U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 14, APRIL 3, 1995
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:

1. U.S. Policy Toward the New Independent States: A Pragmatic Strategy 
Grounded in America's Fundamental Interests--Secretary Christopher
2. Establishing a Comprehensive Agenda For the Moscow Summit--Secretary 
Christopher, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev 
3. Global Climate Change: Protecting the Environment--Vice President 
Gore
4. Renewing the Middle East Peace Process--Secretary Christopher, 
Jordanian King Hussein, Bahraini Foreign Minister Al Khalifa, PLO 
Chairman Arafat, Egyptian President Mubarak, Israeli Prime Minister 
Rabin, Israeli Foreign Minister Peres, Text of Joint Declaration 
5. Crime in the New Independent States: The U.S. Response--James F. 
Collins 
6.Human Rights and Democracy in Asia--John Shattuck 
7. A Framework for Peace and Justice in Northern Ireland--Richard C. 
Holbrooke



ARTICLE 1

U.S. Policy Toward the New Independent States: A Pragmatic Strategy 
Grounded in America's Fundamental Interests
Secretary Christopher
Remarks at Indiana University, Bloomington, March 29, 1995 

Good afternoon. I would like to thank President Brand for that warm 
welcome, and Indiana University for inviting me to speak today. I am 
pleased to be here with Robert Orr, former Indiana Governor and former 
Ambassador to Singapore.

Four decades ago, Indiana President Herman Wells showed foresight in 
founding the Russian and East European Institute. Today, the institute 
is among the country's most respected centers of regional study. Many of 
its graduates have forged distinguished careers in this field, including 
Jim Collins, my special advisor for the New Independent States.

Your state's political leaders have played a crucial role in shaping our 
policy toward the former Soviet Union. When I called Senator Lugar to 
ask if he could join me here today, he said he really needed to be in 
Washington shepherding the ratification of our START II Treaty with 
Russia through the Senate. Under these circumstances, I reconsidered my 
invitation. And I will always be indebted to your highly respected 
Congressman, Lee Hamilton, for his counsel and support. You should be 
proud that Indiana has produced two such outstanding leaders of both 
parties.

Since his first day in office, President Clinton has pursued a pragmatic 
policy of engagement with Russia and the other New Independent States as 
the best investment we can make in our nation's security and prosperity. 
Our approach is to cooperate where our interests coincide, and to manage 
our differences constructively and candidly where they do not. We 
support reform because, in the long run, its success benefits not only 
the people of the region, but the American people as well. We understand 
that Russia and the other new states face a tumultuous future. For that 
reason, our policy is focused on the long haul. In sum, our approach is 
realistic and grounded in America's strategic interests.

The successful transformation of the former Soviet Union into a region 
of sovereign, democratic states is a matter of fundamental importance to 
the United States. These 12 nations cover one-sixth of the world's 
surface. Their territory is home to tens of thousands of nuclear 
weapons. Their people and resources give them vast economic potential.

Twice in this century, political events in this region have remade the 
world--profoundly for the worse in 1917, and profoundly for the better 
in 1991. The events of 1991 set in motion two historic transformations, 
both of which have served our fundamental interests and those of the 
people of the region. The first is the disappearance of a hostile 
totalitarian empire, and its replacement by 12 newly independent states. 
The second is the collapse of communist dictatorship, and the movement 
toward democratic institutions and free markets.

These transformations have presented us with a remarkable opportunity to 
encourage stability in the region and enhance the security of the 
American people. We have taken advantage of that opportunity in ways 
that have paid enormous dividends. Indeed, our engagement with Russia, 
Ukraine, and their neighbors has made America safer than at any time 
since the end of World War II. Thousands of nuclear warheads, built to 
destroy America, are themselves being destroyed. Those that remain no 
longer target our cities and homes.

Last year, President Clinton negotiated a trilateral understanding with 
Russia and Ukraine that sets Ukraine on the path to becoming a non-
nuclear power. In so doing, Ukraine joined Kazakhstan and Belarus in 
agreeing to give up nuclear weapons. We are leading efforts to dismantle 
their weapons and safeguard nuclear materials under a bipartisan program 
sponsored by Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar. In Defense Secretary 
Perry's words, it literally "removes the threat--missile by missile, 
warhead by warhead, factory by factory."

Last December, President Clinton and the leaders of the region's nuclear 
states brought the START I agreement into force and paved the way for 
implementing START II. Together, these important treaties will cut 
strategic nuclear forces in Russia and the United States by almost two-
thirds.

Our diplomacy has also made Europe more secure. After patient but firm 
efforts by President Bush and President Clinton, Russian troops 
completed their withdrawal last August from Germany and the Baltic 
states. Now, for the first time since World War II, the people of 
Central Europe are free of occupying forces.

Despite the progress that has been made, we have no illusions about how 
difficult the region's transformation will be, or how long it will take 
to overcome centuries of empire and autocracy. Ultimately, only the 
peoples of the region can assure their success.

From the outset, our approach has been focused on the entire region of 
the former Soviet Union, in part because the futures of all these 
countries are so closely linked. I am convinced that the success of 
reform in each of these countries will have a positive impact on success 
in the others.

Our region-wide approach can be seen in the emphasis we have placed on 
financial support to the non-Russian states--which in 1995 will 
represent two-thirds of our assistance to the New Independent States. 
Increasingly, we are supporting private sector trade and investment. 
American firms have signed multi-billion-dollar energy deals in 
Kazakhstan and in Azerbaijan--the latter country so rich in oil that its 
capital was described in the 12th century as "blazing like a fire all 
night." Last year, our Overseas Private Investment Corporation provided 
almost $1 billion in financing for projects in the region. These 
programs will generate new exports and jobs for Americans.

The Clinton Administration has been steadfast in support of the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the New Independent States. 
The region's history of imperial conquest underscores how important it 
is that all these countries scrupulously respect international law and 
the rights of their neighbors.

Of course, some states of the former Soviet Union command particular 
attention because of their potential to influence the future of the 
region. Ukraine is critical. With its size and its position, juxtaposed 
between Russia and Central Europe, it is a linchpin of European 
security. An independent, non-nuclear, and reforming Ukraine is also 
vital to the success of reform in the other New Independent States. That 
is why the United States has joined Britain and Russia in providing 
security assurances for Ukraine.

The United States has consistently led the international effort to 
support economic reform in Ukraine. Last year, we convinced the G-7 to 
pledge over $4 billion for that country. In October, Ukraine's 
government launched a courageous program of market reform under newly 
inaugurated President Kuchma. We responded by increasing our assistance 
for 1994 by $250 million, to a total commitment of $900 million. Ukraine 
is now the fourth-largest recipient of U.S. assistance after Israel, 
Egypt, and Russia. It is important that the Ukrainian Rada fully support 
President Kuchma's economic reform program.

Of course, the future of Ukraine and every other state in the region 
will be profoundly affected by the outcome of Russia's new revolution. 
That is why the deliberations of Russia's parliament and the fate of the 
ruble are on everyone's mind, not just in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and 
Vladivostok, but also in Kiev, Almaty, and Baku.

In May, President Clinton will travel to Moscow to meet President 
Yeltsin for the seventh time. This summit comes at an important moment. 
Reform in Russia is under strain. The war in Chechnya continues. We have 
differences with Russia in foreign policy.

But whatever the problems, we must not lose sight of the breathtaking 
changes we have witnessed since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Ten 
years ago, almost 400 million people from the Baltic to the Bering Seas 
were subject to totalitarian dictatorship and hemmed in by minefields 
and barbed wire. Today, Vilnius, Warsaw, and Kiev are free. Moscow is 
alive with political debate. Siberia is becoming a synonym for 
opportunity, not oblivion.

Perspective and a sense of history are also important. Not long ago, a 
severe disagreement between the United States and the Soviet Union could 
have threatened a nuclear confrontation. Today, we do not always agree, 
and there are obviously new challenges in our relationship. But every 
difference is not a crisis. We can address our differences 
constructively, without threatening to blow up the world.

Today, the real question is not whether we should engage with Russia, 
but how. We reject policies that reflect short-term political pressures, 
but undermine the long-term interests of the United States. We are 
determined to continue to work with Russia where our interests coincide. 
We will not hold our relationship hostage to any one issue. But we will 
remain ready to speak openly and act appropriately when Russian actions 
run counter to our interests.

Our policy toward Russia has been and will continue to be based on a 
clear-eyed understanding of the facts on the ground. As President 
Clinton has stressed, we reject the superficial caricature of Russia 
that suggests it is predestined to aggression, predisposed to 
dictatorship, or predetermined to economic failure. At the same time, we 
are under no illusion that success is assured.

The plain truth is that Russia has a choice. It can define itself in 
terms of its past or in terms of a better future.

In many areas Russia is courageously making the right choices. It has a 
freely elected president and parliament and a democratic constitution. 
It has an independent press, which often criticizes central government 
policies. Debate in the parliament is vigorous and open.

Economic reform is continuing. The government has acted boldly to bring 
inflation down. An ambitious privatization program has altered Russia's 
economic landscape. The private sector now accounts for 50% of Russia's 
GDP.

Two weeks ago, Russia initialed a $6.4 billion agreement with the IMF, 
which requires Russia to continue its fight against inflation, implement 
an austere budget, liberalize the energy sector, and free more prices 
from state control. This agreement is a significant landmark on the hard 
march to a stable market economy.

These positive changes are all the more notable in light of the ruinous 
legacy that Russian reformers are having to overcome. After 75 years of 
communism, much of the old elite remains entrenched in government and 
industry. Trust in democratic institutions is fragile--and so are the 
institutions themselves. The rule of law is in its infancy. Crime and 
corruption are rampant. These problems could undermine democracy if they 
are not dealt with effectively.

The economic legacy is also difficult. The new Russia inherited from the 
Soviet Union a decrepit industrial base that has wasted natural 
resources and produced a string of environmental disasters--from 
Chernobyl, to chemical pollution in the Urals, to the drying up of the 
Aral Sea.

Then there is the legacy of empire. Some 150 ethnic groups live within 
Russia's 11 time zones. During the Soviet period, borders between the 
internal regions and republics of the empire were changed by communist 
leaders over 90 times to suit their particular purposes. The central 
government of Russia has made progress in improving relations with the 
diverse people within the Russian Federation. But its actions in 
Chechnya today threaten its ability to emerge as a democratic, multi-
ethnic state.

The Chechnya crisis began as Russia sought to deal with a complex 
problem with deep historical roots. Now a city and many villages have 
been destroyed, tens of thousands have died, and the tensions that led 
to the fighting have surely been exacerbated. Russia's conduct in 
Chechnya has been tragically wrong. Its decision to escalate fighting 
there in the last week is a serious mistake.

That is why I have urged the Russian Government to end the carnage, to 
accept a permanent mission from the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, to provide humanitarian relief, and, above all, 
to reach a peaceful political settlement. It is patently clear that the 
Russian Government is paying a very high price both at home and abroad 
for the Chechnya adventure.

It is easy enough to enumerate our differences with Russia, or with 
other states of the former Soviet Union. But I do not have the luxury of 
making a list and walking away. My job is to build areas of agreement, 
to develop policies to manage our differences, and always to advance our 
nation's interests. Let me describe the five key goals of our strategy 
for the coming year, as they relate to all the states of the former 
Soviet Union.

First, we aim to resolve a number of important security issues vital to 
every American. In 1995, we are pursuing the most ambitious arms control 
agenda in history. President Clinton and I have urged the Senate to 
ratify START II before the U.S.-Russian summit in May. The Russian 
parliament should act promptly to do the same. We are working closely 
with Russia to achieve the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. We will also press to conclude a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty--
thereby realizing the vision set forth three decades ago by President 
Kennedy.

We are also determined to combat the growing threat posed by nuclear 
smuggling. We must prevent rogue states and terrorists from acquiring 
nuclear weapons and materials. Nunn-Lugar programs will help us achieve 
this goal by dismantling nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union and 
safeguarding the resulting nuclear materials. Full funding for Nunn-
Lugar is vital to our nation's security--and I hope Congress will 
receive that message loud and clear.

Because of the importance we attach to fighting the spread of nuclear 
weapons, we are firmly opposed to Russia's nuclear cooperation with 
Iran. Russia is a neighbor of Iran. It will rue the day it cooperated 
with this terrorist state if Iran builds nuclear weapons with the 
benefit of Russian expertise and equipment. Russia should take note that 
no major industrial democracy cooperates with Iran on nuclear matters. 
It is simply too dangerous to be permitted. For this reason, it is 
important that, in our meeting last week, Foreign Minister Kozyrev and I 
agreed to set up a working group to examine non-proliferation issues, 
particularly including the consequences of nuclear cooperation with 
Iran.

A second goal for 1995 will be to cooperate on a newer set of global or 
transnational issues, including crime, energy, the environment, and 
space. During the Cold War, such cooperation was impossible. Today it is 
essential.

International crime is a growing threat to the lives and livelihoods of 
countless Americans, and to the prospects for reform in the former 
Soviet Union. I have made the fight against global crime a top priority 
of U.S. foreign policy. FBI Director Louis Freeh and I have worked 
together to set up an FBI office in Moscow--to work with the Russians to 
combat organized crime, corruption, and drug trafficking.

Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin are spearheading 
efforts to improve the efficiency of the Russian oil and gas sector, 
thereby raising productivity and reducing that industry's high levels of 
pollution. They are also strengthening our cooperation with Russia in 
space--symbolized today by the space station Mir, with its first 
American crew member on board.

Our cooperation on these issues is not limited to Russia. We will 
continue to work with Ukraine and our G-7 partners to overcome the 
dangerous aftermath of Chernobyl. We are also helping Kazakhstan to 
manage its enormous energy resources in economically sound and 
environmentally safe ways.

Third, we will continue carefully targeted assistance programs that 
increase our security, expand our prosperity, and promote our interest 
in democratic reform. Nunn-Lugar monies will continue to advance our 
strategic interest in dismantling nuclear weapons. Our assistance will 
also continue to support the vital elements of a working democracy and 
civil society, including a free press and jury trials. By supporting 
privatization and small business development, it will encourage free 
markets and open new opportunities for American companies. Most of our 
assistance will go to private organizations and local governments 
outside Moscow.

Assistance has put America on the right side of the struggle for change 
in Russia. Some people say we should end these programs to punish Russia 
when it does something we oppose. I am all for maximizing our leverage 
in every way we can. But I have personally reviewed our assistance 
programs and concluded that cutting them back now would simply not make 
sense. It would not be in the interest of the American people. The 
critics of those programs need to ask themselves some tough questions. 
Would they stop the funding necessary to dismantle the nuclear weapons 
that once targeted American cities? Would they cut off support for 
privatization and free elections--wiping out programs that strengthen 
the very forces in Russian society that share our interests and values?

I believe that when they understand these choices, the American people 
will adopt the only course that makes sense: that is, to make the 
necessary investments now to make our nation more secure and prosperous 
for generations to come. I call on both the House and Senate to fund 
fully our request for assistance to the New Independent States.

The fundamental basis of the assistance program is to encourage all of 
the New Independent States to move forward with market and democratic 
reform. Free elections are especially vital. President Nazarbayev's 
recent effort to extend his term unilaterally is, I am sorry to say, a 
step backward for Kazakhstan. We call on him to renew his commitment to 
hold timely parliamentary elections, followed by scheduled presidential 
elections in 1996. At the same time, we applaud President Yeltsin's 
commitment to hold parliamentary elections at the end of this year and 
presidential elections next year. When President Clinton goes to Moscow 
in May, you can be sure he will underscore the importance we attach to 
that commitment.

In meeting with President Yeltsin, President Clinton will be dealing 
with the first freely elected leader of Russia. But he will also talk 
directly to the Russian people and meet a cross-section of Russian 
society--especially those who are committed to reform. The United States 
will continue to cultivate strong ties with a wide range of leaders and 
institutions in and out of the Russian Government. To encourage 
pluralism in Russia, we will deal with Russia as a pluralistic society.

Fourth, we will reinforce the independence of Russia's neighbors and 
support their further development as market democracies. We will also 
use our good offices to help resolve conflicts in the region. Last 
December, we persuaded Russia that an OSCE-led peace-keeping mission in 
Nagorno-Karabakh was preferable to unilateral action. If a settlement is 
reached between the parties to that dispute, such a mission would set a 
powerful precedent for conflict resolution in the New Independent 
States. It is vital that Russia continue to cooperate with the OSCE to 
ensure its success.

Fifth, we will advance the President's comprehensive strategy for 
building a stable, peaceful, and integrated Europe. Just as we had in 
Western Europe after World War II, we now have a rare and historic 
opportunity to build a new security architecture--this time for all of 
Europe--that will last for generations.

President Clinton's vision includes several important elements. The OSCE 
will have a larger and more operational role. NATO's Partnership for 
Peace will strengthen its ties to Central Europe and to the New 
Independent States. NATO will move forward with its steady and 
deliberate process to accept new members, following the approach laid 
out by the NATO ministers last December. And we will seek a stronger 
relationship between NATO and Russia in parallel with NATO expansion.

In the process of NATO expansion, each potential member will be judged 
individually, according to its capabilities and its commitment to the 
principles of the NATO treaty. The fundamental decisions will be made by 
NATO, in consultation with potential members. The process will be 
transparent to all and there will be no vetos by third parties.

As I emphasized to Foreign Minister Kozyrev last week, it is in Russia's 
interest to participate constructively in the process of European 
integration. Russia has an enormous stake in a stable and peaceful 
Europe. No country has suffered more when Europe has not been at peace. 
Russia's path to deeper involvement in Europe is open. It should not 
choose to isolate itself from this effort.

Building a new security architecture in Europe is part of a larger 
strategy of integrating the new democracies of the former Soviet Union 
into the major institutions of the West, including the European Union, 
the World Trade Organization, the OECD, and the G-7. These institutions 
give structure, legitimacy, and strength to the common enterprise of the 
Western democracies--namely, promoting peace and economic growth. It 
will serve our interests to extend the benefits of integration--as well 
as its considerable obligations--to Europe's new democracies, including 
the New Independent States.

