U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 18, MAY 1, 1995
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1. Strengthening Democracy and Advancing Economic Reform in Brazil--
President Clinton, Brazilian President Cardoso
2. American Leadership in the Post-Cold War World--Deputy Secretary
Talbott
3. Focus on the United Nations: UN Peacekeeping Operations
4. Supporting the Economic Mission of the Department of State--Joan
Spero, David Ruth
5. U.S.-Australia Joint Communique
ARTICLE 1
Strengthening Democracy and Advancing Economic Reform in Brazil
President Clinton, Brazilian President Cardoso
Opening remarks at press conference following meeting, Washington, DC,
April 20, 1995
President Clinton. Good afternoon. Please be seated. I am delighted to
welcome President Cardoso to the White House. For many years, he has
been one of the great leaders of the Americas. Although he was only
inaugurated in January, President Cardoso has been a fighter for
democracy throughout his life. He opposed the forces of authoritarianism
at great personal risk to himself. More recently, he led the battle for
economic reform--during his years as Finance Minister--to reduce
inflation, establish growth, and help Brazil fulfill the tremendous
promise of its people and its land.
Today, the President told me about his economic and constitution reform
efforts, which are essential to placing Brazil on the path of
sustainable development. I have every confidence in the President's
ability to strengthen Brazilian democracy and to advance the visionary
economic reforms he began as Finance Minister. Brazil played a key role
in forging the historic agreement at last year's Summit of the Americas.
Today, President Cardoso and I discussed how we could build on that
success. We also discussed bilateral trade issues, and we reaffirmed our
commitments to open our markets to each other's products. With 160
million consumers, Brazil is one of today's biggest emerging markets,
and it offers great opportunity for Americans.
We know that one of the ways we will do this is to realize our common
commitment to achieve a free trade area of the Americas by the year
2005. We have instructed Ambassador Kantor and Foreign Minister Lampreia
to review trade relations between our nations--as well as those between
the NAFTA and the MERCOSUR countries--to consider ways to expand the
flow of goods and capital between our nations. One step will be the
first meeting this June of the U.S.-Brazil Business Development Council,
which will bring together private sector leaders to increase investment
and trade in both our nations.
On security issues, we had a very good discussion about the need to
stand firm together against terrorism. We reviewed the effort by the Rio
Protocol guarantors to find a lasting solution to the conflict between
Peru and Ecuador over their borders. Progress has been made in
implementing a cease-fire; now, we must find an enduring settlement. I
congratulate, again, President Cardoso on his outstanding leadership in
helping to resolve this conflict, and the United States has been proud
to have Americans working with Brazilians there to try to make sure we
bring the conflict to a satisfactory conclusion.
Let me say, finally, that we also reviewed our common efforts against
narcotics and money laundering. We agreed to begin a dialogue on
protecting the environment. U.S. aid funds will be increased this year
to try to assist that effort in Brazil, and our governments will
exchange ideas on reforming international financial institutions to meet
the challenges of the 21st century.
I must say, I was especially impressed by the ideas that President
Cardoso and the members of administration--his administration--have
shared with us on the changes we need to make in the international
institutions so that we can get the benefit of the globally integrated
markets that we all want to benefit from without having too much
instability undermine the march to progress.
With our two great nations cooperating as never before, we stand at a
moment of unparalleled opportunity. We must now seize it, and we will
seize it. We will promote democracy. We will advance prosperity. We will
do it together. In the months and years ahead, I look forward to working
with President Cardoso to forge an even stronger partnership between our
nations and our people. We should do it, it is in our interest to do it,
and it is the right thing for our hemisphere and for the world to do it.
Thank you, Mr. President.
President Cardoso. Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: It was a great
honor to be received by President Bill Clinton today. I know that this
is a day of grief for this country, and I take this opportunity to
extend to all Americans the solidarity of the Brazilian people. To you,
President Clinton, I convey a personal message of support and
encouragement. Mr. President, I repeat what I said this morning: In my
view, this terrorist act affects not only America. It affects all of us
who believe in peace and democracy and in freedom for all. During our
meeting, I had a chance to express to you my personal friendship and the
admiration that Brazil has for his permanent commitment to the cause of
peace, prosperity, and democracy.
I had the privilege of meeting President Clinton during the Miami
summit--his initiative that he revealed, his statesmanship, and his
vision of a better future for the Americas.
Today, as we discussed the prospects for our hemisphere, I had the
chance to assure him that the same spirit of cooperation that guided my
country during the works of the summit will keep guiding us in
implementing its results.
I had also the chance to bring to the American people the message of a
country that went through deep transformations and that, today, presents
itself to the world as a solid democracy, a strong economy, and a
vigorous and free society. This new country is a natural partner of the
U.S., and I stressed to President Clinton that the time is right for the
design of a new affirmative agenda that will bring our two countries
even closer together.
I must say that it was really highly impressive--the kind words by
President Clinton and the spirit of our discussions. We have so many
values in common. We have a similar political will. We have the support
of our people to work together in reaffirming our commitment to reforms,
to bring to our countries better conditions of life, and to go ahead
with democracy.
I would like to add, Mr. President, that Brazil will support also the
effort, under the umbrella of the Organization of American States,
toward democracy and the specific program you referred to; Brazil will
be always open in discussing the international financial issues; and
Brazil is ready to assume more responsibilities at the world level in
order to go ahead with the programs of peacekeeping and to do the best
of our effort to really keep a world of peace.
Already in this context of this new agenda, Ambassador Lampreia, as you
said, and Ambassador Kantor are being instructed to prepare a study of
trade relations between Brazil and the United States with the objective
of improving the flow of goods, services, and capital between our
countries. In this same area, we agreed that the first meeting of the
Brazil-U.S. Business Development Council shall take place in Denver this
June--co-chaired by Ambassador Lampreia and by Secretary Brown--in
bringing together private sector representatives. I am confident that
this first meeting will be a very important opportunity to increase even
further the economic relations between our two countries.
In the discussion of the main themes of the international agenda, I
expressed to President Clinton my view that the same democratic values
that had proven its strength with the end of the Cold War should now
guide us in the effort of building a new international order.
Democracy should be the cornerstone, not only inside each society, but
also among nations. This is the guideline that Brazil will follow in the
meetings in which the revision of the San Francisco charter will be
discussed.
I also had the chance to express to President Clinton our long-standing
commitment to the cause of non-proliferation and peace. This commitment
has a very concrete translation in our decision to ratify and fully
implement the Tlatelolco agreement, and also in the creation of the
Brazilian Space Agency--in our commitment by the executive branch to
abide by the MTCR guidelines in the approval of the Quadrapartheid
Nuclear Safeguards Agreement.
The very positive working meeting that I had the privilege to hold this
morning with President Clinton is only a first step taken toward the
strengthening of a new relationship that, built upon a solid base of
shared values, will be decisive to make real the dream of a prosperous,
fair, and free hemisphere for all of us. (###)
ARTICLE 2
American Leadership in the Post-Cold War World
Deputy Secretary Talbott
Remarks to the Foreign Policy Association, New York City, April 24,1995
Thanks, Mr. Ross--both for that kind introduction and for giving me the
opportunity to be here this evening. It is especially pleasant to see my
friend and colleague, John Temple Swing, who has contributed so much
over the years to sensible and careful discourse about foreign policy--
and, therefore, to sensible foreign policy itself.
I know that, in recent months, this group has heard from several of my
friends in the Administration. Bill Perry has spoken to you about
security and non-proliferation on the Indian subcontinent; Jeff Garten
has laid out for you our efforts to increase American access to the
world's big emerging markets; and Dennis Ross has addressed the Middle
East peace process.
This evening, I'd like simultaneously to step back and look forward--
taking a somewhat broader look at the underlying principles and
overarching goals of U.S. foreign policy. In brief, I want to talk with
you about the future of American leadership in world affairs.
First, though, I should put this subject in the context of recent
history. Over the past decade, the world has changed dramatically and,
mostly, for the better. I say mostly for the better because there are
many places around the globe where misery and brutality still dominate.
