1.  Pursuing a Comprehensive Middle East Peace--President Clinton, 

Secretary Christopher, Joint Communique 

2.  U.S. Policy Toward East Asia and the Pacific--Winston Lord 
3.  Encouraging Trade and Investment:  An Integral part of U.S. Policy 

Toward Africa--George E. Moose 

4.  Human Rights and Democracy in Africa--John Shattuck 

5.  U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer Policy 
Pursuing a Comprehensive Middle East Peace 
President Clinton, Secretary Christopher, Joint Communique 
Remarks at Middle East Foreign Ministers Meeting, Washington, DC, 
February 12, 1995. 
Secretary Christopher. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I am very 
pleased to welcome the ministers here and to welcome all of you and 
those who have joined their ministers here for this important and unique 
The commitment of the United States to the peace process, I think, can 
be judged by the fact that the President, the Vice President, the 
National Security Adviser, and myself are here this morning. And without 
further comment, I would like to introduce to all of you the President 
of the United States. 

President Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and thank you--all of you, 
for coming to this very important meeting. It is no secret to anyone in 
the world that we are at a critical moment in the peace process. We 
cannot allow the rise of terror to again threaten this peace, or as 
Chairman Arafat said the other day, we cannot allow it to kill the 
Palestinian dream. We in this country are prepared to redouble our 
efforts to get the peace process back in full gear. We are doing what we 
can on our own and with others to deal with the problem of terror. 
I want to begin by saying a special word of appreciation to President 
Mubarak for the Cairo summit. He has been involved in this process all 
along, and I think that the Cairo summit produced a clear statement by 
the leaders of all of you here represented that we are not going to let 
terror hold sway, that we are not going to let the peace process 
Today, it is for us to begin to take the specific steps necessary to 
have the message of peace and renewed commitment carried out. I think it 
is clear that we have to complete phase two of the Israeli-Palestinian 
agreement. I think it is clear that we have to fully implement the peace 
treaty between Jordan and Israel. I think it is clear that we have to 
bring some economic benefits of peace as quickly as we possibly can. 
The United States is prepared to do its part on that. For example, if 
you agree to establish industrial zones in the West Bank and Gaza and 
elsewhere, I am prepared to go to Congress to seek approval for 
extending duty-free treatment to products coming out of those zones. Of 
course, in the end the economic and political cooperation among all of 
you will be the most important thing in reaping economic progress. But I 
want to do our part. I know our Russian partner feels the same. I think 
that many others around the world will also help. But I am absolutely 
convinced that we need to move as quickly as we can to prove that there 
are some economic benefits to peace. 
Let me also say that even though we must have enhanced security to 
create enhanced economic benefits, it is obvious that our attempt to do 
that is impaired when the movement of goods is limited by boycott, by 
closure, or by any other action. So we all must work hard to make 
progress on the peace front, on the security front, and on the economic 
front at the same time. We all have to recognize that there are 
difficult decisions to be made in this area. 
The negotiations you already have concluded have built the framework for 
peace. What we have to do now is to have specific achievements--lasting 
achievements. We will do our part. We are as committed today as we have 
ever been to a comprehensive peace. I wish the representatives of Syria 
and Lebanon were around this table. They are not here only because there 
has been no peace agreement signed with them, but I know you all join me 
in saying that our work will never be completed until we are all around 
the table as partners working for peace. 
Now, there are many other things I can discuss today, but I mostly want 
to say to you that the United States is still committed to this--and 
more strongly than ever. We are ready to do our part. 
We are ready to do our part economically; we are certainly ready to do 
our part in fighting terror. But we all have to do this together. I hope 
that this meeting will produce further specific steps that we can all 
take to keep doing it together. We cannot let people believe that they 
can disrupt with terror the rational, humane, decent course of history. 

Statement on Israeli-Palestinian conclusions, Washington, DC, February 
12, 1995. 
Secretary Christopher. This morning, I had a very productive meeting 
with Shimon Peres and Nabeel Sha'ath. Both made it unmistakably clear 
that Israelis and Palestinians--while aware of the challenges they face-
-are committed to a real partnership with one another and to using that 
partnership to reach real peace. Both expressed their determination that 
there can be no turning back and that they must find ways to overcome 
the challenges ahead. Toward this end, they agreed on the following 
statements which I want to report to you. 
First, both Israelis and Palestinians made clear their determination to 
fulfill all elements of their agreements and to ensure their 
Second, both parties expressed understanding for one another's needs and 
requirements. They also affirmed that fulfilling these needs requires a 
cooperative and interrelated approach. Both parties agreed that the 
question of Israeli security needs and Palestinian political and 
economic needs must be satisfied. 
Third, for its part, the Palestinian Authority is committed to the full 
implementation of the Gaza-Jericho accord and to the second phase of the 
Declaration of Principles and to preempting terror, punishing those 
responsible, and denying those who plan and carry out terror or violence 
to  any safehaven. Both parties made clear that the application of these 
measures would significantly enhance the conditions for security, 
stability, and a normalized economic life and cooperation based on the 
free movements of people, material, and goods in accordance with the 
agreements. Israel is committed to the full implementation of the Gaza-
Jericho accord and to the second phase of the Declaration of Principles. 
In this regard, both sides reaffirmed their commitment to negotiate 
promptly all aspects of the interim agreement, including transfer of 
authority and redeployment in the rest of the West Bank, and elections 
in accordance with the Declaration of Principles. 
Finally, both parties agreed that these understandings can help to build 
the trust and confidence so necessary to being able to move forward 
expeditiously through all phases of this process. Both sides expressed 
their determination to use these understandings to work toward a 
successful Israeli-Palestinian meeting next week. 

Blair House Joint Communique 
Text of Joint Communique issued by the U.S., Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and 
the Palestinian Authority, Washington, DC, February 12, 1995. 
On February 12, 1995, the United States hosted a follow-up meeting in 
Washington of the February 2, 1995 Cairo Summit of representatives from 
Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority. President Clinton, 
accompanied by Vice President Gore, addressed the gathering which was 
attended by Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, Egyptian Foreign 
Minister Amre Moussa, Jordanian Foreign Minister Abd al-Karim Kabariti, 
Palestinian Authority Minister of Planning and International Cooperation 
Nabeel Sha'ath, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and Russian 
Deputy Foreign Minister Victor Posuvalyuk who participated as an 
The five participants acknowledged the leadership of Egypt's President 
Hosni Mubarak in hosting the Cairo Summit. Building on that historic 
meeting, the five participants reaffirmed their determination to 
consolidate the breakthroughs achieved in the Arab-Israeli peace 
process, to overcome obstacles and disputes, and to push forward toward 
a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace in the region based on United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 thus leading to a 
lasting reconciliation among the peoples of the Middle East cemented by 
bonds of mutual respect and dignity, tolerance, cooperation, security, 
and peaceful relations. 
Toward this end, the five parties represented in Washington have joined 
together to act to further cooperation in support of peace. Because 
peace requires concerted action, the parties agreed to explore practical 
steps in the political, economic, security, and human dimension areas of 
education and culture. They also agreed to meet as necessary to consult 
and to coordinate action in these areas. Experts will follow up in each 
of these areas as appropriate. 
In the political area, the parties reaffirmed their strong commitment to 
honoring those agreements already concluded in letter and spirit and to 
accelerate negotiations on all tracks. The Secretary of State reported 
on the conclusions reached between the Israeli and Palestinian 
delegations today. Those conclusions are attached and constitute an 
integral part of this communique. The participants in today's meeting 
welcomed the results achieved by Israel and the Palestinian Authority 
and pledged to do all they could to support the conclusion of the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The parties also expressed 
appreciation for the continuation of the implementation of the Israeli-
Jordanian peace treaty in all its aspects. They further expressed the 
hope that a peace agreement between Israel and both Syria and Lebanon 
could be reached soon, leading to comprehensive peace. 
With respect to security, the parties agreed that there can be no real 
peace in the region without security and stability. The parties declared 
that they are committed to combat all acts that aim to destroy the peace 
process, particularly acts of terrorism and violence and to stand 
staunchly against and put an end to all such acts. The parties 
reaffirmed the intention expressed at the Cairo Summit that within the 
framework of peace and reconciliation in the region, with enhanced 
security, economic prosperity, and a higher standard of living for their 
people, they intend to achieve equal security and mutual confidence at 
lower levels of armaments, appreciating President Mubarak's disarmament 
proposal on weapons of mass destruction. The parties shall pursue a 
mutually verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass 
destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery 
In the economic area, they reaffirmed the importance of fostering 
economic development and investment in the region. The parties agreed to 
support assistance to Palestinians and the development and strengthening 
of the Palestinian economy through various means, including the creation 
of industrial zones in the West Bank and Gaza. The parties are committed 
to explore the removal of barriers to trade. They will also explore ways 
to promote liberalized trade between the parties and the United States. 
