U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 17, APRIL 24, 1995
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1. The Non-Proliferation Treaty: The Case for Indefinite Extension--
Vice President Gore, Secretary Christopher
2. Comprehensive Engagement In U.S.-China Relations--Secretary
Christopher, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian
3. The U.S. and Pakistan Reaffirm Their Long-standing Relationship--
President Clinton, Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto,Joint Statement
4. U.S.-Turkish Leadership in the Post-Cold War World--Deputy Secretary
Talbott
5. A Humanitarian Exception to Iraqi Sanctions--Madeleine K. Albright,
UNSC Resolution
6. Recent Efforts To Resolve the Balkan Conflict--Richard C. Holbrooke
7. APEC Finance Ministers' Meeting: Joint Ministerial Statement
ARTICLE 1:
The Non-Proliferation Treaty: The Case for Indefinite Extension
Vice President Gore, Secretary Christopher
Vice President Gore
Remarks before the NPT Extension and Review Conference, New York City,
April 19, 1995.
In just a matter of weeks, the world will commemorate the gathering in
San Francisco half a century ago of delegates from some 50 countries who
met--even as the final embers of world war smoldered in Europe and Asia-
-to create a new world body for the post-war era. The proposal to call
this organization "the United Nations" was adopted by acclamation,
amidst the hopes of all people for lives permanently free of the
"scourge of war."
This moment of promise, however, coincided with the dawn of a new era in
our world's history--the atomic age--an era that carried with it unique
dangers to the future of humankind.
As were those who created the United Nations, we are assembled at a
moment of unusual opportunity and great risk. The confrontation between
the United States and the Soviet Union has ended. Our governments have
moved with great speed to put behind them a relationship based on a
nuclear balance of terror. That alone profoundly diminishes the risk of
nuclear war in the world, but it does not eliminate that risk. Should
nuclear weapons proliferate, those risks could again increase, and the
opportunity we currently have to reduce the global nuclear danger will
be lost.
With this conference, the struggle to block the proliferation of nuclear
weapons enters a critical phase. At the outset of the nuclear era the
technological and financial requirements for constructing nuclear
weapons could be met by only a few countries. That is no longer true.
The knowledge and capacity to build nuclear weapons and their delivery
systems increasingly is available. Most countries have recognized that
the acquisition of nuclear weapons would bring greater insecurity and
danger. But the few countries that wish to seek nuclear weapons have an
increasing possibility of succeeding. Should they succeed, the
consequences will not be merely local but, inevitably, global.
In short, the diminishing risk that nuclear war would be caused by one
rivalry is offset by an increasing risk that it will be caused by
others. It is axiomatic that continuing progress in controlling and
eliminating nuclear weapons will be easier if the number of countries
possessing them is not increasing.
This, of course, is the essence of the challenge which the treaty was
designed to meet. At the time of its creation, the treaty represented a
delicate balance between competing and seemingly irreconcilable
interests.
It met the security needs of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states. It
also took careful account of the universal desire that peaceful nuclear
technologies be made available for the general benefit of all peoples,
while not leading to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The result
was an agreement that balanced the interests of all sides and identified
a path toward a more peaceful future.
First, declared nuclear weapons states would not assist others to
acquire nuclear weapons, while non-weapons states committed to forswear
these weapons for the duration of the treaty. States in a position to do
so also undertook to share peaceful nuclear technology under strict
international safeguards and accepted a solemn obligation to work for
further disarmament measures.
Now, after a quarter of a century of experience with this treaty, we are
gathered to determine whether the cause of peace is best served by
continuing the treaty under temporary arrangements or, by using our one-
time option to give it a permanent basis, by supporting its indefinite
extension without conditions.
The United States believes that it is vital that the treaty be extended
indefinitely--without conditions. I am here to represent my country and
my President in explaining why we hold this belief so firmly and to
discuss the reasons why we disagree with other approaches--much as we
understand and respect the concerns that these approaches reflect.
The case for indefinite extension can be stated succinctly and
convincingly. First and foremost, the treaty creates a more secure world
for all its members--nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons
states alike. By providing an internationally recognized, verifiable
means for states to foreswear nuclear weapons forever, the treaty helps
prevent regional rivalries from evolving into regional nuclear arms
races. Without the treaty, many more nations already would have decided,
however reluctantly, that they needed nuclear arms to deter a neighbor
or hedge against future uncertainty. By making it possible for the vast
majority of the world's nations to remain non-nuclear without
jeopardizing their security, the treaty reinforces the global stability
that is a necessary foundation for further progress in arms control and
disarmament.
While we believe the case for indefinite extension is compelling, any
candid evaluation of the treaty must respond to the principal arguments
that are often directed against it. These arguments are: first, that the
treaty is inherently discriminatory; second, that the nuclear weapons
states have failed to live up to their commitments under Article VI;
third, that the indefinite extension of the treaty without conditions
will free the nuclear weapons states from effective further pressure to
disarm; fourth, that the treaty exposes non-nuclear states to the risk
of intimidation by nuclear weapons states and states not party to the
treaty; and fifth, that permanent extension of the treaty without
conditions will destroy the capacity of the agreement to be adapted to
future circumstances. I shall speak to each of these issues.
First, it is true that the treaty recognized as a matter of practical
necessity an initial division of states between those possessing nuclear
weapons and those who pledged not to acquire them at all. But the treaty
did not create a permanent class of nuclear weapons states.
What the treaty did create was a requirement that those who already
possessed nuclear weapons not help others to acquire them, coupled with
a binding legal obligation under Article VI to pursue good-faith
negotiations on nuclear arms control and disarmament. By extending the
treaty indefinitely, non-nuclear weapons states will ensure that this
obligation remains permanently binding and will create the conditions
for its ultimate achievement.
Second, some argue that the nuclear weapons states have failed to live
up to their commitments under Article VI. Here, the evidence strongly
supports the case that the trend among nuclear weapons states is running
strongly in the direction prescribed by their obligations under Article
VI of the treaty.
-- The United States and Russia have, under the INF Treaty, eliminated
an entire class of nuclear weapons delivery systems.
-- Last December, the United States and Russia, along with Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan, brought the START I Treaty into force, and
under its terms, 9,000 nuclear weapons will be removed from delivery
vehicles subject to elimination under this treaty.
-- The statesmanship of the leaders of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine
have resulted in these nations eschewing nuclear weapons. It is
appropriate today that we salute these three nations, whose decisions to
eliminate the nuclear weapons on their territories and accede to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapons states represent true
steps forward for peace.
-- The United States and Russia are working with our legislatures to
ratify the START II Treaty, which will remove another 5,000 weapons from
the deployed arsenals of the United States and Russia.
-- Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin have agreed to deactivate systems
scheduled for elimination under START II after that treaty has been
ratified.
-- We also have agreed to detarget our nuclear missiles so that no
nation's children are targeted by these weapons.
-- To further match our words with deeds, the United States has stopped
producing fissile materials for nuclear explosives. In addition,
President Clinton has launched a new, global effort to halt the
production of fissile materials for nuclear explosives.
-- Last month, President Clinton announced that the United States would
remove 200 metric tons of fissile material from its stockpile so that it
never again could be used for nuclear weapons. Last year, for the first
time, the United States submitted weapons material from our stockpile to
IAEA safeguards.
These are the tangible forms of progress toward fulfillment of Article
VI and important building blocks as we design the structures for peace
and security in the 21st century. But we must continue to build upon
them in the days and weeks ahead.
For this reason, both President Yeltsin and President Clinton last
September directed their experts to develop steps to adapt nuclear
forces to the changed international security climate and stated publicly
their shared belief that this changed climate will permit--and indeed,
require--additional progress in reducing the size and structure of their
nuclear forces and to look forward to the possibility of continued
reductions.
Indeed, only two weeks ago in Geneva, Russia, France, and the United
Kingdom joined the United States to solemnly reaffirm our commitment, as
stated in Article VI, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to nuclear disarmament, which remains our ultimate
goal.
We also have instructed our delegation in Geneva to conclude a
comprehensive test ban treaty "at the earliest possible time." To
further propel that effort, the President has extended the U.S.
moratorium on nuclear tests to overlap with the expected completion of
test ban negotiations, and he withdrew a previous U.S. proposal for a
10-year withdrawal provision in the test ban treaty.
If the Conference on Disarmament does its job, we are prepared to
conclude that the United States has already conducted its last nuclear
test.
The third argument made against indefinite extension of the NPT is that
it will free the nuclear weapons states from effective further pressure
to disarm. Rather than indefinite extension, some argue that the best
way to ensure that the major nuclear weapons states move toward
disarmament is to hold the NPT hostage by subjecting it to periodic
live-or-die votes or by extending it with conditions of a sort that
reintroduce the live-or-die principle by indirect means.
There are two very serious flaws to this argument. First, as regards the
major nuclear weapons states, the last thing that we need as we wrestle
with the problem of further constraining nuclear weapons in ways that
are irrevocable is for the treaty itself to become a covenant subject to
revocation at regular intervals. It is worth noting that even one of the
longest review periods under discussion--25 years--is well within the
service lifetime of a major nuclear weapons system. In practical effect,
rolling periods of review can have the same consequences for nuclear
planning as would a decision taken right now to terminate the treaty.
Second, making the treaty subject to periodic risk will send a very
powerful signal to states that aspire to acquire nuclear weapons. Such a
decision will encourage them to hold their options in reserve rather
than to accept the permanence of their obligations under the treaty.
States not party to the treaty will be encouraged to hope that it will
one day fall away.
Introducing uncertainty into the calculus of nuclear decision-making
will not reinforce the goals of the NPT. On the contrary, it will
threaten the real progress that is now being made among the original
nuclear weapons states, and it will encourage would-be proliferators to
lie low and to clandestinely pursue their objectives.
The fourth argument made against indefinite extension of the treaty is
that the treaty exposes non-nuclear states to the risk of intimidation
by nuclear weapons states and states not party to the NPT.
Since the nuclear weapons states clearly understand that damaging the
NPT also damages their own security, they have strong motives to refrain
from nuclear threats and, instead, to provide credible assurances
designed to allay the concerns of others. That is why, earlier this
month, President Clinton issued a declaration providing robust positive
and negative security assurances. Each of the other four nuclear weapons
states has provided parallel statements.
Earlier this month, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution
welcoming these assurances and setting forth in unprecedented detail the
means to respond in the event that a non-nuclear party to the treaty is
subject to a nuclear threat.
