U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH 
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 18, MAY 1, 1995 
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
 
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE: 
 
1. Strengthening Democracy and Advancing Economic Reform in Brazil--
President Clinton, Brazilian President Cardoso 
2. American Leadership in the Post-Cold War World--Deputy Secretary 
Talbott 
3. Focus on the United Nations: UN Peacekeeping Operations  
4. Supporting the Economic Mission of the Department of State--Joan 
Spero, David Ruth 
5. U.S.-Australia Joint Communique 
 
 
ARTICLE 1 
 
Strengthening Democracy and Advancing Economic Reform in Brazil 
President Clinton, Brazilian President Cardoso 
Opening remarks at press conference following meeting, Washington, DC, 
April 20, 1995 
 
President Clinton. Good afternoon. Please be seated. I am delighted to 
welcome President Cardoso to the White House. For many years, he has 
been one of the great leaders of the Americas. Although he was only 
inaugurated in January, President Cardoso has been a fighter for 
democracy throughout his life. He opposed the forces of authoritarianism 
at great personal risk to himself. More recently, he led the battle for 
economic reform--during his years as Finance Minister--to reduce 
inflation, establish growth, and help Brazil fulfill the tremendous 
promise of its people and its land. 
 
Today, the President told me about his economic and constitution reform 
efforts, which are essential to placing Brazil on the path of 
sustainable development. I have every confidence in the President's 
ability to strengthen Brazilian democracy and to advance the visionary 
economic reforms he began as Finance Minister. Brazil played a key role 
in forging the historic agreement at last year's Summit of the Americas. 
Today, President Cardoso and I discussed how we could build on that 
success. We also discussed bilateral trade issues, and we reaffirmed our 
commitments to open our markets to each other's products. With 160 
million consumers, Brazil is one of today's biggest emerging markets, 
and it offers great opportunity for Americans. 
 
We know that one of the ways we will do this is to realize our common 
commitment to achieve a free trade area of the Americas by the year 
2005. We have instructed Ambassador Kantor and Foreign Minister Lampreia 
to review trade relations between our nations--as well as those between 
the NAFTA and the MERCOSUR countries--to consider ways to expand the 
flow of goods and capital between our nations. One step will be the 
first meeting this June of the U.S.-Brazil Business Development Council, 
which will bring together private sector leaders to increase investment 
and trade in both our nations. 
 
On security issues, we had a very good discussion about the need to 
stand firm together against terrorism. We reviewed the effort by the Rio 
Protocol guarantors to find a lasting solution to the conflict between 
Peru and Ecuador over their borders. Progress has been made in 
implementing a cease-fire; now, we must find an enduring settlement. I 
congratulate, again, President Cardoso on his outstanding leadership in 
helping to resolve this conflict, and the United States has been proud 
to have Americans working with Brazilians there to try to make sure we 
bring the conflict to a satisfactory conclusion. 
 
Let me say, finally, that we also reviewed our common efforts against 
narcotics and money laundering. We agreed to begin a dialogue on 
protecting the environment. U.S. aid funds will be increased this year 
to try to assist that effort in Brazil, and our governments will 
exchange ideas on reforming international financial institutions to meet 
the challenges of the 21st century. 
 
I must say, I was especially impressed by the ideas that President 
Cardoso and the members of administration--his administration--have 
shared with us on the changes we need to make in the international 
institutions so that we can get the benefit of the globally integrated 
markets that we all want to benefit from without having too much 
instability undermine the march to progress. 
 
With our two great nations cooperating as never before, we stand at a 
moment of unparalleled opportunity. We must now seize it, and we will 
seize it. We will promote democracy. We will advance prosperity. We will 
do it together. In the months and years ahead, I look forward to working 
with President Cardoso to forge an even stronger partnership between our 
nations and our people. We should do it, it is in our interest to do it, 
and it is the right thing for our hemisphere and for the world to do it.  
Thank you, Mr. President. 
 

President Cardoso. Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: It was a great 
honor to be received by President Bill Clinton today. I know that this 
is a day of grief for this country, and I take this opportunity to 
extend to all Americans the solidarity of the Brazilian people. To you, 
President Clinton, I convey a personal message of support and 
encouragement. Mr. President, I repeat what I said this morning: In my 
view, this terrorist act affects not only America. It affects all of us 
who believe in peace and democracy and in freedom for all. During our 
meeting, I had a chance to express to you my personal friendship and the 
admiration that Brazil has for his permanent commitment to the cause of 
peace, prosperity, and democracy. 
 
I had the privilege of meeting President Clinton during the Miami 
summit--his initiative that he revealed, his statesmanship, and his 
vision of a better future for the Americas. 
 
Today, as we discussed the prospects for our hemisphere, I had the 
chance to assure him that the same spirit of cooperation that guided my 
country during the works of the summit will keep guiding us in 
implementing its results. 
 
I had also the chance to bring to the American people the message of a 
country that went through deep transformations and that, today, presents 
itself to the world as a solid democracy, a strong economy, and a 
vigorous and free society. This new country is a natural partner of the 
U.S., and I stressed to President Clinton that the time is right for the 
design of a new affirmative agenda that will bring our two countries 
even closer together. 
 
I must say that it was really highly impressive--the kind words by 
President Clinton and the spirit of our discussions. We have so many 
values in common. We have a similar political will. We have the support 
of our people to work together in reaffirming our commitment to reforms, 
to bring to our countries better conditions of life, and to go ahead 
with democracy. 
 
I would like to add, Mr. President, that Brazil will support also the 
effort, under the umbrella of the Organization of American States, 
toward democracy and the specific program you referred to; Brazil will 
be always open in discussing the international financial issues; and 
Brazil is ready to assume more responsibilities at the world level in 
order to go ahead with the programs of peacekeeping and to do the best 
of our effort to really keep a world of peace. 
 
Already in this context of this new agenda, Ambassador Lampreia, as you 
said, and Ambassador Kantor are being instructed to prepare a study of 
trade relations between Brazil and the United States with the objective 
of improving the flow of goods, services, and capital between our 
countries. In this same area, we agreed that the first meeting of the 
Brazil-U.S. Business Development Council shall take place in Denver this 
June--co-chaired by Ambassador Lampreia and by Secretary Brown--in 
bringing together private sector representatives. I am confident that 
this first meeting will be a very important opportunity to increase even 
further the economic relations between our two countries. 
 
In the discussion of the main themes of the international agenda, I 
expressed to President Clinton my view that the same democratic values 
that had proven its strength with the end of the Cold War should now 
guide us in the effort of building a new international order. 
 
Democracy should be the cornerstone, not only inside each society, but 
also among nations. This is the guideline that Brazil will follow in the 
meetings in which the revision of the San Francisco charter will be 
discussed. 
 
I also had the chance to express to President Clinton our long-standing 
commitment to the cause of non-proliferation and peace. This commitment 
has a very concrete translation in our decision to ratify and fully 
implement the Tlatelolco agreement, and also in the creation of the 
Brazilian Space Agency--in our commitment by the executive branch to 
abide by the MTCR guidelines in the approval of the Quadrapartheid 
Nuclear Safeguards Agreement. 
 
The very positive working meeting that I had the privilege to hold this 
morning with President Clinton is only a first step taken toward the 
strengthening of a new relationship that, built upon a solid base of 
shared values, will be decisive to make real the dream of a prosperous, 
fair, and free hemisphere for all of us.  (###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 2 
 
American Leadership in the Post-Cold War World 
Deputy Secretary Talbott 
Remarks to the Foreign Policy Association, New York City, April 24,1995 
 
Thanks, Mr. Ross--both for that kind introduction and for giving  me the 
opportunity to be here this evening. It is especially pleasant to see my 
friend and colleague, John Temple Swing, who has contributed so much 
over the years to sensible and careful discourse about foreign policy--
and, therefore, to sensible foreign policy itself.  
 
I know that, in recent months, this group has heard from several of my 
friends in the Administration. Bill Perry has spoken to you about 
security and non-proliferation on the Indian subcontinent; Jeff Garten 
has laid out for you our efforts to increase American access to the 
world's big emerging markets; and Dennis Ross has addressed the Middle 
East peace process.   
 
This evening, I'd like simultaneously to step back and look forward--
taking a somewhat broader  look at the underlying principles and 
overarching goals of U.S. foreign policy. In brief, I want to talk with 
you about the future of American leadership in world affairs.  
 
