U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 19, MAY 8, 1995
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS


ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:

1. Presidential Executive Order Expands U.S. Sanctions Against Iran -- 
Secretary Christopher 
2. The Price of Leadership -- Anthony Lake   
3. Dual Engagement: U.S. Policy Toward Russia and China -- James B. 
Steinberg
4. Patterns of Global Terrorism
5. U.S.-Cuba Joint Statement on Migration 
6. Department Statements: Cuban Dissident Sentenced to 15 Years; Zaire: 
Troika Demarche to Political Leadership 

ARTICLE 1:

Presidential Executive Order Expands U.S. Sanctions Against Iran
Secretary Christopher
Opening statement at a State Department press briefing, Washington, DC, 
May 1, 1995

Last night, as you know, the President announced an important decision 
regarding U.S. policy toward Iran. His executive order will ban all U.S. 
trade and investment with Iran, including the purchase of Iranian oil by 
American companies. This action dramatically expands existing U.S. 
sanctions against Iran, which are already the toughest in the world.

The President's decision reinforces our overall strategy toward the 
Middle East. From the outset, advancing the Arab-Israeli peace process 
and maintaining security in the Gulf have been among the highest foreign 
policy priorities of our Administration.

As many of you recall, my first trip to the Middle East included a stop 
in the Gulf. At that time and on many occasions since then, almost every 
Middle Eastern leader--Arab and Israeli alike--has told me that Iran 
represents one of the greatest, if not the greatest threat to peace and 
stability in the region.

With that in mind, our policy toward Iran has been consistent from the 
start; that is, to use our diplomatic and economic measures and our 
military deterrent to contain Iran and to pressure it to cease its 
unacceptable actions.

We have had some successes working with our G-7 partners and other 
nations, but it is clear now that more must be done. Iran is an outlaw 
state. Its repugnant behavior has not changed. Let me be clear about 
what our main concerns are.

First, Iran is the foremost state sponsor of terrorism in the world. 
Second, through its support of particular terrorist enterprises, Iran 
seeks to undermine the Middle East peace process. Third, Iran is a major 
proliferation threat and is pursuing a determined course to acquire 
nuclear weapons.

Iran's backing for international terrorism is pervasive. It has 
supported violence across the Middle East--in Lebanon, Israel, Egypt, 
Turkey, Algeria, and now in Gaza. Its terrorist reach is also global, 
extending to Africa, Latin America, Asia, and Europe as well.

We estimate that Iran, a country that is now in the throes of a severe 
economic crisis, nevertheless spends several hundred million dollars a 
year to provide radical groups with weapons, equipment, training, and 
financial support.

Iran is the primary patron of terrorists trying to derail the Arab-
Israeli peace process. Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, Ahmed Jabril's 
Popular Front: each of these organizations receives funds, training, and 
political support from Iran--support which they have used to leave a 
trail of carnage from Bayt Lid to Buenos Aires.

A regime with this kind of record simply cannot be permitted to get its 
hands on nuclear weapons. Based on a wide variety of data, we know that 
since the mid-1980s Iran has had an organized structure dedicated to 
acquiring and developing nuclear weapons.

We know that Iran is seeking a capability to produce both plutonium and 
highly enriched uranium--the critical materials for a nuclear bomb. For 
years, Iran has been trying to purchase heavy-water research reactors 
that are best suited to producing weapons-grade plutonium, not 
electricity. We know that Iran is devoting resources to various uranium-
enrichment technologies focusing on the gas centrifuge.

Iran has been frustrated so far in its efforts to produce weapons-grade 
material at home. Therefore, it has aggressively sought to buy it 
abroad. Its agents have scoured the former Soviet Union in search of 
nuclear materials, technologies, and scientists. In 1992, for example, 
Iran unsuccessfully approached a plant in Kazakhstan for substantial 
quantities of enriched uranium. In terms of its organization, programs, 
procurement, and covert activities, Iran is pursuing the classic route 
to nuclear weapons which has been followed by almost all states that 
have recently sought a nuclear capability.

If the international community does not take strong action to counter 
its efforts, Iran will achieve its goal. When that might happen, no one 
can predict with certainty--but what we do know is that if Iran gets 
substantial foreign help, it will be able to build nuclear weapons 
sooner rather than later.

That is why we will continue to oppose any Russian or Chinese 
cooperation with Iran on nuclear matters. We are convinced that the 
expertise and technology gained--even from cooperation that appears to 
be strictly civilian in nature--will be used to advance Iran's nuclear 
weapons program. For that reason, all the leading industrialized 
democracies of the world have rejected nuclear trade with Iran because 
they recognize that it is simply too dangerous to do so.

With its proven record of terrorism and aggressive ambitions, Iran 
cannot be given the benefit of the doubt. In-creased international 
pressure must be applied to Iran to bring about a change in its 
policies.

That is exactly the goal of the President's executive order. It sends an 
unmistakable message to friend and foe alike: We view Iran's action as a 
major threat to United States interests and international security, and 
we are determined to stop them.

In recent months, other countries have pointed to the ongoing--although 
heavily restricted--economic ties between the United States and Iran. 
They have pointed to those ties to justify their broad-based commercial 
relationships. Now, the President's decision totally eliminates that 
excuse for their going ahead. The President's decision underscores 
America's readiness to lead by example. It puts the United States in the 
strongest possible position to urge others to take similar steps. 

In addition to opposing Russian and Chinese nuclear cooperation with 
Iran, we will be calling on our G-7 partners to undertake a 
comprehensive review of their economic ties to Iran. Certainly, they 
should end all of their concessionary credits which allow Iran to divert 
scarce resources to military programs and sponsoring terrorism. We're 
also asking our G-7 partners to show maximum restraint across the board 
just as the United States has done.

The President has taken a bold step. His action deserves the support of 
our friends and allies who share our interest in international peace and 
security. I'll be redoubling my own efforts through various diplomatic 
steps and means to ensure that such support is forthcoming. (###)




ARTICLE 2:

The Price of Leadership
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Address before the National Press Club, Washington, DC, April 27, 1995

Let me begin with a simple but alarming fact: The United States could be 
on the brink of unilateral disarmament.

Did that get your attention? I hope so, because it is true.

No, we are not about to junk our jets or scuttle our ships. Our military 
is strong and ready--and there is a strong bipartisan consensus to keep 
it so. But we are on the verge of throwing away--or at least damaging--
many of the other tools America has used for   50 years to maintain our 
leadership in the world: aid to emerging markets, economic support for 
peace, international peacekeeping, programs to fight terrorism and drug 
trafficking, and foreign assistance. Together with a strong military, 
these have been key instruments of our foreign policy.