In addition, the very success of the NPT builds a barrier against
nuclear threats, whether by parties or non-parties. By establishing a
global norm for non-proliferation, a norm that the world community has
demonstrated it is willing to defend, the treaty has far more
effectively discouraged nuclear intimidation than would the
indiscriminate threat of nuclear weapons.
Finally, in response to the fifth argument that an indefinite extension
of the NPT without conditions will set it in stone and destroy its
ability to meet changed circumstances, I would point first to the
radical changes in the world that the treaty has handled without
difficulty, and I would also point to reserves of flexibility inherent
in procedures for review and amendment that are built into the treaty
and will not be altered by a decision to extend it indefinitely without
conditions. The treaty provides for a review at five-year intervals,
giving all parties the opportunity to raise concerns about the operation
of the treaty. Even with indefinite extension of the treaty, these
reviews will continue, and I pledge that the U.S. will work closely with
other delegations to ensure that the review mechanism remains vital and
effective. The NPT will remain a living document.
In short, I believe that all of the questions and criticisms of the NPT
can be answered, not only by logic and argument but by the performance
of the treaty and its parties over the past 25 years.
In the post-Cold War era--an era in which superpower confrontation has
been replaced by cooperation to eliminate nuclear arms but in which the
dangers of nuclear proliferation are increasingly apparent--the treaty
remains central to the cause of peace.
We ask you--the representatives of the largest community of nations to
adhere to any arms control agreement--to support the indefinite and
unconditional extension of the treaty, not as a favor or concession to
anyone but because it is deeply in the security interests of each one of
us to do so.
Even more than when it was concluded 25 years ago, the treaty reduces
the nuclear threat faced by each and every one of its parties, creates
the basis for international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy, and makes a critical contribution to the global stability needed
to achieve further measures of arms control and disarmament.
The decision that you must make on the future duration of the treaty is
a momentous one. It will not only affect the policies of governments but
the future of all peoples. These are choices for which we must expect to
be held fully accountable.
A quarter-century ago, legislative bodies throughout the world in
ratifying the treaty, accepted that they would be bound by a decision
made by a majority of the parties. Any suggestion that this decision
might be made through secret ballot undermines the democratic spirit of
that process. We must expect to take responsibility for our actions.
Nations which call for accountability must accept its burdens. The
United States strongly rejects any notion that the decisions of this
conference cannot stand the light of day and calls upon all countries to
vote openly.
When the Non-Proliferation Treaty was put into force 25 years ago, few
could have suspected the difference it would make in all our lives.
Today, we know what those who were present at the creation of the atomic
age could only hope--that proliferation can be halted and that nations
can work together to protect their mutual security. We cannot rest--will
not rest--until those goals--and the Non-Proliferation Treaty-- become
enduring realities.
One of my country's greatest leaders, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, told
the American people in a moment of crisis that their generation had a
"rendezvous with destiny." It was a phrase that caused our entire nation
to realize that we held in our own hands the power to decide the outcome
of great issues. We, too, are at a moment that should be considered a
rendezvous with destiny. In this moment of decision, therefore, with
faith in peace as our guide, and the hopes of our children as our
inspiration, I urge you to choose rightly by voting to extend this vital
treaty indefinitely and without conditions.
Secretary Christopher
Welcoming remarks to the Non-Proliferation Treaty Extension and Review
Conference, New York City, April 17, 1995.
Mr. President, distinguished delegates: It is a great privilege as
foreign minister of the host country to welcome you to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty Extension and Review Conference.
Let me congratulate you, Ambassador Dhanapala, on your election as
president of this historic conference. My colleagues from around the
world and I have high confidence in your capable leadership.
It is fitting that we should meet at the United Nations to deliberate
the future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty--the NPT. Few agreements have
better embodied the principles that have guided this institution since
its creation. Indeed, the collective force of the NPT has been a shining
example of what nations can do, in the words of the UN Charter, "to
unite our strength to maintain international peace and security."
We should recall the world in which the NPT came into force a quarter-
century ago. The Cold War struggle had created a nuclear standoff that
threatened the survival not only of the United States, the Soviet Union,
and their allies--but that of every nation. That struggle also
contributed to a costly and dangerous global nuclear arms race. The
prospect of 10 or more new nuclear powers seemed just over the horizon.
It was a world in which fear outpaced hope.
Today, we live in a safer, freer, and better world. The Cold War is
over; the strategic forces of the superpowers are standing down while
their nuclear arsenals are shrinking dramatically. The international
community has done its part to reduce the nuclear danger for the entire
world. The heart of this effort has been the NPT. Simply put, the NPT
has worked.
I believe that the NPT truly is one of the most important treaties of
all time. Many of the NPT's achievements cannot be quantified--the
weapons not built, the nuclear materials not diverted, and the wars not
started. But the results are nonetheless impressive. Since coming into
force, the NPT has kept the number of nuclear powers far lower than
initially forecast, it has given the parties confidence in the nuclear
intentions of other nations, it has reduced the risk of nuclear
conflict, it has advanced nuclear disarmament, it has bolstered regional
security, it has promoted the safe and peaceful use of nuclear energy,
and it has undergirded the international community's efforts to halt the
spread of all weapons of mass destruction.
By its purpose and its strength, this treaty has earned the widest
adherence of any international arms control agreement. The nations
assembled here have supported the NPT because it has benefited all of
us. It has protected the security of the nuclear and the non-nuclear,
the strong and the less powerful, the land-locked and the coastal
states. As President Kennedy said before the UN in 1961:
A nuclear disaster, spread by winds and water and fear, could well
engulf the great and the small, the rich and the poor, the committed and
the uncommitted alike.
Fortunately, the disaster of which President Kennedy warned has not come
to pass. The international community has taken important steps to
diminish the nuclear threat. The number and reach of nuclear weapons-
free zones is growing. The nuclear arsenals of the two former Cold War
adversaries are being reduced by almost two-thirds. Negotiations are
advancing on a comprehensive test ban treaty and a cutoff on the
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.
The purpose of the NPT is to preserve the security of all, not the
nuclear weapons monopoly of a few. The nuclear weapons states have
committed themselves to pursue negotiations for nuclear disarmament,
which remains our ultimate goal. The treaty is the basis for assurances
to non-nuclear treaty partners that their security interests continue to
be served by their wise and far-sighted choice.
The security that the NPT helps provide must be constantly reinforced.
Even in a world in which hope is now outpacing fear, we know that the
future is by no means free from danger. While the prospect of global
nuclear war recedes, the prospect of the spread of nuclear weapons
remains. Together, we share the responsibility to meet that common
threat.
In the next four weeks, the nations assembled here will reach a decision
with the most fateful consequences for their national security and for
world peace. For all nations and all peoples, the future of the NPT will
be even more important than its past. Thank you very much. (###)
ARTICLE 2:
Comprehensive Engagement in U.S.-China Relations
Secretary Christopher, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian
Remarks during press availability, New York City, April 17, 1995
Secretary Christopher. I'm very pleased to welcome here to New York this
morning Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian of China. Today's meeting
is our third meeting in the last six months carrying out the President's
strategy of comprehensive engagement.
I'm very pleased to see Minister Qian. We have developed a good and
durable relationship with each other. I think that today's meeting is a
good example of the current relationship we have.
One of the most important things we share with China, of course, is the
need to combat the spread of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction,
and so it's especially fitting that we are meeting today on the
inauguration of the international conference on the extension and review
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The NPT truly is one of the most important treaties of all time. It has
done a number of very significant things--reducing the risk of nuclear
conflict, promoting the safe and peaceful use of nuclear energy, and
strengthening the international community's efforts to keep nuclear
weapons out of the hands of rogue states and terrorists. The treaty has
bolstered international security, both in a regional and global sense,
not least in northeast Asia. For all these reasons, we hope that China
will support the unconditional and indefinite extension of the treaty.
Working together with the minister and with other colleagues in both of
our governments, we have made substantial progress on a number of non-
proliferation issues that are on our agenda today. Last October, the
Vice Premier and I signed a joint statement in which China agreed not to
export ground-to-ground missiles covered by the Missile Technology
Control Regime--MTCR--and we worked together on a global ban on the
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Just last week, we
held talks in Washington on how we might eliminate impediments to
expanded nuclear cooperation between our countries. The United States
also has welcomed China's support of our efforts to ensure peace and
stability on the Korean Peninsula when it emphasized that the
implementation of the Framework Accord between the United States and
North Korea is of great importance. Any steps by North Korea to break
the treaty by its nuclear program would be regarded by the United States
as a very serious matter.
Our comprehensive engagement with China also has advanced our shared
interest in open trade. In February, we reached an agreement to protect
intellectual property rights in China--an agreement that gives American
and other foreign exporters and investors greater confidence that the
rule of law will be respected within China. That agreement also
provides, as you know, for improved market access for information and
entertainment products in China.
We want to emphasize that the United States strongly supports China's
accession to the World Trade Organization. At the same time, we believe
that its membership must be on a basis consistent with the obligations
to which all members of the WTO have adhered. China's membership in the
WTO will help American and other foreign goods compete on a more level
playing field in Chinese markets. I'm very pleased to note that China
has reached a decision to reopen negotiations next month on WTO
membership.
Human rights remains a very important aspect of our relationship because
of the values America shares with many people on both sides of the
Pacific and our interest in political stability and the rule of law.
Certainly, the Vice Premier and I will devote some of our discussion
today to that important issue.
A theme that runs through all the issues on our agenda is the importance
of upholding international norms. We are both members of the Security
Council--both permanent members of that important council--as great
trading nations. The interests of our two nations are served by
agreements that protect us from the threat of nuclear weapons, by
agreements to keep our markets open, and by our agreement to help our
people reach their full potential as workers, consumers, and citizens.
In conclusion, let me emphasize that our goal remains a broad and strong
relationship with a stable, prospering, and strong China--a China that
is a full and constructive member of the international community. By
working together, I believe we can make an important contribution to
peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and around the world. So
I very much look forward to my discussion today with the Vice Premier
and also to responding to your questions after he has an opportunity to
make the remarks that he might want to make.
Foreign Minister Qian. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your statement. I
am very pleased to have this opportunity to meet in New York with you
once again, Mr. Secretary, as the NPT Extension and Review Conference is
beginning. Undoubtedly, I will exchange views with you on the NPT
extension issue as well as other non-proliferation issues. I also look
forward to reviewing together with you, Mr. Secretary, the development
of Sino-U.S. relations since our meeting last October and also to
exchanging views with you on other international issues of common
interest.
