $30 million in 
bilateral assistance directly related to the Partnership. As President 
Clinton pledged in Warsaw last July, his budget request for fiscal year 
1996 designates $100 million to help our new partners work with us to 
advance the partnership's goals.
The Partnership for Peace is firmly established as a central feature of 
Europe's new security architecture. In less than two years, the 
Partnership is achieving its broad purposes. It is providing its members 
a permanent association with NATO, a vital link to virtually all that 
NATO is and does. And for those partners that aspire to join the 
alliance, it is helping to develop the common standards and practices 
that will enable a smooth transition to becoming an effective ally.

In January 1994, at President Clinton's initiative, the alliance 
launched a historic process that will lead to admission of new members 
from the democracies to the east. That process is now moving forward 
according to schedule. NATO's study on how enlargement will occur is 
making good progress and should be completed this summer. This will 
allow us to complete presentations on the study in Brussels and partner 
capitals in time to thoroughly assess the way forward at our December 
meeting.

NATO enlargement remains an essential part of our strategy to build a 
more integrated Europe of democracies at peace. It is essential that our 
efforts to integrate these states remain open and inclusive. Each 
prospective member should be considered individually, on a case-by-case 
basis. Above all, we must not let one set of arbitrary lines across 
Europe be replaced with another.

Clearly, it is in the interest of every NATO ally and partner that 
Russia participate constructively in building a more secure and 
integrated Europe. We welcome Russia's decision to proceed with its 
participation in the Partnership for Peace and to move ahead to fashion 
a broader relationship with the alliance.

An enhanced NATO-Russia relationship is the next important element of 
our overall strategy for European security. This relationship can 
reinforce European security and contribute to NATO's fundamental goals.

The first component of this relationship will be the Partnership for 
Peace. As it does with our other partners, the Partnership for Peace 
will help build our cooperation with the Russian military. Russia's 
Individual Partnership Program envisions continued exchanges in both 
directions. Russian and allied troops will participate in multinational 
exercises and train together for real-world peacekeeping operations.

Outside the Partnership, we will hold political consultations with 
Russia on a number of critical security issues where Russia has special 
interests or capabilities. These include nuclear non-proliferation, 
implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention, building confidence in the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, as well as nuclear safety and 
the prevention of nuclear smuggling. 

We should be prepared to go beyond these initial elements and develop 
the NATO-Russia relationship further. To this end, we welcome tomorrow's 
16-plus-1 meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev. We urge an 
immediate start to the dialogue on the direction our relationship should 
take. I hope we can define a framework of goals and objectives for an 
expanded relationship by the time of our next ministerial meeting in 
Brussels. This process should proceed in rough parallel with NATO's 
enlargement. As Russia progresses with democratic reform and 
demonstrates respect for international norms, we can deepen this 
relationship even further.

Ukraine is also critical. With its size and position, and its history of 
subjugation and upheaval, it is a linchpin of European security. NATO's 
strategy and evolution must take into account this country's strategic 
importance as well as its historic decision to give up nuclear weapons, 
to build democratic institutions, and to pursue free market reform. The 
United States believes that the door to greater cooperation and 
integration with the West should be open to countries that take the bold 
and difficult steps that Ukraine has taken.

We must also sustain our important progress in another new area of focus 
for NATO--fighting the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The 
diplomacy that members of this alliance brought to bear made a decisive 
contribution to the indefinite extension of the nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty last month. We welcome the development of new 
channels for consultation on non-proliferation matters with Russia and 
other NACC partners.

NATO is at the core of our strategy for strengthening security in 
Europe, but it is not the exclusive forum. Our comprehensive strategy 
envisions strong, interlocking institutions of security and economic 
cooperation, each with special and complementary strengths. That is why, 
last December, our heads of state and government took important steps to 
bolster the effectiveness of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe.

With its broad membership and extensive commitments on human rights, the 
OSCE is uniquely equipped to address the root causes of conflict in 
Europe. Its potential is especially evident in Chechnya--where it 
represents the only official international presence. As our communique 
will emphasize, we are profoundly troubled by the continued war in 
Chechnya. This tragedy has killed thousands of innocent civilians, 
damaged reform, and hurt Russia's standing in the international 
community. We urge the Russian authorities to cooperate with the OSCE 
mission to permit the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian relief and to 
reach a genuine political solution to that conflict.

Let me also emphasize the continuing support of the United States for a 
more capable European defense identity--one that will strengthen our 
flexibility, support European integration, and result in a more balanced 
sharing of burdens. The alliance should continue to strengthen its 
relations with the Western European Union. The benefits of improved 
cooperation are already evident in the conduct of the joint NATO-WEU 
Operation Sharp Guard. Similarly, we should redouble our efforts to 
complete development of the Combined Joint Task Force concept. CJTF will 
enable NATO to conduct the full range of its missions more efficiently, 
allow the WEU to make use of alliance assets, and facilitate operations 
with non-members of the alliance.

As I said this morning, this comprehensive strategy for European 
security will strengthen our ability in the future to prevent the kind 
of tragic conflict we are witnessing in the former Yugoslavia. Let me 
say first that our allies with personnel on the ground have shown 
remarkable courage and leadership in standing firm in conditions of 
great threat and adversity. We all owe a debt of gratitude to our NATO 
allies and all the nations that have placed their troops and personnel 
in harm's way to uphold the principles of the international community.

Later today, we will all have an opportunity to discuss the 
understandings that the Contact Group ministers reached last night in 
five key areas:

First, we agreed that UNPROFOR should remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina to 
carry out its important mission.

Second, we agreed that UNPROFOR should move rapidly to reduce the 
vulnerability of its forces, by regrouping units and avoiding activities 
that could unduly endanger their safety.

Third, we should take steps to assure the freedom of movement and safety 
of UNPROFOR personnel. We intend to ask our military experts to examine 
promptly the specific proposals of France, the United Kingdom, and 
others with a view toward achieving that objective.

Fourth, we agreed on the need to enhance the capability and strength of 
UNPROFOR to assure that it can carry out its mission safely and 
effectively--and the United States intends to provide appropriate 
support to that end.

Fifth, we agreed to continue to pursue our efforts to obtain recognition 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Serbia and to achieve an effective closure of 
the border between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The diplomatic efforts of the Contact Group remain the basis for 
achieving a political solution to this conflict. The United States will 
continue to lend its vigorous support to those efforts.

Speaking as the representative of President Clinton and the American 
people, let me assure you that America's engagement in Europe and in 
NATO is as firm and unshakable as ever. The United States has enduring 
political, security, economic, and cultural links to Europe that must 
and will be preserved. NATO will remain the anchor of American power and 
purpose in Europe. We will continue to maintain approximately 100,000 
American troops on European soil. We will continue to help preserve 
peace and prosperity for the next 50 years and beyond--this time for the 
entire continent.

Thank you very much. (###)



ARTICLE 3:

UN-NATO Launch Airstrikes Against Bosnian Serbs
Statement by President Clinton released by the White House, Office of 
the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, May 25, 1995.

I welcome the decision of the UN and NATO to launch airstrikes today 
against a Bosnian Serb ammunition site following the violence of the 
past several days in and around Sarajevo. This action was taken in 
response to Bosnian Serb defiance of yesterday's UNPROFOR demand for the 
return of heavy weapons to designated weapons' collection points in 
accord with existing agreements.

This action should help NATO and the UN sustain their ability to ease 
suffering in the region. I hope that today's airstrikes will convince 
the Bosnian Serb leadership to end their violations of the exclusion 
zone and comply with their other agreements with the UN.

I appreciate the courage and dedication of the UN forces on the ground 
in the former Yugoslavia and trust that this evidence of UN and NATO 
determination will serve to enhance the ability of these forces to 
remain and perform their missions. (###)



ARTICLE 4:

Russia Crosses the Threshold Into Active Engagement With NATO
Secretary Christopher
Statement at the North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting with Russian 
Foreign Minister Kozyrev, Noordwijk, The Netherlands, May 31, 1995

Mr. Secretary General, it is a great pleasure to join our NATO 
colleagues and Foreign Minister Kozyrev to mark this important moment in 
NATO's relationship with Russia--and to set a course for its further 
development. 

It is in the interest of every member of the alliance--and of each of 
our partners--that Russia participate fully and constructively in 
Europe's emerging security architecture. For the United States, Russia's 
decision to cross the threshold into active engagement with NATO puts 
into place an important element of our comprehensive strategy for 
broader European security and integration. For Russia, for NATO, and for 
Europe, this is a historic choice with enormously positive implications. 

This moment has not come without a great deal of hard work. We met 
almost one year ago in Brussels to welcome Russia to the Partnership for 
Peace. We pledged then that we would seize the opportunity to build an 
undivided, peaceful, and democratic Europe. We agreed that cooperative 
relations between the alliance and Russia are essential to this task. 

