U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 9, FEBRUARY 27, 1995
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1. Pursuing a Comprehensive Middle East Peace--President Clinton,
Secretary Christopher, Joint Communique
2. U.S. Policy Toward East Asia and the Pacific--Winston Lord
3. Encouraging Trade and Investment: An Integral part of U.S. Policy
Toward Africa--George E. Moose
4. Human Rights and Democracy in Africa--John Shattuck
5. U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer Policy
ARTICLE 1:
Pursuing a Comprehensive Middle East Peace
President Clinton, Secretary Christopher, Joint Communique
Remarks at Middle East Foreign Ministers Meeting, Washington, DC,
February 12, 1995.
Secretary Christopher. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I am very
pleased to welcome the ministers here and to welcome all of you and
those who have joined their ministers here for this important and unique
meeting.
The commitment of the United States to the peace process, I think, can
be judged by the fact that the President, the Vice President, the
National Security Adviser, and myself are here this morning. And without
further comment, I would like to introduce to all of you the President
of the United States.
President Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and thank you--all of you,
for coming to this very important meeting. It is no secret to anyone in
the world that we are at a critical moment in the peace process. We
cannot allow the rise of terror to again threaten this peace, or as
Chairman Arafat said the other day, we cannot allow it to kill the
Palestinian dream. We in this country are prepared to redouble our
efforts to get the peace process back in full gear. We are doing what we
can on our own and with others to deal with the problem of terror.
I want to begin by saying a special word of appreciation to President
Mubarak for the Cairo summit. He has been involved in this process all
along, and I think that the Cairo summit produced a clear statement by
the leaders of all of you here represented that we are not going to let
terror hold sway, that we are not going to let the peace process
collapse.
Today, it is for us to begin to take the specific steps necessary to
have the message of peace and renewed commitment carried out. I think it
is clear that we have to complete phase two of the Israeli-Palestinian
agreement. I think it is clear that we have to fully implement the peace
treaty between Jordan and Israel. I think it is clear that we have to
bring some economic benefits of peace as quickly as we possibly can.
The United States is prepared to do its part on that. For example, if
you agree to establish industrial zones in the West Bank and Gaza and
elsewhere, I am prepared to go to Congress to seek approval for
extending duty-free treatment to products coming out of those zones. Of
course, in the end the economic and political cooperation among all of
you will be the most important thing in reaping economic progress. But I
want to do our part. I know our Russian partner feels the same. I think
that many others around the world will also help. But I am absolutely
convinced that we need to move as quickly as we can to prove that there
are some economic benefits to peace.
Let me also say that even though we must have enhanced security to
create enhanced economic benefits, it is obvious that our attempt to do
that is impaired when the movement of goods is limited by boycott, by
closure, or by any other action. So we all must work hard to make
progress on the peace front, on the security front, and on the economic
front at the same time. We all have to recognize that there are
difficult decisions to be made in this area.
The negotiations you already have concluded have built the framework for
peace. What we have to do now is to have specific achievements--lasting
achievements. We will do our part. We are as committed today as we have
ever been to a comprehensive peace. I wish the representatives of Syria
and Lebanon were around this table. They are not here only because there
has been no peace agreement signed with them, but I know you all join me
in saying that our work will never be completed until we are all around
the table as partners working for peace.
Now, there are many other things I can discuss today, but I mostly want
to say to you that the United States is still committed to this--and
more strongly than ever. We are ready to do our part.
We are ready to do our part economically; we are certainly ready to do
our part in fighting terror. But we all have to do this together. I hope
that this meeting will produce further specific steps that we can all
take to keep doing it together. We cannot let people believe that they
can disrupt with terror the rational, humane, decent course of history.
Statement on Israeli-Palestinian conclusions, Washington, DC, February
12, 1995.
Secretary Christopher. This morning, I had a very productive meeting
with Shimon Peres and Nabeel Sha'ath. Both made it unmistakably clear
that Israelis and Palestinians--while aware of the challenges they face-
-are committed to a real partnership with one another and to using that
partnership to reach real peace. Both expressed their determination that
there can be no turning back and that they must find ways to overcome
the challenges ahead. Toward this end, they agreed on the following
statements which I want to report to you.
First, both Israelis and Palestinians made clear their determination to
fulfill all elements of their agreements and to ensure their
implementation.
Second, both parties expressed understanding for one another's needs and
requirements. They also affirmed that fulfilling these needs requires a
cooperative and interrelated approach. Both parties agreed that the
question of Israeli security needs and Palestinian political and
economic needs must be satisfied.
Third, for its part, the Palestinian Authority is committed to the full
implementation of the Gaza-Jericho accord and to the second phase of the
Declaration of Principles and to preempting terror, punishing those
responsible, and denying those who plan and carry out terror or violence
to any safehaven. Both parties made clear that the application of these
measures would significantly enhance the conditions for security,
stability, and a normalized economic life and cooperation based on the
free movements of people, material, and goods in accordance with the
agreements. Israel is committed to the full implementation of the Gaza-
Jericho accord and to the second phase of the Declaration of Principles.
In this regard, both sides reaffirmed their commitment to negotiate
promptly all aspects of the interim agreement, including transfer of
authority and redeployment in the rest of the West Bank, and elections
in accordance with the Declaration of Principles.
Finally, both parties agreed that these understandings can help to build
the trust and confidence so necessary to being able to move forward
expeditiously through all phases of this process. Both sides expressed
their determination to use these understandings to work toward a
successful Israeli-Palestinian meeting next week.
Blair House Joint Communique
Text of Joint Communique issued by the U.S., Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and
the Palestinian Authority, Washington, DC, February 12, 1995.
On February 12, 1995, the United States hosted a follow-up meeting in
Washington of the February 2, 1995 Cairo Summit of representatives from
Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority. President Clinton,
accompanied by Vice President Gore, addressed the gathering which was
attended by Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, Egyptian Foreign
Minister Amre Moussa, Jordanian Foreign Minister Abd al-Karim Kabariti,
Palestinian Authority Minister of Planning and International Cooperation
Nabeel Sha'ath, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and Russian
Deputy Foreign Minister Victor Posuvalyuk who participated as an
observer.
The five participants acknowledged the leadership of Egypt's President
Hosni Mubarak in hosting the Cairo Summit. Building on that historic
meeting, the five participants reaffirmed their determination to
consolidate the breakthroughs achieved in the Arab-Israeli peace
process, to overcome obstacles and disputes, and to push forward toward
a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace in the region based on United
Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 thus leading to a
lasting reconciliation among the peoples of the Middle East cemented by
bonds of mutual respect and dignity, tolerance, cooperation, security,
and peaceful relations.
Toward this end, the five parties represented in Washington have joined
together to act to further cooperation in support of peace. Because
peace requires concerted action, the parties agreed to explore practical
steps in the political, economic, security, and human dimension areas of
education and culture. They also agreed to meet as necessary to consult
and to coordinate action in these areas. Experts will follow up in each
of these areas as appropriate.
In the political area, the parties reaffirmed their strong commitment to
honoring those agreements already concluded in letter and spirit and to
accelerate negotiations on all tracks. The Secretary of State reported
on the conclusions reached between the Israeli and Palestinian
delegations today. Those conclusions are attached and constitute an
integral part of this communique. The participants in today's meeting
welcomed the results achieved by Israel and the Palestinian Authority
and pledged to do all they could to support the conclusion of the
Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The parties also expressed
appreciation for the continuation of the implementation of the Israeli-
Jordanian peace treaty in all its aspects. They further expressed the
hope that a peace agreement between Israel and both Syria and Lebanon
could be reached soon, leading to comprehensive peace.
With respect to security, the parties agreed that there can be no real
peace in the region without security and stability. The parties declared
that they are committed to combat all acts that aim to destroy the peace
process, particularly acts of terrorism and violence and to stand
staunchly against and put an end to all such acts. The parties
reaffirmed the intention expressed at the Cairo Summit that within the
framework of peace and reconciliation in the region, with enhanced
security, economic prosperity, and a higher standard of living for their
people, they intend to achieve equal security and mutual confidence at
lower levels of armaments, appreciating President Mubarak's disarmament
proposal on weapons of mass destruction. The parties shall pursue a
mutually verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass
destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery
systems.
In the economic area, they reaffirmed the importance of fostering
economic development and investment in the region. The parties agreed to
support assistance to Palestinians and the development and strengthening
of the Palestinian economy through various means, including the creation
of industrial zones in the West Bank and Gaza. The parties are committed
to explore the removal of barriers to trade. They will also explore ways
to promote liberalized trade between the parties and the United States.