I would like to point out that, recently, Sino-U.S. relations have
registered some positive development. This is gratifying, but in this
relationship there are also problems and difficulties which both our two
sides should make efforts to resolve. The current international
situation is not all that stable. Under these circumstances, the
development of Sino-U.S. relations in the stable and smooth manner
between China and the United States--the two big countries--is in the
interest of our two peoples and also in our two countries' fundamental
interest. It also would contribute to a healthy and stable development
of the global situation.
I hope our meeting this time will, as did our previous meetings, achieve
positive results and advance the development of Sino-U.S. relations and
make a contribution toward world peace and stability. Thank you. (###)
ARTICLE 3:
The U.S. and Pakistan Reaffirm Their Long-standing Relationship
President Clinton, Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto, Joint Statement
President Clinton, Prime Minister Bhutto
Remarks following White House meeting, Washington, DC, April 11, 1995.
President Clinton. Please be seated. Good afternoon. It is a great
pleasure for me to welcome Prime Minister Bhutto to the White House. I
am especially pleased to host her today because of the tremendous
hospitality that the Prime Minister and the Pakistani people showed to
the First Lady and to Chelsea on their recent trip.
I have heard a great deal about the visit--about the people they met,
their warm welcome at the Prime Minister's home, and about the dinner
the Prime Minister gave in their honor. The food was marvelous, they
said, but it was the thousands of tiny oil lamps that lit the paths
outside the Red Fort in Lahore that really gave the evening its magical
air. I regret that here at the White House I can match that only with
the magic of the bright television lights.
Today's meeting reaffirms the long-standing friendship between Pakistan
and the United States. It goes back to Pakistan's independence. At the
time, Pakistan was an experiment in blending the ideals of a young
democracy with the traditions of Islam. In the words of Pakistan's first
President, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Islam and its idealism have taught us
democracy. It has taught us the equality of man, justice, and fair play
to everybody. We are the inheritors of the glorious traditions and are
fully alive to our responsibilities and obligations. Today, Pakistan is
pursuing these goals of combining the practice of Islam with the
realities of democratic ideals, moderation, and tolerance.
At our meetings today, the Prime Minister and I focused on security
issues that affect Pakistan; its neighbor, India; and the entire South
Asian region. The United States recognizes and respects Pakistan's
security concerns. Our close relationship with Pakistan is matched with
growing ties with India. Both countries are friends of the United
States, and, contrary to some views, I believe it is possible for the
United States to maintain close relations with both countries.
I told the Prime Minister that, if asked, we will do what we can to help
these two important nations work together to resolve the dispute in
Kashmir and other issues that separate them. We also will continue to
urge both Pakistan and India to cap, reduce, and finally eliminate their
nuclear and missile capabilities. As Secretary Perry stressed during his
visit to Pakistan earlier this year, we believe that such weapons are a
source of instability rather than a means to greater security. I plan to
work with Congress to find ways to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons
and to preserve the aims of the Pressler Amendment while building a
stronger relationship with a secure, more prosperous Pakistan. Our two
nations' defense consultative group will meet later this spring.
In our talks, the Prime Minister and I also discussed issues of global
concern, including peacekeeping and the fight against terrorism and
narcotics trafficking. I want to thank Prime Minister Bhutto and the
Pakistani officers and soldiers who have worked so closely with us in
many peacekeeping operations around the globe, most recently in Haiti,
where more than 800 Pakistanis are taking part in the UN operation.
On the issue of terrorism, I thank the Prime Minister for working with
us to capture Ramszi Yousef--one of the key suspects in the bombing of
the World Trade Center. We also reviewed our joint efforts to bring to
justice the cowardly terrorist who murdered two fine Americans in
Karachi last month. I thanked the Prime Minister for Pakistan's effort
in recent months to eradicate opium poppy cultivation, to destroy heroin
laboratories, and just last week, to extradite two major traffickers to
the United States. We would like this trend to continue.
Finally, the Prime Minister and I discussed the ambitious economic
reform and privatization programs she has said will determine the well-
being of the citizens of Pakistan and other Muslim nations. Last year,
at my request, our Energy Secretary, Hazel O'Leary, led a mission to
Pakistan which opened doors for many U.S. firms who want to do business
there. Encouraged by economic growth that is generating real dividends
for the Pakistani people, firms in the U.S. and other foreign firms are
beginning to commit significant investments, especially in the energy
sector. I am convinced that in the coming years, the economic ties
between our people will grow closer--creating opportunities, jobs, and
profits for Pakistanis and Americans alike.
Before our meetings today, I was reminded that the Prime Minister first
visited the White House in 1989 during her first term. She left office
in 1990, but then was returned as Prime Minister in free and fair
elections in 1993. Her presence here today testifies to her strong
abilities and to Pakistan's resilient democracy. It is no wonder she was
elected to lead a nation that aims to combine the best of the traditions
of Islam with modern democratic ideals. America is proud to claim
Pakistan among its closest friends.
Prime Minister Bhutto. Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: I would like
to begin by thanking the President for his kind words of support and
encouragement.
Since 1989--my last visit to Washington--both the world and Pakistan-
U.S. relations have undergone far-reaching changes. The post-Cold War
era has brought into sharp focus the positive role that Pakistan--as a
moderate, democratic, Islamic country of 130 million people--can play
and the fact that it is strategically located at the tri-junction of
South Asia, Central Asia, and the Gulf--a region of both political
volatility and economic opportunity.
Globally, Pakistan is active in UN peacekeeping operations. We are on
the forefront of the fight against international terrorism, narcotics,
illegal immigration, and counterfeit currency. We remain committed to
the control and elimination of weapons of mass destruction, as well as
the delivery systems, on a regional, equitable, and nondiscriminatory
basis.
Since 1993, concerted efforts by Pakistan and the United States to
broaden the base of bilateral relations have resulted in steady
progress. In September 1994, in a symbolic gesture, the United States
granted Pakistan about $10 million in support for population planning.
This was announced by the Vice President at the Cairo summit on
population planning. This was followed by the presidential mission, led
by Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary, which resulted in an agreement worth
$4.6 billion being signed. Now, during my visit here, we are grateful to
the Administration and the cabinet secretaries for having helped us sign
$6 billion more of agreements between Pakistan and the United States.
During the Defense Secretary's visit to Pakistan in January 1995, our
countries decided to revive the Pakistan-United States Defense
Consultative Group. More recently, we had the First Lady and the First
Daughter visit Pakistan, and we had an opportunity to discuss women's
issues and children's issues with the First Lady. We found the First
Daughter very knowledgeable--we found Chelsea very knowledgeable on
Islamic issues. I am delighted to learn from the President that Chelsea
is studying Islamic history and has also actually read our Holy Book--
the Koran Shariah.
I am delighted to have accepted President Clinton's invitation to
Washington. This is the first visit by a Pakistani chief executive in
six years. President Clinton and I covered a wide range of subjects,
including Kashmir, Afghanistan, Central Asia, the Gulf, Pakistan-India
relations, nuclear proliferation, UN peacekeeping, terrorism, and
narcotics.
I briefed him about corporate America's interest in Pakistan, which has
resulted in the signing of $12 billion worth of MOUs in the last 17
months since our government took office. I urged an early resolution of
the core issue of Kashmir, which poses a great threat to peace and
security in our region. It has retarded progress on all issues,
including nuclear and missile non-proliferation. A just and durable
solution is the need of the hour, based on the wishes of the Kashmiri
people, as envisaged in the Security Council resolutions. Pakistan
remains committed to engage in a substantive dialogue with India to
resolve this dispute, but not in a charade that can be used by our
neighbor to mislead the international community. I am happy to note that
the United States recognizes Kashmir as disputed territory and maintains
that a durable solution can only be based on the will of the Kashmiri
people.
Pakistan asked for a reassessment of the Pressler Amendment, which
places discriminatory sanctions on Pakistan. In our view, this amendment
has been a disincentive for a regional solution to the proliferation
issue. Pakistan has requested that the President and the Administration
resolve the problem of our equipment worth $1.4 billion, which is
held up. I am encouraged by my discussions with the President this
morning and the understanding that he has shown for Pakistan's position.
I welcome the Clinton Administration's decision to work with Congress to
revise the Pressler Amendment. Thank you, Mr. President.
Joint Statement
Text of U.S.-Pakistan joint statement on the occasion of the visit of
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,
Washington, DC, April 11, 1995.
1. President Clinton and Prime Minister Bhutto called today for enhanced
efforts to strengthen the traditional friendship between the United
States and Pakistan, based on their shared commitment to democracy,
economic liberalization, human rights, peaceful resolution of regional
conflicts, conventional arms control, non-proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and societies free from the evils of narcotics.
2. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that in the post-Cold War
era, Pakistan has a key role to play in promoting moderation, peace and
stability in South and Central Asia and in the Islamic World. Both
leaders welcomed the cooperation between their countries in UN
peacekeeping operations, especially in Haiti, Bosnia and Somalia. The
large contributions made by the U.S. and Pakistan for UN peacekeeping
operations and their determination to strengthen the role of the United
Nations in conflict resolution underscore their commitment to
international peace and stability.
3. Recognizing that the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir remains
the primary source of tension in the region, the two leaders agreed on
the need for India and Pakistan to engage in a substantive dialogue to
resolve the Kashmir issue, taking into account the wishes of the people
of Jammu and Kashmir. Prime Minister Bhutto reiterated to President
Clinton Pakistan's willingness to accept American or other international
mediatory efforts to help the parties find a just and lasting solution
to the Kashmir dispute.
4. President Clinton and Prime Minister Bhutto reaffirmed their support
for global and regional efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction and to forestall production and deployment of
ballistic missile delivery systems. The leaders agreed on the need for
the earliest possible conclusion of a nondiscriminatory and adequately
verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for
nuclear weapons and a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. They also welcomed
upcoming talks between the U.S. and Pakistan on South Asia security,
arms control and non-proliferation at which nuclear and missile
proliferation and its relationship to regional, multilateral and global
issues would be discussed.
5. President Clinton and Prime Minister Bhutto pledged to work together
to expand U.S.-Pakistani security relations, consistent with the laws
and policies of both countries. In this connection, they welcomed the
revival of the U.S.-Pakistani Consultative Group as a means to
strengthen military and security ties between their countries. The two
leaders pledged to work to find a mutually-acceptable solution to
military supply issues. For his part, President Clinton expressed his
intention to work with Congress to revise the Pressler Amendment to
facilitate both a stronger relationship with Pakistan and nuclear non-
proliferation aims in South Asia.
