U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 17, APRIL 24, 1995
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:

1.  The Non-Proliferation Treaty: The Case for Indefinite Extension--
Vice President Gore, Secretary Christopher 

2.  Comprehensive Engagement In U.S.-China Relations--Secretary 
Christopher, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian

3.  The U.S. and Pakistan Reaffirm Their Long-standing Relationship-- 
President Clinton, Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto,Joint Statement

4.  U.S.-Turkish Leadership in the Post-Cold War World--Deputy Secretary 
Talbott 

5.  A Humanitarian Exception to Iraqi Sanctions--Madeleine K. Albright, 
UNSC Resolution 

6.  Recent Efforts To Resolve the Balkan Conflict--Richard C. Holbrooke 

7.  APEC Finance Ministers' Meeting: Joint Ministerial Statement  


ARTICLE 1:

The Non-Proliferation Treaty: The Case for Indefinite Extension
Vice President Gore, Secretary Christopher

Vice President Gore
Remarks before the NPT Extension and Review Conference, New York City, 
April 19, 1995.

In just a matter of weeks, the world will commemorate the gathering in 
San Francisco half a century ago of delegates from some 50 countries who 
met--even as the final embers of world war smoldered in Europe and Asia-
-to create a new world body for the post-war era. The proposal to call 
this organization "the United Nations" was adopted by acclamation, 
amidst the hopes of all people for lives permanently free of the 
"scourge of war."

This moment of promise, however, coincided with the dawn of a new era in 
our world's history--the atomic age--an era that carried with it unique 
dangers to the future of humankind. 

As were those who created the United Nations, we are assembled at a 
moment of unusual opportunity and great risk. The confrontation between 
the United States and the Soviet Union has ended. Our governments have 
moved with great speed to put behind them a relationship based on a 
nuclear balance of terror. That alone profoundly diminishes the risk of 
nuclear war in the world, but it does not eliminate that risk. Should 
nuclear weapons proliferate, those risks could again increase, and the 
opportunity we currently have to reduce the global nuclear danger will 
be lost.

With this conference, the struggle to block the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons enters a critical phase. At the outset of the nuclear era the 
technological and financial requirements for constructing nuclear 
weapons could be met by only a few countries. That is no longer true. 
The knowledge and capacity to build nuclear weapons and their delivery 
systems increasingly is available. Most countries have recognized that 
the acquisition of nuclear weapons would bring greater insecurity and 
danger. But the few countries that wish to seek nuclear weapons have an 
increasing possibility of succeeding. Should they succeed, the 
consequences will not be merely local but, inevitably, global.

In short, the diminishing risk that nuclear war would be caused by one 
rivalry is offset by an increasing risk that it will be caused by 
others. It is axiomatic that continuing progress in controlling and 
eliminating nuclear weapons will be easier if the number of countries 
possessing them is not increasing. 

This, of course, is the essence of the challenge which the treaty was 
designed to meet. At the time of its creation, the treaty represented a 
delicate balance between competing and seemingly irreconcilable 
interests.

It met the security needs of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states. It 
also took careful account of the universal desire that peaceful nuclear 
technologies be made available for the general benefit of all peoples, 
while not leading to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The result 
was an agreement that balanced the interests of all sides and identified 
a path toward a more peaceful future.

First, declared nuclear weapons states would not assist others to 
acquire nuclear weapons, while non-weapons states committed to forswear 
these weapons for the duration of the treaty. States in a position to do 
so also undertook to share peaceful nuclear technology under strict 
international safeguards and accepted a solemn obligation to work for 
further disarmament measures.

Now, after a quarter of a century of experience with this treaty, we are 
gathered to determine whether the cause of peace is best served by 
continuing the treaty under temporary arrangements or, by using our one-
time option to give it a permanent basis, by supporting its indefinite 
extension without conditions.

The United States believes that it is vital that the treaty be extended 
indefinitely--without conditions. I am here to represent my country and 
my President in explaining why we hold this belief so firmly and to 
discuss the reasons why we disagree with other approaches--much as we 
understand and respect the concerns that these approaches reflect.

The case for indefinite extension can be stated succinctly and 
convincingly. First and foremost, the treaty creates a more secure world 
for all its members--nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons 
states alike. By providing an internationally recognized, verifiable 
means for states to foreswear nuclear weapons forever, the treaty helps 
prevent regional rivalries from evolving into regional nuclear arms 
races. Without the treaty, many more nations already would have decided, 
however reluctantly, that they needed nuclear arms to deter a neighbor 
or hedge against future uncertainty. By making it possible for the vast 
majority of the world's nations to remain non-nuclear without 
jeopardizing their security, the treaty reinforces the global stability 
that is a necessary foundation for further progress in arms control and 
disarmament.

While we believe the case for indefinite extension is compelling, any 
candid evaluation of the treaty must respond to the principal arguments 
that are often directed against it. These arguments are: first, that the 
treaty is inherently discriminatory; second, that the nuclear weapons 
states have failed to live up to their commitments under Article VI; 
third, that the indefinite extension of the treaty without conditions 
will free the nuclear weapons states from effective further pressure to 
disarm; fourth, that the treaty exposes non-nuclear states to the risk 
of intimidation by nuclear weapons states and states not party to the 
treaty; and fifth, that permanent extension of the treaty without 
conditions will destroy the capacity of the agreement to be adapted to 
future circumstances. I shall speak to each of these issues.

First, it is true that the treaty recognized as a matter of practical 
necessity an initial division of states between those possessing nuclear 
weapons and those who pledged not to acquire them at all. But the treaty 
did not create a permanent class of nuclear weapons states.

What the treaty did create was a requirement that those who already 
possessed nuclear weapons not help others to acquire them, coupled with 
a binding legal obligation under Article VI to pursue good-faith 
negotiations on nuclear arms control and disarmament. By extending the 
treaty indefinitely, non-nuclear weapons states will ensure that this 
obligation remains permanently binding and will create the conditions 
for its ultimate achievement.

Second, some argue that the nuclear weapons states have failed to live 
up to their commitments under Article VI. Here, the evidence strongly 
supports the case that the trend among nuclear weapons states is running 
strongly in the direction prescribed by their obligations under Article 
VI of the treaty.

--  The United States and Russia have, under the INF Treaty, eliminated 
an entire class of nuclear weapons delivery systems.

--  Last December, the United States and Russia, along with Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Kazakhstan, brought the START I Treaty into force, and 
under its terms, 9,000 nuclear weapons will be removed from delivery 
vehicles subject to elimination under this treaty.

--  The statesmanship of the leaders of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine 
have resulted in these nations eschewing nuclear weapons. It is 
appropriate today that we salute these three nations, whose decisions to 
eliminate the nuclear weapons on their territories and accede to the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapons states represent true 
steps forward for peace.

--  The United States and Russia are working with our legislatures to 
ratify the START II Treaty, which will remove another 5,000 weapons from 
the deployed arsenals of the United States and Russia.

--  Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin have agreed to deactivate systems 
scheduled for elimination under START II after that treaty has been 
ratified.

--  We also have agreed to detarget our nuclear missiles so that no 
nation's children are targeted by these weapons.

--  To further match our words with deeds, the United States has stopped 
producing fissile materials for nuclear explosives. In addition, 
President Clinton has launched a new, global effort to halt the 
production of fissile materials for nuclear explosives.

--  Last month, President Clinton announced that the United States would 
remove 200 metric tons of fissile material from its stockpile so that it 
never again could be used for nuclear weapons. Last year, for the first 
time, the United States submitted weapons material from our stockpile to 
IAEA safeguards.

These are the tangible forms of progress toward fulfillment of Article 
VI and important building blocks as we design the structures for peace 
and security in the 21st century. But we must continue to build upon 
them in the days and weeks ahead.

For this reason, both President Yeltsin and President Clinton last 
September directed their experts to develop steps to adapt nuclear 
forces to the changed international security climate and stated publicly 
their shared belief that this changed climate will permit--and indeed, 
require--additional progress in reducing the size and structure of their 
nuclear forces and to look forward to the possibility of continued 
reductions.

Indeed, only two weeks ago in Geneva, Russia, France, and the United 
Kingdom joined the United States to solemnly reaffirm our commitment, as 
stated in Article VI, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective 
measures relating to nuclear disarmament, which remains our ultimate 
goal.

We also have instructed our delegation in Geneva to conclude a 
comprehensive test ban treaty "at the earliest possible time." To 
further propel that effort, the President has extended the U.S. 
moratorium on nuclear tests to overlap with the expected completion of 
test ban negotiations, and he withdrew a previous U.S. proposal for a 
10-year withdrawal provision in the test ban treaty.

If the Conference on Disarmament does its job, we are prepared to 
conclude that the United States has already conducted its last nuclear 
test.

The third argument made against indefinite extension of the NPT is that 
it will free the nuclear weapons states from effective further pressure 
to disarm. Rather than indefinite extension, some argue that the best 
way to ensure that the major nuclear weapons states move toward 
disarmament is to hold the NPT hostage by subjecting it to periodic 
live-or-die votes or by extending it with conditions of a sort that 
reintroduce the live-or-die principle by indirect means.

There are two very serious flaws to this argument. First, as regards the 
major nuclear weapons states, the last thing that we need as we wrestle 
with the problem of further constraining nuclear weapons in ways that 
are irrevocable is for the treaty itself to become a covenant subject to 
revocation at regular intervals. It is worth noting that even one of the 
longest review periods under discussion--25 years--is well within the 
service lifetime of a major nuclear weapons system. In practical effect, 
rolling periods of review can have the same consequences for nuclear 
planning as would a decision taken right now to terminate the treaty.

Second, making the treaty subject to periodic risk will send a very 
powerful signal to states that aspire to acquire nuclear weapons. Such a 
decision will encourage them to hold their options in reserve rather 
than to accept the permanence of their obligations under the treaty. 
States not party to the treaty will be encouraged to hope that it will 
one day fall away.

Introducing uncertainty into the calculus of nuclear decision-making 
will not reinforce the goals of the NPT. On the contrary, it will 
threaten the real progress that is now being made among the original 
nuclear weapons states, and it will encourage would-be proliferators to 
lie low and to clandestinely pursue their objectives.

The fourth argument made against indefinite extension of the treaty is 
that the treaty exposes non-nuclear states to the risk of intimidation 
by nuclear weapons states and states not party to the NPT.

Since the nuclear weapons states clearly understand that damaging the 
NPT also damages their own security, they have strong motives to refrain 
from nuclear threats and, instead, to provide credible assurances 
designed to allay the concerns of others. That is why, earlier this 
month, President Clinton issued a declaration providing robust positive 
and negative security assurances. Each of the other four nuclear weapons 
states has provided parallel statements.

Earlier this month, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution 
welcoming these assurances and setting forth in unprecedented detail the 
means to respond in the event that a non-nuclear party to the treaty is 
subject to a nuclear threat.