In this regard, the parties expressed appreciation to the United States
for its proposal to extend duty free treatment to products from
industrial zones to be created in the West Bank and Gaza and free trade
zones that may be established in Taba, Eilat, and Aqaba. The United
States will consult further with the parties and the U.S. Congress on
this matter. At the same time, the parties took note of progress and
agreed to continue their efforts towards the establishment of a Middle
East Development Bank. Such an institution would serve to fund
development projects and the promotion of private sector investment.
To underscore the public-private partnership as embodied in the
Casablanca Declaration, the four parties agreed to the promotion of
private sector projects. The parties will work together with the private
sector for the success of the Amman Economic Summit in October.
In the human dimension, the parties also agreed on the need to build
bridges between peoples, to overcome barriers to understanding, and to
share knowledge and expertise to deal with common problems. The parties
also agreed to explore the possibilities of new and more creative forms
of cooperation in these areas.
Finally, the parties pledged to work to ensure that there can be no
turning back in the Arab-Israeli peace process. They agreed to do all in
their power to work toward the achievement of a comprehensive peace and
to create a Middle East with peace, security, and economic prosperity
for all the people of the region. In this regard, they pledged their
continued support for the efforts and contributions of the multilateral
track of the peace process.
In light of our commitment to pursue a comprehensive peace, the United
States will be consulting with its Russian co-sponsor, the European
Union as well as with Norway, Japan, and other regional participants in
the peace process on ways to promote progress and reach our common
goals.
(###)
ARTICLE 2:
U.S. Policy Toward East Asia and the Pacific
Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs of the
House International Relations Committee, Washington, DC, February 9,
1995
Mr. Chairman: Thank you for the invitation to speak before the Asia and
Pacific Affairs Subcommittee so early in this session of the 104th
Congress. It is a distinct pleasure to sketch for you a broad overview
of U.S. policy for the East Asia and Pacific region under the Clinton
Administration. I reiterate the Administration's commitment to working
with this Congress to shape an active bipartisan policy that will
advance our national interests in the world's most dynamic region.
In addition to submitting the full text of these opening remarks, I
would like, with your permission, to place in the record the text of my
January 1995 address to the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco.
I have just returned from a 10-day, five-country tour through Asia with
Deputy Secretary Talbott. I was once again struck by America's large
stakes in the region as well as the strong desire there that the United
States remain engaged.
The Asia-Pacific region is impressive for its diversity and dynamism.
Geographically, it embraces a broad swath of all four hemispheres,
stretching roughly 8,000 miles westward from the U.S. mainland to Burma
and 8,000 miles southward from Alaska to New Zealand. Its ethnic and
religious diversity blends with some of the world's richest cultures. It
includes several of the last communist regimes in the world--Vietnam,
North Korea, and China--as well as free societies such as Japan and
Australia and newer democracies, such as Thailand, South Korea, the
Philippines, Taiwan, Cambodia, and Mongolia.
Economically, the Asia-Pacific region has become the most robust and
important area in the world. The 18 members of the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation--APEC--forum account for more than one-third of the world's
population and produce $14 trillion in goods and services annually--
about half of the world's GDP. Even excluding the U.S., the output of
the region still surpasses that of the European Union. East Asia is the
destination of nearly a third of total U.S. exports and accounts for
over 2.5 million American jobs. American sales in Asia are growing more
rapidly than anywhere else.
The region is not uniformly affluent, however. It is also home to
grinding poverty. It is no coincidence that the poorest countries
generally have some of the most repressive regimes, while the more
affluent are among the most free.
Strategically, the Asia-Pacific is the region where four of the world's
major powers intersect. We have fought three wars there in the past
half-century. Here at home, our population has been shifting toward the
Pacific and is increasingly enriched by large numbers of Asian
immigrants. The hopes for a peaceful and prosperous future are
promising, provided the United States stays actively engaged.
The Clinton Administration's Approach
During the last two years, the Clinton Administration has confronted
head-on the post-Cold War world with all its advantages and ambiguities.
The Pacific arena has been no exception. We have sought to define for
Americans the huge U.S. interest in the region and to heighten U.S.
engagement. We have promoted the full range of U.S. goals. In addition
to more traditional concerns, this includes a new emphasis on advancing
global issues such as narcotics control, population planning, AIDS
prevention and treatment, environmental protection, and cooperation to
curb international crime.
The broad outlines of U.S. policy toward the region were articulated by
President Clinton during his first overseas trip, to Japan and Korea in
July 1993. At that time, he set forth his vision of "a New Pacific
Community built on shared strength, shared prosperity, and a shared
commitment to democratic values." The Administration views the three
pillars of this policy--prosperity, security, and freedom--as mutually
reinforcing elements. We have been pursuing each of these through a
variety of initiatives, policies, statements, and trips--in the process
seeking to raise the profile of Asia in our policy and public
consciousness. Let me now briefly review what has been accomplished and
then discuss the specific ways in which we would hope to continue making
progress in the year ahead.
Prosperity
In an era of relative peace in the Asia-Pacific region, we have been
able to focus heavily on ensuring that the United States contributes to
and benefits from the dynamic economic growth of the region. Within the
context of America's global efforts to promote free trade through the
GATT and, now, WTO, we have been working bilaterally and regionally to
remove barriers to trade and to ensure America's economic place in the
Pacific community.
In 1993, when we were the chair of APEC, we played an active role in
developing that young organization into a more effective vehicle for
promoting economic growth and trade liberalization in the Asia-Pacific
region. In Seattle in the fall of 1993, the President elevated the APEC
forum to the leaders' level by convening the first-ever meeting of Asia-
Pacific leaders and, with those leaders, shaped an economic vision
statement for the Pacific.
In Bogor last year, the second APEC leaders' meeting, under Indonesia's
leadership, made a commitment to achieve open and free trade in the
region by the year 2020. In Osaka this November, we look toward a
blueprint, developed under Japan's leadership, to move APEC toward this
bold vision. The Osaka action agenda will set the work program for APEC
for the next 10 years. We need a comprehensive and credible agenda that
commits APEC to a course of active trade and investment liberalization.
We see APEC not as a trade bloc nor a formal trade agreement like NAFTA
but, rather, as a building block for global trade liberalization and a
spur to freer trade in other regions.
We also have been working bilaterally to open markets. We have made
progress on economic issues a central element in our relations with
Japan. Through the U.S.-Japan framework talks, we have reached a series
of important sectoral agreements and promoted macroeconomic stimulus in
Japan. But there is much unfinished business in the automotive sector,
deregulation, and the faithful implementation of agreements reached.
However sporadically, Japan is moving toward a genuine multiparty system
with more competition for consumer votes and, therefore, greater
pressure for access to foreign suppliers. Still, significant Japanese
trade surpluses, even if at somewhat lower levels, are likely to persist
for the foreseeable future. We do not seek to balance trade bilaterally;
what we do seek are genuinely open markets and a fair opportunity to
compete.
With China, we are in the middle of a series of intense negotiations.
Our textile talks last year resulted in a new accord. We also
successfully negotiated a market access agreement and a framework
agreement on intellectual property rights, as well as our recently
announced accord on satellite launch services. However, serious problems
remain. We recently announced trade retaliation against China because of
its failure to enforce its IPR laws and regulations. Egregious pirating
of intellectual property in China costs American firms about $1 billion
annually. The Chinese have now agreed to resume negotiations. We remain
prepared to reach an equitable agreement, but we will continue to firmly
defend American interests and international trading principles.
Another current issue is China's desire to become a member of the World
Trading Organization, the successor to GATT. We continue to strongly
support China's membership, but its accession must be based on firm
commitments to the basic rules and disciplines of the GATT/WTO. The
Chinese leaders' willingness to open their system to foreign competition
has been complicated by the recent uncertainty in China's domestic
economic situation and the transition to the post-Deng era.
We have negotiated down protectionist barriers with other trade partners
including Korea, Thailand, and Taiwan. We have consulted individually
and collectively with the six dynamic ASEAN economies, which together
are our fourth-largest trading partner.
Economics has thus become a core element of our overall policy toward
the Asia-Pacific. Active economic engagement helps to anchor America in
the region, not only in trade and investment but also in security and
political terms.
Security
In a region where the major powers meet, we have large, abiding security
interests. Relations among these nations are more stable today than they
have been at any time in this century. Managing those interrelationships
is, nevertheless, a key challenge in the years ahead. How are we working
to consolidate these favorable circumstances?
We are maintaining our forward military presence in the Western Pacific.
The bottom-up review concluded that the U.S. interest in deterring
aggression and preserving stability requires us to maintain the
capabilities that are provided now by an active forward presence of
approximately 100,000 troops. While the specific composition of our
forces may change, our commitment to maintain our capabilities and
active engagement in the real security challenges of the region must
not. The Department of Defense soon will publish a new report on our
strategy in the region which will clearly affirm this.
