U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH 
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 22, MAY 29, 1995 
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
 
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE: 
 
1. The U.S. and Ireland: Dedication to a Future Of Cooperation and 
Prosperity--President Clinton  
2. U.S. Policy Toward Cuba--Peter Tarnoff  
3. Preview of the Intergovernmental Conference on Land-based Sources of 
Marine Pollution--Timothy E. Wirth 
4. The Summit of the Americas: Implementation Work Program--Thomas F. 
McLarty III 
5. The Caribbean Basin Trade Security Act--Alexander F. Watson  
6. American Overseas Interests Act--Secretary Christopher 
7. Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security 
8. What's in Print: Foreign Relations of the U.S.  
 
 
ARTICLE 1 
 
The U.S. and Ireland: Dedication to a Future of Cooperation and 
Prosperity 
President Clinton 
Address to Conference on Trade and Investment in Ireland, Washington, 
DC, May 25, 1995 
 
Thank you very much. Secretary Christopher, Secretary Brown, Senator 
Mitchell, Deputy Prime Minister Spring, Mr. Patrick Mayhew, Mr. 
Ambassador, ladies and gentlemen--to all of you of Irish, British, and 
American heritage from the business communities of these great nations, 
I thank you for being here. I have looked forward to this day for a long 
time--to having people like you here who see the opportunities for trade 
and investment that come from peace, and the opportunities for trade and 
investment to support peace. I am especially delighted that so many are 
here from Ireland and the United Kingdom. To all of our friends from 
Northern Ireland, your attendance here shows your dedication to a future 
of cooperation and prosperity and we are particularly glad to have you. 
 
Let me say a special word of thanks to George Mitchell for the 
tremendous work he has done in organizing this conference. His devotion 
to the cause of nurturing peace and growth in Northern Ireland and the 
Republic's border counties has played a central part in the progress 
that we celebrate here today. I am delighted that he will lead another 
mission to Ireland this summer, and even more pleased that he has agreed 
to continue his work in overseeing our economic initiatives through the 
end of this year. Ireland is lucky to have George Mitchell on its side, 
even if it has to put up with the envy of the United States Senate, the 
Supreme Court, and Major League Baseball. You know, George is Irish and 
Lebanese. Maybe when we succeed in Ireland--if the Secretary of State is 
not finished--he will volunteer for other duty. 
 
As all of you know, the United States has a keen interest in a stable 
and democratic and prosperous Europe. But that interest is particularly 
strong when it comes to Ireland. Our strong bonds of kinship, culture, 
and history shared with the people of the United Kingdom and Ireland are 
well-known. 
 
This is a moment of historic opportunity for you and of historic 
interest for the United States. For my own part, people ask me from time 
to time why this is a matter of such deep personal interest to me. It 
goes beyond my Irish roots. I wish I could just say that is all there 
was to it. But an important part of our mission at this moment in time 
as Americans is to help to reconcile the divisions which keep people 
apart and sometimes lead them to violence both within our own country 
and around the world. 
 
If you look into the next century you could thank the good Lord that we 
may--we may--succeed in removing the nuclear threat from the children of 
the 21st century. But we still see these ancient impulses that keep 
people apart based on religious or racial or ethnic differences. 
 
I tell my fellow Americans all the time that the great genius of our 
country in the next century may be our ability to exalt the greatest 
amount of diversity of any large country in the world. But it is still a 
challenge for us here. You see it all the time. We can think of no 
greater mission in our quest to reconcile diversity than trying to help 
peace and prosperity succeed in Northern Ireland, and in Ireland, in 
general. 
 
This is, as I am sure you know, an extraordinary gathering of which you 
are a part. Never before have representatives of all the political 
parties in Northern Ireland, officials from the United Kingdom and 
Ireland, and so many business leaders joined to help us to build a 
better tomorrow. The conference shows anew the historic progress that 
has been made toward a just and lasting settlement, and toward a peace 
that respects the rights and traditions of both communities. 
 
In the last few months, thanks to the cease-fire and the momentum of the 
negotiations, a powerful transformation has begun. Peace is closer than 
it has been in a generation. For the first time in decades, children can 
walk to school without worrying. Families that have endured so much 
violence with so much dignity can now enjoy the blessings of days 
without violence and nights without fear. 
 
The roads between North and South are more open than they have been in 
25 years. Citizens of the Republic are visiting the North in even 
greater numbers. In Belfast, the army patrols have ended, the body armor 
and helmets are gone, and hundreds of troops are now going home. These 
landmark achievements would not have been possible without the 
leadership and courage of Prime Minister Major, Prime Minister Bruton, 
and before him, Prime Minister Reynolds. With the Joint Framework 
Document, they are paving the way for a new and hopeful era of 
reconciliation. All true friends of Ireland are grateful to them and to 
the parties that have risen to their challenge. I salute them, and I 
salute others who work for peace--individuals such as Foreign Minister 
Spring, Sir Patrick Mayhew, and that tireless advocate of peace--our 
friend, John Hume. 
 
We pay tribute as well to the brave people of Northern Ireland whose 
courage has brought them to this point. The United States is proud to 
have helped them and all peacemakers, and today, I renew my pledge to do 
everything in my power to support their efforts. I know I speak for all 
Americans when I say that people who take risks for peace here and 
anywhere else in the world will always be welcome in the White House, in 
Washington, and throughout our country. 
 
This momentum must be maintained. The ministerial-level talks represent 
a step of tremendous promise. I hope the parties can soon sit down 
together to discuss the future and their differences. That is the best 
guarantee of a permanent peace. 
 
But there must be progress as well outside the conference rooms. 
Violence is diminished, but it has not disappeared. I call on all those 
who continue to employ violence to end the punishment beatings and the 
intimidation. And to all who are observing the cease-fire, I appeal to 
you to take the next step and begin to discuss serious decommissioning 
of weapons. Paramilitaries on both sides must get rid of their bombs and 
guns for good. The specter of violence that has haunted Ireland must be 
banished once and for all. 
 
It is also time to begin healing the wounds of a generation. Many 
innocents disappeared during The Troubles. Others were banished from 
their homes. Today there are families that still have not had the chance 
to grieve in peace, to visit the graves of their loved ones, or to 
reunite after years of separation. It is time to allow families to be 
whole again. 
 
As everyone knows, peace is more than cease-fires and formal agreements. 
It demands real hope and progress in the hearts of people. It demands 
common striving for the common good. It is time for those who have been 
most affected by the fighting to feel this kind of hope and this sense 
of progress. As Yeats wrote, "Too long a sacrifice can make a stone of 
the heart." There must be a peace dividend in Northern Ireland and the 
border counties so that everyone is convinced that the future belongs to 
those who build--not those who destroy, so that the majority that 
supports peace is strengthened, and so that there is no slipping back 
into the violence that frustration breeds. 
 
That is why this conference is so important. It underscores that all 
sides have an interest in investing in the future of Northern Ireland 
and that all sides will benefit from the peace. Our own experience here 
in America shows what a difference that kind of progress and benefit can 
bring. More than a century ago, our great sage, Ralph Waldo Emerson, 
said that trade was "the principle of liberty," that it "made peace and 
keeps peace." That is what we wish for Ireland. Now it is time to 
realize that wish. The end of organized violence makes that possible. So 
I urge American businesses and all others to consider investing in 
Northern Ireland and the border counties. The opportunities are 
excellent. The work force is well-educated and well-motivated. The 
productivity levels are high. The unit labor costs are low. The labor 
relations are good. The infrastructure, the communications, and the 
access to the European market are fine. With the prospect of an enduring 
settlement on the horizon, business confidence is rising fast. Experts 
predict investment booms on both sides of the border and an increase in 
tourism in the North that could exceed 100%. 
 
Already, the United States is the number-one investor in both Northern 
Ireland and the Republic. American companies employ nearly 10% of all 
the workers in Northern Ireland's manufacturing sector. Ireland imports 
almost $3 billion-worth of American goods. The firms we have in these 
markets are increasing their investments, strengthening their positions 
in Europe, and building businesses that create jobs on both sides of the 
Atlantic. By doing well, these companies are also doing good. 
 
More investment in Northern Ireland promises to lift the region out of 
the cycle of despair that leads to violence. It will reduce the chronic 
unemployment that runs around 50% in some urban areas and has deadened 
the dreams of so many. 
 
If growth is accompanied by an end to discrimination, by fair and 
nonsectarian employment practices, and by  encouraging investment in 
areas in greatest need, then both Catholics and Protestants will feel 
that they have a stake in their society and its peaceful future. When 
both communities feel the benefits of peace and see that they are 
distributed fairly, despair will lose its hold, and all will have the 
chance they deserve to fulfill their God-given potential. 
 
"Peace," Yeats said, "comes dropping slow." The past will not be 
overcome in a day, but the perception of change provides the kindling 
for hope. The opportunities for positive, powerful, profitable change 
are now clearly present in Northern Ireland. 
 
As long as I am President, the United States will continue to encourage 
that change. I am proud of all that Secretary Brown has done in 
achieving--on his mission to Ireland last December. I am proud of the 
many efforts of the Department of Commerce, USAID, USIA, and other 
government agencies to support reconciliation in Ireland. I am proud of 
the work of the State Department, and I want to say a special word of 
thanks to our ambassadors in the area--Ambassador Crowe and Ambassador 
Jean Kennedy Smith--for the outstanding work that they both have done: 
Thank you. 
 
Ours is the first administration ever to include appropriations for the 
International Fund for Ireland. The IFI has lived up to our hopes for 
it. The Fund supports over 3,000 economic development projects and has 
created some 23,000 jobs in areas that were recruiting grounds for the 
paramilitaries. It is promoting cooperation across the border between 
communities. 
 
The record challenges us to go even further, so we have increased our  
funding request for the IFI to almost $60 million over the next two 
years.  We are working to build more bridges across the ocean through 
exchange  programs for managers, students, agricultural experts, 
artists, and scholars--programs that establish bonds of friendship while 
transporting ideas and information, benefiting people on both sides of 
the ocean. There are some in Washington who would like to cut our 
funding for these and other programs that support peace--in Ireland and 
throughout the world. That would be a grave error. 
 
The United States has an abiding interest in creating peace and the 
opportunities it brings. We must have the resources to foster peace and 
stand by those who take the hard risks for peace. We have seen time and 
again that our investments in peace--whether in the Middle East, 
Southern Africa, Haiti, or Ireland, have always yielded great benefits 
for the American people--in growing markets, greater stability, and 
increased security. 
 
I hope all those who want to see peace in Northern Ireland will keep 
that in mind. Peace has a price, but it is a small one compared to the 
alternative, and it is a price very much worth paying. 
 
I am also glad we have been able to help the cause of peace through this 
conference and other economic initiatives, because Ireland has given us 
so much. The two communities that today are coming together in 
cooperation have each given America a rich legacy. In our nation, 
Catholic and Protestant have been intertwined, and together they have 
contributed immensely to the greatness of our people and the success of 
America. There is evidence all around us. In places like New York, 
Pennsylvania, and Ohio, counties, cities, and towns with names like 
Londonderry, Ulster, and Antrim dot the map. Often, these places mark 
the frontier in the 18th century when Ulster Protestants--some of them 
my ancestors--pushed west to build new lives and a new nation. These 
settlers were the forebears of nearly a dozen American presidents, 
including Andrew Jackson, William McKinley, and Woodrow Wilson. 
 
Irish Catholics contributed just as much to our country's rise, whether 
in building railroads or institutions. A visiting journalist in the last 
century took the measure of that effort when he said that, in America, 
you could see "water power, steam power, horse power, and Irish power." 
"And," he concluded, "the last works hardest of all." 
 
In this half of our century, the names John F. Kennedy, Justice William 
Brennan, and Speaker Tip O'Neill only began to tell the story of Irish 
Catholics' contribution to all the branches of American democracy. These 
true traditions, harnessed together in the New World for common goals, 
has been America's great fortune. Time and again, we have seen people of 
different backgrounds and  ancestries put freedom over faction and the 
goals of the community over the interests of its separate parts. 
 
Of the gifts we can give to Ireland, this example of people joining 
together for the common good clearly is the greatest. The challenges of 
the coming century demand that we keep in mind the examples of those who 
went before us, who built bridges across their differences, and found 
the strength to pull together. 
 
We now face a whole new set of challenges in this new era. The global 
economy, the explosion of information, the advance of technology, the 
growing mobility of people--all these forces are bringing us into a more 
integrated world, more full of possibilities than ever before. The next 
century can be the most exciting time in all human history because of 
the opportunities for human possibilities. 
 
But we have to recognize that all these forces of integration have a 
darker side as well. If we do not rise to the challenges they present, 
we become vulnerable to the organized forces of destruction and evil; 
for the modern world requires us to be open in order to take advantage 
of all the forces of integration. As we become more open, we become more 
vulnerable to those who would hate and those who would destroy. 
 
As the people of Northern Ireland are showing, we can seize the moment. 
We can turn away from terror. We can turn away from destruction. We can 
turn toward peace and unity and possibility. But to keep this process 
going--to lock in the accomplishments--we must make hope real. To grasp 
the opportunity, we must build stronger businesses and communities and 
families. We must have more and better jobs. We must strengthen the 
prospects of a better tomorrow. That is the way to preempt fanaticism. 
That is the way to close the book on old and bloody conflicts. That is 
the way to give our children the future they all deserve. The chance is 
there. It is here.  It is now. We have it in our power to make all the 
difference. Let us do it. Thank you, and bless you all.  (###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 2 
 
U.S. Policy Toward Cuba 
Peter Tarnoff, Under Secretary for Political Affairs 
Statement before the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, May 22, 1995 
 
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify before this 
subcommittee on U.S. policy toward Cuba. I know this subject is of great 
interest to the subcommittee's members and, indeed, to the Congress as a 
whole. 
 