In the last year, we have worked hard to follow up on that mandate. The 
road has not always been smooth, but I believe that the process has been 
constructive. We have learned where we disagree, but, as important, that 
disagreements in some areas need not be an obstacle to moving ahead. 

During this same period, the Partnership for Peace has made impressive 
progress in strengthening our cooperation with the countries of Central 
Europe and the former Soviet Union. The Partnership for Peace is now 
established as an integral European security structure in its own right. 
A full program of Partnership exercises is now in progress. We look 
forward to Russian participation in exercises and other Partnership 
activities scheduled for this year. 

Beyond the Partnership, we look forward to political consultations with 
Russia on a number of important security matters where Russia has 
special interests or capabilities, including non-proliferation and 
nuclear security. The United States is firmly committed to a broad, 
enhanced dialogue between the alliance and Russia. 

Yesterday, we agreed that our immediate objective should be to define a 
framework for developing the NATO-Russia dialogue further. Today, we 
welcome the beginning of that process. We are looking forward to working 
with Russia in building a European security structure in which a 
productive NATO-Russia relationship plays an indispensable role. 

That relationship will complement the other elements of our strategy: 
strengthening the Partnership for Peace; further strengthening the OSCE; 
and maintaining our steady, transparent progress toward the enlargement 
of NATO and the European Union. The objective of this strategy is the 
integration of all of Europe into a series of mutually supporting 
institutions and relationships that ensure that there will be no return 
to division or confrontation. 

The United States looks forward to working with our allies and with 
Russia in the coming months to make this process a success and to ensure 
that it serves the interests we all share. (###)




ARTICLE 5:

Broadening and Deepening the Partnership for Peace
Secretary Christopher
Statement at the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) Ministerial 
meeting, Noordwijk, The Netherlands, May 31, 1995

It is a pleasure to join you today for this sixth ministerial meeting of 
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. In my remarks today, I will 
focus on the Partnership for Peace. Let me begin by congratulating all 
partner governments for helping the Partnership get off to such a strong 
start. This political support and active participation are what has made 
the Partnership's early success possible. 

At the 1994 NATO summit in Brussels, President Clinton proposed a 
practical program that would build on the dialogue and consultation 
initiated so successfully by the NACC. Already, that program--the 
Partnership for Peace--has evolved from a mere concept to a key 
component of Europe's security structures. Though the Partnership for 
Peace is barely 16 months old, the principles and objectives upon which 
it is built are at least as old as NATO itself: shared values and 
interests, mutual commitment, and close cooperation. 

Since we last met in December, allies and partners have made substantial 
progress in broadening and deepening the Partnership. 
 
     -- Austria, Belarus, and Malta have joined, raising the number of 
Partners to 26. 

     -- Four more partners--Albania, Estonia, Latvia, and Russia--have 
concluded Individual Partnership Programs with NATO, and several other 
partners are already updating previous IPPs. 

     -- Detailed planning is well under way for our robust program of 
PFP activities in 1995, which includes a first-ever Partnership training 
exercise in the United States, involving forces from 12 partner and 3 
allied states. 

    -- NATO and 14 partners have begun participating in a PFP Defense 
Planning and Review Process aimed at improving transparency and 
interoperability. 

     -- And NATO has approved a comprehensive PFP funding policy and 
taken other steps to ensure that the Partnership has the resources it 
needs to meet its objectives.
 
The success of the Partnership depends on both partners and allies. As 
the Partnership Framework Document sets forth, partners must ensure 
their own participation in PFP activities. This will require each 
partner to make the budgetary and other adjustments necessary to achieve 
a level of participation commensurate with its national objectives. 

At the same time, allies recognize that we must do our part to help. The 
United States is providing $30 million in this fiscal year in direct 
support of partner participation. As President Clinton pledged in Warsaw 
last July, he has requested $100 million for this purpose in fiscal year 
1996. Other allies are making contributions, and yesterday I urged them 
to do more. But such aid can only supplement, not replace, partner 
efforts. 

While participation in PFP activities has been very strong, we must work 
to advance the political objectives of the Partnership as well. This 
includes ensuring democratic control of defense forces and promoting 
transparency in national defense planning and budgeting. 
Many partners have made significant progress in these and other areas. 
NATO can and should do more to help. In drafting or refining their 
Individual Partnership Programs, partners should place due emphasis on 
these objectives. 

We are very pleased with the progress allies and partners have made in 
developing a PFP planning and review process. So far, 14 partners are 
participating. These partners have set specific goals for improving the 
ability of their forces to work alongside NATO forces in exercises and 
future joint operations. The planning and review process is also a 
valuable mechanism for exchanging information on overall defense and 
financial planning. Finally, the process can help partners interested in 
joining NATO improve and monitor their compatibility with allied 
practices, including with respect to military doctrine. Next week in 
Brussels, our defense ministers will meet to consider practical next 
steps to invigorate the planning and review process. 

Our objective now must be to maintain the Partnership's impressive 
momentum and to broaden and deepen our cooperation. The development of 
the Partnership is a dynamic process. As partner needs and circumstances 
evolve, the Partnership must be adapted and upgraded accordingly. Just 
as NATO is adapting itself to post-Cold War realities, the Partnership 
must rise to meet new challenges. 

Yesterday, I outlined--on behalf of the United States--a number of areas 
where I believe we can intensify the relationship between NATO and its 
partners. These include working on ways to ensure democratic and 
civilian control of the military, widening the Partnership's focus, and 
working more closely together in the planning of Partnership exercises. 

The alliance remains fully committed to the Partnership as an important 
and lasting part of Europe's new security structures. For those partners 
interested in joining the alliance, it is the best path to membership. 
For all, it remains a dynamic and practical link to NATO and a channel 
for close cooperation. Whether seeking to join NATO or not, whether 
interested in one area of cooperation or many, partners should aim to 
forge strong ties with NATO that will help achieve their particular 
goals. Allies are committed to strengthening the Partnership even after 
NATO begins to admit new members. 

The stark Cold War lines of confrontation that once defined security 
relations are gone. The peoples of your nations played a crucial role in 
bringing us to this hopeful point. We now share an unparalleled 
opportunity to build a comprehensive and inclusive security architecture 
for Europe. 

NATO enlargement and the Partnership for Peace are key components of  
this architecture. Our broad approach to security also envisions a 
strengthened OSCE, an enlarged EU, and a strong NATO-Russia 
relationship. 

All of us should be proud of what we have already achieved in the 
Partnership for Peace. We have demonstrated that countries that for 
generations stood on opposite sides of a dangerous line of distrust 
could together obliterate that line and cooperate for their common 
security. But we must not rest on our laurels or limit our aspirations. 
Working together, we can build a safer, more integrated, more democratic 
Europe for the next 50 years and beyond. (###)




ARTICLE 6:

Contact Group Ministers Urge Strengthening of UNPROFOR
Secretary Christopher, Contact Group Statement 

Secretary Christopher
Statement at a press conference following Contact Group Ministerial, The 
Hague, The Netherlands, May 29, 1995.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I want to begin by expressing my 
appreciation to the British and French Governments. They've shown a 
courageous determination to stay in Bosnia and not allow the outrageous 
behavior of the Bosnian Serbs to deter them from their work on behalf of 
the international community. Their leadership has made possible the 
understandings that we reached tonight. All of us strongly condemn the 
action of the Bosnian Serbs in violating the UN Security Council 
resolutions and in detaining UN personnel. UN personnel from many 
countries are being held tonight in blatant violation of international 
law. We hold the Bosnian Serbs and their leadership accountable for the 
safety of all of these UN forces and demand their immediate release. I 
want to highlight five areas of common understanding that were reached 
among the Contact Group countries here.

First, we all agreed on the importance of UNPROFOR's mission and that 
UNPROFOR should remain in Bosnia. 

Second, we agreed that UNPROFOR should move rapidly to reduce the 
vulnerability of its forces by grouping units and avoiding activities 
that unduly endanger their safety. 

Third, we agreed that we should take steps to ensure the freedom of 
movement and safety of UNPROFOR personnel in carrying out their 
important mission. We intend to ask our military experts to examine 
promptly the specific proposals of France, the United Kingdom, and 
others with a view toward achieving these objectives. In this respect, I 
want to reiterate our view that the use of airpower must remain an 
option

Fourth, we agreed on the need to enhance the capability and strength of 
UNPROFOR so that it can carry out its mission safely and effectively. 
The United States intends to provide appropriate support to that end, 
and we will be consulting with the troop-contributing countries to 
determine what additional U.S. equipment may be of use to them. 

Fifth, we will continue to pursue our efforts to obtain recognition of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and to achieve an effective closure of the border 
between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is anticipated that U.S. 
Ambassador Frasure will be pursuing these discussions again in Belgrade 
in the near future.