First, though, I should put this subject in the context of recent 
history. Over the past decade, the world has changed dramatically and, 
mostly, for the better. I say mostly for the better because there are 
many places around the globe where misery and brutality still dominate. 
The Balkans and Central Africa are only the most egregiously afflicted. 
Still, even reserving compassion and outrage for the bad news, we should 
recognize that there is plenty of good news. We live in an era that is 
marked by triumphs of the human spirit: the collapse of the Berlin Wall 
in 1989 and the fall of the Soviet Empire in 1991; the handshakes for 
peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors in 1993; and the end of 
apartheid in South Africa in 1994. 
 
During this same period, there have been many quieter but equally hard-
won and promising examples of progress. Nations from El Salvador to 
Ethiopia to Cambodia have moved from dictatorship to democracy; 
countries from Argentina to India to China have moved toward open 
markets. Open markets are conducive to open societies, and open 
societies are conducive to basic political freedoms and to more peaceful 
international relations. 
 
American statesmen--both Democrats and Republicans, in both the 
executive and legislative branches of our government--have played an 
important, often essential part in creating what is essentially a better 
world. But we can't rest; the work is not done. Now more than ever, the 
world looks to our country for leadership. Now more than ever, the 
rewards for our providing that leadership abroad will be realized here 
at home. We face historic opportunities, not just to combat threats and 
enemies, but also to build a world that reflects our ideals and promotes 
our interests--a world that will be more prosperous and more secure not 
only for our generation, but for our children's as well. 
 
But while we have a great national opportunity for international 
leadership, we do not yet have the necessary national consensus about 
how to seize that opportunity. Instead, once again, for at least the 
third time in this century, we face a great national debate--a debate 
over America's role in the world and over what it takes to play the role 
we should. The first two such debates came after the two world wars. 
This one comes after the end of the Cold War. For that debate to lead 
us, ultimately, to make the right decisions and to make the right 
policies, it must take place not just inside the Washington beltway, or 
on the floor of the U.S. Congress, or on the campaign trail in 1996, 
which, of course, is already officially open to traffic; it must also 
take place at gatherings such as this one.  
 
Today, in the aftermath of the Cold War, just as in the aftermath of 
other great struggles in our nation's history, there is a temptation to 
draw back into ourselves, to devote all our attention and resources to 
fixing our own problems--a temptation to let other countries fend for 
themselves. This temptation is particularly evident in Congress, where 
there are those, in both parties, who imply that we should duck--not 
deal with--the international challenges of our era. This sentiment 
echoes that of the short-sighted naysayers of the 1920s: the wrong-
headed patriots who rejected the League of Nations; embraced 
protectionism; downplayed the rise of Mussolini, Hitler, and Stalin; and 
opposed help to the victims of aggression and inadvertently endangered 
our security, chanting all the while the crowd-pleasing mantra "America 
first." 
 
Arguments that would turn the American eagle into an ostrich have always 
had a certain appeal: in part because we are separated by vast oceans 
from Europe, Asia, and Africa; in part because we have long been at 
peace with our immediate neighbors on this continent; and in part 
because of our founding fathers' advice to avoid foreign entanglements. 
 
Fortunately, for the United States and the world, the leaders of the 
great coalition that won the Second World War learned several of the 
lessons from the aftermath of World War I: The American statesmen of the 
late 1940s and early 1950s resisted and rejected isolationism and 
embraced internationalism instead. Through the Marshall Plan, GATT, and 
the international financial institutions born at Bretton Woods, the 
diplomats who were present at the creation of the post-World War II 
world established the basis for a community of Western democracies and 
for an increasingly interdependent and prosperous global economy. They 
also created a mechanism to further the cause of enduring peace through 
the United Nations Charter--a document inspired by American ideals and 
largely written by American statesmen. 
 
Now it is natural that internationalism is more likely to resonate with 
the public mood when there is a clear-cut enemy such as Soviet 
communism. During the Cold War, much of what we were for was dictated by 
what we were against. The imperative of containing communism permeated 
our policies. We formed alliances to defend against Soviet expansion; we 
reached into our pockets for foreign aid to maintain our influence 
against the encroachments of the Red Menace in what we used to call the 
Third World; and we countered hard-eyed, stubborn, central-casting 
Soviet diplomats on every issue and in every forum. 
 
Now the Cold War is over, and with its end, we face a resurgence--here 
on the home front--of those old temptations and delusions that got the 
better of us in the 1920s. In short, the isolationist instinct is 
twitching again in the American body politic. It is twitching in calls 
for us to reject free trade agreements or to keep our distance from 
foreign conflicts or to gut the UN. It is certainly twitching in calls 
for us to slash the international affairs portion of the federal budget. 
 
More accurately, I should say keep slashing, since international affairs 
spending has already been cut nearly  in half over the past decade. The 
current international affairs budget of $21.2 billion, which President 
Clinton has put before a skeptical Congress, represents only about 1.3% 
of total federal spending. That 1.3% pays for all our embassies and 
diplomats overseas, our foreign aid and economic assistance programs, 
our participation in international organizations and our support for 
multinational peacekeeping operations, many of our arms control and law-
enforcement initiatives, and our over- seas public information services. 
Just 1.3% of our federal spending--that is how much, or, rather, how 
little President Clinton is asking Congress  to approve and the taxpayer 
to fund in order to assure that Americans live, travel, and trade in a 
safer, more stable, more prosperous world.  
 
Yet, there is a move in Congress to slice more than 20% from this bare-
bones budget. If this move prevails, the result would be deep, across-
the-board cuts in all areas: It would eliminate most of our programs in 
Latin America and Africa; it would force us virtually to withdraw from 
international organizations such as the United Nations and the World 
Bank; and it would require that we abandon international environmental 
initiatives that protect the ozone layer, reduce greenhouse gases, 
safeguard coral reef ecosystems, and slow unsustainable population 
growth. 
 
There is, in short, a view on Capitol Hill that we can have a foreign 
policy on the cheap; that our truly vital interests in some sense end at 
the water's edge. That view is just plain wrong and dangerously, 
damagingly so. Why? Because our national well-being, our safety, and our 
prosperity depend, to an unprecedented extent, on what happens in other 
parts of the world; it depends on a continuation of that steady progress 
I mentioned a moment ago--toward open societies and open markets.   
 
The livelihood of our workers increasingly depends on their ability to 
compete in global markets. That is as true in New York City as anywhere 
else in the country. In 1993, the greater New York metropolitan area 
exported some $50 billion of merchandise, representing more than 10% of 
total U.S. exports. Those exports created over 900,000 jobs, so that one 
out of every nine jobs in the New York area depends on exports. 
 
No President in the last 40 years has done more than Bill Clinton to 
open up new markets for American trade and investment. NAFTA and the 
Uruguay Round of GATT are creating hundreds of thousands of good jobs 
for Americans all across the country, including here in New York. The 
President recognizes that there is still more work to be done in 
breaking down barriers to doing business overseas, particularly in the 
world's biggest emerging markets. That work is being done not just by 
Secretary of Commerce Brown and his Under Secretary, your recent guest, 
Jeff Garten; every American diplomat--from my boss, Warren Christopher, 
on down, in Washington and in our posts overseas--has made economic 
issues and U.S. commercial interests a top foreign policy priority. 
 
The Clinton Administration is also focusing foreign policy resources on 
those international threats that directly affect the safety of Americans 
here at home--threats such as international crime, drug trafficking, and 
terrorism. The evil cowards who struck last Wednesday in Oklahoma City 
appear to be American citizens, but as the World Trade Center bombing 
here in New York demonstrated, we face similar threats from overseas as 
well. Thanks to the outstanding efforts of the FBI and the diplomatic 
security agents in our embassy in Islamabad, we were able to catch Ramzi 
Ahmed Yousef--the suspected mastermind of the Trade Center bombing--and 
bring him back to New York to face trial. Clearly, now is not the time 
to abandon the fight against international terrorism; we need a vigorous 
presence abroad so that we can thwart such villains, whoever and 
wherever they are. 
  
At issue here is not just foreign policy but national security. 
Security, writ large, is basically what foreign policy is all about; it 
is about making--and keeping--the United States safe. That includes 
keeping our economy strong, of course. But, as Secretary Perry told you 
when he addressed this group, another important part of our security 
policy is arms control.   
 