There has been considerable discussion and debate in the press, in these 
halls, and in the community of those who care deeply about Cuba 
concerning recent steps taken by the Administration to further 
regularize our migration relations with Cuba. Another important debate 
is taking place with regard to proposed legislation on Cuba now before 
the Congress. I am here today not only to explain the Administration's 
position on these issues, but to place them in the context of the 
situation which prevails in Cuba today and our overall policy toward 
that troubled country. 
 
Despite the regime's strenuous efforts to resist them, the winds of 
change are beginning to blow across Cuba. Economic measures which would 
have been unthinkable only a few short years ago are being tolerated, 
with other, potentially more significant changes reportedly under 
consideration. The dramatic trends toward democracy, respect for human 
rights, and open markets that have swept the rest of the Western 
Hemisphere have not yet had an impact on Cuba, but they inevitably will. 
We strongly believe that U.S. policy must continue to play an important 
role in hastening the change that must soon come and in shaping the 
nature of the transition so that it unfolds in a peaceful and democratic 
manner. 
 
For over 30 years, during both Republican and Democratic 
Administrations, the overarching goal of U.S. policy toward Cuba has 
been to promote a peaceful transition to a democratic society which 
recognizes fundamental freedoms and respects human rights. We are 
resolute in our opposition to the undemocratic regime of Fidel Castro, 
but we have no hostile intent toward the Cuban people. Quite the 
contrary, the Cuban Democracy Act--CDA, which passed with strong 
bipartisan support in 1992 and which this Administration has faithfully 
implemented, is the cornerstone of our policy which puts pressure on the 
Cuban Government through diplomatic isolation and economic embargo while 
at the same time directing humanitarian assistance, information, and 
support to the Cuban people, including those who engage in peaceful 
struggle for human rights and democracy. Also consistent with the CDA, 
we remain prepared to respond to significant political and economic 
reform in Cuba with carefully calibrated measures. 
 
The Situation in Cuba Today
 
Mr. Chairman, I would like to spend a few minutes discussing current 
economic and political conditions in Cuba. 
 
As many experts have noted, Cuba's economy entered into a steep decline 
following the collapse of the Soviet bloc beginning in 1989, even though 
the unilateral U.S. embargo had been in effect for a much longer time. 
Prior to 1989, the Soviet Union pumped $4 to $6 billion of assistance 
and subsidies into the Cuban economy each year, almost one-third of 
Cuba's gross domestic product at the time. The loss of this aid and 
preferential trade after the dissolution of the Soviet Union was 
devastating and exposed the Cuban economy's essential structural 
weaknesses. Cuba has not published economic statistics since 1989, but 
according to unofficial Cuban estimates the island's economic output has 
fallen by over 50%, to just over $10 billion. 
 
Cuba's economic free fall has had a disastrous impact on the Cuban 
people's standard of living. Ordinary Cubans struggle daily against 
scarcity. Their state ration coupons provide barely enough food for half 
the month, and they must scramble to find ways to get through the rest. 
Many Cubans must travel long distances to work on bicycles since 
gasoline is very expensive and can rarely be bought with pesos. Workers 
whose creativity and enterprise are stifled by the state-controlled 
system lack motivation; those who do not accept the party line risk 
unemployment or worse. 
 
The Cuban Government's response to this increasingly dire situation has 
been slow and stubborn. For four years, the regime took no significant 
steps to confront its own economic imbalances or alleviate the growing 
suffering of the population. It sought to blame the U.S. embargo for its 
ills--a charge rejected by nearly all independent analysts--and denied 
that its glaring problems were the result of its obsolete economic 
system. Finally, in 1993, the government began adopting tentative 
measures which have included the legalization of the dollar and of 
tightly circumscribed self-employment, and the establishment of 
agricultural and industrial craft markets. The government also converted 
large, state-run farms into state cooperatives and leased some land to 
individual families. In a particularly odd marriage of convenience, the 
Cuban leadership has aggressively courted foreign investment--something 
it previously considered anathema--to provide the capital it needs "to 
save socialism." 
 
Each of these small steps has moved Cuba away from the Marxist economic 
model that has retarded its development, suffocated private enterprise, 
and denied ordinary Cubans the right to make their own economic 
decisions. Each of the steps, however, also has been carefully limited 
to preserve the regime's control over economic and political life on the 
island. For example, cooperatives and farmers must still sell the vast 
majority of their produce to the government at prices it sets. Self-
employment is only permitted in a few occupations, and those involved 
may hire only family members. University graduates may not participate 
at all in self-employment initiatives. Cuba's current investment climate 
still ranks among the world's riskiest, most arbitrary, and least 
attractive. 
 
The Cuban Government has claimed that the measures it has adopted have 
begun to turn its economy around. However, this year's sugar harvest--
Cuba's main export crop and its largest source of hard currency--appears 
to be even smaller than last year's record low. Factories all over the 
island are idle and food production continues to decline. While it 
appears that the Cuban Government's recent actions have slowed the 
economy's deterioration, we believe that prospects for complete economic 
recovery in Cuba remain dismal until the regime takes bolder measures 
that would liberalize the economy and unleash the Cuban people's 
entrepreneurial energy to solve their own problems. Because of the 
economic downturn, Cuban leaders have outlined plans to undertake a 
major downsizing of government and state enterprises this year that will 
create massive unemployment, possibly in the hundreds of thousands. 
 
Cuba's state-controlled economy currently offers almost no alternatives 
to government employment of one kind or another. When the state 
eliminates jobs, there is no private sector to help create new ones. As 
the Cuban regime grows less and less able to provide for the Cuban 
people, it must allow them to provide for themselves. 
 
While more fundamental economic reforms are necessary to improve Cuba's 
prospects for the future, the island's essential problem remains the 
lack of political freedoms and respect for human rights. 
 
Political/Human Rights Situation in Cuba
 
While it has shown some limited flexibility on the economic side, the 
regime of Cuban President Fidel Castro remains politically unyielding. 
Relying on a network of neighborhood committees, government bureaus, 
Communist Party directorates, state security agencies, and the armed 
forces, the government controls the population and suppresses even 
peaceful opposition. The regime's rapid containment of a significant 
anti-government disturbance in Havana on August 5, 1994, demonstrated 
this continuing control. The riot and the mass outflow of "rafters" 
which overwhelmed Cuban authorities may have forced the regime to 
realize that more needed to be done to meet the material needs of the 
Cuban people. No lessons, however, appear to have been drawn regarding 
the need for a political opening. Indeed, Castro has made clear his 
opposition to any political reforms which might parallel the economic 
changes he has permitted. The monolithic government and Communist Party 
apparatus remain unyielding. 
 
Opposition parties and independent civic organizations remain 
prohibited. Freedom of association does not exist. The regime does not 
tolerate freedom of speech or opinion. Those who dare speak out for 
democratic principles are harassed if they become too vocal. In order to 
placate international public opinion, the government has recently become 
somewhat more subtle in its means of suppressing opposition. Reports of 
beatings, stonings, break-ins, or "acts of repudiation" by regime-
directed mobs directed at dissidents have become less frequent in recent 
years. Rather, proponents of peaceful change are detained for hours or 
several days and released with a warning to alter their behavior or 
suffer the consequences. Opposition figures often suffer economic 
discrimination such as expulsion from their professions, layoffs, 
blacklisting, and loss of benefits. These tactics, combined with close 
surveillance and infiltration of the various small opposition groups, 
have been largely successful in marginalizing and fragmenting Cuba's 
nascent democratic movement. 
 
Contraction of the regime's economic control, however, has created tiny 
spaces in which Cuba's civil society, devastated by 35 years of 
dictatorship, is re-emerging. Attendance at religious services of all 
denominations has risen dramatically. The influence of the Roman 
Catholic Church, aided by the naming of the first Cuban cardinal in over 
30 years--Monsignor Jaime Ortega--has increased. The charitable arm of 
the Catholic Church--CARITAS--has opened offices in seven regional 
centers for the distribution of humanitarian   aid. Small independent 
associations of professionals, including academic researchers, 
economists, lawyers, journalists, and engineers have formed. This 
movement is nascent and fragile, but it provides an alternative to 
state-controlled organizations for a growing number of Cubans. 
 
In November 1994, the Cuban Government agreed to invite the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights Ambassador Jose Ayala Lasso to visit the 
island. In the weeks leading up to the visit, however, the regime 
detained some 55 human rights activists and harassed a number of others, 
threatening them with severe reprisals if they continued to denounce 
human rights abuses or contacted foreign diplomatic missions during the 
High Commissioner's stay. Ambassador Ayala did see a number of human 
rights activists during his four-day visit in meetings that took place 
on the fringes of his official program, which limited his contacts to 
government officials and officially approved groups and individuals.  
 
Still, no improvement in the human rights situation in Cuba has followed 
the visit. Ambassador Ayala presented Fidel Castro with a list of over 
1,000 political prisoners and asked Cuba to free them; since the visit 
the regime has released fewer than 20 political prisoners, most on 
condition of their immediate exile from the country. As recently as last 
month, noted human rights leader Francisco Chaviano was sentenced by a 
closed military tribunal to 15 years' imprisonment on trumped-up charges 
of "revealing state secrets" and document fraud after being held for 
almost a year without formal charges. Ambassador Ayala also pressed the 
Cuban regime to sign the UN charter against torture and to permit the UN 
Special Rapporteur for Cuba, Swedish diplomat Carl-Johan Groth, to visit 
Cuba in order to fulfill his mandate. 
 
Ambassador Ayala's visit notwithstanding, the Cuban Government has taken 
no concrete steps to cooperate with the UN on human rights. While the 
regime claimed that its invitation to Ambassador Ayala demonstrated that 
it had nothing to hide where human rights were concerned, it continues 
to defy the repeatedly expressed will of the international community--
specifically the UN General Assembly and the UN Human Rights Commission-
-by refusing to let Special Rapporteur Groth enter Cuba. Cuba has not 
yet signed the convention against torture, and hundreds of political 
prisoners remain in detention. 
 
A four-person international human rights delegation headed by the French 
organization "France-Liberte" visited Cuba April 27-May 5, after being 
invited by Fidel Castro during his visit to Paris early last month. The 
delegation interviewed 24 political prisoners in the reception areas of 
nine different prisons, but was not allowed to inspect the prisons 
themselves. The delegation called for the immediate, unconditional 
release of four of these prisoners who are seriously ill and expressed 
its concern about excessive sentences meted out for non-violent, 
political "crimes."  Within days of their visit, however, we received 
reports that the Cuban Government had detained 15 members of a human 
rights organization whose leader had met with the delegation, as well as 
with other Western visitors. 
 
The Department of State intends  to increase its support for Cuba's 
embattled activists and will continue  to pursue aggressively in the UN 
and other international fora, as well as in diplomatic contacts with 
other countries, a policy of focusing attention on the need for 
democracy and improvement in the human rights situation in Cuba. On 
December 28, the UN General Assembly passed a U.S.-drafted resolution 
condemning systematic human rights abuses in Cuba. A similar U.S.-
drafted resolution which extended the Special Rapporteur's mandate was 
adopted on March 7 by the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva. The 
United States took the lead in deploring in the strongest terms the 
ramming and sinking by Cuban Government vessels of the tugboat "13th of 
March" on July 13, 1994, which resulted in the deaths of at least 40 
people. 
 
The Department detailed at length in its Country Report on Human Rights 
Practices for 1994, submitted to the Congress on January 31, the 
deplorable state of basic freedoms in Cuba. Our findings of repression, 
of arbitrary arrest, and harassment of democratic opposition figures are 
echoed in the Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Cuba, submitted 
to the UN Human Rights Commission by Special Rapporteur Groth. Numerous 
other impartial and expert studies, including the 1994 report of the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and a Human Rights Watch 
report, are critical of the Cuban regime. 
 
In a region where democratic reform and economic liberalization are fast 
becoming the norm, Castro's anachronistic policies and iron-fisted 
repression have provoked strong criticism from Latin American 
governments. Today, when Fidel Castro and Foreign Minister Robaina 
travel abroad, they hear the same message throughout the hemisphere and 
beyond: democratization and respect for human rights are urgently 
needed. The Rio Group, which includes some of the most important 
regional nations, publicly called, in September 1994, for "a peaceful 
transition to a democratic and pluralistic system which respects human 
rights and freedom of opinion."  Similarly, at the June 1994 Ibero-
American Summit at Cartagena, Colombia, at which 20 democracies and Cuba 
were present, one head of state after another lamented the lack of 
democracy in Cuba. In December 1994, the regional consensus was that 
only Cuba, the lone non-democratic state in the entire region, should be 
excluded from the first Summit of the Americas. While we have been 
pleased at the increased willingness by many countries to speak out for 
democratic reform and respect for human rights in Cuba, increased 
diplomatic and economic engagement with the regime has, so far, shown no 
evidence of hastening democratic change there. As I indicated before, we 
believe that there should be a broadening of contact, not with the 
Government of Cuba, but with those valiant individuals and organizations 
struggling for democratic change. 
 
The Cuban Democracy Act
 
Mr. Chairman, earlier I described our concerted effort to mobilize 
international pressure to encourage the Cuban Government to reform, to 
create democratic openings, to respect human rights, and to liberalize 
its economy. In the UN, the OAS, regional gatherings, and international 
fora our message is clear and understood. But this is only a small part 
of our effort to force Castro to recognize that he must change and end 
his totalitarian rule and communist aspirations which history has 
demonstrated are unjust, unworkable, and unsustainable. 
 