Our alliance with Japan is strong and remains the linchpin of our
defense posture in Asia. We have insulated our security ties from our
trade frictions while making the point that, if left unattended,
economic frictions could eventually affect our overall relationship. We
have worked with Japan on what we call our "Common Agenda" on global
issues and successfully enhanced a global partnership with Japan--one
which also is reflected in our support for Japan's becoming a permanent
member of the UN Security Council.
Relations with China are crucial. It is a permanent member of the UN
Security Council, has nuclear weapons, and is destined to become a
global economic power. It has a major impact on regional issues and on
global challenges such as the environment. We have a clear national
interest in seeing that China is integrated into the international
system on appropriate terms, whether it is the WTO, APEC, the ASEAN
Regional Forum, non-proliferation agreements, or compliance with
international human rights standards. We welcome China's participation
in both global and regional economic and security forums.
Nearly one and a half years ago, the President initiated our policy of
comprehensive engagement. We continue, through high-level dialogue and
working-level talks with China, to pursue our national interest. We have
had modest success in securing China's cooperation on certain issues,
including international peace-keeping, the North Korean nuclear issue,
missile exports, narcotics, alien smuggling, and regional security
dialogue. In recent months, however, differences over the sensitive
issue of Taiwan, human rights, and trade have taken center stage.
Resolving these differences is made more difficult by China's succession
politics.
We are, therefore, in a difficult phase in our relationship. We must
continue to pursue constructive relations with China--one of the key
powers in the world, but we must also show firm resolve whenever
necessary. We have maintained Tiananmen-related sanctions, have taken
firm trade steps where necessary, and are pursuing human rights issues
in various ways. At the same time, we seek to make progress where we
can. Despite some current strains, we remain confident that, over the
long run, our shared interests will clearly outweigh our differences.
A comprehensive and balanced China policy is essential to maintaining
peace, stability, and economic development on both sides of the Taiwan
Strait. While we recognize the Government of the People's Republic of
China as the sole legal government of China, we also maintain a vigorous
and expanding unofficial relationship with Taiwan, within the framework
established by the Taiwan Relations Act and the three joint communiques
with the P.R.C. We acknowledge the Chinese position that there is but
one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. Administrations of both
parties have embraced this policy, which has enabled us to develop
mutually beneficial relations with both the P.R.C. and Taiwan.
The people of Taiwan also have benefited from our strong but unofficial
relationship. The famous Taiwan economic "miracle" has made it the 13th-
largest trading economy in the world and our second-largest export
market in Asia. With our encouragement, Taiwan has taken dramatic
strides toward democracy and the observance of human rights. All of
these developments have provided the people of Taiwan the security to
enjoy their prosperity, and recently a "cross-strait dialogue" between
Taipei and Beijing has replaced the exchanges of shells that once were
common in those waters.
Recognizing this, the Administration conducted the first comprehensive
review of its Taiwan policy in 15 years and implemented significant
adjustments in our unofficial relations with Taiwan. However, we will
continue to reject proposals which would place at risk the peace and
growth that Taiwan has achieved. We will not reverse the policies of six
administrations of both parties. That would not be in our interest, and
it would not serve the interest of the people of Taiwan.
With Russia, our global approach of supporting reform and integration
includes welcoming it into the Pacific community. Russia is playing a
constructive role in the ASEAN Regional Forum and is eager to join APEC.
We have been encouraging Moscow to address the key issues which will
allow it to improve its relations with Japan.
With Vietnam, the fullest possible accounting for our missing-in-action
continues to be our highest priority. We also have important regional
security and economic objectives, which improved relations will promote.
Just last month, we opened a liaison office in Hanoi after favorably
settling property and claims issues. We envisage that this liaison
office will play an important role in encouraging progress in unilateral
and joint Vietnamese efforts on MIAs and in furthering our other
objectives, including human rights. As the President has said
consistently, Vietnamese cooperation in accounting for missing
servicemen remains the priority criterion for further progress in our
bilateral relationship.
Our alliance relationships and forward military presence form the
foundations for our Asian security policy. To supplement but not to
supplant these foundations, the Administration also has explored new
multilateral security dialogues in Asia. Working with ASEAN and other
friends, the U.S. has supported the establishment of the ASEAN Regional
Forum--ARF--the Pacific's first broadly based consultative body
concerned with security issues. An inclusive group, not directed against
any country or bloc, the ARF had its historic first meeting in July 1994
and included the ASEAN countries, the U.S., Canada, Japan, Korea,
Australia, and New Zealand as well as China, Russia, Vietnam, and
others. We believe the ARF can play an important role in conveying
governments' intentions, easing tensions, promoting transparency,
developing confidence, constraining arms races, and cultivating habits
of consultation and cooperation on security issues.
Together with others, we also are laying the groundwork for a smaller
forum for northeast Asia, an area where great powers have clashed
historically and which is the locus of the region's most urgent security
challenges.
The Korean Peninsula represents the most critical security challenge in
Asia. A major Administration accomplishment of 1994 was the successful
negotiation of the Agreed Framework with North Korea.
The nuclear accord has received detailed attention in other hearings, so
I will comment on it only briefly. We are confident that the more the
Congress and the country examine the agreement, the more they will share
our firm judgment that it fulfills America's goals of promoting regional
stability and curbing nuclear proliferation.
In this accord, we address the past, present, and future nuclear threats
posed by North Korea. North Korea has agreed to allow inspections which
the IAEA believes will shed light on how much plutonium North Korea
produced in 1989-91. To be sure, clarifi- cation of the past is
scheduled for a few years later than we would have liked. We judged that
this delay was outweighed by the opportunity to deal effectively with
the present and the future. The Agreed Framework obliges North Korea to
freeze its nuclear capacity. So far it has done so. It has shut down its
small nuclear reactor. It has sealed its reprocessing facility; the
spent fuel rods will be safely encased and eventually shipped out. It
has halted construction on its two large reactors. All of this is being
verified by IAEA inspections and our own surveillance. North Korea has
reversed itself and remains a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
As for the future, North Korea will dismantle its entire nuclear program
and, with outside help, substitute a nuclear energy system that is more
resistant to proliferation. Moreover, as it implements the accord, North
Korea will be progressively integrated into the region and the world,
paving the way to greater stability in northeast Asia and, ultimately,
to a resolution of the tragic division of the Korean Peninsula.
This agreement is not based on trust. In addition to international
verification, there are built-in check- points along the path to
implementation. To gain technical or economic benefits, North Korea must
honor reciprocal obligations. North Korea derives no advantages that do
not also promote regional and global stability. Moreover, the major
financial costs will be borne by the international community.
In short, the Agreed Framework is of major benefit to the United States,
to the region, and to the world. The R.O.K. supports the agreement for
this reason, as do Japan and all other interested parties. The
alternatives are dubious and dangerous. Those who are critical of the
accord should present a better option. No one has done so.
Implementing the Framework will require perseverance by all concerned.
We are working closely with South Korea, Japan, and others. The
Framework stipulates that the south-north dialogue must be resumed. We
insist that dialogue between Seoul and Pyongyang develop in rough
parallel with steps toward improved U.S.-D.P.R.K. relations. The future
of the peninsula must be shaped by the Korean people themselves; the
Framework can only succeed if there is a climate of civility and
cooperation between the north and the south.
Freedom
Finally, there is the goal of freedom. Promoting freedom while balancing
other objectives is the most complex challenge--conceptually and
politically--that we face. It is a quest in which we get the least
international support.
False prophets claim a contest of values between the United States--or
the West--and an Asian monolith. They assert that Asians do not share
universal aspirations for individual rights. Asian electorates and
elected leaders would reject the notion that human rights are uniquely
Western, or the implication that autocracy is intrinsically Asian. Most
would agree with President Kim of South Korea that "respect for human
dignity, plural democracy, and free market economics have firmly taken
root as universal values."
What is our approach? We are not trying to impose our form of society
or ideals. Each country must find its own way, consistent with its
history and culture. But international obligations to which countries
have subscribed should be fulfilled. No government should violate the
core value of human dignity as articulated in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. Each nation's citizens should have the chance to
participate in the decisions that affect their lives, and the
governments they elect should not be overturned by force. Many Asians
have devoted their lives--and given their lives--for these values.
Americans are bound to respect them.
In addition, we appeal to countries' self interest. Experience teaches
that sustained economic development is more likely where government
policies are transparent, where courts provide due process, where
uncensored newspapers are free to expose corruption and to debate
economic policy, and where business people can make independent
decisions with free access to information. Economic rights granted by
authoritarians can as easily be taken away. The foundation of open
economies--rights that protect contracts, property, and patents--can be
guaranteed only by the rule of law.