In this regard, the parties expressed appreciation to the United States 
for its proposal to extend duty free treatment to products from 
industrial zones to be created in the West Bank and Gaza and free trade 
zones that may be established in Taba, Eilat, and Aqaba. The United 
States will consult further with the parties and the U.S. Congress on 
this matter. At the same time, the parties took note of progress and 
agreed to continue their efforts towards the establishment of a Middle 
East Development Bank. Such an institution would serve to fund 
development projects and the promotion of private sector investment. 
To underscore the public-private partnership as embodied in the 
Casablanca Declaration, the four parties agreed to the promotion of 
private sector projects. The parties will work together with the private 
sector for the success of the Amman Economic Summit in October. 
In the human dimension, the parties also agreed on the need to build 
bridges between peoples, to overcome barriers to understanding, and to 
share knowledge and expertise to deal with common problems. The parties 
also agreed to explore the possibilities of new and more creative forms 
of cooperation in these areas. 
Finally, the parties pledged to work to ensure that there can be no 
turning back in the Arab-Israeli peace process. They agreed to do all in 
their power to work toward the achievement of a comprehensive peace and 
to create a Middle East with peace, security, and economic prosperity 
for all the people of the region. In this regard, they pledged their 
continued support for the efforts and contributions of the multilateral 
track of the peace process. 
In light of our commitment to pursue a comprehensive peace, the United 
States will be consulting with its Russian co-sponsor, the European 
Union as well as with Norway, Japan, and other regional participants in 
the peace process on ways to promote progress and reach our common 
U.S. Policy Toward East Asia and the Pacific 
Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs of the 
House International Relations Committee, Washington, DC, February 9, 
Mr. Chairman: Thank you for the invitation to speak before the Asia and 
Pacific Affairs Subcommittee so early in this session of the 104th 
Congress. It is a distinct pleasure to sketch for you a broad overview 
of U.S. policy for the East Asia and Pacific region under the Clinton 
Administration. I reiterate the Administration's commitment to working 
with this Congress to shape an active bipartisan policy that will 
advance our national interests in the world's most dynamic region. 
In addition to submitting the full text of these opening remarks, I 
would like, with your permission, to place in the record the text of my 
January 1995 address to the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco. 
I have just returned from a 10-day, five-country tour through Asia with 
Deputy Secretary Talbott. I was once again struck by America's large 
stakes in the region as well as the strong desire there that the United 
States remain engaged. 
The Asia-Pacific region is impressive for its diversity and dynamism. 
Geographically, it embraces a broad swath of all four hemispheres, 
stretching roughly 8,000 miles westward from the U.S. mainland to Burma 
and 8,000 miles southward from Alaska to New Zealand. Its ethnic and 
religious diversity blends with some of the world's richest cultures. It 
includes several of the last communist regimes in the world--Vietnam, 
North Korea, and China--as well as free societies such as Japan and 
Australia and newer democracies, such as Thailand, South Korea, the 
Philippines, Taiwan, Cambodia, and Mongolia. 
Economically, the Asia-Pacific region has become the most robust and 
important area in the world. The 18 members of the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation--APEC--forum account for more than one-third of the world's 
population and produce $14 trillion in goods and services annually--
about half of the world's GDP. Even excluding the U.S., the output of 
the region still surpasses that of the European Union. East Asia is the 
destination of nearly a third of total U.S. exports and accounts for 
over 2.5 million American jobs. American sales in Asia are growing more 
rapidly than anywhere else. 
The region is not uniformly affluent, however. It is also home to 
grinding poverty. It is no coincidence that the poorest countries 
generally have some of the most repressive regimes, while the more 
affluent are among the most free. 
Strategically, the Asia-Pacific is the region where four of the world's 
major powers intersect. We have fought three wars there in the past 
half-century. Here at home, our population has been shifting toward the 
Pacific and is increasingly enriched by large numbers of Asian 
immigrants. The hopes for a peaceful and prosperous future are 
promising, provided the United States stays actively engaged. 
The Clinton Administration's Approach 
During the last two years, the Clinton Administration has confronted 
head-on the post-Cold War world with all its advantages and ambiguities. 
The Pacific arena has been no exception. We have sought to define for 
Americans the huge U.S. interest in the region and to heighten U.S. 
engagement. We have promoted the full range of U.S. goals. In addition 
to more traditional concerns, this includes a new emphasis on advancing 
global issues such as narcotics control, population planning, AIDS 
prevention and treatment, environmental protection, and cooperation to 
curb international crime. 
The broad outlines of U.S. policy toward the region were articulated by 
President Clinton during his first overseas trip, to Japan and Korea in 
July 1993. At that time, he set forth his vision of "a New Pacific 
Community built on shared strength, shared prosperity, and a shared 
commitment to democratic values." The Administration views the three 
pillars of this policy--prosperity, security, and freedom--as mutually 
reinforcing elements. We have been pursuing each of these through a 
variety of initiatives, policies, statements, and trips--in the process 
seeking to raise the profile of Asia in our policy and public 
consciousness. Let me now briefly review what has been accomplished and 
then discuss the specific ways in which we would hope to continue making 
progress in the year ahead. 
In an era of relative peace in the Asia-Pacific region, we have been 
able to focus heavily on ensuring that the United States contributes to 
and benefits from the dynamic economic growth of the region. Within the 
context of America's global efforts to promote free trade through the 
GATT and, now, WTO, we have been working bilaterally and regionally to 
remove barriers to trade and to ensure America's economic place in the 
Pacific community. 
In 1993, when we were the chair of APEC, we played an active role in 
developing that young organization into a more effective vehicle for 
promoting economic growth and trade liberalization in the Asia-Pacific 
region. In Seattle in the fall of 1993, the President elevated the APEC 
forum to the leaders' level by convening the first-ever meeting of Asia-
Pacific leaders and, with those leaders, shaped an economic vision 
statement for the Pacific. 
In Bogor last year, the second APEC leaders' meeting, under Indonesia's 
leadership, made a commitment to achieve open and free trade in the 
region by the year 2020. In Osaka this November, we look toward a 
blueprint, developed under Japan's leadership, to move APEC toward this 
bold vision. The Osaka action agenda will set the work program for APEC 
for the next 10 years. We need a comprehensive and credible agenda that 
commits APEC to a course of active trade and investment liberalization. 
We see APEC not as a trade bloc nor a formal trade agreement like NAFTA 
but, rather, as a building block for global trade liberalization and a 
spur to freer trade in other regions. 
We also have been working bilaterally to open markets. We have made 
progress on economic issues a central element in our relations with 
Japan. Through the U.S.-Japan framework talks, we have reached a series 
of important sectoral agreements and promoted macroeconomic stimulus in 
Japan. But there is much unfinished business in the automotive sector, 
deregulation, and the faithful implementation of agreements reached. 
However sporadically, Japan is moving toward a genuine multiparty system 
with more competition for consumer votes and, therefore, greater 
pressure for access to foreign suppliers. Still, significant Japanese 
trade surpluses, even if at somewhat lower levels, are likely to persist 
for the foreseeable future. We do not seek to balance trade bilaterally; 
what we do seek are genuinely open markets and a fair opportunity to 
With China, we are in the middle of a series of intense negotiations. 
Our textile talks last year resulted in a new accord. We also 
successfully negotiated a market access agreement and a framework 
agreement on intellectual property rights, as well as our recently 
announced accord on satellite launch services. However, serious problems 
remain. We recently announced trade retaliation against China because of 
its failure to enforce its IPR laws and regulations. Egregious pirating 
of intellectual property in China costs American firms about $1 billion 
annually. The Chinese have now agreed to resume negotiations. We remain 
prepared to reach an equitable agreement, but we will continue to firmly 
defend American interests and international trading principles. 
Another current issue is China's desire to become a member of the World 
Trading Organization, the successor to GATT. We continue to strongly 
support China's membership, but its accession must be based on firm 
commitments to the basic rules and disciplines of the GATT/WTO. The 
Chinese leaders' willingness to open their system to foreign competition 
has been complicated by the recent uncertainty in China's domestic 
economic situation and the transition to the post-Deng era. 
We have negotiated down protectionist barriers with other trade partners 
including Korea, Thailand, and Taiwan. We have consulted individually 
and collectively with the six dynamic ASEAN economies, which together 
are our fourth-largest trading partner. 
Economics has thus become a core element of our overall policy toward 
the Asia-Pacific. Active economic engagement helps to anchor America in 
the region, not only in trade and investment but also in security and 
political terms. 
In a region where the major powers meet, we have large, abiding security 
interests. Relations among these nations are more stable today than they 
have been at any time in this century. Managing those interrelationships 
is, nevertheless, a key challenge in the years ahead. How are we working 
to consolidate these favorable circumstances? 
We are maintaining our forward military presence in the Western Pacific. 
The bottom-up review concluded that the U.S. interest in deterring 
aggression and preserving stability requires us to maintain the 
capabilities that are provided now by an active forward presence of 
approximately 100,000 troops. While the specific composition of our 
forces may change, our commitment to maintain our capabilities and 
active engagement in the real security challenges of the region must 
not. The Department of Defense soon will publish a new report on our 
strategy in the region which will clearly affirm this. 