In addition, the very success of the NPT builds a barrier against 
nuclear threats, whether by parties or non-parties. By establishing a 
global norm for non-proliferation, a norm that the world community has 
demonstrated it is willing to defend, the treaty has far more 
effectively discouraged nuclear intimidation than would the 
indiscriminate threat of nuclear weapons. 

Finally, in response to the fifth argument that an indefinite extension 
of the NPT without conditions will set it in stone and destroy its 
ability to meet changed circumstances, I would point first to the 
radical changes in the world that the treaty has handled without 
difficulty, and I would also point to reserves of flexibility inherent 
in procedures for review and amendment that are built into the treaty 
and will not be altered by a decision to extend it indefinitely without 
conditions. The treaty provides for a review at five-year intervals, 
giving all parties the opportunity to raise concerns about the operation 
of the treaty. Even with indefinite extension of the treaty, these 
reviews will continue, and I pledge that the U.S. will work closely with 
other delegations to ensure that the review mechanism remains vital and 
effective. The NPT will remain a living document.

In short, I believe that all of the questions and criticisms of the NPT 
can be answered, not only by logic and argument but by the performance 
of the treaty and its parties over the past 25 years. 

In the post-Cold War era--an era in which superpower confrontation has 
been replaced by cooperation to eliminate nuclear arms but in which the 
dangers of nuclear proliferation are increasingly apparent--the treaty 
remains central to the cause of peace.

We ask you--the representatives of the largest community of nations to 
adhere to any arms control agreement--to support the indefinite and 
unconditional extension of the treaty, not as a favor or concession to 
anyone but because it is deeply in the security interests of each one of 
us to do so.

Even more than when it was concluded 25 years ago, the treaty reduces 
the nuclear threat faced by each and every one of its parties, creates 
the basis for international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy, and makes a critical contribution to the global stability needed 
to achieve further measures of arms control and disarmament.

The decision that you must make on the future duration of the treaty is 
a momentous one. It will not only affect the policies of governments but 
the future of all peoples. These are choices for which we must expect to 
be held fully accountable.

A quarter-century ago, legislative bodies throughout the world in 
ratifying the treaty, accepted that they would be bound by a decision 
made by a majority of the parties. Any suggestion that this decision 
might be made through secret ballot undermines the democratic spirit of 
that process. We must expect to take responsibility for our actions. 
Nations which call for accountability must accept its burdens. The 
United States strongly rejects any notion that the decisions of this 
conference cannot stand the light of day and calls upon all countries to 
vote openly. 

When the Non-Proliferation Treaty was put into force 25 years ago, few 
could have suspected the difference it would make in all our lives. 
Today, we know what those who were present at the creation of the atomic 
age could only hope--that proliferation can be halted and that nations 
can work together to protect their mutual security. We cannot rest--will 
not rest--until those goals--and the Non-Proliferation Treaty-- become 
enduring realities. 

One of my country's greatest leaders, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, told 
the American people in a moment of crisis that their generation had a 
"rendezvous with destiny." It was a phrase that caused our entire nation 
to realize that we held in our own hands the power to decide the outcome 
of great issues. We, too, are at a moment that should be considered a 
rendezvous with destiny. In this moment of decision, therefore, with 
faith in peace as our guide, and the hopes of our children as our 
inspiration, I urge you to choose rightly by voting to extend this vital 
treaty indefinitely and without conditions.



Secretary Christopher

Welcoming remarks to the Non-Proliferation Treaty Extension and Review 
Conference, New York City, April 17, 1995.

Mr. President, distinguished delegates: It is a great privilege as 
foreign minister of the host country to welcome you to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty Extension and Review Conference.

Let me congratulate you, Ambassador Dhanapala, on your election as 
president of this historic conference. My colleagues from around the 
world and I have high confidence in your capable leadership.

It is fitting that we should meet at the United Nations to deliberate 
the future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty--the NPT. Few agreements have 
better embodied the principles that have guided this institution since 
its creation. Indeed, the collective force of the NPT has been a shining 
example of what nations can do, in the words of the UN Charter, "to 
unite our strength to maintain international peace and security."

We should recall the world in which the NPT came into force a quarter-
century ago. The Cold War struggle had created a nuclear standoff that 
threatened the survival not only of the United States, the Soviet Union, 
and their allies--but that of every nation. That struggle also 
contributed to a costly and dangerous global nuclear arms race. The 
prospect of 10 or more new nuclear powers seemed just over the horizon. 
It was a world in which fear outpaced hope.

Today, we live in a safer, freer, and better world. The Cold War is 
over; the strategic forces of the superpowers are standing down while 
their nuclear arsenals are shrinking dramatically. The international 
community has done its part to reduce the nuclear danger for the entire 
world. The heart of this effort has been the NPT. Simply put, the NPT 
has worked.

I believe that the NPT truly is one of the most important treaties of 
all time. Many of the NPT's achievements cannot be quantified--the 
weapons not built, the nuclear materials not diverted, and the wars not 
started. But the results are nonetheless impressive. Since coming into 
force, the NPT has kept the number of nuclear powers far lower than 
initially forecast, it has given the parties confidence in the nuclear 
intentions of other nations, it has reduced the risk of nuclear 
conflict, it has advanced nuclear disarmament, it has bolstered regional 
security, it has promoted the safe and peaceful use of nuclear energy, 
and it has undergirded the international community's efforts to halt the 
spread of all weapons of mass destruction.

By its purpose and its strength, this treaty has earned the widest 
adherence of any international arms control agreement. The nations 
assembled here have supported the NPT because it has benefited all of 
us. It has protected the security of the nuclear and the non-nuclear, 
the strong and the less powerful, the land-locked and the coastal 
states. As President Kennedy said before the UN in 1961:

A nuclear disaster, spread by winds and water and fear, could well 
engulf the great and the small, the rich and the poor, the committed and 
the uncommitted alike.

Fortunately, the disaster of which President Kennedy warned has not come 
to pass. The international community has taken important steps to 
diminish the nuclear threat. The number and reach of nuclear weapons- 
free zones is growing. The nuclear arsenals of the two former Cold War 
adversaries are being reduced by almost two-thirds. Negotiations are 
advancing on a comprehensive test ban treaty and a cutoff on the 
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

The purpose of the NPT is to preserve the security of all, not the 
nuclear weapons monopoly of a few. The nuclear weapons states have 
committed themselves to pursue negotiations for nuclear disarmament, 
which remains our ultimate goal. The treaty is the basis for assurances 
to non-nuclear treaty partners that their security interests continue to 
be served by their wise and far-sighted choice.

The security that the NPT helps provide must be constantly reinforced. 
Even in a world in which hope is now outpacing fear, we know that the 
future is by no means free from danger. While the prospect of global 
nuclear war recedes, the prospect of the spread of nuclear weapons 
remains. Together, we share the responsibility to meet that common 
threat.

In the next four weeks, the nations assembled here will reach a decision 
with the most fateful consequences for their national security and for 
world peace. For all nations and all peoples, the future of the NPT will 
be even more important than its past. Thank you very much. (###)




ARTICLE 2:

Comprehensive Engagement in U.S.-China Relations
Secretary Christopher, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian
Remarks during press availability, New York City, April 17, 1995

Secretary Christopher. I'm very pleased to welcome here to New York this 
morning Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian of China. Today's meeting 
is our third meeting in the last six months carrying out the President's 
strategy of comprehensive engagement.

I'm very pleased to see Minister Qian. We have developed a good and 
durable relationship with each other. I think that today's meeting is a 
good example of the current relationship we have.

One of the most important things we share with China, of course, is the 
need to combat the spread of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction, 
and   so it's especially fitting that we are meeting today on the 
inauguration of the international conference on the extension and review 
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The NPT truly is one of the most important treaties of all time. It has 
done a number of very significant things--reducing the risk of nuclear 
conflict, promoting the safe and peaceful use of nuclear energy, and 
strengthening the international community's efforts to keep nuclear 
weapons out of the hands of rogue states and terrorists. The treaty has 
bolstered international security, both in a regional and global sense, 
not least in northeast Asia. For all these reasons, we hope that China 
will support the unconditional and indefinite extension of the treaty.

Working together with the minister and with other colleagues in both of 
our governments, we have made substantial progress on a number of non-
proliferation issues that are on our agenda today. Last October, the 
Vice Premier and I signed a joint statement in which China agreed not to 
export ground-to-ground missiles covered by the Missile Technology 
Control Regime--MTCR--and we worked together on a global ban on the 
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Just last week, we 
held talks in Washington on how we might eliminate impediments to 
expanded nuclear cooperation between our countries. The United States 
also has welcomed China's support of our efforts to ensure peace and 
stability on the Korean Peninsula when it emphasized that the 
implementation of the Framework Accord between the United States and 
North Korea is of great importance. Any steps by North Korea to break 
the treaty by its nuclear program would be regarded by the United States 
as a very serious matter.

Our comprehensive engagement with China also has advanced our shared 
interest in open trade. In February, we reached an agreement to protect 
intellectual property rights in China--an agreement that gives American 
and other foreign exporters and investors greater confidence that the 
rule of law will be respected within China. That agreement also 
provides, as you know, for improved market access for information and 
entertainment products in China.

We want to emphasize that the United States strongly supports China's 
accession to the World Trade Organization. At the same time, we believe 
that its membership must be on a basis consistent with the obligations 
to which all members of the WTO have adhered. China's membership in the 
WTO will help American and other foreign goods compete on a more level 
playing field in Chinese markets. I'm very pleased to note that China 
has reached a decision to reopen negotiations next month on WTO 
membership.

Human rights remains a very important aspect of our relationship because 
of the values America shares with many people on both sides of the 
Pacific and our interest in political stability and the rule of law. 
Certainly, the Vice Premier and I will devote some of our discussion 
today to that important issue.

A theme that runs through all the issues on our agenda is the importance 
of upholding international norms. We are both members of the Security 
Council--both permanent members of that important council--as great 
trading nations. The interests of our two nations are served by 
agreements that protect us from the threat of nuclear weapons, by 
agreements to keep our markets open, and by our agreement to help our 
people reach their full potential as workers, consumers, and citizens.

In conclusion, let me emphasize that our goal remains a broad and strong 
relationship with a stable, prospering, and strong China--a China that 
is a full and constructive member of the international community. By 
working together, I believe we can make an important contribution to 
peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and around the world. So 
I very much look forward to my discussion today with the Vice Premier 
and also to responding to your questions after he has an opportunity to 
make the remarks that he might want to make.