Over the last two years, President Clinton has concluded landmark 
agreements with Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia. As a result, 
only one nuclear weapons state will be on the territory of the former 
U.S.S.R., rather than four. Moreover, Americans can go to bed at night 
knowing that the nuclear weapons of the old Soviet arsenal are no longer 
pointed at our cities. Together with the Russians, Ukrainians, and 
others, we have been destroying nuclear warheads at an unprecedented 
rate. We are helping those former Soviet states to tighten their 
custodianship of bomb-making materials, so that that stuff does not 
someday end up in suitcase bombs available to rogue states and nuclear 
terrorists.  
 
Of course, even with these efforts, the United States and Russia will 
remain the world's leading nuclear powers for the indefinite future. For 
that reason, among many others, the Clinton Administration is committed 
to helping Russia not just to reduce its Soviet-era nuclear arsenal, but 
to stay on a reformist course as its economy and political system 
evolve. Imagine our own future if Russia lapses back into tyranny or 
disintegrates into ethnic violence and political chaos. 
 
Furthermore, Russia's fate will very much influence--for better or for 
worse--the fate of the other New Independent States of the former Soviet 
Union--and vice versa. If, for instance, Ukraine successfully completes 
the transition from its communist past, continuing on its current path 
as an independent democratic state with an emerging market economy, then 
other reforming states in the region, including Russia, are more likely 
to succeed. Conversely, if Ukraine slips backward or lurches into 
instability, it could drag much of the region with it.  
 
There is now--and will continue to be for a long time, generations 
probably--a great struggle going on in Russia, in Ukraine, and 
throughout the former Soviet Union--a struggle between the forces of 
reform and those of regression, between the new and the old, and between 
various visions of the new, some hardly more savory than the old. We do 
not know what the outcome of that struggle will be, but we know what we 
want the outcome to be; we know where our interests lie; and we know 
that the stakes are too high for us to remain on the sidelines. As 
President Clinton has said, "if the forces of reform are embattled, we 
must renew, not retreat from, our support for them."  
 
Well, the forces of reform are clearly embattled now. That is one reason 
why President Clinton is soon going to Moscow and Kiev--to reaffirm our 
support for reform and our determination to advance our national 
interests through international engagement.  
 
I mentioned before the importance of our overseas campaign against 
crime. Nowhere is that more vital than in the former Soviet Union. With 
the rise of organized crime and other criminal activities, many Russians 
have begun to equate a free market and democratic society with chaos and 
a breakdown of law and order. As a result, the kind of iron-fisted 
authoritarianism personified by the likes of Vladimir Zhirinovsky has 
become more attractive to worried Russian voters. So we have made it a 
top priority to help establish a law-enforcement infrastructure in these 
countries. We are training local police, prosecutors, and judges. These 
investments will pay immediate dividends to us, as well as long-term 
ones: Fighting these outlaw organizations on their home turf is one of 
the most effective ways to keep them from moving onto ours.  
 
Our other investments in reform in the New Independent States will 
benefit us in similar ways. When we help set up a stock market in Russia 
or train journalists and television producers in Ukraine, we are making 
a direct investment in our own long-term national security.  
 
Let me turn to another dangerous but critical area where American 
engagement and leadership are essential; that is, of course, the Middle 
East. Securing a lasting and comprehensive peace between Israel and its 
Arab neighbors has been a principal and bipartisan goal of American 
foreign policy for more than four decades; resolving that conflict would 
remove a major source of instability in an area of the world where we 
have vital interests. Today, thanks in large part to Secretary of State 
Christopher's persistent efforts--with the crucial help of my colleague 
and your recent guest, Dennis Ross--such a comprehensive peace is closer 
than ever.  
 
As we reward the makers of peace, we must also deal firmly and 
consistently with the enemies of peace. That is why it is so important 
to continue our opposition to Iran and Iraq, the Middle East's most 
dangerous actors. These two nations are not only the most ardent 
opponents of the Middle East peace process; they are also the world's 
most flagrant state sponsors of terrorism--and they both seek to become 
nuclear powers.  
 
Dealing with Iran and Iraq are just two of many instances  in which we 
can defend our interests in cooperation with others. The ultimate 
guarantor of our security remains our capacity and willingness to act 
forcefully and unilaterally when our interests are threatened. Our 
military must remain modern, mobile, ready, and strong. It must be able 
to deal promptly and decisively with any threat anywhere on earth. We 
have the finest military on the planet, and it must remain that way. At 
the same time, we must recognize that our freedom, security, and 
prosperity are best assured with the active help of other free people--
all of whom are looking to us for leadership. 
 
The most successful American-led coalition of our time is NATO, the 
anchor of American engagement in Europe and the linchpin of 
transatlantic security. NATO is, and must remain, a military alliance. 
One of the essential elements of its success has been its rock-solid 
commitment to collective defense, backed by a capacity to exert armed 
force commensurate with the requirement of defending all members 
equally. At the same time, the past five decades have demonstrated that 
the enduring benefits of NATO are political as well as military. As 
Secretary Christopher puts it, NATO has "helped to reconcile old 
adversaries, to embed free countries in strong and solid institutions, 
and to create an enduring sense of shared purpose in one another's 
security." 
 
Now that the Cold War has ended, we must work with our NATO allies to 
bring the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union into a new European security order. If we meet that 
challenge, then we will have dramatically reduced the chance of conflict 
in the area where two world wars and a global cold war began. 
 
When we talk about American leadership of international institutions, we 
must also address the question of the United Nations--especially today, 
since that organization has come under increasing attack. One leader on 
Capitol Hill says that the UN is "the longtime nemesis of millions of 
Americans." Another says that it is "a totally incompetent instrument 
anyplace that matters." A bill has been passed by the House that would 
effectively force the United States to stop paying our UN dues, thereby 
reneging on our treaty obligations under the UN Charter.  That bill is 
designed not to reform the United Nations but to kill it. In the name of 
a so-called Contract with America, it would abrogate the contract with 
the world that Harry Truman signed almost exactly 50 years ago and that 
every President since--Republican and Democrat--has reaffirmed. 
 
The United Nations offers a unique and often indispensable mechanism to 
further American-led efforts on behalf of global stability and security. 
It enables us to maintain sanctions against rogue states such as Libya, 
Iraq, and Serbia. UN peacekeepers are now helping to prevent simmering 
conflicts from erupting into full-scale war in Cyprus, Lebanon, Kashmir, 
and on the border between Kuwait and Iraq. In Cambodia, El Salvador, and 
Mozambique, they have helped bring an end to civil wars, disarm and 
reintegrate combatants into society, and supervise elections. Now, a 
United Nations mission has stepped in to provide security and oversee 
the process of elections in Haiti, thereby ensuring that the United 
States will not have to go it alone--or pay all the costs--to bring 
stability and democracy to that troubled nation just off our shores.   
 
Speaking of cost, let me emphasize this point: The per capita price to 
Americans for all the work the UN does--from blue helmets for 
peacekeepers to polio vaccines for babies--is less than $7 per year--
about the same as the price of a hot dog and a Coke at Shea Stadium. Our 
own country's direct participation in UN peace operations is modest. As 
of January 1, 1995, the U.S. ranked 26th among nations in the number of 
troops participating in peacekeeping operations around the world--behind 
not only Canada and Poland, but also Ghana and Zambia. 
 
There is no question the UN certainly has its share of management 
problems that prevent it from functioning as efficiently and effectively 
as it should. Here, as in all of our foreign policy programs, we must 
make sure that American tax dollars are well spent. But the right cure 
for the ills of the United Nations--or for any of our foreign policy 
programs--is not to call for the services of Dr. Kevorkian, which is 
what the Contract with America prescribes. Rather, we should administer 
sound treatment. We should keep working to make this tool as useful and 
efficient as possible. And that is exactly what the Clinton 
Administration is doing. 
 
As Secretary Christopher puts it, without international partnerships 
such as those made possible by our leadership in the United Nations, we 
would be left "with an unacceptable option each time an emergency arose: 
a choice between acting alone or doing nothing."  Such partnerships do 
not always offer the perfect response. But then again, neither does 
unilateral action--nor does inaction. 
 
Yet inaction will increasingly become what might be called the default 
option if we strip ourselves of the resources necessary to do what is in 
our own national interest. Every single successful and promising foreign 
policy and national security initiative I have mentioned in these 
remarks would be in jeopardy if we cut our foreign affairs budget to the 
extent and in the way that some are proposing.  
 
Those cuts would represent--both symbolically and substantively--a 
withdrawal from our position of international leadership. If we 
withdraw, there is no other country that will step in and lead in our 
place. Make no mistake about that. At the same time, make no mistake 
that there are plenty of forces that will fill the vacuum we leave in 
other ways, not at all to our liking or to our advantage. 
 