The pace of integration in Europe, however, will depend on the extent to 
which the nations of the former Soviet Union continue on the reform path 
and adhere to international norms. WTO membership, for example, is only 
possible for nations that adopt trade and investment rules consistent 
with world standards. Likewise, the evolution of Russia's participation 
in Western institutions will be affected by the world's judgment of its 
conduct in Chechnya and by its respect for international norms.

The United States will continue to pursue a realistic and pragmatic 
course toward all the New Independent States--a course that has already 
produced concrete benefits for Americans. We will not take for granted 
the success of the historic transformations now under way in the former 
Soviet Union. But we will continue to work to bring about the best 
possible outcome. Our enduring interests demand that we stay engaged. 
Our policy is rooted in American interests. We will protect our 
security, our welfare, and our values.

As we travel this difficult yet promising path, we will call upon the 
same qualities that have sustained American leadership in the past: 
steadiness, consistency, and reliability in pursuing our interests and 
upholding our commitments. These are the qualities that have kept 
America strong and free. These are the qualities that must guide us now 
as we build the more secure and integrated world that is in the 
fundamental interest of the American people. Thank you very much. (###)



ARTICLE 2

Establishing a Comprehensive Agenda for the Moscow Summit
Secretary Christopher, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev

Secretary Christopher, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev
Opening statements at a joint press conference, U.S. Mission, Geneva, 
Switzerland, March 23, 1995.

Secretary Christopher. Good afternoon and welcome to the U.S. Mission. 
Foreign Minister Kozyrev and I have just completed a substantive and 
productive set of discussions. Both of us understand the stake both of 
our countries and the whole world have in seeing that the U.S.-Russian 
relationship remains a constructive one. I have said repeatedly that 
this is a complex, multi-faceted relationship. It includes important 
areas of cooperation as well as areas in which there are differences 
between us. Where there are differences, we are determined to address 
them directly and candidly through our joint discussions, and this is 
only one of several in which the Foreign Minister and I have arranged to 
do exactly that.

Our primary task here in the last couple of days has been to organize    
the agenda for the upcoming meeting between Presidents Clinton and 
Yeltsin. The Foreign Minister and I have identified the issues that our 
experts will work on to ensure a successful meeting. He and I have 
agreed that we will meet at least once more, probably toward the end of 
next month, prior to the summit. We have    a great deal of serious 
business to conduct on a wide range of topics:  including European 
security, the former Yugoslavia, arms control and non-proliferation, the 
dangers posed by Iran, the conflict in Chechnya, and peace in the Middle 
East. 

The summit will also have an important economic component, especially in 
light of Russia's recent stand-by agreement with the IMF. That was an 
important milestone in Russia's effort to build a market economy. I am 
glad to say that, through our assistance programs, the United States is 
determined to continue our support for economic reform. 

Last night and today, the Foreign Minister and I got a good start on 
many of the issues we face, and let me just go through several of them 
for you.

On European security, we had a very thorough exchange. President Clinton 
has put forward a comprehensive program which has a number of key 
elements: a strengthened OSCE, a very active Partnership for Peace, a 
process of NATO expansion that is both deliberate and careful, and a 
new, more robust relationship between NATO and Russia. We are convinced 
that this overall approach provides the best chance to promote a secure 
and stable Europe that is integrated and undivided. It is an approach 
that in no way threatens Russia. Mr. Kozyrev and I agreed that we would 
continue our important dialogue toward this end.

On Croatia, we agreed on the importance of maintaining a peace-keeping 
presence in Croatia as part of our goal to avoid a broader Balkan war. 
Toward that end, the Foreign Minister and I have agreed to ask our 
ambassadors at the UN to cooperate very closely together in working out 
a new resolution for Croatia. We also agreed that the Contact Group on 
Bosnia must be re-energized, and we must focus our efforts on a 
continuation of the cessation of hostilities.

We had a thorough discussion of several very important security issues. 
On START II, I told Foreign Minister Kozyrev that before this trip I had 
a very good meeting with Senator Lugar, who I think most of you know is 
chairing the Foreign Relations Committee's effort for a ratification in 
the United States of the START II Treaty. We will be working closely 
with Senator Lugar and other members of the Senate, hoping that the 
treaty can be ratified before the May summit. The Foreign Minister 
assured me of his personal commitment to seek an early ratification of 
the START II Treaty in the Duma, a treaty in which he has a long history 
of support and initiation.

On the extremely important Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States 
and Russia are in complete agreement on the need for a non-conditional 
and indefinite extension. Here, I want to welcome yesterday's resolution 
in the Arab League expressing strong support for the NPT regime and its 
extension. As you know, this was a major topic of my trip to the Middle 
East last week. Foreign Minister Kozyrev will be going to the Middle 
East next week and he will be working on that same problem, trying to 
ensure that our joint efforts produce an indefinite extension of the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty.

On the broader question of non-proliferation, I am pleased to announce 
that we have agreed to establish a special working group on non-
proliferation. In preparation for the May summit, this group will be 
charged with conducting an in-depth review on the full range of regional 
and global issues. We have handed out a brief joint statement on that 
subject.

On the COCOM successor regime and the question of Russian arms sales to 
Iran, I think we are both committed to resolving the remaining 
outstanding details on this issue. We hope and expect that our 
presidents will be able to make a positive announcement on this subject 
at the time of the summit, if matters go as planned.

A number of other important arms control issues were discussed: chemical 
warfare, biological warfare, theater missile defense, CFE, and 
transparency issues. Our experts will be working on these matters 
intensively over the next several weeks in the run-up to the summit.

We reviewed our joint efforts to advance the Middle East peace process, 
in which the United States and Russia serve as co-chairs. I briefed the 
Foreign Minister on my recent trip    and discussed ways in which he 
might advance the process during his trip to the Middle East.

As I did during our last meeting in Geneva, I also raised with the 
Foreign Minister our concerns over the war in Chechnya. I am very 
concerned about the escalation that we have seen there in recent days. I 
underscored to the Foreign Minister our belief that the fighting must 
end, that humanitarian relief must be able to get to the war's victims, 
and that a political settlement must be negotiated. I urged that Russia 
follow through immediately with its commitment of a permanent OSCE 
presence in that region. As I have said to many of you before, I believe 
that Russia is paying a very high price in world opinion for this 
adventure, and I hope it ends as soon as possible.

Well, finally, we have a lot of work to do in the six weeks or so 
between now and the time of the summit. We made a good start here in 
Geneva in establishing a comprehensive agenda, one that reflects the 
complexity and breadth of the relationship. We will be working hard to 
make sure that the summit in early May between our presidents is a 
success. Andrei, it was a good meeting today, and it is pleasant, as 
always, to be with you.


Foreign Minister Kozyrev [translated from Russian]. Ladies and 
gentlemen: Indeed, today we held a very constructive, very businesslike 
meeting with the Secretary of State, which, as I see it, sort of 
reinforced the Geneva spirit which developed at our last meeting, in 
which we succeeded in introducing a number of positive elements in our 
work dealing with several areas of our bilateral and international 
cooperation.

It is my firm view that we will have the same result at the close of 
this meeting, all the more so since it is being held against the 
backdrop of a very important and, I would term it, very correct--
politically correct--major step on the part of President Clinton, who 
accepted an invitation from President Yeltsin to come to Moscow on May 9 
to attend celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the end of the war in 
Europe. In that war against fascism, we acted as allies, and I am 
convinced that this time too, as never before, we have an opportunity to 
further develop our partnership that was agreed upon by our two 
presidents at previous meetings, so that it can be given further 
powerful incentive at the coming May summit meeting.

I think that taking part in the commemorative events jointly is 
something that we appreciate very much. The two presidents will also be 
in a position to discuss some crucial problems of our relationship and 
of international life. This, I would say, would make a major 
contribution to furthering the process of shaping a truly workable 
partnership. In this way, this meeting has developed into a meeting 
designed to prepare the coming Moscow summit and to prepare the ground 
for the coming visit to Moscow by President Clinton.

Also, we discussed matters related to preparations for the Halifax 
meeting to be attended by supreme national leaders and by the 
presidents. This meeting is going to be a major event, and I am sure 
that we are in the position to take note of consistent support that we 
feel coming from the United States for Russia's participation in these 
gatherings. Also, gradual expansion of the format of Russia's 
participation will now have the political aid format, and we are working 
now on ways to have Russia participate in discussion of major economic 
issues in the format that would include the presidents of eight 
countries. Also, we discussed the issues as listed by the Secretary of 
State, and I would only make some smaller additions like, for instance, 
our bilateral partnership in the United Nations. In support of our 
efforts dealing with peace-keeping operations in a number of CIS areas, 
we also discussed the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, our joint efforts, and 
the OSCE role, which I believe was given fresh impulse in the wake of 
the Budapest summit. I can also mention extension and broader 
participation of the United Nations in Tajikistan and in Abkhazia in 
peace-keeping operations there. Of course, I would agree that not in all 
instances and not in every particular case do we see eye-to-eye. But 
there are a number of differences and nuances in our estimates and 
evaluations of situations like, for instance, Iran, or let us say, 
evaluation of the situation in Chechnya. But what counts more is that 
once again we showed our ability to discuss all these matters--not in a 
confrontational way, not by way of swapping ultimatums--without creating 
artificial linkages between these problems and some even more complex 
and complicated issues, something that would make even more difficult 
our work and work dealing with those areas and problems. We showed that 
we can discuss problems in an open and businesslike way, intending to 
have them resolved instead of exacerbated and made more difficult to 
resolve. So, perhaps I should stop here, especially in view of the very 
long list of items that we discussed and the Secretary of State 
mentioned, and I wish also to extend my appreciation to the U.S. 
ambassador in Geneva for helping us in organizing our work here; I wish 
to extend my thanks to the staffs of the Russian and U.S. Missions here 
in Geneva, I wish to express my thanks to the interpreters, to everyone 
who helped us in our work, which is a source of profound satisfaction 
and which makes life easier for skilled diplomats to work and breathe. 
Thank you, Mr. Secretary.


Secretary Christopher
Opening remarks at a briefing, Geneva, Switzerland, March 22, 1995.

In about an hour, I will be meeting with Andrei Kozyrev for another of 
our series of bilateral meetings, which have fallen into something of a 
pattern. We meet for dinner and a one-on-one session in the evening and 
then a plenary starting at 9:00 a.m. tomorrow, and then we will do in 
the afternoon whatever seems to be more useful for us, perhaps another 
plenary, perhaps another one-on-one session.

Before I start, let me introduce our new colleague, Mr. Chip Blacker, 
who has taken over as Special Assistant for National Security Affairs 
for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia at the NSC--a welcomed and fine 
addition for us, occasioned by Nick Burns' coming back to the State 
Department.

Before I get down to more specifics, let me try to put the ministerial 
and our overall relationship into some kind of context. We have to 
remember what the stakes involved here are. It was only a few years back 
that we were involved in a nuclear face-off with a very hostile Soviet 
Union, which seemed to be challenging our interests everywhere. That is 
a pretty sharp contrast to the opportunities we have today to have a 
normal relationship with Russia--a relationship which allows us to 
cooperate together on issues of great importance, a relationship which 
allows us to deal with our differences--even sharp ones--and to manage 
them without threatening to blow up the world.

This is a great change for the better, and I think it is worthwhile to 
step back sometimes and remind ourselves that this is happening. We have 
a very complex, multi-faceted, and broad relationship, and it is 
important that it not be held hostage to any single issue or reduced to 
a single issue. If we did so, we would only be hurting ourselves.

From my standpoint, the question is not whether we engage with Russia 
but how we engage, how we structure our relationship so that it serves 
America's interests. Since the beginning of our Administration we have 
been pursuing a realistic, pragmatic strategy of trying to find the best 
way to advance America's interests. We work with Russia whenever our 
interests coincide, and that has certainly produced very positive 
results as you heard me say before: a reduced nuclear threat, working 
together on Ukraine and the Baltics, and working together to advance 
Middle East peace. At the same time, it is only realistic and pragmatic 
to recognize that there are areas where we do not agree, where our 
interests seem to differ, and there we try to be very candid with the 
Russians and to manage these differences so as to protect our interests. 
I think that is precisely why it is important for Mr. Kozyrev and me to 
meet on a more-or-less regular basis.

I have said before that it is very easy to list the places where we have 
differences between us, places where the Russians are pursuing policies 
that we do not like. We could make that list and walk away, but it is 
certainly a luxury that I do not have. I have the responsibility to try 
and manage the differences and to emphasize the places where we agree, 
to try to look for areas of agreement, and to manage the disagreements 
as well as we can.

Some people say we have to punish Russia when it does something we don't 
like, for example, by conditioning our assistance. I, naturally, would 
like to maximize our leverage wherever we can. I have gone over our aid 
programs personally one by one, and my own conclusion is that 
restricting them would be injuring U.S. interests. That is what is 
really involved here--we hurt ourselves at least as much or more than we 
hurt the Russians. For example, it does not make sense to cut off the 
Nunn-Lugar funds that provide for the dismantlement of the Russian 
nuclear threat--or I guess I should say the nuclear threat that used to 
be posed by the former Soviet Union--because those funds are being used 
throughout the nuclear states of the former Soviet Union. It certainly 
does not, from my standpoint, make any sense for us to back away from 
the funds spent for privatization, because that is one of the areas in 
which there is very considerable progress, or the funds used for 
promotion of democracy, because those are precisely the parts of Russian 
society which we ought to encourage.

So it is against this background that this summit and this ministerial 
are held. The President's decision to go to Moscow for the 9th of May 
occurred--as I mentioned to someone on the plane yesterday--largely 
because of one principal factor: The President understands that if the 
relationship we have with the Russian Government is to be an enduring 
one, it must, in the final analysis, be a relationship with the Russian 
people. The President became convinced through the reports we had from 
our embassy and elsewhere that the Russian people attached great 
symbolic significance to this particular anniversary, which is one of 
the positive events of the last 70 years that the Russian people have 
focused on. So it was principally in our recognition of that, in my 
judgment, that the President made his decision. He had to--as we all 
have to--look at the negative of the decision, and that is that if he 
had not chosen to go, it might well be regarded as turning his back on 
the Russian people. He wants to reach out to the Russian people instead, 
to honor them for the sacrifice they have made and to honor the victory 
over fascism, and to try also to reflect in his comments there the 
battle to overcome communism, which has culminated in where we are 
today.

As I mentioned yesterday, we will be trying to establish the summit 
agenda over the next two days. Thereafter, experts will work on those 
issues, and I would anticipate that Foreign Minister Kozyrev and I will 
meet sometime again, perhaps on the edges of the NPT meeting in New 
York. Obviously, you all know that one of the key issues we will be 
discussing is European security; we and our allies have decided on a 
comprehensive strategy here to try to develop a more secure and 
integrated Europe. There are basically several pieces to that; the first 
is, we are anxious to strengthen the OSCE coming out of the Budapest 
summit. We want to proceed with a transparent and deliberate process of 
NATO expansion, and we want to establish a stronger relationship between 
NATO and Russia.

I met with Foreign Minister Juppe this morning and we reaffirmed our 
agreement on this approach. It is an approach that we agreed on last 
December at the NAC meeting and one that we have been following since 
then, and it has not been changed either in terms of its content or its 
timing. One of the points I will be making with Foreign Minister Kozyrev 
tonight is that Russia is a very important part of the European security 
structure.  If there is to be European integration, then clearly Russia 
will play a very significant role. It is in our interests and NATO's 
interests and Europe's interests, but what I am going to be emphasizing 
to him is that it is in Russia's interests to engage in this process and 
not be outside the process, but on the contrary, to participate in a 
very constructive way. We will be talking tonight about Croatia and 
Bosnia as well, I am sure. That situation is one where we need the 
cooperation of Russia in various aspects. 

You never know how much you are going to get done in a single session, 
but the evening will not be complete from my standpoint if we don't talk 
about Chechnya and the continuation of the situation there, even the 
escalation in the last couple of days. It is a serious error on their 
part and, I think, quite foolhardy, and I am going to be urging them to 
follow through, urging Mr. Kozyrev to follow through with their 
commitment to accept a permanent OSCE mission and do everything they can 
to end the carnage and facilitate a political solution. As I have said 
several times, I think the Russians are paying a very high price 
internationally. They are certainly paying a high price in their 
reputation in the United States.

There are a lot of other issues on our plate. I would like to get to 
Iran at some point and talk about the Middle East, and there are a 
number of important arms control issues-- START II, BW/CW, CFE--so you 
can see we have a menu that will take us well into the evening and into 
tomorrow, but I appreciate a chance to give some of the background for 
the meetings that will be starting in less than an hour, an hour or so. 
. .  .  (###)



ARTICLE 3

Global Climate Change: Protecting the Environment
Vice President Gore
Remarks at George Washington University, Washington, DC, March 17, 1995

Thank you very much for your warm welcome. President Steve Trachtenberg, 
thank you for your kind introduction, your friendship, and your 
leadership of this great university. I want to also acknowledge Walter 
Boortz, Vice President for Administration and Information Services and 
my longtime friend and partner in the efforts to deal with this issue, 
and Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs and former Senator Tim 
Wirth, who is doing an outstanding job in addressing these issues. 

I also want to acknowledge another partner who works with me, the head 
of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Jim Baker, who 
is here from the administration doing a great job. There are many others 
I probably ought to acknowledge and I hope you will forgive me for not 
doing so. I am afraid I would miss somebody.

I want to give a special word of thanks to the AmeriCorps students from 
GW, who are volunteering to help with today's event and I want to thank 
them, also, for their excellent community service work in the District's 
Shaw neighborhood. Also, I want to recognize this university for its 
many achievements in the sciences, some of which inform the debate of 
which this speech is a part today.

It is great to be back at GW again. One reason is that this is the 
nation's first green university. The commitment you have made in a 
unique partnership with the Environmental Protection Agency has made you 
the first university in America to develop a truly comprehensive plan of 
environmental awareness in all of the university's activities, and I 
want to congratulate you for that.

I mentioned the AmeriCorps students earlier--15 of them are part of the 
Green University Initiative, doing a great job, working to draft a model 
environmental audit plan that will establish practices that are both 
environmentally sound and cost-saving.

By the way, Happy St. Patrick's Day. This is one day out of the year you 
cannot be accused of being too green. There could not be a better day to 
address the issue that I believe is the single most serious 
manifestation of the environmental crisis which now characterizes the 
radical change in the relationship between human civilization and the 
earth's environment.