Of course, all of these matters must be discussed with our colleagues in 
NATO and in the other troop-contributing countries and with the United 
Nations. We will begin these discussions at the United Nations and at 
NATO tomorrow. I want to stress the importance of the continued work of 
the Contact Group as the best means of achieving our common efforts to 
arrive at a peaceful solution to the conflict. The difficulties we now 
face will not cause us to cease our efforts to obtain these necessary 
results. We continue to believe that the Contact Group plan continues to 
provide the most appropriate and, indeed, the only satisfactory and 
feasible basis for a political resolution of this conflict and, finally, 
an end to the killing.

Contact Group Statement
Text of statement issued following Contact Group Ministerial, 
The Hague, The Netherlands, May 29, 1995.

The foreign ministers of France, Spain, Germany and the European Union 
Commissioner for external affairs (representing the Troika of the 
European Union), the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom and of 
Russia and the US Secretary of State, together with the co-chairmen of 
the international conference on the former Yugoslavia, met in The Hague 
on May 29th 1995.

They condemned the escalation of violence by the parties and any hostile 
act against UN personnel. 

They most strongly condemned the shelling by the Bosnian Serbs of the 
safe areas, in particular in Tuzla on May 25th 1995. They consider that 
the outrageous acts against UNPROFOR members and UN observers are 
unacceptable. They hold Pale leaders accountable for the security of UN 
personnel taken hostage and warn them that they will bear the 
consequences if these personnel are not correctly treated and returned 
unharmed to their units.

The ministers once again strongly urge the Bosnian Serb authorities to 
accept the Contact Group plan as a starting point for negotiations.

The ministers agreed on the need to reinforce UNPROFOR. To this effect, 
they have decided on the need to secure UNPROFOR's right of freedom of 
movement, in general, and the right of access to Safe Areas in 
particular and to provide the UN with a capacity for rapid reaction. 
They requested the UN commanders to urgently consider the modalities of 
these measures. They stress the importance of a renewal of the cessation 
of hostilities agreement.

The ministers agreed to give a new impetus to the diplomatic process in 
order to reach a political settlement of the conflict, which they 
consider as the only possible solution. They support mutual recognition 
among the states of the former Yugoslavia. In that respect, they agreed 
to make a new effort with a view to the earliest possible FRY (Serbia-
Montenegro) recognition of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the strengthening of 
the borders closure. A resolution on sanctions suspension should be 
finalised in the security council.

Ministers will meet again in the near future in order to examine 
UNPROFOR's situation in the light of progress made by then in the above 
mentioned military and political fields. (###)




ARTICLE 7:

Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council: Final Communique
Text of final communique issued by the NAC, Noordwijk, The Netherlands, 
May 30, 1995.

1. Earlier this month, we commemorated the 50th anniversary of the end 
of the Second World War in Europe. We remain convinced that democracy, 
the rule of law, respect for human rights, and a strong transatlantic 
link are key to maintaining a lasting peace. Over the past fifty years, 
the countries of Western Europe and North America have forged lasting 
bonds of peace and friendship, as embodied in our Alliance. Today, we 
have a unique opportunity to build cooperation and partnership in the 
whole Euro-Atlantic area. We reaffirm our commitment to work for a 
peaceful, secure, stable, and undivided Europe.

2. As our Alliance approaches the fifth anniversary of its London 
Summit, it is opportune to assess the progress we have already made in 
transforming NATO, and our future course in helping to build the safe 
and prosperous Europe which has been our Alliance's goal since its 
inception. We have worked to make the Alliance an agent of change, even 
as it promoted security and stability throughout Europe.

Throughout that time, we have worked to help build the structures of a 
more united continent by extending the hand of friendship and 
cooperation across former dividing lines. Our leaders initiated profound 
changes in NATO's approach to defence in a new, undivided Europe and 
began the hard work of re-orienting NATO's military strategy and re-
structuring our military forces.

As a result, the missions of today's NATO have evolved and its forces 
are being significantly reduced and re-structured. These smaller and 
more flexible forces which include multinational elements are not 
directed against any country and can better address the range of 
security challenges in the post-Cold War environment. 

We accelerated NATO's transformation at the Brussels Summit in January 
1994, where Alliance leaders gave new directions to adapt further the 
Alliance's political and military structures and procedures. They made 
even more concrete NATO's new role through the adoption of a broad 
strategy of practical cooperation throughout Europe. They approved the 
CJTF concept as a means to facilitate the conduct of the Alliance's 
missions and in order to provide separable but not separate military 
capabilities that could be employed by NATO or the WEU. They further 
strengthened NATO's outreach to its East by adopting the Partnership for 
Peace initiative and inviting all the new democracies to join us in new 
political and military efforts to work alongside the Alliance. They also 
decided that the Alliance expects and would welcome NATO enlargement 
that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an 
evolutionary process, taking into account political and security 
developments in the whole of Europe.

The Summit reaffirmed the enduring value of a strong transatlantic 
partnership in sustaining the Alliance's core functions and enabling the 
Alliance to contribute to security and stability in the whole of Europe. 
In implementing the Summit decisions, we will further strengthen the 
transatlantic link between North America and a Europe which is 
developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy and taking on greater 
responsibility on defence matters and give our full support to the 
development of a European Security and Defence Identity. We support 
strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance through the Western 
European Union, which is being developed as the defence component of the 
European Union. The Alliance's organisation and resources will be 
adjusted so as to facilitate this. The Alliance and the European Union 
share common strategic interests. A strengthened, renewed, and balanced 
transatlantic partnership will underline the Alliance's essential role 
for security and stability in Europe and its determination to intensify 
cooperation with the countries to our East. 

3. With the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for 
Peace, we are building lasting ties of cooperation in the political and 
military fields between each Partner and NATO and among Partners. The 
Partnership for Peace has already become a permanent feature of European 
security. We are determined to develop this initiative to its full 
potential. It will become increasingly important as an enduring 
instrument for active relations and practical cooperation with the 
Alliance for all Partners, as well as helping to prepare those countries 
which aspire to membership in the Alliance. The relationship between 
NATO and its Partners is developing on a broad scale, fostering the 
ability of Partners to join in possible future action with the Alliance 
in dealing with common security problems.

We are encouraged by the solid progress in the implementation of 
Partnership for Peace achieved since our last meeting in December. We 
welcome Austria, Belarus, and Malta  as new Partners, bringing the 
number of Partners to twenty-six. Implementation of Individual 
Partnership Programmes has quickly progressed in accordance with our 
instructions of December 1994. We are pleased that the Planning and 
Review Process has attracted such wide interest. Fourteen Partner 
countries participated in the first round, which has just been 
completed. Based on a biennial planning cycle, this process will advance 
interoperability and increase transparency among Allies and Partners. 
Other encouraging developments include:

-- The increasing number of major NATO/PfP exercises with Partners, 
including the first one outside Europe in the United States, together 
with preparatory training activities;

-- The wide Partner participation in the Partnership Coordination Cell, 
which is now playing a key role, in particular in coordinating 
exercises;

-- The increasing number of regional and bilateral activities in the 
spirit of PfP;

-- The elaboration of a more focused and graduated PfP exercise concept;

-- The completion of a PfP Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA);

-- The adoption of a PfP funding policy;

-- The launching of a regular process of information exchange on 
activities which support the Partnership; and

-- Ongoing efforts of Partners engaged in reform processes in 
establishing effective democratic and civilian control over their 
militaries.

We are looking forward to tomorrow's meeting with our Partners in the 
North Atlantic Cooperation Council to discuss the state of our 
cooperation and to consult on topical security issues. The NACC provides 
a valuable forum for common consultations between all Partner countries. 
In order to strengthen our cooperation, we have instructed the Council 
in Permanent Session to explore the scope for integrating our existing 
cooperative structures and procedures for NACC and the Partnership for 
Peace.

4. As recognised by our Heads of State and Government in January last 
year, the admission of new members will take place as part of an 
evolutionary process, taking into account political and security 
developments in the whole of Europe. When the members of the Alliance 
decide to invite new members, their objective will be to enhance 
security for all countries in Europe, without creating dividing lines. 
Enlargement will be part of a broad European security architecture based 
on genuine partnership and cooperation in the whole of Europe. It will 
complement the enlargement of the European Union, a parallel process 
which also, for its part, contributes significantly to extending 
security and stability to the new democracies in the East.

We are satisfied with the progress achieved to date in the internal 
study on NATO enlargement, which we set in train at our last meeting in 
December to determine how NATO will enlarge, the principles to guide 
this process, and the implications of membership. We are well on course 
and will continue to make steady, measured progress. In this context, we 
will complete the study in accordance with the agreed timetable, and the 
results will be presented to all interested Partners collectively in 
Brussels and where requested, individually, including in Partner-country 
capitals, sufficiently in advance of our December meeting for us at that 
meeting to assess thoroughly the results of our presentations and 
consult on the way forward in our examination of enlargement.
5. The Alliance welcomes Russia's acceptance of its Individual 
Partnership Programme under the PfP and of our dialogue and cooperation 
beyond PfP and looks forward to their implementation. This dual step 
paves the way for renewed and extended cooperation between the Alliance 
and Russia which we believe will enhance stability and security in 
Europe.