The reality of Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan shows that
accountable government is the bedrock of stability and prosperity. The
reality of Burma and North Korea is that repression entrenches poverty.
The defense of liberty is not merely an idealistic endeavor. Enlarging
freedom serves concrete American interests as well. The greatest threats
to our security--and to Asia's--come from governments that flout the
rule of law at home and reject the rule of international law abroad. In
353 wars fought since 1819, not a single one was between two established
democracies. Open, accountable governments do not practice terrorism or
generate refugees. They make better trading partners.
Our goals remain constant. The President remains as committed as ever to
the cause of freedom. Consequently, we will continue to champion human
and labor rights in Asia without arrogance or apology. We will do so
where we have friendly relations--as the President did in Indonesia in
his meeting with President Soeharto. We will do so where our interest in
stemming the drug trade goes hand-in-hand with our interest in
accountable government--as it does in Burma. And we will do so where we
have an interest in positive engagement on many critical world issues--
as we have in China.
Finally, we will continue our strong support for fledgling democracies.
Last spring, Secretary Christopher participated in the International
Conference on the Reconstruction of Cambodia and pledged our support for
rebuilding Cambodia. Last month, Deputy Secretary Talbott visited
Cambodia to reaffirm our support for the democratically elected
coalition government.
Later this month, I will be traveling to Mongolia to review our programs
for supporting Mongolia's transition to a democratic, free-market
system.
Goals for the Coming Year
Mr. Chairman, the President and the Secretary of State have articulated
a series of goals which the Administration will energetically and
creatively pursue. In the context of the Administration's broad
objectives, we will be working in the coming year on several important
fronts in Asia. I will mention some of the more important ones briefly.
We will work determinedly to implement the U.S.-North Korean Agreed
Framework but not at the cost of our strong ties with the Republic of
Korea. The task is complex; it will require sustained effort. We will
establish KEDO and get it off to a constructive start. The selection of
a South Korean reactor design is essential on financial, technical, and
political grounds. We expect to establish diplomatic relations at the
most basic level by opening a liaison office in Pyongyang, as foreseen
in the agreement. North Korea will have an office here. In moving ahead
on these fronts, we will insist that the north's undertaking to pursue
the north-south dialogue be implemented faithfully. We hope by these
efforts to move to a new stage in which we and the other countries
concerned begin discussions on a more stable future for northeast Asia.
In APEC, our principal objective is to reach agreement at the Osaka
leaders' meeting in November on an effective action agenda and blueprint
for implementing the Bogor declaration on free trade, investment, and
economic development. To this end, we will need to work closely with
Japan, as chair; with other APEC members; with Congress; and with our
private sector. A comprehensive work plan that addresses liberalization,
facilitation, and cooperation is essential to sustaining APEC's
credibility as a vehicle for economic growth.
During this year, we will be reaffirming with Japan our security
relationship and working to strengthen cooperation on our common agenda.
This 50th anniversary year of the end of the war in the Pacific is a
time which both our government and that of Japan wish to use to
rededicate ourselves to cooperation for future peace and prosperity. At
the same time, we will continue to work on outstanding economic issues--
most importantly in the auto sector--and Japan's plans for economic
deregulation.
We will pursue our strategy of comprehensive engagement with China. We
hope we can successfully conclude important bilateral negotiations on
IPR protection and market access. If not, we will have no choice but to
use the provisions of our trade law. We will continue the multilateral
negotiations on China's admittance to the WTO. We will continue our
limited bilateral military dialogue, with a view to encouraging greater
openness and transparency on the part of the Chinese military. We will
continue to raise human rights issues vigorously, through bilateral
visits and through multilateral channels such as the UN Human Rights
Commission meeting. We will search for cooperation where we can find it
on regional issues and global challenges.
We will further develop regional security dialogues in the new ASEAN
Regional Forum and elsewhere. Our hope is that patient diplomacy will
build consensus for a meaningful ARF work program that will encompass
both confidence-building measures and cooperation in areas of mutual
benefit, such as peace-keeping or disaster relief. At the same time, we
will lay the groundwork for a separate sub-regional dialogue on security
issues in the critical northeast Asia sector.
We also will advance our many other interests. We will strengthen ties
with ASEAN, whose countries together are our fourth-largest market and a
force for stability and growth in the region. We will persistently seek
full cooperation in accounting for our POWs and MIAs in Vietnam, Laos,
Cambodia, Russia, China, and North Korea. We will strengthen ties with
Australia and New Zealand. We will press for political openness in
Burma. We will continue our support for the elected governments in
Cambodia and Mongolia. We will continue to support democracy, human
rights, and reform throughout the region, working in part through
effective non-governmental organizations such as the National Endowment
for Democracy and the Asia Foundation. We will seek practical progress
on law enforcement, environmental, and other global issues.
Conclusion
Broad public and congressional support is critical for our policy. A
prosperous, stable, and open Asia-Pacific region is neither only a
Republican nor only a Democratic cause. While we will see debate and
even disagreement over the next two years, I am optimistic that our
Pacific quest will enjoy bipartisan support.
Some see a Pacific community as a distant if not unrealistic vision. In
fact, it is being shaped now by our actions and those of others.
Clearly, building such a community will take persistence and patience.
We cannot force its definition, nor should we forfeit our difference.
The diversity of the Asia-Pacific region is a reality we recognize and
respect. Its distinctions will be a major source for the region's future
dynamism.
Nevertheless, the contours of commonality are surfacing in the Pacific.
Trade is linking economies, telecommunications are transcending borders,
and transportation is shrinking distance. Business people are spurring
regional integration. Diplomats are strengthening regional institutions.
This is the 50th anniversary year of the end of World War II. This
commemoration of past sacrifice reminds us of our responsibility to the
next generation of young Americans and Asians. It provides an
opportunity to rededicate ourselves to shaping a Pacific community that
is richer, safer, and freer. Thank you.
(###)
ARTICLE 3:
Encouraging Trade and Investment: An Integral Part of U.S. Policy
Toward Africa
George E. Moose, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Washington, DC, February 16, 1995
Madam Chairman and members of the committee: It is fitting that the
first formal hearing on Africa by the 104th Congress should be on trade
and investment. Those who see only news headlines that portray Africa as
a continent of famine and crisis may be surprised by this focus. But
those who have lived and worked in Sub-Saharan Africa or who have
closely watched recent developments on the continent will recognize that
trade and investment are indeed becoming a fundamental aspect of U.S.-
Africa relations. I welcome the opportunity to focus on this theme as we
initiate formally our dialogue on African issues.
Africa: A Transformation
A major transformation is underway in Africa, comparable to what Latin
America experienced over the past decade. The clearest indicators of
this transformation are the growth and expansion of democratic
governments and institutions, paralleled by significant economic reform
and liberalization. Nearly two-thirds of the African countries are now
at some stage of democratic transition, compared to only four in 1989.
Many African nations have taken difficult and courageous steps to keep
budget deficits down, maintain realistic exchange rates, and increase
competition through domestic deregulation, trade reform, and
privatization of public enterprises. The aim of these reforms has been
to create an enabling environment in which the private sector can act as
the engine of development.
U.S. leadership and support are critical to that transformation. Our
diplomatic efforts and bilateral aid programs have given significant
impetus to democracy-building and economic development. Our
contributions--leveraged with those of other donors--to the programs of
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in Africa have reinforced
economic policy reforms and infrastructure development.
The transformation of Sub-Saharan Africa has significant implications
for U.S. interests. First, the progress realized to date has stimulated
growing interest and opportunities for U.S. business. Second, the
emergence of more stable, more democratic governments has given us
responsible partners with whom we can address the full range of regional
and international issues--settling or preventing conflicts; combating
crime, narcotics, terrorism, and weapons proliferation; protecting and
managing the global environment; and expanding the global economy.
Although the results thus far have been encouraging, we must recognize
that Africa's transformation is ongoing, incomplete, and still tenuous
in many places. It would be extremely shortsighted not to persist in the
effort to consolidate and protect the investment already made. The
problems that would arise if the transformation falters--failed states,
political instability, human tragedy--would pose direct threats to U.S.
interests and security.
The Pay-Off of U.S. Involvement
Nowhere are the benefits of active U.S. involvement and investment more
evident than in Southern Africa. Our efforts at conflict resolution and
democratic institution-building have paid-- and will continue to pay--
significant dividends.