Presidents since Harry Truman have used these tools to promote American 
interests--to preserve our security, to expand our prosperity, and to 
advance democracy. Their efforts were supported by Democrats and 
Republicans--and the broad majority of the American people. Congress 
consistently provided the needed resources for these tasks. Because of 
this resolve, coupled with our military might, we prevailed over the 
long haul in the Cold War, strengthened our security, and won 
unparalleled prosperity for our people.

Now, I deeply believe our success is in danger. It is under attack by 
new isolationists from both left and right who would deny our nation 
those resources. Our policy of engagement in world affairs is under 
siege and American leadership is in peril.

A few of the new isolationists act out of conviction. They argue that 
the end of the Soviet menace means that the serious threats are gone and 
that we should withdraw behind our borders and stick to concerns at 
home. "Fortress America," they say, can shut out new dangers even though 
some of the new threats facing us--such as nuclear proliferation, 
terrorism, rapid population growth, and environmental degradation--know 
no boundaries.

But most of the new isolationists  do not argue such a position or even 
answer to the name isolationist. They say they are part of the post-Cold 
War bipartisan consensus, that their goals are its goals--democracy, 
security, peace, and prosperity. But they won't back up their words with 
deeds.

These self-proclaimed devotees of democracy would deny aid to struggling 
democracies. They laud American leadership, but oppose American 
leadership of coalitions, advocating only unilateral action instead.

Yes, they praise peace--but then they cut our help to those who take 
risks for peace. They demand greater prosperity--but they shy away from 
the hard work of opening markets for American workers and businesses. 
Under the cover of budget-cutting, they threaten to cut the legs out 
from under America's leadership.

These are the back-door isolationists--and they are much more numerous 
and influential than those who argue openly for American retreat. They 
can read the polls, and they know that the American people want the U.S. 
to be engaged in the world. Support for American leadership in the world 
is about as strong as ever--a Chicago Council on Foreign Relations 
survey shows two-thirds or more want us to remain deeply engaged. So 
these back-door isolationists and unilateralists cast themselves as the 
true guardians of American power, but through their actions, they could 
become the agents of America's retreat. They champion American 
leadership, but they want it the one way you can't have it--and that is, 
on the cheap.

They want America to turn its back on 50 years of success. They are 
working--whether they know it or not--to destroy part of the foundation 
for our peace and prosperity, the great legacy of our postwar leaders: 
Vandenberg, Truman, Marshall, Acheson. These men faced their own 
challenge from isolationists. But they saw the cost of our earlier 
withdrawal after Versailles was terribly, terribly damaging--saw it in 
the wreckage of Europe and Asia after World War II and the casualties 
America suffered liberating those continents. And they understood that 
investing in a vigorous foreign policy was the only way to prevent 
another catastrophe.

They knew the price of leadership. They spent what was necessary to 
maintain America's security. And they went further, creating the United 
Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions and covering those bills, 
pouring Marshall Plan aid into Western Europe to save it from despair 
and communism, and they and their successors in later administrations 
developed the new tool of technical assistance--so that democracy and 
prosperity got a better chance around the world.

Look at the results: The map is almost covered with democracies, many of 
them strong allies. Markets that fulfill needs and dreams are expanding. 
A global economy supports American jobs and prosperity. These are the 
returns on 50 years of American political and economic investment 
abroad--the benefits of 50 years of bipartisan engagement. But these 
achievements are not cut in stone. We will not go on reaping these 
benefits automatically. Back-door isolationism threatens to propel us in 
the wrong direction at a real moment of hope--when our engagement can 
still make a dramatic difference by securing rather than frittering away 
our victory in the Cold War.

We could forfeit that victory because in many places democracy still 
needs nurturing. Some market economies have not sunk deep roots, and the 
post-Cold War era has brought into new focus real and powerful dangers 
that threaten what we have worked for. Aggression by rogue states, 
international terrorism, economic dislocation: These are new forms of an 
old conflict--the conflict between freedom and oppression, the conflict 
between the defenders of the open society and its enemies.

There is no expiration date on these lessons from five decades. 
Defeating these threats requires persistent engagement and hands-on 
policies. Defeating them demands resources. Throwing money at problems 
won't make them go away, but we also cannot solve problems without 
money. The measure of American leadership is not only the strength and 
attraction of our values but what we bring to the table to solve the 
hard issues before us. That is why President Clinton has said that he 
will not let the new isolationism prevail.

Make no mistake: The American people want their nation to lead. 
Americans know the world is growing closer; they know our security and 
prosperity depend on our involvement abroad. And they agree with the 
President, who has said before and since he took office: "For America to   
be strong at home, it must be strong abroad."

Plenty of Americans also say they want us to spend less abroad until 
they know the real numbers. Most think that we spend 15% or more of the 
Federal budget on foreign aid. They think 5% would be about right. They 
would be shocked to know that little more than 1%--$21 billion out of a 
$1.6-trillion budget--goes to foreign policy spending, and less than $16 
billion goes to foreign assistance. That's a lot of money, but not the 
budget-buster that neo-isolationists pretend. It is 21% less in real 
terms than that spent in FY 1986. They would also be surprised to learn 
that others recognize the reality of necessary resources far better than 
we. The richest, most powerful nation on earth--the United States--ranks 
dead last among 25 industrialized nations in the percentage of GNP 
devoted to aid.

These are facts that should be better known. More of our citizens should 
know that our foreign policy resources are devoted to goals that the 
American people support. 

-- $6.6 billion a year promotes   peace, including our efforts in the 
Middle East, the help we give U.S. allies to defend themselves, and our 
contribution to UN peacekeeping missions around the world, such as those 
on the Golan Heights, the Iraq-Kuwait border, and in Cambodia. 

-- $2.4 billion builds democracy and promotes prosperity, helping South 
Africa, for example, hold free elections and transform itself 
peacefully. 

-- $5 billion promotes development--that includes job programs in Haiti 
to increase employment, improve infrastructure, and help that nation get 
back on its feet. 

-- $1.7 billion provides humanitarian assistance, such as caring for 
refugee children in the former Yugoslavia--because Americans have always 
wanted their country to alleviate suffering in areas with the most 
compelling need. 

-- The remainder funds the State Department and other agencies that work 
every day to advance America's interests abroad.

This is the price of American leadership--and the backdoor isolationists 
don't want us to pay it. But imagine how the world would look if we did 
not. Take what I call the George Bailey Test. You remember George--he is 
the character played by Jimmy Stewart in the Christmas classic "It's a 
Wonderful Life." In that film, the angel Clarence shows George how 
Bedford Falls would have fallen apart without him.

Allow me to play Clarence briefly and take you through a world without 
American leadership. Imagine if: 

-- Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan joined the club of declared nuclear 
weapons states because we couldn't do the deals to denuclearize them. 