The Balkans and Central Africa are only the most egregiously afflicted.
Still, even reserving compassion and outrage for the bad news, we should
recognize that there is plenty of good news. We live in an era that is
marked by triumphs of the human spirit: the collapse of the Berlin Wall
in 1989 and the fall of the Soviet Empire in 1991; the handshakes for
peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors in 1993; and the end of
apartheid in South Africa in 1994.
During this same period, there have been many quieter but equally hard-
won and promising examples of progress. Nations from El Salvador to
Ethiopia to Cambodia have moved from dictatorship to democracy;
countries from Argentina to India to China have moved toward open
markets. Open markets are conducive to open societies, and open
societies are conducive to basic political freedoms and to more peaceful
international relations.
American statesmen--both Democrats and Republicans, in both the
executive and legislative branches of our government--have played an
important, often essential part in creating what is essentially a better
world. But we can't rest; the work is not done. Now more than ever, the
world looks to our country for leadership. Now more than ever, the
rewards for our providing that leadership abroad will be realized here
at home. We face historic opportunities, not just to combat threats and
enemies, but also to build a world that reflects our ideals and promotes
our interests--a world that will be more prosperous and more secure not
only for our generation, but for our children's as well.
But while we have a great national opportunity for international
leadership, we do not yet have the necessary national consensus about
how to seize that opportunity. Instead, once again, for at least the
third time in this century, we face a great national debate--a debate
over America's role in the world and over what it takes to play the role
we should. The first two such debates came after the two world wars.
This one comes after the end of the Cold War. For that debate to lead
us, ultimately, to make the right decisions and to make the right
policies, it must take place not just inside the Washington beltway, or
on the floor of the U.S. Congress, or on the campaign trail in 1996,
which, of course, is already officially open to traffic; it must also
take place at gatherings such as this one.
Today, in the aftermath of the Cold War, just as in the aftermath of
other great struggles in our nation's history, there is a temptation to
draw back into ourselves, to devote all our attention and resources to
fixing our own problems--a temptation to let other countries fend for
themselves. This temptation is particularly evident in Congress, where
there are those, in both parties, who imply that we should duck--not
deal with--the international challenges of our era. This sentiment
echoes that of the short-sighted naysayers of the 1920s: the wrong-
headed patriots who rejected the League of Nations; embraced
protectionism; downplayed the rise of Mussolini, Hitler, and Stalin; and
opposed help to the victims of aggression and inadvertently endangered
our security, chanting all the while the crowd-pleasing mantra "America
first."
Arguments that would turn the American eagle into an ostrich have always
had a certain appeal: in part because we are separated by vast oceans
from Europe, Asia, and Africa; in part because we have long been at
peace with our immediate neighbors on this continent; and in part
because of our founding fathers' advice to avoid foreign entanglements.
Fortunately, for the United States and the world, the leaders of the
great coalition that won the Second World War learned several of the
lessons from the aftermath of World War I: The American statesmen of the
late 1940s and early 1950s resisted and rejected isolationism and
embraced internationalism instead. Through the Marshall Plan, GATT, and
the international financial institutions born at Bretton Woods, the
diplomats who were present at the creation of the post-World War II
world established the basis for a community of Western democracies and
for an increasingly interdependent and prosperous global economy. They
also created a mechanism to further the cause of enduring peace through
the United Nations Charter--a document inspired by American ideals and
largely written by American statesmen.
Now it is natural that internationalism is more likely to resonate with
the public mood when there is a clear-cut enemy such as Soviet
communism. During the Cold War, much of what we were for was dictated by
what we were against. The imperative of containing communism permeated
our policies. We formed alliances to defend against Soviet expansion; we
reached into our pockets for foreign aid to maintain our influence
against the encroachments of the Red Menace in what we used to call the
Third World; and we countered hard-eyed, stubborn, central-casting
Soviet diplomats on every issue and in every forum.
Now the Cold War is over, and with its end, we face a resurgence--here
on the home front--of those old temptations and delusions that got the
better of us in the 1920s. In short, the isolationist instinct is
twitching again in the American body politic. It is twitching in calls
for us to reject free trade agreements or to keep our distance from
foreign conflicts or to gut the UN. It is certainly twitching in calls
for us to slash the international affairs portion of the federal budget.
More accurately, I should say keep slashing, since international affairs
spending has already been cut nearly in half over the past decade. The
current international affairs budget of $21.2 billion, which President
Clinton has put before a skeptical Congress, represents only about 1.3%
of total federal spending. That 1.3% pays for all our embassies and
diplomats overseas, our foreign aid and economic assistance programs,
our participation in international organizations and our support for
multinational peacekeeping operations, many of our arms control and law-
enforcement initiatives, and our over- seas public information services.
Just 1.3% of our federal spending--that is how much, or, rather, how
little President Clinton is asking Congress to approve and the taxpayer
to fund in order to assure that Americans live, travel, and trade in a
safer, more stable, more prosperous world.
Yet, there is a move in Congress to slice more than 20% from this bare-
bones budget. If this move prevails, the result would be deep, across-
the-board cuts in all areas: It would eliminate most of our programs in
Latin America and Africa; it would force us virtually to withdraw from
international organizations such as the United Nations and the World
Bank; and it would require that we abandon international environmental
initiatives that protect the ozone layer, reduce greenhouse gases,
safeguard coral reef ecosystems, and slow unsustainable population
growth.
There is, in short, a view on Capitol Hill that we can have a foreign
policy on the cheap; that our truly vital interests in some sense end at
the water's edge. That view is just plain wrong and dangerously,
damagingly so. Why? Because our national well-being, our safety, and our
prosperity depend, to an unprecedented extent, on what happens in other
parts of the world; it depends on a continuation of that steady progress
I mentioned a moment ago--toward open societies and open markets.
The livelihood of our workers increasingly depends on their ability to
compete in global markets. That is as true in New York City as anywhere
else in the country. In 1993, the greater New York metropolitan area
exported some $50 billion of merchandise, representing more than 10% of
total U.S. exports. Those exports created over 900,000 jobs, so that one
out of every nine jobs in the New York area depends on exports.
No President in the last 40 years has done more than Bill Clinton to
open up new markets for American trade and investment. NAFTA and the
Uruguay Round of GATT are creating hundreds of thousands of good jobs
for Americans all across the country, including here in New York. The
President recognizes that there is still more work to be done in
breaking down barriers to doing business overseas, particularly in the
world's biggest emerging markets. That work is being done not just by
Secretary of Commerce Brown and his Under Secretary, your recent guest,
Jeff Garten; every American diplomat--from my boss, Warren Christopher,
on down, in Washington and in our posts overseas--has made economic
issues and U.S. commercial interests a top foreign policy priority.
The Clinton Administration is also focusing foreign policy resources on
those international threats that directly affect the safety of Americans
here at home--threats such as international crime, drug trafficking, and
terrorism. The evil cowards who struck last Wednesday in Oklahoma City
appear to be American citizens, but as the World Trade Center bombing
here in New York demonstrated, we face similar threats from overseas as
well. Thanks to the outstanding efforts of the FBI and the diplomatic
security agents in our embassy in Islamabad, we were able to catch Ramzi
Ahmed Yousef--the suspected mastermind of the Trade Center bombing--and
bring him back to New York to face trial. Clearly, now is not the time
to abandon the fight against international terrorism; we need a vigorous
presence abroad so that we can thwart such villains, whoever and
wherever they are.
At issue here is not just foreign policy but national security.
Security, writ large, is basically what foreign policy is all about; it
is about making--and keeping--the United States safe. That includes
keeping our economy strong, of course. But, as Secretary Perry told you
when he addressed this group, another important part of our security
policy is arms control.
