U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 8, FEBRUARY 20, 1995 
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
 
 
 
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE: 
1.  The United States and Germany: A Force for Positive Change in the 
Post-Cold War Era--President Clinton, German Chancellor Kohl

2.  Overview of 1995 Foreign Policy Agenda and the Clinton 
Administration's Proposed Budget--Secretary Christopher 

3.  Opposition to the National Security And Revitalization Act, H.R. 
872--Secretary Christopher, Defense Secretary Perry 

4.  Supporting Democracy and Economic Reform in the New Independent 
States--Deputy Secretary Talbott 

5.  Advancing American Interests Through the United Nations-- 
Madeleine K. Albright, 

6.  Leveraging U.S. Resources Through the United Nations--Douglas J. 
Bennet, Jr.,  

7.  U.S.-Bulgaria Joint Statement 

8.  Update on U.S. Policy Toward South Asia--Robin Raphel 

9.  Access to White House Science and Technology Information 

10.  CD-ROM Update:  U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-ROM 

 

 

 

ARTICLE 1 
 
The United States and Germany: A Force for Positive Change in The Post-
Cold War Era 
President Clinton, German Chancellor Kohl 
Remarks prior to White House press conference, Washington, DC, February 
9, 1995 
 
President Clinton. Good afternoon. Please be seated. It is a pleasure 
for me to welcome Chancellor Kohl to the White House again. For more 
than 12 years, American presidents have looked to Helmut Kohl for 
insight and cooperation; and for friendship and    support on the most 
pressing issues of the day. Thanks to his wisdom and leadership, the 
relationship between Germany and the United States has strengthened and 
grown, becoming a force for positive change in the post-Cold War world. 
America has no better friend than Chancellor Kohl. 
 
The Chancellor's visit comes at an important time. One of the most vital 
issues we discussed today was building a more integrated Europe in the 
wake of this new era. The Chancellor and I reaffirmed our intention to 
press ahead with the enlargement of NATO to include Europe's new 
democracies. The current deliberations are moving at the right pace. We 
agreed that the inevitable process of NATO expansion will be gradual and 
open; that there will be no surprises. Its conditions, timing, and 
military implications must be well- and widely known in advance. 
 
We also agreed that, in parallel with expansion, NATO must develop 
close, strong ties with Russia. Chancellor Kohl and I will consult 
closely on the form this new partnership will take. We share a vision of 
European security that embraces a democratic Russia, and we will 
continue to reassure President Yeltsin that an expanded NATO will pose 
no threat to a democratic Russia. 
 
Recent events in Russia were an important part of our discussions today-
-especially the tragedy in Chechnya. Chancellor Kohl and I are in full 
agreement--the violence there must end and negotiation must begin. Every 
day the fighting continues, more innocent people fall victim. In 
response to international appeals, the United States will offer up to 
$20 million in humanitarian and refugee assistance to alleviate their 
distress. 
 
In our conversations with President Yeltsin, we have made clear our 
fears about the corrosive effect the conflict in Chechnya can have on 
democratic, market-oriented reform in the Russian republic. But the 
conflict has not changed the nature of our interest--namely, that 
Russia's efforts to become a stable, democratic nation must succeed. 
 
Today, the Chancellor and I remain determined to stick to our course of 
patient, responsible support for Russian reform. But help can only be 
extended if Russia stays on the course and continues the hard work of 
building democratic institutions and implementing market-oriented 
reforms. 
 
The Chancellor and I also discussed a broad range of other issues, 
including our efforts through the Contact Group to reach a negotiated 
settlement in Bosnia. Both of us believe it is essential to do what we 
can to support the Muslim-Croat Federation, which ended hostilities 
between two of the three parties to that conflict. We believe that 
strengthening the Federation will provide a concrete, positive step 
toward an eventual peace agreement. 
 
I also want to publicly thank the Chancellor for Germany's role in 
assembling the stabilization package for Mexico, which helped to avert a 
larger and far more dangerous financial crisis. The Chancellor and I 
support efforts in the G-7 to review our international institutions--a 
necessary step to ensure that they are fit for the challenges of the 
next half century. 
 
Finally, we are in full agreement that the United Nations should not 
lift sanctions on Iraq until that country meets all the conditions set 
forth in the UN resolutions, something Iraq has, so far, failed to do. 
 
As you can see, in a short time we covered a great deal of ground. Once 
again, we have discovered much common ground. Our nations share a vision 
of an integrated Europe, of strong bonds across the Atlantic, and of a 
world that continues to grow more peaceful and more prosperous. Our 
agenda is ambitious and the tasks ahead are not small. But I am 
convinced that working together we will be equal to the challenge. 
Chancellor. 
 
Chancellor Kohl. Thank you very much, Mr. President. Mr. President, 
ladies and gentlemen: Permit me to preface my actual statement by a 
brief remark. What I would like to do, Mr. President, is to offer my 
special respect and my special condolences to you, Mr. President, and to 
the American people on the occasion of the death of Senator Fulbright. 
 
I am saying this as a member of a generation who, even when they were 
students, wanted nothing more than to obtain the Fulbright Scholarship. 
Few men and women who enter politics ever succeed in having their names 
affiliated once and for all with a specific program. For many Germans--
for many Europeans--Senator Fulbright was a man we did not know 
personally, but he was someone who gave a signal after the Second World 
War and after the end of the Nazi barbarism--and I am saying this very 
pointedly this year, when on May 8 we will be looking back 50 years--
whose name was closely related with openness, with friendship, and with 
people striving together. I think it is only fitting that I, the German 
Chancellor, being here today, should offer my condolences as I just did. 
 
Mr. President, thank you and thank your staff, especially the Vice 
President, for the very warm and cordial reception we were given--as 
usual. These talks, which many might find boring, are talks which took 
place once again in an exceedingly friendly and warm atmosphere. We are 
not done with them; we will be continuing them. These talks of ours make 
a great deal of sense, even though we do talk on the phone regularly and 
frequently. But there is a difference between telephone conversations 
and conversations eye-to-eye. That is why I am especially happy to be 
able, once again, to be here in Washington with my delegation. 
 
I need not add much to what the President said in his preface. We are in 
full agreement as far as the topics and our views on them are concerned. 
It is very important to me, personally, to make very clear in public for 
the benefit of all Americans that the German policy and the policy that 
I, as the Federal Chancellor, am pursuing, be proceeding in close 
coordination with the President of the United States. 
 
We are living in radically changing times--times of dramatic changes; 
everybody knows that. We are finding out today that Germany is 
increasingly feeling how the situation has changed. Many of our 
countrymen no longer live under a regime that subjugated them for 40 
years, and at this point, the question of stability is more urgent than 
ever before. That is why to us, the Germans and the Europeans, NATO and 
the transatlantic security alliance with the United States be preserved-
-because they guarantee our future. 
 