That is why, just as the wise men put in place American foreign policy 
after World War II, our generation of wise men and women must put in 
place a foreign policy for the post-Cold War era that is equally hard-
headed and forward-looking--and that means outward-looking; a foreign 
policy that is not penny-wise and pound-foolish; a foreign policy that 
puts our money where our interests and principles are.  
 
So by all means let us get on with the great debate, but let its 
starting point be a shared recognition of our nation's three greatest 
strengths: first, the strength and global appeal of our democratic 
values and institutions; second, the strength of our economy, which 
depends on global peace and stability; and third, the strength of our 
military power. In short, we have the heart, the brains, the wallet, and 
the muscle to exercise international leadership, and to do so on behalf 
of our own interests as well as those of humanity as a whole.  (###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 3 
 
 
Focus on the United Nations: UN Peacekeeping Operations 
 
UN Peacekeeping Operations:  Supporting U.S. Interests 
 
The peace and security activities of the United Nations directly support 
United States national interests. 
 
Peacekeeping has the capacity, under the right circumstances, to 
separate adversaries, maintain cease-fires, facilitate the delivery of 
humanitarian relief, enable refugees and displaced persons to return 
home, demobilize combatants, and create conditions under which political 
reconciliation may occur and free elections may be held. In so doing, it 
can help nurture new democracies, lower the global tide of refugees, 
reduce the likelihood of unwelcome interventions by regional powers, and 
prevent small wars from growing into larger conflicts which would be far 
more costly in terms of lives and treasure. 
 
[Were there no UN peacekeeping,] it would leave us with an unacceptable 
option when emergencies arose: a choice between acting alone and doing 
nothing. 
--Secretary Christopher,January 6, 1995  
 
Burdensharing. In the post-Cold War world, one of the best vehicles to 
ensure burdensharing is peacekeeping. Nations that would not otherwise 
deploy their military forces outside of their own borders send their men 
and women around the world on UN peace missions. More than 90 nations 
have deployed troops on UN missions; 77 countries have troops deployed 
today. In February 1995, 25 nations had more troops deployed in UN 
missions than did the United States. Since the U.S. makes many other 
voluntary contributions in support of UN activities that directly serve 
U.S. interests, this ranking is by no means indicative of our broader 
role as an international leader. It is, however, indicative of the 
contributions many other nations make in sharing the burden of keeping 
the peace. 
 
Beyond contributing their forces, other nations pay the lion's share of 
the cost of UN peacekeeping operations--70% of total UN costs for 
peacekeeping is assumed by other nations. The Administration seeks to 
increase the non-U.S. burden to 75%. 
 
Were it not for the United Nations, in many cases the United States 
would be forced to act unilaterally. The U.S. share of the personnel and 
finances of such operations would normally be far more than its 
contribution to UN peacekeeping operations. 
 
U.S. and UN: Acting in Concert. The map of UN peacekeeping deployments 
closely parallels the pattern of U.S. interests. UN peacekeepers patrol 
the borders of America's close ally, Israel. They separate forces tied 
to our Greek and Turkish allies in NATO. They have helped resolve 
festering regional conflicts in Europe, Southeast Asia, Southern Africa, 
the Persian Gulf, and Central America. 
 
The United Nations Security Council also provides international backing 
for U.S. actions. In recent years, the UN authorized U.S. military 
deployments in the Persian Gulf, Horn of Africa, and the former 
Yugoslavia. 
 
Most recently, the Clinton Administration won Security Council 
authorization for deployment of a multinational force to Haiti that has 
restored democracy. Security Council support was instrumental in gaining 
agreement from more than two dozen other countries to participate in the 
multinational force, maximizing global diplomatic support for the 
operation and allowing the U.S. to execute the transition to a UN 
peacekeeping force. 
 
To the extent future peacekeeping missions succeed, they will lift from 
the shoulders of American servicemen and servicewomen and the taxpayers 
a great share of the burden of collective security operations around the 
globe. 
--Ambassador Madeleine Albright, September 23, 1994 
 
UN peacekeeping forces moved in after U.S. forces had been drawn down in 
Kuwait, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti. Their arrival allowed thousands of 
U.S. forces to return home safely. 
 
Humanitarian Relief. Concomitant with wars of ethnicity or nationalism 
and by-products of failed states are mass migration, refugees, famine, 
and disease. A necessary component of restoring peace and security is 
stabilizing these calamities and then providing a way for refugees to 
return home. The United Nations, particularly its High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), plays a key role in coordinating and delivering the 
world's assistance. 
 
In many instances, UN peacekeepers provide security for the return of 
refugees and the delivery of humanitarian relief by UNHCR and the many 
government and private voluntary groups that offer assistance. 
Peacekeepers and relief organizations have worked side by side in 
Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, Georgia, Mozambique, and elsewhere. 
 
Were it not for the combined efforts of peacekeepers and relief workers, 
millions more would have died in these conflicts alone. Thus, even when 
peace has not yet been obtained, peacekeepers have made valuable 
contributions by saving lives. 
 
The American people overwhelmingly support helping the innocent victims 
in such disasters, but they do not wish to act alone. The United Nations 
relief and peacekeeping agencies together provide a vehicle for the 
world to unite to deal collectively with  such emergencies.  
 
Role of Peacekeeping in U.S. Foreign Policy. Peacekeeping is one useful 
tool to help prevent and resolve regional and other conflicts before 
they pose direct threats to our national security, which can be 
addressed only by the use of massive military force.  
 
U.S. Participation in UN Peace Operations. In some circumstances, the 
participation of U.S. military personnel in UN operations advances U.S. 
interests. 
 
--  First, U.S. military participation may be necessary to persuade 
others to participate in operations that serve U.S. interests.  
 
--  Second, U.S. participation may enable the U.S. to exercise influence 
over an important UN mission without unilaterally bearing the burden.  
 
--  Third, the U.S. may be called upon and choose to provide unique 
capabilities to important operations that other countries cannot.  
 
Command and Control. The President will never--and under the 
constitution may never--relinquish his command authority over our 
military personnel at any time. Command constitutes the authority to 
issue orders covering every aspect of military operations and 
administration. By law, the chain of command flows from the President to 
the lowest U.S. commander in the field and remains inviolate. 
 
It has been long-standing U.S. policy, when it serves U.S. interests, to 
place U.S. forces under the temporary operational control of another 
commander. We have done this since the Revolutionary War, through World 
Wars I and II, Operation Desert Storm, and in UN peacekeeping operations 
and NATO since their inceptions. This procedure enables the U.S. to 
participate in operations that directly serve U.S. interests, such as 
the UN mission in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, but limit 
our exposure. Moreover, when we are willing to provide U.S. forces to 
collective security actions, we reap the reciprocal benefits of having 
the flexibility to use portions of other countries' forces, as in the 
Gulf War, to achieve common military objectives.  
 
U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations. The Clinton 
Administration is pursuing policies to improve and reform UN 
peacekeeping so that it better serves U.S. interests. In May 1994, 
President Clinton signed a Presidential Decision Directive on Reforming 
Multilateral Peace Operations. The policy is premised on the need to 
reform, not debilitate, UN peacekeeping. 
 
To maximize the benefits of UN peacekeeping, the United States must make 
highly disciplined choices about when and under what circumstances to 
support or participate in such operations. The need to exercise such 
discipline is at the heart of President Clinton's policy, which requires 
that tough questions be asked about the costs, size, risks, mandate, and 
duration of operations before they are started or renewed. The U.S. has 
not hesitated to use its position on the Security Council to insist that 
satisfactory answers to these questions be provided prior to Council 
action. The goal is simple: ensure that UN missions have clear and 
realistic objectives, that peacekeepers are equipped properly, that 
money is not wasted, and that an end-point to UN action can be 
identified. That new policy is working and has resulted in fewer and 
smaller new operations and better management of existing ones. 
 
President Clinton's policy directive addresses six major issues of 
reform and improvement: 
 
--  Ensuring disciplined choices about which peace operations to support 
and when to participate with U.S. forces; 
--  Reducing U.S. costs for UN peace operations; 
--  Reaffirming long-standing U.S. policy regarding the command and 
control of U.S. forces in UN peace operations; 
--  Reforming and strengthening the UN's capability to manage peace 
operations effectively; 
--  Improving the way the U.S. Government manages and funds peace 
operations; and 
--  Improving cooperation between the Executive Branch, the Congress, 
and the American public on peace operations. 
 