Our alliance with Japan is strong and remains the linchpin of our 
defense posture in Asia. We have insulated our security ties from our 
trade frictions while making the point that, if left unattended, 
economic frictions could eventually affect our overall relationship. We 
have worked with Japan on what we call our "Common Agenda" on global 
issues and successfully enhanced a global partnership with Japan--one 
which also is reflected in our support for Japan's becoming a permanent 
member of the UN Security Council. 
Relations with China are crucial. It is a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council, has nuclear weapons, and is destined to become a 
global economic power. It has a major impact on regional issues and on 
global challenges such as the environment. We have a clear national 
interest in seeing that China is integrated into the international 
system on appropriate terms, whether it is the WTO, APEC, the ASEAN 
Regional Forum, non-proliferation agreements, or compliance with 
international human rights standards. We welcome China's participation 
in both global and regional economic and security forums. 
Nearly one and a half years ago, the President initiated our policy of 
comprehensive engagement. We continue, through high-level dialogue and 
working-level talks with China, to pursue our national interest. We have 
had modest success in securing China's cooperation on certain issues, 
including international peace-keeping, the North Korean nuclear issue, 
missile exports, narcotics, alien smuggling, and regional security 
dialogue. In recent months, however, differences over the sensitive 
issue of Taiwan, human rights, and trade have taken center stage. 
Resolving these differences is made more difficult by China's succession 
We are, therefore, in a difficult phase in our relationship. We must 
continue to pursue constructive relations with China--one of the key 
powers in the world, but we must also show firm resolve whenever 
necessary. We have maintained Tiananmen-related sanctions, have taken 
firm trade steps where necessary, and are pursuing human rights issues 
in various ways. At the same time, we seek to make progress where we 
can. Despite some current strains, we remain confident that, over the 
long run, our shared interests will clearly outweigh our differences. 
A comprehensive and balanced China policy is essential to maintaining 
peace, stability, and economic development on both sides of the Taiwan 
Strait. While we recognize the Government of the People's Republic of 
China as the sole legal government of China, we also maintain a vigorous 
and expanding unofficial relationship with Taiwan, within the framework 
established by the Taiwan Relations Act and the three joint communiques 
with the P.R.C. We acknowledge the Chinese position that there is but 
one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. Administrations of both 
parties have embraced this policy, which has enabled us to develop 
mutually beneficial relations with both the P.R.C. and Taiwan. 
The people of Taiwan also have benefited from our strong but unofficial 
relationship. The famous Taiwan economic "miracle" has made it the 13th-
largest trading economy in the world and our second-largest export 
market in Asia. With our encouragement, Taiwan has taken dramatic 
strides toward democracy and the observance of human rights. All of 
these developments have provided the people of Taiwan the security to 
enjoy their prosperity, and recently a "cross-strait dialogue" between 
Taipei and Beijing has replaced the exchanges of shells that once were 
common in those waters. 
Recognizing this, the Administration conducted the first comprehensive 
review of its Taiwan policy in 15 years and implemented significant 
adjustments in our unofficial relations with Taiwan. However, we will 
continue to reject proposals which would place at risk the peace and 
growth that Taiwan has achieved. We will not reverse the policies of six 
administrations of both parties.  That would not be in our interest, and 
it would not serve the interest of the people of Taiwan. 
With Russia, our global approach of supporting reform and integration 
includes welcoming it into the Pacific community. Russia is playing a 
constructive role in the ASEAN Regional Forum and is eager to join APEC. 
We have been encouraging Moscow to address the key issues which will 
allow it to improve its relations with Japan. 
With Vietnam, the fullest possible accounting for our missing-in-action 
continues to be our highest priority. We also have important regional 
security and economic objectives, which improved relations will promote. 
Just last month, we opened a liaison office in Hanoi after favorably 
settling property and claims issues. We envisage that this liaison 
office will play an important role in encouraging progress in unilateral 
and joint Vietnamese efforts on MIAs and in furthering our other 
objectives, including human rights. As the President has said 
consistently, Vietnamese cooperation in accounting for missing 
servicemen remains the priority criterion for further progress in our 
bilateral relationship. 
Our alliance relationships and forward military presence form the 
foundations for our Asian security policy. To supplement but not to 
supplant these foundations, the Administration also has explored new 
multilateral security dialogues in Asia. Working with ASEAN and other 
friends, the U.S. has supported the establishment of the ASEAN Regional 
Forum--ARF--the Pacific's first broadly based consultative body 
concerned with security issues. An inclusive group, not directed against 
any country or bloc, the ARF had its historic first meeting in July 1994 
and included the ASEAN countries, the U.S., Canada, Japan, Korea, 
Australia, and New Zealand as well as China, Russia, Vietnam, and 
others. We believe the ARF can play an important role in conveying 
governments' intentions, easing tensions, promoting transparency, 
developing confidence, constraining arms races, and cultivating habits 
of consultation and cooperation on security issues. 
Together with others, we also are laying the groundwork for a smaller 
forum for northeast Asia, an area where great powers have clashed 
historically and which is the locus of the region's most urgent security 
The Korean Peninsula represents the most critical security challenge in 
Asia. A major Administration accomplishment of 1994 was the successful 
negotiation of the Agreed Framework with North Korea. 
The nuclear accord has received detailed attention in other hearings, so 
I will comment on it only briefly. We are confident that the more the 
Congress and the country examine the agreement, the more they will share 
our firm judgment that it fulfills America's goals of promoting regional 
stability and curbing nuclear proliferation. 
In this accord, we address the past, present, and future nuclear threats 
posed by North Korea. North Korea has agreed to allow inspections which 
the IAEA believes will shed light on how much plutonium North Korea 
produced in 1989-91. To be sure, clarifi- cation of the past is 
scheduled for a few years later than we would have liked. We judged that 
this delay was outweighed by the opportunity to deal effectively with 
the present and the future. The Agreed Framework obliges North Korea to 
freeze its nuclear capacity. So far it has done so. It has shut down its 
small nuclear reactor. It has sealed its reprocessing facility; the 
spent fuel rods will be safely encased and eventually shipped out. It 
has halted construction on its two large reactors. All of this is being 
verified by IAEA inspections and our own surveillance. North Korea has 
reversed itself and remains a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
As for the future, North Korea will dismantle its entire nuclear program 
and, with outside help, substitute a nuclear energy system that is more 
resistant to proliferation. Moreover, as it implements the accord, North 
Korea will be progressively integrated into the region and the world, 
paving the way to greater stability in northeast Asia and, ultimately, 
to a resolution of the tragic division of the Korean Peninsula. 
This agreement is not based on trust. In addition to international 
verification, there are built-in check- points along the path to 
implementation. To gain technical or economic benefits, North Korea must 
honor reciprocal obligations. North Korea derives no advantages that do 
not also promote regional and global stability. Moreover, the major 
financial costs will be borne by the international community. 
In short, the Agreed Framework is of major benefit to the United States, 
to the region, and to the world. The R.O.K. supports the agreement for 
this reason, as do Japan and all other interested parties. The 
alternatives are dubious and dangerous. Those who are critical of the 
accord should present a better option. No one has done so. 
Implementing the Framework will require perseverance by all concerned. 
We are working closely with South Korea, Japan, and others. The 
Framework stipulates that the south-north dialogue must be resumed. We 
insist that dialogue between Seoul and Pyongyang develop in rough 
parallel with steps toward improved U.S.-D.P.R.K. relations. The future 
of the peninsula must be shaped by the Korean people themselves; the 
Framework can only succeed if there is a climate of civility and 
cooperation between the north and the south. 
Finally, there is the goal of freedom. Promoting freedom while balancing 
other objectives is the most complex challenge--conceptually and 
politically--that we face. It is a quest in which we get the least 
international support. 
False prophets claim a contest of values between the United States--or 
the West--and an Asian monolith. They assert that Asians do not share 
universal aspirations for individual rights. Asian electorates and 
elected leaders would reject the notion that human rights are uniquely 
Western, or the implication that autocracy is intrinsically Asian. Most 
would agree with President Kim of South Korea that "respect for human 
dignity, plural democracy, and free market economics have firmly taken 
root as universal values." 
What is our approach?  We are not trying to impose our form of society 
or ideals. Each country must find its own way, consistent with its 
history and culture. But international obligations to which countries 
have subscribed should be fulfilled. No government should violate the 
core value of human dignity as articulated in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. Each nation's citizens should have the chance to 
participate in the decisions that affect their lives, and the 
governments they elect should not be overturned by force. Many Asians 
have devoted their lives--and given their lives--for these values. 
Americans are bound to respect them. 
In addition, we appeal to countries' self interest. Experience teaches 
that sustained economic development is more likely where government 
policies are transparent, where courts provide due process, where 
uncensored newspapers are free to expose corruption and to debate 
economic policy, and where business people can make independent 
decisions with free access to information. Economic rights granted by 
authoritarians can as easily be taken away. The foundation of open 
economies--rights that protect contracts, property, and patents--can be 
guaranteed only by the rule of law. 