We also affirmed our belief that it is desirable to develop the NATO-
Russia relationship even further as part of our broad approach to 
developing a cooperative security architecture in Europe. We propose 
that NATO and Russia initiate a dialogue, to be pursued in our newly 
established relationship beyond the PfP, on the future direction our 
relationship should take. Our aim would be to achieve by the end of this 
year a political framework for NATO-Russia relations elaborating basic 
principles for security cooperation as well as for the development of 
mutual political consultations.

We reaffirm our strong support for the political and economic reforms in 
Russia. We trust that the scheduled legislative and Presidential 
elections will strengthen the democratic process in that country. This 
would underpin security and stability in Europe and reinforce the basis 
for our cooperation.

The construction of a cooperative European security architecture 
requires the active participation of Russia. In this context, it is our 
desire to have Russia play its proper, important role. We are committed 
to a close relationship with Russia, based on mutual respect and 
openness. This relationship can only flourish if it is rooted in strict 
compliance with international commitments and  obligations. 

6. While respecting the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, 
we remain deeply concerned about the developments in Chechnya, which are 
causing so much suffering and so many casualties in the civilian 
population. We welcome the establishment of an OSCE assistance group for 
Chechnya, which is assisting the civilian population and supporting a 
political settlement of the conflict under OSCE auspices. We call for an 
immediate ceasefire and urge the parties to pursue negotiations. We urge 
Russia to facilitate the free passage of humanitarian assistance and 
hold elections.

7. We want to develop further the relationship with all newly 
independent states, whose independence and democracy constitute an 
important factor of security and stability for Europe. We look forward 
to the fullest possible use of established NACC and PfP mechanisms in 
enhancing our relations with these states.

We attach particular importance to our relations with Ukraine which we 
will further develop. We welcome progress achieved in Ukraine's economic 
and political reforms. We hope that Ukraine will pursue this course, to 
which we lend our support. We welcome the fact that Ukraine chose to 
participate in the Partnership Planning and Review Process and look 
forward to the early completion of Ukraine's Individual Partnership 
Programme. Along with the accessions of Belarus and Kazakhstan, we value 
greatly Ukraine's accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) as an expression of a responsible security policy. This was a 
significant contribution to the recent agreement on the Treaty's 
unlimited extension. 

8. We attach great significance to the strengthening of the relations 
between NATO and the WEU, based on the agreed principles of comple-
mentarity and transparency, including through joint Council sessions and 
improved cooperation in a number of fields. We are pleased at the way in 
which our organisations work together in the conduct of the joint NATO-
WEU Operation SHARP GUARD.

We welcome the decisions of the WEU Council of Ministers in Lisbon of 
May 1995 on the improvement of the WEU's operational capabilities 
through the creation of new decision-making and planning mechanisms and 
structures, including the progress achieved in defining the conditions 
in which a WEU Humanitarian Task Force would undertake humanitarian 
operations. We also follow with interest WEU's ongoing "Common 
Reflection on the New European Security Conditions", which could lead to 
a "White Paper" on European security, and look forward to using our 
regular consultations with the WEU to exchange views on this project.
 
The Allies support initiatives to develop multinational operational 
arrangements and force structures which would strengthen the European 
pillar of our Alliance while enabling the European Allies to take 
greater responsibility for the common security and defence and, 
accordingly, took note of the initiative taken by France, Italy, and 
Spain to organise a land force (EUROFOR) and a maritime force 
(EUROMARFOR). We also took note that these forces would be open to WEU 
member states, that they would be declared "forces answerable to WEU", 
and employed as a priority in this framework, and could likewise be 
employed in the framework of NATO. This initiative was announced on the 
occasion of the recent WEU Ministerial Meeting in Lisbon where an 
agreement was also reached on the participation of Portugal in those 
forces. We look forward with interest to a high-level briefing on this 
initiative and to the expeditious definition of the relationship of 
these forces with the WEU and NATO.

9. An essential part of the Alliance's continuing effort to adapt and 
adjust its structures and procedures to the new strategic environment 
lies in the development of the CJTF concept endorsed at the Summit in 
January 1994. This concept is primarily designed to facilitate 
contingency operations, including operations with participating nations 
outside the Alliance. In coordination with the WEU, work has started to 
develop this concept. A worthwhile and extensive exchange of views has 
taken place to identify the essential issues and to develop a political-
military framework for the CJTF concept. We have made progress but more 
remains to be done to adapt Alliance structures and procedures and to 
develop the CJTF concept. We have therefore tasked the Council in 
Permanent Session to complete, as a matter of urgency, its work in 
developing the CJTF concept to the full satisfaction of all Allies and 
look forward to a final report at our next meeting.

10. An important element of the evolving European security architecture 
is the unique framework provided by the OSCE. Its combination of 
democratic standards of human rights with the political, economic, and 
military aspects of security establishes a special credibility in 
dealing with the new challenges of the post-Cold War era. In particular, 
its ability to apply human rights standards operationally in conflicts 
has enabled the OSCE to develop into a primary instrument for early 
warning, conflict prevention, and crisis management in its region.

Decisions at the Budapest meeting significantly enhanced the ability of 
the OSCE, as a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the 
United Nations Charter, to contribute to the maintenance of common 
security in Europe. We welcome the enhancement of the operational role 
of the OSCE and will support its goals. We tasked the Council in 
Permanent Session to review the current pattern of contacts between NATO 
and the OSCE and to improve it as appropriate. We will strongly support 
discussion within the OSCE of the Russian proposal for a common and 
comprehensive security model for Europe in the 21st century, to which 
all Allies will actively contribute. We welcome also the agreement of 
the OSCE to help implement the Pact on Stability in Europe, which 
supports development of good neighbourly relations among its 
participants. We reiterate our pledge made at the OSCE Budapest Summit 
to provide the OSCE with the political support as well as the human and 
financial resources and needs to fulfil its tasks, and call upon other 
OSCE participating states to do likewise.

We value the OSCE's role in preventive diplomacy through, inter alia, 
conflict prevention missions and the activities of the High Commissioner 
on National Minorities, and commend the Chairman-in-Office for his 
efforts to ensure that OSCE principles and commitments are respected in 
the conflict in Chechnya. We call on Russia to observe agreed OSCE 
documents, such as the Vienna Document and the Code of Conduct on 
Security Matters.

The situation in the Southern Caucasus continues to be of special 
concern. We welcome the fact that the ceasefire in the area of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict continues to be generally effective. We 
support the efforts of the Minsk Group to achieve a political settlement 
of the conflict in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, which would, along with 
other conditions, allow the deployment of an OSCE multinational 
peacekeeping force, as agreed at the Budapest Summit.

11. We want to achieve better mutual understanding with the countries to 
our South and to contribute to the strengthening of stability in the 
Mediterranean region. We are pleased that our initiative for dialogue 
has been met with a positive response and that exploratory discussions 
have been launched with five Mediterranean states outside the Alliance. 
We hope further discussions will lead to the establishment of a fruitful 
dialogue with these and other Mediterranean countries. Such exchanges 
will foster transparency and a better understanding of security issues 
of mutual interest. In addition, we mean to make the Alliance's aims and 
objectives better understood, also with regard to its new missions of 
peacekeeping under the authority of the UN or the responsibility of the 
OSCE.

12. We welcome the agreement reached at the Conference in New York to 
extend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) indefinitely. This is 
a decisive step in strengthening the international nuclear non-
proliferation system and, thus, international security.

13. We continue to attach great importance to full compliance with and 
fulfilment of all obligations resulting from existing arms control 
agreements. They remain fundamental to European security and stability, 
providing an essential foundation of confidence and mutual trust among 
European countries. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 
(CFE) is central to the cooperative security structure we have begun to 
build in Europe and to stability and security for parties and non-
parties to the Treaty alike. Its integrity must, therefore, be 
preserved. We will abide by the commitments we have undertaken. We 
expect all other States Parties to implement fully the CFE Treaty, which 
serves the interests of all parties to the Treaty and is fundamental to 
European security. Full implementation of the Treaty by 15 November 1995 
will provide the essential basis for a constructive and comprehensive 
review process at the CFE Review Conference in 1996, as foreseen in the 
Treaty, in the spirit of cooperative security.

We reiterate our hope that all signatories to the Open Skies Treaty who 
have not yet ratified the Treaty will do so and that all instruments of 
ratification necessary for the entry into force of the Treaty will be 
deposited at the earliest possible time. 

We also attach great importance to:

-- The negotiations on a universal and verifiable Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty;
-- A universal ban on the production of fissile material for weapon 
purposes;
-- The early entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention;
-- Completion of work to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention;
-- The full implementation of START I and the early ratification of 
START II.