-- Russian missiles were still point-ed at our cities because we 
couldn't push to detarget them. 

-- Thousands of migrants were still trying to sail to our shores because 
we had not helped restore democracy in Haiti. 

-- Nearly 1 million American jobs had not been created over the last 
three years alone because we had not promoted U.S. exports. 

-- We had to fight a war on the Korean Peninsula--the implied result of 
what some critics were urging--because we did not confront the threat of 
a North Korea with nuclear weapons. 

-- Another quarter of a million people had died in Rwanda because we had 
not deployed our military and they had not been able to do such a fine 
job in the refugee camps. 

-- We had paid tens of billions of dollars more and suffered more 
casualties because we insisted on fighting Operation Desert Storm 
against Iraq by ourselves.

Imagine that. Each of these efforts cost money and the hard work of 
building international coalitions. But you and I are safer, better off, 
and enjoy more freedom because America made these investments. If the 
back-door isolationists have their way, much of what we have worked for 
for over two generations could be undone. Speaker Gingrich recently 
described what the world might look like if America retreats. He 
described "a dark and bloody planet . . . in our absence you end in 
Bosnia and Rwanda and Chechnya." He added, "They are the harbingers of a 
much worse 21st century than anything we've seen in the half-century of  
American leadership."

It does not have to be that way. If we continue to invest in democracy, 
in arms control, in stability in the developing world, and in the new 
markets that bring prosperity, we can assure another half-century of 
American leadership.

But already, because of decisions in the last few years, we sometimes 
cannot make even modest contributions to efforts that deserve our 
support. America is a great nation, but we cannot now find the small sum 
needed to help support peacekeepers in Liberia, where a million people 
are at risk from renewed civil war, or the money to adequately fund UN 
human rights monitors in Rwanda. We can barely meet our obligations in 
maintaining sanctions on Serbia. This is no way to follow the heroic 
achievements of the Cold War. And I can't imagine that this fits any 
American's vision of world leadership. It doesn't fit mine.

Nickel-and-dime policies cost more in the end. Prevention is cheap and 
doesn't attract cameras. When the all-seeing eye of television finds 
real suffering abroad, Americans will want their government to act--and 
rightly so. Funding a large humanitarian effort after a tragedy or 
sending in our forces abroad to assist will cost many times the 
investment in prevention.

Some costs of short-sighted policies must be paid in our neighborhoods: 
In 1993, Congress cut by almost one-third our very lean request for 
funding to combat the flow of narcotics into our country--and that 
funding has been declining in real terms ever since. As a result, we are 
scaling back programs to wipe out production of drugs and block their 
importation, as well as training programs for police, prosecutors, and 
judges in foreign countries. America pays a far higher cost in crime and 
ruined lives.

These are some of the constraints we have lived with in the past few 
years. Now, however, American leadership faces a still more clear and 
present danger. Budget legislation being prepared in Congress could 
reduce foreign affairs spending by nearly one-quarter, or $4.6 billion. 
That would mean drastic cuts in or elimination of aid to some states of 
the former Soviet Union and cuts in the security assistance programs 
that help U.S. allies and friends provide for their own defense. It 
would sharply reduce or eliminate our contributions to international 
peace operations. It would lame the agencies--such as OPIC and the 
Eximbank--that have played a key role in expanding U.S. exports. It 
would threaten our non-proliferation efforts and the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency. It could eliminate assistance for some programs that 
save children's lives.

These cuts would cripple our legacy of leadership. The strength to lead 
does not fall from heaven. It demands effort; it demands resources.

A neo-isolationist budget could undercut our strategic interest in 
democracy in Russia and the former Warsaw Pact countries and it would 
directly affect America's security. We must continue to fund the 
farsighted programs begun by Senators Nunn and Lugar to reduce nuclear 
arsenals in the former Soviet Union. The $350 million in Nunn-Lugar 
funds made it possible for Ukraine to dismantle its arsenal and accede 
to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That made it easier for us to pull back 
from the Cold War nuclear precipice and save some $20 billion a year on 
strategic nuclear forces. That is just one of the more dramatic examples 
of how our foreign spending literally pays off.

A neo-isolationist budget could harm our efforts to prevent rogue states 
and terrorists from building nuclear weapons. We are spending    $35 
million over three years to employ thousands of weapons scientists in 
the former Soviet Union on civilian research projects. That helps keep 
them off the nuclear labor market and from selling their skills to an 
Iraq or Iran.

A neo-isolationist budget could nearly end our involvement in UN peace 
operations around the world--operations that serve our interests. 
Presidents since Harry Truman have supported them as a matter of common 
sense. President Bush, in particular, saw their value: Last year nearly 
60% of our UN peacekeeping bill went to operations begun with his 
Administration's support. His Secretary of State, James Baker, made a 
strong defense for these operations when he remarked that "We spent 
trillions to win the Cold War and we should be willing to spend millions 
of dollars to secure the peace."

This is burdensharing at its best. UN peace operations: 

-- Save us from deploying U.S. troops in areas of great importance, for 
example, Cyprus or the Indian sub-continent. 
-- They help pick up where our troops left off, for example, along the 
border of Iraq and Kuwait. In Haiti, UN troops are saving us resources 
by replacing most of our own withdrawing troops. 
-- They are building democracy in Namibia, Mozambique, and Cambodia--all 
missions we helped design. In Cambodia, the UN negotiated the withdrawal 
of Vietnamese forces and then held the country's first democratic 
election. After the years of the Killing Fields, 90% of the electorate 
turned out to vote--while UN peacekeepers protected them from the Khmer 
Rouge.

We would pay much more if we performed even a small number of these 
missions unilaterally. Instead, the price we pay now in manpower and 
money is reasonable: Of the 61,000 UN peacekeepers deployed around the 
world, only some 3,300 are American. We pay the equivalent of one-half 
of 1% of our total defense spending for UN peace operations--less than a 
third of the total UN cost and less than the Europeans pay in proportion 
to their defense spending. We participate in these operations only after 
careful consideration of the command arrangements and costs--but we gain 
immense influence through our ability to lead multinational efforts.

A neo-isolationist budget could severely undercut our work for peace. 
The President has said that "America stands by those who take risks for 
peace." This is true in Northern Ireland, South Africa, the Middle East, 
and around the world.

For the Middle East peace process to continue--and for negotiations in 
other regions to succeed--we must have the resources to support the 
risk-takers. We cannot convince the holdouts from the peace process that 
we will stand behind a just and lasting settlement if we back away from 
our current commitments. That means maintaining aid to Israel, Egypt, 
and the Palestinians and fulfilling our pledge of debt relief to Jordan. 
In the Middle East, our vital security and economic interests are on the 
line. We must not fold our hands and leave the game to the opponents of 
peace just when we are on the verge of winning.