The thrust of this effort is embodied in the Cuban Democracy Act, 
endorsed by both Presidents Bush and Clinton and passed with bipartisan 
support by the Congress in 1992. As you know, the CDA provides for a 
dual approach to reform in Cuba by both maintaining firm pressure on the 
Cuban Government by denying it legitimacy through international and 
direct pressures such as those I mentioned just a moment ago, and, more 
importantly, by imposing tough economic sanctions. To augment the 
comprehensive U.S. economic embargo on Cuba, the CDA added further 
restrictions on trade by U.S. subsidiaries abroad with Cuba. These 
provisions have reduced such trade from over $700 million in 1992 to 
nearly zero today. In August of last year, during the migration crisis, 
the President imposed additional restrictions on remittances and 
transactions related to travel to Cuba. 
 
We strongly believe that the embargo is the best leverage the U.S. has 
to promote change in Cuba and that particularly in the years since 
Soviet support to Cuba ended, it is working.  It denies the Castro 
regime the benefits that U.S. trade, investment, and tourism would 
provide. While the inherent inefficiencies of Cuba's socialist economy 
make it ultimately unsustainable, a large influx of hard currency from 
the U.S. could allow the regime to resist change and stay afloat for 
years longer. Because of the embargo, Castro faces tough choices now. 
The modest economic reforms that he has authorized would almost 
certainly not have taken place without the added pressure that our 
embargo applies. We are dedicated to maintaining the embargo in place 
until we see the kind of meaningful, far-reaching reform contemplated in 
the CDA. Should such significant, permanent reforms take place, we are 
prepared to respond with calibrated steps contemplated in the CDA. 
 
Mr. Chairman, while it is essential that we keep up this intense 
pressure on the regime, it is also important that we do everything we 
can to empower those living under its yoke to be able to continue their 
struggle for democratic reform and human rights. That is why we have 
vigorously sought to reach out to the Cuban people through private 
humanitarian assistance, increased flow of information, and improved 
telecommunications. Hundreds of thousands of Americans have already 
taken advantage of easier telephone access to Cuba as a result of last 
year's telecommunications agreements. Over the past two years, we have 
licensed more than $65 million in private humanitarian aid to Cuba, 
mostly medicines and mostly from U.S. religious groups. Other key 
elements of Track II to date have been book donations, licensed travel 
to Cuba for research, human rights and other activity, and the 
broadcasts of Radio and TV Marti. These actions are intended to give 
hope to legitimate opponents of the regime to allow them to sustain the 
risks and pressures of maintaining their struggle for democracy. We 
believe that we can and must do more to help in these areas. 
 
Let me stress something very important--these outreach measures are 
designed to open Cuba to the world in selective ways that reinforce the 
message of democratic reform without allowing Castro and his government 
to exploit international trade or our hard dollars to perpetuate his 
dictatorship. An entire generation of Cubans has grown up under Castro's 
domination--we must be able to reveal to them what they have been 
denied. The things we take for granted--the ability to speak freely, to 
seek information without restriction, to exchange ideas without fear, to 
vote for change, to protest against the government--all of these are 
denied to Cubans. The information highway has no exit to Havana because 
the Cuban Government is afraid of what might happen if the average Cuban 
had access to the freedom bulletin board on the Internet. Our efforts 
bring the average Cuban a chance to learn about what we value so highly-
-democracy, freedom, human rights, human values--and help those who seek 
to advance democratic reform in Cuba. 
 
With the liberation of Eastern Europe, we have seen that non-
governmental institutions such as business groups, churches, 
professional associations, news organizations, human rights groups, and 
political organizations can form the bedrock of democracy. We must 
support these struggling entities in Cuba so that whenever change comes, 
there is a strong and well-prepared foundation on which to build a new 
democracy. We need to do more to increase our support for the brave 
activists and independent organizations that already exist on the island 
and increase their contact with potential partners here in the U.S.   
The CDA calls on the Administration to engage in these efforts and I 
know that this committee has expressed its support for them. 
 
The Proposed Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act
 
I know all the members of this subcommittee share with us the objectives 
stated in the Cuban Democracy Act, and many of you are co-sponsors of 
Chairman Helms' proposed legislation--the Cuban Liberty and Democratic 
Solidarity Act--which elaborates on those goals. As you know, on April 
28, we formally conveyed the Administration's views on the House version 
of this legislation to Chairman Gilman in a letter from Assistant 
Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Wendy Sherman. 
 
Since I am certain that you and other committee members have seen that 
letter, I will not go into great detail here. There are aspects of the 
bill we support. These include making the embargo more effective, 
accelerating planning for assistance to Cuba under a transitional or 
democratic government, and protecting American property interests in 
Cuba. As the President has stated, we believe the Cuban Democracy Act 
provides the necessary framework to pursue our central goal of promoting 
a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba, and we are ready to work 
with the Congress to discuss ways in which we can strengthen this 
policy. 
 
As currently drafted, however, some of the bill's provisions would not 
effectively advance our ability to further a peaceful, rapid transition 
to democracy in Cuba. One concern is to ensure that legislation not 
infringe upon the President's authority under the Constitution to 
conduct foreign policy, nor on his flexibility to respond appropriately 
to evolving situations. We are also concerned that a number of the 
bill's provisions could conflict with other important U.S. interests, 
including our compliance with major international trade and investment 
agreements, including GATT, NAFTA, and Treaties of Friendship, Commerce 
and Navigation, and our arms control cooperation with and support for 
democracy in Russia. 
 
Language in one section might also conflict with U.S. obligations under 
the charters of international financial institutions such as the IMF and 
World Bank. Several of the bill's provisions, particularly those 
concerning confiscated U.S. properties overseas, could be difficult to 
defend under international law. The bill's sanctions could affect 
persons not directly related to any decision to invest in or do business 
involving confiscated U.S. properties: shareholders in mutual funds, 
spouses and dependents of principals, and others. 
 
As you are aware, our allies and most important trading partners in 
Europe and North America have voiced their strong opposition to several 
provisions of the bill. If enacted, these provisions could prompt 
retaliatory measures that would severely disrupt essential U.S. trade 
relationships. Some could also set precedents that could undermine U.S. 
commercial interests around the globe. For example, the proposed ban on 
the entry into the U.S. of sugar products from countries that import 
Cuban sugar would likely be viewed by others as a secondary boycott, 
similar to the Arab League boycott on Israel that the U.S. has 
vigorously opposed. The provision enabling owners of claims on 
confiscated U.S. property to sue "traffickers" in those properties in 
U.S. courts, meanwhile, could open the door to a wave of lawsuits in the 
U.S. and undermine principles of international law that have served U.S. 
business and the U.S. Government well. The provision, as drafted, is 
global and could invite a variety of foreign nationals to seek U.S. 
citizenship in order to pursue their property issues in our court 
system. 
 
The United States Government is firmly committed to protecting the 
property rights of all Americans, including those persons who became 
U.S. citizens after their property was taken. However, as currently 
drafted, the proposed legislation might arouse concerns among Cubans on 
the island that their property interests will be ignored under a future 
democratic government. Such fears, fed by the regime, could retard the 
process of democratic change. We believe there may be more effective 
ways than those the bill provides to protect American property interests 
in Cuba and create incentives for a future Cuban Government to provide 
compensation for, or restitution of, confiscated U.S. properties. 
 
We know that members of the committee share our interest in promoting 
peaceful, democratic change in Cuba in ways that are effective and do 
not invite complex international litigation and bitter disputes with 
major trading partners which would only delight and benefit the 
Government of Cuba. We continue to believe our concerns can be resolved 
through consultation and look forward to meeting with sponsors to 
discuss the proposed legislation. 
 
Migration Issues
 
Mr. Chairman, I would like to turn now to the recent migration 
agreements that we have reached with the Cubans and explain to you how 
they serve the U.S. national interest. 
 
The economic changes that have wrenched Cuba in recent years have had a 
powerful social impact. Mounting unemployment and deteriorating quality 
of life have led to a loss of faith in the government's ability to live 
up to its promises to provide a better life for Cuban citizens. This 
growing frustration with the status quo reached a crisis point in the 
summer of 1994 when tens of thousands of Cubans put to sea in 
dangerously unseaworthy vessels in desperate attempts to reach Florida. 
An untold number may have died during the massive, uncontrolled 
migration. Hundreds of rafters landed on the beaches of neighboring 
countries from the Bahamas to Mexico. The courageous men and women of 
our Coast Guard rescued tens of thousands of imperiled rafters, numbers 
which threatened to overwhelm our ability to care for and absorb them. 
To save lives and to ensure the integrity of U.S. national borders, the 
President ordered, on August 19, that Cuban migrants rescued at sea 
would no longer be taken to the United States, but would be given safe 
haven at our naval base at Guantanamo Bay. As the number grew beyond 
Guantanamo's capacity, we secured the agreement of Panama to allow us to 
open a safe haven there as well. We are grateful to Panama for 
responding positively to our request for help. The President also 
instructed us to seek an agreement with the Cuban Government to bring an 
end to the uncontrolled migrant outflow. 
 
On September 9, 1994, we concluded such an agreement. The Cuban 
Government pledged to take effective action to prevent unsafe and 
irregular departures. It agreed to receive any rafter who chose to 
return to Cuba; about 1,600 have since returned voluntarily either 
through official channels or by walking or swimming directly from 
Guantanamo to Cuba. For our part, we committed to ensuring that legal 
migration from Cuba increased to at least 20,000 per year. The agreement 
has worked; the outflow of migrants seeking to reach the United States 
by raft and other unsafe means has been significantly reduced. In April 
1995, for example, Cuban migrants intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guard at 
sea totaled 189, as opposed to 726 in the same month last year. 
 
It must be stressed that the legal migration program established by the 
September 1994 accord represents a significant increase in legal 
migration levels from Cuba. In the years prior to the accord, the U.S. 
Interests Section never processed more than about 6,000 people--
including immigrants and refugees--for migration to the United States. 
On October 12, 1994, we announced plans to expand immigrant visa and 
refugee processing and to use parole authority to meet the 20,000 
minimum. The U.S. Interests Section in Havana is on schedule with regard 
to issuing the required travel documentation. As of May 12, the 
Interests Section has issued travel documents to 13,795 Cubans in 
categories which count toward the 20,000 commitment. Another 5,414 
travel documents had been issued in categories which do not count toward 
our numerical commitment, for example, spouses and minor children of 
U.S. citizens and those on the immigrant visa waiting list on the day 
the agreement was signed. A lottery designed to make migration to the 
U.S. possible for all Cubans, including those without relatives in the 
U.S., was announced in November; over 189,000 requests were received and 
an expected 5,000 will be documented for entry into the United States by 
September of this year. 
 
As part of our enhanced legal migration program for Cubans, the pre-
existing in-country refugee program--one of only three the United States 
conducts in the world--was expanded to process some 7,000 refugees 
during the period September 1994-September 1995. The previous level of 
issuance of refugee documents in Havana was about 3,000 per year. The 
refugee program provides a mechanism for those individual Cubans under 
pressure by the authorities for attempting to exercise fundamental 
rights and freedoms, including the right to criticize the government and 
to come to the United States. 
 
The September accord also called for periodic meetings to review 
progress toward its implementation; three such sessions have been held 
thus far. Our ongoing review indicates that the Cuban Government has 
lived up to its commitment to use persuasive methods to dissuade Cuban 
citizens from unsafe departures. We have no evidence that violence or 
coercion have been used to deter such departures or that those 
attempting to leave the country using irregular means have been 
persecuted or discriminated against. It is important to note that 
despite the lack of human rights and political freedom in Cuba, the 
Castro regime has not taken action against the tens of thousands of 
Cubans who have applied for legal immigration to the U.S. at the U.S. 
Interests Section in Havana or against those who have returned 
voluntarily to Cuba from Guantanamo since September 9, 1994. 
 
Notwithstanding the successful implementation of the September 
agreement, there remained a potential threat to our borders and thus to 
our national security posed by a new outflow of Cuban migrants which 
might have been stimulated by further economic dislocation in Cuba and 
by the uncertain future for those being held in Guantanamo. To address 
these critical issues and to prevent additional loss of life at sea 
during the coming months and to find a responsible humanitarian solution 
to the problem of the Cuban migrants at our safe haven at Guantanamo, 
the President directed that we build on the September 1994 agreement to 
further regularize U.S.-Cuban migration relations. As you know, 
additional discussions were held with the Cuban Government last month 
which resulted in a new migration agreement. These discussions were 
unpublicized for one reason only: To avoid the very real possibility 
that rumors about the talks might trigger a massive exodus of new 
rafters seeking to anticipate any new U.S.-Cuban migration agreement. 
Such a disorganized panic would have presented serious risks of loss of 
life for Cubans on the high seas, as well as risks for U.S. military 
personnel who are charged with maintaining order at Guantanamo. 
 
Let me stress that these talks involved only migration issues--there 
were no side agreements or secret understandings. There are two 
principal features of the May 2, 1995, migration agreement. 
 
Drawing Down the Guantanamo Safe Haven. The first element of the new 
migration agreement concerns the Cuban migrants currently in our safe 
haven at Guantanamo. We will continue to bring into the United States 
those persons who are eligible for parole under the guidelines announced 
last October and December. These cover mainly children, the elderly, and 
the medically ill, with their families. Over 11,000 such persons have 
already arrived and an additional 5,000 remaining at Guantanamo will 
likely be eligible for parole on these same grounds. Following 
completion of processing under these categories, we will continue to 
parole into the United States on a case-by-case basis all other Cubans 
in the safe haven, provided they are not ineligible for admission 
because of criminal record; medical, physical, or mental condition; or 
commission of acts of violence while in U.S. safe havens--these persons 
will be returned to Cuba. In admitting these additional migrants we will 
bear in mind the impact of this "special Guantanamo entrants" program on 
state and local economies. The President has directed that the relevant 
agencies work urgently to determine how the Federal Government can be of 
assistance to Florida in coping with this problem. In addition, we are 
mindful of the need for adequate sponsorships. As has been the case for 
all Cubans and Haitians previously paroled into the United States from 
Guantanamo, sponsorship and resettlement assistance will be arranged 
prior to entry. We expect this process to take about eight months, 
resulting in the closing of the Guantanamo safe haven by early spring 
1996. 
 