14. We attach high importance to the ongoing work inside the Alliance on 
the Summit initiative on the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and their delivery means. We took note of the report of the 
Alliance's Joint Committee on Proliferation on the activities in the 
Senior Political-Military Group on Proliferation and the Senior Defence 
Group on Proliferation. We welcome the progress made in intensifying and 
expanding NATO's political and defence efforts against proliferation 
which remains one of the greatest concerns for the Alliance. We have 
instructed the Groups to continue their work, without replacing or 
duplicating efforts underway in other international fora, and to report 
again to us at our next meeting. We welcome the consultations with 
Cooperation Partners in the NACC and the consultations with Russia on 
proliferation issues.

15. International terrorist crimes constitute a serious threat to peace, 
security, and stability which can threaten the territorial integrity of 
states. They cannot be justified under any circumstances. We condemn all 
acts, methods and practices of international terrorism regardless of 
their origins, causes, and purposes. We reiterate our strong commitment 
to combat this scourge.

16. We remain committed to the Alliance's common-funded programmes. We 
consider these programmes vital elements in underpinning our military 
structures, providing essential operating capability and strengthening 
Alliance cohesion. We need to ensure that appropriate human and 
financial resources are directed towards those programmes which will 
have the highest priority. We welcome that work has begun on the 
examination of Alliance budgetary management, structures and procedures 
which we set in hand last December, and look forward to progress being 
made towards a successful conclusion of this exercise by the time we 
next meet.

17. We express our deep appreciation for the gracious hospitality 
extended to us by the Government of The Netherlands.  (###)




ARTICLE 8:

NAC Ministerial Statement on the Situation in Former Yugoslavia

Text of statement issued by the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial 
Session, Noordwijk, The Netherlands, May 30, 1995.

We regard with the utmost seriousness the further deterioration of the 
situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and condemn the escalation of violence 
by the parties and the hostile acts against UN personnel. We also 
condemn in the strongest terms the outrageous behaviour of the Bosnian 
Serbs in shelling safe areas and killing and seizing UN peacekeepers. We 
demand  that the shelling of safe areas be stopped and that UNPROFOR 
members and UN observers held hostage  by the Bosnian Serbs be released 
unharmed, unconditionally. We hold the Bosnian Serb leaders fully 
accountable for their safe return. We pay tribute to the outstanding 
courage being shown by UNPROFOR and UN personnel in this difficult 
situation.

We stress the importance and urgency of a renewal of the cessation of 
hostilities agreement and call upon all the parties to the conflict to 
seek solutions through negotiation rather than war. We strongly support 
the continued efforts of the international community, including those of 
the Contact Group, to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia through the 
diplomatic process.

NATO air power remains available to help protect the safe areas and UN 
Peace Forces, in accordance with  existing arrangements with the United 
Nations. We will continue to enforce the No-Fly Zone over Bosnia-
Herzegovina. We will also continue, together with the WEU, the maritime  
embargo enforcement operations in the Adriatic.

We strongly support the continued presence of UN forces in former 
Yugoslavia, with their safety assured and a strengthened capability to 
carry out their mission in the pursuit of clear objectives. All parties 
must ensure  that UN troops have freedom of movement and are unharmed, 
and remove any obstacles to the delivery of humanitarian aid to the 
needy. We are ready to support efforts towards the reinforcement of UN 
Peace Forces in former Yugoslavia, with the aim of reducing their 
vulnerability and strengthening their capability to act and react. (###)




ARTICLE 9:

Reaffirming Close Relations Between the U.S. and Portugal
Secretary Christopher
Remarks at signing of the U.S.-Portuguese Agreement on Cooperation and 
Defense, Lisbon, Portugal, June 1, 1995

Good morning, Mr. Minister, distinguished representatives from the 
Azores, ladies and gentlemen: I am just delighted to be here in Lisbon 
on this beautiful spring morning and to have an opportunity to sign this 
Agreement on Cooperation and Defense between the United States and 
Portugal.   

The agreement that we signed here today is, of course, the product of a 
long period of hard work and dedication. The Minister and I had talked 
frequently, in our earlier meetings, about the agreement and tried to 
find ways to resolve the last remaining issues and I am delighted that 
that has now been done. This treaty reaffirms the close relations that 
have long existed between our two countries, relations that have been 
augmented, as the Minister said, in the last year by the signing of the 
tax treaty and the customs agreement as well. This agreement bolsters 
our security relationship and enhances our already excellent bilateral 
relationships in a number of ways.

As one of the founding members of NATO, Portugal is a highly valued ally 
and friend of the United States. Portugal is one that can always be 
counted on in events as momentous as the Gulf war, as complex as the 
crisis in the former Yugoslavia, or as simple as the emergency landing 
of a distressed aircraft in the Atlantic. 

We are very proud to be partners with Portugal in the search for 
regional and global security in the post-Cold War world. The agreement 
we signed today ensures continued United States use of the strategic air 
base facilities in the Azores. In this post-Cold War world, with all of 
its turbulence, the projection of conventional forces at great distance 
remains a vital aspect of our security, and, certainly, the base that is 
reflected in this agreement is a very important link in that security.

The agreement also calls for annual bilateral political and political-
military consultations, and it establishes an important Standing 
Bilateral Commission which will develop programs of cooperation in the 
military field between defense-sector industries and in science and 
technology. The commission will also reinforce the economic and 
commercial relationships between our two countries and provide for 
cooperation with the autonomous region of the Azores. I have asked our 
ambassador here--Ambassador Frawley Bagley--to be my personal 
representative to work with the Portuguese Government to design and 
activate the commission that is called for in the treaty.

Of course, Portugal is a very important player in a variety of 
international institutions. As President of the Western European Union, 
Portugal has mobilized the examination and improvement of that 
organization's operational capabilities.

The Minister and I had an interesting discussion of the important steps 
that Portugal, under his leadership, has been taking in the Western 
European Union. Portugal is one of the most active members of the United 
Nations, and, of course, we cooperate very closely and constructively.

I want to emphasize that the document we signed today will fulfill the 
broad vision of its framers to provide not only a legal basis for 
continued United States presence in the Azores, but to invigorate--to 
really enliven--our overall relationship. For example, now that the 
Lajes Agreement has been signed, we can pursue initiatives that were 
identified by the negotiators which can further our bilateral 
cooperation. This should include initiatives in the scientific, 
technological, and space exploration fields, as well as to find the 
right way to commemorate the upcoming 500th anniversary of Vasco da 
Gama's world-changing voyage.

I look forward to continued work with the Minister on many of the issues 
and many of the great opportunities that we have together, such as the 
Exposition planned here in 1998.

So, Mr. Minister, it is a pleasure to be here and an honor to join you 
in signing this important agreement.  (###)




ARTICLE 10:

Fact Sheets:  NATO, Partnership for Peace, OSCE, and NATO Information 
Sources

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATO Today

NATO remains the core of American engagement in Europe and at the heart 
of European security. It is the member nations' most effective 
instrument for coordinating defense and arms control and maintaining 
stability throughout Europe. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the progress of European integration 
have not ended the need for NATO's essential commitment to safeguard the 
freedom and security of all its members by political and military means 
in accordance with UN principles. The London Declaration on a 
Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, issued after the summit meeting of 
the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in July 1990, signaled the vitality of 
the alliance in adapting to security needs in a post-Cold War world. At 
that meeting, NATO allies announced a fundamental review of strategy and 
invited the Soviet Union and the countries of Central Europe to 
establish regular diplomatic liaison and to develop a new partnership.

The November 1991 Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation further 
underlined NATO's intention to redefine its objectives in light of 
changed circumstances. The declaration took into account the broader 
challenges to alliance security interests, such as the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, regional instability, and terrorism. It 
outlined its future tasks in the context of a framework of interlocking 
and mutually reinforcing institutions--including the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), now the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); the Western European Union 
(WEU); the European Community, now the European Union; and the Council 
of Europe--working together to build a new European security system. The 
"New Strategic Concept" announced at the meeting stressed the alliance's 
mission in crisis management and mandated a more flexible force 
structure and reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. The Rome meeting also 
created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to develop an 
institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political 
and security issues between NATO and its former adversaries. This 
initiative culminated in the participation of Foreign Ministers and 
representatives from the 16 NATO countries, six Central European 
countries, and the three Baltic states at the inaugural meeting of the 
NACC in December 1991. At the second NACC meeting in March 1992, the New 
Independent States of the former Soviet Union became members, except 
Georgia, which was admitted the following month. Albania joined the NACC 
in June 1992.

This alliance of sovereign states pledges, through a combination of 
political solidarity and military force, to preserve its mutual 
security. Reaffirming faith in the principles of individual and 
collective self-defense embodied in the UN Charter, the parties to the 
treaty pledge to defend the common heritage and civilization of their 
peoples and to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic 
area. While recognizing the need to maintain adequate military strength 
to safeguard the security of its members, the alliance also resolves to 
work toward the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in 
Europe. 