Over the last two years, President Clinton has concluded landmark
agreements with Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia. As a result,
only one nuclear weapons state will be on the territory of the former
U.S.S.R., rather than four. Moreover, Americans can go to bed at night
knowing that the nuclear weapons of the old Soviet arsenal are no longer
pointed at our cities. Together with the Russians, Ukrainians, and
others, we have been destroying nuclear warheads at an unprecedented
rate. We are helping those former Soviet states to tighten their
custodianship of bomb-making materials, so that that stuff does not
someday end up in suitcase bombs available to rogue states and nuclear
terrorists.
Of course, even with these efforts, the United States and Russia will
remain the world's leading nuclear powers for the indefinite future. For
that reason, among many others, the Clinton Administration is committed
to helping Russia not just to reduce its Soviet-era nuclear arsenal, but
to stay on a reformist course as its economy and political system
evolve. Imagine our own future if Russia lapses back into tyranny or
disintegrates into ethnic violence and political chaos.
Furthermore, Russia's fate will very much influence--for better or for
worse--the fate of the other New Independent States of the former Soviet
Union--and vice versa. If, for instance, Ukraine successfully completes
the transition from its communist past, continuing on its current path
as an independent democratic state with an emerging market economy, then
other reforming states in the region, including Russia, are more likely
to succeed. Conversely, if Ukraine slips backward or lurches into
instability, it could drag much of the region with it.
There is now--and will continue to be for a long time, generations
probably--a great struggle going on in Russia, in Ukraine, and
throughout the former Soviet Union--a struggle between the forces of
reform and those of regression, between the new and the old, and between
various visions of the new, some hardly more savory than the old. We do
not know what the outcome of that struggle will be, but we know what we
want the outcome to be; we know where our interests lie; and we know
that the stakes are too high for us to remain on the sidelines. As
President Clinton has said, "if the forces of reform are embattled, we
must renew, not retreat from, our support for them."
Well, the forces of reform are clearly embattled now. That is one reason
why President Clinton is soon going to Moscow and Kiev--to reaffirm our
support for reform and our determination to advance our national
interests through international engagement.
I mentioned before the importance of our overseas campaign against
crime. Nowhere is that more vital than in the former Soviet Union. With
the rise of organized crime and other criminal activities, many Russians
have begun to equate a free market and democratic society with chaos and
a breakdown of law and order. As a result, the kind of iron-fisted
authoritarianism personified by the likes of Vladimir Zhirinovsky has
become more attractive to worried Russian voters. So we have made it a
top priority to help establish a law-enforcement infrastructure in these
countries. We are training local police, prosecutors, and judges. These
investments will pay immediate dividends to us, as well as long-term
ones: Fighting these outlaw organizations on their home turf is one of
the most effective ways to keep them from moving onto ours.
Our other investments in reform in the New Independent States will
benefit us in similar ways. When we help set up a stock market in Russia
or train journalists and television producers in Ukraine, we are making
a direct investment in our own long-term national security.
Let me turn to another dangerous but critical area where American
engagement and leadership are essential; that is, of course, the Middle
East. Securing a lasting and comprehensive peace between Israel and its
Arab neighbors has been a principal and bipartisan goal of American
foreign policy for more than four decades; resolving that conflict would
remove a major source of instability in an area of the world where we
have vital interests. Today, thanks in large part to Secretary of State
Christopher's persistent efforts--with the crucial help of my colleague
and your recent guest, Dennis Ross--such a comprehensive peace is closer
than ever.
As we reward the makers of peace, we must also deal firmly and
consistently with the enemies of peace. That is why it is so important
to continue our opposition to Iran and Iraq, the Middle East's most
dangerous actors. These two nations are not only the most ardent
opponents of the Middle East peace process; they are also the world's
most flagrant state sponsors of terrorism--and they both seek to become
nuclear powers.
Dealing with Iran and Iraq are just two of many instances in which we
can defend our interests in cooperation with others. The ultimate
guarantor of our security remains our capacity and willingness to act
forcefully and unilaterally when our interests are threatened. Our
military must remain modern, mobile, ready, and strong. It must be able
to deal promptly and decisively with any threat anywhere on earth. We
have the finest military on the planet, and it must remain that way. At
the same time, we must recognize that our freedom, security, and
prosperity are best assured with the active help of other free people--
all of whom are looking to us for leadership.
The most successful American-led coalition of our time is NATO, the
anchor of American engagement in Europe and the linchpin of
transatlantic security. NATO is, and must remain, a military alliance.
One of the essential elements of its success has been its rock-solid
commitment to collective defense, backed by a capacity to exert armed
force commensurate with the requirement of defending all members
equally. At the same time, the past five decades have demonstrated that
the enduring benefits of NATO are political as well as military. As
Secretary Christopher puts it, NATO has "helped to reconcile old
adversaries, to embed free countries in strong and solid institutions,
and to create an enduring sense of shared purpose in one another's
security."
Now that the Cold War has ended, we must work with our NATO allies to
bring the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union into a new European security order. If we meet that
challenge, then we will have dramatically reduced the chance of conflict
in the area where two world wars and a global cold war began.
When we talk about American leadership of international institutions, we
must also address the question of the United Nations--especially today,
since that organization has come under increasing attack. One leader on
Capitol Hill says that the UN is "the longtime nemesis of millions of
Americans." Another says that it is "a totally incompetent instrument
anyplace that matters." A bill has been passed by the House that would
effectively force the United States to stop paying our UN dues, thereby
reneging on our treaty obligations under the UN Charter. That bill is
designed not to reform the United Nations but to kill it. In the name of
a so-called Contract with America, it would abrogate the contract with
the world that Harry Truman signed almost exactly 50 years ago and that
every President since--Republican and Democrat--has reaffirmed.
The United Nations offers a unique and often indispensable mechanism to
further American-led efforts on behalf of global stability and security.
It enables us to maintain sanctions against rogue states such as Libya,
Iraq, and Serbia. UN peacekeepers are now helping to prevent simmering
conflicts from erupting into full-scale war in Cyprus, Lebanon, Kashmir,
and on the border between Kuwait and Iraq. In Cambodia, El Salvador, and
Mozambique, they have helped bring an end to civil wars, disarm and
reintegrate combatants into society, and supervise elections. Now, a
United Nations mission has stepped in to provide security and oversee
the process of elections in Haiti, thereby ensuring that the United
States will not have to go it alone--or pay all the costs--to bring
stability and democracy to that troubled nation just off our shores.
Speaking of cost, let me emphasize this point: The per capita price to
Americans for all the work the UN does--from blue helmets for
peacekeepers to polio vaccines for babies--is less than $7 per year--
about the same as the price of a hot dog and a Coke at Shea Stadium. Our
own country's direct participation in UN peace operations is modest. As
of January 1, 1995, the U.S. ranked 26th among nations in the number of
troops participating in peacekeeping operations around the world--behind
not only Canada and Poland, but also Ghana and Zambia.
There is no question the UN certainly has its share of management
problems that prevent it from functioning as efficiently and effectively
as it should. Here, as in all of our foreign policy programs, we must
make sure that American tax dollars are well spent. But the right cure
for the ills of the United Nations--or for any of our foreign policy
programs--is not to call for the services of Dr. Kevorkian, which is
what the Contract with America prescribes. Rather, we should administer
sound treatment. We should keep working to make this tool as useful and
efficient as possible. And that is exactly what the Clinton
Administration is doing.
As Secretary Christopher puts it, without international partnerships
such as those made possible by our leadership in the United Nations, we
would be left "with an unacceptable option each time an emergency arose:
a choice between acting alone or doing nothing." Such partnerships do
not always offer the perfect response. But then again, neither does
unilateral action--nor does inaction.
Yet inaction will increasingly become what might be called the default
option if we strip ourselves of the resources necessary to do what is in
our own national interest. Every single successful and promising foreign
policy and national security initiative I have mentioned in these
remarks would be in jeopardy if we cut our foreign affairs budget to the
extent and in the way that some are proposing.