The reality of Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan shows that 
accountable government is the bedrock of stability and prosperity. The 
reality of Burma and North Korea is that repression entrenches poverty. 
The defense of liberty is not merely an idealistic endeavor.  Enlarging 
freedom serves concrete American interests as well. The greatest threats 
to our security--and to Asia's--come from governments that flout the 
rule of law at home and reject the rule of international law abroad. In 
353 wars fought since 1819, not a single one was between two established 
democracies. Open, accountable governments do not practice terrorism or 
generate refugees. They make better trading partners. 
Our goals remain constant. The President remains as committed as ever to 
the cause of freedom. Consequently, we will continue to champion human 
and labor rights in Asia without arrogance or apology. We will do so 
where we have friendly relations--as the President did in Indonesia in 
his meeting with President Soeharto. We will do so where our interest in 
stemming the drug trade goes hand-in-hand with our interest in 
accountable government--as it does in Burma. And we will do so where we 
have an interest in positive engagement on many critical world issues--
as we have in China. 
Finally, we will continue our strong support for fledgling democracies. 
Last spring, Secretary Christopher participated in the International 
Conference on the Reconstruction of Cambodia and pledged our support for 
rebuilding Cambodia. Last month, Deputy Secretary Talbott visited 
Cambodia to reaffirm our support for the democratically elected 
coalition government.  
Later this month, I will be traveling to Mongolia to review our programs 
for supporting Mongolia's transition to a democratic, free-market 
Goals for the Coming Year 
Mr. Chairman, the President and the Secretary of State have articulated 
a series of goals which the Administration will energetically and 
creatively pursue. In the context of the Administration's broad 
objectives, we will be working in the coming year on several important 
fronts in Asia. I will mention some of the more important ones briefly. 
We will work determinedly to implement the U.S.-North Korean Agreed 
Framework but not at the cost of our strong ties with the Republic of 
Korea. The task is complex; it will require sustained effort. We will 
establish KEDO and get it off to a constructive start. The selection of 
a South Korean reactor design is essential on financial, technical, and 
political grounds. We expect to establish diplomatic relations at the 
most basic level by opening a liaison office in Pyongyang, as foreseen 
in the agreement. North Korea will have an office here. In moving ahead 
on these fronts, we will insist that the north's undertaking to pursue 
the north-south dialogue be implemented faithfully. We hope by these 
efforts to move to a new stage in which we and the other countries 
concerned begin discussions on a more stable future for northeast Asia. 
In APEC, our principal objective is to reach agreement at the Osaka 
leaders' meeting in November on an effective action agenda and blueprint 
for implementing the Bogor declaration on free trade, investment, and 
economic development. To this end, we will need to work closely with 
Japan, as chair; with other APEC members; with Congress; and with our 
private sector. A comprehensive work plan that addresses liberalization, 
facilitation, and cooperation is essential to sustaining APEC's 
credibility as a vehicle for economic growth. 
During this year, we will be reaffirming with Japan our security 
relationship and working to strengthen cooperation on our common agenda. 
This 50th anniversary year of the end of the war in the Pacific is a 
time which both our government and that of Japan wish to use to 
rededicate ourselves to cooperation for future peace and prosperity. At 
the same time, we will continue to work on outstanding economic issues--
most importantly in the auto sector--and Japan's plans for economic 
We will pursue our strategy of comprehensive engagement with China. We 
hope we can successfully conclude important bilateral negotiations on 
IPR protection and market access. If not, we will have no choice but to 
use the provisions of our trade law. We will continue the multilateral 
negotiations on China's admittance to the WTO. We will continue our 
limited bilateral military dialogue, with a view to encouraging greater 
openness and transparency on the part of the Chinese military. We will 
continue to raise human rights issues vigorously, through bilateral 
visits and through multilateral channels such as the UN Human Rights 
Commission meeting. We will search for cooperation where we can find it 
on regional issues and global challenges. 
We will further develop regional security dialogues in the new ASEAN 
Regional Forum and elsewhere. Our hope is that patient diplomacy will 
build consensus for a meaningful ARF work program that will encompass 
both confidence-building measures and cooperation in areas of mutual 
benefit, such as peace-keeping or disaster relief. At the same time, we 
will lay the groundwork for a separate sub-regional dialogue on security 
issues in the critical northeast Asia sector. 
We also will advance our many other interests. We will strengthen ties 
with ASEAN, whose countries together are our fourth-largest market and a 
force for stability and growth in the region. We will persistently seek 
full cooperation in accounting for our POWs and MIAs in Vietnam, Laos, 
Cambodia, Russia, China, and North Korea. We will strengthen ties with 
Australia and New Zealand. We will press for political openness in 
Burma. We will continue our support for the elected governments in 
Cambodia and Mongolia. We will continue to support democracy, human 
rights, and reform throughout the region, working in part through 
effective non-governmental organizations such as the National Endowment 
for Democracy and the Asia Foundation. We will seek practical progress 
on law enforcement, environmental, and other global issues. 
Broad public and congressional support is critical for our policy. A 
prosperous, stable, and open Asia-Pacific region is neither only a 
Republican nor only a Democratic cause. While we will see debate and 
even disagreement over the next two years, I am optimistic that our 
Pacific quest will enjoy bipartisan support. 
Some see a Pacific community as a distant if not unrealistic vision. In 
fact, it is being shaped now by our actions and those of others. 
Clearly, building such a community will take persistence and patience. 
We cannot force its definition, nor should we forfeit our difference. 
The diversity of the Asia-Pacific region is a reality we recognize and 
respect. Its distinctions will be a major source for the region's future 
Nevertheless, the contours of commonality are surfacing in the Pacific. 
Trade is linking economies, telecommunications are transcending borders, 
and transportation is shrinking distance. Business people are spurring 
regional integration. Diplomats are strengthening regional institutions. 
This is the 50th anniversary year of the end of World War II. This 
commemoration of past sacrifice reminds us of our responsibility to the 
next generation of young Americans and Asians. It provides an 
opportunity to rededicate ourselves to shaping a Pacific community that 
is richer, safer, and freer. Thank you.  
Encouraging Trade and Investment:  An Integral Part of U.S. Policy 
Toward Africa 
George E. Moose, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs 
Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, Washington, DC, February 16, 1995 
Madam Chairman and members of the committee: It is fitting that the 
first formal hearing on Africa by the 104th Congress should be on trade 
and investment. Those who see only news headlines that portray Africa as 
a continent of famine and crisis may be surprised by this focus. But 
those who have lived and worked in Sub-Saharan Africa or who have 
closely watched recent developments on the continent will recognize that 
trade and investment are indeed becoming a fundamental aspect of U.S.-
Africa relations. I welcome the opportunity to focus on this theme as we 
initiate formally our dialogue on African issues. 
Africa: A Transformation 
A major transformation is underway in Africa, comparable to what Latin 
America experienced over the past decade. The clearest indicators of 
this transformation are the growth and expansion of democratic 
governments and institutions, paralleled by significant economic reform 
and liberalization. Nearly two-thirds of the African countries are now 
at some stage of democratic transition, compared to only four in 1989. 
Many African nations have taken difficult and courageous steps to keep 
budget deficits down, maintain realistic exchange rates, and increase 
competition through domestic deregulation, trade reform, and 
privatization of public enterprises. The aim of these reforms has been 
to create an enabling environment in which the private sector can act as 
the engine of development. 
U.S. leadership and support are critical to that transformation. Our 
diplomatic efforts and bilateral aid programs have given significant 
impetus to democracy-building and economic development. Our 
contributions--leveraged with those of other donors--to the programs of 
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in Africa have reinforced 
economic policy reforms and infrastructure development. 
The transformation of Sub-Saharan Africa has significant implications 
for U.S. interests. First, the progress realized to date has stimulated 
growing interest and opportunities for U.S. business. Second, the 
emergence of more stable, more democratic governments has given us 
responsible partners with whom we can address the full range of regional 
and international issues--settling or preventing conflicts; combating 
crime, narcotics, terrorism, and weapons proliferation; protecting and 
managing the global environment; and expanding the global economy. 
Although the results thus far have been encouraging, we must recognize 
that Africa's transformation is ongoing, incomplete, and still tenuous 
in many places. It would be extremely shortsighted not to persist in the 
effort to consolidate and protect the investment already made. The 
problems that would arise if the transformation falters--failed states, 
political instability, human tragedy--would pose direct threats to U.S. 
interests and security. 
The Pay-Off of U.S. Involvement 
Nowhere are the benefits of active U.S. involvement and investment more 
evident than in Southern Africa. Our efforts at conflict resolution and 
democratic institution-building have paid-- and will continue to pay--
significant dividends. 