Two weeks from now, this issue of global climate change will be 
discussed  in Berlin by more than 120 different countries as they begin 
the first conference of the parties for a framework convention on 
climate change. Since it is St. Patrick's Day, I thought I would begin a 
discussion of this issue by quoting an old Irish politician, Sir Boyle 
Roche, who once asked in the last century, sarcastically, "Why should we 
put ourselves out of our way to do anything for posterity? For what has 
posterity ever done for us?"  That way of thinking would go over real 
well in this session of Congress. 

Posterity is particularly relevant when talking about global climate 
change, because our actions today will have far-reaching implications 
for the environment that we leave to future generations. A commitment to 
posterity requires that we accept and understand this profound change in 
the nature of the relationship between human civilization and the 
ecological system of the earth.

I mentioned a moment ago that, in my view, global climate change is a 
manifestation of that radical change in the fundamental relationship 
between civilization and the earth. There are other manifestations--the 
rapid destruction of forests, especially tropical rain forests; the 
unprecedented loss of living species at a rate that has not taken place 
on this planet since the disappearance of the dinosaurs so many tens of 
millions of years ago; the poisoning of air and water in many places on 
the earth; and the degradation of important ecosystems, from the Aral 
Sea in Central Asia to the coral reef networks in shallow areas of the 
world's oceans.

All of these, including global climate change, are manifestations of 
this change in the relationship between human beings and the 
environment. This radical change has come about in the lifetimes of 
people gathered here in this auditorium because of a confluence of three 
factors. 

The first is the unprecedented explosion in the numbers of human beings 
around the world. We are adding the equivalent of one China's worth of 
people every 10 years. Still, we have begun to address a sensible plan 
of action to assist nations that wish to stabilize population growth. 
But the momentum built into the numbers themselves ensures that the 
rapid growth will continue for quite some time to come.

The second of these three factors is the acceleration of the scientific 
and technological revolution, which has vastly magnified the ability of 
the average human being to have an impact on the environment around him 
or her. To use an analogy, warfare is an ancient habit of human 
civilization. But the invention of nuclear weapons so completely 
transformed the consequences of all-out warfare as to require us to go 
back and think anew about that age-old habit. The Cold War was, in part, 
a result of that sobering re-examination of what all-out warfare would 
mean with these incredibly powerful new weapons.

But all of them taken together have transformed the consequences of all-
out exploitation of the earth, just as surely as nuclear weaponry 
transformed the consequences of all-out warfare. So we must think anew     
about the way in which we go about exploiting the land and the sea and 
the air or the sustenance that we need to survive.

The third factor leading to this radical change is, in some ways, the 
most important. It is a philosophical shift in our way of thinking about 
the consequences of what we do to the environment, a change which has 
led too many people to assume that we need not take into account the 
future effects of our present actions.

All three of these factors together have created a change that we are 
attempting to come to grips with in sessions like the one in Cairo on 
population and sustainable development; sessions like the many which led 
to the Montreal Protocol to limit the introduction of ozone-depleting 
substances into the stratosphere; and conferences like the one in Berlin 
two weeks from now which will address global climate change.

In order to deal with this issue, we have to begin with the facts, and 
any discussion of the facts must take into account categories upon which 
there is agreement and categories that are featured by disagreement. I 
would like to concentrate on the former rather than the latter, because 
there is wide-spread agreement about the central facts which 
characterize this problem.

The revisionist view not withstanding, there is a firm domestic and
international consensus on the most salient issues.

1. We know that greenhouse gases are building up rapidly in the 
atmosphere. Concentrations of carbon dioxide have increased about 25% 
since the Industrial Revolution; nitric oxide has gone up by 15%; 
methane has gone up by more than 100%.

2. Scientists also agree that continuing this buildup of greenhouse 
gases will cause the climate to change. The operative word in that 
sentence is not may, it is will. A continued buildup of this kind will 
cause the climate to change. About that there is no serious 
disagreement. The scientific community cannot tell us the pace of these 
changes or the precise pattern they will take, but they are telling us 
that change is coming.

There is an international consensus that global surface temperatures 
could increase from an average of 2oF to 8oF over the next century. That 
is the rate unseen on this planet for at least the last 10,000 years. 
That is, unseen during the entire history of human civilization. Since 
the first cities appeared on the earth, no such change has been seen.

The United States and other areas in high latitudes are projected to 
warm even more, with increases of up to 10oF. In just the last century, 
the earth's temperature has risen by about 1oF. The nine warmest years 
in this century have all occurred since 1980, even though the eruption 
of Mt. Pinatubo, as predicted at the time, held down temperatures for 
about three years, until the heavy particulates blocking out a tiny 
fraction of the sun's radiation fell back out of the atmosphere to 
earth.

Already, there is ominous evidence of significant change underway. 
Alpine glaciers in every part of the world are retreating rapidly. You 
may have seen the pictures not long ago of the prehistoric traveler 
whose body was found in a mountain pass in the Alps in Italy. They were 
walking along, and there he was. Why had no one noticed him there for 
the last 5,000 years? Because the ice covering him has not melted in 
5,000 years. It is now--it has now melted.

In other areas that have not seen the ice retreat in human experience, 
it is now retreating. There is a decrease in northern hemisphere snow 
cover; evidence of a decrease in Arctic sea ice. Average precipitation 
in the lower 48 states has increased in the last century by about 5%. 
Torrential rains have increased in the summer during agricultural 
growing seasons.

These are troubling, complex, and challenging issues to confront, but we 
should not imagine that they occur according to a pattern of slow and 
gradual change. We know that natural systems are replete with thresholds 
beyond which change can occur suddenly and dramatically. A warmer earth 
alters precipitation, soil moisture, and sea level that can lead to 
changes in the ideal ranges for crops, forests, and wetlands. Changes in 
precipitation patterns cause draught in some areas and more rainfall in 
others. It causes a change in the distribution of microbial populations 
and vulnerabilities to viruses and bacteria; a change in the 
distribution of pests; and a change in the distribution of plant and 
animal life.

Combinations of changes can have dramatic effects--increased rainfall 
can lead to more floods which together with higher sea levels can 
threaten the existence of some low-lying coastal communities, and 
threaten the existence even of some small island nations and low-lying 
coastal nations.

We have seen concern expressed by scientists in several parts of the 
world about the increased frequency of drastic weather events. In our 
own country, we have seen the effects of a shift in the pattern that we 
call El Nino, from a pattern that occurs every two to five years to a 
relatively new pattern during the last decade-and-a- half in which it 
has a tendency to become almost constant.

Some members of the business community whose lines of work make them 
especially sensitive to these kinds of changes are also beginning to 
express concern. Recently, I met with   a large number of 
representatives   from the insurance industry and the reinsurance 
industry. Frank Nutter, President of the Reinsurance Association of 
America, has warned about a serious risk of bankruptcy within the 
insurance industry that can come from, in his words, "significant and 
perhaps permanent changes in our climate in this country and in the 
world."

It is easy to see why insurance companies are concerned. In 1993, the 
Mississippi flooding caused an estimated $10-$20 billion worth of 
damage. Hurricane Hugo cost the Federal Government alone about $1.6 
billion. Hurricane Andrew topped $2 billion in federal disaster payments 
and cost property insurers at least $16 billion. The floods and mud 
slides in California have caused over $2 billion in damage already this 
year.

Does it make sense for us to assume that we need not take action to 
diminish the chance that an altered climate pattern will lead to an 
increase in the frequency of severe events of this sort? We ignore these 
changes at our peril. I mentioned that climate change can cause a shift 
in the distribution of microbial populations. The range of infectious 
diseases such as malaria and dengue fever can change significantly.

How should we respond to this kind of threat? The Clinton Administration 
believes that we must guard against potentially devastating effects, 
even as we deepen our scientific understanding of these issues through 
an aggressive research program. This approach is, in fact, analogous to 
an insurance policy and is not just an abstract notion.

Three years ago, we joined the international community in signing the 
historic Framework Convention on Climate Change. It was the beginning of 
a process to design a kind of insurance policy. It was a treaty that 
called on all nations to work together in an unprecedented effort to 
protect the global environment. Specifically, the industrialized 
countries were urged to take the lead by stabilizing greenhouse gas 
emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000.

Soon after taking office, President Clinton went beyond the vague, non-
binding language of the treaty, declaring that the United States would 
meet the goal set out in the treaty. The President's commitment was made 
to complement his economic objectives. He promised to turn our economy 
around, and he has delivered. Inflation is down; growth is up, 
unemployment is down; jobs are up. All told, we are demonstrating that 
economic and environmental progress can go hand-in- hand.

No doubt, the powerful economic course set by President Clinton 
challenges several of the assumptions of the plan. Rather than shirking 
away from this good news, we embrace it. Today, I want to reaffirm the 
President's pledge: The United States is committed to reaching 1990 
levels of greenhouse gas emissions by the year 2000. We have developed 
an ambitious plan aimed at fulfilling the President's commitment. Forty 
out of 47 of these initiatives have received funding and are now 
underway. Most of these initiatives share at least one common feature: 
they will mean new, clean, American jobs for our future.

For example, we have signed voluntary agreements with the bulk of our 
utility industry to keep greenhouse gas emissions down. Similar 
partnerships have been forged with U.S. industry on energy-efficient 
computers, buildings, and lighting systems. We have pledged $430 million 
to the global environmental facility for its second phase--the largest 
contribution of any nation in the world. We have created a new 
environmental technology initiative, totaling more than $1 billion to 
develop and disseminate environmentally superior technology. The U.S. 
has launched the world's first pilot program to assess the feasibility 
of joint investment projects with other countries aimed at reducing or 
sequestering emissions of greenhouse gases and promoting sustainable 
development.

In addition, we have launched a partnership for a new generation of 
vehicles, also know by some as the Clean Car Initiative. It is a real 
partnership. All three of the big three automakers are participating, 
along with the national laboratories; all of the relevant federal 
agencies; and many suppliers of parts, materials, and equipment; also, 
engineering faculties and students across the country. Together, we are 
tackling a technological challenge--in some ways as tough as putting a 
man on the Moon. We are going to develop a car with three times the 
efficiency of today's automobiles with no sacrifice in cost, comfort, or 
safety.

In the process we hope to discover the best ways to apply new 
technologies which may, in fact, lead to even greater improvements in 
efficiency-- all in 10 years' time. Success will mean less dependence on 
foreign oil and lower emissions of greenhouse gases.   Of course, in 
addition to the benefits for the American consumer, the project also 
holds the promise of an extremely attractive and competitive automobile 
for world markets at the turn of the century and the thriving U.S. auto 
industry to produce them.

In our building and construction initiative our goal is to improve the 
competitive performance of this $800 billion industry by developing much 
better construction technologies that lead to less emissions. With the 
full cooperation of the industry, we are determined to ensure that our 
buildings, like our industry, are the most productive, efficient, safe, 
and durable in the entire world. That means cut-ting delivery time in 
half with a 50% reduction in cost. We want to see  a 50% reduction in 
construction work injuries and illnesses also, while there is a 30% 
improvement in productivity and comfort. We are developing detailed 
plans with the industry to reach these objectives. We want to see 50% 
less waste and pollution and 50% more durability and flexibility.

We recognize that our plan is ambitious. And we recognize that it 
requires support from leaders on Capitol Hill. Some of our previous 
requests were not fully funded and Congress is now considering taking 
previously approved funding back. Just as this treaty requires 
international consensus, our domestic response to it requires a national 
consensus. We are committed to working with the Congress in a true 
partnership on behalf of our nation, the world, and all of its people. 
But it is incumbent upon the new leadership on Capitol Hill to step up 
to the plate and recognize both the challenges and the opportunities 
presented by climate change and recognize, too, the need for U.S. 
leadership.

Fulfilling this responsibility in the future requires acknowledging that 
our plans and those of our industrialized partners are only the first 
step. In two weeks in Berlin, nations will meet to determine what more 
the international community can do in response to the dramatic 
scientific evidence that now exists. Once again, this Administration 
will be at the forefront of this global effort.

We have said for almost a year that we do not believe that the current 
agreement is adequate. It contains an aim or goal only for the year 
2000, and this aim applies only to a limited number of countries. We are 
now in a situation in which the maximum response that is politically 
feasible throughout the world still falls short of what is really needed 
to address the problem. All the nations of the world will need to work 
together to develop guidance on what steps to take beyond the year 2000. 
So we must negotiate a new aim for the future.

In view of these limitations and mindful of our responsibility to the 
future, we are working with other nations to develop a mandate that can 
be agreed upon in Berlin and can set the course for next steps under the 
treaty. This will require us all to carefully examine what each of us 
can do to contribute to further reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. 
Our goal, in other words, in Berlin is to build a foundation and begin 
momentum.

Just as there are thresholds in the natural climate system, there are 
also thresholds in the political system. When evidence accumulates to 
the point where enough people are no longer willing to listen to 
skeptics that have arguments that are not grounded in the facts, then 
beyond that threshold the possibilities for significant action improve 
dramatically. That is why it is important to develop quality research. 
We have already begun that process here in the United States and that 
will be a part of the process we will follow in the future.

But now is the time to re-launch negotiations and walk more concretely 
toward the treaty's objective. Now is the time to establish a new 
negotiating mandate that will allow us to fulfill our responsibilities 
to future generations--a mandate that ensures we move forward from the 
important first steps outlined for the pre-2000 period.

We strongly believe that all nations must participate in this effort. 
Certainly, industrialized countries who have contributed most of the 
problem can and should take the lead--and we shall. But we simply cannot 
ignore the fact that emissions are rising fastest in developing 
countries, which together now account for almost 50% of all greenhouse 
gas emissions in the world. We know that industrialized countries have 
special responsibilities, and we fully support the convention's call for 
common but differentiated responsibilities. But we very much want the 
developing nations to join us at the negotiating table so that together 
we can define these common but differentiated responsibilities in the 
post-2000 era, not so that alone we can do less, but so that together we 
can do more--through trade, technology cooperation, and a host of 
strategies that offer benefits for all nations.

We also must do a better job of ensuring that nations are matching 
rhetoric with reality; that we are accountable for what we say we will 
do. To date, only a handful of nations have put forward clear, 
substantive proposals that move them toward the emission reductions they 
have enunciated. We must be clear: Good intentions and high-flying 
rhetoric will not come close to helping us meet the very significant 
challenges inherent in reducing emissions. What is needed and expected 
under the treaty is concrete action.

In the negotiations that will follow the Berlin meeting, it is 
imperative that we establish a menu of measures from which to choose 
strategies for reaching any new aim set for the post-2000 period. Only 
an analytic phase as part of the negotiating process can provide us with 
realizable measures and the realistic understanding of what our 
expectations and goals should be for the future. But the measures 
selected must truly achieve emissions reductions, and nations must be 
prepared to show actions and results.

Finally, we believe that the mandate for negotiations should be 
concluded as rapidly as possible. We believe that an aggressive, 
ambitious approach, looking at short-term and long-term goals--that is 
for the years 2010 and 2020--can be concluded by 1997, when the third 
conference of the parties will be held. We think this date is a fair 
one, one that reflects our view of the importance and urgency of the 
climate change problem and also gives us the lead time to develop and 
begin to take advantage of new technologies.

On the one hand, we have nations that will be trying to appease strong 
constituencies in their countries by outbidding the rest of the national 
community in their pledges to reduce emissions by future actions. But 
what future generations need is aggressive, measurable, and ambitious 
actions and not political promises of future actions.

On the other hand, we have political extremists--some of them in our own 
country--who would have the United States evade and ignore tough issues 
like global climate change, ozone depletion, or any number of threats to 
human and environmental health. Far outside the mainstream of scientific 
consensus, they would deny the existence of the problem and seek to 
prevent the United States from even acknowledging its concern, even 
though the actions that we envision are good both for the environment 
and for the economy.

This is an intellectually, politically, and morally bankrupt position 
which must be resisted. It is similar to the position that was taken for 
so long by the tobacco industry in the face of mounting medical and 
scientific evidence about the connection between smoking and lung 
cancer. To this day, the precise causal relationship and all the details 
about exactly how smoking causes lung cancer cannot be established with 
precision. But the relationship is accepted. It is a medical fact. Yet, 
for so long, those--some of those with an economic interest in delaying 
the recognition of that connection--argued implausibly that the 
scientific evidence was questionable, ought to be ignored, was 
insufficient upon which to base any conclusions. They were wrong. Those 
who are now seeking to delay the time at which we recognize the 
connection between the accumulation of greenhouse gases and global 
climate change are also wrong. If you think back to the dramatic fires 
in Kuwait when the oil    fields were set ablaze in 1991, all of   that 
carbon pollution put together amounted to less than 1% of what we put 
into the earth's environment every year. And that amount continues to 
increase every year.

We cannot forget that we are now witnessing the most extreme and 
concerted assault on the environment in history. The core of the so-
called Contract With America is a borehole through the heart of the 
nation's environmental laws and commitments. Buried in arcane rhetoric 
about regulatory reform is a deliberate attack--widely acknowledged in 
the popular press--that effectively revokes many of this nation's most 
important environmental laws from the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water 
Act to the Endangered Species Act. The President and I do not support 
this and will not accept it. The health of our children, the safety of 
our workers, and the integrity of our environment cannot be so 
recklessly jeopardized.

Rather than attack environmental initiatives, we hope the Congress will 
work with us to craft policies that are as environmentally sound as they 
are economically beneficial.

Let me close by drawing an analogy to the response by the international 
community to another problem that was similar in some ways to global 
climate change. That is the problem of ozone depletion. Ten years ago, 
at about the same stage in the development of scientific knowledge, the 
nations of the world came together in Montreal to take prudent steps 
toward protecting the earth's stratospheric ozone layer. These initial 
efforts were expanded in the aftermath of a stunning scientific 
discovery--a hole in the ozone layer above Antarctica which was the size 
of the North American continent.

After that discovery was confirmed, the world's political system crossed 
a threshold beyond which it became much easier to secure agreement on 
the need to act. That led to the London Amendments in 1990--where the 
world agreed to phase out the most damaging ozone-depleting chemicals, 
and the subsequent Copenhagen Agreement--which accelerated the process 
by five years. Every American can be proud that the United States helped 
to lead these efforts politically and scientifically.