Foreign Minister Qian. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your statement. I 
am very pleased to have this opportunity to meet in New York with you 
once again, Mr. Secretary, as the NPT Extension and Review Conference is 
beginning. Undoubtedly, I will exchange views with you on the NPT 
extension issue as well as other non-proliferation issues. I also look 
forward to reviewing together with you, Mr. Secretary, the development 
of Sino-U.S. relations since our meeting last October and also to 
exchanging views with you on other international issues of common 
interest.

I would like to point out that, recently, Sino-U.S. relations have 
registered some positive development. This is gratifying, but in this 
relationship there are also problems and difficulties which both our two 
sides should make efforts to resolve. The current international 
situation is not all that stable. Under these circumstances, the 
development of Sino-U.S. relations in the stable and smooth manner 
between China and the United States--the two big countries--is in the 
interest of our two peoples and also in our two countries' fundamental 
interest. It also would contribute to a healthy and stable development 
of the global situation. 

I hope our meeting this time will, as did our previous meetings, achieve 
positive results and advance the development of Sino-U.S. relations and 
make a contribution toward world peace and stability. Thank you. (###)




ARTICLE 3:

The U.S. and Pakistan Reaffirm Their Long-standing Relationship
President Clinton, Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto, Joint Statement

President Clinton, Prime Minister Bhutto
Remarks following White House meeting, Washington, DC, April 11, 1995.

President Clinton. Please be seated. Good afternoon. It is a great 
pleasure for me to welcome Prime Minister Bhutto to the White House. I 
am especially pleased to host her today because of the tremendous 
hospitality that the Prime Minister and the Pakistani people showed to 
the First Lady and to Chelsea on their recent trip.

I have heard a great deal about the visit--about the people they met, 
their warm welcome at the Prime Minister's home, and about the dinner 
the Prime Minister gave in their honor. The food was marvelous, they 
said, but it was the thousands of tiny oil lamps that lit the paths 
outside the Red Fort in Lahore that really gave the evening its magical 
air. I regret that here at the White House I can match that only with 
the magic of the bright television lights. 

Today's meeting reaffirms the long-standing friendship between Pakistan 
and the United States. It goes back to Pakistan's independence. At the 
time, Pakistan was an experiment in blending the ideals of a young 
democracy with the traditions of Islam. In the words of Pakistan's first 
President, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Islam and its idealism have taught us 
democracy. It has taught us the equality of man, justice, and fair play 
to everybody. We are the inheritors of the glorious traditions and are 
fully alive to our responsibilities and obligations. Today, Pakistan is 
pursuing these goals of combining the practice of Islam with the 
realities of democratic ideals, moderation, and tolerance. 

At our meetings today, the Prime Minister and I focused on security 
issues that affect Pakistan; its neighbor, India; and the entire South 
Asian region. The United States recognizes and respects Pakistan's 
security concerns. Our close relationship with Pakistan is matched with 
growing ties with India. Both countries are friends of the United 
States, and, contrary to some views, I believe it is possible for the 
United States to maintain close relations with both countries. 

I told the Prime Minister that, if asked, we will do what we can to help 
these two important nations work together to resolve the dispute in 
Kashmir and other issues that separate them. We also will continue to 
urge both Pakistan and India to cap, reduce, and finally eliminate their 
nuclear and missile capabilities. As Secretary Perry stressed during his 
visit to Pakistan earlier this year, we believe that such weapons are a 
source of instability rather than a means to greater security. I plan to 
work with Congress to find ways to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons 
and to preserve the aims of the Pressler Amendment while building a 
stronger relationship with a secure, more prosperous Pakistan. Our two 
nations' defense consultative group will meet later this spring.

In our talks, the Prime Minister and I also discussed issues of global 
concern, including peacekeeping and the fight against terrorism and 
narcotics trafficking. I want to thank Prime Minister Bhutto and the 
Pakistani officers and soldiers who have worked so closely with us in 
many peacekeeping operations around the globe, most recently in Haiti, 
where more than 800 Pakistanis are taking part in the UN operation.

On the issue of terrorism, I thank the Prime Minister for working with 
us to capture Ramszi Yousef--one of the key suspects in the bombing of 
the World Trade Center. We also reviewed our joint efforts to bring to 
justice the cowardly terrorist who murdered two fine Americans in 
Karachi last month. I thanked the Prime Minister for Pakistan's effort 
in recent months to eradicate opium poppy cultivation, to destroy heroin 
laboratories, and just last week, to extradite two major traffickers to 
the United States. We would like this trend to continue.

Finally, the Prime Minister and I discussed the ambitious economic 
reform and privatization programs she has said will determine the well-
being of the citizens of Pakistan and other Muslim nations. Last year, 
at my request, our Energy Secretary, Hazel O'Leary, led a mission to 
Pakistan which opened doors for many U.S. firms who want to do business 
there. Encouraged by economic growth that is generating real dividends 
for the Pakistani people, firms in the U.S. and other foreign firms are 
beginning to commit significant investments, especially in the energy 
sector. I am convinced that in the coming years, the economic ties 
between our people will grow closer--creating opportunities, jobs, and 
profits for Pakistanis and Americans alike. 

Before our meetings today, I was reminded that the Prime Minister first 
visited the White House in 1989 during her first term. She left office 
in 1990, but then was returned as Prime Minister in free and fair 
elections in 1993. Her presence here today testifies to her strong 
abilities and to Pakistan's resilient democracy. It is no wonder she was 
elected to lead a nation that aims to combine the best of the traditions 
of Islam with modern democratic ideals. America is proud to claim 
Pakistan among its closest friends. 



Prime Minister Bhutto. Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: I would like 
to begin by thanking the President for his kind words of support and 
encouragement.

Since 1989--my last visit to Washington--both the world and Pakistan- 
U.S. relations have undergone far-reaching changes. The post-Cold War 
era has brought into sharp focus the positive role that Pakistan--as a 
moderate, democratic, Islamic country of 130 million people--can play 
and the fact that it is strategically located at the tri-junction of 
South Asia, Central Asia, and the Gulf--a region of both political 
volatility and economic opportunity.

Globally, Pakistan is active in UN peacekeeping operations. We are on 
the forefront of the fight against international terrorism, narcotics, 
illegal immigration, and counterfeit currency. We remain committed to 
the control and elimination of weapons of mass destruction, as well as 
the delivery systems, on a regional, equitable, and nondiscriminatory 
basis. 

Since 1993, concerted efforts by Pakistan and the United States to 
broaden the base of bilateral relations have resulted in steady 
progress. In September 1994, in a symbolic gesture, the United States 
granted Pakistan about $10 million in support for population planning. 
This was announced by the Vice President at the Cairo summit on 
population planning. This was followed by the presidential mission, led 
by Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary, which resulted in an agreement worth 
$4.6 billion being signed. Now, during my visit here, we are grateful to 
the Administration and the cabinet secretaries for having helped us sign 
$6 billion more of agreements between Pakistan and the United States.

During the Defense Secretary's visit to Pakistan in January 1995, our 
countries decided to revive the Pakistan-United States Defense 
Consultative Group. More recently, we had the First Lady and the First 
Daughter visit Pakistan, and we had an opportunity to discuss women's 
issues and children's issues with the First Lady. We found the First 
Daughter very knowledgeable--we found Chelsea very knowledgeable on 
Islamic issues. I am delighted to learn from the President that Chelsea 
is studying Islamic history and has also actually read our Holy Book--
the Koran Shariah. 

I am delighted to have accepted President Clinton's invitation to 
Washington. This is the first visit by a Pakistani chief executive in 
six years. President Clinton and I covered a wide range of subjects, 
including Kashmir, Afghanistan, Central Asia, the Gulf, Pakistan-India 
relations, nuclear proliferation, UN peacekeeping, terrorism, and 
narcotics.

I briefed him about corporate America's interest in Pakistan, which has 
resulted in the signing of $12 billion worth of MOUs in the last 17 
months since our government took office. I urged an early resolution of 
the core issue of Kashmir, which poses a great threat to peace and 
security in our region. It has retarded progress on all issues, 
including nuclear and missile non-proliferation. A just and durable 
solution is the need of the hour, based on the wishes of the Kashmiri 
people, as envisaged in the Security Council resolutions. Pakistan 
remains committed to engage in a substantive dialogue with India to 
resolve this dispute, but not in a charade that can be used by our 
neighbor to mislead the international community. I am happy to note that 
the United States recognizes Kashmir as disputed territory and maintains 
that a durable solution can only be based on the will of the Kashmiri 
people. 

Pakistan asked for a reassessment of the Pressler Amendment, which 
places discriminatory sanctions on Pakistan. In our view, this amendment 
has been a disincentive for a regional solution to the proliferation 
issue. Pakistan has requested that the President and the Administration 
resolve the problem of our equipment worth       $1.4 billion, which is 
held up. I am encouraged by my discussions with the President this 
morning and the understanding that he has shown for Pakistan's position. 
I welcome the Clinton Administration's decision to work with Congress to 
revise the Pressler Amendment. Thank you, Mr. President. 



Joint Statement

Text of U.S.-Pakistan joint statement on the occasion of the visit of 
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 
Washington, DC, April 11, 1995.

1. President Clinton and Prime Minister Bhutto called today for enhanced 
efforts to strengthen the traditional friendship between the United 
States and Pakistan, based on their shared commitment to democracy, 
economic liberalization, human rights, peaceful resolution of regional 
conflicts, conventional arms control, non-proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and societies free from the evils of narcotics.

2. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that in the post-Cold War 
era, Pakistan has a key role to play in promoting moderation, peace and 
stability in South and Central Asia and in the Islamic World. Both 
leaders welcomed the cooperation between their countries in UN 
peacekeeping operations, especially in Haiti, Bosnia and Somalia. The 
large contributions made by the U.S. and Pakistan for UN peacekeeping 
operations and their determination to strengthen the role of the United 
Nations in conflict resolution underscore their commitment to 
international peace and stability.

3. Recognizing that the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir remains 
the primary source of tension in the region, the two leaders agreed on 
the need for India and Pakistan to engage in a substantive dialogue to 
resolve the Kashmir issue, taking into account the wishes of the people 
of Jammu and Kashmir. Prime Minister Bhutto reiterated to President 
Clinton Pakistan's willingness to accept American or other international 
mediatory efforts to help the parties find a just and lasting solution 
to the Kashmir dispute.

4. President Clinton and Prime Minister Bhutto reaffirmed their support 
for global and regional efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction and to forestall production and deployment of 
ballistic missile delivery systems. The leaders agreed on the need for 
the earliest possible conclusion of a nondiscriminatory and adequately 
verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for 
nuclear weapons and a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. They also welcomed 
upcoming talks between the U.S. and Pakistan on South Asia security, 
arms control and non-proliferation at which nuclear and missile 
proliferation and its relationship to regional, multilateral and global 
issues would be discussed.

