U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 16, APRIL 17, 1995
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1.  The U.S. and Egypt: Building Prosperity, Peace, and 
Security in the Middle East -- President Clinton, Egyptian 
President Mubarak

2.  The U.S. and the United Kingdom: Shared Values and Common 
Interests -- President Clinton, British Prime Minister Major
3.  U.S. Global Economic Leadership in the Post-Cold War Era 
-- Joan E. Spero

4.  Ensuring Protection and Promotion of U.S. Interests 
Overseas -- Richard M. Moose

5.  The U.S. Government Role in the NIS: From Aid to Trade -- 
James F. Collins

6.  U.S. Policy Toward Guatemala: The Cases of Michael Devine 
and Efrain Bamaca -- Alexander F. Watson

7.  The Future of NATO and Europe's Changing Security 
Landscape -- Richard C. Holbrooke

8.  Africa Programs in the FY 1996 Budget: Protecting Long-
Term U.S. Interests -- George E. Moose

9.  U.S. Policy Toward Sudan -- Edward Brynn

10. Update on Developments in Rwanda and Burundi -- Townsend 
Friedman

11. International Narcotics Control Efforts in the Western 
Hemisphere

12. Integrating Economics and the Environment -- Elinor G. 
Constable

13. The Framework Convention on Climate Change: Expectations 
for Berlin -- Rafe Pomerance


ARTICLE 1:

The U.S. and Egypt: Building Prosperity, Peace, and Security 
in the Middle East

President Clinton, Egyptian President Mubarak

Opening remarks at a White House press conference, 
Washington, DC, April 5, 1995

President Clinton. Good afternoon. Please be seated. As 
always, it is a great pleasure to have President Mubarak back 
at the White House. For 14 years, he has been a valued friend 
and partner to the United States. He was one of the first 
foreign leaders to visit me here after I became President, 
and I began my trip to the Middle East last fall by visiting 
him in Cairo to seek his counsel. Under his wise leadership, 
Egypt has been an ally as well as a source of stability in 
the region and throughout the world.

In the last two years, we have witnessed the dawn of a new 
era in the Middle East. Without President Mubarak's tireless 
efforts on behalf of peace, these landmark achievements would 
not have occurred. Thanks to his persistence, the promise of 
Camp David--where Egypt took its stand against war--has been 
redeemed.

In the months and years ahead, we will continue to look to 
President Mubarak to play a vital role in broadening the 
circle of peace. We are determined to do everything we can 
meanwhile to deepen our own partnership for peace and 
prosperity.

He and his government have already made great strides toward 
reforming and restructuring the Egyptian economy. I got a 
very impressive report on the progress that has been made at 
the luncheon we just concluded. But more is necessary to 
stimulate the economy so that it can provide good jobs and a 
future of hope for the hundreds of thousands of young people 
who enter the Egyptian work force every year.

The United States is committed to helping. Vice President 
Gore just returned from his second visit to Egypt in the last 
six months. On my behalf, he began a dialogue for growth and 
development with President Mubarak that is unprecedented in 
its scope and ambition.

Today, he and I have taken another step forward in this 
partnership by meeting with the new members of our 
Presidents' Council at their first gathering. These top 
American and Egyptian businessmen will advise us  on several 
vital issues--expanding the private sector, building stronger 
commercial ties between our people, and creating better 
conditions to attract U.S. investment to Egypt.

We are also working together to bring more prosperity and 
stability to the entire region--efforts that are essential 
for peace to establish firm roots. We reaffirmed our support 
for greater regional cooperation and development, especially 
the economic initiative that began at the Casablanca summit. 
We also had a good discussion about the need to lift the 
boycott of Israel and ways to accomplish this as soon as 
possible.

Egypt and the United States share a determination to confront 
and to defeat all those who would undermine peace and 
security through the use of terror and weapons of mass 
destruction. President Mubarak told me of Egypt's regional 
proliferation concerns and of its commitment of a strong 
universal non-proliferation treaty and to a Middle East that 
is free of all weapons of mass destruction. The United States 
shares those goals.

To create the confidence and security that will make those 
aims a reality, we must continue to do all we can to bring a 
comprehensive and lasting peace to the Middle East. For the 
same reason, I believe we must ensure that the NPT is as 
strong and as enduring as possible. Indefinite and 
unconditional extension of the NPT is vital to achieving the 
goals that we both share.

When President Mubarak and I first met here two years ago, he 
told me that, together, we could help to make a just and 
comprehensive peace in the Middle East. He was right. We have 
worked side by side to fulfill that vision. Doing so, we have 
deepened the friendship between our two nations. Our goal is 
now within grasp, and America is proud to be Egypt's partner 
on this great mission. Mr. President.

President Mubarak. Thank you. Once again I meet with my good 
friend, President Clinton, in order to pursue our joint 
endeavor for the benefit of our two nations.

We discussed issues of mutual interest in the spirit of 
friendship, candor, and mutual confidence. Our views were 
similar on various issues. Our paramount commitment is to 
strengthen the structure of world peace and security and to 
promote cooperation among nations.

Our two countries are destined to play a pivotal role 
throughout the world and in their regions, respectively. We 
are determined to pursue our mission with vigor and 
determination. We realize that the challenge is awesome, but 
our commitment to our noble goals is firm--quite firm.

President Clinton, together we have worked tirelessly for 
decades to promote peace and security in the Middle East. We 
achieve tangible success year after year, and we remain 
determined to pursue this goal until a just and comprehensive 
peace is reached throughout the area. We should never allow 
enemies of peace to threaten the gains which were made in the 
recent past. We will never hesitate to condemn terrorism and 
all forms of violence. Our aim is to eliminate the sources of 
hatred and conflict.

As we move to cement the structure of peace and security in 
the Middle East, we should do our utmost in order to remove 
all potential threats. Our purpose is to build together a new 
future of hope and a promise for this troubled region. With 
this in mind, I deemed it necessary to propose, in 1990, the 
establishment of a Middle East free of all weapons of mass 
destruction. My objective was and still is to make every Arab 
and Israeli feel more secure and less worried about the 
future and that of his children.

I explained to President Clinton and his able assistants our 
position on the NPT. We remain among the most enthusiastic 
supporters of the treaty. We consider it one of the pillars 
of the stable world order. Hence, we would like to reinforce 
the moral authority of the NPT. By the same token, we have a 
certain concern which emanates from the existence of nuclear 
programs in our region.

Our view is that since peace is spreading throughout the 
region, all the parts are to work together toward the 
elimination of the potential threats, especially the 
spreading of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. This 
is the true application of the principle of universality and 
adherence to the NPT. All states of the region should  
realize that it serves in their own interests to accede to 
the treaty. Unless this is done, no one would have control 
over the spread of such lethal weapons in a fragile and 
vulnerable region which has suffered long enough from war and 
devastation.

We propose, for our common good, to achieve that through 
serious but friendly negotiations between Egypt, and perhaps 
other Arab countries, and Israel. It is our sincere hope that 
Israel will approach this issue in a positive and 
constructive spirit. The U.S., under the leadership of 
President Clinton, can help attain this objective.

Our bilateral relations, Mr. President, are excellent. We 
work together in various fields in harmony and mutual trust. 
As we have been partners in peace and security, we are 
establishing a new solid partnership for economic growth and 
development. Thanks to President Clinton and Vice President 
Al Gore, we have developed a new concept for this 
partnership. The idea is to stimulate growth and 
productivity. It is vital to create jobs for our young 
people. We shall do that through promoting trade and 
investment.

We have already begun the implementation of this concept, and 
we are determined to make it a success story. We are 
encouraging the private sector to play a major role in this 
endeavor. As you know, our economy is becoming more and more 
business-friendly. This is a cornerstone of our economic 
reform program. We are fully committed to pursue this reform 
until it bears fruit.

In conclusion, I would like to thank President Clinton for 
his warm reception and hospitality. We are most appreciative 
of the understanding and the cooperation we have been 
receiving from every American. We will leave this great 
country with a renewed assurance of the solidity of the 
friendship and the depth of our cooperation. Thank you, Mr. 
President.  

(###)



ARTICLE 2:

The U.S. and the United Kingdom: Shared Values and Common 
Interests

President Clinton, British Prime Minister Major

Remarks following a White House meeting, Washington, DC, 
April 4, 1995

President Clinton. Good afternoon. Please be seated. I am 
delighted to welcome Prime Minister Major back to the White 
House.

Throughout this century, the United States and the United 
Kingdom have stood together on the great issues that have 
confronted our people. Our common cause has been at the heart 
of our success in two world wars and, of course, in the Cold 
War. In just the last two years, British-American cooperation 
has played an essential role in allowing us to reduce the 
threat of weapons of mass destruction, in promoting peace 
around the world, and, certainly, in expanding free trade.

Today, we have continued working in that tradition. We had 
excellent discussions and covered a broad range of issues. We 
have, as always, found much to agree about.

On security issues, we agreed that the inevitable process of 
NATO expansion must proceed smoothly, gradually, and openly--
without any surprises. This is essential for extending 
stability, democracy, and prosperity throughout Europe. We 
believe that, in parallel with the enlargement of NATO, the 
alliance must develop and maintain close ties with Russia.

We affirmed our shared commitment to a political settlement 
in Bosnia based on the Contact Group plan. The conflict is 
being prolonged because of Bosnian-Serb intransigence. 
Renewed fighting will not end the conflict but only lead to 
more bloodshed and continued stalemate.

The Prime Minister and I also vowed to continue working 
together to contain the Iraqi threat to stability in the 
Persian Gulf region. We are deeply concerned that Saddam 
Hussein could be regaining the ability to build weapons of 
mass destruction. We are determined that Iraq must meet all 
its UN obligations. This is no time to relax sanctions.

The Iraqi people are suffering tremendously under Saddam's 
tyranny, and they do deserve the help of the international 
community. But easing up on a regime that oppresses people 
will not help them. So, while there can be no compromise, the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Argentina have put 
forward new proposals in the United Nations to get food and 
medicine to the people of Iraq. We hope other nations will 
join these efforts and support our Security Council 
resolution and pressure Saddam Hussein to stop the needless 
suffering of his innocent citizens.

Prime Minister Major told me a great deal about his recent 
trip to the Middle East. We both strongly believe that this 
is a hopeful moment for broadening the circle of peace. The 
United States and Europe must continue to fight the efforts 
to derail the peace process by those who prefer destruction 
to peace. It is clear that for peace to take root in the 
region, more economic assistance is vital. Peace and 
prosperity depend upon one another. I applaud the United 
Kingdom's investment program in the West Bank and Gaza, as 
well as its debt relief measures for Jordan. All of us must 
continue to support those who take risks for peace.

Nowhere is this more true than in Northern Ireland. I salute 
the Prime Minister for the tremendous efforts he is making to 
bring an enduring peace to Northern Ireland. Today, Northern 
Ireland is closer to a just and lasting settlement than at 
any time in a generation--thanks in large measure to the 
vision and courage of John Major.  He and Prime Minister 
Bruton of Ireland together introduced the joint framework, 
which provides a landmark opportunity to move ahead toward a 
political settlement--one that will be backed by both of 
Northern Ireland's communities.

We also agreed that the paramilitaries of both sides must get 
rid of their weapons forever so that violence never returns 
to Northern Ireland. We must also work to increase economic 
opportunity in that area. Their prospects have been blighted 
by bloodshed for too long.

Next month, our White House Conference on Trade and 
Investment in Ireland will help to expand the ties between 
the United States, Northern Ireland, and Ireland's border 
counties. Building those kinds of bonds will help lead to a 
better life for all the people of the region.

The Prime Minister and I discussed some other issues. We 
agreed on the need for an indefinite extension of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty at the review conference that begins 
this month. To further the cause of non-proliferation, the 
Prime Minister joins me in calling for full implementation of 
the Framework Agreement we negotiated with North Korea to end 
that country's nuclear program. We discussed the need to 
adapt our international institutions to the challenges of the 
next century at the G-7 summit in Halifax.

I was particularly impressed by the thinking that the Prime 
Minister has done on this profoundly important issue. The 
United States and the United Kingdom, after all, helped to 
shape those institutions. They have served our interests for 
the last half century. With the extraordinary relationship 
between our two countries as important as ever, I am 
confident we can make the changes necessary and work together 
to advance our shared values and our common interests--to 
promote peace, democracy, and prosperity in the years ahead 
and, of course, in the century ahead.

Finally, let me say, we discussed the ceremonies that will 
mark the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II. Because 
of my prior commitments,  I have asked the Vice President to 
represent me and all Americans in London on May 8 at services 
that will commemorate the great wartime bravery and sacrifice 
of so many Britons. I look forward to seeing Prime Minister 
Major when together we go to Moscow on May 9 to pay our 
respect to the heroism of the Russian people in that 
conflict. Mr. Prime Minister.

Prime Minister Major. Mr. President, thank you very much. We 
have had the opportunity today for a good-humored, 
worthwhile, productive, and very far-reaching series of 
exchanges on a whole range of matters. The President has said 
how much of the agenda we discussed, and I will not reiterate 
what the President said, except to say that in his remarks he 
spoke not just for the United States, but for the United 
Kingdom as well. I share the views he expressed, and I won't 
reiterate them.

We spent some time looking forward at two separate matters 
which I think are of some importance to both our countries 
and of wider importance as well. The first of them the 
President just touched on, and that was the review of the 
Bretton Woods institutions and the United Nations that we 
agreed upon with the other G-7 heads of government at Naples 
last year, and that we should undertake and return to at 
Halifax later this year.

We have given a great deal of discussion to that, and I 
think, for a range of reasons, the time is right to look at a 
fairly comprehensive reform of some of those institutions. We 
exchanged some ideas today on precisely how we might do that 
and agreed that we would exchange further ideas before we 
came to the G-7 summit. I think there is--to rationalize some 
of the financial institutions.

We wish to look particularly, in addition to that, at the 
United Nations where there are a number of overlapping 
functions. I am a very strong supporter of the United 
Nations, and I wish to see the United Nations a successful 
organization for the year 2000. It does seem that, looking at 
it, some of the areas of the UN could well do with updating 
and refreshing--to make sure that they are entirely 
applicable to the problems they will have to face in the late 
1990s and beyond the turn of the century. I hope very much 
that we will be able to get together with some more of our 
ideas and float those in greater detail when we get to the 
Halifax summit later on this year.

We also spent some time looking at the commonality of 
interests that exists between the United Kingdom and the 
United States. There are a huge range of areas where there is 
common interest, and not just those that were discussed--the 
agreements that we have in terms of policy toward Russia, 
Iran, Iraq, the Middle East, Bosnia, and a range of other 
areas.

But beyond that, I think there is a commonality of interest 
in the future security and prosperity of the Central and East 
European states and also with two other matters: First, the 
further extension of free trade, to which I wish to return in 
just a second; and second,with working together and combating 
together some of the problems of instability, extremism, and 
terrorism that we are beginning to see in parts of North 
Africa, parts of the Levant, and parts of the Middle East. We 
also spent some time considering how we might address some of 
those problems in the future.

It was necessarily a discussion that dealt with problems that 
may arise, and dealt in some cases, frankly, with 
generalities. But it was an opportunity to look forward, 
rather than to just discuss the immediate topical problems 
that we face at the moment.

One area of growing importance that we touched on was the 
possibility of seeing how we can build on the Uruguay Round 
agreement of a year or so ago and see how we can move forward 
to deal with much freer trade in financial services, for 
example, removing many of the non-tariff barriers that still 
exist between Western Europe and the United States, and 
seeing how, step by step, we can move forward to a much 
greater element of free trade between North America and the 
Western European nations. That is something that needs to be 
done. I think it is something that is of immense benefit, and 
I found our discussion on that immensely productive, and it 
is one I know that we will both return to in the future.

So, I found the discussion--not just on contemporary matters 
or views--but I found the sharing of ideas about how we deal 
with the development of the transatlantic relationship to 
deal with the problems that are going to arise in the future 
and also the examination of the common transatlantic view on 
many of the international problems of the world to be a very 
worthwhile and a very refreshing discussion, and I am 
delighted we were able to have it. 

(###)



ARTICLE 3:

U.S. Global Economic Leadership in the Post-Cold War Era

Joan E. Spero, Under Secretary for Economic and Agricultural 
Affairs

Address to the Washington Council on International Trade, 
Seattle, Washington, March 27, 1995

I am personally very pleased to be back here in the wonderful 
city of Seattle, the gateway to Asia. It is a special honor 
to have been invited to speak to the Washington Council on 
International Trade--WCIT--one of America's leading state 
trade-policy organizations. I know you best as a key private 
sector advocate of more open trade and investment in the 
Pacific Rim and a major supporter of the Asia- Pacific 
Economic Cooperation--APEC--forum. The WCIT and the Seattle 
business community deserve a great deal of credit for the 
success of the historic 1993 APEC ministerials and Blake 
Island meetings. I am glad to see that strong interest 
continues in the National Center for APEC which was 
established last year to forge a closer public-private sector 
partnership on APEC. The center has been instrumental in 
publicizing APEC's benefits to business, gathering private 
sector views on APEC, making those views known to policy 
makers, and facilitating greater business participation in 
APEC.

Today, I would like to tell you what the Clinton 
Administration is doing for the U.S. economy and business--
particularly in Asia, which as you know is of vital 
importance to the United States.

Challenge of the New Global Economy

First, let me put our economic policy in its larger global 
context. For the last 50 years, the United States has been 
the leader of the world economy. Motivated by national 
economic interests and by the imperatives of the Cold War, 
the U.S. helped create the Bretton Woods system; we advocated 
a vision of open markets both nationally and internationally; 
and we acted as a major source of capital, technology, and 
managerial know-how and an engine of growth to the world.

Now our vision has to a great extent come true. We live in a 
world where free-market economics is the guiding ideology; 
where economies are increasingly interdependent; where 
dynamic growth has spread beyond North America, Europe, and 
Japan; and where we work daily in a variety of international 
economic institutions. Today, international trade represents 
a huge share of U.S. economic activity. In 1960, U.S. foreign 
trade accounted for about 9% of our GDP; now it accounts for 
almost one-quarter. U.S. exports to the world support 8.5 
million U.S. jobs.

It is no news to anyone here today that Asian economies are, 
quite simply, America's major growth markets:

--  The IMF and World Bank predict that one-half of the 
economic expansion of the entire world during the 1990s will 
take place in Asia.

--  U.S. sales to Asia are expanding more rapidly than to any 
other region--by 12.6% in 1994 over 1993.

--  Asia now buys one-third of U.S. exports, compared to only 
23% in 1985.

--  By the year 2000, the market for automobiles in 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia will equal 
today's market in Canada and Mexico combined.

Although the growth of world trade and investment has created 
great opportunities, greater economic interdependence has 
also spurred protectionism at home. Vulnerable U.S.industries 
and workers often blame international competition for their 
decline. That political reality is reflected in the growing 
debate in the U.S. today between isolationism and 
internationalism. Isolationists argue that, having won the 
Cold War, it is time to take care of ourselves--to fix our 
own problems. One effect is to demand cuts in our foreign aid 
budget, which in reality represents less than 1% of 
government spending. Another effect is increased criticism of 
multilateralism. The United Nations is a favorite target, but 
there also have been charges that the WTO and regional 
arrangements, such as NAFTA, are threats to U.S. sovereignty 
and jobs.

America must promote its own interests--but it cannot do this 
by turning its back on the world. President Clinton has told 
the American people that we must compete, not retreat--that 
our national security in the post-Cold War period depends on 
our economic strength at home and abroad. The President is 
pursuing an aggressive, new economic strategy. That strategy 
is succeeding in strengthening our nation's ability to 
compete in the global marketplace by putting our own economic 
house in order; through efforts to open markets on a 
bilateral, regional, and multilateral basis; and by an 
aggressive export promotion strategy based on a strong 
public-private sector partnership. Let me explain.

Putting Our House in Order

Leadership begins at home. If we are to compete in the 21st 
century, we must solve our own domestic economic problems. 
This has been President Clinton's number-one economic policy 
priority. Two years ago, the President worked with Congress 
to achieve a five-year budget deficit-reduction package of 
$500 billion. In the last 26 months, we have created almost 6 
million new jobs. Last year's GNP growth reached 4%. American 
industry is operating at its highest capacity in 14 years, 
and our inflation and unemployment rates--the so-called 
"misery index"--are the lowest in 22 years. Employment in the 
Federal Government is heading for its lowest level since John 
F. Kennedy was President.

U.S. business has played a major role in the recovery. 
Corporate restructuring and productivity increases have been 
key. Not long ago, the Davos Economic Forum rated us the 
world's most competitive economy, pushing Japan out of its 
long-held first place for the first time since 1955. We are 
once again the world's greatest export machine.

In short, the United States is back--as a competitor and as a 
responsible manager of its own economy. But we cannot stop 
here. In our new legislative environment, we must continue to 
press on with deficit reduction and attack the root causes of 
American domestic anxiety, including the wage stagnation 
which has persisted despite job growth.

Market Access

A second part of the Clinton Administration's strategy is to 
support U.S. competitiveness by making the world an easier 
place for Americans to do business.

The Global Context. Through three administrations, the U.S. 
worked with our trading partners to complete the Uruguay 
Round. The result: a new World Trade Organization, with a 
broader scope, more authority, and a modern set of rules 
covering such issues as intellectual property, services, and 
investment. For the first time, we are addressing agriculture 
in a global context.

Our challenge now is to make the WTO work, finish the job in 
areas such as financial services, and address new issues such 
as the link between trade policy and environment and labor 
standards. At the G-7 summit in Halifax this June, we will 
examine the multilateral trading system, as well as other 
multilateral institutions including the IMF, the World Bank, 
and the regional development banks. For the U.S., the goal is 
to explore how we can reshape international economic 
structures to respond better to today's global realities.

Regional Approaches. The U.S. also is leading the way through 
regional efforts to open markets and create new business 
opportunities for American business. These regional efforts 
complement and strengthen the multilateral trading system 
because they contribute to a worldwide movement toward trade 
liberalization. Let me give you two examples.

Here in our own hemisphere, the President hosted 34 
democratically elected leaders at the Summit of the Americas 
in Miami last December. We had three goals for that meeting: 
to open markets throughout the hemisphere; to strengthen the 
movement to democracy; and to work together to improve the 
quality of life of all the people of the Americas. We agreed 
on 23 initiatives, including a commitment to eliminate 
existing trade and investment barriers and create a "Free 
Trade Area of the Americas" by the year 2005.

In Asia, APEC is the best regional vehicle we have to enhance 
our efforts to open markets and investment regimes. In Bogor, 
Indonesia, last year, President Clinton and the other APEC 
leaders made a historic commitment to achieve free and open 
trade and investment in the region by the year 2020. For 
APEC's industrial members, the goal is 2010.

APEC is now at a crucial crossroads--one that will determine 
APEC's future course and its relevance to the American 
business community. We have the vision and the political 
commitment. Now APEC must prove its value by making concrete 
progress toward creating a predictable trade and investment 
environment in the Asia-Pacific region. If it does not, it 
risks losing its promise--and the support of both the 
business community and the region's leaders.

The Administration is working hard to ensure that APEC lives 
up to its potential. We are doing this by pressing in 1995 
for one, development of a credible action agenda to implement 
APEC's free-trade goals which APEC leaders will bless this 
November in Osaka; and two, early practical benefits to 
business in areas such as customs and standards conformance. 
Progress in these "doing business" issues is a downpayment on 
APEC's longer-term trade liberalization.

We are also working hard to expand the networks of an Asia-
Pacific community through greater economic cooperation. We 
expect a number of U.S. initiatives to get off the ground 
this year, including:

--  Establishment of the APEC Education Foundation and a new, 
permanent APEC Business Advisory Group;

--  The APEC Study Center Telecommunications Network going 
on-line this spring; and

--  Secretary Pena's hosting of the first meeting of APEC 
transportation ministers and industry leaders in Washington 
June 12-13.

These efforts will expand markets for American business and 
allow all APEC members to realize better the economic 
benefits of liberalization. In all of these efforts, the 
government is working hand-in-hand with business. APEC is 
unique in its involvement with business at the political 
level. It is a model for international organizations.

Bilateral Challenges. While working at the global and 
regional level, the U.S. also is continuing to press 
bilaterally for more open markets. The most recent examples 
are the breakthroughs on financial services with Japan under 
the bilateral Framework Agreement and the recent intellectual 
property rights agreement with China. Japanese commitments to 
open its trillion-dollar pension market to foreign fund 
managers, to provide greater opportunities for foreign firms 
in the $500-billion Japanese securities market, and to 
significantly liberalize cross-border transactions--on an MFN 
basis--set the stage for the successful outcome to the 
Uruguay Round financial services negotiations. The U.S.-China 
IPR agreement could lead to China's founding membership in 
the WTO and unprecedented progress in liberalizing the 
world's fastest-growing economy.

National Export Strategy

The final part of President Clinton's economic plan is a new 
National Export Strategy which emphasizes personal advocacy 
by the President, his Cabinet, and other senior officials to 
give American firms a competitive edge abroad.

Our aggressive strategy is paying off. In Asia alone, 
American firms won 34 major contracts during one six-month 
period in 1994--contracts that will generate $5.3 billion in 
new U.S. exports and support more than 100,000 U.S. jobs. 
During the President's trip to the region for the APEC summit 
last November, Secretaries Christopher and Brown witnessed or 
signed deals for American companies worth $400 million in the 
Philippines, more than $250 million in Malaysia, and an 
estimated $40 billion in Indonesia.

America's Desk. This strategy depends on our strong 
partnership with business--a partnership that marks a visible 
departure from the government's past relationship with the 
private sector. Before coming to government, I spent a number 
of years in the private sector, often working--with mixed 
results--to get the U.S. foreign policy machinery to support 
my company's efforts to break into new markets, iron out 
problems, and overcome trade barriers. From that perspective, 
one of the most exciting developments of my service in the 
Clinton Administration has been the unprecedented levels of 
direct support and assistance to U.S. companies abroad.