6. The two leaders strongly welcomed the deepening ties in trade and
investment resulting from Pakistan's broad economic reform program. The
two leaders noted significant investment commitments and expressions of
intent, especially in the energy sector. The leaders agreed to step up
scientific and cultural exchanges consistent with their laws and
policies. In this connection, the U.S. and Pakistan signed a letter of
intent to expand scientific and technical cooperation during Prime
Minister Bhutto's visit.
7. President Clinton and Prime Minister Bhutto recognized that narcotics
addiction and trafficking are a global scourge and pledged to work
together closely to reduce domestic demand for illegal narcotic drugs,
to eradicate cultivation, production and export of drugs to or from
their territories, and to arrest and punish narcotics traffickers around
the world. President Clinton welcomed Pakistan's expanded counter-
narcotics efforts in early 1995, and the two leaders agreed to enhance
cooperation in this area. (###)
ARTICLE 4:
U.S. Turkish Leadership in the Post-Cold War World
Deputy Secretary Talbott
Address at Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey, April 11, 1995
It is a pleasure to be back in Ankara. I'm particularly pleased to be
here at Bilkent University. America is proud to be participating in
various ways in what is happening on this splendid campus. When this
institution first opened its doors to students in 1986 as modern
Turkey's first private university, few would have predicted that, just
nine years later, it would become one of Turkey's top centers of higher
learning. In my own country, private and state universities have long
coexisted and the competition for excellence between the two has
significantly raised the quality of education and the quality of public
discourse to the benefit of the nation as a whole. Outstanding
universities, such as this one, teach good citizenship and thus serve as
bulwarks of democracy.
It was fitting, therefore, that when Prime Minister Ciller spoke here
last month, she spoke about democracy. She argued eloquently that the
work of building a truly open society is never done; democracy is, by
definition, an ongoing process. Her message is relevant not just to
Turkey but to the whole world, including the United States. American
democracy, too, is a work in progress. Moreover, democracy is a
collaborative work. Supporters of the ideal and the process the world
over reinforce and learn from each other. So we are working together on
democracy not just here, but everywhere it has taken root.
There is another task on which Turkey and the United States are working
together--building the institutions and habits of cooperation that
promote international peace and prosperity. This challenge, too, has
been the focus of Turkish-American collaboration. For nearly half a
century, our two countries stood side by side in the cause of freedom.
In no small measure because the United States and Turkey were allies in
the Cold War, that conflict is now over. But our work is not over; there
is still unfinished business. We are as much allies in the post-Cold War
world as we were during the Cold War. If we continue to act together, we
can seize a historic opportunity not just to combat new threats but also
to shape a world that reflects our shared ideals and promotes our common
interests.
This afternoon, I want to talk about how we can make the most of this
opportunity. I'd like to begin--and I hope you will not find this
presumptuous--by relating your national experience in the 20th century
to President Clinton's vision of an international order in the 21st.
Turkey's efforts to define statehood and civil society in the post-
imperial phase of its own history offer valuable lessons to other
countries, particularly to those who are just now emerging from the
wreckage of Soviet-style communism and who, therefore, now have another
chance at building civil societies of their own.
Modern Turkey and the Soviet Union were born about the same time--under
similar circumstances. I thought of this earlier today as I was laying a
wreath at the mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Both the Turkish
Republic and the Soviet Union represented great revolutionary
experiments launched in the wake of World War I and the collapse of
empires. The Soviet experiment lasted for over seven decades. It ended
in paralysis, disintegration, and self-defeat, primarily because the
political and economic system betrayed the hopes and needs of its own
citizens.
The Soviet experiment failed for another reason, too. It failed because
the commissars were every bit as imperialistic as the Czars had been--
both in the way they dealt with non-Russian populations within the
U.S.S.R. and in their behavior toward the outside world.
Turkey's experiment was, at its core, very different. In January 1921,
the Grand National Assembly declared that the new Turkish state rested
"on the principle that the people personally and effectively direct
their own destinies." This simple but enduring precept, which captures
the essence of democracy, has produced powerful, positive, and enduring
results. It has allowed Turkey to overcome difficulties and setbacks and
to develop a system of free and fair elections in which men and women
participate equally. Over the past two decades, Turkey has been able to
move away from unresponsive and inefficient economic practices and move
toward an environment in which private enterprise and free trade can
flourish.
Let me say a word about Turkish foreign policy. In the way that your
country first defined--then defended--its national interest, it has set
an exemplary standard for the 20th century--one that is worth bearing in
mind for the 21st. Under Ataturk's extraordinary leadership, the Turkish
people rejected the legacy and temptation of empire and devoted
themselves, instead, to the goal that Ataturk himself identified as
"independence within defined national frontiers." After World War II,
Turkey forged alliances with the other free peoples of the world in the
fight against Soviet expansionism--not just in the West, as part of
NATO, but also in the Near East, through CENTO, and in the Far East,
through your contribution to the United Nations Force in Korea.
Americans still remember the extraordinary bravery of the Turkish
soldiers who fought at Kunu Ri and along the Imjin River and the
sacrifice of the hundreds of Turks who, like so many Americans, gave
their lives in that war.
Now, just as in the early 1920s, we are in another era of great
transition following the collapse of an empire--one that stretched from
Vilnius to Vladivostock and from Murmansk to Baku--a vast territory
under the hammer and sickle. The sudden implosion of communist systems
has created new opportunities for freedom, prosperity, and long-term
security. Nowhere are those opportunities more apparent than in Europe.
As President Clinton put it,
For the first time in history, we can have a Europe that is united
by a shared commitment to democracy, free market economics, and mutual
respect for borders.
Turkey, which was a front-line state in the battle against Soviet
communism, now has much to gain from this process of post-Soviet
integration. The emergence of stable, prosperous, democratic, and law-
abiding nations along your borders can only benefit Turkey.
There are those who are skeptical about European expansion and
integration. They are skeptical about whether any nations to the east of
what might be called "traditional Europe" can truly be part of a larger
21st-century Europe. To them we say: You're wrong. Europe has always
defined itself not in terms of artificial geographical barriers--a river
here, a mountain range there, or a strait of water somewhere else.
Rather, it has defined itself as a community of nations that share
values, aspirations, and ways of life--that share a sense of common
interest and common destiny. Take my country, for example. The United
States is in a different hemisphere from this continent, separated from
Europe by the vastness of the Atlantic Ocean. Yet America has played an
essential role in securing European unity and prosperity. Your country,
too, is an example of the expansiveness of the idea of Europe. Of
course, Turkey has cultural ties to Central Asia and the Middle East;
most of Turkey is separated from the rest of Europe by the Bosphorus and
the Dardanelles. Yet it has been an important part of the European
system since the 16th century.
Let me, in that regard, mention an essential European institution of
which both your country and mine are members: NATO. The North Atlantic
Treaty Organization has proved to be the greatest, which is to say, the
most successful military alliance in history. It defended democracy and
kept Europe at peace even while the continent was divided between two
heavily armed, ideologically hostile camps. Now, having defended
security in a divided Europe, NATO must help extend stability across an
undivided Europe.
Our two nations also have important roles to play in the economic
integration of the new Europe. The March 6 EU Customs Union Agreement
will link Turkey more closely to the peoples of Western Europe, and it
also will help to ensure that you will be a full participant in the
process of integrating the nations emerging from Soviet-style communism
into the European economic system. Turkish membership in the Customs
Union will encourage Hungarian, Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian
entrepreneurs, as they build new economic partnerships, to look toward
Ankara and Istanbul, as well as toward Frankfurt, Paris, London, and New
York.
Another essential aspect of building an undivided Europe is the
resolution of the conflicts that currently beset individual countries.
If Europe as a whole is going to evolve as a harmonious multiethnic
community, its constituent states must heal their own internal wounds.
An important example is Cyprus. The United States and the United Nations
have been working on the problems of that troubled island for over 30
years. President Clinton believes that the time is right to seek a
lasting solution that will benefit both communities on Cyprus, thus
enhancing the prospects for peace in the entire region. In the past
several months, the President's Special Envoy, Richard Beattie, has had
constructive meetings with all of the involved parties, and we hope that
direct talks under United Nations auspices will resume soon after this
Saturday's elections in north Cyprus.
Looking beyond Europe, the United States and Turkey have vital roles to
play in the Middle East and Central Asia. Turkey is the European nation
most closely linked to those regions by geography, history, culture,
and, of course, by religion.
Let me say a word about Islam. Some have suggested that the Cold War
rivalry between communism and capitalism will be replaced by a global
"clash of civilizations" between Western and Muslim countries. But
Turkey, today, refutes that dire prediction about tomorrow. Turkey is
both a Western and a Muslim country, and its four-decade partnership
with the other nations of Europe and with the United States proves how
productive and enduring cooperation among "the peoples of the book" can
be. It is, in this connection, significant that Turkey has contributed
to the emerging peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors. That was
evident yet again last week when your government hosted the most recent
meeting of the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group in
Antalya. These efforts have created historic opportunities for
cooperation among all of the nations of the region--I might say, among
all the civilized nations of the region.
Last fall's economic summit in Casablanca, which was attended by
representatives of 61 countries and over 1,100 business leaders from all
regions of the world, demonstrated the potential for economic
development in the Middle East. Such development will require enormous
amounts of human and financial capital, and Turkey can play a leading
role in supplying both. Istanbul has the potential to become a leading
capital market for the Middle East, and your young, well-educated work
force will be much in demand.
In addition to its human resources, Turkey has a unique advantage in
its wealth of natural resources. For decades, oil has been the liquid
currency of the Middle East. But with regional peace, rapid population
growth, and greater economic development, water will become increasingly
important, and Turkey is the only country in the region with a water
surplus. Your neighbors to the south--Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and
Israel-- will need access to that surplus in the decades to come.
Furthermore, Turkey is an important gateway for trade and investment in
the resource-rich areas of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Most
immediately, your country offers a highly promising, cost-effective
route for bringing oil and gas from those regions to Western markets. A
pipeline to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, along with other existing
and potential routes, would promote economic development in Turkey, as
well as in the other countries involved. That project will require
cooperation on the part of all the nations in the area and, thus, could
help promote greater regional stability.