5. President Clinton and Prime Minister Bhutto pledged to work together 
to expand U.S.-Pakistani security relations, consistent with the laws 
and policies of both countries. In this connection, they welcomed the 
revival of the U.S.-Pakistani Consultative Group as a means to 
strengthen military and security ties between their countries. The two 
leaders pledged to work to find a mutually-acceptable solution to 
military supply issues. For his part, President Clinton expressed his 
intention to work with Congress to revise the Pressler Amendment to 
facilitate both a stronger relationship with Pakistan and nuclear non-
proliferation aims in South Asia.

6. The two leaders strongly welcomed the deepening ties in trade and 
investment resulting from Pakistan's broad economic reform program. The 
two leaders noted significant investment commitments and expressions of 
intent, especially in the energy sector. The leaders agreed to step up 
scientific and cultural exchanges consistent with their laws and 
policies. In this connection, the U.S. and Pakistan signed a letter of 
intent to expand scientific and technical cooperation during Prime 
Minister Bhutto's visit.

7. President Clinton and Prime Minister Bhutto recognized that narcotics 
addiction and trafficking are a global scourge and pledged to work 
together closely to reduce domestic demand for illegal narcotic drugs, 
to eradicate cultivation, production and export of drugs to or from 
their territories, and to arrest and punish narcotics traffickers around 
the world. President Clinton welcomed Pakistan's expanded counter-
narcotics efforts in early 1995, and the two leaders agreed to enhance 
cooperation in this area. (###)



ARTICLE 4:

U.S. Turkish Leadership in the Post-Cold War World 
Deputy Secretary Talbott 
Address at Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey, April 11, 1995 
 
It is a pleasure to be back in Ankara. I'm particularly pleased to be 
here at Bilkent University. America is proud to be participating in 
various ways in what is happening on this splendid campus. When this 
institution first opened its doors to students in 1986 as modern 
Turkey's first private university, few would have predicted that, just 
nine years later, it would become one of Turkey's top centers of higher 
learning. In my own country, private and state universities have long 
coexisted and the competition for excellence between the two has 
significantly raised the quality of education and the quality of public 
discourse to the benefit of the nation as a whole. Outstanding 
universities, such as this one, teach good citizenship and thus serve as 
bulwarks of democracy. 

It was fitting, therefore, that when Prime Minister Ciller spoke here 
last month, she spoke about democracy. She argued eloquently that the 
work of building a truly open society is never done; democracy is, by 
definition, an ongoing process. Her message is relevant not just to 
Turkey but to the whole world, including the United States. American 
democracy, too, is a work in progress. Moreover, democracy is a 
collaborative work. Supporters of the ideal and the process the world 
over reinforce and learn from each other. So we are working together on 
democracy not just here, but everywhere it has taken root. 

There is another task on which Turkey and the United States are working 
together--building the institutions and habits of cooperation that 
promote international peace and prosperity. This challenge, too, has 
been the focus of Turkish-American collaboration. For nearly half a 
century, our two countries stood side by side in the cause of freedom. 
In no small measure because the United States and Turkey were allies in 
the Cold War, that conflict is now over. But our work is not over; there 
is still unfinished business. We are as much allies in the post-Cold War 
world as we were during the Cold War. If we continue to act together, we 
can seize a historic opportunity not just to combat new threats but also 
to shape a world that reflects our shared ideals and promotes our common 
interests. 

This afternoon, I want to talk about how we can make the most of this 
opportunity. I'd like to begin--and I hope you will not find this 
presumptuous--by relating your national experience in the 20th century 
to President Clinton's vision of an international order in the 21st. 
Turkey's efforts to define statehood and civil society in the post-
imperial phase of its own history offer valuable lessons to other 
countries, particularly to those who are just now emerging from the 
wreckage of Soviet-style communism and who, therefore, now have another 
chance at building civil societies of their own. 

Modern Turkey and the Soviet Union were born about the same time--under 
similar circumstances. I thought of this earlier today as I was laying a 
wreath at the mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Both the Turkish 
Republic and the Soviet Union represented great revolutionary 
experiments launched in the wake of World War I and the collapse of 
empires. The Soviet experiment lasted for over seven decades. It ended 
in paralysis, disintegration, and self-defeat, primarily because the 
political and economic system betrayed the hopes and needs of its own 
citizens. 

The Soviet experiment failed for another reason, too. It failed because 
the commissars were every bit as imperialistic as the Czars had been--
both in the way they dealt with non-Russian populations within the 
U.S.S.R. and in their behavior toward the outside world. 

Turkey's experiment was, at its core, very different. In January 1921, 
the Grand National Assembly declared that the new Turkish state rested 
"on the principle that the people personally and effectively direct 
their own destinies." This simple but enduring precept, which captures 
the essence of democracy, has produced powerful, positive, and enduring 
results. It has allowed Turkey to overcome difficulties and setbacks and 
to develop a system of free and fair elections in which men and women 
participate equally. Over the past two decades, Turkey has been able to 
move away from unresponsive and inefficient economic practices and move 
toward an environment in which private enterprise and free trade can 
flourish. 

Let me say a word about Turkish foreign policy. In the way that your 
country first defined--then defended--its national interest, it has set 
an exemplary standard for the 20th century--one that is worth bearing in 
mind for the 21st. Under Ataturk's extraordinary leadership, the Turkish 
people rejected the legacy and temptation of empire and devoted 
themselves, instead, to the goal that Ataturk himself identified as 
"independence within defined national frontiers." After World War II, 
Turkey forged alliances with the other free peoples of the world in the 
fight against Soviet expansionism--not just in the West, as part of 
NATO, but also in the Near East, through CENTO, and in the Far East, 
through your contribution to the United Nations Force in Korea. 
Americans still remember the extraordinary bravery of the Turkish 
soldiers who fought at Kunu Ri and along the Imjin River and the 
sacrifice of the hundreds of Turks who, like so many Americans, gave 
their lives in that war.

Now, just as in the early 1920s, we are in another era of great 
transition following the collapse of an empire--one that stretched from 
Vilnius to Vladivostock and from Murmansk to Baku--a vast territory 
under the hammer and sickle. The sudden implosion of communist systems 
has created new opportunities for freedom, prosperity, and long-term 
security. Nowhere are those opportunities more apparent than in Europe. 
As President Clinton put it, 

    For the first time in history, we can have a Europe that is united 
by a shared commitment to democracy, free market economics, and mutual 
respect for borders.  

Turkey, which was a front-line state in the battle against Soviet 
communism, now has much to gain from this process of post-Soviet 
integration. The emergence of stable, prosperous, democratic, and law-
abiding nations along your borders can only benefit Turkey. 

There are those who are skeptical about European expansion and 
integration. They are skeptical about whether any nations to the east of 
what might be called "traditional Europe" can truly be part of a larger 
21st-century Europe. To them we say: You're wrong. Europe has always 
defined itself not in terms of artificial geographical barriers--a river 
here, a mountain range there, or a strait of water somewhere else. 
Rather, it has defined itself as a community of nations that share 
values, aspirations, and ways of life--that share a sense of common 
interest and common destiny. Take my country, for example. The United 
States is in a different hemisphere from this continent, separated from 
Europe by the vastness of the Atlantic Ocean. Yet America has played an 
essential role in securing European unity and prosperity. Your country, 
too, is an example of the expansiveness of the idea of Europe. Of 
course, Turkey has cultural ties to Central Asia and the Middle East; 
most of Turkey is separated from the rest of Europe by the Bosphorus and 
the Dardanelles. Yet it has been an important part of the European 
system since the 16th century.

Let me, in that regard, mention an essential European institution of 
which both your country and mine are members: NATO. The North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization has proved to be the greatest, which is to say, the 
most successful military alliance in history. It defended democracy and 
kept Europe at peace even while the continent was divided between two 
heavily armed, ideologically hostile camps. Now, having defended 
security in a divided Europe, NATO must help extend stability across an 
undivided Europe.

Our two nations also have important roles to play in the economic 
integration of the new Europe. The March 6 EU Customs Union Agreement 
will link Turkey more closely to the peoples of Western Europe, and it 
also will help to ensure that you will be a full participant in the 
process of integrating the nations emerging from Soviet-style communism 
into the European economic system. Turkish membership in the Customs 
Union will encourage Hungarian, Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian 
entrepreneurs, as they build new economic partnerships, to look toward 
Ankara and Istanbul, as well as toward Frankfurt, Paris, London, and New 
York. 

Another essential aspect of building an undivided Europe is the 
resolution of the conflicts that currently beset individual countries. 
If Europe as a whole is going to evolve as a harmonious multiethnic 
community, its constituent states must heal their own internal wounds. 
An important example is Cyprus. The United States and the United Nations 
have been working on the problems of that troubled island for over 30 
years. President Clinton believes that the time is right to seek a 
lasting solution that will benefit both communities on Cyprus, thus 
enhancing the prospects for peace in the entire region. In the past 
several months, the President's Special Envoy, Richard Beattie, has had 
constructive meetings with all of the involved parties, and we hope that 
direct talks under United Nations auspices will resume soon after this 
Saturday's elections in north Cyprus.

Looking beyond Europe, the United States and Turkey have vital roles to 
play in the Middle East and Central Asia. Turkey is the European nation 
most closely linked to those regions by geography, history, culture, 
and, of course, by religion.

Let me say a word about Islam. Some have suggested that the Cold War 
rivalry between communism and capitalism will be replaced by a global 
"clash of civilizations" between Western and Muslim countries. But 
Turkey, today, refutes that dire prediction about tomorrow. Turkey is 
both a Western and a Muslim country, and its four-decade partnership 
with the other nations of Europe and with the United States proves how 
productive and enduring cooperation among "the peoples of the book" can 
be. It is, in this connection, significant that Turkey has contributed 
to the emerging peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors. That was 
evident yet again last week when your government hosted the most recent 
meeting of the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group in 
Antalya. These efforts have created historic opportunities for 
cooperation among all of the nations of the region--I might say, among 
all the civilized nations of the region.

Last fall's economic summit in Casablanca, which was attended by 
representatives of 61 countries and over 1,100 business leaders from all 
regions of the world, demonstrated the potential for economic 
development in the Middle East. Such development will require enormous 
amounts of human and financial capital, and Turkey can play a leading 
role in supplying both. Istanbul has the potential to become a leading 
capital market for the Middle East, and your young, well-educated work 
force will be much in demand.

In addition to its human resources, Turkey has a unique advantage in 
its wealth of natural resources. For decades, oil has been the liquid 
currency of the Middle East. But with regional peace, rapid population 
growth, and greater economic development, water will become increasingly 
important, and Turkey is the only country in the region with a water 
surplus. Your neighbors to the south--Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and 
Israel-- will need access to that surplus in the decades to come.  