At the State Department, Secretary Christopher has opened the 
Department's window on the business world. He calls it the 
America Desk. The Secretary regularly seeks out business 
leaders, pinpointing their concerns and putting them high on 
our foreign policy agenda. For example, during a trip to Asia 
in 1993, the Secretary heard a great deal of concern by 
American business representatives about illicit payments. In 
response, the Secretary launched a major initiative to get 
other countries to agree on an international code of practice 
on illicit payments. In May 1994, I am happy to say, the OECD 
asked its member states to take concrete steps to eliminate 
bribery in international business practices.

We are working to make business support a core function of 
the modern Department of State. We are creating a corps of 
diplomats--and a State Department culture--that understands 
the importance of business, how to work with business people, 
and how to play a leadership role in opening new markets for 
our exports. Our embassies now regularly go to bat for U.S. 
firms, helping them to identify opportunities, handle 
problems, and make deals. The positive feedback we are 
getting about our embassies shows that already we are making 
a difference. As Business Week noted in a recent article,

When they're not dealing with emergencies, the main brief of 
U.S. ambassadors in Clinton's new world order is to get the 
order--for whatever U.S. business happens to be in town.

But I will be honest. Companies that find it easy today to 
get action and assistance at an embassy have a more difficult 
time getting our attention in Washington. We are now taking 
steps to make sure that the Secretary's America Desk mandate 
is heard and acted upon at home. We have established the 
Office of the Coordinator for Business Affairs, who reports 
directly to me. His job is to reach out to the business 
community, make sure that we consult businesses as we develop 
policies that affect their interests, assist companies in 
wending their way through the Washington bureaucracy and in 
using our embassies abroad, and expand the Department's and 
the embassies' role as advocate for U.S. business.

This new partnership is a two-way street. We ask that you, 
here in the Northwest, help us find ways to make business 
work even better in Asia. We need your constant input--your 
scoring of how well we are doing in APEC in achieving 
concrete and pragmatic results. And we need your guidance as 
we define and solidify America's new economic leadership role 
in the post-Cold War period--in Asia and in the global 
economy

To conclude: As the world has changed, the nature of American 
leadership has changed. We can no longer shape the world--
alone or with a handful of other great powers. But American 
leadership remains a critical element in the world's 
stability and prosperity. We lead now in different ways--
through multilateral persuasion and cooperation, through 
ground-breaking regional and bilateral initiatives, and by 
the example we set--both corporations and governments--in how 
we respond to new challenges. Today, we face more complex 
tasks in a more complex world. We are prepared to continue to 
lead and to work with you--the business community--to provide 
leadership to this new world. 

(###)



ARTICLE 4:

Ensuring Protection and Promotion Of U.S. Interests Overseas

Richard M. Moose, Under Secretary for Management

Statement before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and 
State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the Senate 
Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC, April 6, 1995

Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity which you have 
provided for me--and my colleagues from other agencies--to 
discuss before this subcommittee a subject of great 
importance to both the Congress and the executive branch--the 
need to devise a system to ensure a flexible, efficient, and 
stably funded platform for the protection and promotion of 
U.S. interests overseas. Merely by holding this hearing, you 
and the committee are taking a creative initiative which, 
hopefully, will redound to the benefit at the U.S. taxpayer 
and enhance the effectiveness of the U.S. Government's 
essential overseas programs.

While I am congratulating you, let me put in a good word for 
ourselves. It is not often that executive branch agencies sit 
together, put their cards on the table, and commit themselves 
to finding a solution to a problem which has set them at odds 
with one another. It is rarer still for a collection of 
agencies to present themselves before their appropriators to 
say: "We have a problem with one another; let us tell you 
what it is and how we propose to solve it." That is very 
rare. The usual procedure would be for each of these 
Departments to approach you out of earshot of the others and 
attempt to beggar our colleagues. Then at some point, your 
patience exhausted, you would mandate a solution which the 
losers would immediately set about trying to un-do. Today, we 
hope to break with the precedent.

This issue has concerned all of us for years. It is an area 
that the General Accounting Office--GAO--and our own 
Inspector General have repeatedly reviewed. The current 
administrative support system has survived over time--less 
because of its own merits than because of the difficulty in 
reaching a consensus on an alternative. The current system is 
broken. We want to fix it. We do not yet have a final 
position on how we think we should do that, but we will need 
your support if we are to succeed.

The State Department currently carries a large part of the 
overseas financial and administrative burden, but the issue 
is important to all foreign affairs agencies; in fact, to all 
U.S. Government agencies with staffing abroad and not just 
those represented here today. The committee will know from 
its perusal of the recent GAO report the demographics of the 
U.S. overseas presence. The United States has more than 160 
embassies and some 100 consulates, liaison offices, and other 
posts in almost every country in the world. They are staffed 
by about 19,000 full-time American employees from some 200 
organizational units belonging to two dozen executive depart-
ments and agencies. Some agencies have only a handful of 
American employees abroad; some have hundreds; others have 
thousands. Among the 19,000 in our posts abroad are some 
7,000 of State's own people. These numbers do not include 
foreign national employees and contractors, let alone TDY 
personnel who number in the hundreds daily at some posts and 
quite a few of whom are considered "permanent TDYers." 
Resource cuts levied on State impact all agencies because 
they limit our ability to support the people they have 
staffing this nation's diplomatic missions.

It is becoming a cliche to preface a comment with the phrase, 
"With the end of the Cold War." But there's no way around the 
fact that the U.S. Government's priorities overseas are 
shifting dramatically, as the distinction between "domestic" 
and "foreign" policy blurs. These changes are reflected in 
the kinds of people the U.S. Government is putting overseas 
and the places they are going. Creating jobs, for example, 
means opening new markets overseas, leading to new Commerce 
staffing in emerging markets. Fighting crime at home compels 
us to trace its connections abroad and to work with other 
governments on anti-crime initiatives. So the locations and 
levels of FBI, DEA, the Secret Service, and other law 
enforcement agencies' staffing take on new configurations and 
require enhanced coordination between agencies. Nothing 
illustrates the radically altered nature of our overseas 
priorities better than the fact that the Justice Department 
now has more Americans overseas than USIA and that the 
combined total of law enforcement people overseas will 
probably surpass that of USAID by next year, if it has not 
already. The fact that I cannot be certain tells you 
something.

The unpredictability of the international environment puts a 
premium on the U.S. Government's ability to respond quickly 
to shifting priorities with staffing changes; yet, our 
present system inhibits this. On the accounting side, the 
Foreign Affairs Administrative System--FAAS--does not produce 
straightforward audit trail links between a particular 
service and its cost. As a result, the FAAS funding structure 
has become a "lightning rod" for serviced agencies concerned 
about both their overseas costs and the quality and adequacy 
of the services delivered--issues not directly related to 
FAAS's function as a cost-distribution system but a great and 
understandable concern to the serviced agencies.

State's primary concern with FAAS is that we can no longer 
shoulder the personnel and financial burden it places upon 
us. We calculate that we bear about 70% of the costs while 
representing only about 30% of the people. As our budget 
diminishes in real terms, we have been forced to strip as 
much cost as possible out of our overseas structure, where we 
spend about two-thirds of our operating budget. Given the 
changing and expanding nature of administrative demands at 
posts, we must recruit, train, assign, and pay additional 
administrative officers--additional to our own needs. With 
the pressure to cut positions, our core functions are 
squeezed, and we have fewer people devoted to formulating and 
coordinating policy, analyzing developments, negotiating and 
advocating U.S. positions overseas, and assisting Americans 
in trouble. If it were not for the resources made available 
by the retention of application fees for machine-readable 
visas, we would even have to stint on our efforts to preserve 
the security of our borders.

Because of the overall budget climate, we think it is 
imperative that we ensure that we find the most cost-
effective ways to support U.S. Government employees overseas. 
The National Performance Review--NPR--under Vice President 
Gore's leadership, has given all of us in the foreign affairs 
community renewed incentive to match resources and structure 
to the mission--not vice versa.

There are two main avenues for overseas streamlining. Within 
State we are pursuing this goal through the Strategic 
Management Initiative-- SMI. The SMI is, in Secretary 
Christopher's words, our "process for forging a comprehensive 
strategy for change." SMI teams are now developing for the 
Secretary's decision recommendations on the future shape of 
State's overseas presence, including downsizing missions and 
closing some posts. In the last two years, we have closed 17 
posts. As part of NPR, we hope to close at least 15 more by 
the end of FY 1996.

Our posts overseas, including an embassy in nearly every 
capital, constitute one of our great diplomatic strengths. 
Our virtually universal coverage allows us to make our case 
to governments around the world and to protect Americans, 
wherever they may be found, at a moment's notice. No other 
nation in the world has such a capability.

Yet, because it is enormously costly to maintain American 
employees abroad, we clearly need to streamline and reduce 
our overseas costs. We will base more support services in the 
U.S. or at least regionally abroad. Specialized substantive 
expertise can be based regionally and shared, as well.

Another result from SMI will be an end to the assumption that 
all embassies must be full-service operations. We need 
smaller embassies with staffs better trained and equipped, 
serviced by up-to-date technology, electronically linked to 
each other and to Washington agencies, and less reliant on 
costly security systems. This should be as true for our 
largest embassies as well as for our smallest.

And our smallest embassies will be small, indeed: We are 
looking at "micro-embassies"--one- or two-person embassies 
that keep the flag flying and give us daily face-to-face 
contact with foreign officials and the public in the host 
country while avoiding the cost and infrastructure of more 
traditional embassies.

However, I want to emphasize that the changing nature of 
State's own overseas presence--and our own reduced staffing 
levels--will have a direct impact on State's ability and 
willingness to support the administrative needs of other 
agencies overseas. Agencies must factor these new realities 
into their overseas staffing plans.

The second avenue to overseas streamlining is through inter-
agency cooperation in the context of NPR. In January, the 
Vice President instructed State, ACDA, USAID, and USIA to 
establish common administrative services, eliminate 
unnecessary and duplicative practices, and use the private 
sector and competition to cut costs. STATE, USAID, USIA, and 
ACDA have, in fact, consolidated or agreed to consolidate 24 
domestic administrative operations, ranging from printing 
services to computer security. Additional initiatives are 
currently underway which can create significant additional 
consolidation or expansion of consolidation and cooperation 
efforts already in place. We will also look at embarking on 
an effort to greatly increase the compatibility of all 
management information systems, e-mail, Internet, and secure 
messaging.

Also, and finally, in January 1995, the Vice President asked 
the PMC to review the structure of all government agencies 
operating overseas. The PMC will report to him this month on 
specific steps that can be taken to streamline overseas 
operations, reduce the costs of administrative services, and 
make better use of information systems and communications 
technology.

Under the PMC's sponsorship, State, USIA, USAID, Commerce, 
Justice, and all of the other primarily concerned agencies 
are examining the feasibility of cooperative administrative 
support units--CASUs--for our overseas posts. This is the 
effort upon which our hopes are pinned. Under the CASU, one 
or more agencies at a given post would take the lead in 
providing administrative services under the oversight of a 
local "Board of Directors." The study is also reviewing 
financing arrangements for CASU with the object of arriving 
at a system which is simple, transparent--including to the 
Congress--and equitable to all agencies. Applying the CASU 
concept overseas would place oversight of service and funding 
on the level where the activity takes place--the individual 
posts--give all participants a direct sense of ownership, 
make it possible for agencies to calculate how much it really 
costs to have staff at a given post, and reinforce one of our 
great strengths--our embassies and the country teams.

Overseas CASUs would have the following attributes:

-- Strong voice for participating agencies in post 
operations;

-- Transparent cost calculations;

-- Full reimbursement to provider agencies;

-- Built-in incentives for high-quality and low-cost service 
delivery;

-- Flexible choice of products and services; and

-- Encouragement for streamlining and cost savings.

The CASU concept would allow us to put into operation a 
number of modern management practices while building on the 
Secretary's SMI initiative. It would:

-- Push responsibility down to the level where the activity 
takes place, i.e., the post;

-- Give all participants a direct sense of ownership and draw 
on the best of "customer service" concepts;

-- Make it possible for agencies to calculate how much it 
really costs to have staff at a given post; and

-- Build on one of our great strengths--our embassies and the 
country teams.

Many aspects of this scheme remain to be explored, but the 
public interest in an equitable resolution is considerable. 
Absent agreement on a mechanism to fund the CASUs, each 
agency, State included, will be compelled to make its own 
arrangements. Given    the inevitable duplication of effort, 
this cannot be in the public interest. Agencies with only a 
small presence will find themselves particularly hard 
pressed, and the coherence of U.S. Government efforts in any 
given country will inevitably suffer.

Those of us who are working hardest on this problem recognize 
that there is no acceptable alternative to success. 
Inevitably, any equitable solution will entail base 
transfers; and, since almost every single appropriations 
committee has at least one agency in this puzzle, it can only 
be solved with the cooperation of the overall appropriations 
leadership.

Vice President Gore and Secretary Christopher have launched 
us on a plan to move vigorously--in cooperation with NPR and 
other agencies--to position ourselves for the future, to 
produce a diplomatic platform that prepares us to carry out 
U.S. interests well into the next century. We hope that we 
can count on you to join us in that effort.

I thank you for your consideration. I look forward to joining 
my colleagues in answering the committee's questions. 

(###)



ARTICLE 5:

The U.S. Government Role in the NIS: From Aid to Trade

James F. Collins, Senior Coordinator, Office of the Special 
Adviser to the Secretary for the NIS

Statement before the Harvard-Columbia Arden House Conference 
on U.S.-Russian Relations, Harriman, New York, March 17, 1995

A little over three years ago, while serving in Moscow, I 
watched Mikhail Gorbachev sign a document to dissolve the 
former Soviet Union and, with that action, to create a new 
Russia and 11 other independent states. Russia and the other 
New Independent States have undergone dramatic change since 
then, and the Clinton Administration has made support of 
political and economic reform in these societies and their 
integration into the world economy its highest foreign policy 
priority.

At the core of our NIS policy is the belief, as articulated 
by President Clinton in his State of the Union address, that 
"our security depends on our continued world leadership to 
advance the causes of peace and freedom and democracy." In no 
area of the world is American leadership more critical and 
more needed than in the vast territory of Eastern Europe, 
Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The United States has 
a tremendous stake in the success of the efforts of these new 
states to become stable, democratic nations and market 
economies. At issue is nothing less than whether these new 
countries, which cover one-sixth of the earth's surface, can 
find a place as responsible and cooperative members within 
the community of nations and, thus, ensure that major threats 
to our security never arise again from this part of the 
globe.

It is our firm belief that the NIS will not succeed in this 
endeavor without the success of economic reform and democracy 
in Russia. But it seems equally clear that the fate of all 
these countries is linked. Russian democracy and reform can 
only be assured if democratic, free-market models take root 
elsewhere in the NIS, particularly in Ukraine. From the 
beginning, the U.S. has been in the forefront in promoting 
and enhancing the independence and sovereignty of each of 
these new states. We worked to assure full diplomatic 
representation in all these states and to support their full 
participation in international bodies, such as the UN and 
OSCE. We encouraged them to create new links and patterns of 
cooperation with European institutions. We led, for example, 
in founding the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and then 
the Partnership for Peace. We strengthened the CSCE by 
converting it into the OSCE and giving this body greater 
institutional importance.

In the economic sphere, we have been conscious that the 
viability and independence of these states would depend on 
their ability to develop national economies built on market 
principles. In our efforts to promote economic reform, we 
started with a handicap in the form of an array of Cold War-
era laws that restricted our ability to conduct economic 
relations with these states. With Congress' cooperation, we 
have worked to repeal most legal barriers to trade and 
investment, while at the same time normalizing our economic 
relations by putting in place a network of bilateral trade, 
investment, and tax agreements. That work has largely been 
done.

We have also encouraged the integration of these new states 
into the global trading system. We are actively supporting, 
for example, the accession of Russia and Ukraine to the 
GATT/WTO. Participation in the Western economic fora offers a 
very real incentive for these states to deepen their 
commitment to reform and to adopt accepted rules of economic 
behavior. That is why we have supported Russia's inclusion in 
the G-7 summit at Naples last year, and in Halifax this June.

To further promote reform in these states, the Clinton 
Administration sought and received authorization from 
Congress to undertake a massive assistance effort to the NIS 
region. Since 1991, Congress has made available $4 billion in 
technical and humanitarian assistance for Russia and the 
other NIS. It has provided an additional $1.3 billion in so-
called Nunn-Lugar funds to assist in dismantling nuclear 
weapons in these states. This is a substantial commitment of 
U.S. resources, and launching such an assistance effort of 
this magnitude has not been without problems. Over the past 
two years, we have developed a number of principles to ensure 
that these monies have maximum impact and to integrate the 
program into our broader policy goals. Let me review this 
assistance strategy with you.

First, we condition our assistance, as provided in the 
FREEDOM Support Act, on these states adopting serious 
political and economic reforms. Our intention has been to 
support reformers, and through them reform, at all levels. 
From the beginning, about two-thirds of our NIS assistance 
has gone to entities other than central governments. And the 
FREEDOM Support funds that have gone to central governments 
in the NIS have gone primarily to support the institutional 
programs that directly promote democracy and market reform, 
such as election assistance, the drafting of commercial 
codes, and the setting up of privatization programs. In the 
process of providing this assistance, we have gained 
unprecedented access and influence within Russian society and 
helped to open what had essentially been a closed system, 
isolated from the West.

Second, we seek to marry our assistance with broader 
diplomatic efforts: Nunn-Lugar funding is reducing nuclear 
arsenals and combating the spread of nuclear weapons and 
materials; our technical assistance is fighting international 
crime, narcotics, and terrorism and fostering an environment 
in which our companies can do business; and other programs, 
like Baltic Officer Resettlement, are  helping to normalize 
relations between Russia and the other NIS by persuading 
Russia to withdraw its troops from that region.

Third, we constantly fine-tune the program to assure it 
reflects actual conditions on the ground and the needs of the 
recipients. As market reform has taken hold in Russia and the 
other NIS, we have shifted the emphasis of our programs from 
humanitarian to technical assistance and to new areas, such 
as combating corruption, which host governments have 
identified as priorities. We are also shifting the balance of 
resources from Russia to other reforming countries. In FY 
1995, more than 60% of our assistance will go to the non-
Russian NIS; we expect that figure to climb to more than two-
thirds in FY 1996.

Fourth, we have encouraged private sector linkages since 
trade and investment, not assistance, will be the long-term 
basis of our relationship with Russia and the NIS. Much of 
what we do under our technical assistance programs--whether 
in privatization, banking reform, or commercial law-- helps 
create an environment to support private sector activity. An 
increasing share of our assistance monies are now also being 
directed at funding the more traditional business promotion 
programs operated by Eximbank, OPIC, TDA, and other U.S. 
Government agencies. We are hopeful that these programs will 
provide real opportunities for U.S. business in the region.

We recognize that in this period of transition, when private 
sectors are only just emerging in the NIS, such linkages are 
hard to establish. Therefore, we are using government-to-
government contacts to expand the potential for economic, 
scientific, space, and environmental cooperation. The joint 
commission that Vice President Gore chairs with Russian Prime 
Minister Chernomyrdin is an effective example of what we are 
doing. Through the commission, we are working to move major 
American investment projects forward in Russia, including 
several multi-billion dollar energy deals, to resolve 
pipeline access for our oil joint ventures in the region, and 
to identify opportunities for American business to 
participate in the conversion of Russian defense industries 
to civilian production. Under the aegis of the commission, we 
have fielded several OPIC investment missions and Department 
of Commerce-led trade delegations to Russia. We have 
established similar commissions for Ukraine and Kazakhstan 
and are hopeful that they will prove equally effective in 
using U.S. Government and private sector cooperation to 
promote trade and investment. This is a process that also 
helps in our efforts to open these societies and expose them 
to Western economic and political ideas and behavior.

Finally, we seek to leverage our assistance with efforts of 
the wider international community. U.S. leadership within the 
G-7 and with the international financial institutions has 
been essential to mobilizing multilateral support for reform 
in the NIS. It was at U.S. initiative that the IMF 
established the Systemic Transformation Facility--STF--a new 
IMF lending program designed to provide pre-stabilization 
support in advance of more traditional IMF stand-by programs. 
Most of the NIS have taken advantage of the STF program. 
Russia and Ukraine's assumption of IMF stand-by programs in 
recent weeks is a historic event. Their ability to implement 
the stand-by owes much to the earlier experience with the STF 
program and also to the essential role played by the U.S. 
Government in keeping the international financial 
institutions actively engaged in negotiations with Moscow and 
Kiev.

The IMF agreements are good news, but despite this success 
and the consistent support of the U.S. and our allies, the 
transition of Russia and the other NIS has taken longer and 
proven more fitful than we had first hoped. The leadership 
committed to reform in Russia alone has appeared in peril and 
has then been rescued, not just once but several times over 
the past three years. It is essential that we appreciate that 
reform will not follow a linear path in any of these 
countries. The transition underway has unleashed political 
and social forces--both old and new--that are contending to 
control and influence the process of reform.

Unfortunately, there has been a tendency in the media to 
respond reflexively to these twists and turns, to paint the 
situation and the fate of reform in starkest, black-and-white 
terms. For example, last month when Russia's negotiations 
with the IMF went into recess, press reports talked about a 
break-off in negotiations and the IMF loan being in serious 
jeopardy. A few weeks earlier there was alarm over remarks by 
the then-minister of privatization, who seemed inclined to 
bring some industries back under state control. This was, 
obviously, a real fight over control of resources, the stuff 
of political power struggles. The upshot, however, was the 
removal of that minister and a strengthening of the grip of 
reformers on the process of privatization.

The most recent questions about the future of reform has 
clearly been the situation in Chechnya. Russia has embroiled 
itself in a not very well thought out military effort to 
reign in a breakaway region of the federation. Tragically and 
unnecessarily, the Russian Government has carried out this 
military campaign in such a way as to cause large numbers of 
civilian casualties and hinder humanitarian assistance. As 
seriously, Chechnya has also proved a deeply divisive element 
in Russian political life and has become a serious setback 
for the cause of reform and democratization. But how serious 
a setback it will eventually prove to have been is not yet 
clear. It is not at all certain that the conflict will 
permanently damage Russia's Federal structure, its 
territorial integrity, or its market reform program. 
Paradoxically, Chechnya has produced promising signs of the 
health of Russia's new democracy. There has been open debate 
of the conflict in the Duma. The press has been outspoken in 
its criticism, and there is evidence that parts of the 
government--if not all--have heard criticisms and acted on 
them.

My point is that building a democratic society and a market 
economy has not been smooth, and we can expect further fits 
and starts in the future. But despite reversals, we need to 
appreciate the fundamentally changed context in which 
political and economic events are taking place in the region. 
Looking at Russia, we can begin to appreciate the enormity of 
the changes that country has undergone in only three years.

-- First, and I believe foremost, Russia and the other states 
no longer see themselves isolated from the broader world by 
an ideological conflict.

-- The centralized, command economy is gone. Prices have been 
largely freed. Russia is now bringing its trading system into 
conformity with the GATT/WTO.

-- Where controls remain, such as the energy sector, prices 
are moving toward world levels, and the export quota system, 
which has been the basis of controlling domestic prices, is 
being eliminated.

-- Some 70% of industry has been privatized; virtually all 
small shops and businesses are in private hands.

-- Russia has begun the massive job of creating the legal, 
tax, and administrative structures necessary to regulate and 
sustain a market economy. A new civil code was passed; 
bankruptcy laws are beginning to be enforced.

-- The Central Bank has begun to function to regulate 
monetary policy. The ruble is now the currency only of 
Russia, and it is freely traded for foreign exchange inside 
the country.

-- Foreign investment is welcomed; the U.S. is the largest 
single investor, with some $700 million. There is general 
recognition that Russia has to create a more attractive 
investment climate, and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin has 
established a Foreign Investment Advisory Council.

-- Creating a predictable and stable tax regime will be 
critical for promoting business and investment. President 
Yeltsin acknowledged to President Clinton in September that 
overhauling Russia's tax regime would be a priority in 1995.

-- Russia has, at last, concluded an IMF program and adopted 
a budget that puts it in a very good position to stabilize 
its economy, lower inflation, and strengthen the ruble over 
the course of this year.

-- Russians now have access to a range of Western and other 
consumer goods that were available to only the most senior of 
Communist Party bosses three years ago. Prices are high, but 
many Russians are, for the first time, enjoying the fruits of 
a consumer economy.

There is more good news for the NIS region as a whole. Reform 
is spreading. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were early leaders in 
Central Asia. Small Moldova has doggedly pursued reform; we 
hosted a visit by Moldova's leading reformer, President 
Snegur, to Washington last month. In recent months, a second 
wave of reformers has arisen in the western NIS: in Ukraine, 
as I have already noted, but also in Belarus, Georgia, and 
Armenia.

Ukraine's new President, Leonid Kuchma, has worked closely 
with the IMF to a prepare a broad reform program to address 
the country's economic crisis. President Kuchma has told us 
that Ukraine has no other alternative but to build a market 
economy, and the Ukrainian people have come to realize that 
they wasted three years by deluding themselves that they 
could avoid tough economic decisions.

The IMF's board will consider Ukraine's program when it meets 
on March 31. The IMF has identified, however, a substantial 
gap in balance-of-payment financing over and above the 
resources that the IFIs can provide and is looking for donor 
countries to fill this gap in 1995. The U.S. is now leading 
an international effort to mobilize substantial external 
support to do this. We will require cooperation from Russia 
and Turkmenistan--Ukraine's principal creditors and suppliers 
of energy--in the form of debt rescheduling. It will also 
require new commitments of support from the G-7. The United 
States announced $100 million in support for Ukraine last 
fall and will be making major new financial commitments of 
support at a World Bank pledging session to be held next week 
in Paris. We are hopeful that resources will be committed at 
this session to allow the fund to approve Ukraine's program 
at the end of the month.

At the opening of the conference, you posed the question to 
keynote speakers: Has Russia--and by extension, the other 
NIS--come of economic age? I would have to give you a 
qualified response. Much has been accomplished in three 
years, particularly in Russia. But, of course, much more has 
to be done. In all these countries, additional steps need to 
be taken to fully make the transition to a market economy.

-- Inflation is still far too high.