As Turkey liberalizes its economy, we see trade and investment
strengthening the link between our two nations. The Clinton
Administration has designated Turkey as one of our 10 so-called Big
Emerging Markets. That means that the Secretary of Commerce, Ron Brown,
and my boss, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, have made it a top
priority to improve market access, provide financing, and otherwise
support U.S. companies that are seeking to trade with and invest in
Turkey.
The great potential of the economic partnership between our two nations
was evident two weeks ago in Washington at the U.S.-Turkey Joint
Economic Commission, led by Assistant Secretary of State Richard
Holbrooke, who is here at this event today, and Dr. Emre Gonensay,
Senior Adviser to Prime Minister Ciller. The JEC has a full and
ambitious agenda, which includes potential financing mechanisms for a
pipeline to Ceyhan. All of which is to say, there is plenty of reason
for optimism about the future of U.S.-Turkish relations in the post-Cold
War era. But we must temper our optimism with realism and our vision
with vigilance--for every opportunity that has come with the end of the
Cold War there is also a challenge; for every favorable development
there seems also to be an ominous one.
While the collapse of Soviet communism created opportunities for
economic integration and political freedom, it also opened the lid on a
Pandora's box of ethnic conflict and civil war. The forces that threaten
to tear apart individual countries and thwart our hopes for
international order are concentrated in your neighborhood--on the Balkan
Peninsula, in the Caucasus, in Central Asia, and in Iran and Iraq.
As a result, Turkey is yet again on the front line of the world's most
important struggles just as it was during the Cold War from the late
1940s to the late 1980s and just as it was during the first major post-
Cold War crisis--the repulse of Iraqi aggression and the liberation of
Kuwait in 1990-91. As our Ambassador, Marc Grossman, puts it, "Turkey
lives in a neighborhood that is a 360-degree challenge."
To your west, in the former Yugoslavia, the war that began with the
Serbs' monstrous scheme for "ethnic cleansing" has led to over 200,000
casualties and forced over 2 million people from their homes. Continued
fighting threatens to undermine stability throughout southeastern Europe
and beyond.
The United States supports the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Bosnia-Herzegovina. We want to see an end to civilian casualties, human
rights abuses, and the flow of refugees. We remain committed to UNPROFOR
and to the NATO-enforced no-fly zone, and we stand ready to work with
our allies to help implement a final peace settlement. We are pressing
Serbia to improve human rights conditions for ethnic minorities
throughout the country and to restore autonomy to the Albanians in
Kosovo. We support Kosovar advocates of nonviolent change and have
warned Slobodan Milosevic that we are prepared to take action against
Serbia in response to a conflict in Kosovo caused by Serb actions. We
also are determined to see that those responsible for ethnic cleansing
and other war crimes are brought to justice through the international
tribunal that already has begun its work.
We are mindful that many of the victims of the violence in the former
Yugoslavia have ties to the people of Turkey. We are grateful for
Turkey's contribution to the peacekeeping force in Bosnia and for your
help in enforcing the no-fly zone. We also welcome Turkey's role as one
of the founding members of the Friends of the Bosnian Croat Federation.
In short, the United States and Turkey are united in their support for a
multiethnic, multi-religious democracy in Bosnia.
Turning eastward, we commend Turkish efforts to help end the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict. Turkey, along with the United States, has been a key
member of the OSCE's Minsk Group, and has been actively involved in the
ongoing negotiations to resolve the conflict peacefully. Toward that
end, we applaud Turkey's move to improve its relations with Armenia.
These efforts have reduced tensions in the region while giving the
peoples of Azerbaijan and Armenia a real opportunity to achieve a
lasting peace.
Let me now say a word about a very large country to your north--Russia,
a country where I have just spent several days. The Soviet Union and
before that the Russian empire used to be your neighbor, right on your
frontier. Now, for the first time in over three centuries--for the first
time since the year 1667--you have no common border with Russia. But its
fate and evolution are still much on your minds and on ours.
The bloody debacle in Chechnya is a reminder that the success of reform
in Russia and an irreversible repudiation of rule by force are by no
means guaranteed. Chechnya has--literally and figuratively--broadcast to
the world images that conjure up the worst memories of Russia's past and
that, therefore, cloud the best visions of its future.
Chechnya stands as a warning to Russia and to the rest of the world: If
any government attempts to enforce unity with brute strength, if it
insists on imposing its control on people who feel disenfranchised or
oppressed, the result will likely be more disintegration, more violence,
and more instability. The policy of the United States in regard to
Chechnya is clear: We support the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of a democratic Russian Federation within its current borders. We do not
countenance attempts to change international borders by armed
secessionism within a state any more than we countenance armed
aggression by one state against another. We want to see Russia develop
as a strong, prosperous, democratic, secure state in the 21st century,
at peace with its own peoples as well as with its neighbors. But we also
have made clear that we think that Russia will attain those goals only
if it continues to develop a pluralistic political system, a
constitutional order, and federal structures that permit all the diverse
peoples of the Russian Federation to identify themselves as citizens of
a multiethnic state, not as subjects of Moscow's rule.
That same lesson should be apparent to other multiethnic states that are
trying to deal with violent sucessionists--force alone is not the
answer; force alone can make a bad situation worse. The way to defeat
outlaw groups is to deprive them of popular support by addressing
legitimate needs and grievances. Inclusive democracy, in short, is the
best antidote to extremism. Let me move from that general proposition to
more specific observations about northern Iraq.
Cooperation between the United States and Turkey on security matters is
especially vital when it comes to dealing with outlaw states such as
Iraq and Iran and outlaw organizations such as the PKK and Hamas that
are determined to use terror to impose their own ideologies, undermine
the search for peace, and threaten the territorial integrity of their
neighbors.
I already mentioned that Turkey played a stalwart role as a front-line
state in the Gulf war, thus affirming its strategic importance and its
reliability as an ally and friend of the U.S. Our joint efforts in Iraq
have continued with Operation Provide Comfort which, for four years, has
served as a deterrent against Saddam Hussein's repression of Iraq's
northern population. That operation has served vital U.S. and Turkish
interests in containing Saddam and has helped prevent massive refugee
flows into Turkey, such as those that occurred in 1991. We look forward
to Turkey's continued support of this mission that is so central to our
collective interests.
The underlying problem in northern Iraq is the one identified by the
United Nations Security Council--namely, that the current Iraqi
Government has not been willing to respect international norms or abide
by basic human rights standards. As a result, the regime in Baghdad has
lost the allegiance of the majority of the Iraqi people, including the
Kurds of northern Iraq. It has shown itself to be the enemy of
neighboring states and the international community. For those reasons,
it has, quite predictably, lost control over its borders.
Over the long run, the only way to eliminate the threat that Turkey
faces along its southeastern border is to restore the rule of law to
northern Iraq. That depends on the formation of a government in Baghdad
that represents all of the Iraqi people and that maintains peaceful
relations with all its neighbors. In the meantime, only the Iraqi Kurds
can control the border and prevent the PKK from infiltrating terrorists
into Turkey. Thus, the U.S. and Turkey must renew our efforts to bring
to a halt the violence among Kurdish factions in northern Iraq.
It is our strong belief that the international sanctions called for by
Security Council Resolution 688 must continue until the Iraqi Government
forsakes terrorism; abandons its attempts to acquire and produce
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons; and ceases repression of its
own citizens. Now we know that Turkey has paid a heavy price for its
enforcement of these sanctions, but your country is also among those
that have the most to gain from an Iraq that fulfills its obligations
and responsibilities to the international community. Conversely, your
country is among those that have the most to lose if Iraq remains an
oppressor of its own people and an exporter of instability.
Our position on Operation Steel is clear. The United States understands
Turkey's need to deal firmly with the PKK, which is a vicious terrorist
organization. But we attach great importance to the assurances of the
Turkish Government that the operation will be limited in scope and
duration. We regard the recent withdrawal of 3,000 troops as a positive
first step. President Clinton has discussed this issue with Prime
Minister Ciller, and I have done the same in my meetings today.
The United States and Turkey must continue to work together, as we have
for half a century, to combat threats to stability and security in this
region where you live and where we have vital interests, including a
vital interest in the stability and security of Turkey itself.
But as we pursue those goals together, we should draw what is perhaps
the most compelling and relevant lesson from the Cold War--we should
remember that we, the Western allies, did not defeat communism by
military deterrence alone, nor did we win this victory by ourselves. In
the end, the Berlin Wall came tumbling down and the Iron Curtain was
lifted because the yearning of the people of the former Soviet Union and
its satellites for human rights, political freedoms, and open societies
finally triumphed over the ideology and the decrepit tyrannical
apparatus of their communist rulers. The Cold War ended when peoples all
across the U.S.S.R. and throughout Central and Eastern Europe--reformers
and democrats and dissidents and, eventually, voters--embraced the same
liberal values that unite the member states of NATO. These are the
values upon which we must continue to rely--and which we must continue
to advance--in the post-Cold War era.
In this sense, too, Turkey is on the front line of a global struggle
between forces of reform and those of regression, between the new and
the old, and between various visions of the new, some hardly more savory
than the old. That struggle continues as diverse peoples seek a balance
between, on the one hand, fulfillment of their religious, ethnic, and
national identities and, on the other, development of inclusive,
secular, democratic institutions and structures of international
cooperation. It continues not just in the lands of the former Romanov
empire but in the lands of former Hapsburg and Ottoman empires as well
as in Central Europe and the Middle East. We want to see Turkey on the
right and winning side of this struggle.
If Turkey can ensure the rights of all of its own citizens and stay on
the path of economic liberalization, then it will become increasingly a
model for states to the West, North, East and South--states that are
just embarking on their own journeys of modernization. Your country's
accomplishments in the 20th century give you the potential to be a
leader in the 21st. This is just one reason among many why the United
States is proud to stand with you as we work to build a safer and more
prosperous future. (###)
ARTICLE 5:
A Humanitarian Exception to the Iraqi Sanctions
Madeleine K. Albright, UNSC Resolution
Madeleine K. Albright
Statement by the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations
before the UN Security Council, New York City, April 14, 1995.
Argentina, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Oman began work on
this resolution at the specific request of a number of Arab, non-
aligned, and European states. We shared a common concern about the
unnecessary humanitarian suffering of the Iraqi people caused by the
Iraqi Government's policies, particularly its refusal to implement the
resolutions of the Security Council. We agreed to make a good-faith
effort to draft a plan that Iraq would have no reason to reject.