Those cuts would represent--both symbolically and substantively--a
withdrawal from our position of international leadership. If we
withdraw, there is no other country that will step in and lead in our
place. Make no mistake about that. At the same time, make no mistake
that there are plenty of forces that will fill the vacuum we leave in
other ways, not at all to our liking or to our advantage.
That is why, just as the wise men put in place American foreign policy
after World War II, our generation of wise men and women must put in
place a foreign policy for the post-Cold War era that is equally hard-
headed and forward-looking--and that means outward-looking; a foreign
policy that is not penny-wise and pound-foolish; a foreign policy that
puts our money where our interests and principles are.
So by all means let us get on with the great debate, but let its
starting point be a shared recognition of our nation's three greatest
strengths: first, the strength and global appeal of our democratic
values and institutions; second, the strength of our economy, which
depends on global peace and stability; and third, the strength of our
military power. In short, we have the heart, the brains, the wallet, and
the muscle to exercise international leadership, and to do so on behalf
of our own interests as well as those of humanity as a whole. (###)
ARTICLE 3
Focus on the United Nations: UN Peacekeeping Operations
UN Peacekeeping Operations: Supporting U.S. Interests
The peace and security activities of the United Nations directly support
United States national interests.
Peacekeeping has the capacity, under the right circumstances, to
separate adversaries, maintain cease-fires, facilitate the delivery of
humanitarian relief, enable refugees and displaced persons to return
home, demobilize combatants, and create conditions under which political
reconciliation may occur and free elections may be held. In so doing, it
can help nurture new democracies, lower the global tide of refugees,
reduce the likelihood of unwelcome interventions by regional powers, and
prevent small wars from growing into larger conflicts which would be far
more costly in terms of lives and treasure.
[Were there no UN peacekeeping,] it would leave us with an unacceptable
option when emergencies arose: a choice between acting alone and doing
nothing.
--Secretary Christopher,January 6, 1995
Burdensharing. In the post-Cold War world, one of the best vehicles to
ensure burdensharing is peacekeeping. Nations that would not otherwise
deploy their military forces outside of their own borders send their men
and women around the world on UN peace missions. More than 90 nations
have deployed troops on UN missions; 77 countries have troops deployed
today. In February 1995, 25 nations had more troops deployed in UN
missions than did the United States. Since the U.S. makes many other
voluntary contributions in support of UN activities that directly serve
U.S. interests, this ranking is by no means indicative of our broader
role as an international leader. It is, however, indicative of the
contributions many other nations make in sharing the burden of keeping
the peace.
Beyond contributing their forces, other nations pay the lion's share of
the cost of UN peacekeeping operations--70% of total UN costs for
peacekeeping is assumed by other nations. The Administration seeks to
increase the non-U.S. burden to 75%.
Were it not for the United Nations, in many cases the United States
would be forced to act unilaterally. The U.S. share of the personnel and
finances of such operations would normally be far more than its
contribution to UN peacekeeping operations.
U.S. and UN: Acting in Concert. The map of UN peacekeeping deployments
closely parallels the pattern of U.S. interests. UN peacekeepers patrol
the borders of America's close ally, Israel. They separate forces tied
to our Greek and Turkish allies in NATO. They have helped resolve
festering regional conflicts in Europe, Southeast Asia, Southern Africa,
the Persian Gulf, and Central America.
The United Nations Security Council also provides international backing
for U.S. actions. In recent years, the UN authorized U.S. military
deployments in the Persian Gulf, Horn of Africa, and the former
Yugoslavia.
Most recently, the Clinton Administration won Security Council
authorization for deployment of a multinational force to Haiti that has
restored democracy. Security Council support was instrumental in gaining
agreement from more than two dozen other countries to participate in the
multinational force, maximizing global diplomatic support for the
operation and allowing the U.S. to execute the transition to a UN
peacekeeping force.
To the extent future peacekeeping missions succeed, they will lift from
the shoulders of American servicemen and servicewomen and the taxpayers
a great share of the burden of collective security operations around the
globe.
--Ambassador Madeleine Albright, September 23, 1994
UN peacekeeping forces moved in after U.S. forces had been drawn down in
Kuwait, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti. Their arrival allowed thousands of
U.S. forces to return home safely.
Humanitarian Relief. Concomitant with wars of ethnicity or nationalism
and by-products of failed states are mass migration, refugees, famine,
and disease. A necessary component of restoring peace and security is
stabilizing these calamities and then providing a way for refugees to
return home. The United Nations, particularly its High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), plays a key role in coordinating and delivering the
world's assistance.
In many instances, UN peacekeepers provide security for the return of
refugees and the delivery of humanitarian relief by UNHCR and the many
government and private voluntary groups that offer assistance.
Peacekeepers and relief organizations have worked side by side in
Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, Georgia, Mozambique, and elsewhere.
Were it not for the combined efforts of peacekeepers and relief workers,
millions more would have died in these conflicts alone. Thus, even when
peace has not yet been obtained, peacekeepers have made valuable
contributions by saving lives.
The American people overwhelmingly support helping the innocent victims
in such disasters, but they do not wish to act alone. The United Nations
relief and peacekeeping agencies together provide a vehicle for the
world to unite to deal collectively with such emergencies.
Role of Peacekeeping in U.S. Foreign Policy. Peacekeeping is one useful
tool to help prevent and resolve regional and other conflicts before
they pose direct threats to our national security, which can be
addressed only by the use of massive military force.
U.S. Participation in UN Peace Operations. In some circumstances, the
participation of U.S. military personnel in UN operations advances U.S.
interests.
-- First, U.S. military participation may be necessary to persuade
others to participate in operations that serve U.S. interests.
-- Second, U.S. participation may enable the U.S. to exercise influence
over an important UN mission without unilaterally bearing the burden.
-- Third, the U.S. may be called upon and choose to provide unique
capabilities to important operations that other countries cannot.
Command and Control. The President will never--and under the
constitution may never--relinquish his command authority over our
military personnel at any time. Command constitutes the authority to
issue orders covering every aspect of military operations and
administration. By law, the chain of command flows from the President to
the lowest U.S. commander in the field and remains inviolate.
It has been long-standing U.S. policy, when it serves U.S. interests, to
place U.S. forces under the temporary operational control of another
commander. We have done this since the Revolutionary War, through World
Wars I and II, Operation Desert Storm, and in UN peacekeeping operations
and NATO since their inceptions. This procedure enables the U.S. to
participate in operations that directly serve U.S. interests, such as
the UN mission in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, but limit
our exposure. Moreover, when we are willing to provide U.S. forces to
collective security actions, we reap the reciprocal benefits of having
the flexibility to use portions of other countries' forces, as in the
Gulf War, to achieve common military objectives.
U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations. The Clinton
Administration is pursuing policies to improve and reform UN
peacekeeping so that it better serves U.S. interests. In May 1994,
President Clinton signed a Presidential Decision Directive on Reforming
Multilateral Peace Operations. The policy is premised on the need to
reform, not debilitate, UN peacekeeping.
To maximize the benefits of UN peacekeeping, the United States must make
highly disciplined choices about when and under what circumstances to
support or participate in such operations. The need to exercise such
discipline is at the heart of President Clinton's policy, which requires
that tough questions be asked about the costs, size, risks, mandate, and
duration of operations before they are started or renewed. The U.S. has
not hesitated to use its position on the Security Council to insist that
satisfactory answers to these questions be provided prior to Council
action. The goal is simple: ensure that UN missions have clear and
realistic objectives, that peacekeepers are equipped properly, that
money is not wasted, and that an end-point to UN action can be
identified. That new policy is working and has resulted in fewer and
smaller new operations and better management of existing ones.
President Clinton's policy directive addresses six major issues of
reform and improvement:
-- Ensuring disciplined choices about which peace operations to support
and when to participate with U.S. forces;
-- Reducing U.S. costs for UN peace operations;
-- Reaffirming long-standing U.S. policy regarding the command and
control of U.S. forces in UN peace operations;
-- Reforming and strengthening the UN's capability to manage peace
operations effectively;
-- Improving the way the U.S. Government manages and funds peace
operations; and
-- Improving cooperation between the Executive Branch, the Congress,
and the American public on peace operations.