-- We still need important legislation to protect investors 
as well as local businessmen. We urge early ratification of 
our bilateral investment treaty in Russia.

-- Most have failed to put an adequate social safety net in 
place, and many of the largest state enterprises still 
require fundamental restructuring.

-- Crime and corruption remains a serious threat. Witness the 
tragedy of the Listev assassination.

But the basic direction of reform is clear, and its 
cumulative impact is building a market economy in Russia and 
in other countries of the NIS. We have only to look to the 
situation just three years ago to grasp the extent of change 
and to find reason for hope in the future.  

(###)



ARTICLE 6:

U.S. Policy Toward Guatemala: The Cases of Michael Devine and 
Efrain Bamaca

Alexander F. Watson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American 
Affairs

Statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 
Washington, DC, April 5, 1995

Mr. Chairman: I welcome this opportunity to appear before you 
and your colleagues on the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence to discuss United States policy in Guatemala and 
the killings of Michael Devine and Efrain Bamaca. You are  
doing the right thing to conduct these hearings. It is 
important to get the facts out--to the Congress, to the 
public, and to the families of the victims.

That is precisely the intent of the President and Secretary 
of State Christopher. The President has asked the 
Intelligence Oversight Board--IOB--to conduct a thorough 
review of all aspects of the allegations associated with and 
the policy issues raised by these two cases. The IOB will 
review the facts surrounding these cases and make appropriate 
recommendations. As the Secretary stated before the Congress 
last week, should disciplinary or other such action be 
indicated, it will be taken. The Administration will provide 
the American people with as much information about the review 
as possible. The Secretary has already recommended the 
fullest disclosure possible.

Mr. Chairman, promotion of human rights abroad is a 
fundamental principle guiding the Clinton Administration's 
foreign policy. The responsibility to protect and assist 
American citizens abroad is a particularly compelling 
obligation assigned to the men and women of our foreign 
service. This statement, therefore, deals in large part with 
how the Department and our embassy in Guatemala discharged 
those responsibilities in the two cases at hand. Your staff 
has indicated, however, that an overview of U.S. policy in 
Guatemala--and how it has evolved over time--would be 
helpful. Let me do that before turning to the cases of 
Michael Devine and Efrain Bamaca.

Overview of U.S. Policy in Guatemala

Guatemala is a deeply troubled country. It is sharply divided 
along ethnic and social lines. The peasantry live in acute 
poverty. Decades of authoritarian and, often, extremely 
violent politics have inhibited the growth of democratic 
institutions. Promising political leaders have often been 
assassinated or driven into exile. The security forces have 
long violated human rights with impunity. A virulent left-
wing insurgency practiced a policy of "take no prisoners" and 
assassinated U.S. Ambassador John Gordon Mein in 1968.  In 
recent years, electoral politics have begun to function, but 
these democratic developments remain fragile.

When the Central American crisis erupted in Nicaragua and El 
Salvador in the late 1970s, our relations with Guatemala were 
problematic. The United States had provided substantial 
assistance to Guatemala under the auspices of the Alliance 
for Progress. Promotion of greater respect for human rights 
became a particular concern under the Carter Administration. 
The emphasis on human rights and the conditionality the 
United States placed on military assistance, in particular, 
stimulated a nationalistic backlash among the Guatemalan 
military officer corps, leading it, in 1977, to reject our 
military aid. It would not be restored until FY 1986.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the guerrilla insurgency 
acquired much larger dimensions. It was met by an 
increasingly brutal counter-insurgency campaign carried out 
under a succession of military leaders: Laugerud Garcia 
(1974-78); Lucas Garcia (1978-82); and Rios Montt (1982-83). 
Large-scale out-migration of Guatemalans began during this 
period, with some 45,000 taking refuge in Mexico. Several 
hundred thousand Guatemalans who were uprooted by the war 
reside in the United States today; about 100,000 have pending 
asylum claims. There is no generally accepted figure for the 
number of Guatemalans killed during the conflict, but 
estimates range upward from 100,000. Human rights abuses 
throughout this period were pervasive and systemic. They are 
well-documented in the annual human rights reports of the 
Department and in those of non-governmental organizations. It 
was also under Rios Montt that the military formed community-
based civil defense patrols--PACs--and armed the nearly half-
million Indian peasants who were recruited into them. In 
time, two problems associated with the PACs emerged: forced 
recruitment into their ranks and human rights abuses which 
they committed. In 1983, Rios Montt was overthrown by the 
Guatemalan army itself. His Defense Minister, General Mejia, 
was named head of state and moved to hold constituent 
assembly elections the following year.

Following adoption of a new constitution in 1985, Guatemala 
held free and fair elections, won by the Christian Democratic 
candidate, Vinicio Cerezo. During the next eight years--
between 1985 and 1992--the United States provided Guatemala 
about $936 million total aid. About $33 million of that 
amount was military, including financing and training. This 
was a significant amount of total aid but, for purposes of 
comparison, in the same period we gave $2.5 billion to El 
Salvador and $1.175 billion to Honduras. In terms of aid per 
capita, the disproportionality was even more pronounced. El 
Salvador received between four and five times as much total 
aid per capita as Guatemala. The Bush Administration 
suspended military assistance--both financing--FMF and grant 
aid--MAP-- in 1990 after concluding that elements of the 
military were responsible for the murder of American citizen 
Michael Devine. Our total aid in 1993 and 1994 was about $113 
million, of which $148,000 went to IMET programs.

When Cerezo took office in January 1986, a regional 
diplomatic effort spearheaded by Mexico--known as the 
Contadora Process--had been underway for nearly three years. 
It was about to give way to an all-Central American 
initiative--the Esquipulas Process. Both diplomatic efforts 
were aimed at bringing the Central American insurgencies to 
an end through peaceful negotiations and national 
reconciliation. The Esquipulas Process produced a series of 
agreements beginning in 1987 that provided the framework for 
free elections in Nicaragua in 1990 and the resulting 
demobilization of the Nicaraguan "contras." Peace 
negotiations had begun on a separate track in El Salvador in 
1984; they eventually culminated in the historic 1992 
comprehensive accords that ended that conflict.

In Guatemala, President Cerezo  initiated talks with the 
Guatemalan guerrilla umbrella organization--the URNG--in 
1987. Those talks made only limited progress but were 
continued and made more headway under President Serrano, 
elected in 1990. It was during Serrano's term, in the last 
year of the Bush Administration, that the United States 
initiated direct contacts with the URNG to encourage forward 
movement in the peace process. This support for the peace 
process has intensified during the Clinton Administration 
when, at the request of the Guatemalan Government and the 
URNG, the United States joined five other governments to 
constitute a "Group of Friends of the Peace Process."

President Cerezo completed his term and became the first 
civilian elected leader in Guatemala's history to turn power 
over to another civilian elected leader--Jorge Serrano, in 
1991. President Serrano betrayed his oath of office to uphold 
the constitution and attempted to dissolve the Congress and 
Supreme Court on May 25, 1993. In the ensuing 12-day crisis, 
the Clinton Administration worked intensively to get 
democracy back on track. We collaborated closely with the 
Organization of American States, other interested 
governments--including Mexico--and with key sectors of 
Guatemalan society itself to produce a peaceful, 
constitutional outcome. The result was the departure of 
Serrano and the election by the Guatemalan Congress of Ramiro 
De Leon Carpio, the widely respected Human Rights Ombudsman. 
At the conclusion of the crisis it was clear that the 
Guatemalan military had acted responsibly. In particular, the 
military had backed the finding of Guatemala's constitutional 
court that the actions of Serrano and his vice president were 
unconstitutional.

De Leon's selection and the role of the military during the 
crisis gave us considerable hope that Guatemala could move to 
further consolidate its democracy, improve respect for human 
rights, and end its insurgency through negotiations. Nothing 
would have a more dramatic and immediately favorable effect 
on the human rights situation than an end to the internal 
conflict. Our policy has thus placed considerable emphasis on 
that goal.

In January 1994, the government and URNG resumed negotiations 
and agreed to a new framework agreement and timetable for 
concluding the talks. Under the new framework, the talks were 
moderated by the United Nations and the Friends were given a 
supporting role. We appointed a special representative to the 
Friends group to give our own support emphasis and focus.

Under the calendar, the parties laid out a schedule of issues 
to be negotiated and set the end of 1994 as the date for a 
comprehensive agreement. Talks made excellent progress during 
the first half of 1994. Three accords were particularly 
noteworthy. A human rights agreement reached in March 1994 
provided for a UN Human Rights Verification Mission--MINUGUA-
-which has now deployed 313 human rights monitors throughout 
Guatemala. The accord also provides that the Human Rights 
Ombudsman has the responsibility to verify that service in 
the Civil Defense Patrols is voluntary and to determine 
whether PAC members have committed human rights abuses. The 
government declares it will not support these patrols or arm 
new volunteer civil defense committees once peace is 
obtained. Acceptance by Guatemala of this international 
presence was a hopeful sign of its growing desire to abide by 
internationally accepted norms of human rights.

The Guatemalan Government and the URNG also reached accords 
on aid to persons displaced by the war, which is already 
attracting international economic and technical support, and 
for a historical clarification commission. The latter accord 
provoked controversy. The commission will begin to function 
only after a comprehensive agreement is reached. It will have 
the mandate to make a public report on human rights 
violations committed by both sides during the war, but it 
does not have the authority to assign individual 
responsibility, and its findings are not to be used for 
prosecutions.

Partly owing to the adverse reaction to this accord from 
within its own ranks, the URNG suspended talks in June 1994. 
Negotiations did not resume until last October. Progress 
thereafter was slow, but last week in Mexico City, the 
parties signed a fourth agreement concerning the rights of 
Guatemala's indigenous population. The parties are now 
attempting to reach a final peace accord by a new target date 
of August 1995. That is an ambitious goal, especially as 
Guatemala holds presidential elections in November and the De 
Leon transitional presidency is drawing to a close. The 
Clinton Administration believes that the peace talks still 
offer the most concrete hope for ending the last of Central 
America's internal wars and for bringing about a lasting 
improvement in respect for human rights in Guatemala. Last 
year, in a step full of symbolism, we redirected the 
remaining $4.6 million of the military assistance suspended 
in 1990 into a peace fund to support implementation of peace 
accords. In sum, the peace talks are key to Guatemala's 
future and will continue to receive our full support.

That is not to say that our human rights policy in Guatemala 
is limited to support for the peace process. Far from it. 
Read our human rights reports. They are candid and detailed. 
They pull no punches. We believe that they have encouraged 
Guatemalan human rights supporters and that our policy has 
given them some protection and greater space to act. Our 
human rights policy is not confined to advocacy and support 
of cases in which we have a U.S.-citizen interest. We have 
been vocal and active in countless others as well--the cases 
of Myrna Mack, Maritza Urrutia, and Amilcar Mendez--to cite 
just three cases active in recent years.

Our human rights policy also seeks to strengthen Guatemalan 
institutions that have responsibility for protecting and 
improving respect for human rights. Specifically, we have:

-- Supported the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman to 
improve its ability to gather and analyze information on 
human rights abuses. Grants totaling $2.6 million in the last 
five years have enabled the office to set up regional 
bureaus, install a computer tracking system, and extend 
education programs to indigenous audiences;

-- Launched this year a three-year, $2-million program of 
education, technical assistance, and other support to help 
indigenous and grass-roots non-governmental organizations 
increase participation of the disenfranchised in civil 
society;

-- Worked to improve the administration of justice through a 
$5-million project to increase the judicial system's 
independence and professionalism and to support efforts by 
the Public Ministry and MINUGUA to prepare cases for trial 
under the new Criminal Procedures Code that took effect last 
July;

-- Assisted municipalities to pursue legal reforms through 
the Local Government Outreach Strategy Project;

--  Provided training to civilian investigators in the Public 
Ministry; and

-- Supported the protection of street children by providing 
financial assistance to NGOs and the children's bureau of the 
Human Rights Ombudsman's office.

Let me say that we see no conflict between our participation 
in the peace process and our pursuit of human rights. Indeed, 
we view these efforts as complementary. The first major 
accord in the peace process deals precisely with halting 
violations of human rights. It is only by guaranteeing basic 
human rights and political freedoms that democracy becomes 
fundamental and accessible to all Guatemalans and national 
reconciliation can be assured.

In sum, our human rights policy is comprehensive and 
multifaceted. We seek to protect the rights of individuals 
and pursue with diligence specific cases of abuse. We 
actively support Guatemalan efforts to build the institutions 
of democracy and law which ultimately are the only guarantee 
of human rights. We make clear our commitment to 
constitutional government and free and fair elections. We 
participate in the peace process whose ultimate objective is 
to create the conditions for democratic progress.

Mr. Chairman, hundreds of thousands of American tourists 
visit Guatemala every year--not only Guatemala City and the 
major attractions of Antigua, Lake Atitlan, and 
Chichicastenango. They also visit the Mayan sites of the 
Peten and the less accessible highlands. Protection of 
citizens who encounter problems is an interest to which we 
devote considerable resources--publication of consular 
information sheets and travel advisories and warden systems 
for checking on the welfare of citizens in the event of a 
natural disaster. In Guatemala, we devote the services of one 
consular officer full time to the needs of U.S. citizens. 
Other consular staff lend assistance as required and, on 
occasion, consular welfare cases become the all-consuming 
focus of the entire embassy team. There have been numerous 
instances of such all-out efforts in the last two years in 
particular, as violent crime throughout Guatemala has 
increased. Kidnapings have been a problem in the last year. 
In those cases, we turn to Guatemalan authorities--political, 
police, and sometimes military--for help. Cooperation is 
generally quite good. I make that point because--in fairness 
to the Guatemalan Government and people--it is the truth.

It is not always the case, however. Let me now turn to the 
two cases that bring us here today. These cases date back to 
the early 1990s, but, as they are unresolved, they remain of 
concern to us. In both instances, we worked with two 
courageous American women whose testimony you will hear 
today.

Case of Michael Vernon Devine

U.S. citizen Michael Devine was murdered June 8, 1990, near 
his ranch in Poptun, Guatemala. Given the remote location and 
the absence of any police investigative ability in the area, 
our embassy in Guatemala initially sought investigative 
assistance from the Guatemalan military. The embassy 
concluded in a matter of weeks, however, that the military 
itself was likely involved. Thereafter, and until the senior 
military commanders at the time of Devine's murder were 
replaced, we pressed our interest in resolving the case with 
the civilian government--first under President Cerezo and 
thereafter with Presidents Serrano and De Leon. Our goals 
throughout were to see the killers, intellectual authors, and 
senior officers whom we believed to have covered up the crime 
face punishment and, in doing so, to have civilian control 
over the military effectively exerted.

In December 1990, to drive home our dissatisfaction with the 
lack of real progress toward achieving these goals, the 
Department suspended FMF and MAP expenditures--both committed 
funds in the pipeline and new assistance--to the Guatemalan 
military. It also stopped authorization of the commercial 
sale of defense items to Guatemala's military. We maintained 
a small IMET program totaling $772,000 between 1991 and 1994.

Sheer persistence on the part of former Ambassador Stroock 
and his staff, together with the effective and courageous 
work of a private investigator and a Guatemalan attorney 
hired by Mrs. Devine, resulted in the conviction by a 
military court of five enlisted men for the murder in 
September 1992. The men were given 30-year sentences. Those 
sentences subsequently were  upheld by the Supreme Court of 
Guatemala. The men are now serving those sentences. Following 
continuous pressure by our Charge d'Affaires and the embassy 
after Ambassador Stroock's departure in November 1992, 
Guatemalan army Captain Hugo Contreras also was tried and 
convicted of complicity in the murder in May 1993. He was 
given a 20-year sentence but, in our view, was allowed to 
escape from military custody the very same day. We have 
pressed continually for the Guatemalan military to find and 
reapprehend Contreras. Following her arrival in Guatemala in 
June 1993, our new ambassador, Marilyn McAfee, pressed 
continually for the Guatemalan military to locate and 
reapprehend Contreras. We have not been successful, but 
neither have we abandoned that effort.

We believe that senior officials of the Guatemalan army 
likely ordered the detention and interrogation of Michael 
Devine, possibly in connection with a case of missing army 
rifles. We have absolutely no reason to believe that Devine 
was engaged in any illegal or even improper activity, nor is 
it the case that Devine was a DEA informant, as has been 
alleged in the press. It is virtually certain that the two 
colonels--Garcia Catalan and Portillo--who commanded the base 
from which the five enlisted men operated were conspirators 
in the subsequent coverup. We have conflicting information on 
the role of Colonel Alpirez. The bulk of the information 
suggests that he was involved in a coverup. The embassy 
repeatedly pressed and continues to press the Government of 
Guatemala and senior military officials themselves to obtain 
an honest account from Alpirez and others.

Case of Efrain Bamaca Velasquez

Guatemalan guerrilla Efrain Bamaca Velasquez disappeared on 
March 12, 1992, after a firefight with the Guatemalan army. 
For nearly a year, his American-citizen wife, Jennifer 
Harbury, told us she believed he died in combat. However, a 
former guerrilla, Santiago Cabrera Lopez, testified in 
February 1993 that, while detained by the Guatemalan 
military, he had seen Bamaca alive in military custody at the 
San Marcos military base in March and July 1992. At that 
point, Ms. Harbury contacted our embassy for the first time 
on March 9, 1993, identifying herself as Bamaca's wife and 
seeking our assistance. The embassy responded quickly, 
mobilizing all elements of the embassy team to raise the case 
with their contacts in the Guatemalan Government to seek new 
information. On March 15, our Charge d'Affaires raised the 
case with the Guatemalan Attorney General.

On March 18, embassy officials   contacted the then Human 
Rights Ombudsman, Ramiro De Leon. He told them of inquiries 
about Bamaca the previous year--in 1992--from the URNG and 
the approaches he made as a result to the Guatemalan 
military. The military claimed Bamaca was probably buried in 
an unmarked grave in Retalhuleu, the site of the firefight. 
De Leon had obtained permission to exhume the grave in May 
1992, but the proceeding was halted on the grounds that no 
family members or dental or other identifying records were 
present.

On March 22, 1993, the embassy raised the case with the 
Guatemalan president's top human rights adviser. We also 
raised the case directly, in several channels, with senior 
military and military intelligence officials. From the 
outset, however, and to this day, the Guatemalan military 
maintained that they did not capture Mr. Bamaca.

Ambassador McAfee addressed the subject of clandestine 
prisons--an issue raised by the Bamaca case--with President 
De Leon on July 11. She brought up the same issue, 
specifically referring to the Bamaca case with Minister of 
Defense Enriquez on July 29, and did so again with President 
De Leon on August 2. This pattern of aggressively pressing 
our interest in the Bamaca case continued throughout 1993 and 
to the present. U.S. Government officials met with Ms. 
Harbury frequently and at high levels in Washington and 
Guatemala--a reflection of our extraordinary interest in the 
case. Ambassador McAfee made herself continuously available. 
In Washington, Ms. Harbury met on numerous occasions with 
senior officials in our Bureau of Inter-American Affairs; 
with Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and 
Labor Affairs John Shattuck; with Ambassador Geraldine 
Ferraro; and with National Security Adviser Anthony Lake.

During Ms. Harbury's October-November 1994 hunger strike in 
Guatemala City, Ambassador McAfee visited her frequently and 
a consular officer visited her daily. Concerned for her 
physical safety, they had the embassy's security guard visit 
the central plaza, where she conducted the strike, several 
times a day. Photographs of a visit to her by Ambassador 
McAfee and my senior adviser Richard Nuccio appeared on the 
front pages of most Guatemalan dailies, conveying a graphic 
message of official U.S. protection, support, and concern.

At the same time, we were asking our intelligence services to 
search their files and data bases for all available 
information, to evaluate and re-assess the information 
available--as is often the case, much was from secondary or 
sub-sources--and to collect new intelligence. As additional 
information was acquired, we became more and more persuaded 
that the Guatemalan military had in fact captured Bamaca in 
1992. The Department instructed Ambassador McAfee to meet 
with President De Leon on November 11, 1994. The Ambassador 
told De Leon that, according to information available to the 
USG, Bamaca was captured alive by the military, transferred 
to the San Marcos military base, and that his wounds were not 
life-threatening. She also told him that, as President, he 
had a responsibility to ensure that the investigation 
underway would be vigorously pursued to confirm the facts of 
the case and to take appropriate strong action.

On the same day, Ambassador McAfee met with Jennifer Harbury, 
who had just ended her hunger strike. Ambassador McAfee told 
Ms. Harbury that she had informed President De Leon that we 
had credible information that Bamaca had been captured alive 
by the military and that his wounds were not life-
threatening. The Ambassador also shared with Ms. Harbury our 
candid assessment that there were, unfortunately, no 
indications that Bamaca survived much beyond the first few 
weeks of his captivity. Ms. Harbury understandably wanted to 
know more. We felt that we had a strong obligation to share 
with her our best assessments drawn from intelligence 
sources--once we were confident of them--but could not share 
specific intelligence without putting at risk the people who 
were helping us find out what happened.

As additional information was acquired in the ensuing months, 
the intelligence community became increasingly persuaded that 
Bamaca had in fact been killed while in military custody. On 
several occasions between December 1994 and March 1995, 
Administration officials told Ms. Harbury of our belief that, 
while we lacked conclusive evidence, Bamaca had not survived. 
Ms. Harbury, during the same period, told us of numerous 
instances of people coming to her anonymously with reports 
that Bamaca had  recently been seen alive in military 
custody. The only such report lending itself to verification 
turned out to be bogus. None of the intelligence supported 
Ms. Harbury's hope that Bamaca was still alive and we 
repeatedly conveyed that painful message.

When, in late January of this year, additional intelligence 
was received and evaluated, we instructed Ambassador McAfee 
to approach President De Leon again, urging him to order the 
re-interrogation of senior military officers who might have 
been involved in Bamaca's disappearance. We specifically 
urged that Colonel Alpirez be interrogated again. We did not 
assert to President De Leon any conclusion as to Colonel 
Alpirez' role--the information available was not sufficiently 
definitive--but we were confident that Alpirez must have had 
direct knowledge of what happened to Bamaca and we urged in 
no uncertain terms that he be interrogated again.

Ambassador McAfee made this demarche on February 6. On 
February 8, Department officials informed Ms. Harbury of the 
demarche, telling her as well that "the information available 
to us, while it is not conclusive, suggests your husband was 
killed following his capture." It was the considered view 
within the Administration, however, that we could not 
properly mention Alpirez' name to her because it might 
prejudice the investigation we expected President De Leon to 
undertake and because we could not draw a definitive 
conclusion about Alpirez' role in the Bamaca case. Most 
importantly, it would have put at risk the people who were 
confidentially helping us. When, after a month, Alpirez still 
had not been questioned again, we announced on March 10 the 
suspension of the participation of Guatemalan military 
personnel in IMET programs conducted in the United States for 
the remainder of FY 1995. Our announcement of that suspension 
also contained the considered assessment of the U.S. 
intelligence community that Bamaca had died in Guatemalan 
military custody.

Mr. Chairman, I do not want to leave this subject without 
saying    again how much we sympathize with Mrs. Devine, Ms. 
Harbury--with all those who have lost a family member in 
circumstances such as these. We understand, too, the pain, 
the frustration, and the anger that they feel when we cannot 
answer all the questions that torment them. At the same time, 
we made extraordinary efforts on behalf of Carol Devine and 
Jennifer Harbury--as we did earlier in the cases of Nicholas 
Blake, Griffin Davis, and Sister Dianna Ortiz. We acted in 
good faith throughout, doing our best to help them and to 
share with them as much information as we could.

We have pressed the Guatemalan Government hard on both the 
Devine and Bamaca cases, and we will continue to do so. 
Indeed, on instructions of Secretary Christopher, Ambassador 
McAfee met with President De Leon last night, delivering a 
personal message from the Secretary underscoring the 
importance that we attach to seeing justice achieved in these 
cases. For our part, we are prepared to provide the 
cooperation and assistance of our Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. For its part, we believe Guatemala could do 
much more to find and imprison Captain Contreras. We believe 
Guatemala has yet to conduct the kind of vigorous, credible 
inquiry into the Bamaca case that we have consistently called 
for, and we will stay the course on that issue, too. We will 
continue to protect U.S. citizens' interests in Guatemala to 
the best of our ability. We will speak up and remain active 
in our Guatemalan human rights policy across the board, and 
we will stay engaged in support of the peace process and the 
consolidation of what is still a very fragile, imperfect 
democracy. Enlightened policy demands no less.  

(###)



ARTICLE 7:

The Future of NATO and Europe's Changing Security Landscape

Richard C. Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary for European and 
Canadian Affairs

Statement before the Subcommittee on Airland Forces of the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, April 5, 
1995

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for the opportunity 
to discuss the future of NATO within the context of Europe's 
changing security landscape. When the Cold War ended--that 
symbolic midnight moment on December 25, 1991, when the 
Soviet flag came down over the Kremlin for the last time--it 
was inevitable that Americans would talk of ending, or 
sharply reducing, their global commitments--of coming home.

A half-century ago, at the end of World War II, the United 
States faced another time of great change, another time of 
enormous opportunity and uncertain peril, another time when 
Americans wanted nothing more than simply to go home. But we 
soon found that freedom's wartime victory was incomplete and 
that the post-war period would require continuous and active 
American engagement to marshal the forces of freedom for a 
new kind of war--a cold war.

Among the challenges that Harry Truman, George Marshall, Dean 
Acheson, and their Democratic colleagues faced was to build a 
new post-war order in cooperation with a new Republican 
Congress. And to the lasting benefit of our nation and the 
world, they met that challenge. They found allies among 
Republicans who recalled the consequences of isolationism 
after World War I--a period that also began with a Democratic 
President facing new Republican majorities in Congress. They 
forged a bipartisan consensus based on the Truman Doctrine, 
the Marshall Plan, the post-war institutions of the West, and 
sustained American leadership.

Now, a half-century later, we have the opportunity--and the 
responsibility--to marshal the forces of freedom for a new 
kind of European peace--one that is just and enduring. We 
have the opportunity--and the obligation--to work with our 
European partners to extend freedom's victory to all of 
Europe.