As with the ozone issue, nations have agreed on the nature of the 
climate change threat, and we have taken the first tentative initial 
steps to thwart that threat. But this is just a beginning. I think we 
can answer the question that I quoted from Sir Roche at the beginning of 
my speech about posterity, and answer it with another Irish sentiment 
written by the great poet, William Butler Yeats. He wrote, "I have 
spread my dreams under your feet. Tread softly because you tread on my 
dreams."

Unless we tread softly, our dreams for the future will be nothing but 
dreams. Let us make sure that our next steps are the right ones. Thank 
you very much.  (###)



ARTICLE 4

Renewing the Middle East Peace Process

Secretary Christopher, Jordanian King Hussein,   Bahraini Foreign 
Minister Al Khalifa, PLO Chairman Arafat, Egyptian President Mubarak, 
Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, Israeli Foreign Minister Peres, Text of 
Joint Declaration

Secretary Christopher
Opening statement at press conference following meeting with Syrian 
President Hafiz al-Asad, Damascus, Syria, March 14, 1995 (introductory 
remarks deleted).

This is an issue very vital to the United States, and of course these 
issues that we are considering here are of critical importance to the 
parties and their leaders.

I have had intensive discussions over the last 24 hours with Prime 
Minister Rabin, and then today with President Asad.  These have been 
productive discussions. We have made good progress. On the basis of 
these discussions, direct contact between Israel and Syria will be 
resumed.  Ambassador Moallem and Ambassador Rabinovich will re-engage 
directly in Washington, DC, under the auspices and the sponsorship of 
the United States. In light of the discussions between the ambassadors, 
I expect that I will be sending Ambassador Dennis Ross back to the 
Middle East in the next couple of weeks to review the security issues 
and to prepare the grounds for subsequent military talks that we hope 
will take place. Both of the leaders, in the discussions yesterday and 
today, made it clear to me that they look forward to my return to the 
region at a time it will be most helpful. 

I think the results of these last two days and this last week have 
brought home to me, once again, the critical importance the United 
States plays in Middle Eastern matters. As a result of my trip out here, 
and coincident with it,  there has been a renewal of the process here in 
the Middle East and a burst of energy, not only on this track but on all 
of the tracks. I must say that when I first was considering a return to 
the Middle East on this trip, I had to take into account that the 
atmosphere here was growing very sour, and I was not at all sure that 
progress could be made.  Nevertheless, I decided that I ought to return 
simply to see if I could make some progress, to see if something could 
be done. Basically, I came out here, as I said to some of you, with five 
objectives.

First, in Egypt, I wanted to give some push forward to the discussions 
between Egypt and Israel on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to have an 
opportunity to talk about our bilateral relationship with Egypt.

Second, I wanted to do what I could to reenergize the negotiations 
between Israel and the Palestinians.

Third, I wanted to reassure King Hussein about the support of the United 
States for Jordan and for the peace process, and particularly, to 
reassure him that we would carry out our commitment on the debt 
forgiveness.

Fourth, I wanted to try to get Israel and Syria to re-engage in direct 
face-to-face discussions, which I  addressed tonight.

Finally, as you know, I made my trip to the Gulf to try to rekindle the 
coalition and to make sure that the coalition will maintain the 
sanctions against Iraq in good form and good order.

Actually, it has turned out to be one of the most satisfying trips that 
I have made to the Middle East. We made progress on each of those five 
objectives--with the announcement today, we have progress on this track. 
We have the vote in the UN today--a reassurance that the coalition will 
maintain the sanctions against Iraq. I can say it has been a very 
satisfying trip, underscoring the importance of continued U.S. 
leadership and involvement in the region. I am very glad I came, and I 
regret the inconvenience to you. But I think it has been a worth-while 
trip, and I feel good about it.


Secretary Christopher, King Hussein
Opening remarks at press conference, Amman, Jordan, March 13, 1995.

King Hussein. Once again, a warm welcome to a good friend, the Secretary 
of State of the United States of America, on his visit here. We have had 
a chance to speak of developments in the recent past and of our efforts 
for the establishment of peace in this region--a comprehensive peace--
and obviously our achievements on the bilateral Jordanian-Israeli 
dimension in terms of the peace treaty and what has been achieved so 
far. We are very happy, indeed, to have the opportunity to give the 
Secretary a chance to answer any of your questions. Maybe I can help in 
any way I can. Welcome.


Secretary Christopher. I am very pleased to be back in Jordan tonight to 
meet with His Majesty and his senior advisors. It was only last October 
that the King and Prime Minister Rabin signed the Jordan-Israel peace 
treaty. It was really an act of extraordinary vision and courage on the 
part of the King. It is one that the world community will not soon 
forget. Where others hesitated, the King has demonstrated the 
statesmanship that we have long come to associate with his leadership in 
this region.

Jordan not only signed the peace treaty, but it has made very strong 
efforts to implement it. In many respects, the relationship between the 
Prime Minister of Israel and the King of Jordan is a model for how to 
implement a new peace treaty to make sure it becomes a warm peace, not 
just in words but in action as well. All of those who have a real 
interest in Middle East peace have a stake in supporting Jordan. The 
United States has a deep interest in Jordan's well-being and security 
and the success of the peace that is made with Israel. That is why 
President Clinton has determined to support Jordan's willingness to take 
the risk for peace. That is why, last August, Congress authorized the 
forgiveness of all of Jordan's official debt to the United States. 
Today, my message to the King and to the people of this great country is 
very clear: America's commitment to Jordan will be fulfilled. I also 
told the King about steps that the United States is prepared to take to 
address Jordan's security needs.

It is proper that elections can and do change American politics, but 
they should not--indeed, they must not--change the nature of our vital 
interests or undermine the credibility of our commitments. Therefore, I 
was very pleased to tell His Majesty that the President and I have been 
working closely with the bipartisan leadership in Congress to maintain 
our commitments to Jordan. We hope and expect that the full Congress 
will act very soon to support the effort that we have been leading.

Tonight, King Hussein and I also discussed the other tracks of the peace 
process and the steps that were taken during my recent trip. We agreed 
that there should be every effort to sustain the momentum that exists 
within this region toward a comprehensive peace. I want to particularly 
note that we reviewed the plans under way for the summit in Amman at the 
end of October, which is a follow-up to the Economic Summit in 
Casablanca. This will bring into focus our commitment to the 
establishment of a Middle East development bank. It is a reflection of 
Jordan's leadership that they are having this summit here in Jordan, and 
I hope and expect that it will be the occasion for the kind of economic 
and business support that Jordan deserves because of its leadership.

As you also know, Vice President Gore will be visiting here in Jordan in 
a few days. As the King and I discussed, the King will be visiting the 
United States before the end of this month. Those back-and-forth visits 
are only a reflection of the closeness of our partnership--a partnership 
that serves so well the cause of peace and prosperity here in the Middle 
East. As always, thank you very much for your hospitality, Your Majesty.


Secretary Christopher, Bahraini Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Mubarak Al 
Khalifa, Text of Joint Declaration 
Opening remarks at press conference following meeting between Secretary 
Christopher and the GCC foreign ministers and text of Joint Declaration 
Issued in Jeddah Following Meeting Between Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher and Gulf Cooperation Council Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, March 12, 1995. 

Mohammed bin Mubarak Al Khalifa. Ladies and gentlemen: I would like to 
welcome you. In this meeting, we discussed certain issues. First, we 
touched on the bilateral relations between the GCC countries and the 
United States of America--how to enhance and to improve and develop this 
relationship. We always have excellent relations. But these meetings 
certainly contribute to making those relations stronger. Second, we 
discussed various issues of interest to both parties: first, the Middle 
East peace process and how can we help in making this process go 
forward. We share with the United States the importance of the peace 
process' success. Also, we discussed the situation in Iraq and the 
implementation of UN resolutions. There are other issues which we 
covered in the communique. I will ask the Secretary General of the GCC 
to read to you the text of the communique. He will read it in Arabic, 
but he will circulate it in English for those who use the English 
language.


Text of Joint Declaration. The Foreign Ministers of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council joined in a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher in Jeddah on March 12. The participants reaffirmed their 
common commitment to security in the Gulf region, including freedom of 
navigation through its international waterways. The Ministers called for 
Iraq's immediate implementation of all relevant UN Security Council 
resolutions and notably the issue related to the Kuwait and non-Kuwait 
Prisoners of War and detainees in Iraq. They expressed appreciation for 
the Security Council's firm stand toward Iraq, and encouraged the 
Council to resist any modification of the sanctions regime until Iraq 
fully complies with all its obligations.

The Ministers expressed their concern for the humanitarian situation in 
Iraq. They underscored the importance of U.N. Security Council 
Resolutions 706 and 712, designed specifically to address the needs of 
Iraq's civilian population. Iraq's refusal to take advantage of these 
resolutions is the primary cause of the suffering of the Iraqi people. 
The Ministers called upon Iraq to implement resolutions 706 and 712, and 
once again urged Iraq to show concern for its citizens by implementing 
these resolutions immediately.

The Ministers expressed their deep appreciation for the United Arab 
Emirates' efforts to peacefully resolve the issue of the Iranian 
occupation of the three islands--the Greater Tomb, the Lesser Tomb, and 
Abu-Musa, which belong to UAE. The Ministers urged the Islamic republic 
of Iran to respond positively to the initiative of the United Arab 
Emirates and to agree to refer this dispute to the International Court 
of Justice.

Secretary Christopher provided a briefing on his recent visits to Middle 
East capitals. The Cooperation Council Ministers expressed strong 
support for the Secretary's trip and praised the U.S. Administration's 
continued efforts to promote the peace process. They reaffirmed the 
Cooperation Council's support for the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of 
Principles and the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan. The Ministers 
recognized these agreements as important steps toward the achievement of 
a comprehensive peace.

The Ministers emphasized the importance of early implementation of the 
second phase of the Declaration of Principles, and underscored the need 
for progress in negotiations between Israel and Syria and Israel and 
Lebanon. The Ministers stressed the importance of a comprehensive peace 
and reaffirmed their determination to work together to achieve that 
goal. They condemned all acts of violence and terrorism.

The Ministers also discussed the Arab League Boycott of Israel. The 
United States welcomed the decision of the Gulf Cooperation Council to 
terminate the secondary and tertiary aspects of the boycott, as 
announced in the Council's September 30, 1994 statement and its 11 
January, 1995 Diplomatic Note to the United States. The United States 
expressed satisfaction over the member states' readiness to support 
initiatives within the Arab League to build on the Council's September 
30, 1994 statement.


Mohammed bin Mubarak Al Khalifa. Now I will ask Mr. Secretary if you 
want to make a statement.


Secretary Christopher. Thank you, Mr. Foreign Minister. First, I want to 
express my appreciation to His Majesty King Fahd and His Royal Highness 
Prince Saud and to the Government of Saudi Arabia for the hospitality 
they extended to us today and for the splendid arrangements to host this 
meeting. As the Minister just said, we had a very productive set of 
discussions. We discussed the peace process; we discussed security in 
the Gulf, as he indicated, and the importance of maintaining the 
sanctions against Iraq; we discussed the Arab League boycott of Israel 
and the determination to lift the secondary and tertiary aspects. 

I was reminded that I last met with the Minister five months ago, when 
Iraq's army was threatening Kuwait. At that time, our joint 
determination to confront Iraq stopped the aggression by Saddam Hussein-
-stopped it in its tracks. I want to emphasize that today  we are no 
less united in supporting peace and security throughout the Gulf region. 
In the meeting today, I reaffirmed to the Ministers long-standing U.S. 
policy: We reject any efforts to intimidate or coerce our regional 
friends, and we are committed to freedom of navigation throughout the 
Gulf's international waterways. The United States and members of the GCC 
continue to insist that Iraq fully comply with all relevant UN Security 
Council resolutions. Unanimously, we oppose any effort now or in the 
future to modify the sanctions until Iraq fulfills all of its 
obligations. Speaking for the United States, we do not believe that Iraq 
is even close to fulfillment of this requirement on a wide range of 
Security Council requirements--from stolen Kuwait property and missing 
persons to accounting for its biological weapons program and its 
treatment of its own citizens, Iraq's record of compliance is genuinely 
a travesty. 

I briefed the ministers on Ambassador Albright's recent trip to several 
Security Council capitals, where she conveyed President Clinton's 
determination to oppose the modification of the Iraqi sanctions. That 
was a position that received endorsements on each of Ambassador 
Albright's stops, and I believe that it commands a strong and durable 
majority in the Security Council at the present time. 

During our meeting, I discussed with the ministers the humanitarian 
situation in Iraq. The United States shares with the other ministers and 
the countries of this region the concerns that exist here over the 
suffering of the Iraqi people. We are also in complete agreement that it 
is the responsibility of the Iraqi Government to end that suffering and 
their responsibility alone. It is the Iraqi regime that refuses to 
comply with all relevant Security Council resolutions, and it is the 
Iraqi regime that refuses to implement resolutions 706 and 712, which 
the Security Council passed with the explicit purpose of addressing 
those humanitarian needs. It is also the Iraqi regime that has sought to 
exploit the suffering of its citizens as a reason to avoid its 
international obligations. I told the ministers that the United States 
is prepared to explore within the sanctions framework new means to 
further meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. 

On the peace process, I briefed the ministers on my current trip. I 
received their strong endorsement for our efforts to advance all 
negotiating tracks, emphasizing, as I strongly believe, that there is an 
important opportunity to revitalize those talks. I underscored our 
efforts to help the peacemakers succeed on the Palestinian track by 
urging that they assist in economic development in Gaza and Jericho and 
support the full implementation of the Declaration of Principles; and, 
on the Syrian and Lebanese tracks, by supporting intensive contacts 
aimed at overcoming the gap that exists between the parties and leading 
to a comprehensive peace.

Finally, the ministers and I discussed steps which could be taken at the 
regional level to bolster the peace process, especially efforts to end 
the Arab boycott of Israel. The United States greatly appreciates the 
leadership of the GCC countries, as they demonstrated last fall with the 
declaration to terminate the secondary and tertiary aspects of the 
boycott. I welcome the declaration of the ministers to support efforts 
within the Arab League to build on the GCC Declaration. The U.S. 
position on this issue, of course, is well known: We regard the boycott 
as an anachronism that must come to an end--come to an end now. The 
boycott, instead of building bridges for the future, reinforces the 
barriers of the past and should be totally overcome. 

Let me close by once again thanking my ministerial colleagues and 
representatives for coming together here for this meeting today on 
relatively short notice, and I stress again my appreciation to the King 
and to Prince Saud for their splendid hosting of this event. Thank you 
very much.


Secretary Christopher, PLO Chairman Arafat
Remarks following a meeting at Palestinian Authority Headquarters, Gaza 
City, March 10, 1995.

Chairman Arafat. I have the privilege to repeat again in front of all of 
you our thanks from our hearts that we extend to President Clinton and 
to   Mr. Christopher for what they are doing to push forward the peace 
process. We are relating to much of what they are doing to save the 
peace process. We had a very positive discussion just now with His 
Excellency, and we have to repeat again our thanks to what he is 
offering toward support and to help our people in all efforts. We can't 
forget that the first initiative was taken by President Clinton for the 
meeting of the donors to help our people in constructing the 
infrastructure and to help our very difficult economic situation in all 
fields. So, I have to repeat here again, thank you for what you are 
doing to help our people and to save the peace process.

Yesterday we had, on the other hand, a mission--a positive meeting with 
Mr. Peres, also to save the peace process. We hope that you will 
continue in this line so that we can have comprehensive, lasting, peace 
resolutions--not only between the Palestinians and the Israelis, not 
only between the Jordanians and the Israelis, but in the whole region, 
including the Syrians and the Lebanese track--so that we can have a 
comprehensive, lasting, peaceful solution in the whole region. Thank you 
very much.


Secretary Christopher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be 
here again to meet with Chairman Arafat and his senior colleagues. We 
had good conversations, ranging over a period of more than an hour, and 
discussed a number of subjects. I had the opportunity to reaffirm the 
United States' commitment to the success of the Palestinian Authority 
and to the progress that they are making here in Gaza and Jericho.

As the Chairman said, yesterday's talks between the Chairman and Foreign 
Minister Peres have reenergized the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, 
and they have given us an opportunity to move forward. Their 
understanding reflects the mutuality of their interests. Most 
importantly, it shows a reflection of the desire of each party to meet 
the needs and respond to the concerns of the others. For the 
Palestinians, that means rapid implementation of the process leading to 
the transfer of authority, redeployment, and elections. For the 
Israelis, this means concrete steps to improve the security situation, 
preempt terror, and bring to justice those who are responsible for 
violence.

Chairman Arafat has assured me that he is undertaking vigorous new 
measures to preempt and fight terror. He is determined and committed to 
implementing a law enforcement mechanism that brings to justice those 
responsible for violence against peace. He is determined to prevent--as 
we all are--the extremists from derailing the process of fulfilling 
Palestinian hopes and dreams. Those who engage in terror against 
Israelis present the greatest threat of all to the Palestinians and to 
the activities of the Palestinian Authority and Chairman Arafat. The 
Chairman made it clear in his comments to me, as he did in his meeting 
yesterday with Foreign Minister Peres, that he will do everything he can 
to prevent these extremists from succeeding.

My assessment, as I conclude this meeting today, is that we can all do a 
better job. For our part, the United States is leading the effort to 
marshall international resources for the Palestinian Authority. In the 
coming weeks, we will be making a push with our partners to see that 
previous pledges are paid, if they are unfulfilled, and that new 
commitments are made to assist the Palestinian Authority. In the United 
States, we have completed a restructuring of our assistance program. We 
will be working with the international community to help redesign their 
program for a greater impact. We are working on a number of new 
initiatives to help stimulate the economy here, especially through 
proposals that will increase employment in the Palestinian area--
projects such as the industrial zones which the Chairman and Foreign 
Minister Peres talked about yesterday. We are going to dispatch a team 
from the United States Department of Agriculture to assist in 
agricultural production here, and we hope that employment and marketing 
will soon follow. These teams from the Department of Agriculture have 
been effective in other countries, and we think they have a good deal of 
promise here. Furthermore, the Department of Defense is going to send a 
team here to evaluate medical and humanitarian needs. President Clinton 
has authorized 200 additional trucks and spare parts from the U.S. 
military stocks to be made available to the Palestinian police.