This alliance is one that, in a changing world, will increasingly have 
to shoulder responsibility for stability throughout Europe. I fully 
agree with President Clinton in that during the preparatory work for the 
extension of NATO, we should proceed in accordance with the program we 
outlined in Brussels last year. It is a gradual process, and when I say 
gradual, I mean step-by-step. It is entirely possible that some of these 
steps will be larger than others. 
 
It is a process which we in Europe and in Germany will possibly be doing 
in parallel with the full expansion of the European Union, although they 
are not directly connected. The expansion of NATO is part of an overall 
security concept which is intended to make sure that we do not get new 
boundaries within Europe. That is why a close partnership with Russia 
and Ukraine is especially important. NATO and the European Union have to 
combine their strengths--combine their forces in pursuit of the common 
goal that we have with a view to what used to be called, in a simplified 
fashion, the Warsaw Pact countries. We must join forces to further 
democracy in the Central and Eastern European countries. I want to urge 
everyone here to realize that this process will require a great deal of 
patience. 
 
As a German, I am more aware than others how difficult it is to take a 
country where people speak the same language and bring two parts of it 
together after 40 years of complete isolation. I know the 
misunderstandings that can arise on simple, everyday matters. And if I 
try to imagine--and by God I do--what it means that since 1917, Russians 
lived under the communists--being aware that the Romanists were not 
exactly a picnic either--when you look at all these facts, you can 
appreciate how difficult the process is that is going on in Russia at 
this time. 
 
Since that is the case, we agreed--the President and I--and our 
governments are agreed, that we should encourage Russia to pursue the 
course of reform. What that means is that we have a vital interest--the 
Germans in particular, because we are close neighbors--we have an 
elemental interest in furthering reforms and cooperating with Russia. 
 
I would like to underline that I still support President Yeltsin, as I 
have always done. I do it with the objective of enabling reforms in 
Russia--enabling them to introduce market economy and create a state 
based on the rule of law. As I say that, I am stating very clearly that 
we will support Russia in its legitimate efforts to preserve the 
territorial integrity of this country, but that does require that Russia 
also stand by its commitments in the area of human rights and other 
international standards that they have committed themselves to, making 
Russia a country open to reform. 
 
I support what the President said regarding events in Chechnya, but let 
me add that a shared wish is to have a peaceful situation, in the best 
sense of the word, return to Chechyna. We wish for the authorities in 
that country to pursue their responsibilities in the manner I tried to 
outline just now. Now, let me state very briefly that we are in full 
agreement that we all must try to diminish and end the horrible 
suffering of people there. We shall jointly pursue that matter. It is an 
area where hundreds of years of history have led to the situation that 
we have now--but that should not discourage us. We must do the best we 
can. 
 
Time is running out. Winter will soon be over. That means at the end of  
the winter, which generally has a paralyzing effect on fighting, the 
full conflict might, once again, rear its head in that area. There is an 
alternative to the combined efforts of the Americans and the Europeans 
in the Bosnian area. 
 
Thank you very much, Mr. President, for the kind welcome you have 
extended to us. Now both of us, as we required, are looking forward to 
the many questions that you will, doubtless, have. 
 
President Clinton. Let me say--just before I recognize the first 
question--I would like to thank the Chancellor for his expressions. I 
think he could speak not only for the people of Germany, but for the--
largely, for the people of the rest of the world of condolences on the 
death of Senator Fulbright. 
 
As many of you know, this is a sad day for me personally; we had been 
friends for more than 25 years. I am just profoundly grateful today for 
the conviction that he imparted to me when I was a young man that we 
could make peace in the world if we seek better understanding, if we 
promote exchanges among people, and if we advance the cause of global 
education. For what you said, Chancellor, I am very grateful.  
 
(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 2 
 
Overview of 1995 Foreign Policy Agenda and the Clinton Administration's 
Proposed Budget 
Secretary Christopher 
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 
February 14, 1995 
 
Mr. Chairman, in the last three weeks, I have appeared before this 
Committee three times to discuss three specific issues--the Agreed 
Framework with North Korea, the START II treaty, and the loan guarantee 
package for Mexico. Today, I have the privilege of offering an overview 
of the Clinton Administration's foreign policy agenda for 1995. I will 
also indicate how our proposed budget supports both the principles 
guiding that agenda and the specific opportunities that I will be 
pursuing this year. 
 
We live in a world that has been profoundly transformed--by the end of 
the Cold War and by the triumph of democracy over dictatorship in many 
nations. It is a world that is taking shape in ways that are remarkably 
consistent with American ideals and conducive to American interests. 
Indeed, it is a world that has been shaped by the successful use of 
American power--and by the power of our principles. 
 
But we must not be complacent. Aggression, intolerance, and tyranny 
still threaten political stability and economic development in vital 
regions. Challenges as diverse as nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and 
environmental degradation still endanger our security and prosperity. 
 
Mr. Chairman, it was a bipartisan consensus that launched the Marshall 
Plan, established NATO and the GATT, contained communism, and kept the 
United States and our allies strong and free. Sustaining that bipartisan 
consensus is a core personal commitment for me as Secretary of State. 
President Clinton and I are determined that a Democratic President and 
Republican majorities in Congress can and will work together to maintain 
our nation's leadership in the world. It is in the direct interest of 
each and every American that we succeed. 
 
The imperative of American leadership is a central lesson of this 
century. Consider what the world would be like without American 
leadership in the last two years alone. We would have four nuclear 
states in the former Soviet Union instead of one, with Russian missiles 
still targeted at our homes; we would have a full throttle nuclear 
program in North Korea; no GATT agreement to expand world trade; brutal 
dictators still terrorizing Haiti; very likely, Iraqi troops back in 
Kuwait; and a deepening Mexican economic crisis threatening instability 
along our border and in emerging market economies around the world. 
 
Since we last met, President Clinton introduced the Administration's 
budget request for fiscal year 1996. It is important to note at the 
outset that since 1984, there have been substantial real cuts in the 
International Affairs budget. It now represents only 1.3% of Federal 
spending. Notwithstanding the extraordinary array of challenges we face, 
our 1996 spending request is essentially level with what we are spending 
in the current fiscal year if the supplementals are taken into account. 
 
We have been tough-minded in putting together an austere budget. Indeed, 
the resources we are requesting through this budget are the rock-bottom 
minimum we need to defend and advance our nation's vital interests.  
 
Mr. Chairman, last November's elections certainly changed a great deal. 
But they were not a license to lose sight of our global interests or to 
walk away from our commitments in the world. This budget advances our 
interests and maintains our commitments. Approving it will be a stern 
test of our willingness to dedicate the resources necessary to protect 
the security and prosperity of the American people. It will be a test of 
the first principle guiding our foreign policy: a test of our commitment 
to lead. 
 
The United States seeks a world of open societies and open markets in 
which American values and interests can thrive. Our strategy is driven 
by four principles: that we continue to engage and to lead; that we 
maintain effective relations with the world's great powers; that we 
adapt and build institutions that will promote economic and security 
cooperation; and that we continue to support democracy and defend human 
rights. 
 