The Price of Peace 
While the cost of UN peacekeeping has increased rapidly in the post-Cold 
War era, the absolute cost to the U.S. remains a small portion of our 
national security expenses--the equivalent of less than one half of 1% 
of the Department of Defense budget. While UN peacekeeping costs can and 
must be better contained, they represent a far cheaper choice than 
either of the alternatives. UN peacekeeping is far more economical for 
the U.S. than acting unilaterally or ignoring opportunities for peace 
and confronting crises only after they have spread and directly threaten 
U.S. national security interests. 
 
Dramatic Cost Growth. During the Cold War, one or both of the two 
superpowers generally opposed using UN peacekeeping to deal with most 
crises. In the immediate aftermath of that period, however, both sides 
urged the UN to create numerous new peacekeeping operations. 
 
In the last Administration, the United States sponsored or supported UN 
resolutions that increased the number of UN peacekeepers from fewer than 
10,000 to more than 70,000. That seven-fold increase in the number of 
peacekeepers deployed caused an increase in the cost of UN peacekeeping 
operations by more than a factor of seven. It is the bow wave from those 
increases that has presented the United States with the large UN 
assessments that, as a formal U.S. treaty commitment, we have had to 
face in the last few years. 
 
Many of the large and most costly operations are now coming to a close. 
The Cambodia mission, which at one point deployed almost 20,000 
peacekeepers and was the largest operation ever attempted at that time, 
has been completed.  
 
Reducing Costs. The U.S. is actively working to lower our peacekeeping 
assessment to 25% by October 1995. In addition to reducing the U.S. 
share of UN peacekeeping costs, we must also reduce costs to all UN 
members by finding ways for the UN to do needed missions more 
efficiently. The United States has, for example, presented the UN with 
an analysis of procurement procedures and specific proposals for cost 
containment and reduction of peacekeeping costs. In addition, the U.S. 
actively supported the recently adopted rules changes that reduce the 
amount paid by the UN for heavy equipment (tanks, armored personnel 
carriers) that troop contributors bring with them on peacekeeping 
missions. We continue to actively pursue additional cost-containment 
measures. 
 
The greatest savings, however, will come from more discretion in 
approving and sizing peacekeeping operations. Pursuant to President 
Clinton's policy, the United States now requires internal U.S. 
Government analyses of the potential costs, appropriate sizing, 
probability of success, end-game/exit strategy, and other considerations 
before supporting new UN peacekeeping operations. Moreover, we have been 
able to gain UN Security Council agreement to a similar procedure 
employed by that body prior to authorizing new missions. Rigorous 
application of such analysis is a key element of reducing costs and 
improving the quality of UN missions. 
 
NOTE:  Refer to hard copy of Dispatch for graphic of Troop Contributions 
to UN Peacekeeping Operations as of March 31, 1995 and UN Peacekeeping 
Operations With More Than 5,000 Troops. (###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 4 
 
Supporting the Economic Mission Of the Department of State 
 
Joan Spero, Under Secretary for Economic, Business, And Agricultural 
Affairs, David Ruth, Senior Coordinator for Business Affairs 
Remarks at State Department briefing, Washington, DC, April 20, 1995 
 
Under Secretary Spero. Thank you. Good afternoon. I will start off with 
some general comments about what we are doing in support of our economic 
mission here at the State Department, and then I will turn it over to 
David, who will go into more detail about some of the specific work that 
we are doing for U.S. companies. Then we will be happy to take your 
questions. 
 
Secretary Christopher has said that the promotion of economic security 
is one of his highest priorities, and we are trying to carry out that 
mission and those priorities in three principal ways. 
 
First of all, we are working to build and modernize what we call the 
economic architecture for the post-Cold War world. Many of you are 
familiar with the preparations that we are now going through for the G-7 
summit in Halifax. We are doing this not only in   a multilateral way, 
but regionally and bilaterally as well. All of this is with a view to 
creating an international system that is more open, more market- 
oriented, and that is better for world prosperity, and, we believe, 
better for world peace. 
 
In doing all of that, we are increasingly working here with U.S. 
business. Let me just give you a couple of quick examples--one is APEC, 
the Asia-   Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. The purpose of APEC is 
to foster open trade and investment in the region. 
 
In my view, APEC is an example of what I would call a modern, 
international organization in that it integrates business directly into 
its activities. Business sits at the table in the APEC working groups; 
they roll up their sleeves; they deal with very practical problems like 
telecommunications or energy or transportation. So they are part of the 
process. 
 
Business also plays a very important formal and informal advisory role 
at the policy level. In fact, business was quite important in developing 
the agreement in Bogor last November which called for the achievement of 
free trade and investment in the region by 2020, and we continue to work 
very closely with the business community as we are trying to figure out 
how to get from here to 2020. 
 
Another couple of examples of the role of business in this new post-Cold 
War architecture: I have just come back from India where we re-launched, 
after five years, the Indo-U.S. Economic Commercial Sub-Commission. I 
co-chair that with the Deputy Finance Minister of India. 
 
We and our Indian counterparts agreed to focus, in this coming year, on 
the issue of developing India's infrastructure. That is a subject of 
great interest to U.S. business. In fact, we work very closely with U.S. 
and Indian businesses as we develop the agenda for the meeting, and in 
fact, we will have a working group of this sub-commission composed 
exclusively of Indian and U.S. companies. That is a model that we are 
applying elsewhere. 
 
We have established the so-called Gore-Mubarak initiative--the U.S.-
Egypt partnership for economic growth and development. I traveled with 
the Vice President to Egypt to hold the first meeting of that commission 
within the last month. That commission also has a joint private sector 
commission that will work in very practical ways to foster the growth of 
the private sector in Egypt and to foster greater U.S.-Egyptian trade 
and investment. 
 
The second thing we are doing on the economic front is using economic 
policy to support peace and democracy--the more traditional missions of 
this Department. 
 
I, personally, have been very much involved in the economic side of the 
Middle East peace process, and again here, the private sector is playing 
a very important role. There was a meeting--some of you were there--in 
Casablanca last October. There will be a follow-up meeting in Amman this 
October. 
 
Those meetings involve not only government leaders but business people, 
and they were designed to foster economic cooperation among businesses 
in the region, designed to support not only prosperity but also the 
peace process. 
 
We are now working on a Middle East Development Bank. Again, that 
Development Bank will be heavily focused on lending to--should it 
actually be agreed upon and implemented-- will focus heavily on lending 
to the private sector. 
 
We are doing similar things in Russia and the New Independent States, 
Haiti, and South Africa--involving the business community directly in 
our activities. 
 
Finally, we are--and this is really what we want to focus on today--we 
also work on a very practical level to ensure that American workers and 
American business can compete in the global economy. That is what we 
call the "America Desk." The message has gone out in the Department and 
abroad that economic policy matters and that looking out for U.S. 
business matters. 
 
The embassies, we believe, are absolutely critical in this effort. From 
my ex-business perspective, I see the embassies as a distribution 
channel, a delivery service for a lot of the products and services that 
the Department offers to business. We do a couple of things primarily. 
 
First, we support U.S. business in its efforts to export and invest in a 
variety of countries around the world. We work closely with our 
colleagues in the foreign commercial service; and where there is no 
foreign commercial service, we do it ourselves. 
 
Increasingly, we are finding that the leadership of the ambassador and 
the expertise, knowledge, and contacts of the economic and political 
officers in the embassies are very important tools for supporting 
business. 
 
There is another thing we do, and I do not think this is recognized or 
understood enough, and that is problem- solving on behalf of U.S. 
businesses. 
 
One of the biggest problems we deal with on a day-to-day basis--that our 
businesses face as they operate abroad--is intellectual property. We are 
constantly working with governments abroad to urge them to develop, to 
pass, to implement, and to enforce intellectual property legislation. 
 
Another area: We have negotiated bilateral investment treaties around 
the world that provide fair treatment for our businesses, and we work 
with local governments to make sure that those treaties are implemented. 
 
Another long-term example that I will cite briefly is dealing with the 
problem of corruption. One of the major issues facing our companies 
around the world--I hear from them constantly when I travel--is the 
practice of bribery, which is prohibited by U.S. law but is fair game in 
a lot of countries. We have pressed hard with other developed countries 
through the OECD, and we have successfully concluded a code on bribery. 
That is just a first step. We are now pushing the other developed 
countries to develop and implement things--things that we would take for 
granted here, such as you cannot deduct bribes from your tax return. You 
can in some countries. We think that is kind of basic. 
 