Mr. Chairman, after my talks in Israel last night and this morning, I   
am convinced that new life has been injected into the negotiations 
between you and the Israelis. In the face of great difficulties, you 
have once again demonstrated that you have a shared interest in 
maintaining the maximum opportunities for peace. For the sake of the 
future, for the sake of peace, I hope that you will succeed. The United 
States will do all that we can to assist in that. Thank you for your 
hospitality, Mr. Chairman. It was a pleasure to be with you and your 
senior colleagues again.


Secretary Christopher, Egyptian President Mubarak
Opening remarks at a press conference, Itihadiya Palace, Cairo, Egypt, 
March 9, 1995.

President Mubarak. I was pleased to meet with Secretary Christopher 
today and pursue with him our discussion of issues of mutual concern. 
Naturally, we reviewed recent developments in the peace process, and we 
reviewed it with special emphasis on the Palestinian, Syrian, and 
Lebanese tracks. Our conclusion was that there is an urgent need for 
energizing this process and creating a new momentum for peace. Time is 
of the essence. We should exert maximum effort in order to enhance the 
chances for making meaningful progress without delay. We count on the 
continuation of the active American role in the crucial weeks and months 
ahead.

We discussed also the issue of our determination to work for a Middle 
East free of weapons of mass destruction. In this context we dealt with 
the issue of the NPT, which has been over-emphasized lately by the 
media. Let me make our viewpoint crystal clear on this matter. We are a 
member in good standing of this important treaty. We would like its 
duration to be extended for the maintenance of global peace and 
security. We want its moral authority to be strengthened. On the other 
hand, we have certain regional concerns which we believe should be taken 
into serious consideration. This emanates from the Israeli nuclear 
program, and we are urging Israel to undertake the necessary steps for 
freeing the region from nuclear weapons together with other weapons of 
mass destruction. This is the best guarantee for the security of all 
peoples of the region. We are engaged in the negotiations with the 
Israeli Government on this matter, and we do hope that its position will 
be forthcoming. Our aim is to move the entire region to a new era of 
balanced security and stability for all of us.

I ask the Secretary to convey my best wishes and regards to our good 
friend President Clinton and the Vice President, Al Gore, whom I expect 
to see by the 19th of this month. And I look forward to meeting with 
President Clinton next month in Washington. Thank you.


Secretary Christopher. Thank you very much, Mr. President. I am very 
pleased to be back here in Cairo and to have an opportunity to consult 
with the President. I believe this is my 11th or 12th trip to the Middle 
East since I have been in office. It is not an accident that I 
frequently come here first whenever I can, as I have had the opportunity 
to do this time. For two decades, Egypt has led the Arab world in a 
search for a comprehensive peace. Just last month, President Mubarak 
convened here the historic summit, which was followed by the ministerial 
meeting in Washington that had as its purpose the desire to energize and 
move the peace process forward. Those two meetings are a reflection of 
the kind of vision that President Mubarak has had, and he has given us 
wise counsel all through this process.

Egypt is a vital partner of the United States in this process. That 
reality, as the President has just indicated, is reflected in the fact 
that Vice President Gore will be coming here the weekend after next. I 
am pleased to confirm, as President Mubarak just said, that he has 
accepted President Clinton's invitation to come to the United States 
during the first week of April, and we will welcome him very warmly 
there. The President and I are agreed on the urgency of moving ahead, as 
he said, on all four tracks of the peace process. We certainly do not 
underestimate the challenges that lie ahead. But we understand and 
recognize that considerable progress has been made up to this point, and 
we need to do everything we can to grasp the historic opportunity that 
we have at the present time.

The key on both the Palestinian track and the Syrian track is that 
parties on both sides must recognize and respond to the needs of the 
parties on the other side. The Palestinians must redouble their efforts 
to fight terror against the Israelis and to bring to justice those who 
are responsible. Israel, under those circumstances, can ensure that its 
own commitment to redeployment and elections is able to be fulfilled. 
Israel and Syria must also recognize the tremendous opportunity that 
they have to move ahead. Both parties face very difficult decisions. But 
it is essential that they reengage soon and grasp this opportunity. 
Progress must be made, and it must accelerate if the parties are to 
reach a settlement in the timeframe that is available. With our help, we 
think these negotiations can bear real fruit.

As President Mubarak has said, we had a good discussion today of the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty. President Mubarak understands the importance 
that President Clinton and the United States attach to the extension of 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty. At the same time, after our discussions, 
we have a clearer understanding of Egypt's concerns on this matter. Most 
important of all, we are in complete agreement on two strategic points. 
First, as the President indicated, we both regard the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty as a pillar of world security. Second, we agree on the need to 
address this issue together in a cooperative way, and in a way that 
strengthens the U.S.-Eyptian partnership and advances the pursuit of 
peace.

That raises the broader point that I want to underscore in closing. 
Israel and the United States and Egypt have been the cornerstone of the 
search for peace in the Middle East. That kind of a relationship was 
essential in creating the historic opportunity that we now have for a 
comprehensive peace. Certainly, that relationship between the three 
countries will be essential if we are to achieve a comprehensive peace. 
President Mubarak and I agree that our countries share a very strong 
interest in ensuring that each part of this unique triangular 
relationship continues to be strong and to build an even stronger 
foundation for the future. Thank you very much.


Secretary Christopher, Israeli Prime Minister Rabin
Remarks following a meeting at the Israeli Defense Ministry, Tel Aviv, 
Israel, March 9, 1995.

Prime Minister Rabin. We welcome you, Mr. Secretary. We appreciate very 
much that the efforts of the United States, the President, and yourself, 
are making real effort to facilitate, to help, and to build bridges that 
will lead to comprehensive peace--that is to say, with the Palestinians, 
Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. We believe that peace is attainable. It 
calls for determination, wisdom, and the capability to overcome 
difficulties.

I believe that by now,  Mr. Secretary, we can sum up our joint 
activities of the last 21/2 years that we in Israel are in government. 
We signed the Declaration of Principles in Washington in September 1993. 
We implemented the Cairo Agreement that brought about "Gaza-Jericho 
First."  We had the Washington Declaration--the United States, Jordan, 
and Israel. We signed the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel. We 
created openness in many parts of the world--in many parts of the Arab 
world, too. And we have to move forward. Today, the major problems are 
to consolidate the agreements that have been reached: the Gaza-Jericho, 
from the point of view of security and economic development; in Jordan, 
by keeping commitments that were given to Jordan, by whoever [sic] gave 
it to them; and of course, to go on with the Palestinians, to implement 
the DoP on the West Bank, Judea and Samaria. I believe that as a result 
of the meeting between Shimon Peres, our Foreign Minister, and Chairman 
Arafat today, we aim to a target date in which both sides had to prove 
their capability, on one hand, to reach an agreement on what will be 
implemented of the DoP, and how the DoP will be implemented--in Judea 
and Samaria, the West Bank, and at the same time, how the Palestinian 
Authority will prove its capability to cope with violence and terrorism. 
The only and the main obstacle to move ahead with the Palestinians is 
terrorism. Therefore, aiming at the target date is a test to both sides-
-to the Palestinians, to prove their capability to cope with terrorism 
from their own territories against Israelis and Palestinians in their 
territories and outside; to us, with them, to reach an agreement that 
will meet the goal of the DoP.

I believe that your mission here will bring about the resumption of the 
negotiations in whatever format with Syria and Lebanon. I would like to 
make it clear: We are capable to achieve peace with Syria. We want to 
achieve with Syria peace that will give Israel peace, in the real 
meaning of it, and security. We reached a high point in our negotiations 
about security in Washington when the two Chiefs of Staff of the armed 
forces of Syria and Israel met and negotiated. I believe there is no 
reason why we shouldn't continue these negotiations. At least in our 
discussions, and during your trips in the region, we try to bring it 
about, and hopefully. I wish you a success to achieve it.

Again, Mr. Secretary, we have worked together. We have great confidence 
in you, and we appreciate what you have done and what you will do to 
strengthen the hopes for peace in the region.


Secretary Christopher. Thank you very much, Mr. Prime Minister. I am 
delighted to be here in Tel Aviv again on this very beautiful spring 
evening. We had a very good discussion on a wide range of issues. My 
strong perception after meeting with Prime Minister Rabin and his top 
aides, including Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, is of a renewed 
commitment on their part to push ahead in seeking a comprehensive peace 
in this region. I want to assure him and all the people of Israel that 
the United States shares that commitment. We will join in pushing ahead.

I gave the Prime Minister and his colleagues an account of my meeting 
today in Egypt with President Mubarak and his aides. We are in complete 
agreement that Israel, Egypt, and the United States should continue to 
work closely together to achieve peace and regional stability. We spent 
a good deal of time talking about the peace process. I was very pleased 
to hear from both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister an account 
of the welcome developments today in Gaza. It is something that I hope I 
can build on by emphasizing some of the points tomorrow when I meet with 
Chairman Arafat. It is very important that we have not only peace in the 
region, but that we have peace with security for Israel.

As the events of the day tend to demonstrate, we are determined to move 
forward. I think we can find ways to work cooperatively to overcome the 
obstacles that exist. If there is a willingness--and I believe there is-
-on all sides to address each other's needs, I think we can make great 
strides toward a comprehensive peace that we all are looking for. The 
United States is determined to stand by Israel and support it and the 
other parties in this peace process. We are committed to pushing ahead 
on all of the negotiating tracks and trying to grasp this opportunity 
for peace. That is the mission of my next several days here in Israel. 
With the Prime Minister's help, I do believe that we can use this 
opportunity, working with Israel and working with the other parties, to 
put the peace process firmly back on track. Thank you very much.


Secretary Christopher, Israeli Foreign Minister Peres
Remarks following the Secretary's arrival, Ben Gurion Airport, Israel, 
March 9, 1995.

Foreign Minister Peres. Let me say here at the outset: Our greatest 
problem in the negotiations with the Palestinian Authority from our 
standpoint was the security matter. I think from the Palestinian side, 
it was really scheduling and organizing the continuation of the 
negotiations about the second stage. We were greatly helped by the 
President of the United States, President Clinton, sending a letter to 
Chairman Arafat emphasizing the issue and the importance of the issue of 
security, and the Secretary calling up, from time to time, both the 
Palestinians and ourselves urging us to deblock the negotiations on the 
Palestinian side. I do believe that both the letter of the President and 
the intervention of the Secretary were of great help, and actually 
today, it was really a reopening in a very serious way the whole 
Palestinian story.

Chairman Arafat has announced in a very detailed way his position on 
security, and we on our side suggested a list of confidence-building 
measures, together with a philosophy about negotiations, and I am very 
glad that the principles were accepted and so we have an opened-up 
situation. I do hope it will help the Secretary on his very important 
mission going around to Jordan, to Syria, because my impression is that 
in the eyes of many of the Arab countries the deblocking of the 
Palestinian issue is of great importance. And so we are all in a real 
coordination in time and content, and I do hope that when the Secretary 
will meet tomorrow Mr. Arafat, he will bring to a very clear conclusion 
the issues of security and the continuation of the negotiations. In the 
name of the Israeli Government, I want to welcome you, Warren, very 
heartily.


Secretary Christopher. As always, I am delighted to be back here in 
Israel and to have a chance to talk with both the Prime Minister and the 
Foreign Minister. Of course, I return here at a time of great challenge 
in the peace process. Although events are changing and challenges are 
changing, our goal is always the same; we are seeking a comprehensive 
peace. We are seeking a more secure Israel in a more stable region, 
which is freed of the threat of war that has hung over this whole region 
for so long. We do not underestimate the problems that we face on this 
trip in trying to help the parties move toward peace, but nevertheless, 
I think that we have the opportunity to move forward. 

With respect to the comments that the Foreign Minister has just made, I 
congratulate him and his team for their progress in unblocking the 
negotiations. We welcome that development. We think that it is very 
important that the negotiations do go forward and do succeed, and we 
will be doing everything we can to assist in that.

Today's problems are difficult, but in finding an answer to them we will 
not rest until we achieve a real peace in this region. If we were to 
abandon this, or if the parties were to regard themselves as being at a 
dead-end, that would be no solution at all. That would be a solution 
only for increased tension and increased terror in the region. There is 
no turning back. The only issue is how we move forward. The real 
question is how can we move forward and ensure at the same time Israel's 
security, which has always been primary. That simply is non-negotiable 
from our standpoint. We think that Israel must have real peace with its 
neighbors. Peace and security are the two elements that we must try to 
achieve together.

The news that the Foreign Minister has brought today is very welcome. 
Both the Palestinians and the Israelis are now seeking to meet each 
other's needs, and unquestionably that is the issue. That is the dilemma 
for both of them. We must find some way to enable the parties to fulfill 
their commitment to preempt and fight against terror and at the same 
time to further economic development and elections that have been so 
long wanted and so long promised. We must find ways, together with the 
Israelis and the other members of the community, to improve economic 
conditions in Gaza and Jericho and in the West Bank as a whole. The 
United States is prepared to take some new steps to this end, and I will 
be talking with the Israelis about how we can cooperate in taking those 
steps.

The Foreign Minister briefly referred to the situation regarding Syria. 
The parties face difficult decisions there. We will be talking about how 
those decisions might be taken and how we can accelerate that process 
too. Because we need to try to achieve here a peace of the brave--a 
peace that      will end the threat of war on Israel's border--to 
provide the kind of security that only peace can provide. The trouble 
that Israel has with its neighbors in this situation is a long road. It 
is a search that did not begin yesterday, and it will not end tomorrow. 
Difficult decisions will be required by all the parties.

The United States, I want to emphasize, will be here for the long pull. 
Our commitment to Israel's security, as I have always said--and I want 
to emphasize again on this trip--is unshakable. We will seek to give aid 
to those who take risks for peace, as we have in the past. We will try 
to fulfill our historic role to assist those who reach out for peace. 
This set of meetings is being launched by the very welcome news that the 
Foreign Minister has brought, and I hope that we can make some 
significant progress in the course of my trip here.

Shimon, thank you so much for coming here. I look forward to our series 
of discussions over the next several days. Thank you very much. (###)



ARTICLE 5

Crime in the New Independent States: The U.S. Response
James F. Collins, Senior Coordinator, Office of the Ambassador-at-Large 
for the New Independent States
Statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 
Washington, DC, March 15, 1995

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman: I appreciate the opportunity to appear 
before you and the other committee members today to discuss the 
disturbing issue of crime in the New Independent States--NIS--and the 
U.S. response to this development.

As Secretary Christopher recently stated, we are at a threshhold of a 
new century and face great challenges. Our goal to build a peaceful, 
free, and prosperous world dictates that we in the United States: 

--  Continue to engage and to lead on critical issues; 
--  Maintain and strengthen our cooperative relationships with the 
world's most powerful nations; 
--  Adapt and build institutions that will promote economic and security 
cooperation; and 
--  Support democracy and human rights because it serves our interests 
and our ideals.

To further these principles, the Secretary announced that the fight 
against international crime, narcotics, and terrorism would be one of 
five key areas of U.S. foreign policy focus in 1995. My purpose today is 
to discuss that priority in the context of Russia and the other New 
Independent States.

Certain strategic assumptions have stood behind our policy toward the 
NIS from the outset. The core assumption has been a belief that the 
emergence of prosperous, democratized, market-based, independent states 
following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the integration of these 
states into the global community of democratic states and economies are 
in the interests of our nation and the people of the NIS themselves. We 
have pursued these goals in a variety of ways, using American resources, 
influence, and our political and economic leadership of the 
international community.

In a policy and program that have reflected bipartisan support and close 
cooperation with Congress, we have sought to seize the opportunities the 
end to communist rule in the former Soviet Union and the emergence of 
new forces offer to build democracies and market-based economic systems 
across the NIS. We have also identified challenges to the success of 
these efforts. The past is with us and the people of the NIS in many 
respects. Communist rule has left a legacy of ethnic division, conflict, 
and military presence inconsistent with the emergence of true 
sovereignty and independence among the NIS. It also has left a 
bureaucracy and economic system of mismanagement that is today only 
beginning to transform itself. We are, in short, in the early stages of 
a socio-economic political revolution and upheaval that is transforming 
the societies and economies of the NIS. The outcome is far from certain, 
but our task is clear. We have no alternative but to seek to assure the 
best result for American interests and security as we work with clear-
eyed realism with these New Independent States in their transformation.

Crime is one of the many manifestations of the momentous social, 
political, and economic revolution taking place in the NIS in the wake 
of the decline of Soviet institutions and instruments of power. Along 
with the positive and historic opportunities created by the collapse of 
the former Soviet Union, a vacuum of legitimate authority developed that 
has led to a rapid increase in criminal activity in the NIS as well as 
new types of criminal activity. While there was crime, and even 
organized crime, in the former Soviet Union, neither we nor the NIS 
themselves predicted the extent of the problem that would arise after 
independence. Crime now poses--some three-plus years after the end of 
the Soviet Union--a major challenge to the governments and the citizens 
of the NIS as they pursue the uncharted road from communist totalitarian 
authority to democracy and market economies.

In a moment, my colleagues will provide a more detailed analysis of the 
extent of the crime problem facing the NIS. I would like to share just a 
few facts with you to set the scene. Russian President Yeltsin himself 
has stated that crime is the number one problem facing his country 
today. In 1994, economic crimes in Russia rose over 12%, and drug-
related crimes rose over 40%. The unregistered import and sale of 
consumer products in the first half of 1994 alone accounted for some 46% 
of total retail sales. Hundreds of armed attacks took place against 
poorly paid and equipped police officers, and the murders of bankers, 
elected officials, and prominent journalists became all too frequent 
events. New activities such as money laundering and alien smuggling 
became rife. This scenario has repeated itself throughout the NIS in 
varying forms.

The potential impact of crime on the transformation of Russia and the 
NIS is indeed great. Crime undermines national sovereignty. As a 
Belarusian presidential aide recently told us, "we have 'declared' 
sovereignty, but the pervasiveness of crime prevents us from achieving 
'real' sovereignty." Rampant crime undercuts the development of 
fledgling democratic institutions, and allows criminal groups, rather 
than the citizenry, to become strong enough to become the ultimate 
brokers of power. Criminal groups indeed represent a type of private 
economy; but it is a private economy that rejects free market principles 
in favor of control by force, and denies the ordinary citizen access to 
the benefits of full opportunity. Crime contributes to social 
instability. It discourages needed foreign investment. Most worrisome is 
the potential for the citizenry of the NIS to equate crime with the 
emergence of democratic and economic reform.