With the establishment of a non-racial democracy in South Africa, U.S. 
business can contribute to the country's economic development and help 
erase the economic disparities that are the legacy of apartheid. South 
Africa already accounts for $2.2 billion in trade--nearly half of U.S. 
exports to Sub-Saharan Africa. Ford and Pepsi recently made 
multimillion-dollar investments, and more than 300 U.S. firms have 
returned since mid-1991. AT&T, Citibank, IBM, Kodak, Sara Lee, and 
Proctor & Gamble are becoming household names. South Africa is the 
cornerstone of a much larger market, one that encompassed the 11 nations 
of Southern Africa and their 130 million inhabitants, and has 
extraordinary minerals, wildlife, and other resources. The potential of 
the Southern African sub-region is what has led the Commerce Department 
to declare it one of the world's 10 major emerging markets for U.S. 
In West Africa, Ghana provides another example of how U.S. involvement 
and support--including USAID's Trade and Investment Program--have 
yielded impressive results. Our leadership in promoting democratic 
institutions and economic reforms have turned Ghana into one of our most 
promising African export markets. Between 1992 and 1993, U.S. exports to 
Ghana expanded by 73%. Figures for 1994 trail that performance, but U.S. 
businesses have found profitable opportunities, and their products and 
investments are reinforcing Ghana's development goals. 
Events in Sierra Leone offer a cautionary lesson. The recent eruption of 
civil unrest in this coastal nation illustrates the fragility of some 
regimes and underscores the need for the U.S. to maintain knowledgeable, 
experienced diplomats in the field who can work to prevent developing 
conflicts where possible or help work out solutions. In the particular 
case of Sierra Leone, the economic stakes are high as well. An attack in 
January shut down Sierra Rutile, a 50% U.S.-owned mine that is the 
world's largest single producer of rutile, a strategic titanium ore used 
in aircraft manufacture and paints. 
Investing in the Future 
The African market, with over one-half billion potential consumers, 
already is significant. There is great potential in sectors such as 
telecommunications, finance, agriculture, and natural resources, 
although obstacles to trade and investment remain in a number of 
countries. The U.S. direct investment position approaches $3.5 billion. 
In 1993, U.S. firms exported nearly $4.8 billion in goods and services 
to Sub-Saharan Africa. This is 20% greater than our exports to the 
Commonwealth of Independent States of the former Soviet Union. 
These exports represent tangible benefits to American families. By some 
estimates, every extra $1 billion in exports adds 19,000 new jobs in the 
United States. Doubling our exports to Africa could create an additional 
90,000 jobs at home, and our exports to Africa will increase, provided 
the political and economic transformation currently underway is 
sustained. Given the potential gains to the United States, our current 
development aid to Africa--about one-half of one-tenth of 1% of the 
federal budget--represents a minuscule investment with the possibility 
of a tremendous future pay-off. 
In a recent speech, USAID Administrator Brian Atwood offered a quick, 
back-of-the-envelope calculation to illustrate this point. Using simple 
but not implausible assumptions about African demand for foreign goods, 
U.S. market share, and U.S. population growth, he came to the following 
conclusion: The average $3 per year that each American family 
contributes to African development assistance, if sustained over 30 
years, could generate an annual $600 in exports per U.S. family by the 
year 2025. As Brian points out, these are not trivial amounts; they 
represent millions of jobs for our children and financial health for our 
nation. It is very much in our own interest to remain engaged in Africa 
and to support the real--but fragile--economic and political 
transformation that has begun. 
U.S. Policy Initiatives to Spur Trade 
This Administration also vigorously has pursued global trade, 
investment, and debt policy initiatives that will boost U.S.-Africa 
business and commercial ties and help integrate Africa into the world 
Trade. The successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations and 
the creation of the World Trade Organization will enhance trade 
opportunities with African countries. The U.S. Trade Representative is 
chairing a working group to formulate and implement a comprehensive 
trade and development policy to ensure that these countries are able to 
take full advantage of the opportunities to compete successfully in 
growing regional and global markets as trade barriers come down. 
Investment. On multiple fronts, we are pursuing our goals of open 
markets, nondiscriminatory treatment, and basic fairness for U.S. 
investors doing business abroad--be it in Europe, East Asia, or Africa. 
Where appropriate, we negotiate bilateral investment treaties that 
protect investors from expropriations and assure the right to transfer 
funds and access to fair dispute resolution mechanisms. 
Debt Relief. The United States and other creditor nations have 
established a mechanism in the Paris Club to offer debt reduction on a 
selective, case-burdens that inhibit private investment and growth. Some 
two dozen low-income African countries have benefited from debt 
reschedulings or reductions over the past several years. 
Providing Direct Support For U.S. Business 
I have outlined how our policies and programs which promote democracy, 
peace, and sustainable development in Africa reinforce U.S. economic 
interests and provide significant indirect benefits and opportunities 
for the U.S. private sector.  But we also are actively involved in 
providing direct support services and assistance to the business 
community. Deputy Assistant Secretary Walker is providing a detailed 
overview. Let me provide just a few recent examples of the role our 
embassies are playing: 
--  In Ethiopia, our embassy helped Louisiana-based Schaffer and 
Associates in a hard-fought and successful bid for an $84-million sugar 
project, with prospects for an additional $50 million in sales of 
related U.S. goods and services. 
--  In Botswana, the U.S. ambassador's intervention resulted in removal 
of discriminatory tender requirements that hampered an Owens-Corning bid 
on a $180-million contract to supply pipes for a major water pipeline. 
--  In Kenya, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Mauritius, our embassies actively 
supported the Kellogg company's effort to reduce import duties on 
breakfast cereal. 
--  In Madagascar, our ambassador's efforts to ensure a level playing 
field for all bidders resulted in the signing of a lease/purchase 
agreement for a Boeing 737 aircraft. 
--  In Cameroon and Chad, our embassies supported negotiations leading 
to a recent $3-4-billion agreement relating to the building of a 
proposed oil pipeline from land-locked Chad through Cameroon to an 
offshore terminal. The consortium which is to build the pipeline is led 
by an affiliate of Exxon 
--  In Zimbabwe, the tender offer for the country's first cellular phone 
system was canceled after our ambassador protested that the 
specifications were biased in favor of European suppliers. Several U.S. 
firms were able to submit bids after the tender was rewritten. 
--  In Senegal, the U.S. envoy successfully persuaded the authorities to 
replace outdated health legislation that prevented Colgate from making 
or selling fluoride toothpaste. 
Creating Government-Business Partnerships 
Providing information on economic trends, local business practices, and 
financing options; ensuring a level playing field; removing 
discriminatory regulations: This is the kind of work that our embassies 
in Africa and our personnel in Washington do every day to help U.S. 
businesses--large and small--to find opportunities in Africa. In an 
increasingly tight budget environment, we need to find ways to be more 
efficient and more effective in our business facilitation efforts. 
We have ongoing contacts with a variety of Africa-related business 
groups, such as the U.S.-Angola Chamber of Commerce, the U.S.-South 
Africa Business Council, and the African Business Roundtable. We also 
have frequent exchanges with the Corporate Council on Africa. These are 
the kinds of partnerships between business and government that we value 
and wish to strengthen. 
A few months ago, the Corporate Council on Africa, the Department of 
State, and other federal agencies held a series of roundtable 
discussions on improving commercial opportunities in Africa. I 
participated in some of those discussions and found many of the 
recommendations that ensued to be useful and timely. Some of the issues 
the Corporate Council raised--the need to remain engaged throughout 
Africa, the need to support regional economic integration, the need to 
secure broader international adherence to the principles of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, the need to reinvent the role of our embassy 
economic officers--are issues we are already in the process of 
Other Corporate Council recommendations touched on complex issues that 
require careful analysis. The availability of government-supported 
export financing, for example, is a central concern, but it is a 
difficult issue, given that current practice is rooted in the provisions 
of the Credit Reform Act and the charter legislation for Eximbank and 
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. I have asked Regina C. 
Brown, our Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs, 
to chair an informal interagency review of the Council's  
recommendations, with the aim of identifying concrete, feasible steps 
the Administration can take to address the concerns that have been 
The U.S. Needs To Remain Engaged 
To recapitulate, Madam Chairman, Sub-Saharan Africa is undergoing a 
sweeping political and economic transformation. Democratic institutions 
are being developed or strengthened in numerous countries, and fledgling 
governments are taking important steps to liberalize their economies and 
create an enabling environment for private sector-led growth. 
U.S. leadership and support have been critical to this transformation. 
Already, our active engagement in this process is starting to show 
results. Our assistance programs fostering democratization and economic 
reform have created opportunities for U.S. business. U.S. exporters and 
investors, in turn, have reinforced development goals in African 
nations. All Americans potentially stand to gain from the expansion of 
African markets. 
We must recognize, however, that Africa's new governments are fragile, 
and their transformation remains incomplete. We need to continue 
supporting their efforts. Our initiatives to strengthen democracy, 
resolve conflicts, and foster sustainable development in Africa 
represent a low-cost investment. If we as a nation remain engaged, 
American businesses--and indeed all of us--can expect to reap 
significant returns.  