We are also taking the show on the road to developing countries. At the 
Summit of the Americas, for example, last December, one of the 
initiatives that we agreed on was expanding the work on combating 
corruption, which is increasingly seen as undermining democracies around 
the world. 
 
We have been working hard for the last couple of years. I think we have 
been able to bring about a dramatic change in the way the embassies do 
business. Business people I have known for many years tell me that 
whereas before they never would have thought of going to the U.S. 
embassy, now it is their first port of call when they go to do business 
abroad. 
 
Our goal for the next two years is to try to bring that same perspective 
to Washington--to bring business closer to the Department itself. To 
explain some of that, I am going to turn the   podium over to David 
Ruth. 
 
Senior Coordinator Ruth. I have some of my own private sector experience 
with government to draw on, but I have talked to a number of companies 
over the past month or two to see what it is they want from State and 
what it is they feel they get and where we need to do better. 
 
First of all--and Joan has described much of this--they want advice and 
orientation as they are planning strategies for a market. They want to 
know who's who, what's the politics, what's the economic policy, what's 
the current state of relations with the United States, and where are 
some of the leverage points. 
 
Second, they want assistance with business problems, either in policy or 
sometimes very practical things like making sure that they can get in 
the door to make a bid. In some instances, they want advocacy, which is 
to say, a visible expression of U.S. official interest, which, coming 
from an ambassador or a senior official here at the Department of State, 
can often be extremely effective in supporting a business deal, 
particularly when there is government support for our competition. 
 
In the past, State was not always seen as ready or willing to use those 
assets and exercise our influence. Frankly, this was often frustrating 
for a business, especially when other governments were acting on behalf 
of their companies' own interests. That has changed over the last few 
years, particularly in the embassies. 
 
However, companies still tell us that it is difficult for them here in 
Washington; it is difficult to find their way around this building; and 
sometimes it is difficult to get a fast response. What is more, they do 
not always feel as though their views are as fully integrated into the 
policy-making process as they should be--which is the point of my 
office--which is the point of the creation of the role of the 
Coordinator for Business Affairs. 
 
Our role has three separate parts. The first is to be a service center 
for business--a first point of contact for companies--to help them tap 
into the resources of the Department. Part of that is really speed. When 
a company is trying to make a deal, sometimes being able to move fast, 
get a fast word of support, and some fast information, will make all the 
difference between them getting it or somebody else--a foreign 
competitor--getting it. 
 
Part of our service is going to be to keep track of companies more 
closely so we are not just giving them one-shot advice, but we are 
following them through the building and helping them to make sure we 
have effective follow-up and effective action. 
 
Another extremely important part of this, from my own experience, is 
that we are now coordinating much more with other federal agencies--the 
Department of Commerce, the Export-Import Bank, the Treasury Department, 
and a whole range of other agencies that are involved in trade promotion 
work. We coordinate among ourselves more than used to be the case. It 
used to be you would have to go door-to-door to make sure that Commerce 
was talking to State and State was talking to Treasury. We now can bring 
that all together. 
 
There is an advocacy center that works interagency in a trade promotion 
coordinating committee--that is also an interagency body that allows us 
to talk to each other, and that works a lot better than it used to. 
 
So this kind of service is really--it works for a big company like my 
former company, but it also is particularly useful for the smaller and 
medium-sized companies that do not have the Washington resources, do not 
know their way around the building, and need a first-point of contact 
and some additional assistance. 
 
The second part of our role will be to encourage outreach to the 
business community to make sure we are consulting business as we make 
policies that affect their interests. A lot of this happens as a daily 
matter here and has for years. People talk to business about things like 
civil aviation, commodities policy, telecommunications policy--a whole 
range of things where business has a direct interest and where State has 
a lead negotiating role. 
 
As Joan has outlined, there are a number of new policy initiatives in 
APEC, in India, and in the Middle East where business is now being 
brought into the process more closely and earlier and more intensely to 
make sure the outcome reflects their economic interests. 
 
We will also be helping the Secretary and other senior policy makers get 
the benefit of hearing business views, and the Secretary is already 
doing a lot of this. We have a lot more planned to really bring people 
through the door so that we are getting private sector advice on a 
regular basis. 
 
I should hasten to point out that business is not always going to be 
happy with the policies we decide on in the end. The Department has 
responsibility for a wide range of cross-cutting interests--everything 
from human rights and national security matters to environmental issues. 
These are not always going to work in favor--in support of what business 
would have  us do. However, even in these areas, we have a particular 
responsibility to make sure that we hear business concerns about them, 
understand the economic costs, the economic impact, and weigh those 
concerns in the process. 
 
Finally, the last piece is really making all this permanent. We will be 
working to integrate support for business as a permanent part of the 
State Department culture. We are already  heavily involved in training. 
We are training people when they come into the Foreign Service for the 
first time. We are training desk officers. We are training DCMs--talking 
to the ambassadors as they go out the door, and a lot of that is already 
having its effect. 
 
So I will conclude. The three pieces that we are doing in fulfilling 
this mission to use the State Department's assets more effectively for 
business really are direct assistance to companies, greater outreach on 
policy issues, and making this a permanent part of the culture. Thank 
you.  (###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 5 
 
U.S.-Australia Joint Communique 
Text of a joint communique released at the Australia-United States 
Ministerial Talks, Washington, DC, April 19, 1995. 
 
1. The United States Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, and 
Secretary of Defense, William Perry, and the Australian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Senator Gareth Evans, and Minister for Defense, Senator 
Robert Ray, met in Washington, D.C. on April 19, 1995 to discuss global 
and regional issues and to advance the U.S.-Australia relationship. 
 
2. Both sides affirmed the importance of the Australia-United States 
Ministerial Talks as an annual forum to review developments, exchange 
views, and explore opportunities for expanded cooperation in pursuing 
shared objectives. Looking forward to the 50th anniversary 
commemorations of the end of World War II, the two Allies welcomed close 
contact at the ministerial level as they shape their responses to new 
challenges in the post-Cold War world. In their exchange of views, both 
sides welcomed the growing sense of community in the Asia-Pacific, and 
noted the positive development of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum as examples of the region's shared 
commitment to peace and prosperity. 
 
3. Both sides affirmed their strong support for APEC and for bold 
implementation of decisions made at Bogor in November 1994 to achieve 
free and open trade and investment by no later than the year 2020 (2010 
for developed APEC member economies). To this end, they undertook to 
work closely with Japan in its capacity as APEC chair for 1995 and with 
all other APEC members to ensure APEC consensus at the Osaka meeting on 
a credible, detailed action plan for achieving the Bogor declaration 
goals. 
 
Defense and Security Cooperation 
 
4. Both governments affirmed the importance of peace and security in the 
Asia-Pacific and recommitted themselves to promoting stability 
throughout the region. They outlined their respective strategic planning 
and high-level policy reviews, including the report on Security Strategy 
for the East Asia-Pacific Region undertaken by the U.S. Department of 
Defense and Australia's 1994 Defense White Paper. The United States 
emphasized that its review reflected continuing vital national interests 
in the region and reaffirmed that maintenance of a stable environment in 
the Asia-Pacific is important not only for U.S. security but also for 
economic cooperation and growth in the region. The United States 
underscored its commitment to continuing strategic engagement through 
alliances, highly-capable forward-deployed forces, access arrangements, 
exercises, expanded trade and investment ties, and participation in 
regional economic and security fora. 
 
5. Australia welcomed the U.S. commitment to continuing strategic 
engagement, noting that it constituted a key element of regional 
stability and an important contribution to Australia's security. The 
U.S. welcomed the emphasis in Australia's Defense White Paper on self-
reliance and the key role of the alliance with the United States in 
Australia's defense policy. It also welcomed the priority accorded by 
Australia to strategic engagement with the region and Australia's 
commitment to substantial support for the United Nations. 
 
6. Both nations stressed the importance of the Australia-U.S. alliance 
in contributing to a stable and peaceful Asia-Pacific region. They also 
affirmed the relevance of the mutual security obligations embodied in 
the ANZUS treaty, and of the need for continued close consultation on 
issues of mutual security concern. They agreed that the relationship has 
evolved over five decades since World War II and grows ever stronger, 
reflecting the depth of their shared democratic values and interests. 
The United States and Australia also affirmed the need to reinforce 
public understanding and support as the strategic partnership meets the 
new challenges of the post-Cold War world. 
 