As several of our recent accomplishments suggest, American leadership 
requires that we be ready to back our diplomacy with credible threats of 
force. To this end, President Clinton is determined that the U.S. 
military remain the most powerful and effective fighting force in the 
world--as it certainly is now. 
 
When our vital interests are at stake, we must remain prepared to defend 
them alone. But sometimes, by leveraging our power and resources, and by 
leading through alliances and institutions, we can achieve better 
results at lower cost to human life and national treasure--and that is a 
sensible bargain I know the American people support. 
 
This Administration has worked to ensure that peacekeepers have 
realistic objectives, that money is not wasted, and that tough questions 
are answered satisfactorily before new missions are approved. We are 
determined not to allow the UN to fall again into the traps of over-
commitment or mission creep. But we strongly oppose efforts in Congress 
that threaten to remove peacekeepers from vital trouble spots around the 
world, and to leave the President with an unacceptable choice each time 
a crisis occurs--a choice between acting alone and doing nothing. As 
Secretary Perry and I indicated yesterday, we will recommend to the 
President that he veto legislation that, in its current form, would 
undermine national security in this and other important ways. 
 
The second principle driving our strategy is the central importance of 
constructive relations with the world's most powerful nations: our 
Western European allies, Japan, China, and Russia. These nations possess 
the political, economic, or military capability to have an impact--for 
good or for ill--on the well-being of every American. The relatively 
cooperative relations that these countries now have with us and with 
each other is unprecedented in this century, but it is not irreversible. 
 
Our strategy toward the great powers begins with Western Europe and 
Japan. We must revitalize our alliances with this democratic core. We 
must also seize the opportunities to build constructive relations with 
China and Russia, countries that were not too long ago our fiercest 
adversaries. Both are undergoing momentous, though very different, 
transformations that directly affect American interests. 
 
Our partnership with Japan is the linchpin of our policy toward East 
Asia, the most dynamic and fastest-growing region in the world. This 
Administration has placed the Asia-Pacific at the core of its long-term 
foreign policy approach. Realizing President Clinton's vision of a 
stable and prosperous Pacific Community will continue to be a top 
priority. Moreover, the region figures prominently in many of the 
central areas of opportunity that we are pursuing in 1995. 
 
It is also imperative that we reinforce our security and political ties 
with Japan--as well as with South Korea and our other treaty allies in 
the Pacific. It is equally essential that the strength of our economic 
ties with Japan matches the overall strength of our relationship. During 
this year marking the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, we 
will highlight and heighten our close cooperation on regional and global 
issues--while continuing to press for greater access to Japanese 
markets. 
 
With China, we are pursuing constructive relations that are consistent 
with our global and regional interests. The President's strategy of 
comprehensive engagement is designed to address a broad agenda with 
Beijing and to maintain momentum in certain areas even as we face 
problems on other issues. We want China to be fully integrated into the 
international community. For that to happen, it must accept the 
obligations that come with membership in international institutions and 
adherence to international norms. 
 
We are encouraging China's participation in regional security and 
economic organizations. We are supporting its accession to the World 
Trade Organization on proper terms. We are seeking its full commitment 
to global non-proliferation regimes. And we are encouraging China to 
demonstrate greater respect for human rights--an interest that is 
clearly connected to the issue of intellectual property rights because 
both depend on the rule of law. 
 
The widespread pirating of computer software, videotapes, and compact 
discs in China is unacceptable to the United States and incompatible 
with China's responsibilities as an emerging economic power. The 
President has indicated his willingness to act. Let me add that every 
business leader I have heard from on this issue supports our course of 
action. And let me emphasize that China's leaders must understand that 
attracting foreign investment and sustaining long-term growth depend on 
their willingness to meet global standards in this key area.  
 
We are working to resolve our differences on this issue. But we are not 
overlooking the other commercial and overall strategic interests that we 
are pursuing with China. We will continue to pursue a strategy of 
comprehensive engagement where it is possible and where it is in our 
interest to do so--such as North Korea, Cambodia, and the control of 
narcotics. It will take time, but our goal remains to cultivate a broad 
and full relationship with a stable, open, and prosperous China that is 
a full and constructive member of the international community. 
 
The United States, of course, has an enormous stake in the outcome of 
Russia's continuing transformation. A stable, democratic Russia is vital 
to a secure Europe and a stable world. An unstable Russia that reverts 
to dictatorship or slides into chaos would be an immediate threat to its 
neighbors and once again a strategic threat to the United States. 
 
Like each of you, we have been deeply concerned about the conflict in 
Chechnya--about the tragic loss of life, the excessive and 
indiscriminate use of force against civilians, and the corrosive 
implications it has for Russia's democracy. That is why we have 
emphasized strongly to the Russian Government that the fighting must 
end--a point that President Clinton reiterated in a telephone call to 
President Yeltsin yesterday. A process of reconciliation must begin that 
validates Russia's commitment to democracy and takes into account the 
views of the people of Chechnya. 
 
Tragic as the situation in Chechnya is, it has not altered our 
fundamental interest in helping Russian reformers build a nation that is 
finally at peace with itself and its neighbors. We have undertaken a 
wide range of programs to advance democratic and economic reform in 
Russia. Our assistance supports programs ranging from Russia's vitally 
important and newly free press to jury trials to small business 
development. Most of the assistance has gone to private organizations 
and to local governments outside Moscow. Those funds that do go to the 
central government primarily support the institutional reforms necessary 
for democracy and market reform, such as election assistance, the 
drafting of commercial codes, and the setting up of privatization 
programs. And of our total request of $788 million to support reform in 
the former Soviet Union, more than half would go to states other than 
Russia. 
 
It is precisely because the future of reform in Russia is not assured 
that we have persevered in our support of the people and institutions 
struggling on its behalf. Cutting assistance now would hurt the friends 
of democracy in Russia--the very forces that have been most critical of 
the Chechnya operation. 
 
There are also many vital security issues on which we are working with 
Russia, such as Nunn-Lugar programs to secure dismantled warheads, arms 
reductions agreements, and cooperation on regional conflict. This aspect 
of our relationship has paid off for every American--from reducing the 
nuclear threat to advancing peace in the Middle East.  
 
Chechnya has raised questions about Russia's commitment to democratic 
processes, economic reform, and international standards of conduct. Our 
approach is designed to reinforce    democratic trends in Russia and to 
encourage the government in Moscow to pursue policies consistent with 
these principles. We will assess Russia's actions in Chechnya and its 
domestic programs and international initiatives in light of this 
objective, and we will adjust our policy accordingly. 
 
The third principle guiding our overall strategy is that if the historic 
movement toward open societies and open markets is to endure, we must 
adapt and revitalize the institutions of global and regional 
cooperation. After World War II, the generation of Truman, Marshall, 
Acheson, and Vandenberg built the great institutions that gave structure 
and strength to the common enterprise of Western democracies: promoting 
peace and economic growth. Now, as President Clinton said in his recent 
meeting with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, "We will consider how to 
move toward NATO's expansion to Europe's new democracies and how to 
adapt the international institutions to serve us for the next 50 years." 
 