NATO Foreign Ministers affirmed their readiness to support peacekeeping 
activities under the auspices of the CSCE on a case-by-case basis in 
June 1992. The following month, the North Atlantic Council agreed on a 
NATO maritime operation in the Adriatic, in coordination with the WEU, 
to monitor compliance with the UN embargo against Serbia and Montenegro-
-upgraded to enforcement in November 1992 following UN Security Council 
resolutions to tighten economic sanctions. On June 8, 1993, agreement 
was reached to place the NATO/WEU Adriatic task force under the 
operational command of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

On December 17, 1992, NATO foreign ministers agreed that NATO would be 
prepared to support a UN Security Council resolution on enforcement of 
the ban on military flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina. NATO has been 
enforcing the no-fly zone over that country since April 12, 1993. In the 
spring of 1993, NATO planned for a peace settlement in Bosnia under UN 
auspices once an equitable agreement is reached by all of the parties 
and put into effect. 

On September 2, 1992, the NAC approved UN humanitarian relief efforts in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. In June 1993, NATO agreed to provide its air power 
to protect UNPROFOR forces in case of attack. In August 1993, in 
extraordinary session, the NAC agreed that air strikes could be used, as 
authorized by the UN Secretary General, to support UNPROFOR's overall 
mandate; to assist in the relief of Sarajevo, the safe areas, and other 
threatened areas in Bosnia; and to relieve the widescale interference 
with the UNPROFOR mandate and  humanitarian assistance operations. NATO 
remains willing to consider positively any further requests by the UN 
for assistance in enforcing Security Council resolutions.

In June 1993, the U.S. proposed a NATO Summit to discuss the Clinton 
initiative, which set an agenda for NATO's future work. The initiative 
included strengthening cooperation among the allies, developing 
relations with the former Warsaw Pact states, improving NATO's links 
with other institutions, and addressing threats to security that arise 
from outside the North Atlantic Treaty area. The January 1994 NATO 
Summit endorsed several of the President's proposals that advance NATO's 
adaptation to the post-Cold War European security environment.

The summit launched the Partnership for Peace (PFP), which expands and 
intensifies practical political and military cooperation between NATO 
and the former Soviet bloc--as well as some of Europe's traditionally 
neutral countries--and allows them to consult with NATO in the event of 
a direct threat to their security. PFP does not extend NATO security 
guarantees.

As of May 1995, 26 countries have joined PFP: Albania, Armenia, Austria, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, 
Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. The central organs of the 
Partnership are the Steering Committee at NATO Headquarters and a 
planning organ, the Partnership Coordination Cell, at Mons, Belgium (at 
the same location as Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe). 

PFP has thus become a permanent and central feature of the transatlantic 
security system. PFP military exercises began in fall 1994: Poland 
hosted the first PFP field exercise in a former communist state, and a 
PFP maritime exercise took place in the North Sea. The Netherlands 
hosted a PFP field exercise in late October 1994. NATO allies also have 
invited observers from PFP countries to a number of previously scheduled 
bilateral and multinational exercises.

At the January 1994 summit, NATO leaders welcomed an evolutionary 
expansion of NATO membership to include new democracies in the region. 
Participation in PFP does not guarantee entry into NATO, but it is the 
best preparation for states interested in becoming NATO members. For 
those countries that do not aspire to NATO membership, PFP will remain 
as a primary link to the alliance.

The summit also endorsed a concept of "Combined Joint Task Forces" 
designed to make NATO military structures more flexible and to encourage 
the development of "separable but not separate" European military 
capabilities that could undertake operations under the auspices of the 
WEU when an alliance response was not required. NATO and the WEU are 
working to develop this concept.

Finally, the summit directed immediate work to intensify and expand 
NATO's political and defense efforts against the spread of weapons of 
mass destruction. This led to agreement on a political framework for 
NATO actions which was approved at the North Atlantic Council 
ministerial meeting in June 1994. Consultations proceed on specific 
allied political and defense steps to combat and defend against the 
proliferation of such weapons. 

Following on the summit's commitment to NATO expansion, the Foreign 
Ministers established a process in December 1994 to study NATO 
enlargement and to brief PFP partners on the conclusions of the study. 
NATO's role as a forum for political consultation and an association of 
nations committed to collective defense remains unchanged, even as its 
new responsibilities in the areas of peacekeeping and crisis management 
continue to evolve.

U.S.-NATO Relations: The Transatlantic Partnership

The decision of the United States after World War II to participate in a 
regional peacetime, defensive alliance represented a fundamental change 
in American foreign policy. The United States recognized that its 
interests no longer could be confined to the limits of the Western 
Hemisphere: U.S. security was linked inextricably to the future of the 
West European democracies. Concepts of individual liberty and the rule 
of law, coupled with those of a common heritage and shared values, 
provided the foundation for the NATO alliance. These ideals, as well as 
the ongoing goal of each member country to achieve a just and lasting 
peaceful order in Europe, continue to link the fate of America to that 
of its NATO allies.

The history of U.S. engagement in NATO has been one of commitment by 
America and its allies to reduce tensions in Europe and to improve East-
West relations. They have pursued a series of initiatives designed to 
lower levels of personnel and equipment and increase mutual confidence, 
while adhering to a policy of political cohesion and military strength. 
Arms control measures aimed at enhancing stability have included the 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987 and the Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in 1990.

The CFE Treaty between the allies and the nations and successor states 
of the former Warsaw Pact provides for an unprecedented level of 
transparency in the security field through an information exchange and 
obligatory inspections. Most importantly, it mandates a sharp reduction 
in conventional weapons throughout Europe. The NATO allies coordinate 
closely to meet their own obligations under the treaty and to ensure 
full compliance in its information, verification, and reduction 
provisions.

NATO has played a leading role in developing far-reaching proposals for 
CSCE's Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC). Alliance proposals on force 
planning, non-proliferation, and harmonization of existing arms control 
commitments already are being developed.

United States supports the development of a greater European security 
identity and defense role as a means of strengthening the integrity and 
effectiveness of NATO. At the NATO summit in Rome, the alliance welcomed 
the prospect of a European political union with a greater security and 
defense dimension but underlined that this would not diminish the need 
for NATO. The alliance's "New Strategic Concept" also reaffirmed the 
essential nature of the transatlantic partnership, recognizing as a 
basic principle the indivisibility of security of all its members. The 
U.S. proposed, and the January 1994 NATO Summit agreed, that "separable 
but not separate" European capabilities be made available to undertake 
independent European missions, drawing as necessary on NATO collective 
assets when NATO-wide actions are not necessary.

The North Atlantic alliance and the American presence in Europe have 
helped keep peace for more than 40 years. Having helped to forge 
successful policies toward the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact 
since the foundation of NATO, the U.S. with its European allies must 
play a central role in building the framework of the new Euro-Atlantic 
architecture.

NATO Strategy

NATO collective security strategy was mainly based on the principle of 
deterrence. Defense capabilities were created to deter military 
aggression or other forms of pressure. Parties to the treaty agreed to 
consult whenever the territorial integrity, political independence, or 
security of any party was threatened. They further pledged to maintain 
their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and, 
should such deterrence fail, to defend the territory of  the alliance. 
As a purely defensive alliance, NATO maintained only a level of military 
strength sufficient to be credible. Given the marked inferiority of 
allied conventional strength in Europe, the NATO guarantee rested 
primarily on the nuclear superiority of the United States.

At the conclusion of a 1967 comprehensive review of NATO strategy, the 
alliance adopted a revised approach to the common defense, based on a 
balanced range of responses--conventional and nuclear--to all levels of 
aggression or threats of aggression. This reassessment of the nature of 
the potential threat to member countries prompted the realization that 
the alliance must increasingly look to the dangers of more limited forms 
of aggression beyond the possibility of a massive Soviet attack. The 
basis of the new concept of "flexible response" was the belief that NATO 
should be able to deter and counter military force with a range of 
responses designed to defend directly against attack at an appropriate 
level, or, if necessary, to escalate the attack to the level necessary 
to persuade an aggressor to desist.

At the same time, the alliance accepted the recommendations of the 
report written by former Belgium Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel and 
titled "Future Tasks of the Alliance," which outlined the need to work 
toward the achievement of disarmament and balanced force reductions. The 
maintenance of adequate military forces would be coupled with efforts at 
improving East-West relations.

Soviet deployment of new mobile theater nuclear missiles (SS-20s) called 
into question the accepted NATO strategy of deterrence based on the 
concepts of forward defense and flexible response and lead to a decision 
in 1979 to modernize its defensive capability. The resulting "dual-
track" decision by the alliance combined pursuing arms control 
negotiations with responding appropriately to the increased imbalance 
created by the new Soviet systems. Alliance governments agreed to deploy 
U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles in Western Europe.