It is fair, of course, to ask why it is in the national 
interest of the United States to continue to play an active 
role in the restructuring of Europe's security. It is 
tempting to say, at the end of the Cold War, that we will 
leave it to the Europeans themselves to work out a new 
concert of Europe, while we focus on problems at home. 

We must resist this temptation for a simple reason: our own 
narrow self-interest. The context for U.S. relations with 
Europe may have changed, but bedrock American interests in 
Europe endure: 

-- A continent free from domination by any power or 
combination of powers hostile to the United States; 

-- Prosperous partners open to our ideas, our goods, and our 
investments; 

-- A community of shared values, extending across as much of 
Europe as possible, that can facilitate cooperation with the 
United States on a growing range of global issues; 

-- A continent that is not so wracked by strife that it 
drains inordinate resources from the United States or the 
rest of the world. 

These interests require active U.S. engagement in Europe. 
They point to close cooperation with our European partners.

President Clinton's four trips to Europe last year 
underscored an inescapable fact: The United States has become 
a European power, an enduring and essential element of a 
stable balance.

Many thought our presence in Europe would no longer be 
necessary when the Soviet threat ended, but after only a few 
years--and the disastrous results of our early non-
involvement in the Yugoslav tragedy--it is time to recognize 
that Europe cannot maintain stability on its own. An unstable 
Europe would still threaten essential national security 
interests of the United States, and Europe still needs 
American involvement to keep the continent stable. Our 
national security requires continued American participation 
in maintaining European stability and promoting an undivided 
continent.

During the Cold War, Americans played an indispensable role 
in containing ancient conflicts by creating a framework of 
cooperative security across the western half of the continent 
and on its always explosive southeastern Aegean flank. Today, 
American power and presence remain essential to extend these 
habits of cooperation across the entire continent, the 
eastern portion of which seethes still with unresolved 
historic legacies. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, it is 
still necessary for "the New World to redress the imbalances 
of the Old."

Local conflicts, internal political and economic instability, 
and the return of historic grievances have replaced Soviet 
expansionism as the greatest threat to peace in Europe. 
Western Europe and the United States must jointly ensure that 
tolerant democracies become rooted throughout all of Europe 
and that the seething, angry, unresolved legacies of the past 
are contained and solved.

Europe's diversity and historic rivalries remain a 
determining aspect of efforts to maintain stability. 
Maintaining peace in Europe has traditionally depended on a 
complicated set of structures that balanced often-conflicting 
interests. Disappearance of Cold War structures has left 
important parts of Europe without a sense of security 
provided by a credible framework. This sense of insecurity is 
related less to the perception of a new threat than it is to 
the need to generate a climate of confidence in which 
difficult economic and political reforms can be advanced.

In this context, building a new security architecture for 
Europe means providing a framework to build democracy, market 
economies, stable societies, and, ultimately, a stable and 
just peace across the continent. If we are to realize our 
goal of a peaceful, democratic, prosperous, and undivided 
Europe, we must work with our European partners to re-
establish a sense of overall security.

Today, the early euphoria that surrounded the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet empire has yielded 
to a more sober appreciation of the problems--new and old. 
The tragedy of Bosnia does not diminish the responsibility to 
build a new comprehensive structure of relationships to form 
a new security architecture. On the contrary, Bosnia--the 
greatest collective security failure of the West since the 
1930s--only underscores the urgency of that task.

Any effort to redesign the new security architecture of 
Europe must focus first on Central Europe, the seedbed of 
more turmoil and tragedy in this century than any other area 
on the continent. The two most destructive wars in human 
history began from events on its plains, and the Cold War 
played itself out in its ancient and storied cities, all 
within the last 80 years.

Other historic watersheds also have not treated this area 
well. First the Treaties of Versailles and Trianon, then the 
agreements of Yalta and Potsdam, and, finally, the collapse 
of the Soviet empire--those three benchmark events left 
throughout Central Europe a legacy of unresolved and often 
conflicting historical resentments, ambitions, and most 
dangerous, territorial and ethnic disputes. If any of these 
malignancies spread--as they have already in parts of the 
Balkans and the Transcaucasus--general European stability is 
again at risk.

But if there are great problems, there are also great 
possibilities. For the first time in history, the nations of 
Central Europe have the chance simultaneously to enjoy 
stability, freedom, and independence based on another first: 
the adoption of Western democratic ideals as a common 
foundation for all of Europe. The emotional, but also 
practical, lure of the West can be the strongest unifying 
force Europe has seen in generations, but only if unnecessary 
delay does not squander the opportunity.

The West owes much of its success to the great institutions 
created in the 1940s and 1950s. These structures offer a 
usable foundation for a new era. There is no desire and no 
reason to dismantle these structures. On the contrary, these 
institutions form the basis for a new security architecture. 
Each has its own role to play, and each represents a separate 
pillar of security. The essential challenge is to maintain 
their coherence, extend their influence, and adapt to new 
circumstances without diluting their basic functions.

If those institutions were to remain closed to new members, 
they would become less relevant to the problems of the post-
Cold War world. It would be a tragedy if, through delay or 
indecision, the West helped create conditions that brought 
about the very problems it fears the most. The West must 
expand to Central Europe as fast as possible in fact as well 
as in spirit. Western cooperation cannot be seen as a closed 
undertaking, open only to those who were lucky enough to be 
on the western side of the Iron Curtain.

Such a development would bring a halt to the process of 
European integration, which is vital for peace in Europe. A 
truly integrated security architecture cannot be built by 
extending the largesse of one part of Europe without a 
commensurate growth in the participation and responsibility 
of the other part. Integration must be open and organic. The 
goal must be a functioning community of nations, not a 
development program from the haves to the have-nots. The 
United States is ready to lead in the building of this 
community.

The President's comprehensive strategy to build a new 
interlocking security architecture builds on the success and 
enduring value of these Western institutions and is based 
upon enlargement, integration, and inclusion. Its key 
elements include a gradual, deliberate, and transparent 
process of NATO enlargement, enhancing the Partnership for 
Peace--PFP, strengthening the Organization on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe--OSCE, supporting European integration 
as embodied in the European Union--EU, and developing the 
NATO-Russia relationship. Each of these mutually supportive 
elements is critical to our overall success.

NATO and the Partnership for Peace (PFP)

The central security pillar of the new architecture is a 
venerable organization--NATO. NATO remains the anchor of 
American engagement in Europe and the linchpin of 
transatlantic security. First and foremost, NATO is the most 
successful and capable military alliance in history. When the 
forces of NATO join together, they are highly effective. NATO 
is a unified force for stability in a fragmented, unstable 
world. Its members are the cornerstone of the free world. We 
and our allies cherish peace and freedom, respect human 
rights, and thrive on free enterprise. If one looks for 
nations with political objectives and military forces capable 
of operating successfully with the United States, most are 
members of NATO.

The tried-and-true patterns of military exercises, planning, 
and collaboration with NATO allies allow the United States to 
leverage its resources and relieve the U.S. from the 
unacceptable choice of either having to act alone or do 
nothing when con- fronted with crises. Without continuing 
political and military cooperation in NATO, the U.S. and its 
allies would be hard pressed to build the kind of political 
coalition and conduct the kind of coalition military 
operations that were the key to success of Operation Desert 
Storm.

In short, NATO has always been more than a transitory 
response to a temporary threat. It is a guarantor of European 
democracy and a force for European stability. NATO provides a 
proven structure for managing transatlantic relations. It is 
the accepted vehicle for our involvement in European 
security. These are the reasons why its mission has endured 
and why its benefits are so attractive to Europe's new 
democracies.

Only eight months after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and 17 
months before the end of the Soviet Union, NATO began a 
historic transformation that continues today. New goals for 
the alliance were set forth in NATO's London Summit 
Declaration of July 1990. NATO declared that it no longer 
considered Russia an adversary and announced a new program of 
cooperation with the states of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Just as importantly, NATO called for a restructuring of its 
military forces and a reorientation of its strategy. This 
declaration also established the first ties between NATO and 
the countries of the then-existent Warsaw Treaty 
Organization.

In June 1991, in Copenhagen, NATO foreign ministers issued a 
statement on "Partnership with the Countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe." NATO declared that 

We do not wish to isolate any country, nor to see a new 
division of the Continent. Our objective is to help create a 
Europe whole and free. 

This objective has guided NATO's policies ever since. It 
remains the foundation of NATO's current efforts to extend 
security throughout Europe.

In pursuit of this objective, the forces and missions of 
NATO's integrated military commands have been radically 
restructured. The former concentrations of heavily armored 
forces in the center of Europe have been replaced by more 
lightly armed, mobile, and flexible multinational corps 
better able to respond to a range of possible security 
challenges in a different, less stable world. These forces 
are not directed against any country or group of countries. 
Their purpose is to defend peace in Europe, either on NATO 
territory or--pursuant to a mandate from either the UN or the 
OSCE--in areas of instability or crisis.

The concept of containment has disappeared from NATO's 
strategy. No country, including Russia, is classified as an 
opponent or an enemy. These points were set forth clearly in 
the New Strategic Concept which alliance heads of state and 
government adopted at the Rome summit in November 1991, and 
they have been enshrined in NATO military planning documents 
ever since. The New Strategic Concept made clear that crisis 
management would become an important mission for the alliance 
in addition to its core purpose of collective defense.

At the same Rome summit, alliance leaders created the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council and invited Russia and the other 
states of the former Soviet Union to join. The NACC, as it is 
known, has proven to be a useful vehicle for political 
contact and consultations. It began in the immediate 
aftermath of the Cold War, when levels of trust were still 
being defined, and has grown progressively more active and 
effective. As the level of trust has increased, NATO has 
redoubled its efforts to cooperate with Russia and other 
states in Central and Eastern Europe, and to build closer, 
institutional links aimed at promoting common approaches to 
common problems.

At the Brussels summit in January 1994, alliance leaders 
added even more substance to NATO's new role through adoption 
of a broad strategy of cooperation with all of Europe. In 
reaffirming the political course set by the London and Rome 
summits and the military redirection enshrined in the 
alliance's new strategic concept, NATO endorsed a series of 
"initiatives designed to contribute to lasting peace, 
stability, and well-being in the whole of Europe, which has 
always been the alliance's fundamental goal." These  
initiatives included the Partnership for Peace, through which 
NATO invited members of the NACC, including  Russia and other 
states, to "join us in new political and military efforts to 
work alongside the alliance." In just one year, the 
innovative PFP has become an integral part of the European 
security scene.

Contrary to a fairly widespread impression, PFP is not a 
single organization; rather, it is a series of individual 
agreements between NATO and, at last count, 25 other 
countries ranging from Poland to Armenia, including Russia. 
Each "partner" country creates an individual program to meet 
its own needs. PFP helps newly democratic states restructure 
and establish democratic control of their military forces; 
develop transparency in defense planning and budgetary 
processes; develop interoperability with alliance forces; 
better understand collective defense planning; and learn new 
forms of military doctrine, environmental control, and 
disaster relief. It provides a framework in which NATO and 
individual partners can cooperate in crisis management, 
peacekeeping, and other activities.

PFP is already having a significant effect on partner 
nations. For example, many partners are organizing most if 
not all of their armed forces around NATO planning concepts. 
Some are submitting their individual partnership programs to 
their parliaments for approval--consolidating legislative 
oversight of military policy for the first time ever in their 
history.

PFP also provides a valuable framework for evaluating the 
ability of each partner to assume the obligations and 
commitments of NATO membership--a testing ground for their 
capabilities. And for those partners that do not become NATO 
members, the PFP will provide a structure for increasingly 
close cooperation with NATO--in itself an important building 
block for European security.

The U.S. and its allies have agreed on a robust program of 
practical cooperation with partner states that builds on 
PFP's early momentum. Thirteen joint exercises with partners 
are planned in 1995, including a SACLANT-sponsored event in 
August at Fort Polk, Louisiana.

No issue has been more important, controversial, or 
misunderstood than that of NATO expansion. NATO heads of 
state and government at the January 1994 summit decided the 
alliance would eventually expand. This decision was 
reaffirmed last June by President Clinton during one of his 
European visits, when he stated that the question was no 
longer whether NATO would expand but how and when.NATO has 
embarked on a two-phase program for 1995. During the first 
part of this year, NATO is determining, through an internal 
discussion, the rationale and process for expanding the new, 
post-Cold War NATO. Then, in the months prior to the December 
1995 ministerial meeting, NATO's views on these two issues--
"why" and "how"--will be presented individually to PFP 
members. This will mark the first time detailed discussions 
on this subject have taken place outside the alliance. Then 
the ministers will meet again in Brussels in December and 
review the results of the discussions with the partners 
before deciding how to proceed.

Several key points should be stressed.

First, NATO expansion must strengthen security in the entire 
region, including nations that are not members.

Second, the rationale and process for NATO's expansion, once 
decided, will be transparent, not secret. All partners will 
have the opportunity to hear exactly the same presentation 
from NATO later this year.

Third, there is no timetable or list of nations that will be 
invited to join NATO. The answers to the critical questions 
of who and when will emerge after completion of this phase of 
the process.

Fourth, each nation will be considered individually, not as 
part of some grouping.

Fifth, the decisions as to who joins NATO and when will be 
made exclusively by the alliance. No outside nation will 
exercise a veto.

Sixth, although criteria for membership have not been 
determined, certain fundamental precepts reflected in the 
original Washington Treaty remain as valid as they were in 
1949; new members must be democratic, have market economies, 
be committed to responsible security policies, and be able to 
contribute to the alliance. As President Clinton has stated, 

Countries with repressive political systems, countries with 
designs on their neighbors, countries with militaries 
unchecked by civilian control or with closed economic systems 
need not apply.

Seventh, all members, regardless of size, strength, or 
location should be full members of the alliance, with equal 
rights and obligations.

Eighth, new members will be expected to pay their share of 
NATO's common budgets, be prepared to contribute to alliance 
missions, and have capable military forces to do so.

Ninth, new members will be expected to commit themselves to 
the political aspect of NATO's unity--the commitment to 
building consensus and cooperating in the development of 
alliance policies.

Lastly, it should be remembered that each new NATO member 
constitutes for the United States the most solemn of all 
commitments: a bilateral defense treaty that extends the U.S. 
security umbrella to a new nation. This requires ratification 
by two-thirds of the U.S. Senate, a point that advocates of 
immediate expansion often overlook.

In this context, let me briefly state why this 
Administration, while leading the alliance on the issue of 
NATO expansion, opposes the approach taken by the House of 
Representatives in H.R. 7 and the "NATO Participation Act 
Amendments of 1995," now pending before the Senate.

We believe these bills would result in the opposite effect of 
that intended by many of its sponsors. They could alter the 
steady course we and our allies have set toward expansion and 
could actually slow down the process. The legislation could 
complicate the expansion process by needlessly generating 
disagreements with our allies. It also violates one of the 
fundamental principles guiding the expansion process, i.e., 
that each nation will be considered individually on its own 
merits.

We must be very careful about unilaterally and prematurely 
trying to choose certain countries for NATO membership over 
others or to set specific guarantees. The Washington Treaty 
is not a paper guarantee. New members have to be in a 
position to undertake the solemn obligations and 
responsibilities of membership, just as we will extend our 
solemn commitments to them. Our gradual, deliberate, and 
transparent approach to NATO enlargement is designed to 
ensure that each potential member is judged fairly and 
individually, by the strength of its democratic institutions 
and its capacity to contribute to NATO's goals.

By following this approach, we    give every new democracy a 
powerful incentive to consolidate reform. Arbitrarily locking 
into law advantages for certain countries would discourage 
reformers in countries not named and encourage complacency in 
countries that are. Indeed, the effect of these measures 
before Congress could be to encourage the very instabilities 
and imbalances we seek to avoid. The Senate bill also does 
not acknowledge the key role played by PFP in increasing 
defense cooperation with partner countries and, thus, helping 
to prepare them for eventual NATO membership.

The view shared by this Administration and each of its allies 
is that in the process of expanding NATO, we should not draw 
new lines in Europe but should reach out to all countries 
emerging from communism. We must remember that the decision 
on expansion is not to be made by the United States alone but 
by the allies collectively. The U.S. should not prejudge 
issues that ultimately will be subject to consensus among 
NATO's 16 members and ratified by legislatures in those 
countries.

We also do not believe that "observer status" in the North 
Atlantic Council, as provided in the Senate bill, is 
desirable given the highly sensitive nature of discussions, 
including on the subject of NATO expansion. Both PFP and NACC 
provide ample opportunity for NATO's partners to participate 
in appropriate meetings and other activities.

While we also attach high priority to improving the English-
language skills of partner defense forces, as reflected in 
our FY 1996 International Military Education and Training 
Program--IMET--and Partnership for Peace program requests, we 
oppose the specific IMET earmarks in the bill. As a general 
proposition, we think the bill gives the President 
insufficient flexibility to meet shifting demands. We would 
much prefer a bill that provides what the President "may" do, 
as opposed to what he "shall" do.

Finally, we are concerned about the reporting requirements in 
the bill. They would place the President in the untenable 
position of having to make a public and unilateral evaluation 
of a country's suitability for NATO membership. This could 
generate disagreements with our allies and further complicate 
the expansion process.

We hope that Congress will make the necessary changes in the 
proposed legislation. Congress and the Administration share 
the same goal with respect to NATO expansion. Working 
together, without unnecessary legislative constraints, we 
will reach that goal more quickly.

Fortifying the European pillar of the alliance contributes 
further to European stability and to transatlantic burden-
sharing. It improves our collective capacity to act. It means 
establishing a new premise of collective defense: The United 
States should not be the only NATO member that can protect 
vital common interests outside of Europe.

For these reasons, the United States promoted the concept of 
the Combined Joint Task Force--CJTF. CJTF offers a practical 
vehicle for making NATO assets and capabilities available to 
our European allies, should the alliance as a whole, 
including the U.S., decide not to participate. It is based on 
the notion that Europe's emerging defense identity should be 
separable but not separate from NATO. CJTF can become an 
important vehicle for the United States to develop more 
effective sharing of military burdens with its European 
allies. NATO will still have the right of first refusal to 
deal with crises that do not automatically invoke Article 5 
of the Washington Treaty, but if the alliance as a whole 
chooses not to act, smaller coalitions of willing members can 
draw on NATO assets to deal with such crises. CJTF also 
provides a means to accommodate participation of forces from 
non-NATO allies, including members of the PFP.

NATO expansion cannot occur in a vacuum. If it did, it would 
encourage the very imbalances and instabilities it was 
seeking to avoid. In addition to NATO and PFP, the new 
architecture involves both the EU, other arrangements such as 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe--
OSCE, and a parallel track developing a pragmatic partnership 
with Russia.

The European Union

For more than 40 years, both Democratic and Republican 
Administrations have supported peaceful European integration. 
The European Union has become a vital partner in trade, 
diplomacy, and security. Close partnership between the United 
States and the European Union is essential to our common 
agenda of democratic renewal. This Administration has 
strongly supported the European Union's efforts at European 
integration.

Although the European Union is usually viewed as a political 
and economic entity, it is an essential pillar of European 
security. The integration of western European nations on the 
basis of democracy and free market economics has virtually 
transcended old territorial disputes, irredentist claims, 
social cleavages, and ethnic grievances that tore apart 
European societies in earlier eras.

Throughout its history, the Union has strengthened the 
democratic impulse of a wider Europe. The extension of the 
Union eastward will be immensely important both politically 
and economically. It will integrate and stabilize the two 
halves of Cold War Europe.

Expansion of NATO and the EU will not proceed at exactly the 
same pace. Their memberships are not and will not be 
identical, but the two organizations are clearly mutually 
supportive. Expansion of both is equally necessary for a 
stable Europe.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE)

Both EU and NATO expansion are proceeding within the broad 
context of a new European security architecture. Neither is 
being pursued in isolation. Integration of Central Europe and 
the nations of the former Soviet Union into the OECD, the 
GATT and its successor, the World Trade Organization, and 
such institutions as the Council of Europe all complement and 
support the gradual expansion of NATO and the EU.

But neither NATO nor the EU can be everything to everybody, 
and the other organizations mentioned above are focused on 
narrower issues. This points to the need in the new European 
architectural concept for a larger and looser region-wide 
organization that can deal with a variety of challenges which 
neither NATO nor the EU is suited to address.

Fortunately, the core for such a structure has existed for 
some years--the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe. Its broad structure of human rights commitments, 
consultations, and efforts at cooperative or preventive 
diplomacy had begun to fill a niche in the new Europe. But it 
was clear by the middle of last year that CSCE, while 
offering intriguing possibilities, was wholly inadequate to 
the opportunities or the challenge. Under the leadership of 
the United States, a significant evolution of this 
organization, including a new name, was started in December 
at the Budapest CSCE summit.

Where NATO and the EU begin with the assumption that their 
members share common goals, the Organization on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE, as it was renamed, presumes 
that many of its participants disagree on how its standards 
are to be implemented. The OSCE takes such disagreement as a 
given and then works to find common ground.

Security in Europe today means solving conflicts--many of 
them centuries old--before they escalate as Bosnia has. This 
is why we have strengthened OSCE mechanisms, are making 
vigorous use of its norms, ensuring full implementation of 
its commitments, and increasing political and material 
support for its conflict prevention activities. At the 
Budapest summit, a comprehensive framework for the future of 
conventional arms control was developed; uniform non-
proliferation principles were established among 52 nations; 
greater political and material support was pledged for 
support for the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the 
Preventive Diplomacy Missions, and the Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights; and Russia and the OSCE, as a 
whole, agreed to merge negotiating efforts on the difficult 
issue of Nagorno-Karabakh and provide peacekeepers there once 
a political agreement is reached--all important steps on 
OSCE's path to becoming a more meaningful organization with 
greater capabilities, operating without regard to old Cold 
War dividing lines.

These decisions complement our efforts at NATO and the 
efforts of the European Union to pursue cooperative, 
integrated security structures for Europe. But they do not 
make OSCE a substitute for NATO or the EU. In no way can OSCE 
be made superior to NATO. Because the functions, as well as 
the structures of OSCE and NATO are entirely different--and 
shall remain so--OSCE will not become the umbrella 
organization for European security, nor will it oversee the 
work of the NATO alliance. But we must develop new methods to 
identify and deal with future potential Bosnias by addressing 
at an early stage the causes of conflict. The OSCE must prove 
its worth in this area, as the CSCE did in spreading 
democratic values and legitimizing human rights. More must be 
done.

A Pragmatic Policy of Engagement With Russia and the NIS

This brings me to another essential pillar of the new 
security architecture: relations with Russia. If the West is 
to create an enduring and stable security framework for 
Europe, it must solve the most enduring strategic problem of 
Europe and integrate the nations of the former Soviet Union, 
especially Russia, into a stable European security system.

Since his first day in office, President Clinton has pursued 
a pragmatic policy of engagement with Russia and the other 
New Independent States as the best investment we can make in 
our nations's security and prosperity. As Secretary 
Christopher said last week,

Our approach is to cooperate where our interests coincide, 
and to manage our differences constructively and candidly 
where they do not. We support reform because, in the long 
run, its success benefits not only the people of the region 
but the American people as well.

The U.S. objective remains a healthy Russia--a democratic 
Russia pursuing reform, respecting the rights of its 
citizens, and observing international norms. This is why the 
events in Chechnya are so disturbing. Chechnya is a setback 
in the evolution of the Russian Federation into a stable, 
democratic, multi-ethnic state.

But as President Clinton stated in January, as Russia 
undergoes a historic, painful transformation, it would be a 
mistake to react reflexively to each of the ups and downs 
that it is bound to experience, perhaps, for decades to come. 
If the forces of reform are embattled, the United States must 
reinforce, not retreat from, its support for them.

Enhancement of stability in Central Europe is a mutual 
interest of Russia and the United States. NATO, which poses 
no threat to Russian security, seeks a direct and open 
relationship with Russia that both recognizes Russia's 
special position and stature and reinforces the integrity of 
the other New Independent States of the former Soviet Union.

It is in our interest for the NATO-Russia relationship to 
develop in parallel with NATO expansion. As Secretary 
Christopher told Foreign Minister Kozyrev in Geneva two weeks 
ago, it is in Russia's interest to participate constructively 
in the process of European integration. Russia has an 
enormous stake in a stable and peaceful Europe. No country 
has suffered more when Europe has not been at peace. Russia's 
path to deeper involvement in Europe is open. It should not 
choose to isolate itself from this effort.

NATO and Russia already have a solid relationship through 
Russia's membership in the NACC and through active diplomatic 
contacts. The next step is Russian acceptance of the 
documents, which it has already negotiated with the alliance, 
setting forth the terms of the relationship both within and 
outside of PFP. This will include cooperative efforts in 
areas where Russia can offer special expertise or 
capabilities, including nuclear non-proliferation.

Any such arrangements as part of a new security architecture 
must also consider the special case of Ukraine. Its 
geostrategic position makes its independence and integrity a 
critical element of European security. Considerable 
cooperation is being pursued between NATO and Ukraine under 
the PFP. Strengthened relations should also be pursued beyond 
the PFP. We have an intensive dialogue with Kiev on the 
evolving European security architecture. Moreover, last year 
President Clinton negotiated a trilateral understanding with 
Russia and Ukraine that sets Ukraine on the path to becoming 
a non-nuclear power. In so doing, Ukraine joined Kazakhstan 
and Belarus in agreeing to give up nuclear weapons. We are 
leading efforts to dismantle their weapons and safeguard 
nuclear materials under a bipartisan program sponsored by 
Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to focus 
more specifically on the ways we are matching our European 
security policy with our resources to advance U.S. national 
interests.

Security Assistance for Central Europe

The evolution of Europe's security architecture, guided in 
large part by the U.S., will fundamentally transform our 
security relations with the Central European states. Our FY 
1996 security assistance requests reflect the high priority 
we attach to nurturing these relationships.

Our requests are carefully designed to support our central 
security policy goals in the region, including advancing PFP, 
enhancing U.S.-Central European defense cooperation, 
promoting regional stability, fostering regional cooperation, 
and encouraging other states to play a greater role in 
multinational peacekeeping activities.