U.S. interests are clearly involved as we face this new development. Our 
most immediate responsibility is to deal with the potential for NIS-
generated organized crime and drug trafficking to spill over into the 
United States, further compounding the problems our authorities already 
face in meeting the challenges at home of countering these dangers. 
Crime also threatens the physical well-being of U.S. citizens traveling 
and working in the NIS. Further, it has the potential to create 
instabilities in the NIS region, affecting international security. It 
undercuts the very reformers we have tried to bolster and thwarts the 
transition to democracies and market economies that we have so 
diligently promoted. Crime inhibits our goal of a future with the NIS 
based upon normal economic relations. The existence of pervasive crime 
also increases the chances that new dictatorships will come to the fore 
in the region. As we look to the future, we see the very real 
possibility that NIS organized crime could become involved in weapons-
grade nuclear materials smuggling.

Our relationship with Russia and the NIS is central to America's 
security. The nature of Russia's dealings with the United States, as 
well as with institutions like NATO and the G-7, will depend in large 
measure on the direction of Russia's transformation. The effects of 
crime can easily skew and undermine that transformation in Russia and 
the other NIS if left unchecked. It is clearly in the U.S. interest to 
engage fully and immediately in the fight against crime in the NIS.

The Challenge

The challenge that faces the NIS in their fight against crime is highly 
complex. If the NIS hope for future integration with the modern 
industrial democracies, they must guard against a historical legacy that 
has prompted them all too often to respond in an authoritarian manner 
when faced with difficult and threatening situations. The goal for these 
new states should be to strengthen law enforcement while supporting 
human rights and the rule of law. This will not be an easy task.

Nor will it be of short duration. What must be done is nothing short of 
re-creation in each of the NIS of a new legal, judicial, and law 
enforcement culture buttressed by radically transformed law and 
institutions. For the present, the great shortcoming is that most law on 
the books is considered illegitimate because it belongs to the Soviet 
period, and NIS governments and legislatures are only beginning the 
process of creating new institutions and a new base of legislation that 
will reflect and accommodate a more open and market-oriented system. It 
is little wonder that in broad terms today most citizens in most of the 
NIS have little to guide them in orienting their thinking about what is 
lawful and what is beyond law.

The process of developing legislation to cover new concepts and 
activities which did not even exist before the breakup of the Soviet 
Union has proven difficult. This is perhaps most clearly seen in the 
Russian attempt to develop a single criminal procedure code from three 
competing drafts, each of which reflects a particular political agenda 
of its sponsoring agency. Draft legislation which does make its way to 
parliament does not have an easy time passing. The result  is a legal 
vacuum in which crime continues to strengthen its hold and 
effectiveness.

Not surprisingly, as my colleagues will describe in greater detail, in 
this environment without appropriate laws and effective legal 
institutions, criminal elements have all too quickly gained a beachhead 
in the region. Bureaucratic mandates among existing law enforcement and 
legal ministries are in flux, and thus there is a confusing patchwork 
quality to governmental operations. Corruption has long been a part of 
the very fabric of many of these institutions. The Russian and NIS 
police are demoralized, and held in disdain--and often in fear--by the 
populace. In many cases, NIS government officials and ordinary citizens 
do not have a basic understanding of the new criminal activities which 
have arisen such as money laundering or bank and computer fraud.

To counter successfully the hold of criminal elements on society, the 
population must support the government's effort to manage the crime 
problem. They will be willing to do so, however, only if government 
institutions protect individual rights and, in particular, the rights of 
the accused. The system must be transparent and accessible to all. In 
addition, government agencies and officials must not themselves be seen 
as criminal or working for their own gain rather than for the common 
good. Essentially, the governments of the NIS must create an atmosphere 
where law enforcement takes place with maximum public support. 
Similarly, in order to engage effectively in the international arena 
with the NIS, the United States and indeed the world community need 
partners with laws, procedures, and institutions which meet 
international standards.

The outlook is not all bleak. We see positive developments. Leaders in 
the NIS increasingly recognize the magnitude of their problem and have 
come to us for assistance in legal reform and in combating crime. The 
NIS have begun to pass some landmark legislation. Perhaps most promising 
was the recent passage in Russia of the first part of a civil code.

We are realistic, however. We recognize that while the NIS themselves 
must become fully engaged, and are ultimately responsible for their own 
fate, they cannot solve the problem alone. Similarly, we cannot solve 
the problem for them. It will take bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation to help stem this worrisome tide. Our important contribution 
to this cooperative process will be through support for legal reform and 
law enforcement training based upon the rule of law, human rights, and 
professional integrity.

The U.S. Response

A year ago, the Clinton Administration formed a policy steering group 
composed of the U.S. diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement 
communities to address this issue. Our strategy was to approach this 
problem in an integrated and fully coordinated manner, combining policy, 
analysis, assistance, and operations. Last summer, FBI Director Freeh 
led an interagency delegation to Moscow and Kiev to begin discussions on 
anti-crime efforts. The issue of crime was also an agenda item during 
the recent summits President Clinton held with Russian President Yeltsin 
and Ukrainian President Kuchma.

Congressional support--both public and financial--was essential to our 
effort. The passage of the FY 1995 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act 
which earmarked up to $30 million in FREEDOM Support Act and SEED Act 
funds for programs to fight crime in the NIS and Central Europe provided 
an impetus for our program.

The program which we have developed is three-pronged:

--  We have expanded our rule of law programs and placed a new emphasis 
on assisting the NIS with criminal justice reform;
--  We are providing law enforcement training which promotes the 
concepts of human rights and professional integrity; and
--  We are working to institutionalize our cooperation with the NIS 
through the negotiation of law enforcement agreements that will allow us 
to share information and cooperate in investigations, prosecutions, and 
the prevention of crime according to internationally accepted standards.

In addition, we have led efforts to galvanize the international 
community to join us in this important task through such fora as the 
upcoming G-7 plus Russia sessions in Halifax where money laundering will 
be an agenda item, and through such multilateral initiatives as creation 
of a new training center in Budapest, Hungary, for law enforcement 
authorities from Central Europe and the NIS.

Programs

U.S. programs address four main threats: 

1. Organized crime; 
2. Financial crime; 
3. Drug trafficking; and 
4. Nuclear materials smuggling.

Each program is designed to promote the rule of law, human rights, and 
professional integrity. Because of resource constraints and the need to 
start slowly in order to design these new programs carefully and well, 
we have focused the majority of our effort for 1995 on the four nuclear 
states: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.

Russia, of course, is of paramount concern because its stability is 
central to our own interests; the Russians recognize the magnitude of 
their problem; and Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin committed themselves 
to joint efforts to combat crime during their summit meeting in 
Washington last September. The other three states were chosen because of 
the nuclear dimension; because they came to us for help; because we 
believe that there is an earnest attempt by reformers to put in place a 
comprehensive set of laws; and because we think we have identified 
people with whom we can work. We surveyed the needs in Moldova, but 
determined that other NIS would take priority this first year. Finally, 
at the request of our ambassador to Georgia and Chairman Shevardnadze, 
we will soon send a small assessment team to Georgia where we will 
evaluate whether our programs can have any measurable effect given the 
lack of governmental infrastructure and accusations of human rights 
abuses. In the future, we will evaluate whether to engage in a 
particular state based upon the interest expressed by that state, their 
needs, where that state stands on reform and the development of 
appropriate laws, our own national interests, and whether we can 
identify appropriate people with whom to work.

We have programmed well over $15 million for rule of law programs in the 
NIS for FY 1995. These programs are designed to support four main 
principles:

--  All elements of society should operate under the same set of legal 
rights and constraints;
--  Governments, laws, and regulations should be transparent, 
predictable, responsive, and accountable;
--  Each individual should have a clear understanding of his or her 
rights and responsibilities; and
--  There should be public participation in the process of formulating, 
implementing, and utilizing laws freely and without fear.

Our rule of law assistance has been used, for example, to help in the 
effort to reintroduce jury trials in nine regions of Russia, and we hope 
to expand to an additional four regions in the near future. Our 
assistance provides support to the NIS in the legislative process by 
providing models of various types of legislation, as well as detailed 
commentary on proposed laws. In addition, we are placing a new emphasis 
this year on judicial reform programs, including support for judicial 
education and curriculum development, and we are crafting integrated 
training for judges, investigators, prosecutors, and defense attorneys.

On the law enforcement side, we have programmed $15.1 million for FY 
1995 training programs, and have already trained some 350 law 
enforcement personnel from Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. Our programs 
are carried out by a variety of U.S. law enforcement agencies, including 
the FBI; the Secret Service; the Customs Service; the Internal Revenue 
Service; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; FinCEN--the 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; FLETC--the Federal Law Enforcement 
Training Center; the Drug Enforcement Administration, and ICITAP--the 
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program of the 
Department of Justice. Our programs involve not only a robust training 
component--covering such diverse topics as white collar crime, 
counterfeiting, narcotics demand reduction, and customs controls--but 
also the building of vital connections with NIS law enforcement 
personnel. Our goal here is to cultivate what we call "talking partners" 
who will help us develop evidence and to strengthen our capabilities in 
order to enhance the prevention of crime. An integral part of our 
strategy is to teach the NIS how to collect and use evidence so that it 
is admissible in U.S. courts.

A hallmark of our cooperative programs will be the new International Law 
Enforcement Academy in Budapest, Hungary. This facility, initiated by 
President Clinton and President Goncz of Hungary, is being established 
with FBI leadership specifically to train law enforcement officers from 
Central Europe and the NIS. The academy, which will be dedicated in late 
April, is designed to have an international visiting faculty and is a 
prime example of a multilateral effort to combat the international 
threat of crime.

The third component of our strategy--the negotiation of law enforcement 
agreements--is at an early stage. We believe these agreements are an 
important factor because they provide an institutional framework for us 
to cooperate with the NIS according to internationally accepted 
standards. We chose to conclude an executive agreement with the 
Russians, rather than a formal treaty, in order to formalize a framework 
for our cooperation as quickly as possible and to send a signal early on 
to criminal elements in Russia that both our countries mean business. We 
have concluded general negotiations with the Russians on the agreement 
and are in the process of preparing the text for signature. We hope a 
signing ceremony can take place next month. If appropriate, at a later 
date, we may decide to conclude a formal and more comprehensive mutual 
legal assistance treaty--MLAT--with Russia. Looking ahead, we have 
proposed that the United States negotiate MLATs with Ukraine and Belarus 
and hope that negotiations can begin this year. We will, of course, 
continue to consult with the Senate as we begin this treaty process.

We are also engaged in several other efforts to protect our own 
territory. We are looking at instituting tougher visa standards and 
enhanced procedures to keep criminal elements out of the United States. 
Of special note is our Russian Business Investigation Initiative--RBII--
a pilot program started in September 1993 that is essentially a lookout 
system which has, by our estimate, successfully prevented hundreds of 
alien organized crime members from entering the United States. We are 
also looking at proposing new legislation to combat such activities as 
alien smuggling.

Corruption

Let me now turn to an issue that is in all our minds--the issue of 
corruption. We are keenly aware that many elements of law enforcement 
ministries in the NIS have engaged in corrupt practices and human rights 
abuses. There are no easy answers to this problem. We strongly believe, 
however, that it is important to remain constructively engaged and, 
through carefully crafted training and contacts, to support reformers 
and influence positive institutional change in the NIS. This strategy is 
not new. We cooperate successfully with Latin American countries, for 
example, on many initiatives, despite allegations of government 
corruption in some of these countries.

I can assure you that in conducting our assistance programs, we are 
careful to examine closely the individuals with whom we work in the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs--MVD--and other law enforcement ministries. 
We do not, for example, cooperate with the OMON special forces unit of 
the MVD that  carried out operations in Chechnya. Further, we emphasize 
in our programs the need for professional integrity and adherence to 
internationally accepted standards of conduct. There is some heartening 
evidence that law enforcement ministries in the NIS are beginning to do 
some house cleaning on their own.

Again, there are no easy solutions to the problem of corruption. It will 
take much exposure to international concepts and practices and probably 
several generations to right itself fully. As I stated earlier, we 
believe constructive engagement is the key. We, therefore, target much 
of our assistance at the junior to mid-career level in law enforcement 
ministries as the greatest hope for the future. Our assistance to 
support the development of a free and independent press and of effective 
grassroots human rights organizations also plays an important role in 
increasing public pressure against corruption.

Nuclear Materials Smuggling

The issue of nuclear materials smuggling warrants special discussion 
because of the magnitude of the potential danger that this activity 
poses to international peace and security. Working to counter this 
threat and to decrease the likelihood that these dangerous materials 
will come into the wrong hands is of highest priority for the United 
States and the world community. We do not have evidence that NIS 
organized crime has entered the field of weapons-grade nuclear materials 
smuggling. The potential, however, is there.  If not kept in check, the 
consequences will be disastrous.

The United States is taking both a near-term and a long-term approach to 
this problem. For the near-term, we are working with the Russians 
through Nunn-Lugar and other U.S. Government programs to assist them in 
securing nuclear materials to reduce the risk of theft or diversion. Our 
nuclear material control and accounting and physical protection 
initiatives, including construction assistance for a fissile material 
storage facility, will help to build a set of redundant barriers to 
theft or diversion of nuclear materials. For the longer-term, we seek to 
convince the Russians to limit further accumulation of excess stocks of 
weapons-usable fissile materials and then to reduce such stocks. Our 
goal is thus to cap and ultimately reduce the nuclear material threat.

We are also working to bring Russia in as a full partner in diplomatic 
and law enforcement activities needed to combat the illicit traffic in 
nuclear materials. To further this end, we are engaged actively with the 
G-7 in cooperation to counter nuclear smuggling. Finally, we are working 
to promote the concepts of transparency and irreversibility in the 
nuclear arms reduction process by confirming inventories of plutonium 
and highly enriched uranium from nuclear disarmament and by placing all 
excess fissile materials solidly under international safeguards.

Listyev Murder

Let me say a few words about the Listyev murder and aftermath. The case 
is a prime example of the complexities we have been discussing. As you 
know, Vladislav Listyev was a popular television journalist and democrat 
committed to promoting free speech and journalistic integrity in the new 
media in Russia. Slated to take over as director of Russian Public 
Television at Ostankino, he was killed on March 1, most likely at the 
instigation of corrupt elements in the industry who were threatened by 
his planned reorganization of advertising sales and other business 
practices. The murder represents a great tragedy for Russia and for 
democracy; it also illustrates the   viciousness of the new criminal 
breed in Russia.

The public outcry in the wake of Mr. Listyev's murder prompted an 
immediate response from President Yeltsin, a response that many feared 
denoted a return to authoritarianism and which augured ill for the 
observance of human rights in Russia. As you know, President Yeltsin 
called for the dismissal of the Moscow city prosecutor and police chief. 
He submitted draft legislation to the Duma to strengthen law enforcement 
structures and made some initial statements that were disturbing 
regarding the Uzbekistan model of summary executions. At the same time, 
President Yeltsin publicly concluded that extraordinary measures were 
not called for in Russia.

The situation bears watching, and we will continue to monitor the 
aftermath of the Listyev murder carefully, especially the implementation 
of any new legislation. At this stage, however, we believe that 
President Yeltsin's initial harsh statements were largely designed to 
show the public that he is serious about fighting crime. His actions 
illustrate the back and forth between authoritarian and reform 
tendencies on the difficult road to a democratic society.

Summary

In closing, let me emphasize that the promotion of stability and 
democracy in the NIS region and throughout the world requires that 
America continue to be the global leader in the fight against crime. The 
stakes are enormous for the NIS and for us.

A stable, democratic Russia is vital to a secure Europe and a stable 
world. An unstable Russia that reverts to authoritarian rule or slides 
into chaos would be an immediate threat to its neighbors and once again 
a strategic threat to the United States. It is thus critical for the 
United States to remain engaged on the issue of crime and to assist the 
NIS to become peaceful and prosperous members of the international 
community. This is an historic opportunity that must not be lost. We 
look forward to working with Congress on this important effort.(###)



ARTICLE 6

Human Rights and Democracy in Asia
John Shattuck, Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and 
Labor
Statement before the Subcommittees on Asia and the Pacific and 
International Operations and Human Rights of the House International 
Relations Committee, Washington, DC, March 16, 1995

Mr. Chairman: I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss human 
rights and democracy in Asia with you. Support for democracy and human 
rights in this dynamic region is a key element of U.S. policy for the 
region. We are committed to working with the Congress to devise the most 
effective means of advancing this interest within our more general Asia 
policy.

I will address some key Asian countries in my remarks and use them to 
illustrate some general features that I believe we can distinguish in 
the region, but we must remember that each of the several dozen 
societies here is quite distinct--and that distinctiveness shapes our 
bilateral diplomacy.

An Overview

Before looking at the specific situations of key countries and the means 
we have available to affect those situations, I will attempt to make a 
general assessment. Categorization of the large array of countries that 
make up the region from the standpoint of democracy and human rights is 
at once simple and complex. The extremes are easy to identify: There are 
democracies that equal those elsewhere, such as Japan, New Zealand, and 
Australia, and there are authoritarian regimes whose only concession to 
democracy and human rights lies in their names or their paper 
constitutions. Within these extremes is a very diverse collection of 
nations and standards of accountable government.

India, for example, is the world's largest democracy and one of the 
oldest in Asia, but it has a very problematic record on human rights. 
The Philippines and South Korea are valued democratic partners of the 
U.S., and indeed, our alliances with them have been made stronger than 
ever by their democratic progress. Thailand, Cambodia, Mongolia, and Sri 
Lanka have made transitions to democracy, but have varying records in 
practice of adherence to democratic standards and quite disparate 
histories on human rights.

In a number of states, circumstances are less encouraging. Ethnic or 
religious strife or ideology or simple desire for power have all too 
frequently restricted the operation of democracy or seriously undermined 
the application of human rights standards. Among those we could cite is 
Indonesia, where an authoritarian government rules despite a veneer of 
democracy, and where there are major problems with both human and worker 
rights as well. Human rights are routinely violated on a large scale in 
Afghanistan. In Pakistan, religious and ethnic rivalries have resulted 
in numerous murders, bombings, and civil disturbances, with over 1,000 
people killed in the last year in the city of Karachi alone.