We decided that we must be guided by the following principles: First,
the purpose of the resolution is to address humanitarian needs, not to
meet political or other extraneous objectives. Second, this resolution
is not an easing or lifting of sanctions but an exception to the
sanctions regime for a specified purpose. Third, we wanted a greatly
simplified resolution, building on both the positive and negative
lessons from UN resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991) and other
experiences. Finally, against the desire for simplification, we had to
balance the need to take full account of the fact that Iraq had not
proven trustworthy in implementing previous resolutions and had
consistently sought to turn innocent-sounding phrases into excuses for
non-compliance.
We approached the task of drafting the new by returning to the old, and
we examined carefully the complete record of resolutions 706 (1991) and
712 (1991). We looked carefully at all the reasons Iraq gave at that
time to justify its refusal to implement that plan. We also reviewed the
record of negotiations between Iraq and Turkey in 1994, when Council
members considered a plan, at first supported by Iraq, to export oil
through the Turkish pipeline and use the proceeds for humanitarian
purposes. Throughout our drafting, we made every effort to understand
every concern expressed by Iraq, and we addressed those concerns in a
serious and open-minded way.
While we addressed every issue Iraq had raised before, we never
underestimated Iraq's ability to generate dozens of new objections and
excuses. We realized from the beginning that Iraq would never say in
advance of the vote that it accepted this plan, just as it has never
accepted any Council resolution before or at the time of its passage. We
note that, eventually, Iraq has found it in its interest to accept--and
on occasion even implement--several Council resolutions. We hope that
Iraq's current position--taken for the sake of posturing and
negotiations--will not be the same as its final position--taken on the
basis of a calm measurement of the benefits this resolution offers to
the Iraqi people.
Let me address just some of the arguments that some delegations have
advanced on behalf of Iraq. First, I reaffirm here--as we reaffirm in
the resolution--my government's unchanging support for the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of Iraq. But I must note that the greatest
threat to the territorial integrity of Iraq is Saddam Hussein. His is
the only government in history to have used weapons of mass destruction
against its own citizens. His is the government that has imposed an
economic and electricity blockade against one section of his country.
Doubts about Iraq's territorial integrity and the need to make special
arrangements to provide for humanitarian needs in northern Iraq arise
only because of the actions of the Iraqi Government.
The Council has other business before it with regard to Iraq as we wait
with impatience for a change in Iraq's attitude and its compliance with
all the Council's resolutions. Today's resolution, however, does not
prejudge in any way subsequent actions the Council may take in this
regard. The United States believes that Iraq's compliance with all the
Security Council's resolutions is the only way in which it will prove to
the international community that its intentions are peaceful. Then--and
only then--can this Council move to modify the sanctions regime. This
resolution today is technical, not political, and we have resisted
efforts by Iraq and others to insert political provisions into the
resolution.
Our work on this new resolution is based on our humanitarian concern
that the people of Iraq are suffering as a result of the policies of
their government. We believe sanctions are a valuable tool for the
Security Council to use when dealing with rogue states that refuse to
live peaceably with their neighbors. But we always have shared the
concern expressed by so many here that sanctions not strike an
unintended target. We believe we have found exactly the right compromise
here--not a lifting of the sanctions on the Iraqi regime but a
humanitarian exception to the sanctions for the benefit of the Iraqi
people.
Even before the passage of this resolution, and even before the passage
of resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991), this Council always has
demonstrated that it has no quarrel with the Iraqi people. The Council
has tried to ensure that the people of Iraq have access to basic
humanitarian goods and has never prohibited the shipment of food and
medicines. The Council and Member States have supported the United
Nations Inter-Agency Humanitarian Program, which operates throughout
Iraq.
We want the Government of Iraq to accept and implement this resolution.
The cosponsors made extraordinary efforts, even before entering a phase
of flexible and productive cooperation with other members of the
Council, to craft a text that would address Iraq's concerns. If it still
refuses to implement it, it will only be because the Government of Iraq
does not know how to take "yes" for an answer.
The Government of Iraq already has at its disposal the means to lift the
sanctions--compliance with the Council's resolutions. It declines to
exercise this option. If it refuses to implement this resolution, it
will be clear for all to see--and especially to the Iraqi people--that
the blame for the suffering of the people of Iraq rests not with the
Security Council but with the government in Baghdad.
Let me stress that that is not the outcome we desire. We call on Iraq to
take its time, study this resolution with an open mind, and decide to
accept it and implement it. The Council has once again given Baghdad the
opportunity to act in the best interests of its citizens. For their
sake, we urge the Government of Iraq to take advantage of this chance.
In closing, let me make it clear that this resolution would not be
necessary and the Iraqi people would not be suffering if Iraq's
Government were not driven by ruthless ambition. Let us not forget that
this is a government that has invaded its neighbor, supported terrorism,
built weapons of mass destruction, and continues to threaten the
stability of the Persian Gulf. It is only when the regime changes its
underlying objectives that the resolutions will no longer be necessary
and the Iraqi people no longer will be suffering.
Resolution 986
(April 14, 1995)
The Security Council,
Recalling its previous relevant resolutions,
Concerned by the serious nutritional and health situation of the Iraqi
population, and by the risk of a further deterioration in this
situation,
Convinced of the need as a temporary measure to provide for the
humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people until the fulfilment by Iraq of
the relevant Security Council resolutions, including notably resolution
687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, allows the Council to take further action
with regard to the prohibitions referred to in resolution 661 (1990) of
6 August 1990, in accordance with the provisions of those resolutions,
Convinced also of the need for equitable distribution of humanitarian
relief to all segments of the Iraqi population throughout the country,
Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Iraq,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Authorizes States, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 3(a),
3(b) and 4 of resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions,
to permit the import of petroleum and petroleum products originating in
Iraq, including financial and other essential transactions directly
relating thereto, sufficient to produce a sum not exceeding a total of
one billion United States dollars every 90 days for the purposes set out
in this resolution and subject to the following conditions:
(a) Approval by the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990), in
order to ensure the transparency of each transaction and its conformity
with the other provisions of this resolution, after submission of an
application by the State concerned, endorsed by the Government of Iraq,
for each proposed purchase of Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products,
including details of the purchase price at fair market value, the export
route, the opening of a letter of credit payable to the escrow account
to be established by the Secretary-General for the purposes of this
resolution, and of any other directly related financial or other
essential transaction;
(b) Payment of the full amount of each purchase of Iraqi petroleum and
petroleum products directly by the purchaser in the State concerned into
the escrow account to be established by the Secretary-General for the
purposes of this resolution;
2. Authorizes Turkey, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 3(a),
3(b) and 4 of resolution 661 (1990) and the provisions of paragraph 1
above, to permit the import of petroleum and petroleum products
originating in Iraq sufficient, after the deduction of the percentage
referred to in paragraph 8(c) below for the Compensation Fund, to meet
the pipeline tariff charges, verified as reasonable by the independent
inspection agents referred to in paragraph 6 below, for the transport of
Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products through the Kirkuk- Yumurtalik
pipeline in Turkey authorized by paragraph 1 above;
3. Decides that paragraphs 1 and 2 of this resolution shall come into
force at 00.01 Eastern Standard Time on the day after the President of
the Council has informed the members of the Council that he has received
the report from the Secretary-General requested in paragraph 13 below,
and shall remain in force for an initial period of 180 days unless the
Council takes other relevant action with regard to the provisions of
resolution 661 (1990);
4. Further decides to conduct a thorough review of all aspects of the
implementation of this resolution 90 days after the entry into force of
paragraph 1 above and again prior to the end of the initial 180 day
period, on receipt of the reports referred to in paragraphs 11 and 12
below, and expresses its intention, prior to the end of the 180 day
period, to consider favourably renewal of the provisions of this
resolution, provided that the reports referred to in paragraphs 11 and
12 below indicate that those provisions are being satisfactorily
implemented;
5. Further decides that the remaining paragraphs of this resolution
shall come into force forthwith;
6. Directs the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) to monitor
the sale of petroleum and petroleum products to be exported by Iraq via
the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline from Iraq to Turkey and from the Mina al-
Bakr oil terminal, with the assistance of independent inspection agents
appointed by the Secretary-General, who will keep the Committee informed
of the amount of petroleum and petroleum products exported from Iraq
after the date of entry into force of paragraph 1 of this resolution,
and will verify that the purchase price of the petroleum and petroleum
products is reasonable in the light of prevailing market conditions, and
that, for the purposes of the arrangements set out in this resolution,
the larger share of the petroleum and petroleum products is shipped via
the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline and the remainder is exported from the
Mina al-Bakr oil terminal;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to establish an escrow account for the
purposes of this resolution, to appoint independent and certified public
accountants to audit it, and to keep the Government of Iraq fully
informed;
8. Decides that the funds in the escrow account shall be used to meet
the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi population and for the following
other purposes, and requests the Secretary-General to use the funds
deposited in the escrow account:
(a) To finance the export to Iraq, in accordance with the procedures of
the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990), of medicine, health
supplies, foodstuffs, and materials and supplies for essential civilian
needs, as referred to in paragraph 20 of resolution 687 (1991) provided
that:
(i) Each export of goods is at the request of the Government of Iraq;
(ii) Iraq effectively guarantees their equitable distribution, on the
basis of a plan submitted to and approved by the Secretary-General,
including a description of the goods to be purchased;
(iii) The Secretary-General receives authenticated confirmation that the
exported goods concerned have arrived in Iraq;
(b) To complement, in view of the exceptional circumstances prevailing
in the three Governorates mentioned below, the distribution by the
Government of Iraq of goods imported under this resolution, in order to
ensure an equitable distribution of humanitarian relief to all segments
of the Iraqi population throughout the country, by providing between 130
million and 150 million United States dollars every 90 days to the
United Nations Inter-Agency Humanitarian Programme operating within the
sovereign territory of Iraq in the three northern Governorates of
Dihouk, Arbil and Suleimaniyeh, except that if less than one billion
United States dollars worth of petroleum or petroleum products is sold
during any 90 day period, the Secretary-General may provide a
proportionately smaller amount for this purpose;
(c) To transfer to the Compensation Fund the same percentage of the