In previous years, we have been able to devote limited 
security assistance resources to the region. This year, we 
have requested increased resources in support of major policy 
initiatives, including PFP, and it is critical that we 
receive this increase. All of the democracies in Central 
Europe are eager to participate in cooperative defense 
activities with us, but most lack the wherewithal to do so.

We have designed a set of distinct, but mutually reinforcing 
security assistance requests to advance U.S. policy 
objectives in Europe. We believe our efforts are consistent 
with the spirit of the NATO Participation Act of 1994, as 
well as the bills described above that are now pending before 
the Congress.

First, the Administration has requested $60 million in 
military assistance for Central European countries and the 
New Independent States under the Partnership for Peace 
program. In addition, the Department of Defense budget 
request contains $40 million for Partnership for Peace 
activities more appropriately conducted under DoD 
authorities. Collectively, this $100 million will meet the 
commitment made by the President last summer in Warsaw to 
support the Partnership for Peace. These funds will 
facilitate partner participation in PFP activities, improve 
the compatibility and interoperability of these countries' 
militaries with NATO forces, build bilateral ties between 
U.S. and Central European militaries, provide us the 
opportunity to influence the evolution of these defense 
establishments, and finance a range of cooperative 
multilateral security activities.

In addition, $25 million is proposed for Central European 
defense infrastructure, peacekeeping, and related programs. 
These funds will continue the process of equipping and 
training the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion and will support 
the reorientation of Central European militaries to defensive 
postures, regional cooperation based on uniform standards of 
equipment, and expanded military cooperation with the U.S. 
and NATO.

Third, $25 million is requested to assist Central European 
states in the deployment of units to multilateral 
peacekeeping operations. While dedicated peacekeeping units 
are now being established in most nations of the region, many 
would be unable to finance their deployment to non-UN 
operations, for example. This fund is intended to alleviate 
that problem, thereby integrating the military forces of 
these nations into broader, cooperative security 
arrangements, improving their interoperability with NATO 
forces, and reducing the need for U.S. forces in peacekeeping 
situations.

Finally, the Administration has requested $7 million for the 
IMET program, which provides military education and training 
on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly 
nations. IMET is an extremely cost-effective component of 
U.S. foreign policy. It provides training in defense 
management concepts, civil-military relations, human rights 
and military justice for civilian and military defense 
officials, members of national parliaments charged with 
defense oversight, and NGO personnel from Central Europe. It 
provides U.S. access and influence in a sector of society 
which often plays a critical role in the transition to 
democracy.

Political and Economic Assistance

Our efforts at building a viable security architecture for 
Europe can only succeed if democracy and market economies 
take root throughout Central Europe. Democratic reform in 
this region is as important to U.S. interests now as when the 
SEED Act was passed in 1989. The success of these democratic 
and market reforms makes us all more secure; they are the 
best answer to the aggressive nationalism and ethnic hatreds 
uncorked by the end of the Cold War. But the process of 
political and economic transformation is jeopardized today by 
a host of challenges--organized crime, ethnic tensions, 
unemployment and other social dislocations, the return of 
historic grievances, and the fire that continues to rage in 
the Balkans.

Democratic institutions have been established, but they 
remain fragile. Credible and transparent elections have been 
held, but in some countries the governing coalitions are 
unstable. Participatory structures for local government are 
still rudimentary. There is an urgent need for social sector 
restructuring throughout the region to solidify popular 
support for continued reform and reduce heavy burdens on weak 
budgets.

In FY 1996, we are requesting $480 million through the SEED 
program, primarily to maintain our core assistance for 
democratic and economic reform in Central Europe. These funds 
will promote small business development to spur job creation. 
They will restructure the financial sectors of the Central 
European countries, and they will establish legal, 
regulatory, and institutional frameworks conducive to private 
investment. In addition, they will help build accountable, 
responsive public administration at the central and local 
levels and promote independent news media. They will also 
help combat organized crime. Finally, they will support 
social- sector reform in areas like health and housing. 
Beyond such core activities, our request includes significant 
funding for assistance to Bosnia and for helping South Balkan 
states cope with critical infrastructure needs.

The SEED program remains transitional in nature, its "sunset" 
in each country determined by the progress achieved. The 
program is reducing assistance in some countries of the 
northern tier, allowing a gradual shift in U.S. assistance to 
those in the southern tier, which have further to   go in 
their transitions. The shift of resources from north to south 
will be carefully monitored to assure that programs are not 
withdrawn from countries before democracy and market 
economies are firmly established. In short, because these 
funds help Central European nations consolidate their 
democracies and market economies, they are an essential 
underpinning to our efforts to enhance security for the 
entire region.

Taken together, the political, economic, and military 
initiatives I have outlined underscore our efforts to 
strengthen and extend NATO within an inclusive framework that 
expands democracy, prosperity, and a sense of security across 
the entire European continent. It will take some time before 
the forms and patterns of a new era settle into place. In the 
meantime, we must expect continuing change and upheaval in 
Europe: at times, promising; at times, frightening. There are 
great problems, but there are also great opportunities. To 
turn away from the challenges would only mean paying a higher 
price later.

The United States will be an active participant in Europe for 
a simple reason--our self-interest requires it. As we proceed 
along this course, I look forward to close cooperation with 
members of this committee and with Congress, in general. 

(###)



ARTICLE 8:

Africa Programs in the FY 1996 Budget: Protecting Long-Term 
U.S. Interests

George E. Moose, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs

Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of 
the Senate Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC, March 
28, 1995

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before this 
subcommittee as it undertakes the difficult task of assessing 
U.S. overseas programs and activities and recommending 
funding levels in what we all recognize is an extremely tight 
budget environment. My aim and that of my colleagues, Ms. 
Oakley, Mr. Hicks, and Ms. Borton, is to help the 
subcommittee in this process. We are firmly convinced that it 
is in the long-term interest of the United States to remain 
actively and fully engaged in Sub-Saharan Africa. We will 
show how the Africa-related items in the Administration's 
budget request for FY 1996 complement each other and together 
contribute to the advancement of U.S. interests.

Our principal message is that we must take a long-term view 
that maintains U.S. international leadership. Of course, we 
must be rigorous in our request at a time of budgetary 
constraint--and we are. But we must avoid decisions that, 
while offering appealing savings in the short term, will 
actually result in far greater costs in the future. Our 
budget request reflects the minimal resources needed to 
implement our key foreign policy priorities in Africa, which 
are to:

-- Promote democracy, respect for human rights, and good 
governance;

-- Help mitigate and resolve conflicts;

-- Encourage equitable economic growth, trade, and free 
markets; and

-- Gain greater African participation in finding solutions to 
such transnational problems as narcotics trafficking, 
terrorism, AIDS, and environmental degradation.

Africa's Ongoing Transformation

Disasters and emergencies tend to make the headlines, but 
that is not the whole story about Africa. There have indeed 
been serious crises, both natural and man-made. It is 
estimated that at least 24 million people in Sub-Saharan 
Africa are currently at risk and could require emergency 
humanitarian assistance. The fate of these people is a 
serious concern, and, as Ms. Oakley will testify, America is 
poised to help them. But these 24 million people represent 
less than 5% of the population of Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
plight of that 5% should not distract us from a telling and 
very encouraging trend. This is the story of the other 95%.

There is growing evidence that Africa is undergoing a major 
transformation, potentially comparable to what Latin America 
experienced over the past decade. The clearest indicators of 
this transformation are the growth and expansion of 
democratic governments and institutions, paralleled by 
significant economic reform and liberalization. Between 1989 
and 1995, Africa's political landscape changed dramatically. 
Botswana, Mauritius, Senegal, and Zimbabwe were joined by 17 
new democracies, and 18 other countries are at some stage of 
political transition. Many African nations have taken 
difficult and courageous steps to reduce budget deficits, 
maintain realistic exchange rates, and increase competition 
through deregulation, trade reform, and privatization of 
public enterprises. The aim of these reforms has been to 
create an enabling environment in which the private sector 
can act as the engine of growth.

U.S. Interests

The transformation of Sub-Saharan Africa has significant 
implications for U.S. interests. First, the emergence of more 
stable, more democratic governments has given us responsible 
partners with whom we can address the full range of regional 
and international issues: settling or preventing conflicts; 
combating crime, narcotics, terrorism, and weapons 
proliferation; protecting and managing the global 
environment; and expanding the global economy. Second, the 
progress realized to date has stimulated growing interest and 
opportunities for U.S. business.

Although the results thus far have been encouraging, we must 
recognize that Africa's transformation is ongoing, 
incomplete, and still tenuous in many places. Many of the new 
democracies and countries in transition face the continuing 
legacy of economic under-development, entrenched corruption, 
and ethnic rivalries. In addressing these challenges, they 
will continue to look to the United States for leadership and 
support. It would be extremely shortsighted not to persist in 
the effort to consolidate and protect the investment already 
made. The problems that would arise if the transformation 
falters--failed states, political instability, human tragedy-
-would threaten our interests and result in further calls on 
our resources.

Preventing Conflicts and Disasters Where Possible

Our strategy is preventive. A major conflict or crisis could 
easily halt or even reverse the progress that has been made 
to date. A relatively modest investment in conflict 
prevention, democracy, and sustainable development in Africa 
can help us prevent or avoid future disasters that would 
cause great human suffering and would end up being very 
costly to us.

It is not always possible to foresee or forestall every 
crisis. When we cannot, the costs--human, material, and 
financial--can be very high. Since   April 1994, we have 
spent nearly $400 million in humanitarian relief for Rwanda 
and Burundi--and that does not include the cost of deploying 
2,000 U.S. troops between late July and the end of September 
1994. U.S. efforts in the Somali crisis also have been very 
costly. In  FY 1992-94, the total costs of all aspects of the 
U.S. operation in Somalia totaled about $1.7 billion.

Elsewhere in Africa, our preventive approach has started to 
pay off. In Mozambique, our peacekeeping and   
democratization efforts and diplomatic engagement have 
brought new hope   after years of strife. Sometimes our 
successes have gone largely unnoticed. In 1992, for example, 
there was a serious drought in Southern Africa. Thousands 
were at risk as crops withered and water holes dried up. But 
thanks   to swift and massive intervention by the United 
States and the international community, widespread famine was 
averted.

Benefits for U.S. Business

Yet, our strategy of engagement in Africa is not just about 
avoiding disasters. There are substantial positive gains to 
be realized through mutually beneficial trade and investment 
relationships. Nowhere are the benefits of active U.S. 
involvement and investment more evident than in Southern 
Africa. Our efforts at conflict resolution and democratic 
institution-building have already paid significant dividends. 
With the establishment of a non-racial democracy in South 
Africa, U.S. business can contribute to the country's 
economic development and help narrow the economic disparities 
that are the legacy of apartheid. South Africa already 
accounts for $2 billion in U.S. exports and is the 
cornerstone of a much larger regional market encompassing 11 
nations and their 130 million people.

In West Africa, Ghana provides another example of how U.S. 
involvement and support have yielded impressive results. Our 
leadership in promoting democratic institutions and economic 
reforms have helped Ghana become one of our most promising 
African export markets. In East Africa--Uganda, a country 
whose name was once synonymous with tyranny and strife--has 
made tremendous strides and is now experiencing a boom in 
trade and investment.

An Investment in our Future

With over one-half billion consumers, Africa already offers 
significant business opportunities. In 1994, U.S. firms 
exported nearly $4.4 billion in goods to Sub-Saharan Africa. 
This is 22% greater than our exports to the independent 
states of the former Soviet Union. African demand for foreign 
goods has risen dramatically--about 7% annually on average--
over the past decade. If this demand continues to grow and if 
we can increase our market share--currently 7.7%--there 
should be significant opportunities for U.S. exports.

These exports represent tangible benefits to American 
families. By some estimates, every extra $1 billion in 
exports adds 19,000 new jobs in the United States. Given the 
potential gains to us, our current bilateral development aid 
to Africa--about one-half of one-tenth of 1% of the federal 
budget--and our contributions to multilateral programs 
represent a minuscule investment with the possibility of a 
tremendous future payoff.

As the world's remaining superpower, the United States has 
the responsibility to lead, both in the interests of the 
American people and of the international community. Between 
1990 and 1993, during this crucial period of African 
transition, net development assistance flows to Africa 
declined 9% in real terms. This erosion must be halted. Other 
donors follow the U.S. lead; if we cut back, others will too. 
That would have a chilling effect on progress made over the 
past several years.

Optimizing Use of Scarce Resources

The Administration's FY 1996 budget request for U.S. 
activities in Africa is therefore best viewed as an 
investment in political stability, market reform, and 
democratic development--not charity.

-- Our budget request is designed to make optimal use of 
scarce resources; our bilateral programs are closely 
coordinated with other donors for maximum effect, and our 
multilateral contributions are leveraged with other partners 
to achieve the greatest developmental impact.

-- On a continent where some of our business competitors have 
longstanding colonial ties, an active U.S. presence gives us 
credibility and clout and the ability to ensure a level 
playing field for U.S. business seeking to enter or expand in 
African markets.

-- There are also considerable direct benefits for U.S. 
business in terms of procurement opportunities from bilateral 
and multilateral programs. USAID programs in Africa entail 
substantial purchases of U.S. goods and services. Development 
projects in Africa funded by the World Bank group brought 
contracts worth $234 million to U.S. suppliers in FY 1994. 
Projects of the African Development Bank brought an estimated 
$60 million to U.S. business in 1993.

Budget Request Overview

I would like to give an overview of U.S. Government programs 
that promote peace, democracy, and sustainable development in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, with emphasis on the accounts for which 
this committee has responsibility. Mr. Hicks will 
subsequently address USAID's programs in greater detail, and 
Ms. Oakley will address emergency humanitarian and refugee 
concerns.

There are three major elements to our support for African 
development and reform: 

1. Bilateral programs; 

2. Multilateral programs; and 

3. Debt reduction. 

Each element contributes to African development and U.S. 
interests in a different way. All elements are important and 
mutually reinforcing.

-- We favor bilateral programs in areas where we have the 
expertise and comparative advantage, and where a direct U.S. 
Government involvement on the ground is most efficient and 
serves our interests.

-- However, the effectiveness of our bilateral programs in 
Africa depends to a large extent on the macroeconomic 
conditions and infrastructural environment in the host 
country. In our experience, only the multilateral 
institutions have the resources and expertise to address 
these issues.

-- In the same vein, bilateral and multilateral efforts to 
support development are hampered if a country is saddled with 
an unsustainable debt burden. Therefore, debt relief also 
needs to be part of the equation.

Bilateral Programs--FY 1996 Requests

-- Development Fund for Africa: $802 million. The 
Administration's abiding commitment to democracy and 
development in Africa is carried out under the auspices of 
the Development Fund for Africa--DFA. Long-term DFA 
assistance to Africa will help improve child survival rates, 
combat HIV/AIDS, upgrade education, increase democratic 
participation, and improve economic management. Assistant 
Administrator Hicks will say more on this.

-- Economic Support Funds: $24.4 million. Fast-disbursing 
Economic Support Funds--ESF--provide the responsiveness and 
flexibility necessary to support democratic and market-based 
transitions in the crucial early stages. The Administration 
has requested $14.35 million for the Africa Regional 
Democracy Fund, designed to strengthen new democratic 
institutions and civil society, provide electoral assistance, 
and support economic reform in countries without USAID 
missions.

An additional $10 million in ESF has been specifically 
targeted to promote democratic development and economic 
stability in Angola. Significant resources are needed to 
support demining, quartering of UNITA troops, demobilization, 
and reintegration of ex-combatants. We also will have to 
begin addressing long-term democratization, human rights, and 
sustainable development requirements.

-- Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Military Training:   
$29.6 million. To promote peace, security, and military 
reform, the Admin- istration is proposing $5 million to 
assist Organization of African Unity conflict-resolution 
activities, $18 million for bilateral grants to enhance the 
capabilities of selected African states to effectively 
participate in peacekeeping operations, and $6.6 million for 
bilateral military training--IMET--that will emphasize 
professional standards of conduct, with a focus on the role 
of the military in democratic societies. These efforts are an 
investment in peace and regional stability, with a goal of 
assisting the development of better disciplined, more 
responsible, and responsive militaries. These programs 
respond to bipartisan congressional concerns expressed in the 
Africa Conflict Resolution Act.

-- Peace Corps: $234 million worldwide. The Peace Corps has 
long been considered one of the U.S. Government's more 
effective, grass-roots development programs. The 
Administration proposes allocating   $63 million specifically 
for Peace Corps programs in Sub-Saharan Africa.

-- African Development Foundation: $17.4 million. Continued 
support for the African Development Foundation--ADF--is an 
integral part of our assistance strategy in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. With a relatively small outlay, ADF has a large 
impact on our efforts to help Africans help themselves. ADF 
funds are provided directly to community-based organizations 
for projects developed and implemented by Africans, 
empowering individuals, families, and communities at the 
grass-roots level.

-- Migration and Refugee Assistance: $169.1 million. 
Notwithstand- ing the progress that has been made, Sub-
Saharan Africa continues to require humanitarian assistance. 
Ms. Oakley will describe these programs in detail.

-- International Disaster Assistance. The very nature of 
disaster assistance requires budget flexibility, but current 
levels give an indication of the order of magnitude of 
probable FY 1996 requirements. USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign 
Disaster Assistance  expects expenditures in excess of $150 
million in Africa this fiscal year and will likely invoke its 
authority to "borrow" additional USAID funds. In addition, 
$457 million is anticipated for Food for Peace programs.

-- Facilitating Trade and Investment. The worldwide programs 
of the Trade and Development Agency, the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation, and the Export-Import Bank of the 
United States also have provided important support to U.S. 
businesses seeking support for trade and investment links 
with Africa.

Multilateral Programs--FY 1996 Requests

We need to continue our strong support for the multilateral 
institutions that play the largest and most critical role in 
Africa's development. Our contributions to multilateral 
organizations are highly leveraged, since many other 
governments contribute as well. For example, for every dollar 
the U.S. contributes to the World Bank's soft-loan window, 
the bank will be able to lend $6.

The emphasis the multilateral development banks--MDBs--place 
on strong economic management and market-oriented reform 
directly supports trade, investment, and sustainable growth 
in developing countries. Indirectly, this contributes to 
political liberalization as well.

We are the only major donor with arrears on its 
internationally negotiated commitments to MDBs. The magnitude 
of these arrears jeopardizes the MDBs' ability to assist 
developing country borrowers in maintaining the momentum of 
reform and undermines U.S. influence. While the President's 
FY 1996 budget includes money to reduce these arrears, we 
have not yet eliminated the problem.

The following multilateral organizations and programs are of 
particular importance to Sub-Saharan Africa:

-- International Development Association--IDA: $1.4 billion   
worldwide. IDA, a World Bank affiliate, is the single largest 
source of concessional--below market rate--financing for 
Africa. Between 40% and 50% of IDA resources go to Sub-
Saharan Africa, where they promote macroeconomic policy 
reforms and support infrastructure development and poverty 
alleviation. The FY 1996 budget request for IDA includes a 
partial payment of U.S. arrears; we need to honor commitments 
made by the U.S. Government in full consultation with 
Congress. The proposed $70 million rescission in FY 1995 IDA 
funding would further increase U.S. arrearages.

-- Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility--ESAF: $25 million 
worldwide. The ESAF, a trust fund that is managed by the 
International Monetary Fund, provides financing at 
concessional interest rates to low-income countries, mostly 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, that undertake economic and structural 
reforms. In FY 1995, the   Administration obtained $25 
million of the $100 million it pledged toward the interest 
subsidy account of the ESAF and is requesting an additional 
$25 million in FY 1996.

-- African Development Bank--AfDB: $127 million. We believe 
it is important that there be an effective  regional 
development bank to complement the programs of the World Bank 
Group. The U.S. Government is working closely with the AfDB 
to make the institution a more effective instrument for 
African development by improving loan quality, management, 
and responsiveness to environmental concerns. The 
Administration's FY 1996 request would go to the African 
Development Fund--AfDF--the Bank's concessional window for 
the poorest countries. The proposed rescission of $62 million 
from the FY 1995 appropriation for the AfDF would undermine 
U.S. leverage in ongoing AfDF replenishment negotiations.

Debt Reduction

Debt reduction, implemented through the "Paris Club" of 
creditor governments, is designed to benefit some of the 
poorest reforming countries--many of them in Africa. 
Countries that would benefit from U.S. debt reduction must 
also meet criteria in U.S. legislation regarding human 
rights, terrorism, military spending, narcotics interdiction, 
and expropriations. The $27 million requested for debt 
reduction in FY 1996 for the poorest countries worldwide 
makes possible the forgiveness of a far greater amount--in 
face value--of outstanding debt because the expected 
repayment is judged to be worth only a few cents on the 
dollar in present value terms.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me reiterate that it is 
consistent with our self-interest and our leadership 
responsibility to reinforce our commitment to democracy, 
peace, and sustainable development in Africa. The African 
continent is important to us now and will be even more so in 
the future. We must remain engaged and support the political 
and economic transformation currently underway. For a small 
investment in bilateral aid and contributions to multilateral 
organizations, we will be able to avoid costly future 
disasters and reap significant returns.

(###)



ARTICLE 9:

U.S. Policy Toward Sudan 

Edward Brynn, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs

Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House 
International Relations Committee, Washington, DC, March 22, 
1995

Madam Chair and members of the committee: I welcome the 
opportunity to participate in this subcommittee hearing on 
Sudan. Our policy toward the largest country in Africa is one 
of the most difficult accounts in the Africa Bureau's 
portfolio. Sudan is a tragedy--a country beset by problems 
which pre-date the current National Islamic Front-led regime 
and which past governments have either failed to address or, 
particularly in the case of the current National Islamic 
Front--NIF--regime, exacerbated.

Background

Sudan is a country which is rich in human and natural 
resources with great potential for national development and 
economic contribution to the region. Independent since 1956, 
Sudan has had a difficult political history in which its 
leaders have either failed to provide for the political 
enfranchisement of the people or, in the case of 
democratically elected governments, simply mismanaged the 
country. In 1989, a military junta aligned with the National 
Islamic Front overthrew the last democratically elected 
government. The NIF strongly advocates Islamist programs and 
Shari'a--Islamic law--not only in Sudan but throughout the 
region. Like many of its predecessors, the NIF-led government 
allows little or no meaningful popular political 
participation and represses the political opposition.

Sudan is a nation of numerous ethnic groups, but there has 
historically been a distinct division in the country; between 
the predominately Arab/Muslim north and the predominately 
African/animist/Christian south. North-south conflict 
predates independence. However, since independence in 1956--
except for the 10 years between 1972 and 1983--there has been 
a bloody civil war in Sudan, with southerners seeking 
increased autonomy and freedom from the imposition of Islamic 
law. Government and rebel forces alike have treated the 
Sudanese people brutally. Over 1 million people have died in 
the civil war, which has created  one of the world's largest 
humanitarian crises in southern Sudan. Almost 4.25 million 
Sudanese need humanitarian assistance, of which several 
hundred thousand would die without it. Over 500,000 Sudanese 
have fled the country and are refugees dependent on the 
international community and Sudan's neighbors for survival.

A Regime Isolated

The NIF-dominated regime is facing increasing economic, 
military, and political difficulties. Despite a record 
harvest this past season in much of the country, Sudan's 
economy remains in poor shape.

Militarily, the regime's long-awaited dry-season offensive 
was delayed late last year when John Garang's Sudanese 
People's Liberation Army--SPLA--attacked first and besieged 
the city of Kapoeta in the southern-most part of Sudan. 
Regime forces have relieved Kapoeta and regained some 
initiative, but they have suffered heavily against a 
resupplied SPLA and may have to scale back their offensive.

Politically, the Khartoum regime is increasingly isolated. 
Eritrean President Isaias broke diplomatic relations with 
Sudan on December 5 over Khartoum's support for extremist 
rebels and is now openly collaborating with the Sudanese 
northern opposition and the SPLA against the regime. 
Relations similarly have deteriorated between Khartoum and 
Ugandan President Museveni over Sudanese support for 
insurgents in northern Uganda in retaliation for alleged 
Ugandan support for the SPLA. Egypt also has charged Khartoum 
with supporting Egyptian extremists and is involved in a 
long-running dispute with Sudan over the Hala'ib border area. 
In short, Khartoum's relations with most of its regional 
neighbors are not good, primarily because of its support for 
regional extremists and its intransigence in regional peace 
talks under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority 
on Drought and Development--IGADD.

Sudan's human rights record is abysmal. Our recently released 
country report on human rights in Sudan documents the serious 
abuses committed by security forces, including massacres, 
extrajudicial executions, kidnapings, and torture of 
political opponents.

Sudan's support for terrorists, its abysmal human rights 
record, and the war-related humanitarian crisis have left it 
few friends in the world. Sudan purchases most of its oil on 
the spot market and must pay cash for the weapons and 
military equipment it receives. Its relationship with China 
is primarily based on trade, as well as on mutual support on 
issues such as international pressure on their respective 
human rights records. There has been much talk of developing 
relations with Iraq, but so far there have been few benefits 
for either party. Even with Iran, differences between Sudan's 
predominately Sunni and Iran's predominately Shi'a Islam, as 
well as Sudan's inability to pay for purchases of goods and 
services, cloud the partnership.

The IGADD peace initiative stalemated in September when 
Khartoum refused to discuss the two issues of religion and 
the state and self- determination, which the regime equates 
respectively with secularism and an independent south. In 
January, the IGADD partners--Kenya, Uganda, Eritrea, and 
Ethiopia--declared that the initiative would continue, but no 
new talks are scheduled.

The IGADD partners also are seeking UN and international 
support for their initiative. At the request of the partners, 
UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali also agreed to 
send an observer to future peace talks. Khartoum is loathe to 
allow UN or international involvement in what it considers to 
be an internal matter and was infuriated by the Secretary 
General's decision. On February 8, the Netherlands, the 
United States, Norway, Canada, and Italy formed the "Friends 
of IGADD" group under Dutch leadership to generate 
international support. The Friends group is planning to meet 
again on April 5 in The Hague.