With the establishment of a non-racial democracy in South Africa, U.S.
business can contribute to the country's economic development and help
erase the economic disparities that are the legacy of apartheid. South
Africa already accounts for $2.2 billion in trade--nearly half of U.S.
exports to Sub-Saharan Africa. Ford and Pepsi recently made
multimillion-dollar investments, and more than 300 U.S. firms have
returned since mid-1991. AT&T, Citibank, IBM, Kodak, Sara Lee, and
Proctor & Gamble are becoming household names. South Africa is the
cornerstone of a much larger market, one that encompassed the 11 nations
of Southern Africa and their 130 million inhabitants, and has
extraordinary minerals, wildlife, and other resources. The potential of
the Southern African sub-region is what has led the Commerce Department
to declare it one of the world's 10 major emerging markets for U.S.
exports.
In West Africa, Ghana provides another example of how U.S. involvement
and support--including USAID's Trade and Investment Program--have
yielded impressive results. Our leadership in promoting democratic
institutions and economic reforms have turned Ghana into one of our most
promising African export markets. Between 1992 and 1993, U.S. exports to
Ghana expanded by 73%. Figures for 1994 trail that performance, but U.S.
businesses have found profitable opportunities, and their products and
investments are reinforcing Ghana's development goals.
Events in Sierra Leone offer a cautionary lesson. The recent eruption of
civil unrest in this coastal nation illustrates the fragility of some
regimes and underscores the need for the U.S. to maintain knowledgeable,
experienced diplomats in the field who can work to prevent developing
conflicts where possible or help work out solutions. In the particular
case of Sierra Leone, the economic stakes are high as well. An attack in
January shut down Sierra Rutile, a 50% U.S.-owned mine that is the
world's largest single producer of rutile, a strategic titanium ore used
in aircraft manufacture and paints.
Investing in the Future
The African market, with over one-half billion potential consumers,
already is significant. There is great potential in sectors such as
telecommunications, finance, agriculture, and natural resources,
although obstacles to trade and investment remain in a number of
countries. The U.S. direct investment position approaches $3.5 billion.
In 1993, U.S. firms exported nearly $4.8 billion in goods and services
to Sub-Saharan Africa. This is 20% greater than our exports to the
Commonwealth of Independent States of the former Soviet Union.
These exports represent tangible benefits to American families. By some
estimates, every extra $1 billion in exports adds 19,000 new jobs in the
United States. Doubling our exports to Africa could create an additional
90,000 jobs at home, and our exports to Africa will increase, provided
the political and economic transformation currently underway is
sustained. Given the potential gains to the United States, our current
development aid to Africa--about one-half of one-tenth of 1% of the
federal budget--represents a minuscule investment with the possibility
of a tremendous future pay-off.
In a recent speech, USAID Administrator Brian Atwood offered a quick,
back-of-the-envelope calculation to illustrate this point. Using simple
but not implausible assumptions about African demand for foreign goods,
U.S. market share, and U.S. population growth, he came to the following
conclusion: The average $3 per year that each American family
contributes to African development assistance, if sustained over 30
years, could generate an annual $600 in exports per U.S. family by the
year 2025. As Brian points out, these are not trivial amounts; they
represent millions of jobs for our children and financial health for our
nation. It is very much in our own interest to remain engaged in Africa
and to support the real--but fragile--economic and political
transformation that has begun.
U.S. Policy Initiatives to Spur Trade
This Administration also vigorously has pursued global trade,
investment, and debt policy initiatives that will boost U.S.-Africa
business and commercial ties and help integrate Africa into the world
economy:
Trade. The successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations and
the creation of the World Trade Organization will enhance trade
opportunities with African countries. The U.S. Trade Representative is
chairing a working group to formulate and implement a comprehensive
trade and development policy to ensure that these countries are able to
take full advantage of the opportunities to compete successfully in
growing regional and global markets as trade barriers come down.
Investment. On multiple fronts, we are pursuing our goals of open
markets, nondiscriminatory treatment, and basic fairness for U.S.
investors doing business abroad--be it in Europe, East Asia, or Africa.
Where appropriate, we negotiate bilateral investment treaties that
protect investors from expropriations and assure the right to transfer
funds and access to fair dispute resolution mechanisms.
Debt Relief. The United States and other creditor nations have
established a mechanism in the Paris Club to offer debt reduction on a
selective, case-burdens that inhibit private investment and growth. Some
two dozen low-income African countries have benefited from debt
reschedulings or reductions over the past several years.
Providing Direct Support For U.S. Business
I have outlined how our policies and programs which promote democracy,
peace, and sustainable development in Africa reinforce U.S. economic
interests and provide significant indirect benefits and opportunities
for the U.S. private sector. But we also are actively involved in
providing direct support services and assistance to the business
community. Deputy Assistant Secretary Walker is providing a detailed
overview. Let me provide just a few recent examples of the role our
embassies are playing:
-- In Ethiopia, our embassy helped Louisiana-based Schaffer and
Associates in a hard-fought and successful bid for an $84-million sugar
project, with prospects for an additional $50 million in sales of
related U.S. goods and services.
-- In Botswana, the U.S. ambassador's intervention resulted in removal
of discriminatory tender requirements that hampered an Owens-Corning bid
on a $180-million contract to supply pipes for a major water pipeline.
-- In Kenya, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Mauritius, our embassies actively
supported the Kellogg company's effort to reduce import duties on
breakfast cereal.
-- In Madagascar, our ambassador's efforts to ensure a level playing
field for all bidders resulted in the signing of a lease/purchase
agreement for a Boeing 737 aircraft.
-- In Cameroon and Chad, our embassies supported negotiations leading
to a recent $3-4-billion agreement relating to the building of a
proposed oil pipeline from land-locked Chad through Cameroon to an
offshore terminal. The consortium which is to build the pipeline is led
by an affiliate of Exxon
-- In Zimbabwe, the tender offer for the country's first cellular phone
system was canceled after our ambassador protested that the
specifications were biased in favor of European suppliers. Several U.S.
firms were able to submit bids after the tender was rewritten.
-- In Senegal, the U.S. envoy successfully persuaded the authorities to
replace outdated health legislation that prevented Colgate from making
or selling fluoride toothpaste.
Creating Government-Business Partnerships
Providing information on economic trends, local business practices, and
financing options; ensuring a level playing field; removing
discriminatory regulations: This is the kind of work that our embassies
in Africa and our personnel in Washington do every day to help U.S.
businesses--large and small--to find opportunities in Africa. In an
increasingly tight budget environment, we need to find ways to be more
efficient and more effective in our business facilitation efforts.
We have ongoing contacts with a variety of Africa-related business
groups, such as the U.S.-Angola Chamber of Commerce, the U.S.-South
Africa Business Council, and the African Business Roundtable. We also
have frequent exchanges with the Corporate Council on Africa. These are
the kinds of partnerships between business and government that we value
and wish to strengthen.
A few months ago, the Corporate Council on Africa, the Department of
State, and other federal agencies held a series of roundtable
discussions on improving commercial opportunities in Africa. I
participated in some of those discussions and found many of the
recommendations that ensued to be useful and timely. Some of the issues
the Corporate Council raised--the need to remain engaged throughout
Africa, the need to support regional economic integration, the need to
secure broader international adherence to the principles of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, the need to reinvent the role of our embassy
economic officers--are issues we are already in the process of
addressing.
Other Corporate Council recommendations touched on complex issues that
require careful analysis. The availability of government-supported
export financing, for example, is a central concern, but it is a
difficult issue, given that current practice is rooted in the provisions
of the Credit Reform Act and the charter legislation for Eximbank and
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. I have asked Regina C.
Brown, our Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs,
to chair an informal interagency review of the Council's
recommendations, with the aim of identifying concrete, feasible steps
the Administration can take to address the concerns that have been
raised.
The U.S. Needs To Remain Engaged
To recapitulate, Madam Chairman, Sub-Saharan Africa is undergoing a
sweeping political and economic transformation. Democratic institutions
are being developed or strengthened in numerous countries, and fledgling
governments are taking important steps to liberalize their economies and
create an enabling environment for private sector-led growth.
U.S. leadership and support have been critical to this transformation.
Already, our active engagement in this process is starting to show
results. Our assistance programs fostering democratization and economic
reform have created opportunities for U.S. business. U.S. exporters and
investors, in turn, have reinforced development goals in African
nations. All Americans potentially stand to gain from the expansion of
African markets.
We must recognize, however, that Africa's new governments are fragile,
and their transformation remains incomplete. We need to continue
supporting their efforts. Our initiatives to strengthen democracy,
resolve conflicts, and foster sustainable development in Africa
represent a low-cost investment. If we as a nation remain engaged,
American businesses--and indeed all of us--can expect to reap
significant returns.