funds deposited in the escrow account as that decided by the Council in
paragraph 2 of resolution 705 (1991) of 15 August 1991;
(d) To meet the costs to the United Nations of the independent
inspection agents and the certified public accountants and the
activities associated with implementation of this resolution;
(e) To meet the current operating costs of the Special Commission,
pending subsequent payment in full of the costs of carrying out the
tasks authorized by section C of resolution 687 (1991);
(f) To meet any reasonable expenses, other than expenses payable in
Iraq, which are determined by the Committee established by resolution
661 (1990) to be directly related to the export by Iraq of petroleum and
petroleum products permitted under paragraph 1 above or to the export to
Iraq, and activities directly necessary therefor, of the parts and
equipment permitted under paragraph 9 below;
(g) To make available up to 10 million United States dollars every 90
days from the funds deposited in the escrow account for the payments
envisaged under paragraph 6 of resolution 778 (1992) of 2 October 1992;
9. Authorizes States to permit, notwithstanding the provisions of
paragraph 3(c) of resolution 661 (1990):
(a) The export to Iraq of the parts and equipment which are essential
for the safe operation of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline system in Iraq,
subject to the prior approval by the Committee established by resolution
661 (1990) of each export contract;
(b) Activities directly necessary for the exports authorized under
subparagraph (a) above, including financial transactions related
thereto;
10. Decides that, since the costs of the exports and activities
authorized under paragraph 9 above are precluded by paragraph 4 of
resolution 661 (1990) and by paragraph 11 of resolution 778 (1991) from
being met from funds frozen in accordance with those provisions, the
cost of such exports and activities may, until funds begin to be paid
into the escrow account established for the purposes of this resolution,
and following approval in each case by the Committee established by
resolution 661 (1990), exceptionally be financed by letters of credit,
drawn against future oil sales the proceeds of which are to be deposited
in the escrow account;
11. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council 90 days
after the date of entry into force of paragraph 1 above, and again prior
to the end of the initial 180 day period, on the basis of observation by
United Nations personnel in Iraq, and on the basis of consultations with
the Government of Iraq, on whether Iraq has ensured the equitable
distribution of medicine, health supplies, foodstuffs, and materials and
supplies for essential civilian needs, financed in accordance with
paragraph 8(a) above, including in his reports any observations he may
have on the adequacy of the revenues to meet Iraq's humanitarian needs,
and on Iraq's capacity to export sufficient quantities of petroleum and
petroleum products to produce the sum referred to in paragraph 1 above;
12. Requests the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990), in
close coordination with the Secretary-General, to develop expedited
procedures as necessary to implement the arrangements in paragraphs 1,
2, 6, 8, 9 and 10 of this resolution and to report to the Council 90
days after the date of entry into force of paragraph 1 above and again
prior to the end of the initial 180 day period on the implementation of
those arrangements;
13. Requests the Secretary-General to take the actions necessary to
ensure the effective implementation of this resolution, authorizes him
to enter into any necessary arrangements or agreements, and requests him
to report to the Council when he has done so;
14. Decides that petroleum and petroleum products subject to this
resolution shall while under Iraqi title be immune from legal
proceedings and not be subject to any form of attachment, garnishment or
execution, and that all States shall take any steps that may be
necessary under their respective domestic legal systems to assure this
protection, and to ensure that the proceeds of the sale are not diverted
from the purposes laid down in this resolution;
15. Affirms that the escrow account established for the purposes of this
resolution enjoys the privileges and immunities of the United Nations;
16. Affirms that all persons appointed by the Secretary-General for the
purpose of implementing this resolution enjoy privileges and immunities
as experts on mission for the United Nations in accordance with the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, and
requires the Government of Iraq to allow them full freedom of movement
and all necessary facilities for the discharge of their duties in the
implementation of this resolution;
17. Affirms that nothing in this resolution affects Iraq's duty
scrupulously to adhere to all of its obligations concerning servicing
and repayment of its foreign debt, in accordance with the appropriate
international mechanisms;
18. Also affirms that nothing in this resolution should be construed as
infringing the sovereignty or territorial integrity of Iraq;
19. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
VOTE: Unanimous (15-0) (###)
ARTICLE 6:
Recent Efforts to Resolve the Balkan Conflict
Richard C. Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian
Affairs
Statement before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
Washington, DC, April 6, 1995
Mr. Chairman: I am delighted to appear before this distinguished
commission to share my thoughts on events in the former Yugoslavia. As
we move into the spring and summer months, we have been working to
prevent renewed fighting not only in Bosnia but in Croatia and elsewhere
in the Balkans. I am pleased to report that our efforts in Croatia have
helped prevent, at least for the moment, the wider war we all feared. I
am equally disappointed that diplomacy has been unable to prevent the
likely resumption of the tragic conflict in Bosnia. Let me elaborate on
our recent efforts, starting with Croatia.
The situation in Croatia has been at a virtual stalemate since 1992,
when UNPROFOR was established to help restore peace and pave the way for
talks between the Zagreb Government and breakaway Serbs. As a result,
Croatian President Tudjman decided, in January, to end UNPROFOR's
mission in Croatia, preparing a military assault to retake the 27% of
Croatia still in Serb hands while pursuing economic and political talks
with the Serbs.
In response to these pressure tactics, however, the Serbs became
recalcitrant. President Milosevic in Belgrade rejected proposals from
the Contact Group and from Zagreb to recognize Croatia. The Croatian
Serb leadership in Knin suspended talks with Zagreb on reopening
transport routes and restoring utility supplies. This gave Croatia even
less reason to reconsider the decision to expel the UN forces. The
result was an escalating spiral of tension: both sides digging in --
literally and figuratively--and likely to start fighting over the buffer
zone that the UN would have to vacate.
To break this dangerous spiral, I went to Zagreb with a two-part
message: We support the goal of Croatian reintegration, but we think
expelling the UN would unavoidably restart the war. I explored with
President Tudjman possibilities for maintaining an international
presence in Croatia that does not perpetuate an unjust status quo but
that helps avoid hostilities. He emphasized the importance of
controlling Croatia's border to deter Serbian military equipment and
personnel from coming into Croatia out of Serbia and Bosnia.
My meetings in Zagreb were followed by an important agreement reached
between Vice President Gore and President Tudjman in Copenhagen. The
Gore-Tudjman agreement struck a fair balance between maintaining the
UN's peacekeeping presence while recognizing Croatia's legitimate right
to control its internationally recognized borders.
On March 31, the UN Security Council unanimously passed three
resolutions: one, establishing a new UN peacekeeping operation in
Croatia--UNCRO; a second, extending the existing peacekeeping operation-
-UNPROFOR--in Bosnia; and the third, renewing the existing peace-keeping
operation in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia under the new
name of UN Preventive Deployment Force--UNPREDEP.
The reconfigured force in Croatia, the mandate for which will be in
effect until the end of 1995, will monitor Croatia's international
border, help implement the cease-fire and economic agreements, and
facilitate the passage of humanitarian supplies headed through Croatia
to Bosnia.
The Council's action demonstrated UN resolve to help create the
conditions for the peaceful resolution of growing tensions and
conflicts. At the same time, much remains to be done. In Croatia, UN
officials, led by former Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorvald
Stoltenberg, will be discussing with the parties the modalities for the
new peacekeeping force. In Bosnia, which I will address more directly in
a moment, escalating fighting threatens the humanitarian and
peacekeeping role played by UNPROFOR.
Above all, the renewal of the UN mandate in Croatia represents a
significant diplomatic achievement for the United States. The personal
intervention of the Vice President was instrumental in reaching a
compromise that helped avert a wider war in the Balkans this spring.
While I do not wish to leave the impression that the situation in
Croatia is now resolved, I am pleased that our work has moved to create
conditions under which differences between Croatians and Knin Serbs can
be reached at the negotiating table, not on the battlefield.
Mr. Chairman, I wish I could give you an equally upbeat report on our
efforts to bring an end to the tragic conflict in Bosnia, but I cannot.
While we continue to work through the Contact Group--U.S., Russia,
France, U.K., and Germany--our occasional achievements have been
outweighed by our inability to convince the Pale Serbs to accept the
Contact Group plan. Our goal, nevertheless, remains to end the war in
Bosnia in a manner consistent with that plan and its two main features--
a 51/49 territorial division and the preservation of Bosnia's
sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The U.S. believes that a lasting settlement in Bosnia can come only
through a political settlement. To create conditions conducive to
negotiations, we helped the parties achieve a cease-fire and formal
cessation of hostilities late last year. We hope that the cease-fire can
be extended beyond its current expiration date of April 30. But as the
current cease-fire begins to fray, we are entering a very precarious
stage of the Bosnian crisis. In coming months, we face a real risk of
renewed and more destructive conflict.
In conjunction with our efforts to extend the cessation agreement, we
have explored every opportunity to end the war by diplomatic means.
Contact Group talks with the Pale Serbs did not succeed, primarily
because of the intransigence of Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic. The
Contact Group also explored another initiative, backed by Bosnian
President Izetbegovic, that would tie Milosevic's recognition of Bosnia
and other former Yugoslav republics to sanctions relief for Serbia for
limited, renewable periods. This route, too, appears to be closing.
In spite of the dangers presented by renewed fighting, we believe
UNPROFOR's mission should continue. The role that the UN has played in
assuring delivery of humanitarian assistance has been the untold success
story of the international community's response to the war in Bosnia. We
are proud that the U.S. has been the largest single-country humanitarian
aid donor to the region--$780 million since 1991--is the largest food
donor, and has performed over three-quarters of all airdrops. While much
attention has been put on the difficulties faced by UNPROFOR in
enforcing its mandate, too little has been put on the countless lives it
has saved.
While we appreciate the work the UN has done in alleviating the
suffering, and we hope that conditions permit it to remain in Bosnia, if
it ultimately proves necessary to withdraw UNPROFOR, President Clinton
is committed, in principle, to provide U.S. support. This would include
the use of ground forces to any future NATO-led operation to help assure
a safe withdrawal. NATO planning for this contingency is underway.
Mr. Chairman, we have also expended much effort in support of the
Federation of Bosniac Muslims and Bosnian Croats. Just a few weeks ago,
Secretary Christopher hosted an event at the State Department to mark
the first anniversary of the Washington accords, which established the
Federation. We are taking additional steps to support the Bosnian
Federation, which has improved the prospects for an overall settlement,
helped end the fighting in central Bosnia, and reopened humanitarian
convoy routes. At the request of the parties, Secretary Christopher
recently named the distinguished former State Department Legal Adviser,
Roberts Owen, as arbitrator for the Federation. Mr. Owen has already
begun the work of settling nettlesome disputes between the parties. We
have also announced the selection of Maj. Gen. (Ret.) John Sewall as a
special adviser for the purpose of integrating the Federation's military
forces. We are cosponsoring--along with the EU--the Friends of the
Federation, a consultative and donor group of nations which support the
Federation. We remain convinced that federation is the only viable model
for reconciliation and peace in the region.