Human Rights and Democracy in Africa 
John Shattuck, Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and 
Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House International 
Relations Committee, Washington, DC, February 22, 1995 
Madam Chairman, I am glad to be here with you today to discuss human 
rights and democracy in Africa. Africa defies generalization. We see 
significant variation among countries and within countries. Across this 
diversity, events unfold--some profoundly hopeful, others profoundly 
disappointing. For simplicity's sake, I will speak of Africa as an 
entity, and our diplomacy does have a continental scope, as we work 
through and support multilateral institutions such as the Organization 
of African Unity. But I stress that we recognize and work with each 
country's unique social, economic, and political circumstances, and that 
perspective informs my remarks today. 
Before I turn to the details, let me offer a general assessment. First, 
we have seen and have every reason to expect to see some very 
encouraging developments. The majority of Africa's states are turning 
toward democracy and market-based economic systems, having realized that 
one-party rule and state-run economies do not and cannot work. Progress 
here has not been uniform. The fullness and consolidation of democratic 
and market reform vary across countries. For our part, we in the U.S. 
Government intend to do what we can to support these transitions.  
I would, of course, highlight South Africa's transition from legal 
apartheid to democracy, which led to the election of Nelson Mandela as 
president in 1994. We are proud of our contribution to that change, and 
we look forward to a continued effort to help South Africa succeed over 
the local haul. The most immediate effect of its success will be felt in 
its region, where other democratic governments, such as Botswana and 
Namibia, among others, will benefit from a vibrant, free-market 
democracy in South Africa. 
In Africa, of course, we see major problems, most stunningly in Rwanda 
but elsewhere as well. One of Africa's largest and most important 
states, Nigeria, remains under the rule of the military, which seized 
power after the elections of 1993. There are civil wars in Liberia and 
Sudan. Last year, The Gambia slid back into military rule. I will take 
up many of these problems in detail later in my remarks. Here, I will 
say only that we believe that democracy and human rights in Africa 
matter to the United States, and we intend to do what we can to work 
with those trying to improve their own countries and to work with 
multilateral organizations, including the UN, to help resolve civil 
conflicts and prevent future crises. 
U.S. Policy Objectives 
Let us turn first to the key goals of U.S. policy toward Africa, which 
can be briefly summarized. They are based upon the premise that we need 
to support the political and economic reforms initiated by Africans 
themselves. Our chief objectives are: 
--  Governments that are democratic, stable, effective, and responsible; 
--  Equitable economic growth; 
--  Prevention and resolution of conflicts; and 
--  Effective responses to transnational issues. 
These goals and the policies to effect them are related. We have learned 
in our human rights and democracy work in Africa, as elsewhere, that we 
must look at events through a policy lens that will capture the complex 
relationships among problems--and among solutions. Thus, we recognize 
that the growth of democracy supports market-based economic growth by 
providing the resources for the development of what we refer to as civil 
society--a network of relationships based on mutual trust and the rule 
of law rather than arbitrary or authoritarian power. By the same token, 
preventing or, if need be, resolving conflicts through the development 
of African peace-keeping and enforcement mechanisms will also help 
prevent the massive violations of human rights that we have seen in 
Rwanda, Liberia, and elsewhere, and, in turn, help reduce the refugee 
movements and environmental destruction these conflicts engender. 
Bearing in mind the links among these issues, I will focus my testimony 
on the first policy objective I mentioned--the promotion of democracy 
and human rights on the continent. In Africa, as elsewhere, democratic 
government and respect for human rights are closely linked. Democracy is 
the best means the world has produced to protect and advance human 
rights, based on individual freedom and dignity. In turn, respect for 
human rights is the only means by which a democracy can sustain the 
individual freedom and dignity that enable it to endure. 
Tools for Promoting Democracy and Human Rights 
The United States has a range of tools to promote democracy and human 
rights in our foreign policy. Central among them are our assistance 
programs, which are used both positively to encourage progress and 
negatively to discourage and condemn reversals and bring to justice 
human rights violators. The Congress has played a key role with the 
executive branch in developing specific democracy assistance programs. 
Some programs are carried out through grants administered by American 
non-governmental organizations, such as the National Endowment for 
Democracy, the International Republican Institute, the National 
Democratic Institute, and the African-American Institute. One of our 
most innovative and creative assistance programs--the democracy and 
human rights fund--enables our embassies to provide small support grants 
for grass-roots democratization and human rights projects that they can 
observe and evaluate directly. The important role of these grants in 
effecting real change in Africa's political life is all the more 
striking in light of the small sums involved--in FY 1995 just $4 
million, with no individual grant exceeding $100,000. The Administration 
strongly supports this program and urges that it be retained as we 
reshape our assistance policies toward Africa. 
Through these assistance programs, we have conducted a wide variety of 
effective projects in recent years. For example, we have supported 
election assistance and civic education in Mali; election monitors in 
Zambia; training for political parties in Benin; election efforts and 
democratic institution-building in Malawi; election management, 
demobilization, and civic education in Namibia; and parliamentary 
training in the Central African Republic. In South Africa, democracy 
promotion projects, such as voter education, community outreach, and 
leadership development, and support for strengthening of public 
management and institutions and the like are a significant part of our 
overall program to help South Africa through its dramatic and difficult 
transition from apartheid to democracy. 
We also use our aid to press for an end to human rights abuses by 
reducing or eliminating programs. One recent example is The Gambia, 
where the 1994 coup prompted a suspension of our aid program. 
Multilaterally, we oppose loans by international financial institutions 
to countries that have a pattern of serious human rights abuses 
excepting loans for basic human needs. We have opposed loans to 
Equatorial Guinea, Mauritania, and Sudan for these reasons. 
On the political and diplomatic level, we are actively working to 
facilitate the establishment and maintenance of democratic systems that 
respect human rights. Our embassies are responsible for developing 
annual plans to work on these goals, with specific teams to oversee 
progress. In the department and in the field, we review problems 
continually and ensure that they are raised in private and public 
diplomatic channels as appropriate. For example, we have urged the 
regime in Nigeria to rescind its decrees restricting press and other 
freedoms and to return to its announced program to hand over power to 
elected civilian leaders. I will discuss Nigeria later in some detail. 
We have employed a variety of sanctions there, including refusal of 
visas to civilian and military leaders, and their families, who impede 
the return to democracy; export-control restrictions; prohibition of 
military sales; and termination of Eximbank lending and OPIC coverage. 
To look at a different sort of case, in Mauritania, we have condemned 
and pressed the government to end continuing practices of slavery by 
cutting off assistance and ending trade benefits under the Generalized 
System of Preferences. 
Another important diplomatic tool is our annual country reports on human 
rights, published earlier this month. These reports are widely 
publicized throughout Africa and are closely read by governments and 
private organizations; we are confident they have an impact on official 
Democratic Developments in 1994 
I now will turn to the record of events in Africa over the last year and 
review some key countries in more detail. Although international 
attention tends to focus on some deeply disturbing developments--
exemplified by the Rwanda catastrophe, to which I will return later--it 
is essential that we recognize the truly remarkable progress on the 
continent. By pursuing a strong policy on democracy and human rights in 
Africa, the United States has made a positive difference in many places. 
In that regard, I cite the greatest triumph of 1994--the election of 
Nelson Mandela as President of South Africa, marking the end of one of 
the most profoundly racist systems in history and the beginning of a 
democratic polity. South Africa's new interim constitution and Bill of 
Fundamental Rights provide for freedoms of speech, press, assembly, 
association, religion, and other critical rights. Although the 
government faces difficult challenges, the cabinet has operated by 
consensus and enjoys widespread, popular support. Politically motivated 
violence has decreased significantly since the April elections. Just 
last week, the country took another step forward with the installation 
of a constitutional review court, some of whose members were anti-
apartheid activists in the past, including one who represented President 
Mandela at his trial for treason 31 years ago. Not long ago, most 
observers would have considered this peaceful shift to a model democracy 
nearly impossible. We are proud to have contributed to this major 
victory for democracy. 
Many other African countries have undertaken democratic transitions, 
which, while perhaps less heralded, are by no means less profound or 
meaningful, particularly for their citizens. Five years ago, there were 
five democratically elected governments in Sub-Saharan Africa; today 
there are 21. There have been other important strides toward civil 
society. For example, the press in many African countries has gained 
considerably greater freedom than it enjoyed a decade ago in a number of 
countries. The number of human rights activists and organizations is 
growing, exemplified by GERDDES--the Group for Studies and Research on 
Democracy and Economic and Social Development--in several francophone 
states of West Africa and ZIMRIGHTS in Zimbabwe. Let me cite some of the 
African democracy and human rights success stories in the 1990s. 
In 1991, Mali's 23-year-old military dictatorship was deposed, and a 
multi-party democracy has risen in its place. The Central African 
Republic successfully completed its transition to democratic, multiparty 
rule following free and fair elections in 1993. In 1994, Malawi ended 
the one-man, one-party rule it had experienced since independence and 
introduced a new constitution with strong human rights provisions. 