At the President's initiative, we and our G-7 partners will chart a 
strategy in Halifax this June to adapt the post-war economic 
institutions to the more integrated post-Cold War world. We will assess 
what changes need to be made, and determine how to modernize these 
institutions for the future. We are also helping regional institutions 
and structures like the Organization of American States, ASEAN, and the 
Organization of African Unity support peace and democratic development. 
Our 1996 budget includes $934 million in contributions to the UN and to 
other international bodies, as well as $2.2 billion to the multilateral 
development banks. 
 
The fourth principle is the fundamental role that democracy and human 
rights have in this Administration's foreign policy. Our commitment is 
consistent with American ideals. It also rests on a sober assessment of 
our long-term interest in a world where stability is reinforced by 
accountability and disputes are mediated by dialogue; a world where 
information flows freely and the rule of law protects not only political 
rights but the essential elements of free market economies. 
 
Since my last appearance before this Committee, the State Department has 
issued its 19th annual report on human rights practices worldwide. The 
first reports were prepared under my direction in 1977 during my first 
year as Deputy Secretary of State. Those early reports were small in 
scale and narrow in scope compared to today's effort. The country 
reports help us to shape our diplomacy, assistance, and trade policy. We 
use them as we work with foreign governments, international 
organizations, and NGOs. They are also important in their own right, 
because they shine a bright light on human rights violations that might 
otherwise be shielded by a veil of secrecy and indifference.  
 
In FY 1996, we are requesting $480 million through the SEED program to 
maintain our assistance for democratic and economic reform in Central 
and Eastern Europe. These funds will support social sector reform in 
areas like health and housing. They will help build accountable, 
responsive public administration at the central and local levels. And 
they will promote small business development to spur job creation. 
 
Our budget requests $220 million for countries in transition such as 
Haiti, Cambodia, and Angola. In Haiti, our $90 million of continued 
support will help consolidate democracy and promote the economic 
development that will enable the majority of Haitians to overcome 
poverty and raise their living standards. Cambodia has struggled, so far 
with encouraging success, to overcome a tragic legacy of war, 
repression, and genocide. We have designated $39.5 million to support 
democratic and market reform, including the implementation of 
transparent legal and judicial reforms. Angola is trying to lift itself 
up from the bitter terrain of Africa's longest running conflict. Our $10 
million request can make a difference on behalf of democracy and 
stability. 
 
Approximately $18 million of the $220 million we request will go to 
other African countries in transition to support credible elections, 
respect for the rule of law, and good governance. And $33.5 million will 
support a wide variety of programs in Latin America and the Caribbean to 
promote and strengthen democratic institutions, local government, police 
training, the media, and grass-roots non-governmental organization 
development. 
 
Mr. Chairman, the Summit of the Americas demonstrated that this 
hemisphere has committed itself to democratic institutions, respect for 
human rights, and free markets. Only one country out of 35 was not 
invited to the Summit, the one country that rejects the shared goals of 
those who came to Miami in December. That country is Cuba. 
 
The fundamental goal of our Cuba policy is a peaceful transition to 
democracy, respect for the human rights of the Cuban people, and an open 
economy with opportunity for all. This Administration is committed to a 
vigorous pursuit of that objective. We believe the best means of 
achieving this goal is the course outlined by the Cuban Democracy Act. 
We believe the enforcement of the embargo, and the pressures it brings 
to bear on the regime in Havana, are hastening the day when democracy 
will return to Cuba. 
 
Opportunities for 1995 
 
As we are guided by these basic principles, I intend to focus in 1995 on 
five key areas that offer particularly significant opportunities: 
advancing the most open global trading system in history; developing a 
new European security order; helping achieve a comprehensive peace in 
the Middle East; combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction; 
and fighting international crime, narcotics, and terrorism.  
 
Open Trade, Exports, and Jobs 
 
First, we must sustain the momentum we have generated toward the 
increasingly open global and regional trading system that is vital to 
American exports and American jobs. A core premise of our domestic and 
foreign policy is that our economic strength at home and abroad are 
mutually reinforcing. I believe that history will judge this emphasis to 
be a distinctive imprint and a lasting legacy of the Clinton 
Administration. 
 
This year, we will take steps to implement the Uruguay Round and ensure 
that the new World Trade Organization upholds essential trade rules and 
disciplines. We will work with Japan and our other APEC partners to 
develop a blueprint for achieving open trade and investment in the Asia-
Pacific region. We will begin to implement the Summit of the Americas 
Action Plan. And last week, Ambassador Kantor announced that we will 
also begin to negotiate Chile's accession to NAFTA. 
 
At the same time, American companies and workers must be able to take 
advantage of the opportunities that these successful negotiations are 
helping to create. That is why this Administration is sparing no effort 
to make sure that our companies can compete on a level playing field. 
That is why I continue to sit behind what I call the America Desk at the 
State Department, and why I am determined to keep economic and 
commercial diplomacy at the core of the Department's work. 
 
Our embassies around the world are working harder than ever to help win 
contracts, safeguard investments, and support American firms in every 
way they can. This Administration has achieved an unprecedented degree 
of focus and coordination in our export promotion efforts. 
 
Exports have been the driving force in our economic recovery. They must 
remain the driving force for long-term growth. Over the past two years, 
our export promotion efforts have created more than 1 million high-
paying American jobs. This budget will help sustain that performance. 
 
In FY 1996, we are requesting $900 million to promote trade and 
investment opportunities for American businesses through programs run by 
the Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the 
Trade and Development Agency, and others. These programs produce 
concrete economic benefits for the American people. They also reinforce 
our other foreign policy goals. They strengthen free markets and 
modernize vital sectors in developing economies. They lift living 
standards and multiply future demand for American goods. And they 
contribute to stability in new democracies struggling to overcome 
legacies of repression and conflict.  
 
Let me add a word about an issue that has occupied the attention of the 
Administration and the Congress in recent weeks: the Mexican financial 
crisis. Two weeks ago, the President decided that the situation had to 
be addressed without further delay. With the support of the 
congressional leadership of both parties, he took decisive action to 
safeguard the prosperity of our people, the security of our borders, and 
the stability of our closest Latin neighbor and of other emerging 
markets in which we have a growing stake. 
 
In the long run, of course, stability in Mexico will depend on the 
Mexican Government's ability to consolidate economic and political 
reform. As you know, President Zedillo last week ordered the arrest of 
the leaders of the rebel movement in Chiapas. We recognize that the 
Mexican Government, indeed, all governments, have a responsibility to 
protect their citizens against violence and lawlessness. We are pleased 
to note that President Zedillo also called for a special session of the 
Mexican Congress to address the underlying problems in the region. The 
United States agrees with President Zedillo that, in his words, "a 
solution to this conflict should come through full respect for the law, 
through political channels, and through conciliation." 
 