The Price of Peace
While the cost of UN peacekeeping has increased rapidly in the post-Cold
War era, the absolute cost to the U.S. remains a small portion of our
national security expenses--the equivalent of less than one half of 1%
of the Department of Defense budget. While UN peacekeeping costs can and
must be better contained, they represent a far cheaper choice than
either of the alternatives. UN peacekeeping is far more economical for
the U.S. than acting unilaterally or ignoring opportunities for peace
and confronting crises only after they have spread and directly threaten
U.S. national security interests.
Dramatic Cost Growth. During the Cold War, one or both of the two
superpowers generally opposed using UN peacekeeping to deal with most
crises. In the immediate aftermath of that period, however, both sides
urged the UN to create numerous new peacekeeping operations.
In the last Administration, the United States sponsored or supported UN
resolutions that increased the number of UN peacekeepers from fewer than
10,000 to more than 70,000. That seven-fold increase in the number of
peacekeepers deployed caused an increase in the cost of UN peacekeeping
operations by more than a factor of seven. It is the bow wave from those
increases that has presented the United States with the large UN
assessments that, as a formal U.S. treaty commitment, we have had to
face in the last few years.
Many of the large and most costly operations are now coming to a close.
The Cambodia mission, which at one point deployed almost 20,000
peacekeepers and was the largest operation ever attempted at that time,
has been completed.
Reducing Costs. The U.S. is actively working to lower our peacekeeping
assessment to 25% by October 1995. In addition to reducing the U.S.
share of UN peacekeeping costs, we must also reduce costs to all UN
members by finding ways for the UN to do needed missions more
efficiently. The United States has, for example, presented the UN with
an analysis of procurement procedures and specific proposals for cost
containment and reduction of peacekeeping costs. In addition, the U.S.
actively supported the recently adopted rules changes that reduce the
amount paid by the UN for heavy equipment (tanks, armored personnel
carriers) that troop contributors bring with them on peacekeeping
missions. We continue to actively pursue additional cost-containment
measures.
The greatest savings, however, will come from more discretion in
approving and sizing peacekeeping operations. Pursuant to President
Clinton's policy, the United States now requires internal U.S.
Government analyses of the potential costs, appropriate sizing,
probability of success, end-game/exit strategy, and other considerations
before supporting new UN peacekeeping operations. Moreover, we have been
able to gain UN Security Council agreement to a similar procedure
employed by that body prior to authorizing new missions. Rigorous
application of such analysis is a key element of reducing costs and
improving the quality of UN missions.
NOTE: Refer to hard copy of Dispatch for graphic of Troop Contributions
to UN Peacekeeping Operations as of March 31, 1995 and UN Peacekeeping
Operations With More Than 5,000 Troops. (###)
ARTICLE 4
Supporting the Economic Mission Of the Department of State
Joan Spero, Under Secretary for Economic, Business, And Agricultural
Affairs, David Ruth, Senior Coordinator for Business Affairs
Remarks at State Department briefing, Washington, DC, April 20, 1995
Under Secretary Spero. Thank you. Good afternoon. I will start off with
some general comments about what we are doing in support of our economic
mission here at the State Department, and then I will turn it over to
David, who will go into more detail about some of the specific work that
we are doing for U.S. companies. Then we will be happy to take your
questions.
Secretary Christopher has said that the promotion of economic security
is one of his highest priorities, and we are trying to carry out that
mission and those priorities in three principal ways.
First of all, we are working to build and modernize what we call the
economic architecture for the post-Cold War world. Many of you are
familiar with the preparations that we are now going through for the G-7
summit in Halifax. We are doing this not only in a multilateral way,
but regionally and bilaterally as well. All of this is with a view to
creating an international system that is more open, more market-
oriented, and that is better for world prosperity, and, we believe,
better for world peace.
In doing all of that, we are increasingly working here with U.S.
business. Let me just give you a couple of quick examples--one is APEC,
the Asia- Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. The purpose of APEC is
to foster open trade and investment in the region.
In my view, APEC is an example of what I would call a modern,
international organization in that it integrates business directly into
its activities. Business sits at the table in the APEC working groups;
they roll up their sleeves; they deal with very practical problems like
telecommunications or energy or transportation. So they are part of the
process.
Business also plays a very important formal and informal advisory role
at the policy level. In fact, business was quite important in developing
the agreement in Bogor last November which called for the achievement of
free trade and investment in the region by 2020, and we continue to work
very closely with the business community as we are trying to figure out
how to get from here to 2020.
Another couple of examples of the role of business in this new post-Cold
War architecture: I have just come back from India where we re-launched,
after five years, the Indo-U.S. Economic Commercial Sub-Commission. I
co-chair that with the Deputy Finance Minister of India.
We and our Indian counterparts agreed to focus, in this coming year, on
the issue of developing India's infrastructure. That is a subject of
great interest to U.S. business. In fact, we work very closely with U.S.
and Indian businesses as we develop the agenda for the meeting, and in
fact, we will have a working group of this sub-commission composed
exclusively of Indian and U.S. companies. That is a model that we are
applying elsewhere.
We have established the so-called Gore-Mubarak initiative--the U.S.-
Egypt partnership for economic growth and development. I traveled with
the Vice President to Egypt to hold the first meeting of that commission
within the last month. That commission also has a joint private sector
commission that will work in very practical ways to foster the growth of
the private sector in Egypt and to foster greater U.S.-Egyptian trade
and investment.
The second thing we are doing on the economic front is using economic
policy to support peace and democracy--the more traditional missions of
this Department.
I, personally, have been very much involved in the economic side of the
Middle East peace process, and again here, the private sector is playing
a very important role. There was a meeting--some of you were there--in
Casablanca last October. There will be a follow-up meeting in Amman this
October.
Those meetings involve not only government leaders but business people,
and they were designed to foster economic cooperation among businesses
in the region, designed to support not only prosperity but also the
peace process.
We are now working on a Middle East Development Bank. Again, that
Development Bank will be heavily focused on lending to--should it
actually be agreed upon and implemented-- will focus heavily on lending
to the private sector.
We are doing similar things in Russia and the New Independent States,
Haiti, and South Africa--involving the business community directly in
our activities.
Finally, we are--and this is really what we want to focus on today--we
also work on a very practical level to ensure that American workers and
American business can compete in the global economy. That is what we
call the "America Desk." The message has gone out in the Department and
abroad that economic policy matters and that looking out for U.S.
business matters.
The embassies, we believe, are absolutely critical in this effort. From
my ex-business perspective, I see the embassies as a distribution
channel, a delivery service for a lot of the products and services that
the Department offers to business. We do a couple of things primarily.
First, we support U.S. business in its efforts to export and invest in a
variety of countries around the world. We work closely with our
colleagues in the foreign commercial service; and where there is no
foreign commercial service, we do it ourselves.
Increasingly, we are finding that the leadership of the ambassador and
the expertise, knowledge, and contacts of the economic and political
officers in the embassies are very important tools for supporting
business.
There is another thing we do, and I do not think this is recognized or
understood enough, and that is problem- solving on behalf of U.S.
businesses.
One of the biggest problems we deal with on a day-to-day basis--that our
businesses face as they operate abroad--is intellectual property. We are
constantly working with governments abroad to urge them to develop, to
pass, to implement, and to enforce intellectual property legislation.
Another area: We have negotiated bilateral investment treaties around
the world that provide fair treatment for our businesses, and we work
with local governments to make sure that those treaties are implemented.
Another long-term example that I will cite briefly is dealing with the
problem of corruption. One of the major issues facing our companies
around the world--I hear from them constantly when I travel--is the
practice of bribery, which is prohibited by U.S. law but is fair game in
a lot of countries. We have pressed hard with other developed countries
through the OECD, and we have successfully concluded a code on bribery.