The Regime Is Intact and Resilient

Notwithstanding the bleak picture which I just described, the 
Government of Sudan has shown no inclination toward positive 
change. Indeed, the regime's reaction to outside pressure has 
been to reinforce NIF domination of the government. A recent 
shake-up resulted in the replacement of the foreign minister-
-the last relative moderate in the government--with a NIF 
hardliner. Elections planned for later this year and ongoing 
efforts to institute federalism in Sudan are unlikely to 
compromise the NIF's domination.

The NIF-led government is unpopular with most of the Sudanese 
people. On several occasions during the past two years, 
economic frustrations boiled over into civil disturbances 
which, though quickly suppressed, were troubling to the 
regime. It is unlikely, however, that popular discontent with 
the NIF will result in political change in the forseeable 
future. There is currently no credible political alternative 
to the ruling National Islamic Front.

Sudan's political opposition groups are weak, divided amongst 
themselves, and suppressed by government security services. 
Opposition leaders frequently exaggerate their ability to 
effect political change in Sudan. Perhaps most importantly, 
the political opposition is generally discredited in the eyes 
of many Sudanese, having been associated with past 
governments which, like the NIF, mismanaged the economy, 
prosecuted the civil war, allowed the humanitarian crisis to 
develop, and showed little respect for human rights.

The southern rebels also have little to offer the Sudanese 
people. John Garang's Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army and 
Riak Machar's South Sudan Independence Movement--SSIM--are 
fractioned and factioned, both internally and against each 
other. The SPLA and SSIM have poor human rights records. A 
number of Riak's commanders have allied themselves with 
Khartoum. Longstanding inter-tribal conflict makes other 
commanders quick to switch sides and turn their weapons on 
each other. Forced conscription of boys by rebel militias has 
also been a problem. Finally, both the SPLA and the SSIM 
regularly loot, harass, and obstruct international relief 
efforts for needy southern Sudanese.

U.S. Interests and U.S.-Sudanese Bilateral Relations

U.S. interests vis-a-vis Sudan include deterring Sudanese 
support for terrorism and regional extremism, supporting an 
end to the civil war, encouraging the restoration of 
political/human rights, and ending the humanitarian crisis.

U.S.-Sudanese bilateral relations are poor. What was once a 
close and cooperative relationship deteriorated markedly 
after the 1989 overthrow of the democratically elected 
government and plummeted after Sudan was placed on the 
terrorism list in August 1993. Although Khartoum had for some 
time  been considered a dangerous place for American 
diplomats, the increasingly hostile bilateral relationship 
and threatening security environment following the terrorism-
list decision caused us to reduce significantly our 
diplomatic presence in Khartoum. Embassy Khartoum's staffing 
remains limited, and travel to Khartoum by U.S. Government 
visitors is subject to both embassy and Department review and 
approval. Although the threat of terrorism is much less in 
the south, the ongoing civil war requires that we also 
monitor and approve official USG visits in the south--mostly 
U.S. Agency for International Development emergency program 
monitoring teams.

In 1992 in Juba, two Sudanese employees of USAID were 
executed by the regime, allegedly for assisting the SPLA. Two 
more Sudanese USAID employees were also taken and are 
believed to have been killed. We have told Khartoum that 
there must be an accounting for these atrocities before our 
relations improve.

The Khartoum regime has worked hard to portray U.S. policy 
toward Sudan as reflecting an anti-Sudanese and anti-Islamic 
bias. Such allegations are, of course, without foundation. 
Our problems with the regime are due to its failure to 
provide for democratic political institutions, to respect the 
human rights of its own people, and to end the civil war and 
humanitarian crisis in the south. In addition, the present 
NIF-led government is a sponsor and supporter of major 
international terrorist groups, which threaten not only 
Americans but the rest of the world. Finally, while it has 
had very limited success, the regime in Khartoum seeks to 
export its own brand of Islamic fundamentalism in the region, 
in part by supporting extremist groups such as the Eritrean 
Islamic Jihad.

Although the U.S. has provided no developmental assistance to 
Sudan since 1989, we continue to offer generous emergency 
assistance for the international relief effort for war-
affected Sudanese. Since 1983, we have given over $1.6 
billion in assistance for Sudan. In this fiscal year alone, 
we have provided thus far over $28 million in aid, largely in 
support for the UN-led relief effort for the south--Operation 
Lifeline Sudan. In addition, the U.S. contributes to the UN 
Human Rights Commission and other non-governmental 
organizations' relief efforts for Sudanese refugees in 
neighboring countries and non-Sudanese refugees in Sudan 
itself.

Little Progress

In our bilateral relations and in international fora, the 
U.S. has tried to persuade Khartoum to address our concerns.

Shortly after the terrorism-list decision, we delivered a 
stern warning to the regime about the consequences of any 
Sudanese support for terrorist actions against U.S. 
interests. In September 1994, in response to repeated 
Sudanese requests for evidence of Sudan's support for 
terrorism, we gave Khartoum solid, incontrovertible 
information about the location of a military facility north 
of Khartoum at which training--including small arms 
familiarization--had been provided to non-Sudanese 
extremists.

On human rights, we have led the international community at 
UNGA and in the UNHCR mission in condemning human rights 
violations by both the Sudanese Government and the southern 
rebels. Our embassy in Khartoum has worked hard to monitor 
human rights abuses and to bring to public attention the 
regime's blatant disregard for the human rights of the 
Sudanese people.

While the U.S. record on humanitarian assistance to the 
victims of the civil war is a long and generous one, we have 
repeatedly criticized all of the parties to the conflict for 
their interference with relief efforts.

Recognizing that ending Sudan's humanitarian crisis can be 
achieved only by ending the civil war, the U.S. has long been 
interested in a peaceful settlement to the conflict. In May 
1994, Ambassador Melissa Wells was appointed the President's 
Special Representative on Sudan with a mandate to assist 
regional peace efforts and to ensure the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance to the needy. Ambassador Wells has 
traveled to the region and has consulted extensively with the 
IGADD partners, the parties to the conflict, and the 
international community on ways to progress toward a peaceful 
settlement.

Unfortunately, I must tell you that both the Khartoum regime 
and the southern rebels have been unresponsive to our 
concerns. Khartoum rejected our information on the terrorist 
training facility out-of-hand and continues to harbor 
elements of Hezbollah, Hamas, the Abu Nidal Organization, 
Palestine Islamic Jihad, and other groups. Both Khartoum and 
the rebels continue to brutalize the Sudanese people and to 
attack civilian populations and obstruct or loot relief 
convoys. Finally, while the southern rebels have been 
somewhat more forthcoming in the IGADD talks, and there was 
limited agreement on some ways to facilitate humanitarian 
relief, Khartoum stalemated the talks in September by 
refusing to cooperate in substantive discussions.

In short, while we have been successful in keeping attention 
focused on Sudan, we have been unable to effect change in 
those regime policies and practices of most concern to us. We 
will maintain bilateral and international pressure on 
Khartoum. We have not  and will not stop looking for ways in 
which to bring about changes in Khartoum's behavior.

The Sudanese Government must understand that those same 
policies and practices which we find threatening and 
objectionable will eventually cause its downfall. If the 
regime continues on its present course and when a credible 
political alternative to the NIF emerges, we believe the 
Sudanese people will take the steps necessary to restore 
their legitimate political and human rights, end their 
suffering, and end Sudan's status as a pariah state in the 
world.  

(###)



ARTICLE 10:

Update on Developments in Rwanda and Burundi

Townsend Friedman, Special Coordinator for Rwanda

Statement before a joint hearing of the Subcommittee on 
African Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and 
the Subcommittee on Africa of the House International 
Relations Committee, Washington, DC, April 5, 1995

Honorable Chairwomen: One year ago, genocide started in 
Rwanda. In a few weeks, perhaps a half million people or more 
were murdered solely because of their ethnic identity.

I want to thank the Senate Foreign Relations Africa 
Subcommittee and the House International Relations Africa 
Subcommittee for convoking this joint hearing, which will 
allow an opportunity to take stock of where we are on Rwanda 
one year later, where the Administration wants to go from 
here, and how we foresee getting there. Thank you for asking 
me to testify at this hearing.

Because recent news from Burundi is so disturbing, I 
understand that this session also addresses events there. The 
second half of this statement is about Burundi. Arlene 
Render, the Director of the Department's Office of Central 
African Affairs, who has just returned from Burundi, and Nan 
Borton, Director of USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster 
Assistance, are here with me to answer questions.

Rwanda

As you know, on April 6 last year, the President of Rwanda 
and the President of Burundi died when their plane crashed as 
it approached the airport in Kigali. There followed violence 
and death unmatched in the history of this region.

What took place from April 7 was a systematic massacre of the 
political opposition and Tutsi people of Rwanda. The genocide 
killed many, but it was incomplete. Indeed, the targets of 
that attempt emerged in the leadership of the coalition that 
now governs Rwanda, having routed those who authored the 
genocide.

The genocide itself was conceived and led by a group that 
pretends to speak for the Hutu people of Rwanda. Their 
actions also targeted Hutu opposition leaders who did not 
agree with their analysis or plans. The instruments of the 
genocide were Hutu extremist militias, elements of the former 
army, and often ordinary citizens.

What could have kindled the violence and murder? There is no 
simple, fully satisfactory answer. But the elements of an 
explanation would include:

Ethnic hostility. It is not necessary and it may not be 
possible to fix the time when the Hutu--who represent about 
85% of the population, and Tutsi--who represent about 15%, 
started down the path of mutual fear and hatred. These two 
groups of people have been joined in a history that has 
extended and deepened mutual mistrust and hatred since 
independence   30 years ago. But ethnic hostility is only 
part of the picture. As Secretary Christopher has said, 

Conflicts with an ethnic dimension . . . do not arise from 
national-ism alone. Blame for their violent excesses can and 
should be assigned to individuals, not entire nations.

Malevolent leadership. In Rwanda, those who were interested 
only in power and its privileges used and fueled ethnic 
distrust to maintain power at all costs. These extremists--
who held influence in the Habyarimana regime--took full 
control after the plane crash and effectuated a plan of 
extermination that, judging by its efficacy, had been in 
preparation long before the April plane crash.

Population and development. Rwanda was the most over-crowded 
country in Africa. Population overwhelmed economic growth 
which had been positive in the 1970s and 1980s. Ninety 
percent of the population farmed increasingly crowded land 
with little opportunity elsewhere, particularly for the 
young. Large numbers of idle young were easy recruits for 
those who had massive murder on their mind.

Fear. Fear is a reciprocal of hatred in Rwanda. The attitude 
of "them or us," that either you are victimizer or victim, 
prevailed. In many instances, we have reports of neighbor 
murdering neighbor. Sometimes these acts were coerced; 
sometimes not. As one author wrote, there is not a Hutu or a 
Tutsi who does not either bear the resentment of a relative 
killed by the other   15 years ago, or who does not fear the 
fate of his children at the hands of the other within the 
next 10 years.

The fire that these factors fueled consumed Rwandan society. 
By July 1994, Rwanda ceased to exist as a functioning 
country.

-- At least 500,000 had been killed.

-- Some 2 million Rwandans fled their country; another 
million were displaced inside Rwanda. Zaire was host to over 
1 million refugees; Tanzania to perhaps 500,000-600,000; and 
Burundi to over 200,000.

-- The economy stopped as industry and farming ended.

-- Most of the educated--doctors, lawyers, professionals--had 
been killed or fled.

-- The court system had only four out of 600 judges left.

-- The government was without personnel, buildings, and 
equipment.

-- Education halted in a country now bereft of teachers and 
school buildings.

-- Health care collapsed with the destruction of hospitals, 
the death and departure of health care workers, and the 
absence of medical supplies.

The Response

The involvement of the United States with Rwanda did not 
begin last April. Prior to that explosion, we had been among 
several nations supporting the Arusha peace process, which 
aimed at halting the war between a Tutsi-led insurgent group, 
the Rwandan Patriotic Front, and the Hutu Government in 
Kigali. Our mission in Kigali kept up an intensive effort to 
keep the dialogue between and within political parties alive, 
while pressing the government to end human rights abuses and 
improve security.

Humanitarian concern and our regard for regional stability 
drew us to these efforts. Our political interest and our 
economic involvement in Rwanda were, and are, small. However, 
the carnage that began in April deepened our involvement. The 
massive suffering and the effects on Rwanda's neighbors of 
the great movements of people across their borders required 
action. We also have a strong interest in seeing that the 
perpetrators of genocide are punished.

Our effort to help alleviate the immediate suffering of 
Rwandans was a success. We and the international community 
were confronted with massive human suffering from disease and 
hunger in Rwanda and in the refugee camps.

The American response on the ground was most evident in 
Operation Support Hope. Over 2,000 members of our military 
and our humanitarian assistance response played a 
distinguished role in providing the strategic lift and 
airport management to an international effort to transform 
the refugee camps from chaos, suffering, disease, and death 
to the ordered sites that exist today. American humanitarian 
organizations, many of whom I understand will testify today, 
played a major role in this success.

We were instrumental in developing the United Nations Mission 
in Rwanda by soliciting troop contributions and providing 
airlift and equipment to participating African troops.

The survival of the refugees was a triumph of international 
cooperation and the political order that underlies that 
cooperation. In another era, these refugees would have died. 
This time they were saved because the international 
community--official and unofficial--came to their rescue. It 
must be noted that this rescue operation was undertaken 
despite the knowledge that those who were being saved 
included some who were involved in the genocide. We do not 
accept the concept of collective guilt, and the imperative of 
saving the innocent gave us no other choice, or no other 
choice that was both realistic and consistent with our 
values.

Having succeeded in rescuing this massive population, the 
international community needed to find a solution to their 
plight. Similarly, confronted by the crime of genocide, we 
needed to find ways to bring about justice.

The approach to these matters involves:

-- Repatriation for the refugees--the number of refugees 
stands at about 2 million. One large group of more    than 
600,000 has returned. These are refugees of Tutsi origin who 
either fled Rwanda more than 30 years ago or the children of 
that wave of ethnic violence. Another 200,000 of those who 
fled last year have returned, according to the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees--UNHCR;

-- Return for the internally displaced--the number of 
internally displaced was halved to about 230,000 by January. 
Some have since returned to the camps;

-- Punishment for the genocide through reconstitution of 
justice in Rwanda and the establishment of an International 
War Crimes Tribunal--if those who are guilty of these crimes 
are punished in a lawful manner, the crimes are much less 
likely to be repeated. There can be no impunity;

-- Rehabilitation for the economy, society, and government; 
and

-- Reconciliation--the process of rebuilding Rwanda includes 
bringing together all Rwandans of good will.   The process 
should exclude those who conceived, led, organized, or 
knowingly stood to benefit from this crime. Reconciliation 
requires genuine remorse among the perpetrators, of course.

What needs to be done involves not only ourselves and the 
Rwandans, but also other bilateral donors and the United 
Nations. In order to enhance donor cooperation and with it 
effectiveness, the United States stimulated the organization 
of the Rwanda Operational Support Group. This informal body 
of major donors, UN entities, and others (World Bank, ICRC, 
etc.) has met monthly and has been quite successful in 
molding donor cooperation and consensus.

The United Nations has also played a major role in Rwanda. 
The United Nations peacekeeping force there has been a 
stabilizing and useful force. Without the coordinating role 
of such organizations as the World Food Program and the 
leadership of the UNHCR in caring for refugees and the 
diligence and creativity of NGO staffs on the ground, we and 
other donors would be at sea. We are grateful for these 
activities even as we seek to encourage greater efficiency 
and effectiveness.

We are only at the beginning. Indeed, while there was some 
moderate increase in refugee repatriation earlier this year, 
this movement has now slowed to a trickle and in the past 
month there have been some returns to the camps.

We would like to see the numbers of refugees and displaced 
dramatically reduced. For this to come about, the refugees 
have to believe that they will be secure to exercise freely 
and without intimidation the option of leaving camps for 
home. There is no question that potential returnees have been 
intimidated by those in the camps who oppose such a move.

In order to enhance the opportunity for refugees to freely 
choose, we have supported the UNHCR establishment of a 1,500-
man security force in the camps in Zaire. Begun in February 
of this year, this program is still developing. There were 
some early signs that it was having some positive effect 
within the camps.

Unfortunately, events within Rwanda that discourage the 
return of refugees and displaced have intervened. Of 
particular concern has been the continued arrest of up to 
1,500 Hutus a week in Rwanda and their detention in 
conditions that induce a high rate of mortality. The 
government in Kigali states that these arrests respond to 
real security concerns or reports of involvement in genocidal 
crimes. It also points out that it has no judicial system to 
review these arrests, asking that the international community 
accelerate and increase its aid in these areas. We have 
expressed our concern about these detentions and offered some 
suggestions on how they might be relieved. We are also 
seeking to help re-establish the judicial system. Yet, the 
most pressing immediate need is to end the overcrowding that 
produces the high incidence of death. Once again, 
international assistance is required.

Reconciliation has yet to begin. We have made it clear to the 
government that the kind of reconciliation we seek would 
exclude discussion with those who organized, incited, or 
knowingly stood to benefit from the genocide. Reconciliation 
has been made more difficult by elements of the former regime 
who have begun military destabilization efforts against 
Rwanda, including terrorist attacks. We see no prospect that 
they can bring down the government.

For there to be reconciliation there must also be 
accountability for those who perpetrated genocide. Impunity 
for these crimes cannot be allowed, but the Rwandan justice 
system must be reconstituted of the courts and the Ministry 
of Justice. Along with other donors, we have made this 
objective a central priority. Our first delivery of equipment 
and vehicles to the Ministry of Justice took place earlier 
this month. A U.S. team is now in Rwanda assessing how we 
might help in reconstituting the system of justice.

The crime of genocide is so terrible and the need for justice 
so imperative, that we led the effort in the United Nations 
to create an International War Crimes Tribunal. International 
law has been violated. This forum, like the one established 
for the former Yugoslav Republic, is just getting underway. 
We are committed to making it a success both because it is 
right for Rwanda-- critical to reconciliation between the 
Hutu and the Tutsi--and it is right for the United States. 
Only the international community can determine if this court 
will succeed or fail. We will do all we can to make it 
succeed.

Many states, including the United States, will need 
implementing legislation to authorize them to turn over 
defendants. We hope that draft legislation will reach the 
Congress soon and we will be grateful for your quick action 
on that legislation.

In the meantime, Rwanda, its economy, and its society must be 
restored. Earlier this year, the international community 
pledged some $588 million to help in this effort. The first 
fruits of these pledges are beginning to arrive in Kigali. 
Our own pledge amounted to about $60 million, including 
development assistance at about $12.5 million and $47.5 
million of humanitarian relief, including $17.5 million of 
food aid.

Hope Glimmers

We have a very ambitious agenda before us: return, 
reconciliation, justice, rehabilitation. Each of these 
elements is dependent on the others. Any one of them would be 
dauntingly difficult to accomplish alone. Bringing them all 
more or less together is excruciatingly hard. Yet, we know of 
no other approach that has a chance of succeeding. Other 
courses of action, however attractive they might seem at 
first glance, seem only to offer the promise of increased 
suffering for the innocent and frequently are not realistic 
alternatives or offer no gain toward our objectives.

One course that we have ruled out is to abandon the struggle-
-an option that would be inconsistent with both our values 
and our humanitarian interest. We will persist in testing 
always if our hopes are based in reality. We do not blink at 
the obstacles, but we do not believe that reconciliation must 
remain a chimera. Men and women everywhere can respond to 
their "better angels."

We are encouraged by the existence of a government in Kigali 
which is publicly committed to this objective. The multi-
party, multi-ethnic government has stated its clear 
commitment to the principles of the Arusha Accord, principles 
that were rooted in cooperation and power-sharing across 
ethnic lines. Over 2,000 troops from the former regime have 
returned to Rwanda to join the new army; punishment is 
promised for those who are accused of crimes and brutality 
against refugees and returnees. Rwandans in the past have 
reached across the ethnic divide at the risk of their lives 
to offer shelter from machete-wielding extremists. This 
spirit, adopted by private citizens, encouraged by the 
government, and supported by the international community can 
prevail.

Our Rwandan effort is premised on the continued emergence of 
the conditions that we are seeking to support. We will be 
patient but we also resist illusions. We know that in the end 
we must be able to say that we did all that we could. But we 
also know that the prospects for peace, reconciliation, and 
recovery will be determined by Rwandans.

Burundi

Some are now asking: Will Burundi be another Rwanda? Burundi 
is tense. We have evacuated our dependents and recommended 
that unofficial Americans leave. Predictions are very risky, 
but our current assessment is that an explosion into anarchy 
may not be imminent. We are in daily contact with our allies, 
comparing notes and discussing possible courses of action. 
The international community is doing everything it can to 
help Burundians avoid another Central African tragedy.

History and Current Dynamics

Burundi has long been troubled by deep divisions between the 
majority Hutus and minority Tutsis, who governed Burundi 
until 1993. Indeed, until the events in Rwanda last year, 
Burundi's history was far bloodier than that of its neighbor 
to the north. Ethnic violence over the past three decades has 
caused hundreds of thousands of deaths and large refugee 
outflows.

There was great hope in June 1993, when the country held its 
first free and fair elections. Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu, and 
his FRODEBU party won those elections handily. Tragically, 
Ndadaye was slain by members of the Tutsi-dominated military 
in a failed coup attempt only four months later. This set off 
ethnic bloodletting that killed 50,000 or more and drove 
another 600,000 into neighboring countries.

Since that time, ethnic divisions between majority Hutus and 
minority Tutsis have deepened. The tragedy in Rwanda has only 
heightened these tensions.

Extremists in Burundi are seeking to manipulate these 
divisions in order to reverse progress toward democracy, in 
the hopes of profiting from the resulting instability. 
Political divisions have hobbled the fragile coalition 
government formed last year following the death of Ndadaye's 
successor, Cyprien Ntaryamira, in the April 1994 plane crash.

Hardliners in the Tutsi-led opposition, playing on sympathies 
in the ranks of the largely Tutsi military, have fomented 
violence against Hutu civilians. Meanwhile, Hutu extremists 
arm themselves in order to make raids on the military and on 
Tutsi civilian targets. Political assassinations have become 
gruesomely commonplace, and death lists have circulated, 
intimidating moderates into silence. The recently 
assassinated minister of energy, I understand, was on such a 
list. The result is a climate of deep fear, where trust is 
the first victim.

Differences From Rwanda

Those who followed the Rwanda story will undoubtedly see the 
similarities in Burundi. However, there are important 
differences. In Rwanda, unelected Hutu extremists controlled 
both the government and the security forces at the time of 
the genocide. Moderate Hutus and Tutsis were largely 
defenseless against the extremists' genocidal campaign.

In Burundi, the current government is a coalition of forces, 
the product of lengthy political negotiations which produced 
a comprehensive power-sharing agreement in September of last 
year. While Tutsis are an equally small minority in Burundi, 
they make up the bulk of the Burundi security forces.

Finally, both ethnic groups in Burundi suffered enormous 
casualties in the horrendous violence in 1993.    This 
tragedy and that of Rwanda in 1994 are still very fresh in 
the minds of Burundians. These painful memories can serve in 
some sense as a deterrent to drastic actions on either side.

These distinctions, while instructive, certainly do not 
preclude a serious deterioration in Burundi. The atmosphere 
is extremely tense and the fragility of the situation 
combined with the pervasive fear make the situation 
dangerously susceptible to a downward spiral into widespread 
violence.

The vast majority of the Burundi people want desperately to 
avoid this, and the Administration, working closely with the 
UN and the international community, is doing everything it 
can to help.

Pre-1994 U.S. Involvement

It should be remembered that the United States was positively 
engaged in Burundi long before the Rwanda crisis. We helped 
Burundi make the transition from single-party minority rule 
to democratic elections, providing both diplomatic support 
and electoral assistance.

While the October 1993 coup attempt and subsequent widescale 
massacres may have received relatively little press coverage, 
Burundi's friends in the international community were quick 
to react in its defense. The U.S. Government and its allies 
immediately condemned the attempted coup and suspended both 
economic and military assistance. According to Burundians, 
the quick and strong reaction by the United States and other 
key donors, along with the resistance of the Burundi 
population, was crucial to ensuring the failure of this 
brutal attempt to reverse historic democratic gains.

Current Efforts at Preventive Diplomacy

Since that time, the Administration has undertaken a series 
of preventive diplomacy measures which have been intensified 
since the events in Rwanda. Our initiatives are designed to 
bolster moderate forces and deter extremists from fomenting 
violence or overturning the current fragile power-sharing 
arrangement. We have carefully calibrated our efforts to 
avoid destabilizing the situation further, and we have 
closely coordinated our efforts with those of our allies.

The focus of international efforts has been centered on the 
mission of the UN Secretary General's very able special 
representative in Burundi-- Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah. Mr. 
Abdallah has been instrumental in facilitating dialogue among 
the major groups. He has helped Burundi's leaders through two 
separate rounds of presidential succession negotiations. He 
also served to facilitate the multi-party talks that produced 
the September 1994 power-sharing arrangement.

We have supported Mr. Abdallah's excellent work in our 
diplomatic discussions with Burundi's leaders and through 
direct assistance to the special representative's programs 
designed to promote dialogue and reconciliation. We supported 
the Security Council's March 9 statement calling for a 
reinforcing of Mr. Abdallah's office. As a result, we 
understand the Secretary General has ordered an increase in 
personnel on the ground.

In addition, the Organization of African Unity--OAU--has 
deployed   46 military observers to Burundi to monitor the 
situation and help restore confidence. The United States and 
other donor governments have assisted the OAU in this 
critical effort and support its expansion. We understand that 
efforts are currently underway    to modestly increase this 
force to 60 observers.

Our aid program in Burundi has been reoriented to support 
programs aimed at promoting peace and national 
reconciliation. The United States is providing $5 million in 
development assistance this fiscal year, including grants to 
promote dialogue, civic education, reconciliation, and human 
rights. The U.S. has also been an active supporter of greater 
NGO involvement in conflict resolution and peace promotion 
activities in Burundi.

A key element of our policy is to heighten awareness and 
international attention to Burundi. Experience shows that 
regular high-level visits and extensive international 
engagement in Burundi serve to reassure and bolster Burundi 
moderates. It can have the effect of deterring the activities 
of extremists on both sides.