European Security Architecture 
 
In our second area of opportunity, we are taking concrete steps to build 
a new European security architecture. Deep political, economic, and 
cultural bonds continue to make Europe's security and prosperity 
essential to ours. Our efforts will focus on maintaining strong 
relations with Western Europe, consolidating democracy in Central Europe 
and the former Soviet Union, and engaging Russia as a responsible 
partner. 
 
We are pursuing these goals through continued development of NATO and 
its outreach to the east, strengthening the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe, building our relationship with the European 
Union, and developing a cooperative NATO/Russia relationship in 
promoting European security. 
 
NATO remains the anchor of American engagement in Europe and the 
linchpin of transatlantic security. NATO has always been more than a 
transitory response to a temporary threat. It has been a guarantor of 
European democracy and a force for European stability. That is why its 
mission has endured, and why its benefits are so attractive to Europe's 
new democracies. 
 
NATO has previously welcomed new members who shared its purposes and who 
could add to its strength. With American leadership, NATO agreed last 
December to begin a steady, deliberate process that will lead to further 
expansion. We have already begun to examine with our Allies the process 
and objectives of expansion. We intend to share our conclusions with the 
members of the Partnership for Peace this fall so that at the December 
ministerial we can evaluate the results of our consultations and be 
ready to consider next steps.  
 
Our strategy encourages new democracies to become responsible partners 
in a new European security order. The Partnership for Peace is a 
critical tool for cooperation between NATO and the 24 partner states. It 
is also the best path to membership for countries wishing to join the 
alliance. The President's budget request meets the commitment he made in 
Warsaw last July to help the states of Central and Eastern Europe 
participate in the Partnership for Peace, and to help potential members 
prepare for the obligations they will assume if they join NATO. 
 
Our step-by-step approach to NATO expansion is designed to ensure that 
each potential member is judged fairly and individually, by its capacity 
to contribute to NATO's goals and the strength of its democratic 
institutions. By following this approach, we give every new democracy a 
powerful incentive to consolidate reform. We remain convinced that 
arbitrarily locking in advantages for certain countries, or setting 
specific timetables, could discourage reformers in countries not named 
and foster complacency in countries that are. 
 
The tragic war in Bosnia underscores the importance of building an 
effective new architecture for conflict prevention and resolution in 
Europe. Together with our partners in the Contact Group, we are seeking 
a negotiated solution. The Contact Group plan, with its 51/49 
territorial division, must be the basis for a settlement, and Bosnia's 
territorial integrity and independence must be respected. 
 
As you know, a cease-fire and formal cessation of hostilities have been 
achieved and are largely holding. We are taking advantage of this 
opportunity to intensify our diplomatic efforts to bring an end to the 
war. Last week in Munich, Defense Secretary Perry and Assistant 
Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke met with Bosnian Muslim and Croat 
leaders to bolster support for their planned confederation. 
 
Now we and our Contact Group partners are working intensively to bring 
the parties to the negotiating table. We believe the French proposal for 
a conference involving the Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian Presidents--if 
properly structured--could advance our overall goals for the former 
Yugoslavia, including political settlements in Bosnia and Croatia. We 
would want the conference to be held in the context of the Contact Group 
efforts. And we would not favor participation of the Bosnian Serbs until 
and unless they have accepted the Contact Group plan. Prior to holding 
any such conference, however, there should be a firm commitment to 
genuine mutual recognition among all the republics of the former 
Yugoslavia. 
 
I remain convinced that only a negotiated settlement has any chance of 
lasting. I am committed to pursuing that goal. What we must not do is 
make the situation worse by unilaterally lifting the arms embargo. We 
have always believed that the embargo is unfair and we have worked to 
end it multilaterally. But going it alone would lead to the withdrawal 
of UNPROFOR and an escalation of violence.  
 
Such a course would leave Sarajevo and the enclaves extremely vulnerable 
to Serb offensives. It would effectively Americanize the conflict, and 
lead others to abandon the sanctions on Serbia. It would undermine the 
authority of all UN Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 
that impose sanctions on Iraq and Libya. 
 
Middle East Peace and Security 
 
Our third area of opportunity is advancing peace in the Middle East. Our 
budget allocates $5.24 billion to sustain our efforts at a decisive 
moment for the peace process. Over the past few years, we have seen an 
extraordinary transformation in the landscape of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict--one of the century's most intractable. Clearly, however, there 
are still many horrible vestiges of the past that must be eradicated. 
The terrorist outrage in Israel on January 22 is a painful reminder of 
the challenges still to be overcome. 
 
Last Sunday, President Clinton convened an unprecedented meeting at 
Blair House, attended by ministers from Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the 
Palestinian Authority. At the end of the day, the parties produced two 
important documents. The first came out of my meeting with Israeli 
Foreign Minister Peres and Nabil Sha'th of the Palestinian Authority. In 
it, Israel and the Palestinians declared that there could be no turning 
back in the peace process. They vowed to press ahead. And the 
Palestinian Authority underscored its commitment to preempt terror, 
punish those responsible, and deny safehavens to those who plan and 
carry out terror. 
 
The second document was the Blair House Communique, reflecting the 
discussions of the full ministerial. The ministers identified a series 
of cooperative goals that must be met in four key areas: the peace 
process, security, economics, and people-to-people. The ministers 
directed their experts to work urgently on implementing their 
recommendations. 
 
For our part, President Clinton on Sunday proposed that the United 
States extend duty-free treatment to products from future industrial 
zones on the West Bank and Gaza and free trade zones in Taba, Eilat, and 
Aqaba. This proposal can probably do more over time to help the region's 
struggling economies than any aid program. We look forward to further 
consultations with the Congress on this important matter. 
 
The momentum for a comprehensive peace must be maintained. Israel's 
negotiations with Syria are entering a crucial phase. We have made 
progress in narrowing the gaps between the parties. But if a 
breakthrough is to be achieved in the next few months, critical 
decisions must be made and the process must be accelerated. President 
Clinton and I will do everything we can to support these efforts.  
 
Non-proliferation 
 
Our fourth area of emphasis is to intensify our efforts to stop the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. We 
face a year of decision for global non-proliferation. Indeed, our global 
and regional strategies for 1995 comprise the most ambitious non-
proliferation effort in history. We will carry out that effort in close 
consultation with the Congress. 
 
The centerpiece of our strategy is to obtain the indefinite and 
unconditional extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is up for 
renewal this year--and which I believe history will record as one of the 
most important treaties of all time. Achieving this objective is a key 
priority of our diplomacy around the world. 
 
With the agreements President Clinton signed last December in Budapest, 
we can also begin to implement the START I nuclear reduction treaty. 
Prompt ratification of START II will in turn enable us to complete the 
work we began with START I. Its elimination of missiles with multiple 
independently targeted re-entry vehicles will further enhance stability 
and lower the chances of a massive nuclear conflict. At the same time, 
it will enable us to retain a strong and capable deterrent. 
 
Mr. Chairman, North Korea is also central to our non-proliferation 
objectives. Let me emphasize today that we have stressed to the North 
Koreans the need to accept South Korean light-water reactors and to 
resume North-South dialogue. Both conditions are essential to full 
implementation of the Framework accord. We are holding talks with North 
Korea to ensure implementation of the Framework. 
 