Furthermore, Turkey is an important gateway for trade and investment in 
the resource-rich areas of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Most 
immediately, your country offers a highly promising, cost-effective 
route for bringing oil and gas from those regions to Western markets. A 
pipeline to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, along with other existing 
and potential routes, would promote economic development in Turkey, as 
well as in the other countries involved. That project will require 
cooperation on the part of all the nations in the area and, thus, could 
help promote greater regional stability.

As Turkey liberalizes its economy, we see trade and investment 
strengthening the link between our two nations. The Clinton 
Administration has designated Turkey as one of our 10 so-called Big 
Emerging Markets. That means that the Secretary of Commerce, Ron Brown, 
and my boss, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, have made it a top 
priority to improve market access, provide financing, and otherwise 
support U.S. companies that are seeking to trade with and invest in 
Turkey.

The great potential of the economic partnership between our two nations 
was evident two weeks ago in Washington at the U.S.-Turkey Joint 
Economic Commission, led by Assistant Secretary of State Richard 
Holbrooke, who is here at this event today, and Dr. Emre Gonensay, 
Senior Adviser to Prime Minister Ciller. The JEC has a full and 
ambitious agenda, which includes potential financing mechanisms for a 
pipeline to Ceyhan. All of which is to say, there is plenty of reason 
for optimism about the future of U.S.-Turkish relations in the post-Cold 
War era. But we must temper our optimism with realism and our vision 
with vigilance--for every opportunity that has come with the end of the 
Cold War there is also a challenge; for every favorable development 
there seems also to be an ominous one. 

While the collapse of Soviet communism created opportunities for 
economic integration and political freedom, it also opened the lid on a 
Pandora's box of ethnic conflict and civil war. The forces that threaten 
to tear apart individual countries and thwart our hopes for 
international order are concentrated in your neighborhood--on the Balkan 
Peninsula, in the Caucasus, in Central Asia, and in Iran and Iraq. 

As a result, Turkey is yet again on the front line of the world's most 
important struggles just as it was during the Cold War from the late 
1940s to the late 1980s and just as it was during the first major post-
Cold War crisis--the repulse of Iraqi aggression and the liberation of 
Kuwait in 1990-91. As our Ambassador, Marc Grossman, puts it, "Turkey 
lives in a neighborhood that is a 360-degree challenge."

To your west, in the former Yugoslavia, the war that began with the 
Serbs' monstrous scheme for "ethnic cleansing" has led to over 200,000 
casualties and forced over 2 million people from their homes. Continued 
fighting threatens to undermine stability throughout southeastern Europe 
and beyond. 

The United States supports the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. We want to see an end to civilian casualties, human 
rights abuses, and the flow of refugees. We remain committed to UNPROFOR 
and to the NATO-enforced no-fly zone, and we stand ready to work with 
our allies to help implement a final peace settlement. We are pressing 
Serbia to improve human rights conditions for ethnic minorities 
throughout the country and to restore autonomy to the Albanians in 
Kosovo. We support Kosovar advocates of nonviolent change and have 
warned Slobodan Milosevic that we are prepared to take action against 
Serbia in response to a conflict in Kosovo caused by Serb actions. We 
also are determined to see that those responsible for ethnic cleansing 
and other war crimes are brought to justice through the international 
tribunal that already has begun its work. 

We are mindful that many of the victims of the violence in the former 
Yugoslavia have ties to the people of Turkey. We are grateful for 
Turkey's contribution to the peacekeeping force in Bosnia and for your 
help in enforcing the no-fly zone. We also welcome Turkey's role as one 
of the founding members of the Friends of the Bosnian Croat Federation. 
In short, the United States and Turkey are united in their support for a 
multiethnic, multi-religious democracy in Bosnia.

Turning eastward, we commend Turkish efforts to help end the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict. Turkey, along with the United States, has been a key 
member of the OSCE's Minsk Group, and has been actively involved in the 
ongoing negotiations to resolve the conflict peacefully. Toward that 
end, we applaud Turkey's move to improve its relations with Armenia. 
These efforts have reduced tensions in the region while giving the 
peoples of Azerbaijan and Armenia a real opportunity to achieve a 
lasting peace. 

Let me now say a word about a very large country to your north--Russia, 
a country where I have just spent several days. The Soviet Union and 
before that the Russian empire used to be your neighbor, right on your 
frontier. Now, for the first time in over three centuries--for the first 
time since the year 1667--you have no common border with Russia. But its 
fate and evolution are still much on your minds and on ours. 

The bloody debacle in Chechnya is a reminder that the success of reform 
in Russia and an irreversible repudiation of rule by force are by no 
means guaranteed. Chechnya has--literally and figuratively--broadcast to 
the world images that conjure up the worst memories of Russia's past and 
that, therefore, cloud the best visions of its future. 

Chechnya stands as a warning to Russia and to the rest of the world: If 
any government attempts to enforce unity with brute strength, if it 
insists on imposing its control on people who feel disenfranchised or 
oppressed, the result will likely be more disintegration, more violence, 
and more instability. The policy of the United States in regard to 
Chechnya is clear: We support the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of a democratic Russian Federation within its current borders. We do not 
countenance attempts to change international borders by armed 
secessionism within a state any more than we countenance armed 
aggression by one state against another. We want to see Russia develop 
as a strong, prosperous, democratic, secure state in the 21st century, 
at peace with its own peoples as well as with its neighbors. But we also 
have made clear that we think that Russia will attain those goals only 
if it continues to develop a pluralistic political system, a 
constitutional order, and federal structures that permit all the diverse 
peoples of the Russian Federation to identify themselves as citizens of 
a multiethnic state, not as subjects of Moscow's rule.

That same lesson should be apparent to other multiethnic states that are 
trying to deal with violent sucessionists--force alone is not the 
answer; force alone can make a bad situation worse. The way to defeat 
outlaw groups is to deprive them of popular support by addressing 
legitimate needs and grievances. Inclusive democracy, in short, is the 
best antidote to extremism. Let me move from that general proposition to 
more specific observations about northern Iraq. 

Cooperation between the United States and Turkey on security matters is 
especially vital when it comes to dealing with outlaw states such as 
Iraq and Iran and outlaw organizations such as the PKK and Hamas that 
are determined to use terror to impose their own ideologies, undermine 
the search for peace, and threaten the territorial integrity of their 
neighbors.

I already mentioned that Turkey played a stalwart role as a front-line 
state in the Gulf war, thus affirming its strategic importance and its 
reliability as an ally and friend of the U.S. Our joint efforts in Iraq 
have continued with Operation Provide Comfort which, for four years, has 
served as a deterrent against Saddam Hussein's repression of Iraq's 
northern population. That operation has served vital U.S. and Turkish 
interests in containing Saddam and has helped prevent massive refugee 
flows into Turkey, such as those that occurred in 1991. We look forward 
to Turkey's continued support of this mission that is so central to our 
collective interests.

The underlying problem in northern Iraq is the one identified by the 
United Nations Security Council--namely, that the current Iraqi 
Government has not been willing to respect international norms or abide 
by basic human rights standards. As a result, the regime in Baghdad has 
lost the allegiance of the majority of the Iraqi people, including the 
Kurds of northern Iraq. It has shown itself to be the enemy of 
neighboring states and the international community. For those reasons, 
it has, quite predictably, lost control over its borders.

Over the long run, the only way to eliminate the threat that Turkey 
faces along its southeastern border is to restore the rule of law to 
northern Iraq. That depends on the formation of a government in Baghdad 
that represents all of the Iraqi people and that maintains peaceful 
relations with all its neighbors. In the meantime, only the Iraqi Kurds 
can control the border and prevent the PKK from infiltrating terrorists 
into Turkey. Thus, the U.S. and Turkey must renew our efforts to bring 
to a halt the violence among Kurdish factions in northern Iraq.

It is our strong belief that the international sanctions called for by 
Security Council Resolution 688 must continue until the Iraqi Government 
forsakes terrorism; abandons its attempts to acquire and produce 
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons; and ceases repression of its 
own citizens. Now we know that Turkey has paid a heavy price for its 
enforcement of these sanctions, but your country is also among those 
that have the most to gain from an Iraq that fulfills its obligations 
and responsibilities to the international community. Conversely, your 
country is among those that have the most to lose if Iraq remains an 
oppressor of its own people and an exporter of instability.

Our position on Operation Steel is clear. The United States understands 
Turkey's need to deal firmly with the PKK, which is a vicious terrorist 
organization. But we attach great importance to the assurances of the 
Turkish Government that the operation will be limited in scope and 
duration. We regard the recent withdrawal of 3,000 troops as a positive 
first step. President Clinton has discussed this issue with Prime 
Minister Ciller, and I have done the same in my meetings today.

The United States and Turkey must continue to work together, as we have 
for half a century, to combat threats to stability and security in this 
region where you live and where we have vital interests, including a 
vital interest in the stability and security of Turkey itself. 

But as we pursue those goals together, we should draw what is perhaps 
the most compelling and relevant lesson from the Cold War--we should 
remember that we, the Western allies, did not defeat communism by 
military deterrence alone, nor did we win this victory by ourselves. In 
the end, the Berlin Wall came tumbling down and the Iron Curtain was 
lifted because the yearning of the people of the former Soviet Union and 
its satellites for human rights, political freedoms, and open societies 
finally triumphed over the ideology and the decrepit tyrannical 
apparatus of their communist rulers. The Cold War ended when peoples all 
across the U.S.S.R. and throughout Central and Eastern Europe--reformers 
and democrats and dissidents and, eventually, voters--embraced the same 
liberal values that unite the member states of NATO. These are the 
values upon which we must continue to rely--and which we must continue 
to advance--in the post-Cold War era.

In this sense, too, Turkey is on the front line of a global struggle 
between forces of reform and those of regression, between the new and 
the old, and between various visions of the new, some hardly more savory 
than the old. That struggle continues as diverse peoples seek a balance 
between, on the one hand, fulfillment of their religious, ethnic, and 
national identities and, on the other, development of inclusive, 
secular, democratic institutions and structures of international 
cooperation. It continues not just in the lands of the former Romanov 
empire but in the lands of former Hapsburg and Ottoman empires as well 
as in Central Europe and the Middle East. We want to see Turkey on the 
right and winning side of this struggle.

If Turkey can ensure the rights of all of its own citizens and stay on 
the path of economic liberalization, then it will become increasingly a 
model for states to the West, North, East and South--states that are 
just embarking on their own journeys of modernization. Your country's 
accomplishments in the 20th century give you the potential to be a 
leader in the 21st. This is just one reason among many why the United 
States is proud to stand with you as we work to build a safer and more 
prosperous future. (###)



ARTICLE 5:

A Humanitarian Exception to the Iraqi Sanctions 
Madeleine K. Albright, UNSC Resolution 
 
Madeleine K. Albright
 
Statement by the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations 
before the UN Security Council, New York City, April 14, 1995.