The United States was a strong supporter of holding the 
recent OAU/UNHCR regional refugee conference in Bujumbura. 
This conference produced a useful action plan for beginning 
to resolve the problem of Rwandan and Burundian refugees and 
displaced persons in the subregion.

American officials have made regular visits to Burundi to 
show support for the country's fragile democracy and reassure 
moderate elements that the world is watching. These visits 
also warn everyone, including the extremists, that the world 
is watching. The U.S. has sent several key officials on 
missions to Burundi, including National Security Advisor 
Anthony Lake, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, Under 
Secretary of State for Global Affairs Timothy Wirth, USAID 
Administrator Brian Atwood, and the Assistant Secretaries of 
State for Africa, for Population, Refugees and Migration, and 
for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor.

We have also issued regular public statements and appeals. 
Most notably, President Clinton taped a radio message in mid-
February urging the Burundi people to reject the efforts of 
extremists to reverse progress toward peace and democracy. 
This message was played over VOA in Burundi and was very well 
received by moderate forces looking for additional outside 
support.

Key to the success of any effort to lessen tensions in 
Burundi is progress on human rights. Past atrocities-- 
including the assassination of President Ndadaye and 
subsequent ethnic massacres--have gone unpunished, while 
killings and lawlessness continue. This condition of impunity 
only emboldens the extremists and serves to feed the cycle of 
violence.

To help address these problems, a substantial portion of our 
U.S. aid funds this year will be devoted to helping the 
Burundi Government strengthen its judicial system. In 
addition, the UN Human Rights Center has developed a 
comprehensive plan for human rights technical advisory 
services. We have contributed to this worthy effort and 
joined the Security Council in calling for a reinforcement of 
this office. We understand that the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights plans to add several additional field officers 
to the center.

Most recently, the U.S. co-authored a March 29 Security 
Council statement stressing the need for accountability. The 
statement:

-- Strongly condemned the recent assassinations and violence;

-- Endorsed the Burundi Government's request for an 
International Commission of Inquiry into the October 1993 
assassinations, coup attempt, and subsequent massacres; and

-- Warned that if acts of genocide occur in Burundi, the 
Council will consider prosecutions under international law, 
as with Rwanda.

We are pressing to see that the International Commission is 
quickly established.

Burundi's Responsibility

The United States has provided over $77 million in relief aid 
to Burundi since October 1993. We do not wish to see the 
suffering of the people of Central Africa continue. For these 
reasons, we believe the current program of preventive 
diplomacy is a very worthy investment which we intend to 
continue and intensify. Indeed, it is clearly better to make 
this relatively small investment now than wait for a larger 
crisis that would require a far costlier response.

In the end, however, the future of Burundi, like the future 
of Rwanda, lies in the hands of its people. The international 
community can help Burundi to make a better society. However, 
we cannot save Burundi from itself.

The Glimmer of Hope

Despite the painful history and deep- seated mistrust, 
Burundi has somehow managed--so far at least--to weather the 
storm that has raged in the subregion. After months of 
difficult negotiations and repeated episodes of violence, the 
main political forces reached a delicate power-sharing 
agreement in September 1994. This is a testament to what 
Burundians can achieve if they choose dialogue and compromise 
over violence and intimidation. The situation, however, 
remains extremely precarious. In the end, only the Burundians 
can make the choice of which route they take. 

(###)



ARTICLE 11:

International Narcotics Control Efforts in the Western 
Hemisphere

Robert Gelbard, Assistant Secretary for International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

Statement before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere 
of the House International Relations Committee, Washington, 
DC, March 29, 1995

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: Thank you for 
inviting me to appear before your committee today. While I am 
here to focus specifically on the Western Hemisphere, I would 
like to present my comments within the context of our broader 
international narcotics control policy.

Since I testified before Congress on the Department's 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report-- INCSR--last 
year, much has changed. I especially appreciate the concern 
about international narcotics trafficking that the new 
members are showing by taking an interest in these hearings. 
I am anxious to work with all of you.

The Threat

Mr. Chairman, allow me to outline briefly the nature of the 
international narcotics threat, which we have presented in 
greater detail in this year's INCSR.

The spread of international narcotics trafficking constitutes 
one of the most persistent and serious challenges to 
America's foreign and domestic interests in the post-Cold War 
era. In his January address at Harvard University, Secretary 
Christopher identified the need to attack international 
narcotics trafficking and organized crime as one of the five 
key objectives of our foreign policy.

From a domestic perspective, it is increasingly clear that we 
cannot sustain a reduction in drug use without significant 
progress against foreign supplies. The United States has 
worked hard to reduce consumption--in effect, upholding our 
end of the international bargain to cut demand. We have 
achieved noteworthy progress--cocaine consumption by casual 
users fell significantly between 1985 and 1992. This occurred 
despite inadequate efforts to reduce coca production. The 
latest drug abuse indicators, however, show that the use of 
cocaine and other drugs is rising. This suggests that our 
best efforts to reduce consumption will be overwhelmed if we 
cannot control supplies.

On the foreign front, the wealth and power of the 
international narcotics trade pose additional challenges to 
our interests. The trade generates hundreds of billions of 
unregulated dollars annually that cause enormous disruption 
to economic planning and growth. It is a political threat--
trafficker corruption and intimidation can destroy democratic 
institutions and their leaders. It inflicts staggering social 
costs, condemning millions of drug users to painful, sick, 
shortened, and unproductive lives.

The potential for the problem to get worse is great. The 
rapid expansion and growth in communications and trade are 
making it easier for contraband, dirty money, and smugglers 
to move across borders undetected. In addition, the breakdown 
of central authority and the disruption of law and social 
order in several regions of the world are producing 
safehavens for new and established criminal organizations to 
base their operations. It is against this backdrop that we 
must ensure that we have a comprehensive counter-narcotics 
policy that addresses a wide range of narcotics-related 
security threats.

Status Report

A snapshot-look at the results of our efforts last year 
presents a decidedly mixed picture. Thanks to U.S. 
leadership, more governments than ever are aware of the drug 
threat and have expressed their willingness to combat it. 
Domestic legislation was introduced in several countries 
restricting the spread of precursor chemicals or the use of 
the nation's financial institutions to launder trafficking 
proceeds. Important advances were made in attacking drug 
crops, particularly through U.S.-supported efforts to 
eradicate opium poppies in Venezuela and coca in Colombia. 
Uncommon police efforts resulted in arrests of major 
traffickers in Peru, Mexico, and other key countries. In a 
noteworthy departure from the polarizing "user" versus 
"producer" response that tends to paralyze counter-narcotics 
cooperation, several eastern Caribbean countries sought U.S. 
assistance in coping with the growing power of Colombian-
based organizations that are terrorizing their judiciaries 
and threatening the very sovereignty of their countries.

Still, the core of the drug trade remains intact. Cocaine is 
still our largest problem and continues to generate the most 
narcotics-related money and crime, but heroin is getting 
worse. Both drugs remain enormously abundant on the global 
market. The problem also is having a serious effect on 
Europe, where drug seizures were up 55% in 1993.

Coca cultivation and production, after falling significantly 
in 1993, rose in 1994 owing largely to a significant increase 
in cultivation in Colombia and the failure of Peru and 
Bolivia--the two largest producers--to undertake virtually 
any eradication. Also, there were no significant efforts to 
reduce opium production in Burma and Afghanistan, which 
together supply 87% of worldwide production. Worldwide opium 
production was down about 10% in 1994, primarily because bad 
weather hurt Burma's crop. But much of this loss was offset 
by increased production in Afghanistan, the second-largest 
producer.

Meanwhile, the core trafficking organizations responsible for 
drug processing and for financing and managing the global 
drug trade continue to operate with impunity from political 
and judicial safehavens around the world. The leaders of the 
major organizations in, for example, Colombia, Burma, 
Pakistan, and Nigeria continue to operate freely because 
authorities lack either the will to go after them or the laws 
and institutions to capture and prosecute them--or both.

Policy Framework

I testified last year that this Administration would not 
conduct a business- as-usual attack on the drug trade. We 
promised to implement a policy that ensured greater bilateral 
and multilateral cooperation against the trade and a sharper 
attack on its most critical elements. This approach was 
driven by the need to sustain efforts that worked, respond to 
new drug trafficking threats, and make more effective use of 
limited resources. We are not satisfied with simply raising 
the cost of doing business for the traffickers. While this is 
certainly a goal, we expect more from international anti-drug 
operations. We want concrete and sustained progress in 
reducing narcotics crop production, and we want the most 
powerful trafficking organizations in the world dismantled 
through effective law enforcement operations.

We are keeping our promise. The President's 1995 National 
Drug Control Strategy continues our shift in focus to the 
source countries, so we are taking a more surgical view of 
how to destroy major transit and transshipment operations. 
Both concentrations are occurring against the backdrop of 
enhanced efforts to strengthen the anti-narcotics 
institutions of cooperating countries so they can shoulder 
more of the drug control burden. In conjunction with this 
effort, we are concentrating more intelligence and 
enforcement pressure on the kingpin organizations. We also 
are expanding our approaches to multilateral organizations, 
and we are making much more stringent use of the 
certification process.

Certification

Let me first discuss this year's certification. Certification 
is one of the most powerful tools the President has to focus 
international attention on the narcotics threat and achieve 
results. The Foreign Assistance Act requires that each year 
the President identify the major drug-producing and drug-
transit countries and determine whether they have fully 
cooperated with the United States or taken adequate steps on 
their own in narcotics control. The United States must cut 
off most foreign assistance to those countries that are not 
certified and vote against their requests for loans from 
multilateral development banks. For countries found not to be 
fully cooperating or taking adequate steps on their own, the 
President may grant a national interest certification if the 
vital interests of the United States require continued 
provision of foreign assistance.

Last year, I reported to Congress that President Clinton 
issued the toughest certification decision ever--10 of the 26 
major producing and transit countries were either denied 
certification or granted a national interest certification. 
This year, the process was even tougher. We expanded the 
"majors" list to 29 countries--adding the Dominican Republic, 
Haiti, Taiwan, and Vietnam and deleting Belize. In his 
decision on March 1, the President denied certification to 
five countries and granted a national interest certification 
to six others--a total of 11 countries--one more than last 
year.

As last year, these were difficult decisions based strictly 
on the 1994 counter-narcotics performance of these countries 
and our national interests. There were no "rubber stamp" 
decisions. Indeed, many countries with whom we have strong 
bilateral relations were affected. Let me summarize these 
decisions, then make some separate comments on the Latin 
American countries that were affected.

Two countries that had been granted national interest 
certifications last year--Laos and Panama--were moved to the 
fully certified category because of their improved 
performance and cooperation with us.

Three countries were given national interest certifications 
for the first time: Colombia--primarily for its failure to 
take action as promised against the Cali cartels; Pakistan--
for not taking significant action against opium crops, heroin 
producers, and kingpins; and Paraguay--for lack of credible 
action against official corruption.

Afghanistan, which had been granted a national interest 
certification in 1994, was denied certification owing to a 
substantial rise in opium production.

Burma, Iran, Nigeria, and Syria were denied certification 
again; and Bolivia, Lebanon, and Peru were given national 
interest certifications again.

Latin America: More National Interest Certifications

I would like to focus a few comments on Colombia, Bolivia, 
Peru, and Paraguay--the four Latin American countries that 
received national interest certifications. Before turning to 
them individually, however, let me say that the President's 
certification message this year to foreign and domestic 
audiences alike is strong and unambiguous: Certification is 
an honest process and is meant to produce meaningful 
international narcotics control results. We will recognize 
and support those countries that respond positively. Two 
years of increasingly tough decisions, however, should be 
sending strong signals to countries that doubt our resolve or 
believe that piecemeal, misdirected, or last-minute efforts 
to enhance counter-narcotics performance will satisfy us. It 
will not. We expect sustained cooperation focused on the core 
challenges.

Colombia. The need to control drug trafficking from Colombia 
is one of the most pressing narcotics and foreign policy 
challenges the United States faces. From the late 1970s on, 
we have confronted an increasingly complex and intense 
narcotics threat from Colombia. As Colombian traffickers have 
moved from large-scale marijuana production and smuggling to 
cocaine and, now, heroin, they have developed the most 
sophisticated, violent, and wealthiest organized crime groups 
in the world. They have taken aim at innocent citizens and 
government institutions around the world but have saved their 
most insidious attacks for their own people. For now, the 
reign of terror perpetrated by the notorious Medellin 
syndicates has abated--Pablo Escobar and other kingpins are 
all dead or in jail.

But the stakes for Colombia, the United States, and many 
other parts of the world these organizations have penetrated 
remain extremely high. The Cali networks and their well-known 
leaders have absorbed and expanded the Medellin trade. They 
are now waging a similarly destructive but less visible 
campaign of bribery, intimidation, and misinformation to 
destroy the anti-drug efforts of the Colombian Government and 
cooperating nations. Their organizations have assassinated 
witnesses and informants in the United States, Colombia, and 
elsewhere, underscoring their capacity for violence.

We applaud the positive steps that Colombia took last year 
against narcotics trafficking--most notably its decision to 
eradicate coca cultivation through aerial spraying. Nearly 
5,000 hectares--approximately 10% of the crop--were 
destroyed, according to the Colombian Government, 
demonstrating for the first time on a large scale the 
efficacy of this crop control tactic. The decision was taken 
none-too-soon; in fact, a surge in new planting outpaced 
eradication by two-to-one, resulting in a 5,000-hectare net 
increase in coca cultivation. U.S.-supported opium 
eradication efforts also were sustained but only at about 
half the rate as in 1993. Consequently, opium cultivation 
remains high.

Our concern with Colombia, however, is its failure to address 
the most serious challenge--the kingpins and their vertically 
integrated trafficking organizations. Police and other 
officials on the front lines showed considerable 
determination to bring drug traffickers to justice. They and 
their supervisors have been prepared for this by U.S.-
provided training and tens of millions of dollars of U.S. 
equipment and technical assistance over the years. We have 
produced analyses and shared important information with them. 
Colombia itself has even sought in the past to reform its 
criminal justice system to enhance this effort.

Nevertheless, the trafficking organizations and their leaders 
continued to operate with virtual impunity. Despite pledges 
at the highest levels of government, crackdowns on the 
kingpins never materialized. In 1994, the Government of 
Colombia took no legislative steps to reverse the 1993 
revision of the criminal procedures code which made it more 
difficult to bring mid-level and senior syndicate heads to 
justice. Following the trend set in 1993, there were no 
arrests, incarcerations, or fines imposed on such 
traffickers. In addition, several previously convicted 
traffickers had their sentences reduced owing to Colombia's 
woefully lenient sentencing law and automatic sentence-
reduction provisions.

The United States is paying a severe price for Colombia's 
lack of response to the kingpin threat. The Cali syndicates, 
in particular, are undertaking increasingly brazen operations 
designed to deliver more drugs faster to the United States 
and return more dollars to Colombia. This is vividly 
reflected in the enormously successful trend of flying 
cocaine from Colombia through Mexico to the United States in 
727 and other cargo jet aircraft operating out of San Andres 
Island, Cali, and other major cities. We are working on many 
fronts to stop these flights, but in the end, we need 
Colombia to stop--through effective law enforcement--the 
criminal organizations that put these operations together.

Peru and Bolivia. The narcotics trafficking threats from Peru 
and Bolivia are less complex but no less critical to our 
interests than the threats from Colombia. Together, these 
countries grow more than 70% of the world's illicit coca--
108,600 hectares in Peru and 48,100 hectares in Bolivia in 
1994. Much of this production is refined into intermediate 
coca products and flown clandestinely to Colombia for final 
processing into cocaine. During 1994, however, there were 
increasing signs that criminals in both countries were 
becoming more involved in cocaine refining and trafficking. 
This raises the specter of both countries becoming more 
involved in international distribution, further complicating 
international narcotics control efforts.

In contrast to Colombia, both Bolivia and Peru improved their 
law enforcement operations against significant local 
traffickers, but neither took meaningful steps to reduce coca 
cultivation--their primary contribution to the illicit drug 
trade. In Peru, the government sentenced one of the country's 
top traffickers--who was captured in Colombia and returned to 
Peru--to 30 years in jail. It continued to implement an air 
intercept program even while the U.S. stopped sharing 
intelligence on this threat as we reviewed our laws. The 
police and military seized a record 10 tons of cocaine and 
cocaine base in 1994. At our urging, the Government of Peru 
also approved a national drug control plan that defines 
measures to eliminate illegal drug production, trafficking, 
and abuse, including all coca cultivation intended for 
illicit uses.

Bolivia similarly improved its law enforcement efforts. It 
conducted four major operations designed to block trafficker 
movements, seized two large cocaine processing laboratories, 
and arrested major traffickers with links to the Medellin 
drug mafia. Authorities foiled a prison break by a major 
Colombian trafficker and his Bolivian accomplices and 
arrested the warden for complicity. The Bolivian congress 
removed two supreme court justices for corruption. The 
executive branch has supported efforts to extradite 
traffickers to the U.S., but such efforts were stalled in the 
Supreme Court. The government, however, has refused to 
initial a new extradition treaty, negotiated in 1990, 
choosing instead to present a different draft, which we are 
now reviewing.

While we welcome the positive steps, the overall efforts do 
not meet the required conditions for certification--neither 
country has cooperated fully with the United States nor taken 
adequate steps on its own to comply with the 1988 UN 
Convention. Specifically, we expect to see progress to reduce 
coca cultivation. We do not impose magic formulas on 
countries to reach this goal. Both Peru and Bolivia know this 
must be a central objective of their near- and long-term 
counter-narcotics effort. Indeed, both countries have 
accepted U.S. assistance for development programs designed to 
create income and employment alternatives to coca production 
and eventually lower cultivation.

The verdict is in on the effectiveness of an alternative 
development-only approach to crop control: Without a credible 
threat to eradicate, it will not cause cultivation to fall 
rapidly. Neither country, however, has buttressed alternative 
development by eradicating crops that are grown in clear 
violation of the law even if the population is benefiting 
from U.S. developmental assistance. In February 1994, the 
Government of Bolivia briefly undertook a campaign of forced 
eradication which resulted in a violent reaction by coca 
growers. Voluntary, compensated eradication dropped off 
sharply and new plantings increased, resulting in a net 
increase in coca hectarage.

The Government of Peru has ignored efforts to destroy mature 
cultivation, concentrating on seedbeds instead. While this 
approach together with crop disease and other factors 
contributed to a decline in cultivation in 1993, it is losing 
ground. Cultivation remained stable in 1994, but output rose 
as fields planted a couple of years ago reached maturity. 
Peruvian growers, abandoning old and diseased fields in parts 
of the Huallaga Valley, are rapidly turning to new and 
secondary growing areas. The trend is ominous. If cultivation 
spreads to new areas, the expansion will undermine nascent 
alternative development projects, as well as interdiction and 
other operations that, to be cost-effective, depend on 
keeping production confined. The government, however, has an 
opportunity to mute some of the political opposition to 
eradication by initiating efforts to destroy new cultivation 
that does not represent the life-long work of the peasants. 
President Clinton's certification decision signals our 
concern with the Government of Peru's failure to address new 
and existing cultivation.

Paraguay. Paraguay is subject to certification because it is 
used as a transit route for cocaine shipped primarily from 
Bolivia to Argentina, Brazil, and eventually the United 
States. Our interest is in stopping these shipments through 
interdiction and the arrest and incarceration of traffickers 
who arrange and transport them. In Paraguay and other transit 
countries, we are concerned about trafficker efforts to 
protect operations by suborning government officials. 
Unchecked corruption will destroy the best anti-narcotics 
operations regardless of the level of resources and planning 
that goes into them. Thwarting known corruption is not 
costly--it is more a reflection of government will and 
commitment than ability and resources.

It was the prevalence of serious corruption suspected among 
Paraguayan officials last year and the government's lack of 
will to respond that led to the national interest 
certification. Several high-level officials in the government 
and the armed forces are suspected of facilitating the 
transit of illicit drugs and in engaging in, encouraging, and 
facilitating the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug 
transactions. In early 1994, a major narcotics operation 
appeared to have been compromised when Paraguayan law 
enforcement authorities did not provide adequate cooperation. 
Despite vows to combat corruption, the Government of Paraguay 
did not undertake aggressive investigations to identify and 
punish corrupt officials and prevent further cases of 
malfeasance.

The decision to grant national interest certifications to 
Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, and Paraguay underscores their 
importance to our overall interest in improving the quality 
of life and security in the hemisphere--a goal unanimously 
endorsed at the Summit of the Americas President Clinton 
hosted in Miami last December. Our own interests require that 
their democracies and economies grow larger and stronger. 
Indeed, this is critical to any long-term strategy to reduce 
narcotics production and trafficking at the source. 
Accordingly, even though these four countries did not meet 
the requirements for certification, denial of certification 
would have caused grave damage to our narcotics control or 
other foreign and domestic policy interests in the region.

This year's certification message is already having an 
impact. Colombia has promised to make significant progress 
toward incarcerating the leaders of the Cali cocaine networks 
and eradicating all of the country's coca and opium poppy 
cultivation. There are several important follow-up actions to 
the summit that the 34 participating countries are to take 
collectively and individually to control the narcotics 
problem. As we did last year, we will make our expectations 
for 1995 perfectly clear through a series of at least two 
demarches that we will send to all of the major drug-
producing and transit countries-- except Iran and 
Afghanistan, where we do not have missions. In the spring, we 
will outline our expectations; in the fall, we will assess 
progress.

Mexico and Other Challenges. Latin America presents other 
narcotics control challenges. There is always the potential 
for cultivation to spread to other countries: INL-funded 
eradication programs have virtually wiped out Guatemala's 
once-thriving opium crop and, over the past year, they have 
stopped cold an emerging opium crop in Venezuela and a coca 
crop in Panama. The United States has stopped the flow of 
essential and precursor cocaine-manufacturing chemicals to 
suspect consignees in Latin America, but they continue to be 
supplied from Europe and elsewhere. Through the OAS, we are 
teaming up with Latin American governments to close the 
European pipeline, too. Traffickers are always probing our 
interdiction defenses with new routes and methods, and with 
these and other operations comes their constant application 
of bribery--their most effective tool to weaken government 
resolve and undermine our efforts.

This brings me to the need to make a couple of points about 
Mexico, where new evidence is increasingly exposing high-
level corruption in the previous Mexican Administration. We 
always have been aware--and have acknowledged--that law 
enforcement corruption in Mexico is a deeply entrenched, 
serious obstacle to bilateral anti-narcotics cooperation. We 
became increasingly concerned about this problem last August, 
when the Government of Mexico confiscated a Caravelle cargo 
jet that reportedly had smuggled 10 tons of cocaine from 
Colombia but seized only 2.5 tons. As we learned more about 
this and subsequent cargo jet operations, we pressed the 
former Mexican Administration to investigate our suspicions 
and, after the Zedillo Administration took office in 
December, indicated that we expect close cooperation from the 
highest levels of government to stop this new and dangerous 
trafficking trend.

I have just returned from having serious and frank 
discussions with Mexico's most senior anti-narcotics law 
enforcement, and Foreign Ministry officials on this and 
related narcotics control issues. I went because President 
Clinton suggested these meetings and President Zedillo 
accepted.

The meetings went extremely well. Alarmed by the 
unprecedented series of drug-related assassinations in Mexico 
over the past year, the Zedillo Administration sees 
escalating trafficking as a national security threat that 
must be stopped. It also knows how important this is to 
Mexico's relations with the United States. Indeed, it is 
because of the Zedillo Administration's commitment to 
attacking senior crime figures and institutional corruption 
that we are realizing how bad the corruption problems were 
under the Salinas government.

Despite the problems, we share our most important bilateral 
law enforcement relations with Mexico. They cover narcotics 
and a wide range of related crime that potentially affects 
every American household. We now see clearer than ever the 
improvements Mexico must make and the assistance we can offer 
to strengthen these relations. We should not move recklessly 
to throw out the good with the bad, but instead we should 
build on these new revelations.

Institution-building

Neither denying certification nor granting a national 
interest certification affects our counter-narcotics 
assistance to the major countries. Increasingly, we are 
focusing this assistance on the institutional weak links in 
their counter-narcotics programs. For many countries, this 
means strengthening their police and judicial capabilities to 
identify, investigate, and prosecute major traffickers. We 
have experienced too many cases where effective police 
operations made possible by years of U.S.-provided training 
and assistance have been nullified by weak and corrupt 
judicial systems that let the traffickers, their accomplices, 
and assets go free. It also means enacting domestic 
legislation and developing investigators and regulators to 
control money laundering and chemical diversions. These are 
low-cost tactics that can produce high-value dividends.

For the producer countries, institution-building also means 
the development and implementation, for the first time, of 
comprehensive strategies to eliminate narcotics crop 
production. We are not blind to the difficulty of this task; 
yet we know that without progress against the crop, the 
prospects of achieving a significant and sustained reduction 
in the supply of illicit drugs are dim. We believe the 
opportunities for coca control in the Andes are improving. 
Successful U.S.-supported aerial spray operations in Panama 
and Colombia this past year demonstrated the technical 
feasibility and cost-effectiveness of this approach. Colombia 
has made a public commitment to eradicate, Peru has developed 
a comprehensive strategy to reduce cultivation through 
alternative development, and we are pressing both Peru and 
Bolivia to reinforce alternative development with 
eradication. Asian opium is more problematic given the lack 
of government influence in the major growing areas and the 
perennial nature of the crop. In all of these areas, there 
are serious political, economic, and security barriers to 
crop control. In most cases, the need to provide alternative 
development assistance will be critical to getting the 
programs underway and helping to lower these barriers.

International Cooperation

Our success in increasing global awareness of the narcotics 
threat has not relieved the United States of having to lead 
the international effort against it. We do not intend to wage 
this battle alone, however, and have intensified our efforts 
to get key multilateral organizations more involved in this 
effort.

A major goal is to get the multilateral development banks--
MDBs--to focus more of their loans on programs that can help 
create income and employment alternatives in narcotics-
producing areas and strengthen the ability of judicial 
systems to investigate and prosecute drug traffickers. The 
MDBs traditionally have been reluctant to support such 
programs. The Department, working with USAID and the 
Department of the Treasury, has, however, initiated 
discussions with the World Bank and the Inter-American 
Development Bank that, for the first time, have gotten them 
to consider such programs for Peru and Bolivia. I am 
following up on this opening, including trying to encourage 
the World Bank to host a hemispheric conference of donors 
later this year, as called for by the Summit of the Americas.