7. Both countries emphasized the benefits of cooperation in a wide range 
of areas including intelligence, training, logistics, defense science, 
and access to advanced technology. The United States confirmed that 
Australia, as a close ally of long standing and a major buyer of U.S. 
defense equipment, would continue to receive preferential access to U.S. 
equipment, intelligence and military science and technology to assist in 
maintaining defense force readiness and capability at the level of 
sophistication envisaged in Australia's defense policy. The U.S. 
undertook to assist Australia in maintaining its F-111 capability 
following the U.S. decision to withdraw the aircraft from service. 
 
8. Both governments agreed that expanded industry access to each other's 
defense markets would be a practical step to further strengthening of 
the defense relationship. To this end, Secretary of Defense Perry and 
Minister for Defence Ray signed today a Memorandum of Agreement Between 
the Government of Australia and the Government of the United States of 
America Concerning Reciprocal Defense Procurement. The agreement 
establishes a framework to facilitate the efforts of each country's 
industry to seek contracts in the other country. The memorandum should 
pave the way to more open defense markets, with benefit to both 
countries' industries. 
 
9. Both governments affirmed the key role which activities supported 
through the United States-Australia joint defense facilities continue to 
play in supporting their security interests, including through 
furthering post-Cold War regional and global peace and stability. 
Cooperation in these pursuits is an important element in the bilateral 
relationship, and the participants pledged to continue such activities 
under arrangements which are beneficial to both countries. 
 
10. Australia affirmed the importance of promoting regional security 
through bilateral defense relationships with nations in the Asia-Pacific 
and through appropriate multilateral mechanisms such as the Five Power 
Defense Arrangements (FPDA). The United States emphasized the importance 
of its regional alliances and agreements, and both sides noted, in 
particular, the key contribution made to regional security by the U.S.-
Japan security relationship. The U.S. reaffirmed its determination to 
work with Japan to maintain that relationship as a pillar of regional 
security. 
 
11. Both sides agreed to explore ways to enhance cooperative activities 
and deployments in the Asia-Pacific intended to support regional peace 
and security. To this end they agreed to continue regular official 
consultations to harmonize defense activities in the region. Australia 
noted that it would welcome additional opportunities to assist U.S. 
military deployments and defense activities which advance shared 
interests in the stability and security of the region, including 
provision of access to Australian military training ranges and 
facilities. 
 
12. Australia noted the high-level visits between the United States and 
New Zealand which resulted from the 1994 U.S. policy review and led to 
the March 27 Washington meeting between President Clinton and Prime 
Minister Bolger. The United States confirmed that the resumption of such 
senior-level contacts did not signify a restoration of the previous 
alliance with New Zealand under ANZUS. The United States expressed the 
hope that these contacts, along with important changes in the 
international environment since differences with New Zealand first 
arose, will lead over time to changes in New Zealand policy which could 
permit a restoration of the close security ties the two countries 
previously enjoyed. 
 
Regional Issues 
 
13. The United States and Australia underscored the importance of the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in promoting multilateral security dialogue 
and peace in the Asia-Pacific. The United States praised Australia's 
leadership in hosting the first ARF intersessional seminar in November 
which included defense policy specialists from most members and which 
broadened understanding and support for trust-building and defense 
transparency measures. Both sides agreed that the ARF Mixed Seminar on 
Peacekeeping in Brunei in March which included military officers from 
most members was useful in considering cooperation in support of UN 
peacekeeping. The United States and Australia looked forward to 
additional useful areas for cooperation emerging from the ARF 
intersessional seminar on preventive diplomacy in Seoul in May. 
 
14. Both sides believe it is very important that the ARF senior 
officials meeting this May in Brunei lay the basis for decisions by 
Ministers at the ARF in August on a concrete work program. The U.S. and 
Australia noted that members would also want to agree on practical 
cooperative outcomes at the ARF in August, in order to sustain 
confidence in the utility of the ARF. Both sides looked forward to 
continuing discussions at the ARF on the current security challenges in 
the region. The United States and Australia strongly support Cambodia's 
early admission to the ARF. 
 
15. The United States and Australia expressed concern about recent 
events in the Spratly Islands. They urged all the claimants to exercise 
restraint, avoid further destabilizing actions, and intensify 
cooperative efforts on South China Sea issues. Both sides also affirmed 
their support for the 1992 and 1995 ASEAN statements on the South China 
Sea. Stressing the need to encourage a peaceful solution to the dispute, 
they noted with approval Indonesia's efforts in hosting the informal 
South China Sea workshops, including plans for a sixth workshop this 
year. 
 
16. Both governments affirmed the importance to regional security and 
global nuclear non-proliferation of compliance by the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) with its obligations under the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty. Australia welcomed the DPRK's commitment, in 
the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, to freeze and eventually dismantle its 
existing gas-graphite moderated nuclear facilities under strict 
monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency and return to full 
compliance with its non-proliferation obligations. Australia expressed 
appreciation for U.S. leadership in establishing the Korean Peninsula 
Energy Development Organization (KEDO). The United States thanked 
Australia for its financial contribution of US $5 million to KEDO. Both 
sides noted that the Republic of Korea will assume the central role in 
financing and construction of the light water reactor project and that 
Japan will play a significant role in the project and other KEDO 
activities. Both sides agreed broad multilateral participation and 
contributions to KEDO were desirable. 
 
17. The United States and Australia affirmed their willingness to 
continue assisting with the reconstruction of Cambodia and supporting 
the Royal Cambodian Government (RCG) in its efforts to promote 
stability, economic development, administrative and military 
professionalization and reform, good governance, transparency, the rule 
of law, and respect for the human rights of all Cambodians. Both sides 
condemned the Khmer Rouge for its ongoing acts of violence and brutality 
against Cambodia's people and legitimate government. Both sides praised 
the work of the International Committee on the Reconstruction of 
Cambodia and urged the follow-on Consultative Group chaired by the World 
Bank to promote common goals in Cambodia. Both urged that Cambodia, in 
its own interest and that of the international community, keep open the 
UN Human Rights Center Field Office in Phnom Penh. 
 
18. Australia welcomed the expansion of U.S.-Vietnam relations and the 
opening of liaison offices in Washington and Hanoi and noted that this 
was in the best interests of both countries and regional peace and 
stability. The United States affirmed its intention to utilize its 
liaison office to promote further progress on POW/MIA issues, which 
remains its highest national priority with respect to Vietnam. The 
office will also seek to advance the human rights dialogue with Vietnam 
and provide services to American citizens in that country. Australia 
stressed its support for such a dialogue, noting that human rights 
issues are an important part of its own broadening ties with Vietnam. 
Both countries welcomed Vietnam's economic reform efforts and its 
outward-looking foreign policy. In this context, they supported 
Vietnam's closer integration with the Asia Pacific region and its 
forthcoming membership of ASEAN. 
 
19. The United States and Australia expressed disappointment at the lack 
of progress by Burma on political liberalization and human rights. They 
cited the failure of the Burmese government to resume dialogue with Aung 
San Suu Kyi, release her and other political prisoners, pursue a serious 
dialogue with the UN which produces real political change, agree to 
prison monitoring by the International Committee of the Red Cross, and 
work toward peaceful reconciliation with the Karen National Union and 
other groups. While the release in March of some political prisoners was 
encouraging, the United States and Australia called for more progress on 
this and other issues of democracy and human rights. Both sides noted 
that more than half of the heroin in the world, and more than two-thirds 
of the heroin seized in the United States, has been traced to Burma. 
Both urged the Burmese government to cooperate with the world community 
in reducing the opium and heroin produced in Burma. Both sides affirmed 
the need to work together with ASEAN nations and the international 
community to encourage positive change in Burma. 
 
20. The United States complimented Australia's hosting of the 1994 South 
Pacific Forum meeting. The United States and Australia reaffirmed the 
importance of the Forum and its contribution to broadening regional 
dialogue. Both welcomed the increasing commitment of South Pacific 
nations to pursuing sound economic and sustainable development policies. 
Both sides noted the continued need for South Pacific nations to take 
difficult economic decisions in order to promote prosperity and 
development. Both anticipate a useful meeting of the South Pacific Forum 
in Papua New Guinea in September. 
 