A neo-isolationist budget could throw away decades of investment in 
democracy. In the last 15 years, the number of democracies in the world 
has almost doubled and USAID provided assistance to most of the 
newcomers. For example, in Mozambique--a nation emerging from years of 
strife--USAID assistance helped register 6 million out of a possible 8 
million voters and turn the polling there into a success. Now--when 
these societies are most fragile--is not the time to cut this lifeline 
for democracy.

A neo-isolationist budget would directly damage our own livelihoods. Our 
economy depends on new markets for U.S. goods and high-paying jobs for 
American workers. That is why President Clinton led efforts to expand 
free trade with the landmark GATT agreement, NAFTA, and the free-trade 
agreements in the Asia-Pacific region and in the Americas. And this 
Administration has worked harder, I believe, than any other to promote 
American exports. Imagine, for example, where we would be without the 
Commerce Department's efforts on this score. Secretary Brown's staff 
worked with other agencies last year on export deals worth $46 billion 
for American businesses--deals that support 300,000 U.S. jobs.

In many cases, we were in a position to close deals because America had 
been engaged in those countries for years. Consider two statistics: 
USAID programs in some countries have helped increase life expectancy by 
a decade. Every year, USAID's immunization program saves 3 million 
lives. These are statistics not only of humanitarian hope; they are part 
of efforts to help create stable societies of consumers who want to buy 
our goods--not masses of victims in need of relief.

In addition, our support of the multilateral development banks also 
helps nations grow and their economies prosper. We contribute $1.8 
billion while other nations contribute $7 billion--and that capital 
leverages more than $40 billion in lending. If we stopped our 
contributions, we would lose our influence. And others might follow our 
lead, and that would cripple these important institutions.

The backdoor isolationists who claim they are saving America's money 
cannot see beyond the green of their own eyeshades: Our assistance has 
repaid itself hundreds and hundreds of times over. That was true when 
Marshall Plan aid resuscitated European markets after the war. And South 
Korea now imports annually U.S. goods worth three times as much as the 
assistance we provided over almost 30 years.

While we preserve our tradition of assistance, we are reforming its 
practice. USAID has become a laboratory for Vice President Gore's 
efforts to reinvent government--it is eliminating 27 overseas missions 
and cutting its workforce by 1,200.

Now, with the "New Partnership Initiative," we will improve our 
assistance programs even more, by focusing on the local level. This will 
enhance the efforts of non-governmental organizations and raise the 
percentage of our aid that is channeled to them to 40%. These 
organizations are on the ground and more responsive than distant 
national governments. This local focus, therefore, puts our resources to 
better use in helping nations so they can become self-sufficient.

Every one of us in this room knows that winning support for an activist 
foreign policy has never been easy in America.

Throughout the history of our Republic, Americans have never lived in 
literal isolation. In a world of instant communication and capital 
flows, we cannot do so now. That is not the issue, because literal 
isolationism is not an option.

What is at issue is whether we will have the policies and resources that 
can shape and support our involvement in ways that benefit our people in 
their daily lives--whether by opening markets or by preventing conflicts 
that could embroil us. It is at those times when our government failed 
to engage in such efforts that our people paid the greatest price--as in 
World War II, which followed a period of irresponsible American retreat.

The genius of our postwar leaders was to see that technology and 
American power had changed the world and that we must never again remain 
aloof. But they had a hard time winning support even with the memories 
of war still fresh.

As he put his case forward, President Truman had an uphill struggle. But 
a foreigner saw that it was America's moment to lead--and told us so. 
Winston Churchill stirred the nation with his appeal for an engaged 
foreign policy. Today, we remember his address as the Iron Curtain 
speech, but Churchill called it "The Sinews of Peace." The phrase plays 
on a saying of the Romans: "Money is the sinews of war." Churchill's 
message was that preserving peace--like waging war--demands resources.

Today, that message rings as true as ever. This is a moment of 
extraordinary hope for democracy and free markets. But nothing is 
inevitable. We must remain engaged. We must reach out, not retreat. 
American leadership in the world is not a luxury; it is a necessity. The 
price is worth paying. It is the price of keeping the tide of history 
running our way. (###)




ARTICLE 3:

Dual Engagement: U.S. Policy Toward Russia and China
James B. Steinberg, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Address to the Trilateral Commission 1995 Annual Meeting, Copenhagen, 
Denmark, April 24, 1995

During the Cold War, the fundamental structure of U.S. foreign policy 
was reasonably straightforward: We built strong security alliances and 
supported Western Europe and Japan's post-war economic and political 
reconstruction. This effort was motivated in part by our commitment to 
promote democratic values and open markets. But it also grew out of our 
need for strong partners to respond to the challenge posed by two 
powerful states--the Soviet Union and, later, China--whose ideology not 
only doomed their own people to repression and despair but also 
threatened our security and liberty.

Today, our challenge is different. The importance of our core alliances 
remains fundamental. But their purpose is no longer to contain or combat 
a common enemy. Rather, it is to work together to advance common 
interests and to meet a far more complex and diverse range of 
challenges. Russia and China are no longer our ideological or strategic 
adversaries. But, by virtue of their size, geography, and potential 
economic, political, and military power, they can still have a profound 
impact on the security and well-being of all our citizens--for good and 
for ill.

For this reason, Secretary of State Warren Christopher has identified 
the strengthening of productive relations with the world's leading 
powers as one of the core strategic principles guiding U.S. foreign 
policy. I need not dwell--before this audience--on the para- mount 
importance we place on making sure that the ties that bind the United 
States together with our European and Asian partners remain strong. 
These alliances are at the core of our foreign policy. Instead, today I 
want to discuss our strategy toward the two other leading powers--Russia 
and China--a strategy I might call, following humbly in the shadow of my 
predecessor and, now, colleague, Anthony Lake, "dual engagement."

As we approach the 21st century, Russia and China are both embarking on 
treacherous and, often, unpredictable paths of transformation in 
domestic as well as foreign policy. Russia has opted for the truly 
daunting course of building democracy and a market economy for a people 
who have never experienced either. China seeks to orient its economy 
away from centralized control to promote growth and prosperity while 
retaining an authoritarian political system. Both are struggling to 
define appropriate foreign, economic, and security policies, torn as 
they are between the often conflicting impulses of gaining the benefits 
of participating in Western and global institutions while protecting 
their as yet ill-defined national interests.

Our strategy of engagement with these countries takes into account both 
the similarities and differences in these two transformations. Before 
turning to our policy, let me take just a minute to provide a brief 
assessment of the changes taking place in each country.