We will also continue close consultations with our allies. I met last 
week with the new Foreign Minister of South Korea. He reaffirmed South 
Korea's determination to move forward with the accord. We agree that we 
must remain vigilant. But careful implementation of the Agreed Framework 
is far preferable to the alternatives we were facing: a North Korea 
going forward with its nuclear program, a return to the Security Council 
for sanctions, and a costly military build-up. 
 
Our 1996 budget dedicates $166 million to meet the threat posed by 
proliferation. It provides assistance to the International Atomic Energy 
Agency--an organization vital in our non-proliferation efforts and 
especially in the implementation of the Framework accord with North 
Korea. It supports the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, including 
funds for implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. And it 
replenishes the non-proliferation fund we use to combat nuclear 
smuggling, enforce export controls, and ensure missile dismantlement.  
 
Crime, Terrorism, and Drugs 
 
Our fifth area of opportunity for 1995 is combating international 
terrorists, criminals, and drug traffickers. This Administration is 
aggressively fighting these threats at home. But we recognize their 
global dimensions, and we are actively mobilizing other nations to help 
us defeat them. 
 
Altogether, our budget requests $240 million for these efforts. It more 
than doubles our funding to fight international crime. And it will 
support a comprehensive global strategy that we are developing with our 
colleagues at Justice, Treasury, and other law enforcement agencies. 
 
This strategy will include intensive diplomacy to ensure that other 
nations fulfill their international obligations; broader international 
cooperation in asset forfeiture and money laundering; and consideration 
of tougher requirements for obtaining U.S. visas. And, as the President 
announced last week, the Administration will be proposing legislation to 
combat alien smuggling and illegal immigration. We will be consulting 
closely with Congress as we put the final elements of this strategy 
together. 
 
The budget also supports our battle against international terrorism, in 
which we have made substantial progress in just the past few weeks. The 
President's executive order freezing the assets of certain terrorist 
groups and individuals in the United States sent a message that we 
intend to cut off the financial pipeline that supports their activity. 
The spectacular arrest of Ramzi Yousef, the alleged mastermind of the 
World Trade Center bombing, in Pakistan and his transfer to the United 
States reminds those who target Americans and America that they cannot 
escape forever the long arm of American law enforcement. Also last week, 
the President transmitted to the Congress our proposed Omnibus 
Counterterrorism Act of 1995, which, if enacted, will give the executive 
branch new tools to improve prevention, investigation, and prosecution 
of terrorism. 
 
I have described five key areas of opportunity for 1995. But I want to 
stress that we will continue to address many other issues important to 
our nation's interests and to this Congress, such as promoting stability 
and democracy in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. American engagement in 
the world is also reflected in our willingness to take on global 
challenges that call for international partnership, but require the 
leadership that only the United States can provide. 
 
We can no longer escape the consequences of environmental degradation, 
unsustainable population growth, and destabilizing poverty beyond our 
borders. Increasingly, they threaten not just our continued prosperity 
but our security. Countries with persistent poverty, worsening 
environmental conditions, and feeble social infrastructure are not just 
poor markets for our products. They are likely victims of conflicts and 
crises that can only be resolved by costly American intervention.  
 
That is why the Clinton Administration is dedicated to restoring 
America's leadership role on sustainable development--an approach that 
recognizes the links between economic, social, and environmental 
progress. We are putting this global challenge back where it belongs: in 
the mainstream of American foreign policy and diplomacy. The President's 
FY 1996 request includes $5.2 billion for promoting sustainable 
development. That includes funding for the multilateral development 
banks, the International Monetary Fund, the Peace Corps, and our 
bilateral and multilateral assistance programs. I believe strongly that 
every dollar of this money will yield lasting dividends for the American 
people. 
 
Supporting the developing world's efforts to promote economic growth and 
alleviate chronic conditions of poverty serves America's interests. 
Nearly $1.4 billion of this budget will fund through USAID and 
multilateral programs activities that will, among other things, promote 
economic growth and free-market economies; improve basic education; 
lessen the suffering and increase the survival of children; and treat 
and prevent HIV/AIDS. By helping nations to emerge from poverty, we can 
help them become stable pillars of regions at peace, and closer partners 
of ours in diplomacy and trade. 
 
Our FY 1996 request for stabilizing world population growth is designed 
to complement our efforts to promote economic development. To maintain 
the momentum of last September's Cairo Conference on Population and 
Development, we are requesting $635 million for bilateral and 
multilateral population programs. We also designate $378 million for 
USAID and multilateral programs to address global environmental problems 
like air and water pollution, decreased biodiversity, and damage to the 
ozone layer. 
 
The FY 1996 budget harnesses the will and capacity of our nation to 
respond to famine, natural disasters, and the displacement of peoples 
from their homes. The $1.7 billion we request for humanitarian 
assistance is integral to our overall development strategy because it 
not only provides relief, but helps victims of violence and disaster 
return to the path of recovery and sustainable development. Our budget 
also designates $283 million to support the Peace Corps and two other 
agencies that work at the grass-roots level: the Inter-American 
Foundation and the African Development Foundation. 
 
Our nation's ability to achieve success in the five areas of opportunity 
that I have identified for 1995, as well as the other objectives of our 
foreign policy, depends on the dedicated men and women who serve our 
nation's international affairs agencies. 
 
Our diplomats around the world serve as sentries for the American 
people. They confront short- and long-term threats to the security of 
our citizens. They protect Americans traveling abroad. And as I pointed 
out earlier, promoting the interests of American companies and workers 
is a central element of our foreign policy, and our posts around the 
world are on the front lines of that effort. 
 
It is essential that we arm our international affairs personnel with the 
skills and resources they need to do their jobs on behalf of our 
nation's vital interests. Like our soldiers, they must be equipped to 
fight for America's interests. They must have access to modern 
communications technology. They must work in facilities that help, not 
hinder, their productivity. And they must be trained in the diplomatic 
disciplines of the future, from commercial promotion to helping fight 
international crime, terrorism, and narcotics. 
 
Clearly, our long-term interests are ill-served by responding only to 
the crises of the day. The challenge of diplomacy is to anticipate, and 
to prevent, the crises of the future. If we are successful, we can 
dedicate greater resources to the urgent challenges of domestic renewal 
that the American people demand we meet. 
 
America today faces a challenge that recalls the opportunities and 
dangers that confronted us at the end of the First and Second World 
Wars. Then, as now, two distinct paths lay before us: either to claim 
victory and withdraw, or to provide American leadership to build a more 
peaceful, free, and prosperous world. After World War I, our leaders 
chose the first path, and we and the world paid a terrible price. No one 
will dispute that after the Second World War, our leaders, and most of 
all the American people, wisely chose the other path. 
 