That is just a first step. We are now pushing the other developed
countries to develop and implement things--things that we would take for
granted here, such as you cannot deduct bribes from your tax return. You
can in some countries. We think that is kind of basic.
We are also taking the show on the road to developing countries. At the
Summit of the Americas, for example, last December, one of the
initiatives that we agreed on was expanding the work on combating
corruption, which is increasingly seen as undermining democracies around
the world.
We have been working hard for the last couple of years. I think we have
been able to bring about a dramatic change in the way the embassies do
business. Business people I have known for many years tell me that
whereas before they never would have thought of going to the U.S.
embassy, now it is their first port of call when they go to do business
abroad.
Our goal for the next two years is to try to bring that same perspective
to Washington--to bring business closer to the Department itself. To
explain some of that, I am going to turn the podium over to David
Ruth.
Senior Coordinator Ruth. I have some of my own private sector experience
with government to draw on, but I have talked to a number of companies
over the past month or two to see what it is they want from State and
what it is they feel they get and where we need to do better.
First of all--and Joan has described much of this--they want advice and
orientation as they are planning strategies for a market. They want to
know who's who, what's the politics, what's the economic policy, what's
the current state of relations with the United States, and where are
some of the leverage points.
Second, they want assistance with business problems, either in policy or
sometimes very practical things like making sure that they can get in
the door to make a bid. In some instances, they want advocacy, which is
to say, a visible expression of U.S. official interest, which, coming
from an ambassador or a senior official here at the Department of State,
can often be extremely effective in supporting a business deal,
particularly when there is government support for our competition.
In the past, State was not always seen as ready or willing to use those
assets and exercise our influence. Frankly, this was often frustrating
for a business, especially when other governments were acting on behalf
of their companies' own interests. That has changed over the last few
years, particularly in the embassies.
However, companies still tell us that it is difficult for them here in
Washington; it is difficult to find their way around this building; and
sometimes it is difficult to get a fast response. What is more, they do
not always feel as though their views are as fully integrated into the
policy-making process as they should be--which is the point of my
office--which is the point of the creation of the role of the
Coordinator for Business Affairs.
Our role has three separate parts. The first is to be a service center
for business--a first point of contact for companies--to help them tap
into the resources of the Department. Part of that is really speed. When
a company is trying to make a deal, sometimes being able to move fast,
get a fast word of support, and some fast information, will make all the
difference between them getting it or somebody else--a foreign
competitor--getting it.
Part of our service is going to be to keep track of companies more
closely so we are not just giving them one-shot advice, but we are
following them through the building and helping them to make sure we
have effective follow-up and effective action.
Another extremely important part of this, from my own experience, is
that we are now coordinating much more with other federal agencies--the
Department of Commerce, the Export-Import Bank, the Treasury Department,
and a whole range of other agencies that are involved in trade promotion
work. We coordinate among ourselves more than used to be the case. It
used to be you would have to go door-to-door to make sure that Commerce
was talking to State and State was talking to Treasury. We now can bring
that all together.
There is an advocacy center that works interagency in a trade promotion
coordinating committee--that is also an interagency body that allows us
to talk to each other, and that works a lot better than it used to.
So this kind of service is really--it works for a big company like my
former company, but it also is particularly useful for the smaller and
medium-sized companies that do not have the Washington resources, do not
know their way around the building, and need a first-point of contact
and some additional assistance.
The second part of our role will be to encourage outreach to the
business community to make sure we are consulting business as we make
policies that affect their interests. A lot of this happens as a daily
matter here and has for years. People talk to business about things like
civil aviation, commodities policy, telecommunications policy--a whole
range of things where business has a direct interest and where State has
a lead negotiating role.
As Joan has outlined, there are a number of new policy initiatives in
APEC, in India, and in the Middle East where business is now being
brought into the process more closely and earlier and more intensely to
make sure the outcome reflects their economic interests.
We will also be helping the Secretary and other senior policy makers get
the benefit of hearing business views, and the Secretary is already
doing a lot of this. We have a lot more planned to really bring people
through the door so that we are getting private sector advice on a
regular basis.
I should hasten to point out that business is not always going to be
happy with the policies we decide on in the end. The Department has
responsibility for a wide range of cross-cutting interests--everything
from human rights and national security matters to environmental issues.
These are not always going to work in favor--in support of what business
would have us do. However, even in these areas, we have a particular
responsibility to make sure that we hear business concerns about them,
understand the economic costs, the economic impact, and weigh those
concerns in the process.
Finally, the last piece is really making all this permanent. We will be
working to integrate support for business as a permanent part of the
State Department culture. We are already heavily involved in training.
We are training people when they come into the Foreign Service for the
first time. We are training desk officers. We are training DCMs--talking
to the ambassadors as they go out the door, and a lot of that is already
having its effect.
So I will conclude. The three pieces that we are doing in fulfilling
this mission to use the State Department's assets more effectively for
business really are direct assistance to companies, greater outreach on
policy issues, and making this a permanent part of the culture. Thank
you. (###)
ARTICLE 5
U.S.-Australia Joint Communique
Text of a joint communique released at the Australia-United States
Ministerial Talks, Washington, DC, April 19, 1995.
1. The United States Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, and
Secretary of Defense, William Perry, and the Australian Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Senator Gareth Evans, and Minister for Defense, Senator
Robert Ray, met in Washington, D.C. on April 19, 1995 to discuss global
and regional issues and to advance the U.S.-Australia relationship.
2. Both sides affirmed the importance of the Australia-United States
Ministerial Talks as an annual forum to review developments, exchange
views, and explore opportunities for expanded cooperation in pursuing
shared objectives. Looking forward to the 50th anniversary
commemorations of the end of World War II, the two Allies welcomed close
contact at the ministerial level as they shape their responses to new
challenges in the post-Cold War world. In their exchange of views, both
sides welcomed the growing sense of community in the Asia-Pacific, and
noted the positive development of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum as examples of the region's shared
commitment to peace and prosperity.
3. Both sides affirmed their strong support for APEC and for bold
implementation of decisions made at Bogor in November 1994 to achieve
free and open trade and investment by no later than the year 2020 (2010
for developed APEC member economies). To this end, they undertook to
work closely with Japan in its capacity as APEC chair for 1995 and with
all other APEC members to ensure APEC consensus at the Osaka meeting on
a credible, detailed action plan for achieving the Bogor declaration
goals.
Defense and Security Cooperation
4. Both governments affirmed the importance of peace and security in the
Asia-Pacific and recommitted themselves to promoting stability
throughout the region. They outlined their respective strategic planning
and high-level policy reviews, including the report on Security Strategy
for the East Asia-Pacific Region undertaken by the U.S. Department of
Defense and Australia's 1994 Defense White Paper. The United States
emphasized that its review reflected continuing vital national interests
in the region and reaffirmed that maintenance of a stable environment in
the Asia-Pacific is important not only for U.S. security but also for
economic cooperation and growth in the region. The United States
underscored its commitment to continuing strategic engagement through
alliances, highly-capable forward-deployed forces, access arrangements,
exercises, expanded trade and investment ties, and participation in
regional economic and security fora.
5. Australia welcomed the U.S. commitment to continuing strategic
engagement, noting that it constituted a key element of regional
stability and an important contribution to Australia's security. The
U.S. welcomed the emphasis in Australia's Defense White Paper on self-
reliance and the key role of the alliance with the United States in
Australia's defense policy. It also welcomed the priority accorded by
Australia to strategic engagement with the region and Australia's
commitment to substantial support for the United Nations.
6. Both nations stressed the importance of the Australia-U.S. alliance
in contributing to a stable and peaceful Asia-Pacific region. They also
affirmed the relevance of the mutual security obligations embodied in
the ANZUS treaty, and of the need for continued close consultation on
issues of mutual security concern. They agreed that the relationship has
evolved over five decades since World War II and grows ever stronger,
reflecting the depth of their shared democratic values and interests.
The United States and Australia also affirmed the need to reinforce
public understanding and support as the strategic partnership meets the
new challenges of the post-Cold War world.