Russia Today

Some three and a half years ago, the Russian people made a fundamental 
break with their own history by dismantling both the Soviet Union and 
the brutal communist system that kept it together. Today, the 
rudimentary foundations of a democratic government are in place, but 
they are buffeted daily by the stresses of an unprecedented and 
turbulent transition.

New elites and interest groups have joined an intense struggle for 
power, influence, and wealth that is fought increasingly but not 
exclusively within the bounds of a nascent constitutional and legal 
framework.

The unheralded everyday struggles of the average Russian are complicated 
by growing feelings of vulnerability and confusion. Rampant crime and 
corruption are leading some to equate democracy with disorder. Yet, 
while their craving for order has deepened, most Russians would not 
willingly abandon the new freedoms and opportunities brought by the end 
of communist rule.

To the surprise of nearly all observers, the liberalization and 
privatization of the Russian economy have proceeded at a dizzying pace. 
In 1994, the burgeoning private sector produced more than half of 
Russia's GDP. Russia's admittedly chaotic emerging market is being 
shaped today not solely by government decree, but by the combined forces 
of some 2,500 commercial banks, 600 investment funds, and 40 million 
private shareholders.

The path of economic change still faces serious obstacles. Private 
property is emerging faster than the legal framework needed to guarantee 
its sanctity. New owners, managers, and investors must contend with 
punishing taxation, widespread crime and extortion, and bouts of high 
inflation and currency instability. In the face of constant pressures on 
the Russian Government to provide wasteful subsidies, the recent 
agreement with the IMF creates a sound basis on which Russia can 
continue down the essential path of reform and budget discipline.

The collapse of the U.S.S.R.'s internal and external empires has left a 
vacuum in Russia's foreign policy. Without question, history and 
geography will tug Russia's leaders in predictable--and sometimes 
dangerous--directions. But Russia is in the midst of a profound debate 
about its real national interests.

The Russians have honored their commitments to withdraw their forces 
from Central Europe and the Baltic states and have pursued a moderate 
and largely pragmatic stance toward Ukraine. But they must also decide 
whether--as in the case of arms sales and nuclear exports--they will 
continue to place short-term, economic advantages over Russia's enduring 
security interests as well as its international obligations. It is 
unclear whether Russia will respect the security, independence, and 
sovereignty of all the states of the former Soviet Union while it 
pursues its declared goal of CIS integration. The signs thus far are 
mixed.

The increasingly assertive tone of Russia's leaders on a whole range of 
foreign policy issues stands in sharp contrast to the intense weakness 
of today's Russian state. The Yeltsin government's disastrous policy in 
Chechnya may well have been, in part, a misguided attempt to counter 
perceptions of this weakness. The greatest risk in the near term is not 
that Russia may reconstitute its global military potential but, rather, 
that a beleaguered Russia would be increasingly vulnerable to the 
insecurities and nationalism that have fed Russia's dangerous isolation 
in previous eras.

In addition to a series of real and imagined threats from the south, 
Russia must also contend with the prospect of being isolated between 
what Duma Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Vladimir Lukin has 
described as "two Europes"--the Europe of the European Union, which may 
soon embrace most of Central Europe and East-Central Europe, and the 
Europe to Russia's east--the rapidly modernizing, democratic countries 
of Asia.

China Today

China is undergoing a remarkable transformation, growing over the past 
15 years from a rigid, ideologically driven state, proud but mired in 
poverty, to a rapidly developing, more outward-oriented country with 
great hopes for the future.

Economic modernization has been accompanied by immense problems-- 
massive economic and human dislocations, serious corruption, a 
leadership distanced from its people and grounded in an outmoded party 
structure, and a military that is concerned about the prospect of public 
disorder.

But with its double-digit economic growth rates, its military 
modernization, and its growing activism abroad, China's Government 
conveys a sense of substantial--some might say excessive--self-
confidence. In most other Asian nations, the reaction has been a growing 
sense of unease.

There is a broad consensus within the Chinese elite on enhancing the 
P.R.C.'s prestige and influence. But the ongoing process of leadership 
succession will produce new uncertainties and the possibility of 
instability. Any likely successors, confident as they may be about long-
term historical trends, will be guided by their view of China's history. 
They will recall not only the hyperinflation and social disorder earlier 
in this century but also the numerous political campaigns China endured, 
including the Cultural Revolution. Just as they likely will seek a 
stable international environment, they will continue to fear dissent and 
unrest at home, attaching a level of importance to maintaining order and 
preserving their control that may well exceed our understanding as well 
as the broadly based principles of human rights--as at Tiananmen Square 
in   June 1989.

Lacking a credible ideological appeal, China's leaders emphasize 
nationalistic themes to mobilize support. To all appearances, they are 
having some success. Mao's words on the eve of victory in 1949 still 
resonate: "Ours will no longer be a nation subject to insults and 
humiliation. We have stood up."

Engaging Russia and China as Great Powers

Our policy toward these two important countries is not driven by a 
desire to balance one against the other but by our conviction that 
engagement with both is in our interest. Some recommend that we base our 
relations with Russia and China on classical balance of power 
considerations. They would take it as a given that Russia is doomed to 
authoritarianism at home and expansionism abroad and that Confucian 
culture and Middle Kingdom syndromes will hinder China's emergence as a 
constructive, democratic partner.

We reject such notions of geopolitical and cultural predetermination. We 
know that many of the forces shaping Russia's and China's destiny are 
beyond our capacity to influence. We recognize that the future of both 
countries is uncertain. But we do believe it is within our collective 
capabilities to help shape their choices in directions compatible with 
our interests and our values. It would be not only self-defeating but 
irresponsible to forego this historic opportunity to sustain the 
constructive relations we now have with both these nations.

The United States has a fundamental interest in cooperating with Russia 
where possible--under whatever regime--on such vital security issues as 
arms control, regional conflicts, and global non-proliferation. We also 
have to manage the differences--sometimes quite significant--that we do 
have. This "pragmatic policy of engagement," as Secretary Christopher 
has termed it, has produced real dividends for the people of the United 
States, our allies, and the world. The ongoing process of nuclear 
reduction and measures to safeguard nuclear materials are but one, 
albeit central, example. This approach is the basis for the regular 
meetings between our two Presidents, such as the summit we will hold 
following the V-E commemoration next month in Moscow.

We have important issues at stake with Russia that President Clinton 
will pursue at the Moscow summit. He will emphasize our strong 
opposition to Russia's proposed Iranian nuclear reactor sale, which 
poses a direct threat not only to our security and to stability in the 
Middle East, but to Russia's security  as well. He will continue to 
press for speedy Russian ratification of the  Start II Treaty as well as 
for full Russian compliance with various arms control obligations, 
including the CFE Treaty.