Among the challenges that Truman, Marshall, Acheson, and their 
Democratic colleagues faced was to build a new post-war order in 
cooperation with a new Republican Congress. And to the lasting benefit 
of our nation and the world, they met that challenge. They found new 
allies among Republicans who recalled the consequences of isolationism 
after World War I--a period that also began with a Democratic President 
facing new Republican majorities in Congress. With congressional leaders 
such as Senator Arthur Vandenberg--a great chairman of this committee--
they forged the bipartisan consensus that delivered aid to Greece and 
Turkey, developed the Marshall Plan, devised the post-war institutions, 
and sustained American leadership ever since. 
 
Since my first week in office, I have consulted closely with both 
parties in Congress on every important issue on our agenda. We have 
gained bipartisan backing for key objectives of our foreign policy, 
including our approach on the Middle East peace process; our landmark 
trade agreements, such as NAFTA, GATT, and APEC; and denuclearization in 
the former Soviet Union. 
 
My discussions with you Mr. Chairman, the members of this committee, and 
the new Republican leadership give me great confidence that we will 
sustain the bipartisan foreign policy that is America's tradition. I 
look forward to continuing to work closely with you as we pursue 
America's interests.  
 
(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 3 
 
Opposition to the National Security And Revitalization Act, H.R. 872 
Secretary Christopher, Secretary of Defense William Perry 
Text of a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, 
Washington, DC, February 13, 1995 
 
Dear Mr. Speaker: 
 
This week the House of Representatives will consider legislation that 
would undermine this and every future President's ability to safeguard 
America's security and to command our armed forces. The National 
Security and Revitalization Act, or H.R. 872, is deeply flawed and, if 
adopted, would endanger national security. 
 
First, it would prematurely commit to deploy an expensive and uncertain 
national missile defense system at the expense of military readiness. 
Second, it would recklessly accelerate what is now a steady, deliberate 
and responsible process to enlarge NATO's membership. Third, H.R. 872 
would deal U.N. peacekeeping a lethal blow, forcing the United States to 
respond to crises alone or not at all. We are committed to working with 
Congress in a bipartisan fashion. If, however, H.R. 872 passes Congress 
in its current form, we have told the President we would recommend that 
he veto it. 
 
The most objectionable parts of the bill include the following: the 
findings are in a number of instances both inaccurate and injurious to 
the national security. In particular, we object to the characterization 
of the United States military as on the road to "hollow forces."  Such 
declarations are not only inaccurate but encourage our adversaries to 
make false calculations, and create doubts in the minds of our friends 
and allies. General Shalikashvili, the Service Chiefs and the U.S. 
Commanders-in-Chief in the field have all recently confirmed that our 
forces are at a high state of readiness today, and the proposed defense 
budget is sufficient to keep them there. 
 
The bill's first flaw is that it would force the United States onto a 
crash-schedule deployment of a National Missile Defense that is not 
justified by an existing threat. Such a deployment would divert billions 
of scarce defense dollars and resources from more pressing needs, 
particularly in the area of theater missile defense. 
 
We are building effective theater missile defense systems to protect 
U.S. forces abroad, our allies, and the ports and airfields we both use, 
from threats posed by rogue states such as North Korea, Iraq and Iran. 
While the continental United States does not foresee a ballistic missile 
attack from these states, we are not complacent toward this prospect. We 
are conducting a broad research and development program that will, in a 
few years, be able to deploy a national missile defense system whenever 
a threat emerges. 
 
Second, the bill would establish a commission that would unnecessarily 
duplicate work that already is done properly by the Department of 
Defense and Congress, that would infringe on the responsibilities of the 
President and the Secretary of Defense, and could disrupt the productive 
defense dialogue between the legislative and executive branches. 
 
Third, the bill imposes unnecessary, unsound and unconstitutional 
restrictions on the President's authority to place our troops under the 
operational control of another country--even a NATO ally--for U.N. 
operations. Our forces always remain under the command of the President, 
and we already apply the most rigorous standards when we pass even the 
most limited responsibility to a competent foreign commander. But the 
Commander-in-Chief must retain the flexibility to place troops 
temporarily under the operational control of officers of another nation 
when it serves our interests. By restricting that flexibility, H.R. 872 
would undercut our ability to get the international community to respond 
to threats. 
 
Fourth, H.R. 872 would effectively abrogate our treaty obligation to the 
U.N. to pay our share of the cost of U.N. peacekeeping operations which 
we have supported in the U.N. Security Council. The bill would require 
us to reduce our peacekeeping dues dollar-for-dollar by the costs of 
operations we conduct voluntarily and in support of U.S. interests. 
These operations include enforcement of the no-fly zone in Bosnia, 
sanctions enforcement against Serbia and Iraq--constraining their 
ability to threaten their neighbors--and humanitarian relief to Kurds in 
northern Iraq. 
 
If we deduct the cost of our voluntary actions against our U.N. dues, it 
would cancel our entire peacekeeping account. Other nations--Japan and 
our NATO allies--would surely follow. This would end U.N. peacekeeping 
overnight. The effect would be to eliminate peacekeepers from important 
potential flashpoints like the Golan Heights, the Iraq-Kuwait border, 
the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia and Cyprus. In short, this 
bill would eliminate an effective tool that every President from Harry 
Truman to George Bush has used to advance American interests. It would 
leave the President with an unacceptable choice whenever an emergency 
arose: act alone. 
 
Fifth, H.R. 872 impedes progress toward U.N. reform by imposing 
unworkable requirements upon the U.N.'s Inspector General, who has only 
been in office since November. Failure to meet these requirements would 
preclude any voluntary contributions for peacekeeping and force major 
withholding from our U.N. regular budget and assessed peacekeeping 
contributions. It would also bar payments to the U.N. unless the Defense 
Department has been reimbursed fully for prior actions. 
 
Sixth, H.R. 872 unilaterally and prematurely designates certain 
candidates for NATO membership. NATO should and will expand. But new 
members must be ready to undertake the obligations of membership just as 
we and our allies must be ready to extend our solemn commitments to 
them. Our present steady approach to NATO expansion is designed to 
ensure that each potential member is judged fairly and individually, and 
gives every new European democracy a strong incentive to consolidate 
reform. But if we arbitrarily lock in advantages now for some countries, 
we risk discouraging reformers in countries not named and fostering 
complacency in countries that are. Indeed, the effect of H.R. 872 could 
be to further instability in the very region whose security we seek to 
bolster. 
 
Effective American leadership abroad requires that we back our diplomacy 
with the credible threat of force. To this end, President Clinton is 
determined that the U.S. military will remain the most powerful fighting 
force in the world--as it certainly is now. 
 
When our vital interests are at stake, we must be prepared to act alone. 
And in fact, our willingness to do so is often the key to effective 
joint action. By mobilizing the support of other nations and leveraging 
our resources through alliances and institutions, we can achieve 
important objectives without asking American soldiers to bear all the 
risks, or American taxpayers to pay all the bills. That is a sensible 
bargain the American people support. 
 