These special Guantanamo entrants, who are expected to number about 
15,000, will not represent a net increase in overall Cuban migration. 
Rather, they will be credited against the 20,000 annual Cuban migration 
figure which the United States agreed to in September 1994, at a rate of 
5,000 per year for three years, beginning September 1995, regardless of 
when the parolees arrive in the United States. 
 
The Government of Cuba has agreed to accept all Cuban nationals in 
Guantanamo who wish to return home, as well as persons at the safe haven 
who were previously excluded or deported from the United States or whom 
the United States deems ineligible for admission. 
 
This course of action was necessary because the situation at the 
Guantanamo safe haven was not sustainable over the long term. We became 
convinced that the potential   for unrest--and quite possibly violent 
unrest--in the Guantanamo camps was real, especially following the 
departure by mid-summer of the last of those who qualified under the 
existing humanitarian parole categories. In addition, the cost of 
administering the safe haven is approximately $1 million per day, and at 
least $90 million would have been needed for civilian contracting if the 
facilities were to be used over the long term. Finally, these particular 
migrants, owing to the length of time they had remained outside Cuba 
proper, had been dislocated, lost their jobs, and in some cases their 
housing, and this represents a humanitarian way to address their 
situation. 
 
Future Unauthorized Migration. The second element of the May 2 agreement 
provides that Cuban migrants rescued at sea while attempting to reach 
the United States will be taken back to Cuba, where U.S. consular 
officials will meet them at the dock and advise them how to apply to 
come to the United States through existing legal mechanisms. All such 
returnees will be permitted to apply for legal migration, including the 
expanded refugee program. The Government of Cuba has committed to the 
United States that no one will suffer reprisals, lose benefits, or be 
prejudiced in any manner, either because he or she sought to depart 
irregularly, or because he or she applied for legal migration to the 
United States. As noted above, the Cuban Government has lived up to a 
similar commitment made in the context of the September 1994 agreement. 
 
Let me describe how this has worked so far. After being rescued by the 
U.S. Coast Guard, Cuban rafters heading for the United States will be 
read a statement explaining that they will be taken back to Cuba where 
they can apply for legal migration. Trained, Spanish-speaking 
Immigration and Naturalization Service officers will be available on 
Coast Guard cutters to evaluate any claims the migrants may make 
regarding fear of return to Cuba. These are the procedures which were 
followed in the handling of the initial groups of rafters rescued since 
May 2. In all these cases the INS officer's determination was that the 
migrants could safely be returned to Cuba. A similar process will be 
available for post-May 2 arrivals at Guantanamo. 
 
In the cases we have had thus far, a U.S. Coast Guard cutter returned 
the rafters directly to Puerto Cabanas, Cuba, where officers of the U.S. 
Interests Section boarded the cutter. They spoke with all the migrants 
and gave them information and application forms for legal migration to 
the United States, as well as a pass to the Interests Section in Havana. 
The migrants then left the cutter and boarded Cuban buses which took 
them to a Havana center for reentry processing. U.S. Interests Section 
officers waited at the center to ensure all the migrants got through the 
reentry without incident--and thus far there have been no incidents. The 
migrants were then provided transportation by the Cuban Government back 
to their homes. 
 
Now as I said earlier, the Cuban Government lived up to its September 
1994 commitment not to harass those who voluntarily returned to Cuba 
from a U.S. safe haven, and we demanded firm commitments that returned 
rafters would not be subject to arrest or harassment because of their 
illegal departure. We received those commitments. We insisted that the 
U.S. would have to be able to verify for ourselves that rafters were not 
being threatened or penalized, and Cuba agreed we could do so. After the 
first group of rafters returned to Cuba on May 9, the Cubans facilitated 
the immediate travel of two U.S. Interests Section officers to Camaguey 
to meet with each of the first 13 returnees. In private interviews the 
officers verified that migrants had returned directly home from the 
processing center, that they were able to return to their lives without 
repercussion for their illegal departure. Allegations of mistreatment of 
the first group of 13 returnees were not substantiated and criticism of 
the role played by U.S. Interests Section officer Ted O'Connor in this 
operation were irresponsible and without foundation. Mr. O'Connor 
boarded the U.S. Coast Guard cutter on May 9 to brief the migrants on 
their right to apply for legal migration, to inform them that U.S. 
officers would monitor their status closely, and to urge them to come to 
the U.S. Interests Section if they had any problems. Mr. O'Connor is 
well-known to the thousands of Cubans who have passed through the doors 
of the U.S. Interests Section in the past year as a dedicated public 
servant. Verbal attacks against Mr. O'Connor labeling him an agent of 
Cuban state security were malicious and unjust and led to threats 
against him. 
 
In monitoring the second group of 11 migrants who were returned to Cuba 
on May 12, U.S. Interests officials became aware of two possible 
incidents in which it appeared possible that returnees were being 
disadvantaged by their effort to leave Cuba illegally. In both cases we 
have protested to Cuban authorities who have recognized their commitment 
to comply with the accord and have promised to take corrective action. 
The U.S. Government will continue to monitor the treatment of these and 
all other returned Cuban migrants through calls and spot visits by U.S. 
Interests Section personnel, reports from non-governmental organizations 
working on human rights, and through direct reporting from the returned 
migrants and their families. The U.S. Interests Section will collect and 
maintain records on returned migrants to facilitate subsequent 
monitoring, and the Department will ensure that the office in Havana has 
the requisite personnel and resources to carry out these functions. 
 
Cubans who reach the United States through irregular means will be 
placed in exclusion proceedings and treated as are undocumented migrants 
from other countries, including being given the opportunity to apply for 
asylum. 
 
It must also be noted that the arrival of warm weather has signaled the 
start of the period in which rafting historically reaches a peak. While 
prior to May 2 the number of interdicted rafters was well below the same 
period last year, it has been evident that some Cubans intended to 
persist in this risky venture. The announcement that Cuban migrants 
henceforth will not be allowed to enter the United States by illegal 
means should have a deterrent effect on future irregular departures. 
 
We in the Administration feel deeply about the plight of the people in 
Cuba. We, too, feel frustration at the lack of progress toward political 
freedom on the island and the economic deprivation borne by its 11 
million inhabitants. U.S. policy is designed to bring about change in 
this sad state of affairs. 
 
At the same time, we came to the reluctant conclusion that it was not 
possible for the U.S. to continue to admit all Cubans who sought to come 
here, and that leaving migrants indefinitely in Guantanamo was neither 
humane nor sustainable. 
 
It is important to understand that our migration accords with the Cubans 
and the decision to allow Cubans to enter the U.S. from Guantanamo were 
made in order to help the U.S. better control its borders, to deal with 
the humanitarian problem posed by prolonged migrant residence on 
Guantanamo, and to promote legal, orderly migration from Cuba that 
ensures adequate sponsorship of new arrivals and ends the life-
threatening rafter phenomenon. These migration agreements stand alone. 
They do not signal any change in our policy toward  Cuba, which is--let 
me state one more time--that we seek a peaceful, timely transition to a 
democratic government in Cuba, one which respects basic freedoms and 
human rights, one which promotes economic liberalization and individual 
enterprise, one which provides opportunity and liberty to all its 
citizens. It would be a mistake to encourage hope on the part of the 
Cuban Government that there has   been or will be a change in U.S. 
policy toward Cuba as a result of these migration agreements. 
 
Conclusion
 
Recent discussion on Cuba in the press and elsewhere has focused on 
migration questions and on the legislative proposals now before the 
Congress. These are significant issues and merit considered debate. They 
should not, however, distract us from the real problem--the dire 
situation in Cuba itself--nor from our fundamental goal: a peaceful 
transition to democracy, respect for the human rights of the Cuban 
people, and an open economy with opportunity for all. 
 
We are keenly aware that the people of Cuba continue to suffer under a 
repressive regime whose misguided economic policies have deprived many 
of them of hope for a better life. I have described at length above the 
many measures we have in place to apply pressure on the regime and to 
initiate a revival of civil society which would empower the Cuban people 
to begin to be able to act in their own self-interest. Our policies are 
at least partially responsible for the halting steps being taken in the 
right direction on the economic front. The solution to the Cubans' 
problems lies not beyond Cuba's borders, but rather within them. To 
resolve its current predicament, the Castro regime must look inward, 
toward the Cuban people and dialogue with them, not to seek political 
dialogue with the United States or other foreign governments. 
 
Some in this country and abroad are calling for negotiations between the 
U.S. and Cuba over political changes on the island and what the U.S. 
will do to encourage such movement. This we will not do. The future of 
Cuba must be decided by the people of that country, and this will happen 
only when democracy is practiced there. 
 
Change is coming in Cuba. How it happens will affect not only the people 
of Cuba but the people of the United States. We will do everything we 
can to help steer this change into peaceful, democratic channels, to 
ease what will undoubtedly be a difficult transition for the Cuban 
people. When Cuba becomes democratic, there will be much less desire to 
leave the island. We agree with those in Congress who believe that the 
Cuban people should know that the U.S. Government and the American 
people are prepared to help them get back on their feet once they are on 
the road to democracy. 
 
We will continue to draw international attention to the woeful record of 
the Cuban Government and to isolate that regime. But now is also the 
time to encourage new leaders, free-thinking intellectuals, the 
democratic opposition, and those first, struggling entrepreneurs and let 
them know there is a place in the world community for a free Cuba. 
 
Now is the time to encourage church, human rights, academic, and other 
independent organizations in  Cuba to push the boundaries of state 
control and assert peacefully their right to basic freedoms. Now is the 
time for us to support journalists, writers, and thinkers who seek to 
free themselves   of the shackles of state-controlled thought and 
promulgate new ideas, and new approaches to life.  
 
The Summit of the Americas, held in Miami in December, marked a major 
milestone; 34 of 35 nations in the hemisphere reinforced their 
commitment to the shared values of democracy, human rights, and 
prosperity for all their citizens. Only Cuba was excluded, because its 
government continues to shun those principles. We will help speed the 
day when the Cuban people can benefit from the great wave of democracy, 
respect for human rights, and open markets which has swept the 
hemisphere in recent years. Although the people of Cuba must determine 
their own destiny, we are ready to help them go the way of their 
neighbors. We look forward to the day when we will be able to work with 
a freely elected Cuban Government and welcome Cuba into the community of 
democratic nations. (###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 3 
 
Preview of the Intergovernmental Conference on Land-based Sources Of 
Marine Pollution  
Timothy E. Wirth, Under Secretary of State For Global Affairs 
Address to the Oceans Conference of the Global Legislators Organization 
For a Balanced Environment, Washington, DC, May 25, 1995 
 
It is a pleasure to be with you today to talk about this fall's 
Intergovernmental Conference on Land-based Sources of Marine Pollution. 
This conference will continue a long-standing tradition of identifying 
ocean issues by some of the more obtuse and lengthy--not to mention less 
than thrilling--titles in international affairs. Later this year, we can 
also look forward to the UN Conference on Highly Migratory and 
Straddling Fish Stocks--and Senator Kerry is all too familiar with the 
U.S.-Canada dispute on whether or not Icelandic sea scallops are 
sedentary or mobile creatures. 
 
Behind these convoluted conference headings, however, is a piece of some 
of the most exciting issues emerging in foreign policy--issues that 
increasingly define the work of parliaments and governments and are ever 
more a part of the overriding mission of this and all nations--cross-
cutting, global issues which we are confronting in the context of 
profound change for our country and the world. 
 
For my generation, the East-West confrontation was certainly the 
formative experience. It defined who we were as a country, what we 
thought was valuable, and what we thought was important. For my 
children, however, the Cold War is ever more a distant reflection in the 
rearview mirror. 
 
In its place, we face a range of unfamiliar challenges--diverse and 
complicated all--emerging and infectious diseases, rapid population 
growth, global climate change, and ozone depletion. Taken together, 
these global challenges are demonstrating that the community of nations 
must work together, that our interests and objectives are overlapping, 
that the new era unfolding is characterized by interdependence, not 
isolation. 
 
Threats to the Marine Environment
 
Few issues highlight the notion of interdependence as does protection of 
the world's marine environment. The combined forces of population growth 
and economic development have placed corresponding pressures on the 
world's oceans. The productive and regenerative capacity of the oceans 
are increasingly threatened by the introduction of pollutants, over-
utilization of marine resources, habitat destruction, and dramatic 
coastal development. 
 
In turn, these trends affect a range of interests for all nations--not 
least the United States. The U.S. interest in the marine environment and 
high seas is as complex as it is profound. 
 
U.S. Oceans Interests 
 
First and foremost, we have a range of well-explored national security 
interests related to navigation and passage in the oceans. With one of 
the longest coastlines in the world, we have basic resource and 
environmental interests. In many ways, the health and well-being of our 
coastal population--more than 60% of all Americans--are inextricably 
linked with the quality of the coastal marine environment. 
 
We have a highly developed and extensive fishing industry, whose jobs 
provide livelihoods and whose catch provides food for our people. 
 
Beyond fishing, we have critical commercial interests--ranging from 
shipping and transportation to recreation and tourism. We also have 
cultural interests related to coastal communities and Native Americans. 
Most broadly, we have transnational environmental interests related to 
the diversity of marine biology and the critical role that oceans play 
in the functioning of the planet. 
 