7. Both countries emphasized the benefits of cooperation in a wide range
of areas including intelligence, training, logistics, defense science,
and access to advanced technology. The United States confirmed that
Australia, as a close ally of long standing and a major buyer of U.S.
defense equipment, would continue to receive preferential access to U.S.
equipment, intelligence and military science and technology to assist in
maintaining defense force readiness and capability at the level of
sophistication envisaged in Australia's defense policy. The U.S.
undertook to assist Australia in maintaining its F-111 capability
following the U.S. decision to withdraw the aircraft from service.
8. Both governments agreed that expanded industry access to each other's
defense markets would be a practical step to further strengthening of
the defense relationship. To this end, Secretary of Defense Perry and
Minister for Defence Ray signed today a Memorandum of Agreement Between
the Government of Australia and the Government of the United States of
America Concerning Reciprocal Defense Procurement. The agreement
establishes a framework to facilitate the efforts of each country's
industry to seek contracts in the other country. The memorandum should
pave the way to more open defense markets, with benefit to both
countries' industries.
9. Both governments affirmed the key role which activities supported
through the United States-Australia joint defense facilities continue to
play in supporting their security interests, including through
furthering post-Cold War regional and global peace and stability.
Cooperation in these pursuits is an important element in the bilateral
relationship, and the participants pledged to continue such activities
under arrangements which are beneficial to both countries.
10. Australia affirmed the importance of promoting regional security
through bilateral defense relationships with nations in the Asia-Pacific
and through appropriate multilateral mechanisms such as the Five Power
Defense Arrangements (FPDA). The United States emphasized the importance
of its regional alliances and agreements, and both sides noted, in
particular, the key contribution made to regional security by the U.S.-
Japan security relationship. The U.S. reaffirmed its determination to
work with Japan to maintain that relationship as a pillar of regional
security.
11. Both sides agreed to explore ways to enhance cooperative activities
and deployments in the Asia-Pacific intended to support regional peace
and security. To this end they agreed to continue regular official
consultations to harmonize defense activities in the region. Australia
noted that it would welcome additional opportunities to assist U.S.
military deployments and defense activities which advance shared
interests in the stability and security of the region, including
provision of access to Australian military training ranges and
facilities.
12. Australia noted the high-level visits between the United States and
New Zealand which resulted from the 1994 U.S. policy review and led to
the March 27 Washington meeting between President Clinton and Prime
Minister Bolger. The United States confirmed that the resumption of such
senior-level contacts did not signify a restoration of the previous
alliance with New Zealand under ANZUS. The United States expressed the
hope that these contacts, along with important changes in the
international environment since differences with New Zealand first
arose, will lead over time to changes in New Zealand policy which could
permit a restoration of the close security ties the two countries
previously enjoyed.
Regional Issues
13. The United States and Australia underscored the importance of the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in promoting multilateral security dialogue
and peace in the Asia-Pacific. The United States praised Australia's
leadership in hosting the first ARF intersessional seminar in November
which included defense policy specialists from most members and which
broadened understanding and support for trust-building and defense
transparency measures. Both sides agreed that the ARF Mixed Seminar on
Peacekeeping in Brunei in March which included military officers from
most members was useful in considering cooperation in support of UN
peacekeeping. The United States and Australia looked forward to
additional useful areas for cooperation emerging from the ARF
intersessional seminar on preventive diplomacy in Seoul in May.
14. Both sides believe it is very important that the ARF senior
officials meeting this May in Brunei lay the basis for decisions by
Ministers at the ARF in August on a concrete work program. The U.S. and
Australia noted that members would also want to agree on practical
cooperative outcomes at the ARF in August, in order to sustain
confidence in the utility of the ARF. Both sides looked forward to
continuing discussions at the ARF on the current security challenges in
the region. The United States and Australia strongly support Cambodia's
early admission to the ARF.
15. The United States and Australia expressed concern about recent
events in the Spratly Islands. They urged all the claimants to exercise
restraint, avoid further destabilizing actions, and intensify
cooperative efforts on South China Sea issues. Both sides also affirmed
their support for the 1992 and 1995 ASEAN statements on the South China
Sea. Stressing the need to encourage a peaceful solution to the dispute,
they noted with approval Indonesia's efforts in hosting the informal
South China Sea workshops, including plans for a sixth workshop this
year.
16. Both governments affirmed the importance to regional security and
global nuclear non-proliferation of compliance by the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) with its obligations under the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. Australia welcomed the DPRK's commitment, in
the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, to freeze and eventually dismantle its
existing gas-graphite moderated nuclear facilities under strict
monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency and return to full
compliance with its non-proliferation obligations. Australia expressed
appreciation for U.S. leadership in establishing the Korean Peninsula
Energy Development Organization (KEDO). The United States thanked
Australia for its financial contribution of US $5 million to KEDO. Both
sides noted that the Republic of Korea will assume the central role in
financing and construction of the light water reactor project and that
Japan will play a significant role in the project and other KEDO
activities. Both sides agreed broad multilateral participation and
contributions to KEDO were desirable.
17. The United States and Australia affirmed their willingness to
continue assisting with the reconstruction of Cambodia and supporting
the Royal Cambodian Government (RCG) in its efforts to promote
stability, economic development, administrative and military
professionalization and reform, good governance, transparency, the rule
of law, and respect for the human rights of all Cambodians. Both sides
condemned the Khmer Rouge for its ongoing acts of violence and brutality
against Cambodia's people and legitimate government. Both sides praised
the work of the International Committee on the Reconstruction of
Cambodia and urged the follow-on Consultative Group chaired by the World
Bank to promote common goals in Cambodia. Both urged that Cambodia, in
its own interest and that of the international community, keep open the
UN Human Rights Center Field Office in Phnom Penh.
18. Australia welcomed the expansion of U.S.-Vietnam relations and the
opening of liaison offices in Washington and Hanoi and noted that this
was in the best interests of both countries and regional peace and
stability. The United States affirmed its intention to utilize its
liaison office to promote further progress on POW/MIA issues, which
remains its highest national priority with respect to Vietnam. The
office will also seek to advance the human rights dialogue with Vietnam
and provide services to American citizens in that country. Australia
stressed its support for such a dialogue, noting that human rights
issues are an important part of its own broadening ties with Vietnam.
Both countries welcomed Vietnam's economic reform efforts and its
outward-looking foreign policy. In this context, they supported
Vietnam's closer integration with the Asia Pacific region and its
forthcoming membership of ASEAN.
19. The United States and Australia expressed disappointment at the lack
of progress by Burma on political liberalization and human rights. They
cited the failure of the Burmese government to resume dialogue with Aung
San Suu Kyi, release her and other political prisoners, pursue a serious
dialogue with the UN which produces real political change, agree to
prison monitoring by the International Committee of the Red Cross, and
work toward peaceful reconciliation with the Karen National Union and
other groups. While the release in March of some political prisoners was
encouraging, the United States and Australia called for more progress on
this and other issues of democracy and human rights. Both sides noted
that more than half of the heroin in the world, and more than two-thirds
of the heroin seized in the United States, has been traced to Burma.
Both urged the Burmese government to cooperate with the world community
in reducing the opium and heroin produced in Burma. Both sides affirmed
the need to work together with ASEAN nations and the international
community to encourage positive change in Burma.
20. The United States complimented Australia's hosting of the 1994 South
Pacific Forum meeting. The United States and Australia reaffirmed the
importance of the Forum and its contribution to broadening regional
dialogue. Both welcomed the increasing commitment of South Pacific
nations to pursuing sound economic and sustainable development policies.
Both sides noted the continued need for South Pacific nations to take
difficult economic decisions in order to promote prosperity and
development. Both anticipate a useful meeting of the South Pacific Forum
in Papua New Guinea in September.