Argentina, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Oman began work on 
this resolution at the specific request of a number of Arab, non-
aligned, and European states. We shared a common concern about the 
unnecessary humanitarian suffering of the Iraqi people caused by the 
Iraqi Government's policies, particularly its refusal to implement the 
resolutions of the Security Council. We agreed to make a good-faith 
effort to draft a plan that Iraq would have no reason to reject. 

We decided that we must be guided by the following principles: First, 
the purpose of the resolution is to address humanitarian needs, not to 
meet political or other extraneous objectives. Second, this resolution 
is not an easing or lifting of sanctions but an exception to the 
sanctions regime for a specified purpose. Third, we wanted a greatly 
simplified resolution, building on both the positive and negative 
lessons from UN resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991) and other 
experiences. Finally, against the desire for simplification, we had to 
balance the need to take full account of the fact that Iraq had not 
proven trustworthy in implementing previous resolutions and had 
consistently sought to turn innocent-sounding phrases into excuses for 
non-compliance. 

We approached the task of drafting the new by returning to the old, and 
we examined carefully the complete record of resolutions 706 (1991) and 
712 (1991). We looked carefully at all the reasons Iraq gave at that 
time to justify its refusal to implement that plan. We also reviewed the 
record of negotiations between Iraq and Turkey in 1994, when Council 
members considered a plan, at first supported by Iraq, to export oil 
through the Turkish pipeline and use the proceeds for humanitarian 
purposes. Throughout our drafting, we made every effort to understand 
every concern expressed by Iraq, and we addressed those concerns in a 
serious and open-minded way. 

While we addressed every issue Iraq had raised before, we never 
underestimated Iraq's ability to generate dozens of new objections and 
excuses. We realized from the beginning that Iraq would never say in 
advance of the vote that it accepted this plan, just as it has never 
accepted any Council resolution before or at the time of its passage. We 
note that, eventually, Iraq has found it in its interest to accept--and 
on occasion even implement--several Council resolutions. We hope that 
Iraq's current position--taken for the sake of posturing and 
negotiations--will not be the same as its final position--taken on the 
basis of a calm measurement of the benefits this resolution offers to 
the Iraqi people. 

Let me address just some of the arguments that some delegations have 
advanced on behalf of Iraq. First, I reaffirm here--as we reaffirm in 
the resolution--my government's unchanging support for the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of Iraq. But I must note that the greatest 
threat to the territorial integrity of Iraq is Saddam Hussein. His is 
the only government in history to have used weapons of mass destruction 
against its own citizens. His is the government that has imposed an 
economic and electricity blockade against one section of his country. 
Doubts about Iraq's territorial integrity and the need to make special 
arrangements to provide for humanitarian needs in northern Iraq arise 
only because of the actions of the Iraqi Government. 

The Council has other business before it with regard to Iraq as we wait 
with impatience for a change in Iraq's attitude and its compliance with 
all the Council's resolutions. Today's resolution, however, does not 
prejudge in any way subsequent actions the Council may take in this 
regard. The United States believes that Iraq's compliance with all the 
Security Council's resolutions is the only way in which it will prove to 
the international community that its intentions are peaceful. Then--and 
only then--can this Council move to modify the sanctions regime. This 
resolution today is technical, not political, and we have resisted 
efforts by Iraq and others to insert political provisions into the 
resolution. 

Our work on this new resolution is based on our humanitarian concern 
that the people of Iraq are suffering as a result of the policies of 
their government. We believe sanctions are a valuable tool for the 
Security Council to use when dealing with rogue states that refuse to 
live peaceably with their neighbors. But we always have shared the 
concern expressed by so many here that sanctions not strike an 
unintended target. We believe we have found exactly the right compromise 
here--not a lifting of the sanctions on the Iraqi regime but a 
humanitarian exception to the sanctions for the benefit of the Iraqi 
people. 

Even before the passage of this resolution, and even before the passage 
of resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991), this Council always has 
demonstrated that it has no quarrel with the Iraqi people. The Council 
has tried to ensure that the people of Iraq have access to basic 
humanitarian goods and has never prohibited the shipment of food and 
medicines. The Council and Member States have supported the United 
Nations Inter-Agency Humanitarian Program, which operates throughout 
Iraq.

We want the Government of Iraq to accept and implement this resolution. 
The cosponsors made extraordinary efforts, even before entering a phase 
of flexible and productive cooperation with other members of the 
Council, to craft a text that would address Iraq's concerns. If it still 
refuses to implement it, it will only be because the Government of Iraq 
does not know how to take "yes" for an answer. 

The Government of Iraq already has at its disposal the means to lift the 
sanctions--compliance with the Council's resolutions. It declines to 
exercise this option. If it refuses to implement this resolution, it 
will be clear for all to see--and especially to the Iraqi people--that 
the blame for the suffering of the people of Iraq rests not with the 
Security Council but with the government in Baghdad. 

Let me stress that that is not the outcome we desire. We call on Iraq to 
take its time, study this resolution with an open mind, and decide to 
accept it and implement it. The Council has once again given Baghdad the 
opportunity to act in the best interests of its citizens. For their 
sake, we urge the Government of Iraq to take advantage of this chance. 

In closing, let me make it clear that this resolution would not be 
necessary and the Iraqi people would not be suffering if Iraq's 
Government were not driven by ruthless ambition. Let us not forget that 
this is a government that has invaded its neighbor, supported terrorism, 
built weapons of mass destruction, and continues to threaten the 
stability of the Persian Gulf. It is only when the regime changes its 
underlying objectives that the resolutions will no longer be necessary 
and the Iraqi people no longer will be suffering.



Resolution 986
(April 14, 1995)

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions,

Concerned by the serious nutritional and health situation of the Iraqi 
population, and by the risk of a further deterioration in this 
situation,

Convinced of the need as a temporary measure to provide for the 
humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people until the fulfilment by Iraq of 
the relevant Security Council resolutions, including notably resolution 
687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, allows the Council to take further action 
with regard to the prohibitions referred to in resolution 661 (1990) of 
6 August 1990, in accordance with the provisions of those resolutions,

Convinced also of the need for equitable distribution of humanitarian 
relief to all segments of the Iraqi population throughout the country,

Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Iraq,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Authorizes States, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 3(a), 
3(b) and 4 of resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions, 
to permit the import of petroleum and petroleum products originating in 
Iraq, including financial and other essential transactions directly 
relating thereto, sufficient to produce a sum not exceeding a total of 
one billion United States dollars every 90 days for the purposes set out 
in this resolution and subject to the following conditions:

(a) Approval by the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990), in 
order to ensure the transparency of each transaction and its conformity 
with the other provisions of this resolution, after submission of an 
application by the State concerned, endorsed by the Government of Iraq, 
for each proposed purchase of Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products, 
including details of the purchase price at fair market value, the export 
route, the opening of a letter of credit payable to the escrow account 
to be established by the Secretary-General for the purposes of this 
resolution, and of any other directly related financial or other 
essential transaction;

(b) Payment of the full amount of each purchase of Iraqi petroleum and 
petroleum products directly by the purchaser in the State concerned into 
the escrow account to be established by the Secretary-General for the 
purposes of this resolution;

2. Authorizes Turkey, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 3(a), 
3(b) and 4 of resolution 661 (1990) and the provisions of paragraph 1 
above, to permit the import of petroleum and petroleum products 
originating in Iraq sufficient, after the deduction of the percentage 
referred to in paragraph 8(c) below for the Compensation Fund, to meet 
the pipeline tariff charges, verified as reasonable by the independent 
inspection agents referred to in paragraph 6 below, for the transport of 
Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products through the Kirkuk- Yumurtalik 
pipeline in Turkey authorized by paragraph 1 above;

3. Decides that paragraphs 1 and 2 of this resolution shall come into 
force at 00.01 Eastern Standard Time on the day after the President of 
the Council has informed the members of the Council that he has received 
the report from the Secretary-General requested in paragraph 13 below, 
and shall remain in force for an initial period of 180 days unless the 
Council takes other relevant action with regard to the provisions of 
resolution 661 (1990);

4. Further decides to conduct a thorough review of all aspects of the 
implementation of this resolution 90 days after the entry into force of 
paragraph 1 above and again prior to the end of the initial 180 day 
period, on receipt of the reports referred to in paragraphs 11 and 12 
below, and expresses its intention, prior to the end of the 180 day 
period, to consider favourably renewal of the provisions of this 
resolution, provided that the reports referred to in paragraphs 11 and 
12 below indicate that those provisions are being satisfactorily 
implemented;

5. Further decides that the remaining paragraphs of this resolution 
shall come into force forthwith;

6. Directs the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) to monitor 
the sale of petroleum and petroleum products to be exported by Iraq via 
the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline from Iraq to Turkey and from the Mina al-
Bakr oil terminal, with the assistance of independent inspection agents 
appointed by the Secretary-General, who will keep the Committee informed 
of the amount of petroleum and petroleum products exported from Iraq 
after the date of entry into force of paragraph 1 of this resolution, 
and will verify that the purchase price of the petroleum and petroleum 
products is reasonable in the light of prevailing market conditions, and 
that, for the purposes of the arrangements set out in this resolution, 
the larger share of the petroleum and petroleum products is shipped via 
the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline and the remainder is exported from the 
Mina al-Bakr oil terminal;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to establish an escrow account for the 
purposes of this resolution, to appoint independent and certified public 
accountants to audit it, and to keep the Government of Iraq fully 
informed;

8. Decides that the funds in the escrow account shall be used to meet 
the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi population and for the following 
other purposes, and requests the Secretary-General to use the funds 
deposited in the escrow account:
 
(a) To finance the export to Iraq, in accordance with the procedures of 
the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990), of medicine, health 
supplies, foodstuffs, and materials and supplies for essential civilian 
needs, as referred to in paragraph 20 of resolution 687 (1991) provided 
that:

(i) Each export of goods is at the request of the Government of Iraq;

(ii) Iraq effectively guarantees their equitable distribution, on the 
basis of a plan submitted to and approved by the Secretary-General, 
including a description of the goods to be purchased;

(iii) The Secretary-General receives authenticated confirmation that the 
exported goods concerned have arrived in Iraq;

(b) To complement, in view of the exceptional circumstances prevailing 
in the three Governorates mentioned below, the distribution by the 
Government of Iraq of goods imported under this resolution, in order to 
ensure an equitable distribution of humanitarian relief to all segments 
of the Iraqi population throughout the country, by providing between 130 
million and 150 million United States dollars every 90 days to the 
United Nations Inter-Agency Humanitarian Programme operating within the 
sovereign territory of Iraq in the three northern Governorates of 
Dihouk, Arbil and Suleimaniyeh, except that if less than one billion 
United States dollars worth of petroleum or petroleum products is sold 
during any 90 day period, the Secretary-General may provide a 
proportionately smaller amount for this purpose;