International Progress
 
Underlying all of these issues is the fact that achievement of oceans 
policy objectives requires international cooperation--at the bilateral, 
regional, and global level. Accordingly, the United States has engaged 
with the international community in a broad range of cooperative efforts 
aimed at protecting the oceans. The problems, like the solutions, 
transcend the ability of any one nation to act unilaterally. Our 
interests are shared by others--we are all in this boat together; the 
oceans are a primary illustration of the abstract concept of the global 
commons. 
 
Over the past several decades, remarkable progress has been made-- from 
the difficult negotiation of the Law of the Sea Convention, now amended 
to meet our requirements, to the network of international agreements to 
prevent pollution from vessels as established through the International 
Maritime Organization. We have negotiated and amended the London Dumping 
Convention and developed a rich fabric of regional mechanisms for 
fisheries and pollution. 
 
Conference Issues and Goals
 
Despite all of this progress, much more remains to be done, in 
particular to promote more widespread compliance internationally with 
the standards and measures set in place by the various agreements to 
protect the marine environment. 
 
Land-based Sources of Marine Pollution. Overarching all of these gaps is 
the void we have and the challenge we face in combating ocean pollution 
that originates on land. Land-based sources--LBS--include municipal, 
industrial, and agricultural effluents--which reach the marine 
environment directly from the coast through outflows or run-off, through 
rivers or other watercourses, and via the atmosphere. 
 
All told, these are the source for 70%-80% of the total pollutant-
loading in the marine environment and includes such sources as the vast 
volume of coastal sewage which is discharged untreated; the sediments 
that wash into the sea from onshore development, logging, and 
construction; and the nutrient runoff from fertilizers and persistent 
organic compounds from pesticides. 
 
Land-based pollution can cause the decline or total demise of entire 
fisheries stocks and the industries based upon them. Pollution also 
affects and reduces the habitat available for marine life and lowers 
reproductive success. Contamination can shut down entire coastal fishing 
areas, as we have seen with frequency here in the United States, where 
approximately one-fourth of all shellfish beds are closed each year to 
avoid public health problems caused by pathogens. 
 
While most nations have recognized the priority of addressing land-based 
sources of pollution, their complexity, range, and intractability have 
made concerted effort elusive. Consequently, pollutants from land-based 
activities have resulted in major impacts on estuaries and near-shore 
environments. As a growing body of evidence indicates, there are 
international problems as well. Pollutants transported by lateral 
coastal currents and global circulation patterns have led to 
transboundary impacts in the Gulf of Mexico, the Gulf of Maine, and the 
Caribbean, to name only those in our own backyard. 
 
The inadequacy of efforts to control and manage land-based sources of 
marine pollution was recognized at the Earth Summit in Rio three years 
ago. Chapter 17 of the 500-page action plan, known as Agenda 21, called 
for stepped-up efforts to prevent point and non-point pollution sources 
and to address the whole range of issues associated with land-based 
pollution. The centerpiece of these efforts is the convening of the UN 
conference that the U.S. will host later this fall. 
 
The principles outlined in Agenda 21 serve as a model for the approach 
that must be set in addressing land-based marine pollution--emphasizing 
the balance that must be struck between local interests and initiatives 
with broader, more international responsibilities. 
 
Conference Goals. We do not pretend the conference in Washington will 
find every answer for every input into the marine environment--that is 
not realistic. But we hope to develop important tools and information 
sources so that information will flow to even the smallest governments, 
encouraging action at the national and local level. 
 
We have four specific goals for this November's conference:
 
First, we want to develop a methodology that will enable governments and 
regional organizations to strengthen efforts to identify approaches and 
prioritize actions to deal with land-based activities; 
 
Second, we want to develop a clearinghouse that will link expertise, 
programs, and resources with identified needs and stated requests; 
 
Third, we hope to reach agreement on policy guidance to guide the 
critical activities of the major funding institutions, such as the World 
Bank and the Global Environment Facility; and 
 
Fourth, we want to continue making progress toward addressing the 
troubling issues raised by certain persistent organic pollutants--POPs. 
 
Persistent Organic Pollutants. I want to take a moment to discuss the 
issue of persistent organics, because I believe it is emerging as one of 
the great environmental challenges the world faces. 
 
Persistent organic pollutants include well-known and obscure substances 
such as PCBs; dioxins and furans, which are the unintended by-products 
of manufacturing and combustion; and a variety of pesticides. 
 
PCBs were used in the past quite extensively in various industrial and 
commercial applications, most commonly as a non-conducting fluid in 
electrical equipment. Commercial--non-research--production of PCBs has 
been virtually eliminated across the globe, but these substances still 
present risks resulting from reuse of products and the need to ensure 
proper management and disposal of existing stocks. 
 
Dioxins and furans are often referred to as unintended by-products of 
manufacturing and production. They are typically lumped together, 
because they are generally controlled by the same technology. 
 
Chlorinated pesticides are getting much of the attention in the current 
debate about POPs. These pesticides have been extensively analyzed in 
the U.S. in terms of risk, resulting in their virtual elimination due to 
their negative effects. Chlorinated pesticides include aldrin, dieldrin, 
DDT, endrin, chlordane, mirex, toxaphene, and heptachlor. 
 
All of the persistent organics pose a problem because of their 
longevity, toxicity, tendency to bioaccumulate, and their potential for 
long-range transport. Chlorinated hydrocarbon pesticides were first 
introduced at the end of WWII precisely because of their persistence: 
They offered the potential to keep down agriculture pests for 
generations at a time. They were cheap, and initial testing revealed 
them to be non-toxic to mammals. In early experiments, prison volunteers 
ate spoonfuls of DDT without getting sick. 
 
The acute toxicity of these chemicals in mammals is, indeed, very low. 
Many are suspected carcinogens in lab animals but have not been shown to 
be so in humans. But a feature first noted in birds and more recently in 
other species is the effect on hormones, particularly estrogens. Long-
term administration of the chlorinated compounds has feminizing effects 
not only in male birds but also in mammals. While the precise impacts on 
humans and certain wildlife are not pinned down with precision, there is 
no doubt that biopsies of fatty tissues of humans throughout the world 
reveal significant deposits of chlorinated compounds. 
 
Rachel Carson brought the issue of chlorinated compounds to national 
attention with Silent Spring, in which she documented the effects of DDT 
on birds. She found that birds, at the high end of the food chain, were 
consuming large quantities of DDT and dying off--dying outright from 
over-ingestion or having trouble maintaining egg quality. 
 
While most of the persistent organic pesticides have been banned in 
developed countries, they continue to be used in Africa and India for 
the control of malaria--in view of their availability and the lack of 
cheap alternatives. This large-scale use accounts for the dispersion of 
chlorinated compounds throughout the world. 
 
Unfortunately, the exact pathways and transport mechanisms for 
persistent organics remain uncertain. A growing body of evidence 
suggests not only that sources are widely dispersed, but that the 
mammalian effects are enormous--ranging from infertility to reproductive 
abnormalities. The key question is whether chlorinated compounds 
originating in Africa, for example, are turning up in people in the 
Arctic. There is broad agreement, therefore, that we need to gather more 
information about costs, production, substitute availability, trade in 
POPs, global transport characteristics, and use in developing countries. 
 
At the UNEP Governing Council this week, we are seeking to reach 
agreement on several concrete steps--beginning with a call for the 
Inter- governmental Forum on Chemical Safety to set up a working group 
to assess the threats to human health and the environment posed by POPs. 
We hope that they ultimately will develop recommendations for 
international actions to be considered in 1997. In June, Canada will be 
hosting a technical meeting on POPs in Vancouver, which is intended 
especially to introduce this subject to experts from developing 
countries. 
 
To complement and further these efforts, we are anxious to use the LBS 
meeting to endorse the efforts underway and to adopt a call for global 
action, bringing attention to the urgency of the POPs problem for the 
health of the marine environment, as well as directly and indirectly for 
human beings. I want to highlight just a couple of other top priorities 
on the Administration's oceans agenda--which are part of and complement 
our work on land-based sources. 
 
Coral Reefs. One priority is the exciting international consensus we 
have forged around the idea of protecting the world's coral reefs. 
Sometimes referred to as "the rain forests of the ocean," coral reefs 
rank among the most biologically productive and diverse ecosystems. They 
are an essential supplier of fish and plant protein to coastal 
subsistence communities; a valuable source of revenue for developing 
countries through exploitation of reef resources and tourism; a natural 
barrier which protects land; and a reservoir of unique biological 
materials. 
 
To forge international resolve, the United States has assembled an 
international partnership--the International Coral Reef Initiative-- 
involving Japan, Australia, France, Barbados, a host of other nations, 
and international institutions such as the World Bank. The Coral Reef 
Initiative has been successful beyond our wildest dreams, and we are 
looking forward to launching this initiative in a major way at a meeting 
we have organized in the Philippines next week. 
 
The Arctic Environment. Also, we have placed a priority on addressing 
the myriad environmental challenges in the Arctic. The Arctic 
Environmental Protection Strategy, an initiative of the eight Arctic 
nations, is now developing recommendations as to the protection of the 
Arctic environment as a whole. To accomplish this, four major working 
groups have been established, two of which involve land-based sources of 
pollution--one on Arctic Monitoring and Assessment, which will assess 
the health and ecological risks associated with contamination from 
radioactive waste, heavy metals, persistent organics, and other 
contaminants, many of which have a land-based origin; and  one on the 
Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment, which will examine how 
land-based sources affect the Arctic marine environment and will 
recommend ways of addressing such problems. 
 
We look forward to continuing this progress with the help of Senator 
Stevens and his colleagues, who have been terrific supporters of these 
efforts and a range of other ocean issues. We are proud to work with 
them. 
 
Conclusion
 
Land-based sources of marine pollution, protection of coral reefs, and 
attention to the Arctic--these are all pieces of a broad ocean agenda 
that we must work together on. Meeting these challenges is in our 
interest as Americans and for the collective security and cooperation of 
the world. 
 
Make no mistake: This agenda is not costless and, certainly, not 
barrier-free. More optimistically, the question is no longer what to do-
-the question is how to facilitate what so clearly needs to be done. 
Success would send benefits rippling across our nations, our economies, 
and, most important, the lives of present and future generations. Our 
legacy depends in large measure on our ability to understand and react 
to these new challenges. More ominously, the future habitability and 
stability of the world is in the balance. In this way, protecting the 
globe is a metaphor for the degree to which we recognize the 
interdependent nature of the world unfolding before us. 
 
In 1948, when the notion of space exploration was still science fiction, 
the astronomer Fred Hoyle said: 
 
Once a photograph of the Earth, taken from the outside, is available . . 
. a new idea as powerful as any in history will be let loose. 
 
Twenty years later, when space travel became a reality, the travelers 
themselves provided powerful testimony to Hoyle's sense of the unity of 
the world. Let me read to you from our own astronaut, James Irwin: 
 
That beautiful, warm, living object looked so fragile, so delicate that 
if you touched it with a finger it would crumble and fall apart. 
 
And now from a Russian cosmonaut:  
 
After an orange cloud--formed as a result of a dust storm over the 
Sahara--reached the Philippines and settled there with rain, I 
understood that we are all sailing in the same boat. 
 
In this last decade of the millennium, we have the power and enormous 
responsibility to captain that boat carefully. We also have the ability 
to shape change for the benefit of the entire world. The interests and 
intellectual capacity reflected in this room today bear a special burden 
in this regard. Working together, your talents, your energy, and your 
power are more than a match for the challenges and the institutions 
involved. I hope that each of you will engage in this effort and that we 
can harness that energy and wisdom in service of these objectives. Our 
future certainly depends on it.(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 4 
 
The Summit of the Americas: Implementation Work Program 
Thomas F. McLarty III, Counselor to the President and Secretary of State 
for the Summit of the Americas 
Address to the Council of the Americas, Washington, DC, May 23, 1995 
 
When I was asked by the President and the Secretary of State earlier 
this spring to be their Special Representative to the hemisphere, I was 
honored--knowing that one of my privileges in this position would be to 
address organizations like the Council of the Americas that have made a 
real contribution and a real difference over the years. I am 
particularly pleased to be able to address your 25th Washington 
Conference today. I want to say at the outset that I have only the 
highest regard for this outstanding organization and for its mentor and 
founder David Rockefeller, who has done so much to promote understanding 
within and throughout the hemisphere. 
 
As the President commented when we were visiting about this this 
morning, the State of Arkansas has a long and productive history with 
the Rockefeller family. Many of you may recall that Winthrop Rockefeller 
was governor there for four years in the late 1960s, leaving a rich and 
lasting legacy. David is someone I admire greatly. It is not an 
exaggeration to say that his work for many, many years has laid a 
foundation for the hemispheric architecture which we are in the process 
of building in a spirit of bipartisanship and mutual respect. 
 
I am also pleased to see so many other familiar faces here today: John 
Avery, Ambassador Ted Briggs, Susan Kaufman Purcell, Kim Flower, and 
others. Your long experience in the region and sage advice have brought 
the council continued success. Your contributions to the Summit of the 
Americas last December in Miami were critical. You helped us shape the 
agenda and provided counsel and insight we simply would not have had 
without your involvement. I personally appreciate your efforts, as do 
the President and Secretary of State. 
 
Hemispheric Interests Linked to Domestic Interests
 
From the beginning of his Administration, President Clinton has laid out 
a series of foreign policy goals: remaining firm in our commitments to 
building greater security; spreading democracy; and ushering in a new 
age of open markets and prosperity across the world. These pillars of 
foreign policy are grounded in the reality that fluctuations in the 
global economy have direct consequences for the American economy and 
jobs at home. I'm sure you would agree that in order to project economic 
and strategic power in the international arena, we must first have a 
strong and growing economy domestically. 
 