International Issues
21. Both governments reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening the
United Nations as the pre-eminent international organization entrusted
with global security. Both agreed that increased cooperation in the
Security Council has rendered the UN more relevant, not only in the
resolution of regional conflicts, but also through multilateral action
in new and difficult areas of activity such as humanitarian emergency
assistance and the promotion of human rights and democracy. The United
States and Australia cited the importance of these efforts, while urging
reforms that will make the UN more effective in carrying out its growing
responsibilities.
22. Both sides agreed that, as the Security Council addresses
unprecedented challenges, the international community should consider
changes in Council composition to reflect new political, economic, and
security realities. They welcomed steps the Council has already taken to
increase transparency and exchange information with the general
membership. Both governments encouraged further exploration of practical
reforms in Council working methods and procedures.
23. Both governments noted the growing complexity of tasks facing
peacekeepers. Both recognized that, in the past, most UN peace missions
operated in non-hostile environments, and the difficulties of creating a
secure environment in the midst of ongoing conflict have engendered
frustration. Both affirmed that, while they support an active UN role in
maintaining international peace and security, operations in Somalia,
Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia showed that a continuing thorough
review is needed of how the UN decides, manages, funds, and supports
peacekeeping. Both sides agreed that mandates for peacekeeping
operations should include an explicit time frame and clear, practicable
goals. Both welcomed the UN General Assembly resolution in December
opening for signature a Convention on the Safety of United Nations and
Associated Personnel, which will provide further protection for UN
peacekeepers. The United States pledged to work closely with Australia
to promote more effective forms of UN preventive diplomacy.
24. The United States and Australia welcomed progress in the Middle East
peace talks during the year and recommitted themselves to support the
process, noting in particular the need for full implementation of the
Declaration of Principles between Israel and the Palestinians. They also
welcomed further Israeli-Syrian talks. Australia praised U.S. leadership
in seeking a comprehensive Middle East peace, and the United States
expressed appreciation for Australia's role in the multilateral phase of
the process, including its hosting later this month of the Water
Resources Working Group Workshop on Rainfall Enhancement. Both sides
reiterated their call for a speedy lifting of the Arab boycott on trade
with Israel.
25. The United States and Australia noted the March 14 UN Security
Council decision to renew international economic sanctions against Iraq
and the April 14 decision to permit selected humanitarian measures to
assist the people of Iraq. They called on Iraq to comply fully with all
relevant Security Council resolutions in order that the international
community could consider lifting the sanctions now in force. The U.S.
side highlighted the continuing importance of the UN-authorized
Multinational Interception Force in the Arabian Gulf in increasing the
effectiveness of the maritime regime and enforcing UN sanctions against
Iraq.
26. Australia observed that several Indian Ocean littoral states have
expressed interest in exploring ways to cooperate, especially in
economic relations. Australia noted that prospects for such cooperation
will be discussed at a mid-June conference to be held in Perth. The U.S.
side signalled its interest in such discussions and Australia undertook
to keep the U.S. informed of developments.
Non-proliferation And Arms Control
27. Affirming the centrality of nuclear non-proliferation to their
respective national interests, both governments underlined how essential
it is that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and
Extension Conference now under way in New York endorse an indefinite
extension of the NPT without conditions. Both sides affirmed a permanent
NPT as the foundation of a stable strategic environment for future arms
control efforts.
28. The United States and Australia affirmed their commitment to halting
the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems.
They expressed support for existing multilateral non-proliferation
treaties and committed themselves to continued close cooperation in
ensuring the effectiveness of the non-proliferation export-control
regimes: the Nuclear Suppliers Group; the Missile Technology Control
Regime; and the Australia Group which seeks to control the proliferation
of chemical and biological weapons.
29. Both sides expressed their determination to move forward on
establishing a new multilateral arrangement to promote responsibility
and transparency in trade in arms and dual-use items, and reaffirmed
that the new arrangement should prevent the acquisition of arms and
sensitive dual-use items for military end-uses in states whose behavior
is, or becomes, a cause for serious concern. They agreed on the need to
encourage participation in, and to establish guidelines for, the
information exchange begun at the Post-COCOM Working Group meeting [in]
Canberra in February 1995. Finally, both Australia and the United States
acknowledged the importance of establishing an effective COCOM successor
regime. In this regard, each government pledged to rededicate its
efforts to control dangerous conventional arms and associated dual-use
technologies and to promote similar responsible behavior by other
countries.
30. Both governments expressed determination to achieve, in negotiations
at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, a Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty at the earliest possible date. Australia praised the recent U.S.
decision to drop a ten-year CTBT withdrawal clause. Australia welcomed
the United States' national declaration of April 5, 1995, and the recent
statements of the other nuclear weapon states, providing negative and
positive security assurances to non-nuclear weapons states, and Security
Resolution 984 of April 11, 1995. Both sides welcomed the mandate
achieved in the Conference on Disarmament for the negotiation of a
multilateral treaty to ban the production of fissile material for
weapons purposes, and expressed support for the early commencement of
negotiations. Australia urged the United States to accede at an early
date to the protocols of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.
31. The United States and Australia affirmed their willingness to
explore areas in which Australia could cooperate in those elements of
the United States ballistic missile defense program which enhance the
common objectives of discouraging missile proliferation and affording
protection against missile attack. Both sides were pleased that an
initial program of cooperative activities was expected to begin this
year.
32. Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to work for the entry into
force of the Chemical Weapons Convention as soon as possible. Both
agreed on the importance of strengthening the Biological Weapons
Convention by encouraging more widespread participation in confidence-
building measures such as data submissions and by taking an active role
in drafting a legally-binding protocol.
Economic and Trade Issues
33. Both parties welcomed the entry into force of the World Trade
Organization at the beginning of the year and reaffirmed their
commitment to implement fully and on a timely basis their obligations
under the Uruguay Round agreements. They urged other WTO members to
implement their commitments in all areas fully and promptly. Both agreed
on the continued need to work toward a more liberal international
trading system. In this context, they agreed on the importance for
global growth of the liberalization of trade and investment around the
world.
34. Both countries agreed that continuing efforts to strengthen the
multilateral trading system and the liberalization of trade and
investment had the highest priority in their trade policies. They
expressed their undivided commitment to make the World Trade
Organization an effective organization. In this regard, it was noted
that the broadening and deepening of the disciplines in new areas such
as services and intellectual property and traditional areas such as
agriculture, along with more effective disciplines in activities such as
subsidies and grey-area measures, will substantially enhance the
credibility of the multilateral trading system.
35. The United States and Australia discussed trade relations and recent
developments concerning other major regional trading partners. Both
sides agreed on the importance of a strong U.S.-Japan economic
relationship and improved access to the Japanese market on an MFN basis
in order to promote global growth and increase trading opportunities for
all countries. Both sides reaffirmed their intention to work together to
pursue a commercially viable WTO accession agreement with China.
36. Both countries reaffirmed their commitment to reducing and
eliminating barriers to trade and to expanding bilateral trade and
investment flows. In that regard, Australia welcomed the debate on the
1995 Farm Bill and confirmed its intention to contribute to that debate.
They again noted that the Uruguay Round outcome would alleviate some
issues which have been sources of friction in the bilateral relationship
over recent years. The U.S. confirmed that the Export Enhancement
Program (EEP) and the Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP) had been
refocused so they can be used for market expansion in addition to
focussing on combating unfair trade practices. The U.S. reaffirmed that
it would seek to avoid using these programs in ways that undermine
Australia's legitimate interests.
37. Both governments renewed their commitment to the Trade and
Investment Framework Arrangement (TIFA), concluded in 1992, as a
mechanism for addressing trade and investment concerns and for pursuing
further expansion of trade and investment relations. Both sides welcomed
the TIFA Senior Officials Meeting in Canberra last month and looked
forward to a Ministerial-level TIFA Council meeting in Washington in
July 1995.
Conclusion
38. Both sides affirmed the value of
the annual Australia-United States Ministerial talks, and Australia
confirmed its invitation to the United States to take part in the next
round of talks in Australia in 1996.(###)
[END OF DISPATCH VOLUME 6, NO. 18]
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