We do not underestimate the risks and challenges Russia faces during the 
transition period. Many of Moscow's most critical foreign policy 
dilemmas lie in sensitive areas close to home. Our engagement--indeed, 
the engagement of all the nations represented in this organization--can 
help bring Russia to pursue its interests in ways consistent with 
international norms.

Our policy of comprehensive engagement with China has created a 
foundation for building constructive ties in a way that the U.S.-P.R.C. 
relationship of 25 years ago could not. That earlier relationship 
enhanced the security of both countries, but it was essentially one-
dimensional. Only after China adopted its reform policy in the late 
1970s and after its emergence as a less ideological state did a more 
broad-ranging relationship based on pragmatic self-interest become 
possible.

Still, the P.R.C.'s transformation into a non-revolutionary state did 
not necessarily mean China would become a status quo power or--as we can 
see-- a democracy. In fact, China's growing military power means that 
China's own strategic orientation has become an important issue for the 
future.

We do not assume that China harbors hegemonic ambitions or that it will 
become a "rival" or "threat" to our interests in the region. China can 
become a force for stability in that region. At the same time, China 
could choose a course that poses dangers to its neighbors.

In the South China Sea region and in the case of Taiwan, for example, 
although it espouses a peaceful course,  Beijing has stated that it is 
prepared to use force--if challenged--to support its extensive claims of 
sovereignty. Today, the issue of China's long-term role arises with 
increasing frequency in our conversations with Asians--as often at their 
initiative as ours.

Of course, China's reach goes beyond its immediate neighborhood. The 
P.R.C.'s cooperation will be critical, for example, to prevent the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. 
Beijing may now be willing to forgo export of any MTCR-class missiles 
and related technology and equipment. But its record is mixed at best, 
and questions remain about China's past activities. Moreover, China's 
cooperation with Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear energy programs as 
well as with Iran's nuclear efforts cause us deep concern.

An important dividend of our engagement strategy has been the renewal of 
U.S.-P.R.C. dialogue on a range of proliferation-related issues in 
addition to our ongoing productive consultations on North Korea. We 
believe that these dialogues, as well as other conversations, including 
nascent regional security dialogues such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and 
the Northeast Asia Security Dialogue can help assure that concerns are 
openly addressed rather than letting them fester behind a facade of 
politesse.

The Case for Promoting Russia's Integration

As we deal with China's and Russia's foreign policies, we are not 
indifferent to internal political developments. This is not simply 
because we are troubled by repressive practices on human rights grounds 
alone--although we are deeply concerned by them--but also because we 
believe there are important linkages between what happens internally and 
how nations behave externally.

This explains why there is an important difference in our approach to 
Russia and China. While we seek to engage both countries across a broad 
spectrum of issues, Russia's courageous decision to opt for democracy 
and its commitment to respect international norms open the door to a 
strategy of integration into Western institutions. Russia's membership 
in the NACC; its expanding relationship with such economic institutions 
as the OECD; and, above all, its participation in the political 
dimension of the G-7 summits--through what we call the G-7-plus-1--have 
become possible by virtue of the political and economic freedom that 
Russia has embraced. As Russia moves further down the path   of reform, 
we will support its fuller integration into the West.

Russia's integration into European security structures is an important 
element of our overall strategy. The United States and our NATO allies 
have charted a vision of an undivided Europe and an important role for 
Russia within an overall European security structure. This structure 
includes a strengthened OSCE and a closer relationship between Russia 
and NATO, both through the Partnership for Peace and through enhanced 
NATO-Russia links. We believe the most appropriate next step for Russia 
in developing this relationship is by implementing its Individual 
Partnership Program and the separate document on NATO-Russian ties.

Despite the urging of some, we do not rule out a priori that Russia, 
like any other member of PFP, might, one day, join NATO. At the same 
time, it is reasonable to examine, as many Russians themselves have 
done, whether this is the most appropriate way for Russia to participate 
in the overall European security structure, given its size and 
geographical situation astride two continents. For now, the question is 
open, and it will be a long time at best before Russia's transformation 
is sufficiently assured to make this issue ripe for NATO's members. As 
Secretary Christopher has said, each potential member "will be judged 
individually, according to the strength of its democratic institutions 
and its capacity to contribute to NATO's goals."  Meanwhile, the 
Partnership for Peace has enduring value, both for those who may become 
members of NATO and those who follow a different course.

The predicate for broadening and deepening this process of integration 
is Russia's continued pursuit of economic, political, and foreign policy 
reform. The Russian Government's use of excessive and indiscriminate 
force against the people of Chechnya is inconsistent with the 
international code of conduct it endorsed at last December's OSCE summit 
in Budapest. For the United States, this was a factor in deciding 
against supporting an enhanced role for Russia at the G-7 summit in 
Halifax.

Despite the questions raised by Chechnya, we believe that democracy is 
very much alive in Russia. Indeed, the ability of Russia's independent 
media and those both on the right and the left to criticize President 
Yeltsin and the Chechnya operation is a healthy sign. President Clinton 
has made clear the importance we place on upholding the democratic 
process in Russia--in particular, this fall's parliamentary elections 
and next year's presidential contest.

In contrast, the leadership of China continues to resist democratization 
and has only slowly and reluctantly embraced international norms. The 
President's decision to continue to advance human rights and 
democratization, even as he severed the linkage with China's MFN, was 
based on the belief that observance of these principles is the only 
reliable assurance that over time China's behavior abroad---as well as 
at home--will be grounded in the rule of law and not the whim of 
individual leaders. One test of China's ability to make this transition 
will come in its handling of the reversion of Hong Kong in 1997.

In the economic arena, China's behavior has generated mixed signals 
about its willingness to abide by international rules, including the 
terms on which it could enter the WTO. One helpful sign is that, while 
negotiations with the United States over protection of intellectual 
property rights were resolved only at the last minute under threat of 
retaliation, we are seeing growing, if tentative, indications that the 
agreement is being implemented.

Conclusion 

In dealing with both Russia and China, our focus must be on the long run 
and on providing positive support to the forces of reform. While we feel 
deep frustration at our limited progress in securing human rights in 
China and ending the fighting in Chechnya, we must make sure that the 
response we adopt will help achieve our goal. It is tempting to cut off 
assistance to Russia in protest over Chechnya. But we need to ask 
whether it serves our interests to cut off the funds that are helping to 
dismantle Russia's nuclear arsenal, or are supporting privatization, 
legal reform, and freedom of the press.

The United States, along with our allies, has an immense stake in the 
way we manage our relationships with Russia and China. Although much has 
changed since the end of the Cold War, one fundamental fact has not: Our 
ultimate success depends on the close cooperation of the world's great 
industrial democracies.