The successful conclusion of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) 
Treaty in 1987, while eliminating all Soviet and U.S. land-based, 
intermediate-range missiles, required a new appraisal of NATO policy. In 
response, the alliance developed its "Comprehensive Concept of Arms 
Control and Disarmament," which provided a framework for alliance policy 
in nuclear, conventional, and chemical fields of arms control and tied 
defense policies to progress in arms control.

In July 1990, the NAC issued the "London Declaration on a Transformed 
North Atlantic Alliance" to adapt to the new realities in Europe. The 
ministers pledged to intensify political and military contacts with 
Moscow and with Central and East European capitals and to work not only 
for the common defense but to build new partnerships with all the 
nations of Europe. They underlined the need to undertake broader arms 
control and confidence-building agreements to limit conventional armed 
forces in Europe. In recognition of the radical political changes in 
Europe and the improved security environment, the ministers mandated a 
fundamental review of the alliance's political and military strategy.

The "New Strategic Concept" was outlined at the meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council in November 1991. The threat of a massive full-scale 
Soviet attack, which had provided the focus of NATO's strategy during 
the Cold War, had disappeared after the end of the political division of 
Europe. The alliance acknowledged that the risks to its security, such 
as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and acts of terrorism 
and sabotage, were now less predictable and beyond the focus of 
traditional concerns. The new strategy adopts a broader approach to 
security, centered more on crisis management and conflict prevention. It 
assumes completion of the planned withdrawal of military forces from 
Central Europe and the Baltics and the full implementation of arms 
control agreements limiting conventional forces in Europe.

In the context of changed circumstances, the alliance will maintain a 
mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe, although at 
significantly lower levels. To ensure effectiveness, alliance forces 
will be increasingly mobile to respond to a range of contingencies. 
Forces will be organized for flexible buildup to react to regional 
instability and crises. Collective defense arrangements will rely 
increasingly on multinational forces within the integrated military 
structure. Nuclear forces will continue to play an essential role in 
allied strategy but will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient 
to preserve stability.

The new strategy reaffirms the principle of common commitment and mutual 
cooperation in support of the indivisibility of security for all 
alliance members and underscores the essential political and military 
link between European and North American members provided by the 
presence of nuclear forces in Europe. 


[BOX]

NATO Background

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed against the backdrop 
of emerging post-war tensions engendered by the threat of Soviet 
expansionism and concern over political and economic instability in 
Western Europe. On April 4, 1949, in Washington, DC, the Foreign 
Ministers of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, and United 
States signed the North Atlantic Treaty, the political framework for an 
international alliance designed to prevent aggression, or, if necessary, 
to resist attack against any alliance member. In 1952, Greece and Turkey 
acceded to the treaty, followed by the Federal Republic of Germany in 
1955 and by Spain in 1982.

[END BOX] 



[BOX]

NATO Structure

North Atlantic Council

The NAC is the principal forum for consultation and cooperation between 
NATO member governments on all issues affecting their common security. 
Its decisions are based on consensus, with each member having an equal 
right to express its views. The NATO Secretary General is chair. The NAC 
meets at least twice a year in ministerial session.  It also meets 
weekly at the level of Permanent Representatives, who hold ambassadorial 
rank.
 
Defense Planning Committee (DPC)

The DPC deals with overall issues of defense and is composed of 
represen-tatives of all countries except France, which withdrew from 
NATO's integrated military structure in 1966. Like the NAC, it meets 
regularly at ambassadorial level and twice yearly, when member countries 
are represented by their defense ministers.

Nuclear Planning Group

This group has authority for nuclear matters. All countries except 
France participate. Iceland participates as an observer.

Military Committee

The highest military authority in the alliance, it is composed of the 
chiefs of staff of each country except France, which is represented by a 
military mission. Iceland, which has no military forces, is represented 
by a civilian member. The Military Committee advises the NAC and the DPC 
on military measures necessary for the common defense and provides 
guidance to the NATO commanders.

Regional Commands

The strategic area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty is divided into 
three regional commands: Allied Command Europe, Allied Command Atlantic, 
and Allied Command Channel, with a regional planning group for North 
America. With the exception of France and Iceland, all countries assign 
forces to the integrated military command structure. The NATO Defense 
area covers the territories of member nations in North America, in the 
Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer, and in Europe, including 
Turkey. However, events occurring outside the area which affect the 
preservation of peace and security in the treaty area also may be 
considered by the NAC.

North Atlantic Cooperation Council

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established in 
November 1991 to conduct NATO's outreach program to the former Warsaw 
Pact states. Current members include the 16 NATO allies, seven Central 
European states--Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, and Slovakia--the 12 former Soviet republics, and the three 
Baltic states. It meets in ministerial session at least once a year. 
Finland, Slovenia, and Sweden attend as observers. 

[END BOX]


NATO Partnership for Peace

What It Is   

-- A U.S. initiative, Partnership for Peace (PFP) was launched by the 
January 1994 NATO Summit to establish strong links between NATO, its new 
democratic partners in the former Soviet bloc, and some of Europe's 
traditionally neutral countries to enhance European security.

-- It provides a framework for enhanced political and military 
cooperation for joint multilateral crisis management activities, such as 
humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping.

-- It enables PFP members to consult with NATO when faced with a direct 
threat to its security but does not extend NATO security guarantees. 
Participation in PFP does not guarantee entry into NATO, but it is the 
best preparation for states interested in becoming NATO members.
 
Who Has Joined

-- 26 countries:  Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkmeni- stan, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan.  

How It Works
 
-- Once a country has joined the PFP, it submits a Presentation Document 
to NATO explaining what resources it will contribute to PFP activities 
and the steps that it will take to meet PFP political goals, such as 
democratic control of the military. To date, Albania, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, 
and Ukraine have submitted Presentation Documents.

--  A unique Individual Partnership Program (IPP) is then agreed to with 
the alliance. IPPs set forth shared objectives (for instance, 
establishing democratic control over military forces, developing 
transparency in defense planning and budgetary processes, and developing 
interoperability with NATO forces) and list activities planned to meet 
those objectives.  

-- NATO has reached agreement on IPPs with Albania, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, and Sweden. IPPs for several other partners are under 
consideration.

-- Partners can assign personnel on a full-time basis to NATO 
Headquarters in Brussels and to the Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) 
at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium.   

-- Partners may participate in an optional Defense Planning and Review 
Process (PARP) designed to evaluate and enhance a partner nation's 
inter- operability with NATO. Participating states work with NATO to 
develop interoperability objectives, which can be used to help refine 
IPPs. As of May 12, 14 partners--Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Sweden, and Ukraine--are participating in PARP.

PFP Joint Military Exercises

-- 1994. Three joint military exercises were held, including 
"Cooperative Bridge" in Poland, marking the first time NATO forces had  
joined with former adversaries on the territory of a former Warsaw Pact 
state.  

-- 1995. Eleven exercises are planned in field, maritime, search and 
rescue, and command-post functions. The U.S. will host a PFP field 
training exercise at Fort Polk, Louisiana in August.



[BOX]

U.S. Policy in Brief

NATO's Partnership for Peace will strengthen its ties to Central Europe 
and to the New Independent States. NATO will move forward with its 
steady and deliberate process to accept new members, following the 
approach laid out by the NATO ministers last December. And we will seek 
a stronger relationship between NATO and Russia in parallel with NATO 
expansion. In the process of NATO expansion, each potential member will 
be judged individually, according to its capabilities and its commitment 
to the principles of the NATO Treaty. The fundamental decisions will be 
made by NATO, in consultation with potential members. The process will 
be transparent to all and there will be no vetos by third parties. 

--Secretary Christopher, 
March 29,1995   

[END BOX]



Organization for Security And Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

From Vancouver to Vladivostok, the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) brings a new kind of diplomacy--one built 
on respect for human rights and regional cooperation as the bases for 
security among Atlantic, European, and Eurasian countries. 

Renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe at the 
December 1994 Budapest Summit to reflect its increased role in European 
security, the OSCE furthers European security and cooperation by 
defining and protecting human rights. OSCE also fosters these goals 
through programs centered on press and culture, economics, conflict 
prevention, and military security. OSCE is committed to developing 
democratic institutions at the grass-roots level, through local 
officials and activities, and through non-governmental organizations.

Evolution of the OSCE

The OSCE began during the Cold War as a way to promote dialogue and 
decrease tensions between East and West and was originally known as the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In August 1975, 
35 nations signed the Helsinki Final Act, which outlines democratic 
principles governing relations among nations. The act contained a 
provision to continue regular discussions on a broad range of concerns--
from migration and military security to the environment and media 
relations--in what became known as the "Helsinki process."

During the 1980s, follow-on meetings in Madrid, Stockholm, and Vienna 
reviewed implementation of the then-CSCE agreements and continued the 
opportunity for discussion. Although CSCE had no permanent headquarters 
and no enforcement capability, important progress was made to establish 
firm standards for the protection of human rights and to increase 
confidence through the advance notification of military activities and 
the exchange of military information.