Namibia has made a successful transition to multi-party democracy, and 
in December 1994, it held free and fair presidential and parliamentary 
elections. Ghana's transition to a constitutional democracy, begun in 
1992, remained on track. A UN-negotiated peace in Mozambique ended 16 
years of war, and elections last year installed a new government; the 
human rights situation has steadily improved, and we are hopeful this 
progress will be sustained. Tanzania also continued to move toward 
democracy, and most of the 12 new opposition parties participated in 
local and by-elections in 1994. Benin, Sao Tome and Principe, and Cape 
Verde are also examples of nations that recently have joined the ranks 
of African democracies with good human rights records. Zimbabwe has 
continued to improve its human rights record, led by key rulings from 
its supreme court in 1994 on the rights of women, free assembly and 
press, and due process. In 1994, Botswana completed 28 years of 
democracy since independence. President Masire's government, which has 
an excellent record of respect for human rights, has made a commitment 
to address gender inequities in the citizenship law this year. 
These and other examples reflect the diversity I noted earlier. There 
has been a broad variety of democracy movements and institutional means 
of transition--referenda, national conferences, constitutional 
commissions--and different approaches to the establishment of 
accountable governments that respect human rights. In the aid projects I 
discussed earlier, we have sought to support the institutions each 
country is developing for itself and also attempted to provide cross-
fertilization by sharing ideas that have worked elsewhere. I also note 
that many of these countries are undertaking democratic reform in tandem 
with serious efforts at economic reform. We are working to support such 
economic reform through our assistance programs. And we provide 
humanitarian aid to countries in transition to lessen the suffering of 
innocent civilians and to help create a climate conducive to 
negotiations and dialogue--for example, in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and 
Human Rights Crises And the U.S. Response 
Africa is also the site of very serious human rights problems. Liberia 
continues to be wracked by brutal civil war. We are working with the UN 
and with regional organizations to bring the parties together. In 
Southern Africa, Angola has been unable to bring its conflict to a 
peaceful conclusion, and egregious violations of human rights continue, 
although there is hope that the Lusaka Protocol, signed late in 1994, 
will finally bring peace--and U.S. participation helped bring this 
about. In the Sudan, the civil war continues, and the dismal human 
rights situation shows no signs of improvement. Both government and 
rebels commit horrendous abuses, with the official pressure for 
Islamization presenting special hardships for the non-Muslim population. 
We have made a resolution on Sudan one of our top priorities this year 
in the UN Human Rights Commission. 
Both military and civilian governments in Africa are responsible for 
human rights abuses. In Nigeria, the military seized power in November 
1993, following the annulment of the elections in June of that year, 
which had been judged by national and international observers as the 
freest and fairest in that nation's history. The military government, as 
I noted earlier, has an abysmal human rights record and is making almost 
no progress toward democracy, disregarding any semblance of democratic 
process. We have made unambiguously clear that we support responsible 
efforts to restore civilian, democratic government and bring an end to 
human rights abuses. We have, as I mentioned, instituted visa 
restrictions and export controls, terminated all aid except for 
humanitarian and democratization aid through non-governmental entities, 
suspended consideration of applications for OPIC and Eximbank financing-
-and we do not rule out the possibility of further sanctions. 
The Gambia's military has scrapped most of the country's democratic 
institutions and committed many abuses. In response, we have terminated 
aid other than democracy promotion. The military rulers have now agreed 
to a two-year timetable for holding democratic elections. In Zaire, 
Prime Minister Kengo's ambitious and, at times, courageous program of 
political reform continues to be obstructed by President Mobutu and his 
allies in the security services and the parliament. We have imposed an 
arms embargo in response, as well as a visa sanction targeted at Zairian 
obstructionists. The Kenyan Government continued efforts to silence 
critics, although in June it withdrew charges against opposition 
leaders, and democratic reformers in parliament continue to press for 
change. In neighboring Ethiopia, the transitional government continued 
to move toward multiparty democracy, but opposition parties are 
boycotting the spring 1995 elections, complaining of government 
domination of the political process. 
In northern Africa, human rights conditions have deteriorated in several 
countries. In Egypt, the government's security services and terrorist 
groups are locked in a cycle of violence, and widespread violations 
continue. In Algeria, government forces have shown increasing disregard 
for human rights in their attempts to suppress the Islamist insurgency, 
while some Islamist groups have committed heinous acts of violence 
against Algerian citizens and foreigners, intimidating the population 
and depriving it of basic human rights. We have publicly and privately 
condemned violence and human rights abuses in both Egypt and Algeria. 
Libya, of course, is one of the rogue states of the world, and we have 
used a broad range of sanctions against its harsh regime. 
Finally, a group of human rights disasters poses enormous challenges for 
the United States and the world community in responding to and getting 
ahead of the immediate conflict, coping with the refugee movements that 
result, and resolving the conflict so that long-term stability can be 
established. Our efforts to create or assist effective, local conflict-
prevention and peace-keeping institutions will be critical if we are to 
avoid future disasters. Somalia, where the civil war continues unabated 
and the human rights situation goes on deteriorating, is an obvious 
example. The international community has not been able to find a means 
to resolve this conflict. Without political reconciliation, and faced 
with a worsening security situation, the Security Council reluctantly 
ordered a total withdrawal of UN forces by the end of March 1995. 
Genocide in Rwanda 
An even more pressing situation is presented by Rwanda. The genocidal 
slaughter in Rwanda is among the greatest human rights catastrophes of 
our time in both speed and scale. I have traveled twice to Rwanda since 
the onslaught of the killings in April 1994. I cannot adequately 
describe some of the things I have seen. From this horror, we are trying 
to wrest some measure of justice and hope for the future. In particular, 
we fought hard and successfully for the creation of the UN War Crimes 
Tribunal for Rwanda. We have contributed personnel and over $1 million 
in funds to the tribunal and were instrumental in helping the UN field 
human rights monitors in Rwanda, contributing three-quarters of a 
million dollars to this major effort to stabilize the country so that 
refugees can return, and we are contributing development aid for the 
rebuilding of the economic and social structures. The establishment of 
criminal responsibility for genocide is crucial if we are to 
differentiate victims from aggressors, foster societal reconciliation, 
and overcome the cynical argument that ethnic conflicts cannot be 
The Rwanda genocide was the result of years of mounting inter-ethnic 
hostility and conflict. It is the cause of the flood of refugees, the 
depopulation of the country, and the continuing instability, which 
threatens to spread to neighboring countries. In order to address this 
crisis, all aspects of a human rights response must be present and well 
integrated. How is that to be done?   
-- First, through the tribunal.  
-- Second, through the deployment of UN monitors whose work and presence 
will promote stability.  
-- Third, we must coordinate the UN peace-keeping operation in Rwanda 
with humanitarian relief and human rights monitoring and enforcement 
-- Fourth, through the UN, we must assist the Rwandan Government to 
build national institutions of justice and democracy. 
We must also work to prevent a human rights disaster in Burundi akin to 
that of Rwanda. There, we are actively supporting efforts to prevent 
ethnic bloodshed and promote national reconciliation. We will provide $5 
million in FY 1995 development aid focused on grants to promote 
dialogue, reconciliation, and human rights. We will look to other funds 
to support the UN's comprehensive plan for human rights advisory 
services and the OAU monitoring force. We also are pressing for 
accountability for those responsible for the attempted coup and murder 
of President Ndayade in October 1993 and the ethnic violence that 
followed. I have traveled twice to Burundi to investigate and encourage 
efforts at accountability and reconciliation. 
I have discussed Rwanda and Burundi at some length because they are 
indicative of the new, creative efforts in preventive diplomacy and 
preemptive conflict resolution that we must develop to manage the post-
Cold War human rights challenges that arise along fault lines within 
societies and between countries. Many of the old familiar diplomatic and 
military tools have proven to be of limited utility in addressing these 
challenges. We are joining our efforts with other governments and non-
governmental organizations to begin to establish mechanisms that will 
meet these challenges. 
In closing, Madam Chairman, I would echo the words of National Security 
Adviser Anthony Lake, who has devoted much of his career to the study of 
Africa, and who recently completed extensive travels there. He has said:  
President Clinton and his Administration reject Afro-pessimism. But 
neither should any of us seek refuge in the illusions of Afro-optimism. 
What is needed instead is a new Afro-realism--an Afro-realism that 
commits us to the hard work that can strengthen the partnership between 
Africa and America. Without that partnership, Africa will have lost the 
support we wish to give and are determined to give. America will have 
lost the opportunity to participate in what could be--what must be--one 
of the great adventures of our time: fulfilling the dreams of Africa's 
greatness that animated the leaders of its independence so many years 
I would add that those dreams are not the special province of the elite. 
Men and women throughout Africa are working to create better lives for 
themselves and their children, often in the face of fantastic hardship, 
and with great courage. They are endowed with inalienable rights to 
freedom and dignity, and we are committed to helping them realize those 
U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer Policy 
White House press statement, Fact Sheets 
Conventional Arms Transfer Policy 
Statement by White House Press Secretary Michael McCurry, Washington, 
DC, February 17, 1995. 