(###)
ARTICLE 4:
Human Rights and Democracy in Africa
John Shattuck, Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor
Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House International
Relations Committee, Washington, DC, February 22, 1995
Madam Chairman, I am glad to be here with you today to discuss human
rights and democracy in Africa. Africa defies generalization. We see
significant variation among countries and within countries. Across this
diversity, events unfold--some profoundly hopeful, others profoundly
disappointing. For simplicity's sake, I will speak of Africa as an
entity, and our diplomacy does have a continental scope, as we work
through and support multilateral institutions such as the Organization
of African Unity. But I stress that we recognize and work with each
country's unique social, economic, and political circumstances, and that
perspective informs my remarks today.
Before I turn to the details, let me offer a general assessment. First,
we have seen and have every reason to expect to see some very
encouraging developments. The majority of Africa's states are turning
toward democracy and market-based economic systems, having realized that
one-party rule and state-run economies do not and cannot work. Progress
here has not been uniform. The fullness and consolidation of democratic
and market reform vary across countries. For our part, we in the U.S.
Government intend to do what we can to support these transitions.
I would, of course, highlight South Africa's transition from legal
apartheid to democracy, which led to the election of Nelson Mandela as
president in 1994. We are proud of our contribution to that change, and
we look forward to a continued effort to help South Africa succeed over
the local haul. The most immediate effect of its success will be felt in
its region, where other democratic governments, such as Botswana and
Namibia, among others, will benefit from a vibrant, free-market
democracy in South Africa.
In Africa, of course, we see major problems, most stunningly in Rwanda
but elsewhere as well. One of Africa's largest and most important
states, Nigeria, remains under the rule of the military, which seized
power after the elections of 1993. There are civil wars in Liberia and
Sudan. Last year, The Gambia slid back into military rule. I will take
up many of these problems in detail later in my remarks. Here, I will
say only that we believe that democracy and human rights in Africa
matter to the United States, and we intend to do what we can to work
with those trying to improve their own countries and to work with
multilateral organizations, including the UN, to help resolve civil
conflicts and prevent future crises.
U.S. Policy Objectives
Let us turn first to the key goals of U.S. policy toward Africa, which
can be briefly summarized. They are based upon the premise that we need
to support the political and economic reforms initiated by Africans
themselves. Our chief objectives are:
-- Governments that are democratic, stable, effective, and responsible;
-- Equitable economic growth;
-- Prevention and resolution of conflicts; and
-- Effective responses to transnational issues.
These goals and the policies to effect them are related. We have learned
in our human rights and democracy work in Africa, as elsewhere, that we
must look at events through a policy lens that will capture the complex
relationships among problems--and among solutions. Thus, we recognize
that the growth of democracy supports market-based economic growth by
providing the resources for the development of what we refer to as civil
society--a network of relationships based on mutual trust and the rule
of law rather than arbitrary or authoritarian power. By the same token,
preventing or, if need be, resolving conflicts through the development
of African peace-keeping and enforcement mechanisms will also help
prevent the massive violations of human rights that we have seen in
Rwanda, Liberia, and elsewhere, and, in turn, help reduce the refugee
movements and environmental destruction these conflicts engender.
Bearing in mind the links among these issues, I will focus my testimony
on the first policy objective I mentioned--the promotion of democracy
and human rights on the continent. In Africa, as elsewhere, democratic
government and respect for human rights are closely linked. Democracy is
the best means the world has produced to protect and advance human
rights, based on individual freedom and dignity. In turn, respect for
human rights is the only means by which a democracy can sustain the
individual freedom and dignity that enable it to endure.
Tools for Promoting Democracy and Human Rights
The United States has a range of tools to promote democracy and human
rights in our foreign policy. Central among them are our assistance
programs, which are used both positively to encourage progress and
negatively to discourage and condemn reversals and bring to justice
human rights violators. The Congress has played a key role with the
executive branch in developing specific democracy assistance programs.
Some programs are carried out through grants administered by American
non-governmental organizations, such as the National Endowment for
Democracy, the International Republican Institute, the National
Democratic Institute, and the African-American Institute. One of our
most innovative and creative assistance programs--the democracy and
human rights fund--enables our embassies to provide small support grants
for grass-roots democratization and human rights projects that they can
observe and evaluate directly. The important role of these grants in
effecting real change in Africa's political life is all the more
striking in light of the small sums involved--in FY 1995 just $4
million, with no individual grant exceeding $100,000. The Administration
strongly supports this program and urges that it be retained as we
reshape our assistance policies toward Africa.
Through these assistance programs, we have conducted a wide variety of
effective projects in recent years. For example, we have supported
election assistance and civic education in Mali; election monitors in
Zambia; training for political parties in Benin; election efforts and
democratic institution-building in Malawi; election management,
demobilization, and civic education in Namibia; and parliamentary
training in the Central African Republic. In South Africa, democracy
promotion projects, such as voter education, community outreach, and
leadership development, and support for strengthening of public
management and institutions and the like are a significant part of our
overall program to help South Africa through its dramatic and difficult
transition from apartheid to democracy.
We also use our aid to press for an end to human rights abuses by
reducing or eliminating programs. One recent example is The Gambia,
where the 1994 coup prompted a suspension of our aid program.
Multilaterally, we oppose loans by international financial institutions
to countries that have a pattern of serious human rights abuses
excepting loans for basic human needs. We have opposed loans to
Equatorial Guinea, Mauritania, and Sudan for these reasons.
On the political and diplomatic level, we are actively working to
facilitate the establishment and maintenance of democratic systems that
respect human rights. Our embassies are responsible for developing
annual plans to work on these goals, with specific teams to oversee
progress. In the department and in the field, we review problems
continually and ensure that they are raised in private and public
diplomatic channels as appropriate. For example, we have urged the
regime in Nigeria to rescind its decrees restricting press and other
freedoms and to return to its announced program to hand over power to
elected civilian leaders. I will discuss Nigeria later in some detail.
We have employed a variety of sanctions there, including refusal of
visas to civilian and military leaders, and their families, who impede
the return to democracy; export-control restrictions; prohibition of
military sales; and termination of Eximbank lending and OPIC coverage.
To look at a different sort of case, in Mauritania, we have condemned
and pressed the government to end continuing practices of slavery by
cutting off assistance and ending trade benefits under the Generalized
System of Preferences.
Another important diplomatic tool is our annual country reports on human
rights, published earlier this month. These reports are widely
publicized throughout Africa and are closely read by governments and
private organizations; we are confident they have an impact on official
behavior.
Democratic Developments in 1994
I now will turn to the record of events in Africa over the last year and
review some key countries in more detail. Although international
attention tends to focus on some deeply disturbing developments--
exemplified by the Rwanda catastrophe, to which I will return later--it
is essential that we recognize the truly remarkable progress on the
continent. By pursuing a strong policy on democracy and human rights in
Africa, the United States has made a positive difference in many places.
In that regard, I cite the greatest triumph of 1994--the election of
Nelson Mandela as President of South Africa, marking the end of one of
the most profoundly racist systems in history and the beginning of a
democratic polity. South Africa's new interim constitution and Bill of
Fundamental Rights provide for freedoms of speech, press, assembly,
association, religion, and other critical rights. Although the
government faces difficult challenges, the cabinet has operated by
consensus and enjoys widespread, popular support. Politically motivated
violence has decreased significantly since the April elections. Just
last week, the country took another step forward with the installation
of a constitutional review court, some of whose members were anti-
apartheid activists in the past, including one who represented President
Mandela at his trial for treason 31 years ago. Not long ago, most
observers would have considered this peaceful shift to a model democracy
nearly impossible. We are proud to have contributed to this major
victory for democracy.
Many other African countries have undertaken democratic transitions,
which, while perhaps less heralded, are by no means less profound or
meaningful, particularly for their citizens. Five years ago, there were
five democratically elected governments in Sub-Saharan Africa; today
there are 21. There have been other important strides toward civil
society. For example, the press in many African countries has gained
considerably greater freedom than it enjoyed a decade ago in a number of
countries. The number of human rights activists and organizations is
growing, exemplified by GERDDES--the Group for Studies and Research on
Democracy and Economic and Social Development--in several francophone
states of West Africa and ZIMRIGHTS in Zimbabwe. Let me cite some of the
African democracy and human rights success stories in the 1990s.
In 1991, Mali's 23-year-old military dictatorship was deposed, and a
multi-party democracy has risen in its place. The Central African
Republic successfully completed its transition to democratic, multiparty
rule following free and fair elections in 1993. In 1994, Malawi ended
the one-man, one-party rule it had experienced since independence and
introduced a new constitution with strong human rights provisions.