As the President has said time and time again, we are working on the 
economic fundamentals, just as progressive, reforming governments in the 
hemisphere are doing. The President's program stresses putting our 
financial house in order so as not to mortgage our children's futures; 
highlighting job creation as a means to expand our middle class and 
allow full participation of our society in ever-higher levels of 
economic activity; encouraging a longer term economic perspective 
through savings and investment, in particular investment in human 
capital through education and training; and expansion of markets through 
aggressive pursuit of international trading opportunities. 
 
This hemisphere is a natural ally in our efforts. To this end, the 
President has devoted considerable energy and demonstrated consistent 
commitment to improving the economic and political health of countries 
within our own hemisphere. These goals fit clearly within our broader 
foreign policy framework: promotion of free markets; increasing economic 
and political integration; and promotion of democracy. I believe it is 
fair to state that our Administration has made significant strides in 
achieving these goals--three of which I should note. 
 
First, we passed the NAFTA, the cornerstone of a new hemispheric policy, 
which promotes free markets, creates jobs in the United States and 
elsewhere, and promotes hemispheric stability by linking us more closely 
with Mexico. NAFTA was a bipartisan effort, which passed with assistance 
for organizations such as the council. 
 
Second, we passed the GATT Uruguay Round--again bipartisan and with your 
support. The Uruguay Round is the largest trade agreement in history, 
which incorporates vast new sectors of heretofore unregulated 
international trade. Importantly, we have institutionalized Uruguay 
Round gains by supporting creation of the WTO. 
 
Third, we hosted the Summit of the Americas in Miami in December. The 
summit, as you know, brought together all of the democratic countries of 
the hemisphere for the first time. It was a historic event which 
exceeded expectations, establishing an agenda for the hemisphere based 
on shared values and common interests. 
 
Implementation of Summit Commitments 
 
These three achievements have really formed much of the basis for our 
hemispheric relations. Open markets and strong democracies are not 
mutually exclusive; they are reinforcing. The Summit of the Americas 
recognized this linkage, and our work program in the implementation of 
summit commitments is consistent with that premise. 
 
When the 34 democratically elected hemispheric leaders gathered together 
last December in Miami, it was evident then--and it remains evident now-
-that we have moved toward a hemispheric consensus of values which was 
perhaps unthinkable even a few short years ago. Miami charted a course 
for the hemisphere which is visionary yet achievable, expansive yet 
practical, dramatic yet fully grounded in the experiences and 
prerogatives of our individual nations. Just as the United States is in 
the process now of "reinventing government," so we consider the summit 
to have been the beginning of regional efforts to reinvent hemispheric 
relations in keeping with the foundation you've helped put in place over 
the years. 
 
Many of the countries in our hemisphere have already taken concrete 
actions--both individually and collectively--to move forward with the 
hemispheric agenda. We are encouraged by that. I want to discuss briefly 
several instances. 
 
Haiti. Perhaps the best example is Haiti. In less than two weeks, I will 
travel to Port-au-Prince with the Secretary of State for the annual 
General Assembly of the Organization of American States. The General 
Assembly would obviously not be taking place in Haiti had we not taken 
action--collectively, purposefully, and with resolve--to rid that 
country of its de facto leadership. Such collective action would not 
have been possible even a few short years ago. This is a tangible result 
of our hemispheric cooperative agenda and an excellent example of the 
successes that joint cooperation can produce. 
 
Mexico. Another example is our firm, dedicated response to the recent 
Mexican peso crisis, which directly or indirectly affected many other 
countries in the hemisphere and, indeed, around the world. The health of 
each of our economies is inextricably inter-twined with each other 
hemisphere-wide; our interests are consonant. Our citizens, our markets, 
our pensioners, our importers and exporters, our everyday investors--
demand confidence in hemispheric finances. When this confidence was 
threatened soon after the summit concluded, we worked closely together 
with international financial institutions and other countries in the 
hemisphere to provide the leadership necessary to restore confidence. 
Immediate, unflinching collective action was required to address the 
problem. In December, it was said that the surprises from Mexico were 
all bad. Since March, the surprises from Mexico have been all good. 
Although the financial crisis is not yet over, the trend-line is better, 
and indications are good that Mexico is beginning to move forward on a 
road to recovery. Other affected economies have regained stability and 
some vibrance. 
 
Last week, I attended a dinner in honor of Mexico's Treasury Secretary 
Guillermo Ortiz. The presentation he made was impressive, providing a 
realistic assessment of the progress made and steps yet to be taken, 
especially in the area of employment. The markets are responding. 
Investment is flowing back into Latin America, much of it brick-and-
mortar investment which will remain even during future financial 
dislocations. For example, the largest employer in my home state, Wal-
Mart, Inc., has just announced major investment in Brazil and Argentina, 
and previously planned investments by General Motors and other major 
companies are moving ahead on schedule. Other investments have been put 
on hold--not canceled. We must maintain steadiness of purpose and 
resolve in our actions. We must have realistic expectations; that  
is the right place to be in my view. 
 
Peru and Ecuador. Finally, the recent border dispute between Peru and 
Ecuador was handled--appropriately--by the Rio Protocol guarantors. 
Ambassador Watson played an important role in making progress toward 
resolving a long-outstanding dispute in the region. Under Brazil's 
valued leadership and with the welcome participation of Argentina and 
Chile, we remain committed to assisting the parties to reach a long-term 
solution on the underlying issues. As we have said time and time again, 
the summit did not promise that there would no longer be serious 
problems to contend with in this hemisphere; rather, the promise of the 
summit was that we now have a means to address, cooperatively, problems 
which arise in the hemisphere for our collective good. We continue to 
watch the border situation carefully and look forward to the day when 
the matter is not a point of bilateral or multilateral contention. 
 
Building on our successes, the foreign ministers of the hemisphere plan 
to issue a report in Haiti which details significant summit-related 
actions that individual governments have taken to date. The report also 
sets forth a framework for future efforts. It is specific and clear; we 
have moved the process forward. Included in this report will be specific 
actions taken on trade, crime prevention, sustainable development, and 
the reinvigorization of the inter-American system. Progress is seldom 
easy. There have been and will continue to be problems and 
complications, but we have achieved a solid beginning after the summit 
meeting in Miami. 
 
Trade
 
We have made progress in promoting prosperity hemisphere-wide. 
Recognizing the importance of open markets, free trade, and the 
participation of the private sector to broad-based economic prosperity, 
our leaders in Miami called for negotiation of a free trade area of the 
Americas by 2005. Ambassador Kantor has said, "I want to clearly state 
that we are committed to pursuing the goal."  Trade ministers in the 
hemisphere have taken up this challenge, committing themselves to two 
ministerials in the next 10 months. 
 
The first one, which will take place in Denver June 30 under Ambassador 
Kantor's leadership, will discuss steps to be taken as we begin to lay a 
foundation upon which negotiations can later proceed; the second will 
occur in March 1996. The Denver ministerial in June will be followed 
immediately by the Trade and Commerce Forum--hosted by Ambassador Kantor 
and Commerce Secretary Ron Brown--a cooperative public and private 
effort designed to expand hemispheric economic activity. 
 
As you have now heard from Ambassador Barshefsky and others, we are also 
moving ahead with discussions to admit Chile into the NAFTA, the next 
critical step of our commitment to regional openness and shared 
prosperity. We want to move ahead quickly with Chile's accession to the 
NAFTA to send a positive signal to our hemispheric partners at a 
critical juncture. President Bush noted this when he recently spoke in 
Santiago. As Congressman Lee Hamilton has argued, in the end trade is 
good because it creates markets for the United States and bolsters the 
economies and stability of the countries we trade with. That is the kind 
of common-sense approach we seek. 
 
General fast-track hearings have already begun, and timely action by 
Congress is essential. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
recently wrote that if we do not seize the opportunities now facing us, 
there is a real danger the United States will become marginalized--a 
bystander in our own hemisphere. In reaching out to others, we directly 
help ourselves. At bottom, we seek a closer economic relationship with 
our neighbors, based on shared values and mutual objectives, in order to 
promote what is clearly in the interests of our own citizens. 
 
Crime Prevention
 
We are also taking a tough stand against crime. Support is growing for 
the Mexico-United States draft on counter-narcotics strategy for the 
21st century, which offers a comprehensive plan to eradicate the illegal 
narcotics trade hemisphere-wide. Already, half the countries in the 
hemisphere support this strategy. Hemispheric experts on money 
laundering met in April to shape an agreement on eliminating this 
activity; other meetings are scheduled in June to put the final touches 
on the accord. Additionally, the United States plans to increase its 
drug control budget to almost $15 billion, more than 36% of which will 
be spent for demand reduction. 
 
Steps have also been taken to combat corruption to level the playing 
field for U.S. business. Of special note is Colombia's recent contract 
with the Swiss company, SWIPCO, for the purpose of ensuring that multi-
million-dollar defense-related purchases will be undertaken with 
transparency and fairness. This is the kind of concrete action with 
direct relevance to private sector activities which many summit 
initiatives are designed to provide. 
 
Sustainable Development
 
There are numerous examples of innovative programs to foster economic 
growth while protecting the environment throughout the hemisphere. The 
Central American countries have taken an important leadership role in 
this area through the Central American Alliance for Sustainable 
Development. The United States is supporting this effort with $5 million 
through CONCAUSA--Conjunta Centro- America-USA--part of a $22.6-million 
environmental initiative for the Americas funded by USAID. We are also 
moving forward on pollution prevention. Various countries in the 
hemisphere now have plans to dramatically reduce lead--one of the main 
causes of childhood retardation--in their gasoline. 
 
Inter-American System
 
A final key achievement is the process now underway for revitalization 
of the inter-American system. The OAS, under the vigorous leadership of 
Secretary General Gaviria, is reinventing itself in response to summit 
mandates. The summit leaders proposed a significant increase in the 
budget of the Unit for Promotion of Democracy, the Inter-American 
Commission for Human Rights, and the Inter-American Court. They also 
asked that a trade unit to provide technical studies on trade 
integration be created. Secretary General Gaviria has been responding to 
these requests, and the United States is proud to have made additional 
voluntary contributions to the democracy unit and to the human rights 
bodies. We are also very pleased that the Inter-American Development 
Bank, under the extremely able leadership of Enrique Iglesias, has 
committed itself to increasing its lending in education and health--two 
summit priorities--by some $5 billion over the next five years. And, 
with First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, the Pan-American Health 
Organization has just launched a program to eradicate measles throughout 
the hemisphere, forever eliminating fear of this disease from childhood 
experience. 
 
Next Steps
 
These are just some of the key activities drawn from an impressive list 
of tangible actions. Our implementation work program is expansive but 
focused. 
 
In closing, however, I must add a word concerning potential stormclouds 
which are on the horizon. An audience as sophisticated in Latin American 
and Caribbean affairs as the one here today understands the importance 
of this hemisphere in calculations of our national interests. Latin 
America already represents the fastest-growing market for U.S. goods and 
services of any region in the world--$92 billion in exports last year, 
triple what it was only a decade ago. Yet legislation now being 
considered by Congress--H.R. 1561--would have negative effects on our 
ability to conduct a vigorous hemispheric foreign policy. This 
legislation would violate the separation of powers and deny the 
executive branch adequate resources to defend U.S. foreign policy 
objectives and U.S. national interests in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. It would put us on the path toward isolationism. 
 
To advance key foreign policy objectives, including implementation of 
summit commitments, we need all instruments of foreign policy available 
to us. Our ability to help advance the summit agenda--in key areas, 
including anti-corruption, administration of justice, health, education, 
and the environment--would be seriously damaged by proposed legislation. 
This legislation would not only destroy important foreign policy 
implementing agencies, but it would also cut, at a minimum, 35%-40% in 
program resources for Latin America, even though, as you know, we have 
already cut our funding in the region to the bone. The cuts would also 
spell an immediate and unjustified end to the Inter-American Foundation. 
This legislation should not pass. We need your help to substantially 
modify it or defeat it. 
 
This hemisphere is the second fastest-growing economic region in the 
world. Latin America's infrastructure needs alone will require an 
estimated $500 billion in investment in the coming decade. The 
opportunities for U.S. business and industry are immense. But we must 
work cooperatively both in the United States and region-wide to sustain 
mutually beneficial progress. Economic integration is a natural and 
desired course. 
 
President Clinton and his colleagues in the hemisphere have sketched a 
visionary blueprint--an architecture if you will--to guide hemispheric 
relations well into the next century. The President feels strongly about 
this commitment. As one pundit wrote recently, the President is 
attacking insecurity by confidently defining the future. Now is not the 
time to withdraw. The opportunities presented by greater integration in 
the hemisphere are vast. We will leave our children an expansive legacy 
if we seize them. (###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 5 
 
The Caribbean Basin Trade Security Act 
Alexander F. Watson, Assistant Secretary For Inter-American Affairs 
Statement before the Subcommittee on Trade of the Senate Finance 
Committee, Washington, DC, May 15, 1995 
 
Mr. Chairman, I wish to express my deep gratitude for the opportunity to 
testify before your Committee on Senate Bill 529, the Caribbean Basin 
Trade Security Act of 1995. 
 
The Caribbean Basin Initiative, which S. 529 seeks to enhance, is 
important in promoting two of our most important foreign policy 
objectives in the hemisphere--the growth of democracy and economic 
prosperity. The broad bipartisan support which has marked the passage of 
CBI legislation in the past reflects a consensus in Congress and the 
executive branch that the U.S. has a strong interest in, and remains 
committed to, the economic and political well-being of the Caribbean 
Basin. 
 