(c) To transfer to the Compensation Fund the same percentage of the 
funds deposited in the escrow account as that decided by the Council in 
paragraph 2 of resolution 705 (1991) of 15 August 1991;

(d) To meet the costs to the United Nations of the independent 
inspection agents and the certified public accountants and the 
activities associated with implementation of this resolution;

(e) To meet the current operating costs of the Special Commission, 
pending subsequent payment in full of the costs of carrying out the 
tasks authorized by section C of resolution 687 (1991);

(f) To meet any reasonable expenses, other than expenses payable in 
Iraq, which are determined by the Committee established by resolution 
661 (1990) to be directly related to the export by Iraq of petroleum and 
petroleum products permitted under paragraph 1 above or to the export to 
Iraq, and activities directly necessary therefor, of the parts and 
equipment permitted under paragraph 9 below;

(g) To make available up to 10 million United States dollars every 90 
days from the funds deposited in the escrow account for the payments 
envisaged under paragraph 6 of resolution 778 (1992) of 2 October 1992;

9. Authorizes States to permit, notwithstanding the provisions of 
paragraph 3(c) of resolution 661 (1990):

(a) The export to Iraq of the parts and equipment which are essential 
for the safe operation of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline system in Iraq, 
subject to the prior approval by the Committee established by resolution 
661 (1990) of each export contract;

(b) Activities directly necessary for the exports authorized under 
subparagraph (a) above, including financial transactions related 
thereto;

10. Decides that, since the costs of the exports and activities 
authorized under paragraph 9 above are precluded by paragraph 4 of 
resolution 661 (1990) and by paragraph 11 of resolution 778 (1991) from 
being met from funds frozen in accordance with those provisions, the 
cost of such exports and activities may, until funds begin to be paid 
into the escrow account established for the purposes of this resolution, 
and following approval in each case by the Committee established by 
resolution 661 (1990), exceptionally be financed by letters of credit, 
drawn against future oil sales the proceeds of which are to be deposited 
in the escrow account;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council 90 days 
after the date of entry into force of paragraph 1 above, and again prior 
to the end of the initial 180 day period, on the basis of observation by 
United Nations personnel in Iraq, and on the basis of consultations with 
the Government of Iraq, on whether Iraq has ensured the equitable 
distribution of medicine, health supplies, foodstuffs, and materials and 
supplies for essential civilian needs, financed in accordance with 
paragraph 8(a) above, including in his reports any observations he may 
have on the adequacy of the revenues to meet Iraq's humanitarian needs, 
and on Iraq's capacity to export sufficient quantities of petroleum and 
petroleum products to produce the sum referred to in paragraph 1 above;

12. Requests the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990), in 
close coordination with the Secretary-General, to develop expedited 
procedures as necessary to implement the arrangements in paragraphs 1, 
2, 6, 8, 9 and 10 of this resolution and to report to the Council 90 
days after the date of entry into force of paragraph 1 above and again 
prior to the end of the initial 180 day period on the implementation of 
those arrangements;

13. Requests the Secretary-General to take the actions necessary to 
ensure the effective implementation of this resolution, authorizes him 
to enter into any necessary arrangements or agreements, and requests him 
to report to the Council when he has done so;

14. Decides that petroleum and petroleum products subject to this 
resolution shall while under Iraqi title be immune from legal 
proceedings and not be subject to any form of attachment, garnishment or 
execution, and that all States shall take any steps that may be 
necessary under their respective domestic legal systems to assure this 
protection, and to ensure that the proceeds of the sale are not diverted 
from the purposes laid down in this resolution;

15. Affirms that the escrow account established for the purposes of this 
resolution enjoys the privileges and immunities of the United Nations;

16. Affirms that all persons appointed by the Secretary-General for the 
purpose of implementing this resolution enjoy privileges and immunities 
as experts on mission for the United Nations in accordance with the 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, and 
requires the Government of Iraq to allow them full freedom of movement 
and all necessary facilities for the discharge of their duties in the 
implementation of this resolution;

17. Affirms that nothing in this resolution affects Iraq's duty 
scrupulously to adhere to all of its obligations concerning servicing 
and repayment of its foreign debt, in accordance with the appropriate 
international mechanisms;

18. Also affirms that nothing in this resolution should be construed as 
infringing the sovereignty or territorial integrity of Iraq;

19. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

VOTE: Unanimous (15-0) (###) 


 
ARTICLE 6:

Recent Efforts to Resolve the Balkan Conflict 
Richard C. Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian 
Affairs 
Statement before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
Washington, DC, April 6, 1995 
 
Mr. Chairman: I am delighted to appear before this distinguished 
commission to share my thoughts on events in the former Yugoslavia. As 
we move into the spring and summer months, we have been working to 
prevent renewed fighting not only in Bosnia but in Croatia and elsewhere 
in the Balkans. I am pleased to report that our efforts in Croatia have 
helped prevent, at least for the moment, the wider war we all feared. I 
am equally disappointed that diplomacy has been unable to prevent the 
likely resumption of the tragic conflict in Bosnia. Let me elaborate on 
our recent efforts, starting with Croatia.

The situation in Croatia has been at a virtual stalemate since 1992, 
when UNPROFOR was established to help restore peace and pave the way for 
talks between the Zagreb Government and breakaway Serbs. As a result, 
Croatian President Tudjman decided, in January, to end UNPROFOR's 
mission in Croatia, preparing a military assault to retake the 27% of 
Croatia still in Serb hands while pursuing economic and political talks 
with the Serbs.

In response to these pressure tactics, however, the Serbs became 
recalcitrant. President Milosevic in Belgrade rejected proposals from 
the Contact Group and from Zagreb to recognize Croatia. The Croatian 
Serb leadership in Knin suspended talks with Zagreb on reopening 
transport routes and restoring utility supplies. This gave Croatia even 
less reason to reconsider the decision to expel the UN forces. The 
result was an escalating spiral of tension: both sides digging in --
literally and figuratively--and likely to start fighting over the buffer 
zone that the UN would have to vacate.

To break this dangerous spiral, I went to Zagreb with a two-part 
message: We support the goal of Croatian reintegration, but we think 
expelling the UN would unavoidably restart the war. I explored with 
President Tudjman possibilities for maintaining an international 
presence in Croatia that does not perpetuate an unjust status quo but 
that helps avoid hostilities. He emphasized the importance of 
controlling Croatia's border to deter Serbian military equipment and 
personnel from coming into Croatia out of Serbia and Bosnia.

My meetings in Zagreb were followed by an important agreement reached 
between Vice President Gore and President Tudjman in Copenhagen. The 
Gore-Tudjman agreement struck a fair balance between maintaining the 
UN's peacekeeping presence while recognizing Croatia's legitimate right 
to control its internationally recognized borders.

On March 31, the UN Security Council unanimously passed three 
resolutions: one, establishing a new UN peacekeeping operation in 
Croatia--UNCRO; a second, extending the existing peacekeeping operation-
-UNPROFOR--in Bosnia; and the third, renewing the existing peace-keeping 
operation in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia under the new 
name of UN Preventive Deployment Force--UNPREDEP.

The reconfigured force in Croatia, the mandate for which will be in 
effect until the end of 1995, will monitor Croatia's international 
border, help implement the cease-fire and economic agreements, and 
facilitate the passage of humanitarian supplies headed through Croatia 
to Bosnia.

The Council's action demonstrated UN resolve to help create the 
conditions for the peaceful resolution of growing tensions and 
conflicts. At the same time, much remains to be done. In Croatia, UN 
officials, led by former Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorvald 
Stoltenberg, will be discussing with the parties the modalities for the 
new peacekeeping force. In Bosnia, which I will address more directly in 
a moment, escalating fighting threatens the humanitarian and 
peacekeeping role played by UNPROFOR.

Above all, the renewal of the UN mandate in Croatia represents a 
significant diplomatic achievement for the United States. The personal 
intervention of the Vice President was instrumental in reaching a 
compromise that helped avert a wider war in the Balkans this spring. 
While I do not wish to leave the impression that the situation in 
Croatia is now resolved, I am pleased that our work has moved to create 
conditions under which differences between Croatians and Knin Serbs can 
be reached at the negotiating table, not on the battlefield.

Mr. Chairman, I wish I could give you an equally upbeat report on our 
efforts to bring an end to the tragic conflict in Bosnia, but I cannot. 
While we continue to work through the Contact Group--U.S., Russia, 
France,  U.K., and Germany--our occasional achievements have been 
outweighed by our inability to convince the Pale Serbs to accept the 
Contact Group plan. Our goal, nevertheless, remains to end the war in 
Bosnia in a manner consistent with that plan and its two main features--
a 51/49 territorial division and the preservation of Bosnia's 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The U.S. believes that a lasting settlement in Bosnia can come only 
through a political settlement. To create conditions conducive to 
negotiations, we helped the parties achieve a cease-fire and formal 
cessation of hostilities late last year. We hope that the cease-fire can 
be extended beyond its current expiration date of April 30. But as the 
current cease-fire begins to fray, we are entering a very precarious 
stage of the Bosnian crisis. In coming months, we face a real risk of 
renewed and more destructive conflict.

In conjunction with our efforts to extend the cessation agreement, we 
have explored every opportunity to end the war by diplomatic means. 
Contact Group talks with the Pale Serbs did not succeed, primarily 
because of the intransigence of Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic. The 
Contact Group also explored another initiative, backed by Bosnian 
President Izetbegovic, that would tie Milosevic's recognition of Bosnia 
and other former Yugoslav republics to sanctions relief for Serbia for 
limited, renewable periods. This route, too, appears to be closing.

In spite of the dangers presented by renewed fighting, we believe 
UNPROFOR's mission should continue. The role that the UN has played in 
assuring delivery of humanitarian assistance has been the untold success 
story of the international community's response to the war in Bosnia. We 
are proud that the U.S. has been the largest single-country humanitarian 
aid donor to the region--$780 million since 1991--is the largest food 
donor, and has performed over three-quarters of all airdrops. While much 
attention has been put on the difficulties faced by UNPROFOR in 
enforcing its mandate, too little has been put on the countless lives it 
has saved.

While we appreciate the work the UN has done in alleviating the 
suffering, and we hope that conditions permit it to remain in Bosnia, if 
it ultimately proves necessary to withdraw UNPROFOR, President Clinton 
is committed, in principle, to provide U.S. support. This would include 
the use of ground forces to any future NATO-led operation to help assure 
a safe withdrawal. NATO planning for this contingency is underway.