Whatever course Russia and China finally pursue, we know that none of us 
can assure our security or prosperity alone. President Clinton has made 
clear his commitment to keeping the United States engaged in the world 
and maintaining our partnership with our key allies--principles which 
have guided the work of this distinguished organization from its 
inception. (###)




ARTICLE 4:

Patterns of Global Terrorism
Text of Introduction from Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1994 released by 
the Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 
Washington, DC, April 1995.

Terrorism continued to menace civil  society in 1994. Although 
international terrorism declined worldwide, there was an upsurge of 
attacks by Islamic extremist groups, including many aimed at undermining 
the Middle East peace process. The Clinton Administration increased 
cooperative efforts with many nations to reduce the threat of terrorism.

Examples of serious acts of international terrorism in 1994 were: 

--  The bombing of a Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires in July that 
killed nearly 100 persons. 
--  The hijacking in December of an Air France jet by the Algerian Armed 
Islamic Group, who are waging a massive campaign of terrorism against 
Algerians and foreigners in Algeria. 
--  Attacks against foreign tourists by Islamic radicals in Egypt and by 
the PKK in Turkey. 
--  The bombing of a Panamanian commuter aircraft that killed 21 
persons.

Extremists opposed to the Arab- Israeli peace process dramatically 
increased the scale and frequency of their attacks in Israel, the West 
Bank, and Gaza. More than 100 civilians died in these attacks in 1994.

The pattern of terrorism in 1994  reflects a trend in recent years of a 
decline in attacks by secular terrorist groups and an increase in 
terrorist activities by radical Islamic groups. These groups are a small 
minority in the Islamic world, and most Islamic countries, as well as 
the Organization  of the Islamic Conference, have condemned religious 
extremism and violence. Nevertheless, terrorism in Islamic guise is a 
problem for established governments in the Middle East and a threat to 
the Arab-Israeli peace process.

There have been important positive developments as well in the fight 
against international terrorism: 

--  Two radical Arab regimes long involved in sponsoring and supporting 
terrorism in the Middle East--Libya and Iraq--are isolated. 
--  Iran, while still a major state sponsor of terrorism, is under 
considerable economic pressure. 
--  The old Soviet Union, once a protector of radical terrorist states 
and organizations, is gone. 
--  The conflicts in Northern Ireland and South Africa, regarded in the 
past as intractable, have also yielded to processes of peaceful 
settlement, and the main protagonists have halted the use of terror and 
violence as political weapons. 
--  Counterterrorism and law enforcement cooperation among nations has 
grown, increasing the pressure on terrorists, and there is a growing 
international consensus that terrorism is beyond the pale. 
--  The Arab-Israeli conflict, which has bred much terror and violence, 
has taken a historic turn toward resolution. Israel and the PLO have 
concluded an agreement on interim self-government in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip. Jordan has followed Egypt in making peace with Israel; other 
Arab states are establishing contacts with Israel; and Syria and Israel 
are engaged in a process of negotiations. Nevertheless, those opposed to 
the peace process dramatically increased their rear-guard terrorist 
campaigns in Israel and the West Bank and Gaza aimed at destroying the 
process.

U.S. counterterrorism policy follows three general rules: 

--  First, do not make deals with terrorists or submit to blackmail. We 
have found over the years that this policy works. 
--  Second, treat terrorists as criminals and apply the rule of law. 
--  Third, bring maximum pressure on states that sponsor and support 
terrorists by imposing economic, diplomatic, and political sanctions and 
urging other states to do likewise.

Because terrorism is a global problem, the Clinton Administration is 
deeply engaged in cooperation with other governments in an international 
effort to combat terrorism: 

--  U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies have an active 
network of cooperative relations with counterparts in scores of friendly 
countries. 
--  The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the Department  
of State conducts consultations on counterterrorism with many other   
governments. There are similar consultations in the G-7 and the European 
Union. 
--  There are now 11 treaties and conventions that commit signatories to 
combat various terrorist crimes. The United States urges governments 
that have not signed and ratified these to do so promptly. 
--  The Department of State's antiterrorism training assistance program 
has trained over 15,000 law enforcement personnel from more   than 80 
countries over 10 years in counterterrorism techniques. 
--  The United States and other nations fund an active counterterrorism 
research and development program that strengthens our capability in such 
areas as plastic explosives detection. 
--  Finally, the United States offers rewards of up to $2 million for 
information that leads to the prevention or favorable resolution of a 
terrorist attack against U.S. citizens.

Civilized people everywhere are outraged by terrorist crimes. The scars 
are long lasting, and there is no recompense for victims. But terrorists 
are a small minority, whose crimes, deadly as they are, cannot be 
allowed to intimidate the forces of peace and democracy. The message to 
terrorists from Americans and other free people and nations is that we 
are strong, vigilant, and determined to defeat terrorism.

Legislative Requirements

This report is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United 
States Code, Section 2656f(a), which requires the Department of State to 
provide Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for 
those countries and groups meeting the criteria of Section (a)(1) and 
(2) of the Act. As required by legislation, the report includes detailed 
assessments of foreign countries where significant terrorist acts 
occurred and countries about which Congress was notified during the 
preceding five years pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export 
Administration Act of 1979 (the so-called terrorism list countries that 
have repeatedly provided state support for international terrorism). In 
addition, the report includes all relevant information about the 
previous year's activities of individuals, terrorist groups, or umbrella 
groups under which such terrorist groups fall known to be responsible 
for the kidnaping or death of any American citizen during the preceding 
five years, as well as groups known to be financed by state sponsors of 
terrorism.

Definitions

No one definition of terrorism has gained universal acceptance. For the 
purposes of this report, however, we have chosen the definition of 
terrorism contained in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 
2656f(d). That statute contains the following definitions: 

--  The term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated 
violence perpetrated against noncombatant* targets by subnational groups 
or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. 
--  The term "international terrorism" means terrorism involving 
citizens or the territory of more than one country. 
--  The term "terrorist group'' means any group that practices or has 
significant subgroups that practice international terrorism.

The U.S. Government has employed this definition of terrorism for 
statistical and analytical purposes since 1983. In a number of 
countries, domestic terrorism or an active insurgency has a greater 
impact on the level of political violence than does international 
terrorism. Although not the primary purpose of this report, we have 
attempted to indicate those areas where this is the case.

Note

Adverse mention in this report of individual members of any political, 
social, ethnic, religious, or national group is not meant to imply that 
all members of that group are terrorists. Indeed, terrorists represent a 
small minority of dedicated, often fanatical, individuals in most such 
groups. It is that small group--and their actions--that is the subject 
of this report.

Furthermore, terrorist acts are part of a larger phenomenon of 
politically inspired violence and, at times, the line between the two 
can become difficult to draw. To relate terrorist events to the larger 
context and to give a feel for the conflicts that spawn violence, this 
report will discuss terrorist acts as well as other violent incidents 
that are not necessarily international terrorism.