The United States is, and will remain, engaged in not only the Caribbean 
Basin's economic development and integration, but also that of the 
entire hemisphere. This commitment was reaffirmed in Miami at the Summit 
of the Americas last December when the United States and the other 
nations of the hemisphere pledged to work toward greater economic 
integration and the goal of a Free Trade Agreement for the Americas by 
the year 2005. 
 
CBI: A Success
 
To date, the Caribbean Basin Initiative has been an unqualified success. 
The fundamental economic goal of the CBI--broadening and diversifying 
the economic base of the beneficiaries--is being realized. Since the CBI 
went into effect in 1984, non-traditional exports from the region have 
grown at a rate of nearly 25% per year. But CBI has not simply benefited 
those countries: It has resulted in increased U.S. exports to and 
investment in the region. The last decade has seen impressive growth in 
trade in both directions. U.S. exports to the region have grown rapidly, 
strengthening the overall job base in the U.S. 
 
U.S. Interests in the Region
 
The Caribbean Basin is often referred to as the third border of the 
United States. Much of our trade with the hemisphere passes through the 
sea lanes, ports, and airports of the region. Democracy, stability, and 
broad-based economic growth grounded in free market principles are the 
goals we share with the countries in the region. 
 
The countries of Central America and the Caribbean are enjoying 
increasing prosperity and positive political change. The region is 
continuing to implement market-oriented reforms and is beginning to 
gather some of the fruits of these reform efforts. Growth last year for 
the CBI region as a whole amounted to 3.1%. This is an encouraging sign, 
although it does not yet represent the kind of vibrant growth necessary 
to address the deep-seated poverty and social problems of many of the 
countries in the region. After the turbulent and economically 
devastating decade of the 1980s, however, our neighboring countries in 
the hemisphere are well on the road to consolidating democracy and 
building market-based economies. 
 
I want to mention some recent progress the CBI countries have achieved. 
In El Salvador, which struggled through more than a decade of armed 
aggression between the government and the FMLN rebels, a negotiated 
settlement was achieved on the last day of 1991. Implementation of the 
UN-sponsored peace accords was vigorously pursued by all parties and has 
resulted in the integration of many former guerrilla leaders into the 
political system and most former combatants into the productive sector. 
The process of reconciliation continues apace, and the highly successful 
UN mission, known as ONUSAL, has completed its task. Only a much reduced 
office reporting to the UN Secretary General continues to monitor the 
peace process. The impressive economic reforms undertaken by the 
governments of President Alfredo Cristiani and of President Armando 
Calderon Sol have stimulated critical foreign investment and are fueling 
impressive growth, which reached 5% in 1994. 
 
Nicaraguans chose a democratic future when they elected Violeta Barrios 
de Chamorro as President in 1990. The previously warring factions are 
now pursuing political change through the National Assembly and are 
preparing for the next general elections set for November 1996. There is 
new leadership in the national army, and the size of the armed forces 
has decreased more than 70%. While improvements have been made in 
improving the investment climate, we continue to vigorously pursue 
further progress with the Government of Nicaragua. 
 
Panama, at the center of the Western Hemisphere, elected a dynamic new 
president last year--Ernesto Perez-Balladares. His government is 
pursuing policies of democratic consolidation and vastly more open 
markets. 
 
In the Caribbean, democracy is becoming the rule, not the exception. The 
legitimate government of Haiti was restored in October 1994 by the U.S.-
led Multinational Force authorized by the United Nations. This action 
sent a powerful message to those who do not respect the authority of 
electoral outcomes and would rule instead by repression and force. 
 
The challenge to legitimate power in Haiti led to one of the most direct 
security challenges to the United States and all democracies of the 
Caribbean--the tragic outflow of thousands of boat people over many 
months following the September 1991 coup d'etat. Developments in Haiti 
following the U.S.-led action, however, are very promising. 
Parliamentary and local elections are set for June 25. A new civilian 
police force is in training, and the new police academy will graduate 
its first class next month. The human rights situation has shown vast 
improvement, and the U.S. is joining other donors to assist in 
completely overhauling the justice system. 
 
Haiti has experienced a drastic decline in per capita income, which is 
the lowest in the hemisphere. In 1990, per capita GDP was 21% below that 
of 1981; in 1994, it dropped another 34%. The new signs of political 
reform in Haiti provide hope for the political stability and economic 
development which this country so desperately needs. 
 
With the end of the Cold War, the real threats to the political 
stability of democracies in the area are posed by endemic internal 
problems rather than by foreign aggressors. Uneven development, poverty 
and widespread unemployment, poor education and health systems, and 
public sector corruption are the new forces of destabilization. We must 
work with countries in the region to develop consensual and transparent 
democratic government, encouraging citizens to work within the system 
rather than outside it and to make the necessary economic changes to 
ensure further economic growth and development. 
 
While development assistance has played a significant role in the 
development of the Caribbean Basin, CBI nations are now adjusting to 
declining real levels of external assistance. The CBI countries must 
compete on a global basis for markets and investment capital. Those 
economies with the most efficient market forces will reap the greatest 
rewards and those with the greatest protectionism will be least likely 
to attract foreign capital. 
 
The legislation the committee is considering today, with the changes 
outlined by Ambassador Barshefsky, will strongly increase the ability of 
these nations to reap the rewards of economic reform. 
 
Many of the CBI countries, including Haiti, have made great strides to 
reform their economies to become more competitive in the world 
marketplace. But these reforms often entail high  short-term costs. 
Dislocation and unemployment are natural by-products of such reform. 
Through the opportunities created by the CBI, and those offered in S. 
529, countries of the CBI will have the tools to support their continued 
economic reform and to bring this region a step closer to the goals 
established by the Summit of the Americas. 
 
This legislation can also help the U.S. and the CBI nations address two 
additional problems--drug trafficking and illegal immigration. While the 
threat of externally generated political/military challenge in the 
region has nearly dissipated, it has been replaced by the different but 
highly insidious threat of international narco-terrorism and drug 
trafficking. These problems pose a serious threat to the political 
stability of many of the countries in the region. Prosperous and growing 
economies offer alternatives to the lucrative and corrosive narcotics 
trade destined for the U.S. and Europe. Another phenomenon of 
underdevelopment, and an increasing threat to the U.S., is illegal 
immigration. Increased jobs and opportunities at home reduce the number 
of people seeking to cross our borders illegally. 
 
NAFTA's Impact on CBI
 
The passage of the NAFTA by the 103rd Congress was a triumphant event in 
the relationship of the United States and all democracies of the Western 
Hemisphere. It marked a new era of mature partnership. This legislation 
offers an opportunity to address the unintended consequences of the 
NAFTA on the CBI and to move forward in partnership with the CBI nations 
toward shared economic goals. 
 
Leaders of the Caribbean Basin countries met with President Clinton in 
1993 and 1994 to express their serious concerns about the impact of 
NAFTA on their economic development. They did not come seeking a 
handout. They came seeking enhanced access to our market. Their 
objective is laudable--to strengthen their economies in order to be more 
competitive as the hemisphere deepens its integration. The President 
responded to their concerns last year by proposing the Interim Trade 
Program--ITP. Due to circumstances at the time, it was withdrawn for 
future consideration. 
 
The Administration supports legislation to enhance the CBI and hopes 
that it will win the same bipartisan support enjoyed by earlier CBI 
legislation. Such legislation is needed to ensure that U.S. firms 
working and investing actively in the Caribbean Basin will continue to 
do so, improving our overall healthy level of trade activity with the 
Caribbean Basin. As I often hear from private sector groups I meet with, 
this legislation is of great interest to U.S. firms exporting to and 
investing in the region. They are looking for our government to take 
action to reinforce the economic and financial vitality of the Caribbean 
Basin as a market for U.S. goods and a destination for U.S. investment. 
Further, we support such legislation because we want to continue to 
promote the impressive economic and political reforms undertaken, while 
encouraging further changes in critical areas like protection for 
intellectual property rights, market access, and investment protection. 
 
Toward the FTAA
 
At the Summit of the Americas last December, the nations of the 
hemisphere threw their support fully behind democracy, open markets, and 
free trade. The democratically elected leaders of these countries 
pledged to work toward the goal of a Free Trade Area of the Americas by 
2005. The Caribbean Basin Trade Security Act, as amended, would be a 
positive step in that direction, providing the countries in the region 
with an opportunity to move toward market economic reform and greater 
economic integration. Legislation addressing the effects of NAFTA on the 
CBI will help ensure that CBI beneficiaries implement necessary and far-
reaching reforms to enable them to stand by the market discipline 
required to compete in a free trade area, and to continue their economic 
development. 
 
We believe that these objectives serve the foreign policy interests of 
the United States. Sound and stable democracies throughout the bordering 
Caribbean region, with increasing opportunities for economic advancement 
at home, means greater export opportunities for U.S. manufacturers and a 
brighter future for citizens of the Caribbean Basin.  (###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 6 
 
American Overseas Interests Act  
Secretary Christopher 
Text of a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, May 22, 
1995. 
 
Dear Mr. Speaker: 
 
This week, the House of Representatives will consider legislation that 
could undermine this and every future President's ability to safeguard 
America's security, to advance America's interests, and to provide 
American leadership in the world. The "American Overseas Interests Act," 
H.R. 1561, is deeply flawed. If this bill were presented to the 
President, I would have no choice but to recommend that the President 
veto it. 
 
H.R. 1561 wages an extraordinary assault on this and every future 
President's constitutional authority to manage foreign policy. It 
contains numerous restraints and restrictions that would do immense harm 
to our nation's foreign policy. It drastically reduces our resources. 
And it mandates a costly and disruptive reorganization of the Executive 
Branch that will damage our ability to promote American interests 
worldwide. 
 
On the most fundamental constitutional grounds, I am deeply opposed to 
the elaborate and unnecessary restraints that H.R. 1561 would impose. If 
enacted, they would compromise our ability to follow through on the 
North Korea Framework Agreement. They would undermine our effective 
participation and weaken our leverage in international organizations. 
They would compel changes in our refugee policy that could pose a 
serious threat to our borders, limiting the President's ability to 
respond to boat migration and possibly exacerbating the illegal 
smuggling of aliens into the United States. The bill would seriously 
impair the President's responsibility to manage our delicate relations 
with China at a time of its transition in leadership. Numerous 
conditions on our assistance to Russia and the other New Independent 
States could derail our steady support for democratic and market reform 
in a region that remains the site of tens of thousands of nuclear 
weapons. Other provisions of the bill would seriously disrupt our 
ability to move decisively when warranted by rapidly changing 
circumstances as well as our relations with a variety of countries. 
 
These far-reaching restrictions, combined with the sharp reductions in 
resources for the International Affairs budget, would cripple our 
ability to respond to the complex opportunities and challenges of the 
post-Cold War world. At a time when American strength, vision, and 
leadership are essential, this legislation would force our unilateral 
retreat. 
 
As you know, the International Affairs budget represents only 1.3% of 
total federal spending. It has absorbed substantial real cuts in recent 
years. The resources we are requesting, in my judgment, are the rock 
bottom minimum we need to advance our nation's vital interests. 
 
The International Affairs budget has always been a prudent investment 
that produces clear benefits for the American people. It protects 
American lives by combating the spread of nuclear weapons, the scourge 
of drugs, and the threat of international terrorism. It has helped lead 
to the detargeting and dismantlement of missiles in the former Soviet 
Union and facilitated the departure of Russian troops from the Baltics. 
It has advanced peace in the Middle East. It has helped to end the 
violence in Northern Ireland and to assist the transition to democracy 
in South Africa. It has promoted free trade and U.S. exports, creating 
more than one million high-paying American jobs in the last two years 
alone. Whether in the case of South Korea or South America, our foreign 
assistance over the years has ultimately put more dollars in the pockets 
of the American taxpayer than it has ever taken out. 
 
Moreover, the preventive diplomacy that the International Affairs budget 
funds is our first and least costly line of defense. Compare the cost of 
diplomatic action to stem proliferation to the price we would pay if 
rogue states obtained nuclear weapons. Compare the cost of promoting 
development to the price of coping with famine and refugees. If we gut 
our diplomatic readiness today, we will face much greater costs and 
crises down the line. H.R. 1561's cuts in Function 150 resource levels 
are flatly irresponsible. 
 
H.R. 1561's elimination of ACDA, USIA, and AID, as well as cuts in the 
State Department's operating expenses, threatens our ability to achieve 
our foreign policy goals through effective international affairs 
agencies. The State Department, ACDA, AID, and USIA are all proceeding 
vigorously with their own streamlining efforts. Each is actively cutting 
costs, realigning resources to better match policy priorities, and 
updating communications and information technologies. Together, these 
measures are lowering costs and raising productivity in each of the 
international affairs agencies. 
 
H.R. 1561 would disrupt and deflect these comprehensive efforts by 
abolishing ACDA, AID, and USIA in name only and reassigning their 
functions to the State Department. The turmoil and inevitable 
dislocation could seriously undermine the conduct of U.S. foreign policy 
by hampering a flexible response to continually evolving world crises 
and opportunities. Like the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines, which 
operate under the overall direction of the Secretary of Defense, AID, 
ACDA, and USIA each has a distinct mission that can be best performed 
under the overall foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of State. 
 
As the sole remaining superpower, we have an unprecedented opportunity 
to shape the world we seek--a world of open societies and open markets. 
Our nation's foreign policy cannot be supported on the cheap; we cannot 
protect our interests as the world's most powerful nation if we 
undermine the role of the President or if we do not marshal the 
resources to stand by our commitments. We cannot lead if we do not have 
the tools of leadership at our disposal. This is equally true whichever 
party is in power at any given moment. 
 