International Issues 
 
21. Both governments reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening the 
United Nations as the pre-eminent international organization entrusted 
with global security. Both agreed that increased cooperation in the 
Security Council has rendered the UN more relevant, not only in the 
resolution of regional conflicts, but also through multilateral action 
in new and difficult areas of activity such as humanitarian emergency 
assistance and the promotion of human rights and democracy. The United 
States and Australia cited the importance of these efforts, while urging 
reforms that will make the UN more effective in carrying out its growing 
responsibilities. 
 
22. Both sides agreed that, as the Security Council addresses 
unprecedented challenges, the international community should consider 
changes in Council composition to reflect new political, economic, and 
security realities. They welcomed steps the Council has already taken to 
increase transparency and exchange information with the general 
membership. Both governments encouraged further exploration of practical 
reforms in Council working methods and procedures. 
 
23. Both governments noted the growing complexity of tasks facing 
peacekeepers. Both recognized that, in the past, most UN peace missions 
operated in non-hostile environments, and the difficulties of creating a 
secure environment in the midst of ongoing conflict have engendered 
frustration. Both affirmed that, while they support an active UN role in 
maintaining international peace and security, operations in Somalia, 
Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia showed that a continuing thorough 
review is needed of how the UN decides, manages, funds, and supports 
peacekeeping. Both sides agreed that mandates for peacekeeping 
operations should include an explicit time frame and clear, practicable 
goals. Both welcomed the UN General Assembly resolution in December 
opening for signature a Convention on the Safety of United Nations and 
Associated Personnel, which will provide further protection for UN 
peacekeepers. The United States pledged to work closely with Australia 
to promote more effective forms of UN preventive diplomacy. 
 
24. The United States and Australia welcomed progress in the Middle East 
peace talks during the year and recommitted themselves to support the 
process, noting in particular the need for full implementation of the 
Declaration of Principles between Israel and the Palestinians. They also 
welcomed further Israeli-Syrian talks. Australia praised U.S. leadership 
in seeking a comprehensive Middle East peace, and the United States 
expressed appreciation for Australia's role in the multilateral phase of 
the process, including its hosting later this month of the Water 
Resources Working Group Workshop on Rainfall Enhancement. Both sides 
reiterated their call for a speedy lifting of the Arab boycott on trade 
with Israel. 
 
25. The United States and Australia noted the March 14 UN Security 
Council decision to renew international economic sanctions against Iraq 
and the April 14 decision to permit selected humanitarian measures to 
assist the people of Iraq. They called on Iraq to comply fully with all 
relevant Security Council resolutions in order that the international 
community could consider lifting the sanctions now in force. The U.S. 
side highlighted the continuing importance of the UN-authorized 
Multinational Interception Force in the Arabian Gulf in increasing the 
effectiveness of the maritime regime and enforcing UN sanctions against 
Iraq. 
 
26. Australia observed that several Indian Ocean littoral states have 
expressed interest in exploring ways to cooperate, especially in 
economic relations. Australia noted that prospects for such cooperation 
will be discussed at a mid-June conference to be held in Perth. The U.S. 
side signalled its interest in such discussions and Australia undertook 
to keep the U.S. informed of developments. 
 
Non-proliferation And Arms Control 
 
27. Affirming the centrality of nuclear non-proliferation to their 
respective national interests, both governments underlined how essential 
it is that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and 
Extension Conference now under way in New York endorse an indefinite 
extension of the NPT without conditions. Both sides affirmed a permanent 
NPT as the foundation of a stable strategic environment for future arms 
control efforts. 
 
28. The United States and Australia affirmed their commitment to halting 
the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems. 
They expressed support for existing multilateral non-proliferation 
treaties and committed themselves to continued close cooperation in 
ensuring the effectiveness of the non-proliferation export-control 
regimes: the Nuclear Suppliers Group; the Missile Technology Control 
Regime; and the Australia Group which seeks to control the proliferation 
of chemical and biological weapons. 
 
29. Both sides expressed their determination to move forward on 
establishing a new multilateral arrangement to promote responsibility 
and transparency in trade in arms and dual-use items, and reaffirmed 
that the new arrangement should prevent the acquisition of arms and 
sensitive dual-use items for military end-uses in states whose behavior 
is, or becomes, a cause for serious concern. They agreed on the need to 
encourage participation in, and to establish guidelines for, the 
information exchange begun at the Post-COCOM Working Group meeting [in] 
Canberra in February 1995. Finally, both Australia and the United States 
acknowledged the importance of establishing an effective COCOM successor 
regime. In this regard, each government pledged to rededicate its 
efforts to control dangerous conventional arms and associated dual-use 
technologies and to promote similar responsible behavior by other 
countries. 
 
30. Both governments expressed determination to achieve, in negotiations 
at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, a Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty at the earliest possible date. Australia praised the recent U.S. 
decision to drop a ten-year CTBT withdrawal clause. Australia welcomed 
the United States' national declaration of April 5, 1995, and the recent 
statements of the other nuclear weapon states, providing negative and 
positive security assurances to non-nuclear weapons states, and Security 
Resolution 984 of April 11, 1995. Both sides welcomed the mandate 
achieved in the Conference on Disarmament for the negotiation of a 
multilateral treaty to ban the production of fissile material for 
weapons purposes, and expressed support for the early commencement of 
negotiations. Australia urged the United States to accede at an early 
date to the protocols of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. 
 
31. The United States and Australia affirmed their willingness to 
explore areas in which Australia could cooperate in those elements of 
the United States ballistic missile defense program which enhance the 
common objectives of discouraging missile proliferation and affording 
protection against missile attack. Both sides were pleased that an 
initial program of cooperative activities was expected to begin this 
year. 
 
32. Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to work for the entry into 
force of the Chemical Weapons Convention as soon as possible. Both 
agreed on the importance of strengthening the Biological Weapons 
Convention by encouraging more widespread participation in confidence-
building measures such as data submissions and by taking an active role 
in drafting a legally-binding protocol. 
 
Economic and Trade Issues 
 
33. Both parties welcomed the entry into force of the World Trade 
Organization at the beginning of the year and reaffirmed their 
commitment to implement fully and on a timely basis their obligations 
under the Uruguay Round agreements. They urged other WTO members to 
implement their commitments in all areas fully and promptly. Both agreed 
on the continued need to work toward a more liberal international 
trading system. In this context, they agreed on the importance for 
global growth of the liberalization of trade and investment around the 
world. 
 
34. Both countries agreed that continuing efforts to strengthen the 
multilateral trading system and the liberalization of trade and 
investment had the highest priority in their trade policies. They 
expressed their undivided commitment to make the World Trade 
Organization an effective organization. In this regard, it was noted 
that the broadening and deepening of the disciplines in new areas such 
as services and intellectual property and traditional areas such as 
agriculture, along with more effective disciplines in activities such as 
subsidies and grey-area measures, will substantially enhance the 
credibility of the multilateral trading system. 
 
35. The United States and Australia discussed trade relations and recent 
developments concerning other major regional trading partners. Both 
sides agreed on the importance of a strong U.S.-Japan economic 
relationship and improved access to the Japanese market on an MFN basis 
in order to promote global growth and increase trading opportunities for 
all countries. Both sides reaffirmed their intention to work together to 
pursue a commercially viable WTO accession agreement with China. 
 
36. Both countries reaffirmed their commitment to reducing and 
eliminating barriers to trade and to expanding bilateral trade and 
investment flows. In that regard, Australia welcomed the debate on the 
1995 Farm Bill and confirmed its intention to contribute to that debate. 
They again noted that the Uruguay Round outcome would alleviate some 
issues which have been sources of friction in the bilateral relationship 
over recent years. The U.S. confirmed that the Export Enhancement 
Program (EEP) and the Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP) had been 
refocused so they can be used for market expansion in addition to 
focussing on combating unfair trade practices. The U.S. reaffirmed that 
it would seek to avoid using these programs in ways that undermine 
Australia's legitimate interests. 
 
37. Both governments renewed their commitment to the Trade and 
Investment Framework Arrangement (TIFA), concluded in 1992, as a 
mechanism for addressing trade and investment concerns and for pursuing 
further expansion of trade and investment relations. Both sides welcomed 
the TIFA Senior Officials Meeting in Canberra last month and looked 
forward to a Ministerial-level TIFA Council meeting in Washington in 
July 1995. 
 
Conclusion 
 
38. Both sides affirmed the value of  
the annual Australia-United States Ministerial talks, and Australia 
confirmed its invitation to the United States to take part in the next 
round of talks in Australia in 1996.(###) 
 
[END OF DISPATCH VOLUME 6, NO. 18] 

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