Mr. Chairman, we have also expended much effort in support of the 
Federation of Bosniac Muslims and Bosnian Croats. Just a few weeks ago, 
Secretary Christopher hosted an event at the State Department to mark 
the first anniversary of the Washington accords, which established the 
Federation. We are taking additional steps to support the Bosnian 
Federation, which has improved the prospects for an overall settlement, 
helped end the fighting in central Bosnia, and reopened humanitarian 
convoy routes. At the request of the parties, Secretary Christopher 
recently named the distinguished former State Department Legal Adviser, 
Roberts Owen, as arbitrator for the Federation. Mr. Owen has already 
begun the work of settling nettlesome disputes between the parties. We 
have also announced the selection of Maj. Gen. (Ret.) John Sewall as a 
special adviser for the purpose of integrating the Federation's military 
forces. We are cosponsoring--along with the EU--the Friends of the 
Federation, a consultative and donor group of nations which support the 
Federation. We remain convinced that federation is the only viable model 
for reconciliation and peace in the region.

We also remain committed to seeing that those responsible for ethnic 
cleansing and other war crimes are brought to justice. The International 
Tribunal, which we pressed to establish and for which we are providing 
personnel and other services, has issued its first indictments and is 
expected to issue more shortly.

We have taken a leadership role in NATO decisions on Bosnia. NATO has 
done what it has been asked to do and stands ready to provide close air 
support to UNPROFOR under existing authority. That authority, however, 
has rarely been invoked by UNPROFOR under the cumbersome dual-key 
arrangement that requires the approval of both organizations before air 
support can be used. But I would like to stress that NATO agreed to use 
air power as necessary to end the Serb strangulation of Sarajevo and 
protect other safe areas, to establish heavy-weapon exclusion zones 
around Sarajevo and Gorazde, to enforce the no-fly zone, and to support 
enforcement of sanctions. We continue to discuss within NATO and at the 
UN the best way to coordinate these activities. (###)



ARTICLE 7:

APEC Finance Ministers' Meeting: Joint Ministerial Statement 
Text of Joint Ministerial Statement released following the Second APEC 
Finance Ministers' Meeting, Bali, Indonesia, April 15-16, 1995.

APEC Finance Ministers have now met for a second time to discuss the 
economic challenges facing the Asia Pacific region and the opportunities 
for action that could assist individual economies in meeting these 
challenges. The meeting provided an opportunity for a frank exchange of 
views, that sharing of experiences, and a greater understanding of each 
other's concerns and interests. Our discussions here today of the 
challenges facing the region were conducted on the basis of cooperation, 
consensus, and collegiality and were meaningful and productive.

This past November in Bogor, the Economic Leaders of APEC issued a call 
to usher in an era of free and open trade and investment in the region 
by not later than the year 2020 and to intensify development cooperation 
among our economies. We are all committed to these goals and view the 
maintenance of macroeconomic stability, including financial market 
stability, as a key requirement for their achievement.

Economic Developments

The Asia Pacific remained the fastest growing region in the world in the 
past year despite significant fluctuations in global financial markets. 
These fluctuations had significant implications for the economies of the 
region through, among other events, shifting capital flows and rapidly 
moving exchange rates. These are matters of particular importance to us 
as Finance Ministers.

In order to promote better understanding of each other's concerns, views 
were exchanged on the impact of recent economic developments in each of 
our economies. In reviewing recent economic developments and the 
policies adopted to address them, we noted the increasing importance of 
regional economies in the global economy, as well as the growing 
interdependence of member economies. We also noted that attaining our 
goals of free and open trade and investment increases the exposure of 
our economies to market forces from the global financial marketplace. 
While this carries with it a number of significant benefits, it also 
increases the importance of sound, consistent, and sustainable 
macroeconomic policy in maintaining the dynamism of the region. We feel 
strongly that cooperation through meetings such as this enhances our 
ability to attain macro-economic stability.

Capital Flows

Global capital flows have grown substantially over the past five years. 
Capital flows into APEC member economies can be growth-enhancing when 
they contribute to productive investment. Efforts to encourage such 
flows play an important role in supplementing policies aimed at raising 
domestic savings to finance needed investment in APEC member economies. 
With the growth of capital flows, and the increased reliance of all 
economies on them, has come increasing vulnerability to rapid shifts in 
the volume and direction of such flows. It is often difficult for 
authorities to determine in advance whether capital inflows are driven 
by short-term speculative motives or by longer-term intentions. However, 
policies governing the macroeconomic environment play an important role 
in encouraging longer-term investor commitment.

In this regard we wish to express our appreciation to the IMF for its 
study entitled "Portfolio Capital Flows (Policy Issues and 
Developments)" which greatly facilitated our discussions. Based on the 
experiences of our economies and on the experiences discussed in the IMF 
study, we concluded that the risks of capital inflows being quickly 
reversed can be minimized if governments demonstrate a commitment to 
prudent fiscal and monetary policies leading to macroeconomic stability. 
We would also encourage the IMF to consider ways to improve current 
mechanisms to respond effectively to problems in this area. Improved 
economic surveillance would be an important initial step in this regard.

It is also important to take the necessary steps to improve the quality 
of capital flows; that is, to promote flows that generate real economic 
returns and hence are less susceptible to sudden reversal. Direct 
investment and diversified portfolio inflows are especially welcome for 
this reason.

We observed that one reason for rapidly shifting capital flows is the 
difficulty that financial markets face in knowing what is happening in 
an economy on a timely basis. Unlike public corporations, many 
governments have few obligations to publish detailed information on 
their financial operations. For this reason, we believe that increasing 
the availability of economic and financial information about our 
economies can play an important role in enhancing the confidence of 
financial markets in the strength of regional fundamentals which can, in 
turn, help sustain high and stable capital inflows. The strong track 
record of many of the APEC economies makes this a region that has much 
to gain from informing investors on a timely basis of key economic and 
financial developments. We therefore have reached agreement to develop 
recommendations regarding voluntary and timely public disclosure on a 
regular basis of economic and financial information of interest to 
financial markets.

We also observed that capital market development in the region is 
important to smooth capital flows and to mobilize sufficient domestic 
capital to reduce over dependence on capital inflows in some economies. 
It is important for each economy to develop the infrastructure for 
broad, deep capital markets. This includes human resource development 
for financial market supporting institutions. In this area we have much 
to learn from each other. Moreover, with the internationalization of 
capital markets, it is increasingly important that the regulatory 
authorities of member economies build ways of  cooperating with each 
other.

Exchange Rate Movements

We discussed the effects of exchange rate movements on trade and 
investment on member economies, recognizing that the impact of exchange 
rate movements varies substantially among the economies of the region. 
We agreed that there is no one optimal exchange rate policy for all 
regional economies. But one policy goal emerged as fundamental--pursuing 
macroeconomic stability and balance. This means control over inflation 
and sustainable deficits, both fiscal and external. As we concluded last 
year, sound macro-economic policies are the essential prerequisite for 
sustained, low-inflation growth. Exchange rate policy alone cannot 
compensate for unsound macro-economic policies. Instead, exchange rate 
policies must form an integral part of an overall macroeconomic policy 
framework for each of our economies.

Those of us who deal day-to-day with the challenges created by the 
current world exchange rate system understand that rapid exchange rate 
movements create problems both for our own economies and for economies 
with which we have close ties. Thus, we recognize that adopting policies 
that promote domestic macroeconomic stability will have beneficial 
impacts beyond our borders and thus such policies should be encouraged 
in all of the regional economies. Moreover, we believe that economies 
that adopt such policies will find that global financial markets respond 
favorably.

Even with prudent macroeconomic policies in place, individual economies 
can still be substantially affected by excessive volatility in the value 
of currencies. We express our concerns over the recent developments in 
the foreign exchange market where they do not reflect economic 
fundamentals. We agreed that there should be a determined effort to 
attain stability in the foreign exchange market, as such stability would 
benefit all member economies.

Furthermore, given the importance of exchange rate movements to our 
economies, we believe that substantially more research is needed on the 
forces that move exchange rates and, particularly, on the impacts of 
exchange rate movements on trade and investment flows. To that end we 
ask the IMF to prepare a study of the impacts of exchange rate movements 
on trade and investment in the APEC region. Such a study would assist 
further work by our Deputies on this subject at their next meeting. In 
particular, we ask our Deputies to review the IMF study and identify key 
conclusions and issues as a basis for our further discussion next year.

Funding for Infrastructure Development

We also had a constructive discussion on the importance of 
infrastructure development in the region to sustain non-inflationary 
growth toward the 21st century. This discussion benefited from the 
valuable paper prepared by the Asian Development Bank. We stressed the 
need to address the medium- and long-term challenges of mobilizing 
capital flows for infrastructure development. We noted the increasing 
role of both domestic and external private resources to meet the need to 
invest in physical infrastructure as a supplement to government 
financing and the resources of the international financial institutions 
and the need to create a conducive environment to support this. With the 
increased role of domestic and external private financing in 
infrastructure development, we see a clear need for coordination of 
public and private resources in financing infrastructure development. 
From our discussions, it is clear that various member economies have 
experience in this area that should be shared more broadly. We would 
likewise encourage multilateral institutions (e.g., World Bank and Asian 
Development Bank) to assume a more proactive role in acting as catalysts 
toward helping mobilize private sector funds for infrastructure as well 
as to take a lead role in studying the issue of appropriate guarantee 
mechanisms.

Other Issues

It is important, in the context of strengthening capital markets, that 
we support international anti-money laundering efforts in the region and 
encourage adherence to the international standards and recommendations 
which have been developed in this area. We refer this issue to the next 
Deputies' meeting for further discussion.

We are also resolved to contribute to the overall APEC to pursue trade 
and investment liberalization, cooperation, and facilitation. In 
particular, as many of us have responsibility for customs operations, we 
welcome the achievements of our customs authorities so far and encourage 
them to continue their trade facilitation efforts.

Future Meetings and Activities

While much was accomplished at our meeting, it is clear that much 
remains to be done. Thus, we have decided to continue to review 
macroeconomic development and market situations in the region, as well 
as to explore further the fundamental economic challenges facing the 
region. We look forward to having the opportunity to meet again next 
year in Japan for this purpose and ask our Deputies to undertake the 
necessary preparations for that meeting.

To assist us in our collective efforts, we have asked our Deputies to 
form a Working Group to advance our work this year in three areas: 
financial and capital markets, mobilizing private capital for 
infrastructure development, and effect of exchange rate movement on 
trade and investment. We have asked our Deputies to report on their 
efforts to the 1996 Finance Ministers Meeting.

At our meeting in Hawaii, we requested that several organizations and 
groups take action in support of our efforts. We wish to express our 
appreciation for the work of the IMF, the ADB, our central bank deputies 
who participated in our discussion of capital flows, and our own 
Deputies who met several times to prepare for this meeting. In addition, 
the APEC financiers have also met very recently and we encourage them to 
continue their efforts.

Finally, we agreed to report to the APEC Leaders' Meeting, scheduled to 
be held in November in Osaka, on the activities of the APEC Finance 
Ministers' Meeting. (###)


[END OF DISPATCH VOL. 6, NO. 17]

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