At the absolutist end of the spectrum lie China, Burma, and Vietnam. 
Because of its size and influence, China's future development will have 
enormous consequences for the region and the world. North Korea has 
sealed itself from the world. Not only one-party but one-man rule has 
been the organizing principle of the state. The North Korean 
dictatorship maintains extremely tight controls over its citizens.

Vietnam is also a one-party state, and its government is responsible for 
substantial human rights abuses. It is opening to the West, however, and 
we have established a human rights dialogue, which will be an integral 
part of our own developing relations with Vietnam. Finally, I would cite 
Burma, where a popular movement for democracy was crushed by the 
military in 1990; this authoritarian regime continues year after year to 
show a callous disregard for human rights.

The human rights abuses that occur in the states I have highlighted 
often dominate the news. These abuses are serious and widespread, and it 
is fitting that they draw the attention of the press. But there is 
another side of the human rights story in Asia, which does not receive 
the attention it merits. There are more and more signs that the center 
of gravity in Asian societies does not rest permanently with the 
authoritarians. Internal pressures for change are confronting even the 
sternest regimes. People and organizations are speaking out and making 
known their commitment to democracy and human rights even when the costs 
are high. We see those pressures now in China, Burma, and Vietnam, and I 
am sure they will come in North Korea. It is our task to ensure that the 
U.S. continues to contribute to the progress of human rights and 
democracy as these societies transform themselves. There will be 
progress, and there will be serious backsliding. It is, however, 
incumbent on us to take the long view and not become too discouraged by 
setbacks or too complacent in the face of progress.

U.S. Policy Goals and Strategies

Before I discuss specific countries, I will briefly address two 
fundamental principles underlying our human rights policies in Asia. 
First, we are not trying to impose a Western form of society or idea of 
human rights. These ideals are reflected in international obligations 
subscribed to by Asian governments as well as others. I would quote 
Secretary Christopher's remark about this last year: 

Commitment to democracy is neither occidental nor accidental. We are not 
imposing an American model; we are supporting a universal impulse for 
freedom.

Second, promoting human rights and democracy is, in our view, in the 
interest of the United States, as of all nations. Our shared economic 
and security interests in Asia are best served in the long run by a 
political and social order that respects the rule of law, where freedom 
of speech is a safety valve, and where government is accountable to its 
citizens.

As history has shown, democracies seldom, if ever, make war on each 
other. At the same time, there is a close relationship between our 
interests in human rights in Asia and our economic interests there. 
Trade relations in themselves are no substitute for vigorous human 
rights advocacy. Economic growth and trade and the accompanying social 
mobility do not suffice to create political pluralism. They do, however, 
create powerful pressures for political change. Free and open markets 
need open societies that respect basic rights and the rule of law.

Assertions continue to be heard, sometimes from senior officials in 
Asia, that economic development must take precedence over democracy or 
respect for human rights. This posited tradeoff is ultimately false. It 
is precisely because the United States has an interest in economic 
development and political stability in Asia that it promotes human 
rights and accountable government. President Clinton explained this on 
the eve of his departure for the APEC summit in Jakarta last November:


In societies where the rule of law prevails, where governments are held 
accountable to their people, and where ideas and information freely 
circulate, we are more likely to find economic development and political 
stability.

Tools for Promoting Democracy And Human Rights

How can we promote these central goals? Throughout the world, the United 
States pursues a broad-based approach to promoting democracy and human 
rights. At the State Department, my bureau works closely with the 
regional bureaus to fashion plans appropriate for each country and 
issue, along with multilateral approaches where this would be effective. 
I chair the new interagency working group on democracy to coordinate 
democracy-promotion activities throughout the U.S. Government.

Bilateral diplomacy is the foundation of our international dialogue. 
There are intensive dialogues on human rights with China, Vietnam, and 
Indonesia, which I plan to visit next month. Beyond the headlines, we 
regularly raise human rights issues with individual governments, for 
example, encouraging the Thai Government to pass new legislation 
amending the 1991 labor law that constricted worker rights there. We are 
also discussing continuing concerns about worker rights violations in 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan.

Following a 1993 worldwide directive by Secretary Christopher, a system 
of embassy-based working groups has been operating to coordinate 
reporting and development of action plans focused on human rights and 
democracy issues specific to the host country. Measurable benchmark 
activities are built into these plans, which are reviewed and adjusted 
periodically. Our annual country reports on human rights play a related 
role in this bilateral diplomacy. They are a guide for the embassy 
working groups, and they are widely publicized throughout Asia and read 
by governments and private organizations. Both official and private 
sources often issue statements acknowledging the reports. Even in their 
assertions criticizing the reports, some governments for the first time 
acknowledge the need to conform to international human rights standards.

Our bilateral democracy strategies target key "countries in transition" 
across Asia with financial assistance and support in multilateral 
institutions, including special efforts concentrated on accountability 
and national reconciliation. In Cambodia, for example, we have pledged 
$40 million in 1995 to advance these goals. The USAID program focuses on 
four areas: 

--  Population and public health; 
--  Infrastructure development; 
--  Building democracy; and 
--  Promoting broad-based economic growth. 

Through the Democracy Initiatives Project ($15 million over 5 years), we 
will work to strengthen public and NGO institutions in transition to a 
democratic and free market society. Assistance is provided through 
organizations such as the Asia Foundation and the Asian-American Free 
Labor Institute. We also granted $500,000 to Yale University in January 
for the support of work related to the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act 
passed by the Congress in 1994. In Mongolia, we have supported a variety 
of activities to assist the democratization process, and we will remain 
committed to supporting economic and political reforms there.

Multilateral approaches can sometimes be an effective complement to 
unilateral pressure. In particular, we are trying to make more effective 
use of the UN system, where we are asking for greater support from Asian 
democracies. We were instrumental in creating the new position of UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights last year, and we have supported his 
work. We have successfully called for special rapporteurs on problems 
such as torture, racism, arbitrary detention, extrajudicial executions, 
and religious intolerance--and the latter has recently visited China. In 
the Human Rights Commission, we sponsored or supported key resolutions 
and statements focused on human rights abuses in Asia, including China, 
Burma, and East Timor. This year for the first time, China failed to 
prevent action on the resolution, which lost by only one vote. We also 
are encouraging the efforts of international humanitarian organizations 
to visit political prisoners in some Asian countries, such as China, 
Indonesia, and India.

Although we prefer to cooperate positively with other governments, we 
have available a range of negative inducements to use when necessary. 
These include trade sanctions, opposition to loans by multilateral 
development banks, reduction of U.S. economic or security assistance, 
reduction or suspension of senior-level visits, prohibition of some or 
all military sales, and termination of OPIC coverage and Eximbank 
lending. Privileges of duty-free exports to the U.S. under the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) are conditioned, in part, upon 
commitment to international labor standards by the exporting country. 
Examples of these methods include our opposition to loans to China--
except for projects aimed at basic human needs--and to Burma; our 
restrictions on official visits to North Korea and Burma; our GSP 
reviews of Indonesia and Pakistan and other countries; and our 
calibrated arms-sales policy, which affects several states in the 
region.

Our public diplomacy supports these bilateral and multilateral efforts. 
U.S. officials have stressed human rights and democracy concerns in 
regional settings, such as the ASEAN post-ministerial meetings in 
Bangkok in July 1994, and in conjunction with the President and 
Secretary's participation in the APEC meetings in Jakarta last November. 
After those meetings, Secretaries Christopher and Brown held productive 
meetings with the Human Rights Commission there. Officials who visit 
Asia include human rights and democracy messages in their public 
statements, to support the efforts of local defenders of freedom and to 
remind public officials of their importance. There is a strong democracy 
and human rights content in VOA broadcasting, and resources are focused 
on relatively closed societies. In addition, Radio Free Asia has been 
authorized and funding appropriated by the Congress.

Cooperation with U.S. non-governmental organizations is vital. They 
conduct their own assistance programs, monitor developments, and provide 
critical feedback on human rights and democracy progress and problems. 
Among the organizations with programs in Asia are the National Endowment 
for Democracy, the Asia Foundation, and the Asian-American Free Labor 
Institute, all of which receive support from the U.S. Government and 
work with grass-roots Asian NGOs. We also have consulted with the U.S. 
business community, which has a stake in the establishment of the rule 
of law because it is the best guarantee that contracts, intellectual 
property, and other transactions will be respected. U.S. businesses are 
also important in ensuring respect for worker rights.

We also seek partnerships with Asian democracies to facilitate 
cooperation on mutual objectives and look for regional initiatives to 
support, such as the ASEAN Colloquium on Human Rights, which recommended 
that ASEAN form its own subregional Human Rights Commission. We also 
have supported initiatives by other governments, such as the Forum for 
Democratic Leaders established in December 1994 by the Kim Dae Jung 
Peace Foundation--Korea--with the objective of promoting Asian democracy 
and civil society. Finally, we are working with Asian women's 
organizations to prepare for the UN World Conference on Women, to be 
held in September 1995 in Beijing.

Civil-Military Relations

We have also focused on the role of the military in human rights 
protection and democratic systems. Our military training programs 
recently have been restructured to incorporate this. Direct training--
formerly called International Military Education and Training or IMET--
now includes training for foreign military services--and to some extent 
civilians--in a variety of disciplines and subjects, including rule of 
law, human rights, and the function of the military in a democratic 
system. These programs increase our influence on both military and 
civilian leaders throughout the region. They can advance international 
understanding of democratic values and the supportive, subordinate role 
of the military to civilian authority. The training takes place in the 
U.S., exposing the participants to Americans and our democratic 
institutions.

U.S. military officials who visit the region or interact in other ways 
with their military counterparts include material on these issues in 
their talking points to ensure that the message of the importance of the 
military's role in maintaining constitutional democracy is conveyed to 
military audiences.

Key Countries in 1994

I would now like to review developments in a few key countries in more 
detail, and at the same time provide you with a synopsis of our country 
policies and strategies on human rights and democracy.

China. China, the largest and most populous country in Asia, continues 
to engage in very serious human rights abuses. As we noted in our annual 
human rights report, 1994 brought no improvement in the human rights 
situation in China. There continued to be widespread and well-documented 
examples of the authorities' intolerance of dissent and sharp 
restrictions on freedom of speech, association, and religion. Additional 
abuses include instances of torture, arbitrary arrest and detention 
without public trial, long detention of Tibetans for peacefully 
expressing their political and religious views, and the arrest and 
detention of persons on freedom of speech.

We also remain concerned about reports of coercive family planning 
practices, particularly in rural areas of China. This issue is regularly 
brought up during our human rights dialogue. I also have raised this 
issue at relevant Chinese ministries, as have others in the 
Administration, including Under Secretary Wirth. Physical compulsion to 
submit to abortion or sterilization is not authorized, but Chinese 
officials acknowledge privately that there are instances where it 
occurs. Officials also have maintained that those responsible are 
disciplined and undergo retraining. We have asked the Chinese Government 
for examples of cases where such discipline has occurred, and the 
Chinese agreed to provide us with such an accounting--but have not yet 
done so.

China is also an extraordinarily dynamic and diverse country that is 
undergoing a sweeping economic transformation while facing a leadership 
transition. Its diversity can be seen in the human rights situation last 
year. Greater disposable income, looser ideological controls, and freer 
access to outside sources of information led to more freedom in cultural 
life and media reporting. In several instances, the government acted to 
move toward conformity with internationally accepted norms, and it 
continued to acknowledge the need for the rule of law and the necessary 
legal structure to implement it. Here, however, I stress that, in 
practice, China's legal reform efforts have not yet had a significant 
effect on protecting the rights granted to citizens in China's 
constitution and criminal and administrative procedure laws.

In May 1994, President Clinton announced his decision to delink China's 
most-favored-nation status from its near-term human rights performance. 
At that time he also set forth five initiatives aimed at promoting human 
rights: 

--  Bilateral diplomacy; 
--  Multilateral diplomacy; 
--  Working to encourage the development of China's civil society; 
--  Working with the U.S. business community to promote human rights; 
and 
--  International broadcasting. 

All five are moving forward. Over the last 18 months, the United States 
has had the most intensive human rights dialogue with China that it has 
had with any country in the world. Our most recent round--the seventh--
took place in Beijing in mid-January. In these dialogues we have raised 
core issues--freedom of speech, association, and religion and the 
treatment of prisoners and persons detained by the government--but have 
also sought to broaden and make substantive our engagement on the rule 
of law and legal exchanges.

We have continued our efforts to work for improvements in the human 
rights situation in China in multilateral fora. Last week, together with 
26 other countries, we sponsored a China resolution at the UN. The U.S. 
worked with other sponsors to put together a coalition of countries 
that, for the first time, included a non-Western majority of countries 
from all regions of the world to support a China human rights 
resolution. Also for the first time, China failed in its efforts to pass 
a "no-action" motion and prevent its human rights practices from coming 
under international scrutiny, and the resolution itself fell short only 
by one vote.

Consultations continue with U.S. businesses, human rights NGOs, labor 
organizations, and the Congress on a set of voluntary business 
principles to be used by U.S. business in China and elsewhere. We also 
are working on increased support for U.S. NGOs active in China with the 
aim of promoting a stronger civil society. The Voice of America has 
increased its programming to China, and Radio Free Asia will commence 
broadcasting as soon as possible.

Burma. Since the Burmese military's assumption of power in 1962, and 
especially since its usurpation of the 1990 democratic elections--which 
overwhelmingly rejected military rule--Burmese citizens have been 
subjected to the arbitrary and sometimes brutal dictates of the 
military. Government security forces commit serious abuses, including 
extrajudicial killings and rape, and forced labor on public works 
projects. Although some political prisoners have been released, Nobel 
Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi began her sixth year of house arrest last 
July, and key leaders of her National League for Democracy Party remain 
in prison under harsh conditions.

The military regime, or SLORC, also has renewed its offensive against 
the Karen ethnic minority, pushing some 10,000 refugees across the 
border into Thailand and undermining its avowed policy of reconciliation 
with ethnic minorities. In a situation with devastating impact on our 
interests, opium production has doubled in Burma since the SLORC took 
power, and the drug trade has become more deeply ingrained in Burma's 
political and economic life. In the long run, our interest in narcotics 
control in Burma is inextricably linked to our interest in accountable 
government and the rule of law.

Multilaterally, we have succeeded in passing strong resolutions on Burma 
at the UN General Assembly and at the UN Human Rights Commission, and 
will do the same this year at the International Labor Organization. We 
also oppose multilateral loans to Burma. In November 1994, a U.S. 
delegation led by the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Bureau's Deputy 
Assistant Secretary Tom Hubbard and Nancy Ely-Raphel, my principal 
deputy, met with the military leadership in Rangoon to outline two 
visions of a future relationship with Burma--the first, an improved 
relationship based on improvements in human rights, democratization, and 
counternarcotics; the second, further isolation and a deteriorating 
relationship in the absence of such improvements. The regime must 
choose. We have been disappointed by the lack of progress on human 
rights to date and have expressed our displeasure to the Burmese 
Government.

Vietnam. As a result of market-  oriented economic reforms, the 
Vietnamese Communist Party has relaxed many of the restrictions on 
personal freedoms of average Vietnamese citizens. However, the 
government has reacted harshly to its political opponents and has 
continued to monitor those suspected of engaging in political or 
religious activities that it considers oppose the government. 
Restrictions on basic civil liberties, including free speech, press, and 
assembly, remain in place in order to control dissenting voices, and 
arbitrary arrest and detention remain a serious problem. Numerous 
political prisoners have been sentenced to hard labor camps for the 
peaceful expression of their views, and the government recently arrested 
several monks affiliated with the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam.

Last year when the President lifted the trade embargo, he initiated a 
human rights dialogue with the Vietnamese Government. We began this 
dialogue in February 1994, and held a second round of talks in 
Washington in August 1994. We plan to continue these discussions in 
Hanoi this spring. In all our discussions, we have urged the government 
to release all prisoners of conscience and comply with internationally 
recognized standards of human rights. We have made it clear to Vietnam 
that its performance on human rights will affect the strength of our 
future bilateral relationship. We have raised specific human rights 
cases and concerns with the Vietnamese in both Washington and Hanoi. 
Although the fullest possible accounting of our POWs and MIAs remains 
our highest priority, human rights will become increasingly important as 
our bilateral relationship moves forward.

Indonesia. Indonesia is a complex society, whose authoritarian 
government is coupled with emerging democratic elements and a rapidly 
developing market economy. Pressures for greater freedom have led to 
periods of openness, and an independent National Human Rights Commission 
has criticized government actions, but the government continues to 
restrict development of an opposition. The human rights situation in 
Indonesia has deteriorated since early 1994. Following the arbitrary 
arrest and detention of labor activists for labor demonstrations last 
April, the Indonesian Government, in June, reversed a trend toward 
greater "openness" by revoking the licenses of three major publications. 
The government also prepared a draft presidential decree that would 
seriously limit the activities of non-governmental organizations 
interested in human rights and worker rights, although this decree now 
appears to be on hold.

There are also problems on the labor front. The GOI refuses to recognize 
the independent SBSI labor organization, and military authorities 
interfere in labor matters. Key SBSI leader Pakpahan was convicted on 
charges of incitement, and his sentence of three years was extended to 
four when he appealed.

Finally, the situation in East Timor, which began deteriorating in late 
1994, worsened further in January of this year, with reports that 
security forces had executed six civilians while suppressing suspected 
separatist activity. Following an investigation, the armed forces 
announced that there were indications of procedural violations by the 
military during the raid in which the six died, and formed an honor 
council to hold accountable any wrongdoers, while asserting that the six 
victims were strongly associated with the armed secessionist movement, 
Fretilin. The independent National Human Rights Commission, however, 
said there was credible evidence that the victims, who it said were non-
combatant civilians, had been tortured before their deaths. We are very 
concerned about this and other signs of increasing violence in East 
Timor, and I plan to visit Indonesia, including East Timor, next month.