*For purposes of this definition, the term ''noncombatant'' is 
interpreted to include, in addition to civilians, military personnel who 
at the time of the incident are unarmed and/or not on duty. For example, 
in past reports we have listed as terrorist incidents the murders of the 
following U.S. military personnel: Col. James Rowe, killed in Manila in 
April 1989; Capt. William Nordeen, U.S. defense attache killed in Athens 
in June 1988; the two servicemen killed in the La Belle disco bombing in 
West Berlin in April 1986; and the four off-duty U.S. Embassy Marine 
guards killed in a cafe in El Salvador in June 1985. We also consider as 
acts of terrorism attacks on military installations or on armed military 
personnel when a state of military hostilities does not exist at the 
site, such as bombings against U.S. bases in Europe, the Philippines, or 
elsewhere.  

Single copies of Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1994 are available from 
the Public Information Division, Bureau of Public Affairs, Room 5827, 
Department of State, Washington, DC 20520-6811.

Electronic distribution of the full report is available on the Internet 
and through GPO's Federal Bulletin Board. 

On the Internet via gopher to dosfan.lib.uic.edu, the report can be 
found under "Publications and Major Reports" and also under 
"GlobalAffairs/Coordinator for Countererrorism". On the Federal Bulletin 
Board (202-512-1387), the report   can be found in the Department of 
State Terrorism Library under Global Issues. (###)




ARTICLE 5:

U.S.-Cuba Joint Statement on Migration
Released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, 
DC, May 2, 1995.

The United States of America and the Republic of Cuba have reached 
agreement on steps to normalize further their migration relationship. 
These steps build upon the September 9, 1994, agreement and seek to 
address safety and humanitarian concerns and to ensure that migration 
between the countries is safe, legal, and orderly.

Humanitarian Parole

The United States and the Republic of Cuba recognize the special 
circumstances of Cuban migrants currently at Guantanamo Bay. 
Accordingly, the two governments have agreed that the process of 
humanitarian parole into the United States should continue beyond those 
eligible for parole under existing criteria. The two governments agree 
that if the United States carries out such paroles, it may count them 
toward meeting the minimum number     of Cubans it is committed to admit 
every year pursuant to the September 9, 1994, agreement. Up to 5,000 
such paroles may be counted toward meeting the minimum number in any 
one-year period beginning September 9, 1995, regardless of when the 
migrants are paroled into the United States.

Safety of Life at Sea

The United States and the Republic of Cuba reaffirm their common 
interest in preventing unsafe departures from Cuba. Effective 
immediately, Cuban migrants intercepted at sea by the United States and 
attempting to enter the United States will be taken to Cuba. Similarly, 
migrants found to have entered Guantanamo illegally also will be 
returned to Cuba. The United States and the Republic of Cuba will 
cooperate jointly in this effort. All actions taken will be consistent 
with the parties' international obligations. Migrants taken to Cuba will 
be informed by United States officials    about procedures to apply for 
legal admission to the United States at the U.S. Interests Section in 
Havana.

The United States and the Republic of Cuba will ensure that no action is 
taken against those migrants returned to Cuba as a consequence of their 
attempt to immigrate illegally. Both parties will work together to 
facilitate the procedures necessary to implement these measures. The 
United States and the Republic of Cuba agree to the return to Cuba of 
Cuban nationals currently at Guantanamo who are ineligible for admission 
to the United States.

September 9, 1994 Agreement

The United States and the Republic of Cuba agree that the provisions of 
the September 9, 1994, agreement remain in effect, except as modified by 
the present joint statement. In particular, both sides reaffirm their 
joint commitment to take steps to prevent unsafe departures from Cuba 
which risk loss of human life and to oppose acts of violence associated 
with illegal immigration.(###)




ARTICLE 6

Department Statements

Cuban Dissident Sentenced to 15 Years
Statement by Department Spokesman Nicholas Burns, Washington, DC, April 
24, 1995.

The United States deplores the harsh prison sentence meted out to Cuban 
human rights leader Francisco Chaviano, President of the National 
Council for Civil Rights in Cuba.  This case, from the questionable 
circumstances of Mr. Chaviano's arrest, through his detention for almost 
a year without formal charges to the hastily called closed military 
tribunal that tried and sentenced him to 15 years' imprisonment 
epitomized the lack of the rule of law and due process in Cuba.  It is 
especially telling that the full weight of the Cuban state has been 
brought against an individual who has courageously championed the cause 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

 We call on the Cuban Government either to dismiss the charges against 
Mr. Chaviano and release him or to present the charges in open court in 
accordance with internationally recognized standards of jurisprudence, 
including representation by a lawyer of his own choosing, access to the 
evidence against him, and the capability to present exculpatory evidence 
and witnesses in his own defense.  We also call on the Cuban Government 
to allow international human rights organizations to visit with Mr. 
Chaviano.

Zaire: Troika Demarche to Political Leadership
Statement by Department Spokesman Nicholas Burns, Washington, DC, April 
24, 1995.

The governments of the United States, France, and Belgium are deeply 
disturbed by the evolution of the political situation in Zaire.

After prolonged political consultations in 1993, all parties to the 
transition in Zaire agreed in 1994 on the terms of the transition to the 
Third Republic.  The Transition Constitutional Act established the 
responsibilities of the major institutions of the Zairian State to 
manage the transition in a spirit of cooperation.  The Act was intended 
to foster democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and 
economic recovery in Zaire, and, at the outset, it inspired hope and 
received the support of the international community, but since the 
formation of the Kengo government in July 1994,  the functioning of the 
institutions--indeed, the entire transition--has often been hampered, in 
violation of the spirit of the Transition Constitutional Act.  As a 
result, legislation critical to the advance toward democracy-- including 
reform of the provincial administration and the establishment of an 
independent electoral commission --remains blocked in Zaire's Transition 
Parliament.

The governments of the U.S., France, and Belgium are all disturbed by 
these developments.  Instead of seeking a consensus which might favor 
Zaire's recovery, certain forces have created conflict and placed 
obstacles in the path of the progress of the transition.  Those who 
obstruct Zaire's transition must understand that they are leading the 
country into political impasse and economic and social decline.  This 
will only heighten the suffering already endured by the Zairian people 
and result in a renewed period of diplomatic isolation.

The three governments have just concluded demarches on the Zairian 
political leadership.  We call upon all parties to respect the terms of 
the Transition Constitutional Act, to move forward with legislation to 
advance the transition, to cease tactics of obstruction, and to work 
together in good faith to bring democracy to Zaire.(###)

[END OF DISPATCH VOL. 6, NO. 19]

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