With the end of the Cold War, all CSCE states for the first time 
accepted the principles of pluralism and free markets as the basis for 
their cooperation. This made it possible for CSCE to explore ways to act 
on its rigorous principles and to ensure that they were upheld. To do 
this CSCE, in 1990, established the Secretariat in Prague, Conflict 
Prevention Center in Vienna, and Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights in Warsaw. A decision to create an office of Secretary 
General was made at the December 1992 Stockholm meeting of CSCE Foreign 
Ministers.

During 1992, the decision to move from principle to action was most 
marked in a new Helsinki document which established a number of 
practical tools that help OSCE work with NATO, the European Union (EU), 
and other international bodies to defend human rights and manage the 
unprecedented changes now taking place in Europe. In particular, it sets 
out an ambitious role for the OSCE in conflict resolution and 
"preventive diplomacy."

The OSCE also is an important framework for conventional arms control in 
Europe. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, signed in 
November 1990, limits non-nuclear ground and air forces from the 
Atlantic to the Urals. A separate political agreement, concluded in July 
1992, covers personnel in the same region. Through continued 
negotiation, confidence-building measures have been extended, and higher 
expectations for treaty compliance and verification have been set. A new 
security negotiation--the Forum for Security Cooperation--opened in 
Vienna on September 22, 1992.

OSCE and European Conflicts

The OSCE is in the forefront of conflict resolution in various European 
conflicts through preventive diplomacy and human rights monitoring.

-- Under OSCE auspices, the Minsk Group--11 nations, including 
Azerbaijan and Armenia--is the focus of international efforts to solve 
the crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh.

-- The OSCE mission in Georgia assesses the political and human rights 
situations in the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia. It also 
monitors peacekeeping forces and participates in political negotiations 
in South Ossetia. 

-- In December 1993, the then-CSCE established a mission to Tajikistan 
in order to foster confidence-building, democracy, and human rights. In 
addition, rapporteur missions have been sent to other new Central Asian 
republics to assess the governmental and human rights situations.

-- The OSCE missions to Latvia and Estonia are mandated to promote 
integration and better understanding between communities there. 

-- In Moldova, the OSCE mission assists in seeking a solution to the 
problems of the Transdniester region. 

-- The OSCE mission to Ukraine, established in 1994, focuses on the 
Crimea issue by enhancing dialogue and fostering a peaceful solution. 

-- The OSCE mission in Bosnia supports the Ombudsmen of the federation. 

-- Along with other international fora, such as the Contact Group and 
the UN, the OSCE makes an important contribution to efforts to stop the 
fighting in the former Yugoslavia and to help prevent any further spill-
over of hostilities. To this end, the OSCE has established a preventive 
diplo-macy mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. OSCE 
missions to Kosovo, Sandzak, and Vojvodina were established in 1992, but 
were expelled by Belgrade authorities in July 1993. The OSCE also 
assists in monitoring sanctions compliance in the countries around 
Serbia and Monte-negro. There are now sanctions monitoring missions in 
Hungary, Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, The Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Romania, and Ukraine. 

-- In April 1995, the OSCE established a long-term presence in Grozny to 
promote human rights and a political settlement to the Chechnya 
conflict. 

As a charter member of the OSCE, the United States has been central in 
the promotion of uncompromising humanitarian standards and their 
practical implementation. This effort has embodied America's hopes for a 
unified, democratic, and prosperous Europe. Americans continually have 
worked to ensure that the OSCE process remains flexible, innovative, and 
unbureaucratic. By establishing the first permanent delegation to the 
then-CSCE in Vienna in August 1992, the United States charted the course 
which other nations have followed.




[BOX]

OSCE Participating States

Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, The Holy See, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, 
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, San Marino, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, 
Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, 
Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia*

* Excluded from all OSCE meetings  

[END BOX]


NATO Information Sources

NATO Information On-Line

NATO official documents and publications--communiques, press releases, 
fact sheets, speeches, and newsletters--are available electronically on 
the Internet through the NATO Integrated Data Service (NIDS). The 
service also includes documentation from other NATO agencies and the 
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). Information is 
available on the Internet either by daily automatic electronic mail 
distributions or through World Wide Web or "gopher" searches, as 
follows:  

-- For e-mail NATO general information: send the message SUB NATODATA 
(followed by your first and last name) to: 

LISTSERV@CC1.KULEUVEN.AC.BE

-- For e-mail NATO scientific and environmental information: send the 
message SUB NATOSCI (followed by your first and last name) to:  

LISTSERV@CC1.KULEUVEN.AC.BE
 
-- For NATO documents on the Internet gopher:  

URL://GOPHER.NATO.INT:70/1

-- For NATO documents through the World Wide Web:  

HTPP://WWW.NATO.INT/

Internet connections are widely available commercially, at low cost, on 
subscription. All data provided by NATO through the NIDS is free of 
charge. For further information, contact the NATO Integrated Data 
Service, NATO Headquarters, 1110 Brussels, Belgium. Tel: (Int'l-32-2) 
728. 4599. Fax: (Int'l-32-2) 728.4579. E-mail: NATODOC@ hq.nato.int.

NATO Publications

NATO Review. Published under the authority of the Secretary General, 
NATO Review is a colorful and informative magazine which contributes to 
the constructive discussion of Atlantic problems. Articles provide 
insight into the changing nature of the NATO alliance and do not 
necessarily represent official opinion or policy of member governments 
or NATO.  

The NATO Review is published six times a year in English, and also is 
available in French--Revue de l'Otan; German--NATO Brief; Italian--
Notizie NATO; Danish--NATO Nyt; Dutch--NATO Kroniek; and Spanish--
Revista de la OTAN.  Quarterly editions are published in Norwegian--NATO 
Nytt; Greek--Deltio NATO; Portuguese--Noticias da OTAN; and Turkish-- 
NATO Dergisi.

The NATO Review is free of charge for persons or institutions who inform 
the public about NATO affairs or who have a professional interest in 
NATO information, including libraries, research institutions, 
educational institutions--including school librarians and teachers--and 
journalists.  

NATO Handbook. A pocket-sized booklet covering all aspects of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Handbook is published as needed. It is 
not a formal NATO document and does not, therefore, necessarily 
represent the official opinion or position of member governments on all 
policy issues involved. The NATO Handbook is free of charge to qualified 
applicants of the NATO Review (see above).


U.S. Department of State Sources of NATO Information

The U.S. Department of State includes NATO information on its Internet, 
CD-ROM, and print publication resources, as follows:

Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN). On the Internet, 
DOSFAN provides global access to a timely array of official U.S. foreign 
policy information, including speeches and testimony by senior 
officials, plus the official weekly publication, Dispatch; Background 
Notes on countries and international organizations; congressional 
reports; daily press briefing transcripts; and much more. To access 
DOSFAN: 

Gopher: dosfan.lib.uic.edu
URL: gopher://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/
WWW: http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/dosfan.html

U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-ROM (USFAC). USFAC is a compact, fully 
searchable foreign policy library, offering more than 4,000 official 
documents  from 1990 through the present. USFAC archives DOSFAN and is 
published quarterly. One-year subscriptions for USFAC (four discs per 
year) are priced at $80 ($100 foreign) per year and also are available 
from the U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh, 
PA 15250-7954. To order, call (202) 512-1800 or fax: (202) 512-2250.  

U.S. Department of State Dispatch. Dispatch is the official record of 
U.S. foreign policy and includes major speeches and congressional 
testimony by the President, Secretary of State, and senior U.S. 
officials, plus fact sheets, treaty actions, and more. Subscriptions, 
which include all supplemental issues and six-month indexes, are priced 
at $91 domestic third-class postage; $144 domestic first-class; $113.75 
foreign and are available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954. 
To order, call (202) 512-1800 or fax: (202) 512-2250.



[BOX]

How to Order

Readers in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom may obtain 
copies of the NATO Review  and the NATO Handbook from the addresses 
below. Requests should indicate how the magazine will be used to inform 
the public about NATO. Readers in other countries who desire copies of 
the English-language or other editions of the NATO Review, as well as 
other NATO publications, should contact the NATO Office of Information 
and Press (see below) or by e-mail:
 
          NATODOC @HQ.NATO.INT 

United States
NATO Review
U.S. Mission to NATO
PSC-81,  Box 200
APO-AE 09724

Canada
Domestic Communications Division
Department of External Affairs
125 Sussex Drive
Ottawa, Ontario  K1A OG2

United Kingdom
Assistant Chief 
Public Relations Central
Ministry of Defence
Room 0384 Main Building
London SW1A 2HB

Other Countries
NATO Office of Information and Press
1110 Brussels, Belgium
Fax: (Int'l-32-2) 728-4579 (###)  

[End Box]



[END OF DISPATCH VOL 6, NO 23]

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