We have steadily pursued our human rights and democracy agenda, working 
with Indonesians both inside and outside the government and using our 
USAID and USIA programs to support NGOs. Both President Clinton and 
Secretary Christopher pressed for continued progress on human rights 
during their bilateral meetings in November, stressing that our 
relationship would not reach its full potential without such progress. 
We are monitoring the GOI's implementation of the action plan on worker 
rights agreed to last November, even though the formal review of the 
Indonesia GSP case is suspended. We also will respond to the GOI's 
invitation to make suggestions on improving its labor legislation. 
Finally, we have banned the sale of small arms and crowd control devices 
as part of our arms sales policy toward Indonesia.

We have urged the Indonesian Government to improve access to East Timor 
for Indonesian and international organizations; encouraged Indonesian 
government recognition of the special status of East Timor, with greater 
local control over political, economic, and cultural life; emphasized 
the importance of reducing military forces in East Timor; and supported 
negotiations between Indonesia and Portugal under the auspices of the UN 
Secretary General.

Cambodia. In 1994, Cambodia completed its first full year under 
democratic rule, following the May 1993 elections overseen by the UN 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in which 90% of the 
population participated. The press and indigenous NGOs are active, and 
the human rights situation has improved since the pre-UNTAC period. 
However, Cambodia suffers from many problems, including the ongoing 
threat of the Khmer Rouge. The recent killing of three journalists 
created a climate of fear among members of the press, and there were 
several extrajudicial killings in 1994 that appeared to be politically 
motivated. Emerging democratic institutions, particularly the legal 
infrastructure, remained weak. In addition, the Khmer Rouge continued to 
summarily execute large numbers of civilians, including Cambodians, 
Thais, Vietnamese residents, and Western tourists.

The U.S. was instrumental in the international effort to help Cambodians 
build democracy after more than 20 years of civil war and autocratic 
regimes, and we are committed to assisting the Royal Cambodian 
Government as it develops democratic institutions. With pledges in 1995 
of  $40 million, we are promoting human rights through indigenous NGOs, 
human rights training for the military, and support for the UN Human 
Rights Center. We have pressed the government to maintain its commitment 
to democracy and human rights, and we have raised specific human rights 
cases and concerns and allegations of corruption with senior government 
officials.

India. Although India enjoys the extensive safeguards of a longstanding 
parliamentary democracy, including a free press and a civilian-
controlled military, we have documented persistent and significant human 
rights abuses. They may be rooted in ancient social systems, expressed 
as intercaste or inter-religious violence, or arise from the intense 
social tensions. There is political violence by anti-government 
militants, police brutality against those in custody, and incommunicado 
detention without charges for prolonged periods under special security 
laws. Exploitation of and violence against women, children, and 
indentured or bonded labor are also serious problems.

Attempts by the authorities to repress secessionist movements generate 
many abuses. Kashmir remains a flashpoint, but we also are concerned 
about violent human rights abuses by paramilitary forces in northeastern 
India as those forces react to increasingly violent secessionist 
tactics. In Punjab, incidents of terrorism by Sikh militants have 
largely ceased. However, the police forces in that state continue to be 
responsible for grave abuses such as extrajudicial killings, arbitrary 
arrests, and torture, although at a much reduced rate than in the past.

A commitment to human rights is enshrined in India's constitution and 
democratic tradition, beginning with its independence movement, and it 
has taken some positive steps to overcome these problems. However, the 
government has not prosecuted and appropriately punished police and 
security forces implicated in abuses, and abusive detention laws remain 
on the books and are enforced. The government has allowed some 
humanitarian groups restricted access to Kashmir. However, India has 
denied other international human rights organizations to enter the 
country or to obtain access to Kashmir. It has, however, established a 
National Human Rights Commission, which we hope will eventually become 
an effective advocate for human rights.

This Administration has energetically engaged the Government of India on 
human rights, both privately and publicly, at every level. I plan to 
travel to India on a human rights mission in May. There is a growing 
awareness within India that more needs to be done to protect the rights 
guaranteed by India's constitution. We have stressed a cooperative, 
constructive  approach, believing that the solutions lie in full 
acknowledgement by the government of the problems, and in institution-
building. Indigenous NGOs will be essential and we seek to foster their 
work.

Pakistan.  Pakistan is an Islamic republic, in which citizens are able 
to peacefully change their government, although several million bonded 
laborers and nomads are excluded from the vote. The government does, 
however, harasses its political opponents, and it represses the Sindh-
based Mohajir Qoumi Movement political party. Government security forces 
are responsible for serious abuses of human rights, including 
extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrest and detention, and torture of 
prisoners and detainees. Police and paramilitary forces are unchecked by 
any serious government effort to reform them or to prosecute those 
responsible for abuse.

Islamic religious zealots discriminate against and persecute religious 
minorities, basing their activities in part on discriminatory 
legislation against those religious minorities. The government has 
proposed changes in the enforcement of the so-called blasphemy law to 
limit its abuse, but no changes have yet been enacted and abuse 
continues. In February the Lahore High Court overturned the blasphemy 
conviction of two Christians. So severe were the threats against them, 
however, that they fled the country.

The government and employers restrict workers' rights significantly. The 
use of child and bonded labor is widespread in spite of legislation to 
restrict these practices and the signing of a Memorandum of 
Understanding on child labor with the International Labor Organization. 
Little has been done to improve basic conditions for women and children. 
Female children continued to fall behind their male counterparts in such 
measures as levels of health care and education.

Conclusion

My prepared statement, though lengthy, has barely skimmed the vast array 
of developments--some disappointing, some encouraging--in this huge 
region. I will leave further detail to any questions that you may have 
and close with this human rights appeal to the world from Aung San Suu 
Kyi:

It is precisely because of the cultural diversity of the world that it 
is necessary for different nations and peoples to agree on those basic 
human values which will act as a unifying factor. . .the values that 
democracy and human rights seek to promote can be found in many 
cultures. Human beings the world over need freedom and security so that 
they may be able to realize their full potential. 

Thank you. (###)



ARTICLE 7

A Framework for Peace and Justice in Northern Ireland
Richard C. Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian 
Affairs
Statement before the House International Relations Committee, 
Washington, DC, March 15, 1995

Mr. Chairman: Thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify today 
on the Administration's approach to the peace process in Northern 
Ireland. The United States attaches great importance to the search for 
peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland. Our close bonds of 
history, culture, and tradition with Ireland and the United Kingdom 
provide us with a unique role in helping to achieve those goals.

Starting with the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, support for this historic 
effort has been the policy of both Republican and Democratic 
administrations. It has been widespread on both sides of the aisle in 
both houses of Congress. But it has received a special priority with 
President Clinton.

The Clinton Administration has encouraged and supported the courageous 
initiative of British Prime Minister John Major, Irish Prime Minister 
John Bruton, and former Irish Prime Minister Albert Reynolds to 
establish a new framework for peace and justice in Northern Ireland. 
With the historic Downing Street Declaration of 1993, the joint resolve 
of the two governments to end the violence and pursue a negotiated 
settlement set the stage for the dramatic developments of the past year. 
That resolve, which in the United Kingdom and Ireland also extends 
across party lines, remains crucial to further progress. I am pleased 
that the United States has been able to contribute to this process of 
reconciliation.

Let me begin by reviewing briefly the events since the announcement of 
the Downing Street Declaration. I will include a summary of President 
Clinton's initiatives to support the peace process. Finally, I will 
describe the present status of that process.

The Cease-fire

The present peace in Northern Ireland began with the watershed 
announcement by the IRA on August 31, 1994, that it had decided to cease 
all military operations and end its 25-year campaign of violence. The 
IRA's decision marked the beginning of a new era that holds the promise 
of peace for all the people of Northern Ireland. This cease-fire was 
followed, in October, by a similar announcement by the Combined Loyalist 
Military Command. The Loyalists have said their cease-fire will depend 
on a continued IRA cease-fire. As we have made clear to all parties, we 
expect both cease-fires to be irreversible, and, with both cease-fires, 
deeds and not words will remain the key factor.

Unfortunately, violence does continue within the respective communities 
in Northern Ireland. It takes the form of so-called "punishment 
beatings," whereby the respective para- military groups continue to 
enforce their Mafia-like discipline within their communities. It appears 
that this sort of violence may even have increased somewhat since the 
cease-fire. We call upon all parties to cease this violence within their 
own communities and support the only real avenue to peace--that of a 
negotiated political settlement.

President Clinton's Initiative To Support Peace

On November 1, shortly after both cease-fires came into force, President 
Clinton announced a number of initiatives to increase our support for 
the political and economic revitalization of Northern Ireland and the 
border counties. Northern Ireland has been at the top of our foreign 
policy agenda since the very first day of this Administration. The 
President saw the promise of peace as allowing Americans to build on the 
strong business, trade, political, and cultural links we already enjoy 
with Ireland--north and south. He understood that the present 
opportunity for lasting peace is the chance of a generation that must be 
seized and supported.

On December 1, the President announced the appointment of Senator George 
Mitchell as Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State 
for Economic Initiatives in Ireland. Senator Mitchell's appointment 
underscores the Administration's commitment to support the kind of 
political and economic progress that will lead to a permanent, just 
peace in Northern Ireland. Senator Mitchell has recently returned from a 
trip to the region during which he met with a wide range of leaders and 
discussed many issues related to a White House conference that I will 
address in a moment. I am sure Senator Mitchell will discuss separately 
with Members the progress that he is making in coordinating all of these 
Administration initiatives.

The centerpiece of our support is the White House Conference for Trade 
and Investment in Ireland. This conference is now scheduled for May 24-
26 in Washington, DC. The President will be participating in the 
conference along with the British Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland, Sir Patrick Mayhew, and Irish Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister Dick Spring. The aim of the conference will be to show U.S. 
companies that sustained peace is dramatically improving business 
opportunities in Northern Ireland and the border counties. In addition 
to providing some needed employment opportunities in areas which have 
served as the recruiting ground for paramilitaries, we want American 
businesses to be in on the ground floor of these new opportunities.

The White House also arranged for Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown to 
lead a delegation of U.S. business executives to Northern Ireland to 
attend Prime Minister Major's Belfast Investment Conference last 
December. This was a successful visit that not only identified concrete 
new opportunities for increased business links, but also prepared the 
groundwork in both Belfast and Dublin for the White House conference.

Other Administration initiatives include proposed increased funding for 
the International Fund for Ireland, strengthened collaborative business 
programs within the Department of Commerce and an overall Commerce 
strategy to be presented by Secretary Brown at the May White House 
conference, increased funding for the U.S. Information Agency's 
International Visitor programs, additional emphasis on political party 
training by the National Endowment for Democracy, and more technical 
delegations for the U.S. Trade and Development Agency to identify 
mutually beneficial trade and investment opportunities. Let me say in 
particular that I recognize the brutal realities of our budget 
situation, but the Administration request for IFI funding remains an 
essential investment in peace.

Status of the Peace Process In Northern Ireland

On February 22 in Belfast, Prime Minister Bruton and Prime Minister 
Major announced a Joint Framework Document--JFD--outlining their 
governments' shared proposals for inclusive talks on Northern Ireland. 
The JFD lays the foundation for all-party talks--also including the 
British and Irish Governments. Based on the Downing Street Declaration, 
the JFD includes the same core principle of the need for the majority 
consent of the people of Northern Ireland to any constitutional changes. 
North-south bodies are proposed, comprising elected representatives from 
and accountable to a Northern Ireland Assembly and the Irish parliament. 
The bodies are intended to have a harmonizing and consultive role in 
matters most efficiently handled in an all-island context--agriculture, 
tourism, fishing, etc.

The Irish Government agreed in the JFD to introduce and support changes 
to its constitution, such that no territorial claim of right to 
jurisdiction contrary to the will of the majority of the people of 
Northern Ireland shall be asserted. The British Government also will 
enact constitutional legislation to exercise their jurisdiction with 
rigorous impartiality on behalf of all of the people of Northern 
Ireland, in a way that does not prejudice their freedom to determine 
Northern Ireland's constitutional status, whether in remaining part of 
the United Kingdom or in forming part of a united Ireland.

Both governments pledged themselves to the protection of the rights and 
identities of both traditions. Both governments also envisage a new and 
more broadly based agreement between their governments to follow on the 
cooperative work of the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement. A standing 
intergovernmental conference may be created to consider matters not 
transferred to the new political assembly in Northern Ireland.

It is important to remember that the JFD does not provide for joint 
authority by the British and Irish governments over Northern Ireland. 
Neither government has attempted to predetermine any outcome to the  
all-party talks. The key to a comprehensive solution remains agreement 
by the parties, by the people of Ireland and Northern Ireland in 
separate referendums, and then by the parliaments of the respective 
governments.

A Framework for Accountable Government in Northern Ireland

Also on February 22, Prime Minister Major announced separately the 
Framework for Accountable Government in Northern Ireland. This document 
outlines proposals for a new, devolved local assembly in Northern 
Ireland and is intended to form the basis for negotiations between the 
British Government and Northern Ireland political parties. It provides 
for a unicameral legislature elected by proportional representation with 
a number of checks and balances such as: super-majority votes--65-75%--
for certain kinds of legislation; protection for minority rights; 
proportional assignments to committees and committee chairmanships; and 
a panel of three persons elected by direct vote of the people to 
nominate assembly chairmen and, if necessary, block legislation. The 
assembly would not have taxing powers.

Reaction to Framework Documents. Both framework documents are designed 
to assist negotiations. They will not be imposed on any party. The 
Administration has supported these documents as significant steps 
forward in the peace process. President Clinton has called upon all 
parties to examine the documents carefully and to move forward on that 
basis. Irish Foreign Minister Spring briefed Secretary Christopher, NSC 
Adviser Anthony Lake, and Vice President Gore on the JFD and peace 
prospects on February 27-28. Northern Ireland Secretary of State Mayhew 
gave similar briefings to the same officials on March 7.

Nationalist reaction to the framework documents has been favorable. Sinn 
Fein and the Social Democratic and Labor Party have said they are ready 
to begin negotiations with the British, although Sinn Fein has some 
reservations about the Irish Government's pledge to remove its 
constitutional claim to Northern Ireland. The two small Loyalist 
parties--the Ulster Democratic Party and the Progressive Unionist Party-
-and the center Alliance Party also have agreed to begin talks. The 
Democratic Unionist Party has condemned the documents as reflecting a 
nationalist agenda and refuses to discuss them with Her Majesty's 
Government. The Ulster Unionist Party, or UUP--the largest party in 
Northern Ireland--has issued its own framework document calling for the 
election of a constitutional assembly to draft a constitution for a new 
assembly. The UUP also has rejected these framework documents, but has 
agreed to negotiate with the British Government on the basis of the UUP 
draft.

Exploratory Talks Between the British Government and the Sinn Fein Party 
and the Loyalist Parties. The British Government has completed five 
sessions of exploratory talks at the senior civil servant level with 
representatives of Sinn Fein and a separate set of six talks with 
Loyalist Party leaders. Additional talks with both groups are scheduled. 
These discussions are expected to move to the junior ministerial level 
when sufficient progress in these exploratory discussions has been made 
on a range of issues, including decommissioning of arms. Northern 
Ireland Secretary of State Mayhew has stated that the British Government 
would consider placing a minister in the talks if it believed that doing 
so would result in serious discussions on disarmament.

Decommissioning Weapons. On March 8, at the urging of the 
Administration, Sinn Fein issued a press release announcing its 
representatives are prepared to discuss with ministers all issues, 
including decommissioning of weapons. In response to this statement and 
Sinn Fein's positive response to the Joint Framework Document, the 
President agreed to permit Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams to fund-raise 
in the U.S. for a period of three months. We sincerely hope these 
exploratory talks will move to the ministerial level and expect both 
Sinn Fein and the Loyalist parties will immediately begin serious 
discussions on disarmament.

Of course, deeds are much more important than words. As Secretary 
Christopher stated February 27 and March 7, We continue to call on all 
parties to refrain from violence, and particularly, we urge those who 
have laid down their arms to take the next essential step and that is to 
begin the process of disarmament.

Non-violent constitutional parties cannot be expected to sit at a table 
with the political representatives of paramilitary groups who have 
retained the right to return to violence if they do not achieve their 
goals. Decommissioning of the vast arsenals of Loyalist and Nationalist 
paramilitaries must be mutual, balanced, and across the board. It must 
begin now, not await the end of the talks. Just as no party will be able 
to have all of its expectations met in a comprehensive settlement, no 
party can be permitted to retain the means to attempt to gain more 
violence.

Let me stress that we have maintained contacts across the political 
spectrum in Northern Ireland. Our diplomats in Belfast, London, and 
Dublin regularly exchange views with John Hume and his colleagues in the 
SDLP, with Jim Molyneaux and other leaders of the UUP, with John 
Alderdice of the Alliance Party, with Ian Paisley and others of the DUP, 
and, since President Clinton lifted a long-standing ban on such 
contacts, with Gerry Adams and others in Sinn Fein, as well as with 
Loyalist leaders of the PUP and UDP. Many of these leaders also are 
regular visitors to the State Department, as well as the White House and 
elsewhere in the Administration.

The President has taken a risk on behalf of peace by permitting limited 
fund-raising by Sinn Fein. The ball is in their court to show that they 
are serious about removing the gun from the political arena in Northern 
Ireland. I firmly believe the decision by the President last year to 
grant visa waivers to Sinn Fein leaders Gerry Adams, Joe Cahill, and 
others contributed to their ability to persuade the IRA to cease its 
campaign of violence. This, in turn, led to the Loyalist cease-fire and 
all the hopeful developments I have outlined. We expect that the fund-
raising decision will have a similar result in bringing forward the day 
when all paramilitary organizations decommission their arms and all-
party talks begin.

Conclusion

In concluding, Mr. Chairman, I would like to emphasize again that while 
the U.S. can and will continue to support the peace process in Northern 
Ireland, the success of that process depends on the people of Northern 
Ireland and the British and Irish governments. We believe the basis for 
a comprehensive settlement is to be found in the principles set forth in 
the 1993 Downing Street Declaration, which have been developed and 
elaborated in the various framework proposals for negotiations issued by 
John Major and John Bruton in Belfast February 22. We can and will 
encourage this process in those ways we believe can best help the 
progress of peace, but the people of Northern Ireland in the end must 
want peace enough to compromise and bridge the divisions which have 
separated their two communities for so long. (###)

[END OF DISPATCH VOL. 6, NO. 14]

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