The President has approved a comprehensive policy to govern transfers of 
conventional arms. This policy, as detailed in the attached fact sheets, 
serves our nation's security in two important ways. First, it supports 
transfers that meet the continuing security needs of the United States, 
its friends, and allies. Second, it restrains arms transfers that may be 
destabilizing or threatening to regional peace and security. 
This policy reflects an approach toward arms transfers that has guided 
the Administration's decisions over the last two years. Specifically, 
the United States continues to view transfers of conventional arms as a 
legitimate instrument of U.S. foreign policy--deserving U.S. Government 
support--when they enable us to help friends and allies deter 
aggression, promote regional security, and increase inter-operability of 
U.S. forces and allied forces. Judging when a specific transfer will 
meet that test requires examination of the dynamics of regional power 
balances and the potential for destabilizing changes in those regions. 
The criteria guiding those case-by-case examinations are set forth in 
the attached guidelines for U.S. decision-making on conventional arms 
The centerpiece of our efforts to promote multilateral restraint is our 
initiative to work with allies and friends to establish a successor 
regime to COCOM. The new regime should establish effective international 
controls on arms sales and the transfer of sensitive technologies--
particularly to regions of tension and to states that pose a threat to 
international peace and security. While pursuing multilateral restraint 
through this and other mechanisms, such as the UN Conventional Arms 
Register and regional initiatives, the United States will exercise 
unilateral restraint in cases where overriding national security or 
foreign policy interests require us to do so. 

Fact Sheet: Conventional Arms Transfer Policy  
Released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, 
DC, February 17, 1995. 
U.S. conventional arms transfer policy promotes restraint, both by the 
U.S. and other suppliers, in transfers of weapons systems that may be 
destabilizing or dangerous to international peace. At the same time, the 
policy supports transfers that meet legitimate defense requirements of 
our friends and allies, in support of our national security and foreign 
policy interests. 
Our record reflects these considerations. U.S. arms sales remain close 
to our historical average--approximately $12 billion in government-to-
government sales agreements in FY 1994.  U.S. arms deliveries have also 
remained flat. Sales and deliveries sales have been primarily to allies 
and major coalition partners such as NATO member states and Israel. 
U.S. Goals 
The policy issued by the President will serve the following goals: 
1. To ensure that our military forces can continue to enjoy techno-    
logical advantages over potential adversaries. 
2. To help allies and friends deter or defend themselves against 
aggression, while promoting inter-operability with U.S. forces when 
combined operations are required. 
3. To promote regional stability in areas critical to U.S. interests, 
while preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
their missile delivery systems. 
4. To promote peaceful conflict resolution and arms control, human 
rights, democratization, and other U.S. foreign policy objectives. 
5. To enhance the ability of the U.S. defense industrial base to meet 
U.S. defense requirements and maintain long-term military technological 
superiority at lower costs. 
Supporting Arms Control and Arms Transfer Restraint 
A critical element of U.S. policy is to promote control, restraint, and 
transparency of arms transfers. To that end, the U.S. will push to 
increase participation in the UN Register of Conventional Arms. We will 
also take the lead to expand the register to include military holdings 
and procurement through national production, thereby providing a more 
complete picture of change in a nation's military capabilities each 
The U.S. also will support regional initiatives to enhance transparency  
in conventional arms--such as those being examined by the OAS and ASEAN-
-and will continue to adhere to the London and OSCE guidelines, while 
promoting adherence to such principles by others. 
The United States will continue its efforts to establish a successor 
export control regime to the Cold War-era COCOM. Our goals for this 
regime are to increase transparency of transfers of conventional arms 
and related technology, to establish effective international controls, 
and to promote restraint--particularly to regions of tension and to 
states that are likely to pose a threat to international peace and 
The United States will also continue vigorous support for current arms 
control and confidence-building efforts to constrain the demand for 
destabilizing weapons and related technology. The United States 
recognizes that efforts such as those underway in the Middle East and 
Europe bolster stability in a variety of ways, ultimately decreasing the 
demand for arms in these vital regions.  
The United States will act unilaterally to restrain the flow of arms in 
cases where unilateral action is effective or necessitated by overriding 
national interests. Such restraint would be considered on a case-by-case 
basis in transfers involving pariah states or where the U.S. has a very 
substantial lead on weapons technology; where the U.S. restricts exports 
to preserve its military edge or regional stability; where the U.S. has 
no fielded countermeasures; or where the transfer of weapons raises 
issues involving human rights or indiscriminate casualties, such as 
anti-personnel landmines. 
Finally, the U.S. will assist other suppliers in developing effective 
export control mechanisms to support responsible export policies. The 
United States also will continue to provide defense conversion 
assistance to the states of the former Soviet Union and Central Europe 
as a way of countering growing pressures to export. 
Supporting Responsible  U.S. Transfers 
Once an approval for a transfer is made, the U.S. Government will 
provide support for the proposed U.S. export. In those cases, the United 
States will take such steps as tasking our overseas mission personnel to 
support overseas marketing efforts of American companies bidding on 
defense contracts, actively involving senior government officials in 
promoting sales of particular importance to the United States, and 
supporting official Department of Defense participation in international 
air and trade exhibitions when the Secretary of Defense, in accordance 
with existing law, determines such participation to be in the national 
interest and notifies Congress. 
Decision-making on U.S. Arms Exports: Criteria and Process 
Given the complexities of arms-transfer decisions and the multiple U.S. 
interests involved in each arms-transfer decision, decisions will 
continue to be made on a case-by-case basis. These case-by-case reviews 
will be guided by a set of criteria that draw the appropriate balance 
between legitimate arms sales to support the national security of our 
friends and allies and the need for multilateral restraint against the 
transfer of arms that would enhance the military capabilities of hostile 
states or that would undermine stability.  

Fact Sheet: Criteria for  Decision-making on U.S. Arms Exports  
Released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, 
DC, February 17, 1995. 
Given the complexities of arms-transfer decisions and the multiple U.S. 
interests involved in each arms-transfer decision, the U.S. Government 
will continue to make arms-transfer decisions on a case-by-case basis. 
These reviews will be guided by the criteria below. 
General Criteria 
All arms-transfer decisions will take into account the following 
--  Consistency with international agreements and arms control 
--  Appropriateness of the transfer in responding to legitimate U.S. and 
recipient security needs. 
--  Consistency with U.S. regional stability interests, especially when 
considering transfers involving power projection capability or 
introduction of a system which may foster increased tension or 
contribute to an arms race. 
--  The degree to which the transfer supports U.S. strategic and foreign 
policy interests through increased access and influence, allied 
burdensharing, and inter-operability. 
--  The impact of the proposed transfer on U.S. capabilities and 
technological advantage, particularly in protecting sensitive software 
and hardware design, development, manufacturing, and integration 
--  The impact on U.S. industry and the defense industrial base whether 
the sale is approved or not. 
--  The degree of protection afforded sensitive technology and potential 
for unauthorized third-party transfer, as well as in-country diversion 
to unauthorized uses. 
--  The risk of revealing system vulnerabilities and adversely impacting 
U.S. operational capabilities in the event of compromise. 
--  The risk of adverse economic, political, or social impact within the 
recipient nation and the degree to which security needs can be addressed 
by other means. 
--  The human rights, terrorism, and proliferation record of the 
recipient and the potential for misuse of the export in question. 
--  The availability of comparable systems from foreign suppliers. 
--  The ability of the recipient effectively to field, support, and 
appropriately employ the requested system in accordance with its 
intended end use. 
Upgrade Criteria 
Upgrades of equipment--particularly that of former Soviet-bloc 
manufacture--is a growing segment of the market. The U.S. Government 
should support U.S. firms' participation in that market segment to the 
extent consistent with our own national security and foreign policy 
interests. In addition to the above general criteria, the following 
guidelines will govern U.S. treatment of upgrades: 
--  Upgrade programs must be well-defined to be considered for approval. 
--  Upgrades should be consistent with general conventional arms 
transfer criteria outlined above. 
--  There will be a presumption of denial of exports to upgrade programs 
that lead to a capability beyond that which the U.S. would be willing to 
export directly. 
--  Careful review of the total scope of proposed upgrade programs is 
necessary to ensure that U.S. licensing decisions are consistent with 
U.S. policy on transfers of equivalent new systems. 
--  U.S. contributions to upgrade programs initiated by foreign prime 
contractors should be evaluated against the same standard. 
--  Protection of U.S. technologies must be ensured because of the 
inherent risk of technology transfer in the integration efforts that 
typically accompany an upgrade project. 
--  Upgrades will be subject to standard U.S. Government written end-use 
and retransfer assurances by both the integrator and final end user, 
with strong and specific sanctions in place for those who violate these 
--  Benchmarks should be established for upgrades of specific types of 
systems, to provide a policy baseline against which 1) individual arms 
transfer proposals can be assessed and 2) proposed departures from the 
policy must be justified.   

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