I recently returned from Vienna, where I held extensive 
consultations on narcotics-related development issues with 
the UN and our Dublin Group partners. The Dublin Group was 
formed by the United States and includes the 15 European 
Union members and Norway, Canada, Japan, and Australia to 
coordinate their counter-narcotics assistance and programs. 
The feedback was positive, particularly with regard to our 
initiatives to seek greater involvement by the MDBs. The UN 
and the Dublin Group members also acknowledged the key roles 
they can play in Asia where our influence is limited. In all 
these cases, we stressed that assistance comes with a price--
the recipient countries must take steps to eradicate drug 
crops if development projects alone do not cause growers to 
abandon and destroy their fields.

Budget

Mr. Chairman, through certification, our efforts with the 
multilateral organizations, and other aspects of our policy, 
we have set the stage for significantly improved 
international narcotics control efforts in 1995. We must be 
prepared to buttress these efforts and provide assistance to 
countries that demonstrate their commitment to narcotics 
control. 

We are, however, mindful of the need to practice fiscal 
restraint. The President's proposal for the international 
affairs budget--a mere 1.3% of total federal spending for the 
next fiscal year--is already austere. It reflects important 
initiatives to streamline our activities and save where we 
can.

As I noted at the beginning of my statement, our 
international narcotics control program is an integral part 
of our broad international efforts to advance America's 
interests. Today, America faces a choice between the concrete 
benefits of international engagement and the illusory appeal 
of isolationism. Those who say they are for a strong America 
must help keep America strong. We cannot have it both ways. 
We cannot be the world's most powerful nation if we do not 
marshal the resources to stand by our commitments. We cannot 
lead if we do not have all the tools of leadership at our 
disposal.

For a program that is as small as ours--yet so closely linked 
to the health and safety of the American people--we have 
borne our share of recent budget cuts. This has meant cutting 
our programs to the bone, closing our least-critical foreign 
operations, wiping out most of our pipelines, and shrinking 
our airwing operations. We continue to postpone the 
implementation of new programs and, to the extent safety 
considerations permit, delay upgrades and maintenance. Lack 
of funds is stymieing our response to the growing heroin 
threat.

We simply cannot sustain a credible international narcotics 
control pro-gram at current funding levels. We are seeking to 
consolidate funding from economic and military counter-
narcotics assistance programs and the traditional 
international narcotics control budget into one account. We 
desperately need these funds to follow through on the source 
country crop-control and interdiction programs that are 
crucial to the success of our strategy. Moreover, the 
consolidated budget further ensures that the economic and 
military support funds, in particular, go strictly for 
counter-narcotics objectives. This is a practical way of 
tightening counter-narcotics oversight and makes good fiscal, 
policy, and national security sense.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, in the post-Cold War era, you can hardly find a 
foreign policy issue that has such an immediate and direct 
detrimental effect on so many Americans as the international 
drug trade. There should be no question that the resources we 
spend on combating this problem abroad serve first and 
foremost the American people. I strongly believe that if we 
do not get ahead of this problem overseas it will eventually 
overwhelm our best domestic efforts to combat narcotics 
abuse, crime, and poverty.

As I briefly have outlined here, we have a policy and 
strategy designed to strike at the heart of the international 
narcotics trafficking problem. It contains no magic bullets 
or quick solu- tions, nor does it pretend to go after the 
easy targets--the easy targets are often the least 
consequential. Instead, it seeks to put pressure on the most 
important parts of the trade--the producers and the most 
powerful traffickers who run it.

By taking this approach, we are challenging the key countries 
and the rest of the international community to undertake more 
aggressive and effective anti-drug efforts. We are running 
into political resistance from some countries. We believe, 
however, that we can work through this resistance with 
carefully designed assistance programs, effective 
institution-building, and honest use of the certification 
process. Your support will clearly strengthen our hand and 
accelerate the progress that recent events have shown can be 
achieved through focused and sustained efforts. 

(###)



ARTICLE 12:

Integrating Economics and the Environment

Elinor G. Constable, Assistant Secretary for Oceans and 
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Address at a workshop on environmental policy sponsored by 
the U.S.          Environmental Protection Agency, Antalya, 
Turkey, March 19, 1995

It is a pleasure to be with you today to share some ideas 
about the environmental issues that loom large on the agenda 
for the international community in general and our two 
nations in particular.

This is a time of profound change for both the United States 
and Turkey. We are both grappling with the altered nature of 
geopolitics in the aftermath of the Cold War. More broadly, 
we have a new understanding of the relationship between 
humans and the natural world. Nations are beginning to 
recognize their responsibility to look beyond the challenges 
and crises of the moment toward underlying issues, such as 
environmental degradation and population growth, which affect 
national progress and global stability. To deal with these 
complex problems, we must redefine our priorities.

Environmental degradation is clearly one of the major issues 
that will have to be dealt with in this new, post-Cold War 
world. At the global level, ozone layer depletion and climate 
change threaten populations of the entire planet. At the 
local level, many urban populations face serious health 
threats from air and water pollution, while damage to the 
natural resource base is a vital concern in rural areas.

This workshop comes at a very good time. As host of the 
HABITAT II conference next year, Turkey will have a key role 
to play in global efforts to deal with the severe 
environmental problems facing urban communities worldwide. 
The issues we discuss today and tomorrow will help inform the 
preparations for that important gathering.

Integrating Environmental and Economic Policies

The United States has considerable experience in addressing 
environmental issues. The first comprehensive U.S. efforts to 
deal with environmental problems date back to the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and the creation of the 
Environmental Protection Agency in 1970. In the 25 years 
since that time, the United States has implemented a sweeping 
set of laws on clean air, clean water, hazardous and solid 
waste disposal and cleanup, endangered species protection, 
and natural resource management.

These laws have been very successful in reversing decades of 
damage. For example:

-- U.S. carbon monoxide emissions fell by 40% from 1970 to 
1990. They will decline to less than half the 1990 level by 
the end of the century;

-- Lead emissions and ambient lead concentrations declined by 
95% from 1980 to 1992;

-- Reforestation efforts have mushroomed, with annual 
plantings rising from 1.5 million to 3.5 million acres from 
1970 to 1990; and

-- During that same period, ocean dumping of industrial and 
other wastes in U.S. waters fell from 6 million tons per year 
to nearly zero.

These environmental policies have also had considerable 
economic benefits. Clean air and water reduce environmental 
health problems, which not only take a human toll but 
diminish labor productivity and increase health care costs. 
Sound natural resource management policies mean that U.S. 
farmers and foresters can count on long-term sustainable 
yields. And local communities derive economic and social 
value from the recreational use of unpolluted beaches, parks, 
and other natural areas.

These successes were not easy, nor did they come without a 
price. Some environmental programs, such as the hazardous 
waste cleanup program called Superfund, have been very 
expensive. We have not always found the right balance in 
managing our natural resources, as seen in a decline in 
several U.S. fisheries that have been over-harvested for 
years. Similarly, there is now strong political opposition to 
energy taxes and market-value grazing fees for federal lands.

The key issue--and one of the main themes of this workshop--
is how governments can best pursue environmental protection 
without hindering progress toward meeting other national 
social and economic needs. This is an especially important 
issue for developing and newly industrializing countries, 
which have to balance the twin goals of economic growth and 
environmental protection. We believe the U.S. experience 
provides valuable lessons in environmental policy making in 
the form of both successes and failures.

One of the most important lessons is--as stated at the Rio 
Earth Summit--that environmental protection and economic 
growth can be mutually supportive goals and must be pursued 
in tandem. Looking around the world, it is clear that the 
countries with growing, market-based economies are leading 
the way on environmental cleanup--their growth provides the 
wealth and technology to achieve environmental goals. In the 
case of the United States, the environmental successes of the 
past 25 years were accompanied by a 50% increase in GDP.

One of the main ways to promote environmental protection and 
economic growth is by focusing on production efficiency, 
which leads to enhanced profitability and decreased pollution 
and frees up resources for other uses. U.S. industries have 
found that cleaner operations can also be more efficient, 
thus increasing profits. For example, the 3M Corporation, 
under its own pollution prevention program, avoided releasing 
an estimated 1 billion pounds of toxic chemicals from 1975 to 
1990, while saving an estimated $480 million in material and 
pollution control costs. Similarly, the economist Michael 
Porter has found that industries that are subject to more 
stringent environmental regulations are generally more 
efficient--and usually more profitable--than their 
counterparts that face a lax regulatory environment.

Another lesson from the U.S. experience is that market forces 
and economic incentives often can provide the best means for 
achieving environmental goals, as opposed to a sole reliance 
on "command and control" regimes. We have, for example, used 
emissions trading schemes under our lead phase-out program 
and the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. These programs have 
created a market in pollution emission permits which ensures 
that emissions are reduced at the lowest overall cost to the 
economy.

In a similar vein, there is an increasing awareness that 
environmental issues cannot always be handled on a sector-by-
sector basis, as they have been in the past. Too often, 
regulations on pollution in one sector have lead to an 
increase in pollution in other sectors. To address this 
problem, we increasingly are looking at the "big picture," 
whether through ecosystem management strategies--which look 
at the full range of relevant resource and environmental 
management issues in defined areas--or through a multi-
sectoral approach.

EPA recently launched its "Common Sense" initiative, which 
creates partnerships among government, business, and 
environmental representatives to look at how to achieve 
overall pollution-abatement goals.

We have also learned the critical need for public involvement 
in environmental decision-making. The Administration was able 
to resolve conflicts over forests in the Pacific Northwest 
through a participatory process that involved all 
stakeholders, from industry to environmental groups to local 
towns. This principle is also the central element of U.S. 
community-right-to-know legislation, which requires companies 
to publish data on their releases to the environment of toxic 
substances. This knowledge empowers people by providing them 
the information needed to participate in environ-mental 
decision-making.

We also encourage the voluntary participation of industry in 
achieving U.S. environmental objectives, rather than relying 
solely on legislation and standards. When presented with the 
opportunity to help define environmental policy, U.S. 
industry has invariably sought ways to work with the Federal 
government to reach mutually satisfactory understandings. In 
most cases, industries have formed associations, such as the 
Chemical Manufacturers Association, to provide input into the 
environmental policy process.

Finally--and this is an issue of particular significance for 
this workshop--effective environmental protection requires a 
sound institutional structure. Environmental institutions 
have to be strong and have the authority to enforce 
regulations and also need to be integrated into overall 
governmental activities. Because environmental and natural 
resource regulations in the United States are implemented by 
various agencies--such as the EPA and the Departments of the 
Interior, Agriculture, Energy, Commerce, and Justice-- 
coordination is sometimes difficult. It is also necessary to 
balance the interests of environmental and natural resource 
agencies on the one hand and economic development agencies on 
the other.

To address these issues, the Clinton Administration created 
the Office of Environmental Policy in the White House. This 
office helps integrate policy through closer coordination of 
environmental and economic agencies. In addition, 
environmental agencies now play a greater role in broader 
policy coordination bodies, such as the National Economic 
Council, the Trade Policy Review Group, and the Trade 
Promotion Coordinating Committee. This has resulted in 
innovative policies in areas such as trade policy, climate 
change, and technology development.

International Environmental Policies

Although the focus of this workshop is national environmental 
strategies, I would like now to spend a few minutes 
discussing protection of the global environment. The Clinton 
Administration has made global environmental issues a key 
part of U.S. foreign policy. The State Department thus has an 
important role to play in dealing with the global 
environmental problems that threaten all nations.

As in domestic policy, our approach to international 
environmental issues seeks to promote environmental 
protection and economic growth. The need to integrate 
environmental and economic policies has perhaps been most 
apparent with respect to trade and the environment. There is 
broad agreement that we have to do a better job of 
reconciling these twin international priorities, but this can 
be difficult in practice. In the case of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement, the United States concluded a side 
agreement to address the linkage between trade and the 
environment. We have made similar proposals for addressing 
these linkages in the broader trade discussions of the new 
World Trade Organization.

One of the greatest challenges the world faces is global 
climatic changes which may be caused by our collective 
actions. Policy makers have had to balance the economic 
considerations of reducing greenhouse gas emissions with the 
potential for serious adverse impacts from climate change.

Like most OECD countries, the U.S. is seeking to limit its 
greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the end of the 
century and to consider what actions are appropriate for the 
period after the year 2000.

As the global debate on climate change progresses, we have 
been considering how market forces can be brought to bear on 
this issue. This is why the United States has advocated 
consideration of joint implementation, which would allow 
industries in developed countries to obtain credit for 
greenhouse gas reductions through cooperative projects in 
developing countries. Because the costs of reducing emissions 
are generally much lower in developing countries, this type 
of system provides incentives for the transfer of 
environmentally sound technologies in the energy, forest, and 
other sectors. Potentially, a joint implementation program 
could bring about significant north-south transfers that 
would benefit all parties.

The biodiversity convention is another important 
environmental document that focuses on economic 
considerations. One of the most critical aspects of the 
convention is its emphasis on the equitable sharing of 
biological resources. This provides new economic incentives 
for countries to conserve their biological resources and for 
interested industries to cooperate with those countries in 
benefit-sharing arrangements. In fact, an arrangement of this 
nature already has been concluded between the pharmaceutical 
firm Merck and Costa Rica's INBIO foundation, and others are 
under consideration.

While the United States has a strong interest in global 
environmental issues, such as climate change and biodiversity 
loss, we are also concerned about local environmental 
problems that affect much of the world's population. Urban 
and industrial pollution, the unsafe use of pesticides and 
toxic chemicals, and unsustainable natural resource use 
threaten the health and lives of many in the developing 
world.

In order to address these growing environmental threats in 
developing countries, U.S. foreign assistance programs are 
increasingly focused on the most effective means of 
addressing environmental concerns. For example, we are now 
emphasizing pollution prevention, since it is many times more 
cost-effective to prevent pollution from occurring than to 
clean it up after the fact. The major U.S. pollution 
prevention assistance program has been so successful in its 
initial implementation in Latin America that we plan to make 
it a global program.

We also are stressing the need for public participation in 
environmental decision-making because we have found that 
environmental programs work best from the "ground up," using 
the skills and knowledge of affected citizens.

The Regional Environment Center, which we helped establish in 
Budapest in 1989, has promoted the development of non-
governmental groups in Eastern Europe and has resulted in a 
strong awareness of and support for environmental programs. 
Similarly, the inclusion of local citizens' groups in the 
U.S.-Mexico Border Environmental Cooperation Commission, 
created under a NAFTA side agreement, has led to a more 
effective decision-making process for addressing 
environmental problems in the border region.

The Vice President's GLOBE program is another important 
vehicle for enhancing public participation and awareness of 
environmental issues. GLOBE will create a worldwide network 
of students working under the guidance of teachers to report 
on environmental trends. We hope a GLOBE bilateral agreement 
can be concluded soon so that Turkey can participate in the 
pilot phase that begins in April.

In summary, it is clear that the environment is a key issue 
for governments everywhere. We must all learn to deal with 
global environmental problems that affect the world 
community. It is clear that--as stated so forcefully at the 
Rio Earth Summit--environment and development are truly 
interlinked. One cannot be achieved without the other.

Perhaps the most important factor of all is the commitment of 
governments and individuals. The fact that this conference is 
taking place with such a distinguished panel of experts 
should be evidence enough that there is widespread commitment 
to dealing with these critical issues. We very much look 
forward to working with Turkey on the environmental problems 
that concern us all. 

(###)



ARTICLE 13:

The Framework Convention on Climate Change: Expectations for 
Berlin

Rafe Pomerance, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environment 
and Development

Statement before the Subcommittee on Energy and Power of the 
House Committee on Commerce, Washington, DC, March 21, 1995

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman  and members of the 
subcommittee. I am glad to have the opportunity to speak with 
you at this time--only days before the opening of the first 
meeting of the Conference of the Parties under the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change in Berlin on March 28. My 
testimony will focus on the international situation and our 
expectations for the Berlin meeting.

The Berlin Conference will be the first high-level, worldwide 
meeting on climate change since the climate convention was 
opened for signature at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. Since 
the convention was adopted, there has been a series of 
preparatory meetings of the Intergovernmental Negotiating 
Committee, or INC, the last of which concluded in New York in 
February.   In these meetings, participants have worked to 
address issues left unresolved by the convention--and on 
which decisions are required in order to implement the 
convention's provisions. In addition to these official, UN-
sponsored meetings, Germany--in its role as host to the 
Conference--con-vened an informal ministerial meeting in Bonn 
less than two weeks ago. Under Secretary Wirth represented 
the United States at that meeting.

We are gratified that, as a result of these efforts, there is 
increasing recognition that the central goal in Berlin should 
be to agree on a mandate to begin considering next steps 
under the convention. Still, achieving such a mandate will 
not be easy. There are now over 120 parties to the 
convention, each of which approaches the Berlin Conference 
with its own set of concerns. Nevertheless, if we are able to 
summon the same spirit of compromise that was present in New 
York less than three years ago when the convention was 
adopted, we are confident that we can reach our goal.

Before going into detail on the Berlin session and our views 
of next steps under the convention, I would like briefly to 
explain why the Administration believes that, as President 
Clinton has put it, climate change is the most important 
environmental issue of our time.

Scientists have confirmed that the blanket of gases around 
our planet--including water vapor, carbon dioxide, methane, 
and nitrous oxide--trap heat near the planet's surface. 
Without this blanket, the earth would be about 600F colder--
making life as we know it difficult to imagine. Scientists 
have verified this "greenhouse effect" by comparing our 
atmosphere with those of our sister planets: Mars, which has 
few greenhouse gases and is extremely cold; and Venus, which 
has massive accumulations of carbon dioxide and is extremely 
hot.

Since the dawn of the industrial revolution, human activity 
has released literally billions of tons of these gases into 
the atmosphere--with the single largest effect coming from 
emissions of carbon dioxide. As a consequence, the amount of 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has risen from 280 parts per 
million in 1800 to 360 parts per million today. If present 
trends continue, we could be committed to tripling carbon 
dioxide concentrations over their pre-industrial 
concentrations by the end of the next century. Concentrations 
of other greenhouse gases, such as methane and nitrous oxide, 
are increasing as well. 

Over the past two decades, a great deal of progress has been 
made in understanding how the atmospheric system works. While 
we don't have all the answers yet, we do know that this 
continued build-up will cause the climate to change. Such 
climate change could lead to changes in precipitation 
patterns, constantly increasing sea levels, and enormous 
impacts on the world's ecosystems.

At Rio, industrialized countries agreed to the non-binding 
"aim" of returning their greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 
levels by the year 2000. All countries--including developing 
countries with the assistance of developed countries--are 
required to inventory their emissions and sinks of greenhouse 
gases and to "formulate, implement, publish, and regularly 
update national, and where appropriate, regional programs 
containing measures to mitigate climate change."

As part of the "bargain" struck in Rio between those who 
advocated more stringent commitments and those wary of moving 
too quickly, the parties agreed that the adequacy of Article 
4, subparagraphs 2(a) and (b)--which contains the "aim" 
language--would be reviewed at the first meeting of 
Conference of the Parties, in order to determine whether 
additional action might be needed to move toward the 
convention's ultimate goal: stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous human interference with the climate system.

For several reasons, the Administration believes, and has 
stated here at home and at INC meetings over the last year, 
that existing convention provisions do not adequately address 
policies and measures to be taken beyond the year 2000.

First, as our delegation observed at INC-9, even if all 
industrialized countries succeed in returning their year 2000 
emissions to 1990 levels, these efforts will fall far short 
of stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases 
at any level.

Second, the convention's current "aim" provides no guidance 
for the post-2000 period. While the convention's requirement 
for countries to adopt policies and measures continues after 
the year 2000, the convention contains no milestone against 
which to gauge progress after the turn of the millennium.

Third, we have long stated that climate change is a global 
problem and that solving it will require broad international 
participation. While industrialized countries and developing 
countries both have commitments under the convention, we 
believe that more must be done on a global basis, recognizing 
the common, but differentiated, responsibilities of all 
parties.

For these reasons, the Administration believes that all 
parties to the convention must move forward in Berlin and 
agree to consider next steps. It will not be possible there 
to reach agreement on specifics--there is too much work yet 
to be done and too little time. Instead, we favor agreeing in 
Berlin to begin a negotiating process that will unite all 
parties in seeking to establish a new regime with milestones 
for the post-2000 period.

In our view, the negotiating process should include an 
analytical or assessment phase. In this phase, parties would 
be asked to consider what level of action should be achieved, 
and what level of action may realistically be achieved, by 
whom and over what time period. The analytical phase should 
examine the potential for action not only in the near term--
by the year 2010--but also in the longer term--by the year 
2020. Available assessments of technological success stories 
in different regions and ways to accelerate the development 
and diffusion of solutions could help to inform the process. 
For example, we have proposed developing a common menu of 
actions; programs outlined in the parties' national 
communications could be useful in such an effort.

The analytical or assessment phase should proceed in parallel 
with negotiations of a new aim to guide our efforts in the 
first decade of the next century. The analytical or 
assessment phase should help us to reach agreement--no later 
than 1997--on this new aim.

The United States is not alone in viewing global climate 
change as a critical problem or in urging that countries 
begin to consider next steps to deal with it. Virtually all 
countries acknowledge that the commitments in Article 4.2(a) 
and (b) are only a first step, and several have proposed 
concrete targets for reducing emissions. For example, the 
United Kingdom has suggested that industrialized countries 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions 5%-10% from 1990 levels by 
the year 2010, while the Alliance of Small Island States--
AOSIS--has proposed that industrialized countries reduce 
their carbon dioxide emissions by 20% by 2005.

On the other hand, there are a number of developing countries 
that are reluctant to consider next steps under the 
convention. Some of these countries even question whether 
industrialized countries should be encouraged to go beyond 
their existing actions. We understand the concerns of these 
countries--they face a broad array of problems at home and 
they are determined that their economies will grow.

But as we have sought to do here at home, we must also 
convince developing countries that environmental protection 
and economic growth are not adversaries but partners. In this 
regard, we have been exploring new avenues for cooperating in 
the development and diffusion of environmental technologies. 
Clearly, new technologies and new approaches will be vital in 
addressing the long-term threat of global climate change. 
Cooperation in this area is a triple win--good for the 
environment, good for the economy, and good for American 
industry. Despite the difficulties involved, we are hopeful 
that the parties will be able to agree in Berlin to begin a 
negotiating process that will lead to innovative next steps 
under the convention.

In this connection, we are also hopeful that Berlin will 
produce agreement on terms for a pilot phase for joint 
implementation. Joint implementation--a means by which 
countries can engage in cooperative projects that avoid, 
reduce, or sequester greenhouse gas emissions and share the 
benefits obtained--is recognized, but not defined, in the 
convention. Through several difficult meetings, INC 
participants have sought to come to grips with joint 
implementation. To increase understanding about the benefits 
of joint implementation, the United States has promoted the 
concept with both developing countries and countries with 
economies in transition. While many continue to have 
concerns, it is clear that there is growing support for 
exploring and assessing the advantages of joint 
implementation, particularly as it may relate to next steps 
in the post-2000 period. Beginning a pilot phase in Berlin 
would send an important signal, particularly to the private 
sector, of  our resolve to look for cost-effective solutions 
to environmental problems that simultaneously promote 
sustainable development.

Because of our strong belief in the long-term potential of 
joint implementation, the United States has already launched 
its own pilot program--the U.S. Initiative on Joint 
Implementation--as part of the U.S. Climate Change Action 
Plan announced by the President in October 1993. My 
colleagues from the Department of Energy and the 
Environmental Protection Agency will have more to say about 
our early efforts under this program, but let me note that we 
are quite encouraged. In our view, joint implementation 
provides a significant new opportunity to harness the 
enthusiasm and creativity of the private sector in pursuit of 
solutions to global environmental problems.

Mr. Chairman, let me also touch on a more prosaic issue that 
will occupy our time in Berlin--reaching agreement on rules 
of procedure to govern the conduct of our work under the 
convention. While the normal rule is for all parties to 
strive to reach consensus in all matters, it is also normal 
to have recourse to a special majority voting process for 
decisions in the rare instance when consensus proves 
impossible. We are hopeful that we can reach agreement on 
such a process in Berlin quickly, so that we can devote our 
attention to the key substantive issues before the Conference 
of the Parties.

Finally, let me turn to how other countries are doing in 
meeting their domestic commitments to return greenhouse gas 
emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. The Convention 
mandates that all Annex I parties (OECD countries and 
countries with economies in transition to market economies) 
communicate to other parties information on their policies 
and measures to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions. To date, 
of the 26 countries from which such communications were due, 
22 have responded.

The United States submitted its own communication on 
September 21, 1994, meeting the deadline set in the 
convention. Our plan has been acclaimed by other countries as 
being one of the most comprehensive efforts of any; meeting 
all of the agreed guidelines set by the INC for reporting. It 
was also, we understand, the only  report to do so; other 
countries were asked by the Secretariat to submit additional 
information to supplement their communications, which were 
incomplete in some areas.

Our experts who have reviewed other country communications 
believe that some may need to adopt additional measures to 
reach their goals; only a few appear to have plans that are 
adequate. An in-depth review of national communications, 
coordinated by the Secretariat, will begin later this year.

We note that more than 700 measures were listed by countries 
as they sought to address their greenhouse gas emissions. In 
our view, this cornucopia of ideas should be carefully 
examined in seeking to adopt next steps to address the 
problem. At the same time, we must seek--as must all 
countries--to work continuously to improve our own domestic 
efforts. That means that funding for programs must be a 
continued priority. Efforts to inform our citizens of the 
issue and of actions they can take must continue. In 
addition, countries must work to meet their reporting 
commitments so that we can continue to benefit from shared 
ideas and determine how most cost-effectively and efficiently 
to proceed. I believe that these will continue to be 
priorities for our meeting in Berlin. 

(###)

END OF DISPATCH VOLUME 6, NUMBER 16

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