We also remain committed to seeing that those responsible for ethnic
cleansing and other war crimes are brought to justice. The International
Tribunal, which we pressed to establish and for which we are providing
personnel and other services, has issued its first indictments and is
expected to issue more shortly.
We have taken a leadership role in NATO decisions on Bosnia. NATO has
done what it has been asked to do and stands ready to provide close air
support to UNPROFOR under existing authority. That authority, however,
has rarely been invoked by UNPROFOR under the cumbersome dual-key
arrangement that requires the approval of both organizations before air
support can be used. But I would like to stress that NATO agreed to use
air power as necessary to end the Serb strangulation of Sarajevo and
protect other safe areas, to establish heavy-weapon exclusion zones
around Sarajevo and Gorazde, to enforce the no-fly zone, and to support
enforcement of sanctions. We continue to discuss within NATO and at the
UN the best way to coordinate these activities. (###)
ARTICLE 7:
APEC Finance Ministers' Meeting: Joint Ministerial Statement
Text of Joint Ministerial Statement released following the Second APEC
Finance Ministers' Meeting, Bali, Indonesia, April 15-16, 1995.
APEC Finance Ministers have now met for a second time to discuss the
economic challenges facing the Asia Pacific region and the opportunities
for action that could assist individual economies in meeting these
challenges. The meeting provided an opportunity for a frank exchange of
views, that sharing of experiences, and a greater understanding of each
other's concerns and interests. Our discussions here today of the
challenges facing the region were conducted on the basis of cooperation,
consensus, and collegiality and were meaningful and productive.
This past November in Bogor, the Economic Leaders of APEC issued a call
to usher in an era of free and open trade and investment in the region
by not later than the year 2020 and to intensify development cooperation
among our economies. We are all committed to these goals and view the
maintenance of macroeconomic stability, including financial market
stability, as a key requirement for their achievement.
Economic Developments
The Asia Pacific remained the fastest growing region in the world in the
past year despite significant fluctuations in global financial markets.
These fluctuations had significant implications for the economies of the
region through, among other events, shifting capital flows and rapidly
moving exchange rates. These are matters of particular importance to us
as Finance Ministers.
In order to promote better understanding of each other's concerns, views
were exchanged on the impact of recent economic developments in each of
our economies. In reviewing recent economic developments and the
policies adopted to address them, we noted the increasing importance of
regional economies in the global economy, as well as the growing
interdependence of member economies. We also noted that attaining our
goals of free and open trade and investment increases the exposure of
our economies to market forces from the global financial marketplace.
While this carries with it a number of significant benefits, it also
increases the importance of sound, consistent, and sustainable
macroeconomic policy in maintaining the dynamism of the region. We feel
strongly that cooperation through meetings such as this enhances our
ability to attain macro-economic stability.
Capital Flows
Global capital flows have grown substantially over the past five years.
Capital flows into APEC member economies can be growth-enhancing when
they contribute to productive investment. Efforts to encourage such
flows play an important role in supplementing policies aimed at raising
domestic savings to finance needed investment in APEC member economies.
With the growth of capital flows, and the increased reliance of all
economies on them, has come increasing vulnerability to rapid shifts in
the volume and direction of such flows. It is often difficult for
authorities to determine in advance whether capital inflows are driven
by short-term speculative motives or by longer-term intentions. However,
policies governing the macroeconomic environment play an important role
in encouraging longer-term investor commitment.
In this regard we wish to express our appreciation to the IMF for its
study entitled "Portfolio Capital Flows (Policy Issues and
Developments)" which greatly facilitated our discussions. Based on the
experiences of our economies and on the experiences discussed in the IMF
study, we concluded that the risks of capital inflows being quickly
reversed can be minimized if governments demonstrate a commitment to
prudent fiscal and monetary policies leading to macroeconomic stability.
We would also encourage the IMF to consider ways to improve current
mechanisms to respond effectively to problems in this area. Improved
economic surveillance would be an important initial step in this regard.
It is also important to take the necessary steps to improve the quality
of capital flows; that is, to promote flows that generate real economic
returns and hence are less susceptible to sudden reversal. Direct
investment and diversified portfolio inflows are especially welcome for
this reason.
We observed that one reason for rapidly shifting capital flows is the
difficulty that financial markets face in knowing what is happening in
an economy on a timely basis. Unlike public corporations, many
governments have few obligations to publish detailed information on
their financial operations. For this reason, we believe that increasing
the availability of economic and financial information about our
economies can play an important role in enhancing the confidence of
financial markets in the strength of regional fundamentals which can, in
turn, help sustain high and stable capital inflows. The strong track
record of many of the APEC economies makes this a region that has much
to gain from informing investors on a timely basis of key economic and
financial developments. We therefore have reached agreement to develop
recommendations regarding voluntary and timely public disclosure on a
regular basis of economic and financial information of interest to
financial markets.
We also observed that capital market development in the region is
important to smooth capital flows and to mobilize sufficient domestic
capital to reduce over dependence on capital inflows in some economies.
It is important for each economy to develop the infrastructure for
broad, deep capital markets. This includes human resource development
for financial market supporting institutions. In this area we have much
to learn from each other. Moreover, with the internationalization of
capital markets, it is increasingly important that the regulatory
authorities of member economies build ways of cooperating with each
other.
Exchange Rate Movements
We discussed the effects of exchange rate movements on trade and
investment on member economies, recognizing that the impact of exchange
rate movements varies substantially among the economies of the region.
We agreed that there is no one optimal exchange rate policy for all
regional economies. But one policy goal emerged as fundamental--pursuing
macroeconomic stability and balance. This means control over inflation
and sustainable deficits, both fiscal and external. As we concluded last
year, sound macro-economic policies are the essential prerequisite for
sustained, low-inflation growth. Exchange rate policy alone cannot
compensate for unsound macro-economic policies. Instead, exchange rate
policies must form an integral part of an overall macroeconomic policy
framework for each of our economies.
Those of us who deal day-to-day with the challenges created by the
current world exchange rate system understand that rapid exchange rate
movements create problems both for our own economies and for economies
with which we have close ties. Thus, we recognize that adopting policies
that promote domestic macroeconomic stability will have beneficial
impacts beyond our borders and thus such policies should be encouraged
in all of the regional economies. Moreover, we believe that economies
that adopt such policies will find that global financial markets respond
favorably.
Even with prudent macroeconomic policies in place, individual economies
can still be substantially affected by excessive volatility in the value
of currencies. We express our concerns over the recent developments in
the foreign exchange market where they do not reflect economic
fundamentals. We agreed that there should be a determined effort to
attain stability in the foreign exchange market, as such stability would
benefit all member economies.
Furthermore, given the importance of exchange rate movements to our
economies, we believe that substantially more research is needed on the
forces that move exchange rates and, particularly, on the impacts of
exchange rate movements on trade and investment flows. To that end we
ask the IMF to prepare a study of the impacts of exchange rate movements
on trade and investment in the APEC region. Such a study would assist
further work by our Deputies on this subject at their next meeting. In
particular, we ask our Deputies to review the IMF study and identify key
conclusions and issues as a basis for our further discussion next year.
Funding for Infrastructure Development
We also had a constructive discussion on the importance of
infrastructure development in the region to sustain non-inflationary
growth toward the 21st century. This discussion benefited from the
valuable paper prepared by the Asian Development Bank. We stressed the
need to address the medium- and long-term challenges of mobilizing
capital flows for infrastructure development. We noted the increasing
role of both domestic and external private resources to meet the need to
invest in physical infrastructure as a supplement to government
financing and the resources of the international financial institutions
and the need to create a conducive environment to support this. With the
increased role of domestic and external private financing in
infrastructure development, we see a clear need for coordination of
public and private resources in financing infrastructure development.
From our discussions, it is clear that various member economies have
experience in this area that should be shared more broadly. We would
likewise encourage multilateral institutions (e.g., World Bank and Asian
Development Bank) to assume a more proactive role in acting as catalysts
toward helping mobilize private sector funds for infrastructure as well
as to take a lead role in studying the issue of appropriate guarantee
mechanisms.
Other Issues
It is important, in the context of strengthening capital markets, that
we support international anti-money laundering efforts in the region and
encourage adherence to the international standards and recommendations
which have been developed in this area. We refer this issue to the next
Deputies' meeting for further discussion.
We are also resolved to contribute to the overall APEC to pursue trade
and investment liberalization, cooperation, and facilitation. In
particular, as many of us have responsibility for customs operations, we
welcome the achievements of our customs authorities so far and encourage
them to continue their trade facilitation efforts.
Future Meetings and Activities
While much was accomplished at our meeting, it is clear that much
remains to be done. Thus, we have decided to continue to review
macroeconomic development and market situations in the region, as well
as to explore further the fundamental economic challenges facing the
region. We look forward to having the opportunity to meet again next
year in Japan for this purpose and ask our Deputies to undertake the
necessary preparations for that meeting.
To assist us in our collective efforts, we have asked our Deputies to
form a Working Group to advance our work this year in three areas:
financial and capital markets, mobilizing private capital for
infrastructure development, and effect of exchange rate movement on
trade and investment. We have asked our Deputies to report on their
efforts to the 1996 Finance Ministers Meeting.
At our meeting in Hawaii, we requested that several organizations and
groups take action in support of our efforts. We wish to express our
appreciation for the work of the IMF, the ADB, our central bank deputies
who participated in our discussion of capital flows, and our own
Deputies who met several times to prepare for this meeting. In addition,
the APEC financiers have also met very recently and we encourage them to
continue their efforts.
Finally, we agreed to report to the APEC Leaders' Meeting, scheduled to
be held in November in Osaka, on the activities of the APEC Finance
Ministers' Meeting. (###)
[END OF DISPATCH VOL. 6, NO. 17]
To the top of this page
Index of Dispatch Magazine Archives 1995 Issues||
Index of Dispatch Magazine Archives||
Index of "Briefings and Statements"
Index of Electronic Research Collections
ERC Reference Desk ||
Alphabetic Index ||
Sitemap ||
ERC Homepage
Last modified: Jun. 8, 1999