Namibia has made a successful transition to multi-party democracy, and
in December 1994, it held free and fair presidential and parliamentary
elections. Ghana's transition to a constitutional democracy, begun in
1992, remained on track. A UN-negotiated peace in Mozambique ended 16
years of war, and elections last year installed a new government; the
human rights situation has steadily improved, and we are hopeful this
progress will be sustained. Tanzania also continued to move toward
democracy, and most of the 12 new opposition parties participated in
local and by-elections in 1994. Benin, Sao Tome and Principe, and Cape
Verde are also examples of nations that recently have joined the ranks
of African democracies with good human rights records. Zimbabwe has
continued to improve its human rights record, led by key rulings from
its supreme court in 1994 on the rights of women, free assembly and
press, and due process. In 1994, Botswana completed 28 years of
democracy since independence. President Masire's government, which has
an excellent record of respect for human rights, has made a commitment
to address gender inequities in the citizenship law this year.
These and other examples reflect the diversity I noted earlier. There
has been a broad variety of democracy movements and institutional means
of transition--referenda, national conferences, constitutional
commissions--and different approaches to the establishment of
accountable governments that respect human rights. In the aid projects I
discussed earlier, we have sought to support the institutions each
country is developing for itself and also attempted to provide cross-
fertilization by sharing ideas that have worked elsewhere. I also note
that many of these countries are undertaking democratic reform in tandem
with serious efforts at economic reform. We are working to support such
economic reform through our assistance programs. And we provide
humanitarian aid to countries in transition to lessen the suffering of
innocent civilians and to help create a climate conducive to
negotiations and dialogue--for example, in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and
Mozambique.
Human Rights Crises And the U.S. Response
Africa is also the site of very serious human rights problems. Liberia
continues to be wracked by brutal civil war. We are working with the UN
and with regional organizations to bring the parties together. In
Southern Africa, Angola has been unable to bring its conflict to a
peaceful conclusion, and egregious violations of human rights continue,
although there is hope that the Lusaka Protocol, signed late in 1994,
will finally bring peace--and U.S. participation helped bring this
about. In the Sudan, the civil war continues, and the dismal human
rights situation shows no signs of improvement. Both government and
rebels commit horrendous abuses, with the official pressure for
Islamization presenting special hardships for the non-Muslim population.
We have made a resolution on Sudan one of our top priorities this year
in the UN Human Rights Commission.
Both military and civilian governments in Africa are responsible for
human rights abuses. In Nigeria, the military seized power in November
1993, following the annulment of the elections in June of that year,
which had been judged by national and international observers as the
freest and fairest in that nation's history. The military government, as
I noted earlier, has an abysmal human rights record and is making almost
no progress toward democracy, disregarding any semblance of democratic
process. We have made unambiguously clear that we support responsible
efforts to restore civilian, democratic government and bring an end to
human rights abuses. We have, as I mentioned, instituted visa
restrictions and export controls, terminated all aid except for
humanitarian and democratization aid through non-governmental entities,
suspended consideration of applications for OPIC and Eximbank financing-
-and we do not rule out the possibility of further sanctions.
The Gambia's military has scrapped most of the country's democratic
institutions and committed many abuses. In response, we have terminated
aid other than democracy promotion. The military rulers have now agreed
to a two-year timetable for holding democratic elections. In Zaire,
Prime Minister Kengo's ambitious and, at times, courageous program of
political reform continues to be obstructed by President Mobutu and his
allies in the security services and the parliament. We have imposed an
arms embargo in response, as well as a visa sanction targeted at Zairian
obstructionists. The Kenyan Government continued efforts to silence
critics, although in June it withdrew charges against opposition
leaders, and democratic reformers in parliament continue to press for
change. In neighboring Ethiopia, the transitional government continued
to move toward multiparty democracy, but opposition parties are
boycotting the spring 1995 elections, complaining of government
domination of the political process.
In northern Africa, human rights conditions have deteriorated in several
countries. In Egypt, the government's security services and terrorist
groups are locked in a cycle of violence, and widespread violations
continue. In Algeria, government forces have shown increasing disregard
for human rights in their attempts to suppress the Islamist insurgency,
while some Islamist groups have committed heinous acts of violence
against Algerian citizens and foreigners, intimidating the population
and depriving it of basic human rights. We have publicly and privately
condemned violence and human rights abuses in both Egypt and Algeria.
Libya, of course, is one of the rogue states of the world, and we have
used a broad range of sanctions against its harsh regime.
Finally, a group of human rights disasters poses enormous challenges for
the United States and the world community in responding to and getting
ahead of the immediate conflict, coping with the refugee movements that
result, and resolving the conflict so that long-term stability can be
established. Our efforts to create or assist effective, local conflict-
prevention and peace-keeping institutions will be critical if we are to
avoid future disasters. Somalia, where the civil war continues unabated
and the human rights situation goes on deteriorating, is an obvious
example. The international community has not been able to find a means
to resolve this conflict. Without political reconciliation, and faced
with a worsening security situation, the Security Council reluctantly
ordered a total withdrawal of UN forces by the end of March 1995.
Genocide in Rwanda
An even more pressing situation is presented by Rwanda. The genocidal
slaughter in Rwanda is among the greatest human rights catastrophes of
our time in both speed and scale. I have traveled twice to Rwanda since
the onslaught of the killings in April 1994. I cannot adequately
describe some of the things I have seen. From this horror, we are trying
to wrest some measure of justice and hope for the future. In particular,
we fought hard and successfully for the creation of the UN War Crimes
Tribunal for Rwanda. We have contributed personnel and over $1 million
in funds to the tribunal and were instrumental in helping the UN field
human rights monitors in Rwanda, contributing three-quarters of a
million dollars to this major effort to stabilize the country so that
refugees can return, and we are contributing development aid for the
rebuilding of the economic and social structures. The establishment of
criminal responsibility for genocide is crucial if we are to
differentiate victims from aggressors, foster societal reconciliation,
and overcome the cynical argument that ethnic conflicts cannot be
resolved.
The Rwanda genocide was the result of years of mounting inter-ethnic
hostility and conflict. It is the cause of the flood of refugees, the
depopulation of the country, and the continuing instability, which
threatens to spread to neighboring countries. In order to address this
crisis, all aspects of a human rights response must be present and well
integrated. How is that to be done?
-- First, through the tribunal.
-- Second, through the deployment of UN monitors whose work and presence
will promote stability.
-- Third, we must coordinate the UN peace-keeping operation in Rwanda
with humanitarian relief and human rights monitoring and enforcement
activities.
-- Fourth, through the UN, we must assist the Rwandan Government to
build national institutions of justice and democracy.
We must also work to prevent a human rights disaster in Burundi akin to
that of Rwanda. There, we are actively supporting efforts to prevent
ethnic bloodshed and promote national reconciliation. We will provide $5
million in FY 1995 development aid focused on grants to promote
dialogue, reconciliation, and human rights. We will look to other funds
to support the UN's comprehensive plan for human rights advisory
services and the OAU monitoring force. We also are pressing for
accountability for those responsible for the attempted coup and murder
of President Ndayade in October 1993 and the ethnic violence that
followed. I have traveled twice to Burundi to investigate and encourage
efforts at accountability and reconciliation.
I have discussed Rwanda and Burundi at some length because they are
indicative of the new, creative efforts in preventive diplomacy and
preemptive conflict resolution that we must develop to manage the post-
Cold War human rights challenges that arise along fault lines within
societies and between countries. Many of the old familiar diplomatic and
military tools have proven to be of limited utility in addressing these
challenges. We are joining our efforts with other governments and non-
governmental organizations to begin to establish mechanisms that will
meet these challenges.
Conclusion
In closing, Madam Chairman, I would echo the words of National Security
Adviser Anthony Lake, who has devoted much of his career to the study of
Africa, and who recently completed extensive travels there. He has said:
President Clinton and his Administration reject Afro-pessimism. But
neither should any of us seek refuge in the illusions of Afro-optimism.
What is needed instead is a new Afro-realism--an Afro-realism that
commits us to the hard work that can strengthen the partnership between
Africa and America. Without that partnership, Africa will have lost the
support we wish to give and are determined to give. America will have
lost the opportunity to participate in what could be--what must be--one
of the great adventures of our time: fulfilling the dreams of Africa's
greatness that animated the leaders of its independence so many years
ago.
I would add that those dreams are not the special province of the elite.
Men and women throughout Africa are working to create better lives for
themselves and their children, often in the face of fantastic hardship,
and with great courage. They are endowed with inalienable rights to
freedom and dignity, and we are committed to helping them realize those
rights.
(###)
ARTICLE 5:
U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer Policy
White House press statement, Fact Sheets
Conventional Arms Transfer Policy
Statement by White House Press Secretary Michael McCurry, Washington,
DC, February 17, 1995.
The President has approved a comprehensive policy to govern transfers of
conventional arms. This policy, as detailed in the attached fact sheets,
serves our nation's security in two important ways. First, it supports
transfers that meet the continuing security needs of the United States,
its friends, and allies. Second, it restrains arms transfers that may be
destabilizing or threatening to regional peace and security.