Last November's elections may have changed the balance of power between 
the parties. But they did not change--indeed, they enhanced--our 
responsibility to cooperate on a bipartisan basis in foreign affairs. 
The election was not a license to lose sight of our nation's global 
interests or to launch an assault on the President's constitutional 
responsibility to conduct foreign policy. I regret to conclude that this 
legislation would have us do both. 
 
                                     Sincerely, 
                                     Warren Christopher (###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 7 
 
Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security 
 
At the Budapest summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE) in December 1994, the OSCE heads of state adopted the 
Politico-Military Code of Conduct that had been negotiated in the OSCE 
Forum for Security Cooperation. The code is a politically binding 
agreement among OSCE states; it is not a treaty or a legal document. In 
the tradition of the Helsinki Final Act, the Code of Conduct sets 
standards to guide OSCE states in the actions toward one another, as 
well as toward their own citizens. It is designed to foster the open 
consultative process that is one of the strengths of the OSCE and to 
encourage responsible and cooperative norms of behavior on politico-
military aspects of security. The code focuses particularly on the 
democratic control and use of armed forces. The code's standards have 
relevance for all OSCE members and will be particularly useful for those 
new states which are in the process of building the structures necessary 
to ensure effective democratic control over armed forces. Following is 
the text of the Code of Conduct, adopted at the summit and entered into 
effect on January 1, 1995. 
 
Preamble 
The Participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (CSCE), 
 
Recognizing the need to enhance security co-operation, including through 
the further encouragement of norms of responsible and co-operative 
behaviour in the field of security, 
 
Confirming that nothing in this Code diminishes the validity and 
applicability of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations or of other provisions of international law, 
 
Reaffirming the undiminished validity of the guiding principles and 
common values of the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris and the 
Helsinki Document 1992, embodying responsibilities of States towards 
each other and of governments towards their people, as well as the 
validity of other CSCE commitments, 
 
Have adopted the following Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects 
of security:
 
     I 
 
1. The participating States emphasize that the full respect for all CSCE 
principles embodied in the Helsinki Final Act and the implementation in 
good faith of all commitments undertaken in the CSCE are of fundamental 
importance for stability and security, and consequently constitute a 
matter of direct and legitimate concern to all of them. 
 
2. The participating States confirm the continuing validity of their 
comprehensive concept of security, as initiated in the Final Act, which 
relates the maintenance of peace to the respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. It links economic and environmental co-operation 
with peaceful inter-State relations. 
 
3. They remain convinced that security is indivisible and that the 
security of each of them is inseparably linked to the security of all 
others. They will not strengthen their security at the expense of the 
security of other States. They will pursue their own security interests 
in conformity with the common effort to strengthen security and 
stability in the CSCE area and beyond. 
 
4. Reaffirming their respect for each other's sovereign equality and 
individuality as well as the rights inherent in and encompassed by its 
sovereignty, the participating States will base their mutual security 
relations upon a co-operative approach. They emphasize in this regard 
the key role of the CSCE. They will continue to develop complementary 
and mutually reinforcing institutions that include European and 
transatlantic organizations, multilateral and bilateral undertakings and 
various forms of regional and subregional co-operation. The 
participating states will co-operate in ensuring that all such security 
arrangements are in harmony with CSCE principles and commitments under 
this Code. 
 
5. They are determined to act in solidarity if CSCE norms and 
commitments are violated and to facilitate concerted responses to 
security challenges that they may face as a result. They will consult 
promptly, in conformity with their CSCE responsibilities, with a 
participating State seeking assistance in realizing its individual or 
collective self-defence. They will consider jointly the nature of the 
threat and actions that may be required in defence of their common 
values. 

     II 
 
6. The participating States will not support terrorist acts in any way 
and will take appropriate measures to prevent and combat terrorism in 
all its forms. They will co-operate fully in combating the threat of 
terrorist activities through implementation of international instruments 
and commitments they agree upon in this respect. They will, in 
particular, take steps to fulfil the requirements of international 
agreements by which they are bound to prosecute or extradite terrorists. 
 
     III 
 
7. The participating States recall that the principles of the Helsinki 
Final Act are all of primary significance and, accordingly, that they 
will be equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted 
taking into account the others. 
 
8. The participating States will not provide assistance to or support 
States that are in violation of their obligation to refrain from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Charter of the United Nations and with the Declaration on Principles 
Guiding Relations between Participating States contained in the Helsinki 
Final Act. 
 
     IV 
 
9. The participating States reaffirm the inherent right, as recognized 
in the Charter of the United Nations, of individual and collective self-
defence. 
 
10. Each participating State, bearing in mind the legitimate security 
concerns of other States, is free to determine its security interests 
itself on the basis of sovereign equality and has the right freely to 
choose its own security arrangements, in accordance with international 
law and with commitments to CSCE principles and objectives. 
 
11. The participating States each have the sovereign right to belong or 
not to belong to international organizations, and to be or not to be a 
party to bilateral or multilateral treaties, including treaties of 
alliance;  they also have the right to neutrality. Each has the right to 
change its status in this respect, subject to relevant agreements and 
procedures. Each will respect the rights of all others in this regard. 
 
12. Each participating State will maintain only such military 
capabilities as are commensurate with individual or collective 
legitimate security needs, taking into account its obligations under 
international law. 
 
13. Each participating State will determine its military capabilities on 
the basis of national democratic procedures, bearing in mind the 
legitimate security concerns of other States as well as the need to 
contribute to international security and stability. No participating 
State will attempt to impose military domination over any other 
participating State. 
 
14. A participating State may station its armed forces on the territory 
of another participating State in accordance with their freely 
negotiated agreement as well as in accordance with international law. 
 
     V 
 
15. The participating States will implement in good faith each of their 
commitments in the field of arms control, disarmament and confidence- 
and security-building as an important element of their indivisible 
security. 
 
16. With a view to enhancing security and stability in the CSCE area, 
the participating States reaffirm their commitment to pursue arms 
control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building measures. 
 
     VI 
 
17. The participating States commit themselves to co-operate, including 
through development of sound economic and environmental conditions, to 
counter tensions that may lead to conflict. The sources of such tensions 
include violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms and of other 
commitments in the human dimension; manifestations of aggressive 
nationalism, racism, chauvinism, xenophobia and anti-semitism also 
endanger peace and security. 
 
18. The participating States stress the importance both of early 
identification of potential conflicts and of their joint efforts in the 
field of conflict prevention, crisis management and peaceful settlement 
of disputes. 
 
19. In the event of armed conflict, they will seek to facilitate the 
effective cessation of hostilities and seek to create conditions 
favourable to the political solution of the conflict. They will co-
operate in support of humanitarian assistance to alleviate suffering 
among the civilian population, including facilitating the movement of 
personnel and resources dedicated to such tasks. 
 
     VII 
 
20. The participating States consider the democratic political control 
of military, paramilitary and internal security forces as well as of 
intelligence services and the police to be an indispensable element of 
stability and security. They will further the integration of their armed 
forces with civil society as an important expression of democracy. 
 
21. Each participating State will at all times provide for and maintain 
effective guidance to and control of its military, paramilitary and 
security forces by constitutionally established authorities vested with 
democratic legitimacy. Each participating State will provide controls to 
ensure that such authorities fulfil their constitutional and legal 
responsibilities. They will clearly define the roles and missions of 
such forces and their obligation to act solely within the constitutional 
framework. 
 
22. Each participating State will provide for its legislative approval 
of defence expenditures. Each participating State will, with due regard 
to national security requirements, exercise restraint in its military 
expenditures and provide for transparency and public access to 
information related to the armed forces. 
 
23. Each participating State, while providing for the individual service 
member's exercise of his or her civil rights, will ensure that its armed 
forces as such are politically neutral. 
 
24. Each participating State will provide and maintain measures to guard 
against accidental or unauthorized use of military means. 
 
25. The participating States will not tolerate or support forces that 
are not accountable to or controlled by their constitutionally 
established authorities. If a participating State is unable to exercise 
its authority over such forces, it may seek consultations within the 
CSCE to consider steps to be taken. 
 
26. Each participating State will ensure that in accordance with its 
international commitments its paramilitary forces refrain from the 
acquisition of combat mission capabilities in excess of those for which 
they were established. 
 
27. Each participating State will ensure that the recruitment or call-up 
of personnel for service in its military, paramilitary and security 
forces is consistent with its obligations and commitments in respect of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
 
28. The participating States will reflect in their laws or other 
relevant documents the rights and duties of armed forces personnel. They 
will consider introducing exemptions from or alternatives to military 
service. 
 
29. The participating States will make widely available in their 
respective countries the international humanitarian law of war. They 
will reflect, in accordance with national practice, their commitments in 
this field in their military training programmes and regulations. 
 
30. Each participating State will instruct its armed forces personnel in 
international humanitarian law, rules,  conventions and commitments 
governing armed conflict and will ensure that such personnel are aware 
that they are individually accountable under national and international 
law for their actions. 
 
31. The participating States will ensure that armed forces personnel 
vested with command authority exercise it in accordance with relevant 
national as well as international law and are made aware that they can 
be held individually accountable under those laws for the unlawful 
exercise of such authority and that orders contrary to national and 
international law must not be given. The responsibility of superiors 
does not exempt subordinates from any of their individual 
responsibilities. 
 
32. Each participating State will ensure that military, paramilitary and 
security forces personnel will be able to enjoy and exercise their human 
rights and fundamental freedoms as reflected in CSCE documents and 
international law, in conformity with relevant constitutional and legal 
provisions and with the requirements of service. 
 
33. Each participating State will provide appropriate legal and 
administrative procedures to protect the rights of all its forces 
personnel. 
 
     VIII 
 
34. Each participating State will ensure that its armed forces are, in 
peace and in war, commanded, manned, trained and equipped in ways that 
are consistent with the provisions of international law and its 
respective obligations and commitments related to the use of armed 
forces in armed conflict, including as applicable the Hague Conventions 
of 1907 and 1954, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 1977 Protocols 
Additional thereto, as well as the 1980 Convention on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons. 
 
35. Each participating State will ensure that its defence policy and 
doctrine are consistent with international law related to the use of 
armed forces, including in armed conflict, and the relevant commitments 
of this Code. 
 
36. Each participating State will ensure that any decision to assign its 
armed forces to internal security missions is arrived at in conformity 
with constitutional procedures. Such decisions will prescribe the armed 
forces' missions, ensuring that they will be performed under the 
effective control of constitutionally established authorities and 
subject to the rule of law. If recourse to force cannot be avoided in 
performing internal security missions, each participating State will 
ensure that its use must be commensurate with the needs for enforcement. 
The armed forces will take due care to avoid injury to civilians or 
their property. 
 
37. The participating States will not use armed forces to limit the 
peaceful and lawful exercise of their human and civil rights by persons 
as individuals or as representatives of groups nor to deprive them of 
their national, religious, cultural, linguistic or ethnic identity. 
 
38. Each participating State is responsible for implementation of this 
Code. If requested, a participating State will provide appropriate 
clarification regarding its implementation of the Code. Appropriate CSCE 
bodies, mechanisms and procedures will be used to assess, review and 
improve if necessary the implementation of this Code. 
 
     IX 
 
39. The provisions adopted in this Code of Conduct are politically 
binding. Accordingly, this Code is not eligible for registration under 
Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. This Code will come 
into effect on 1 January 1995. 
 
40. Nothing in this Code alters the nature and content of the 
commitments undertaken in other CSCE documents. 
 
41. The participating States will seek to ensure that their relevant 
internal documents and procedures or, where appropriate, legal 
instruments reflect the commitments made in this Code. 
 
42. The text of the Code will be published in each participating State, 
which will disseminate it and make it known as widely as possible.  
(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 8 
 
What's in Print: Foreign Relations Of the United States 
 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-63, Volume IX, Foreign 
Economic Policy has been recently released by the Department of State. 
The volume, which covers the period during the presidency of John F. 
Kennedy, documents the Administration's preoccupation with reversing the 
rapidly deteriorating U.S. balance of payments.  
 
Many short- and long-term policy initiatives in the areas of financial 
and monetary policy, foreign assistance, and trade and commercial policy 
were launched to try to eliminate the deficit and stem the outflow of 
gold caused by loss of foreign confidence in the dollar.  
 
Perhaps the most controversial initiative was the effort to reduce U.S. 
overseas expenditures. Multilateral trade negotiations aimed at 
increased U.S. exports were also initiated. A new foreign assistance 
policy aimed at moving developing nations into self-sustained economic 
growth was begun. Kennedy Administration officials hoped to use foreign 
assistance policy to help improve the balance of payments. The newly 
created Agency for International Development (USAID) became the central 
coordinating agency for economic and military assistance as well as for 
training police in foreign nations.  
 
The Administration debated other foreign economic issues, such as 
expanded trade with the Soviet bloc and exports of Western technology to 
Soviet bloc countries. Finally, President Kennedy's decision to sell off 
part of the surpluses in the U.S. stockpile of strategic materials 
resulted in mixed reactions in Congress and the affected departments. 
 
The official record of U.S. policy contained in this volume was drawn 
primarily from documents originating in the Departments of State and 
Commerce, the White House, the Agency for International Development, and 
from papers of key participants. 
 
This volume (GPO Stock No. 044-000-02396-2) may be purchased for $38 
postpaid ($47.50 for foreign orders). VISA, MasterCard, and personal 
checks are accepted. Order from: 
 
U.S. Government Printing Office 
Superintendent of Documents 
P.O. Box 371954 
Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954 
To order by phone, call (202) 512-1800; to fax your order, call (202) 
512-2250 
 
For further information and/or a summary of the volume, contact David S. 
Patterson, Chief of the Arms Control and Economics Division, Office of 
the Historian, at (202) 663-1127 or fax (202) 663-1289. (###) 
 
[END OF DISPATCH VOL. 6, NO. 22] 

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