This policy reflects an approach toward arms transfers that has guided
the Administration's decisions over the last two years. Specifically,
the United States continues to view transfers of conventional arms as a
legitimate instrument of U.S. foreign policy--deserving U.S. Government
support--when they enable us to help friends and allies deter
aggression, promote regional security, and increase inter-operability of
U.S. forces and allied forces. Judging when a specific transfer will
meet that test requires examination of the dynamics of regional power
balances and the potential for destabilizing changes in those regions.
The criteria guiding those case-by-case examinations are set forth in
the attached guidelines for U.S. decision-making on conventional arms
transfers.
The centerpiece of our efforts to promote multilateral restraint is our
initiative to work with allies and friends to establish a successor
regime to COCOM. The new regime should establish effective international
controls on arms sales and the transfer of sensitive technologies--
particularly to regions of tension and to states that pose a threat to
international peace and security. While pursuing multilateral restraint
through this and other mechanisms, such as the UN Conventional Arms
Register and regional initiatives, the United States will exercise
unilateral restraint in cases where overriding national security or
foreign policy interests require us to do so.
Fact Sheet: Conventional Arms Transfer Policy
Released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington,
DC, February 17, 1995.
U.S. conventional arms transfer policy promotes restraint, both by the
U.S. and other suppliers, in transfers of weapons systems that may be
destabilizing or dangerous to international peace. At the same time, the
policy supports transfers that meet legitimate defense requirements of
our friends and allies, in support of our national security and foreign
policy interests.
Our record reflects these considerations. U.S. arms sales remain close
to our historical average--approximately $12 billion in government-to-
government sales agreements in FY 1994. U.S. arms deliveries have also
remained flat. Sales and deliveries sales have been primarily to allies
and major coalition partners such as NATO member states and Israel.
U.S. Goals
The policy issued by the President will serve the following goals:
1. To ensure that our military forces can continue to enjoy techno-
logical advantages over potential adversaries.
2. To help allies and friends deter or defend themselves against
aggression, while promoting inter-operability with U.S. forces when
combined operations are required.
3. To promote regional stability in areas critical to U.S. interests,
while preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
their missile delivery systems.
4. To promote peaceful conflict resolution and arms control, human
rights, democratization, and other U.S. foreign policy objectives.
5. To enhance the ability of the U.S. defense industrial base to meet
U.S. defense requirements and maintain long-term military technological
superiority at lower costs.
Supporting Arms Control and Arms Transfer Restraint
A critical element of U.S. policy is to promote control, restraint, and
transparency of arms transfers. To that end, the U.S. will push to
increase participation in the UN Register of Conventional Arms. We will
also take the lead to expand the register to include military holdings
and procurement through national production, thereby providing a more
complete picture of change in a nation's military capabilities each
year.
The U.S. also will support regional initiatives to enhance transparency
in conventional arms--such as those being examined by the OAS and ASEAN-
-and will continue to adhere to the London and OSCE guidelines, while
promoting adherence to such principles by others.
The United States will continue its efforts to establish a successor
export control regime to the Cold War-era COCOM. Our goals for this
regime are to increase transparency of transfers of conventional arms
and related technology, to establish effective international controls,
and to promote restraint--particularly to regions of tension and to
states that are likely to pose a threat to international peace and
security.
The United States will also continue vigorous support for current arms
control and confidence-building efforts to constrain the demand for
destabilizing weapons and related technology. The United States
recognizes that efforts such as those underway in the Middle East and
Europe bolster stability in a variety of ways, ultimately decreasing the
demand for arms in these vital regions.
The United States will act unilaterally to restrain the flow of arms in
cases where unilateral action is effective or necessitated by overriding
national interests. Such restraint would be considered on a case-by-case
basis in transfers involving pariah states or where the U.S. has a very
substantial lead on weapons technology; where the U.S. restricts exports
to preserve its military edge or regional stability; where the U.S. has
no fielded countermeasures; or where the transfer of weapons raises
issues involving human rights or indiscriminate casualties, such as
anti-personnel landmines.
Finally, the U.S. will assist other suppliers in developing effective
export control mechanisms to support responsible export policies. The
United States also will continue to provide defense conversion
assistance to the states of the former Soviet Union and Central Europe
as a way of countering growing pressures to export.
Supporting Responsible U.S. Transfers
Once an approval for a transfer is made, the U.S. Government will
provide support for the proposed U.S. export. In those cases, the United
States will take such steps as tasking our overseas mission personnel to
support overseas marketing efforts of American companies bidding on
defense contracts, actively involving senior government officials in
promoting sales of particular importance to the United States, and
supporting official Department of Defense participation in international
air and trade exhibitions when the Secretary of Defense, in accordance
with existing law, determines such participation to be in the national
interest and notifies Congress.
Decision-making on U.S. Arms Exports: Criteria and Process
Given the complexities of arms-transfer decisions and the multiple U.S.
interests involved in each arms-transfer decision, decisions will
continue to be made on a case-by-case basis. These case-by-case reviews
will be guided by a set of criteria that draw the appropriate balance
between legitimate arms sales to support the national security of our
friends and allies and the need for multilateral restraint against the
transfer of arms that would enhance the military capabilities of hostile
states or that would undermine stability.
Fact Sheet: Criteria for Decision-making on U.S. Arms Exports
Released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington,
DC, February 17, 1995.
Given the complexities of arms-transfer decisions and the multiple U.S.
interests involved in each arms-transfer decision, the U.S. Government
will continue to make arms-transfer decisions on a case-by-case basis.
These reviews will be guided by the criteria below.
General Criteria
All arms-transfer decisions will take into account the following
criteria:
-- Consistency with international agreements and arms control
initiatives.
-- Appropriateness of the transfer in responding to legitimate U.S. and
recipient security needs.
-- Consistency with U.S. regional stability interests, especially when
considering transfers involving power projection capability or
introduction of a system which may foster increased tension or
contribute to an arms race.
-- The degree to which the transfer supports U.S. strategic and foreign
policy interests through increased access and influence, allied
burdensharing, and inter-operability.
-- The impact of the proposed transfer on U.S. capabilities and
technological advantage, particularly in protecting sensitive software
and hardware design, development, manufacturing, and integration
knowledge.
-- The impact on U.S. industry and the defense industrial base whether
the sale is approved or not.
-- The degree of protection afforded sensitive technology and potential
for unauthorized third-party transfer, as well as in-country diversion
to unauthorized uses.
-- The risk of revealing system vulnerabilities and adversely impacting
U.S. operational capabilities in the event of compromise.
-- The risk of adverse economic, political, or social impact within the
recipient nation and the degree to which security needs can be addressed
by other means.
-- The human rights, terrorism, and proliferation record of the
recipient and the potential for misuse of the export in question.
-- The availability of comparable systems from foreign suppliers.
-- The ability of the recipient effectively to field, support, and
appropriately employ the requested system in accordance with its
intended end use.
Upgrade Criteria
Upgrades of equipment--particularly that of former Soviet-bloc
manufacture--is a growing segment of the market. The U.S. Government
should support U.S. firms' participation in that market segment to the
extent consistent with our own national security and foreign policy
interests. In addition to the above general criteria, the following
guidelines will govern U.S. treatment of upgrades:
-- Upgrade programs must be well-defined to be considered for approval.
-- Upgrades should be consistent with general conventional arms
transfer criteria outlined above.
-- There will be a presumption of denial of exports to upgrade programs
that lead to a capability beyond that which the U.S. would be willing to
export directly.
-- Careful review of the total scope of proposed upgrade programs is
necessary to ensure that U.S. licensing decisions are consistent with
U.S. policy on transfers of equivalent new systems.
-- U.S. contributions to upgrade programs initiated by foreign prime
contractors should be evaluated against the same standard.
-- Protection of U.S. technologies must be ensured because of the
inherent risk of technology transfer in the integration efforts that
typically accompany an upgrade project.
-- Upgrades will be subject to standard U.S. Government written end-use
and retransfer assurances by both the integrator and final end user,
with strong and specific sanctions in place for those who violate these
conditions.
-- Benchmarks should be established for upgrades of specific types of
systems, to provide a policy baseline against which 1) individual arms
transfer proposals can be assessed and 2) proposed departures from the
policy must be justified.
(###)
[END OF DISPATCH VOL 6, NO 9]
To the top of this page
Index of Dispatch Magazine Archives 1995 Issues||
Index of Dispatch Magazine Archives||
Index of "Briefings and Statements"
Index of Electronic Research Collections
ERC Reference Desk ||
Alphabetic Index ||
Sitemap ||
ERC Homepage
Last modified: Jun. 8, 1999