This Administration has worked hard to improve our consultation with the 
Congress on every issue raised by H.R. 872. But in each case, what is at 
stake is fundamental: the authority of the President to protect our 
national security and to use every effective option at his disposal to 
advance the interests of the United States. In its present form, H.R. 
872 unwisely and unconstitutionally deprives the President of the 
authority he needs to make the right choices for our nation's security. 
 
 
Warren Christopher 
Secretary of State 
 
William J. Perry 
Secretary of Defense  
 
(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 4 
 
Supporting Democracy and Economic Reform in the New Independent States 
Deputy Secretary Talbott 
Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the Senate 
Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC, February 9, 1995 
 
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to have an opportunity to discuss with you 
and your colleagues one of the most important means we have to advance 
our national interest--our foreign assistance programs. On Monday, 
President Clinton submitted his 1996 budget to Congress. It is, as the 
President has said, a plan to reduce the deficit and cut taxes without 
undermining the ability of the Federal Government to meet its 
obligations to the American people. The Function 150 Account--the 
international affairs portion of the budget--totals $21.2 billion and 
represents about 1.3% of current Federal spending. That is how much we 
are asking the Congress to approve and the taxpayer to fund in order to 
assure that Americans live, travel, and trade in a safer, more stable, 
more prosperous world.  
 
With the end of the Cold War, we now face an extraordinary array of 
challenges, some of them familiar, many of them new. In the coming year, 
we will focus on five areas of opportunity. These are the consolidation 
of a liberal trading order and the opening of markets for American trade 
and investment; the building of a stable European security architecture; 
the quest for peace in the Middle East; the effort to stop the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and the fight against 
terrorism, crime, and narcotics trafficking.  
 
These goals are, if anything, more important today than ever before. Yet 
we are devoting less of our national treasure to their pursuit. Since 
1984, the international affairs budget has been reduced by 45% in real 
terms. As Secretary Christopher said on Monday, we believe the resources 
we are requesting for the Function 150 Account in fiscal year 1996 are 
the rock-bottom minimum that we need to maintain our commitments and to 
defend and advance our interests. If we cut further, we will be in real 
danger of hollowing out our foreign policy--of depriving ourselves of 
the means to meet the needs of the American people.  
 
Approving this budget will be a key test of our nation's willingness to 
dedicate the resources necessary to protect our security and promote our 
prosperity. It is also, as Secretary Christopher has noted, essentially 
a test of our commitment to lead. American engagement and leadership are 
an imperative. We live in a world that is more interdependent than ever 
before. Increasingly, for better or for worse, what happens beyond our 
borders can dramatically affect us here in the United States. The 
livelihood of our workers and farmers depends on their ability to 
compete in the global marketplace; the safety of our nation depends on 
keeping weapons of mass destruction from falling into the wrong hands; 
the lives of our children and grandchildren will be dramatically 
influenced by our efforts to promote sustainable development and combat 
threats to the environment; and our nation's security will be directly 
affected by the success--or failure--of democratic and economic reforms 
in that vast region of the world that was until recently the Soviet 
Empire. 
 
It is on that last subject, Mr. Chairman, that I would like to 
concentrate this morning. In this budget, we are asking for a total of 
$788 million to support political and economic reform in the 12 New 
Independent States of the former Soviet Union. Our NIS program is a 
dramatic illustration of the basic proposition with which I began this 
testimony: U.S. foreign assistance is rooted in American self-interest. 
Just as the Nunn-Lugar program is defense by other means, so, too, is 
the FREEDOM Support Act an investment in a safer future. It is an 
instrument for promoting those geopolitical and economic trends that 
will reinforce our nation's well-being.  
 
That concept of foreign assistance has been the premise of American 
programs for the former Soviet Union over the past four years, and it 
has enjoyed consistent bipartisan support from the Congress. The General 
Provisions of the 1992 FREEDOM Support Act identified a "historic 
opportunity for a transition to a peaceful and stable international 
order and the integration of the independent states of the former Soviet 
Union into the community of democratic nations." Our Administration's 
only amendment to that language in 1995 would be, "Now more than ever."  
 
Mr. Chairman, there is a struggle going on throughout the former 
U.S.S.R.--between forces of reform and those of regression, between the 
new and the old, and between various visions of the new, some hardly 
more savory than the old. We have a vital national interest in the 
outcome of that struggle, which is anything but foreordained. It is 
precisely because the outcome is not predetermined that we must try to 
affect the course of events in a way that is consistent with our 
interests and values. We can do that by training judges and lawyers in 
Saratov, or by helping a young businessman start a garment factory that 
employs 40 people in Podolsk, or by bringing Ukrainian parliamentarians 
here to the United States to see our political and economic systems in 
action.  
 
The principle of interdependence that is increasingly manifest globally 
is also at work regionally and nowhere more so than among the New 
Independent States. If, for instance, Ukraine successfully completes the 
transition from its communist past, other states in the region embarked 
on that same path--in Central Europe, in the Transcaucasus, in Russia, 
and elsewhere in the former Soviet Empire--are more likely to succeed. 
Conversely, if Ukraine slips backward or lurches into instability, it 
could drag much of the region with it.  
 
Similarly, the success or failure of Eduard Shevardnadze's heroic 
attempt to preside over the rebirth of Georgian nationhood and of 
Armenia's and Azerbaijan's attempt to find a way out of the war over 
Nagorno-Karabakh will have serious long-term consequences for all of 
their neighbors, including Russia, our NATO ally Turkey, and Iran.  
 
Then there is Russia itself. By far the largest and most powerful of the 
New Independent States, Russia has the most influence, good or bad, on 
its neighbors. The fate of reform in Russia will be a major factor in 
determining the fate of reform in neighboring states. All the states of 
that region recognize that basic fact of life and so must we. That is 
part of the reason why the situation in Chechnya is now so much on 
everyone's mind, not only in Washington, Tokyo, Ankara, and Bonn but 
also in Kiev, Tbilisi, Yerevan, and Tashkent. 
 
Chechnya is not only a combat zone but a humanitarian disaster area. 
While the fighting continues, the civilian population is deprived of 
basic human needs such as food, shelter, and medicine. The State 
Department is now responding to requests for emergency assistance by the 
international relief organizations in the area. We hope to provide up to 
$20 million in humanitarian and refugee assistance. We have already 
taken the lead by coordinating the delivery of close to $6 million in 
Department of Defense rations, clothing, and medical supplies. 
 
The catastrophe that the Russian Government has brought upon the people 
of Groznyy and the surrounding area is also a crisis for the Russian 
Federation as a whole. Chechnya is more than a place name hitherto 
exotic, now suddenly a household word every-where in reach of CNN--which 
is to say, everywhere, period. Chechnya has become, in a matter of two 
months, a universally recognized synonym for a threat to the survival of 
reform in Russia in which we Americans, along with all the peoples of 
the former U.S.S.R. and, indeed, the rest of the world have such a huge 
stake. Since it is precisely the cause of reform in Russia and the other 
NIS that our assistance programs are intended to support, I would like 
to discuss the implications of Chechnya before this subcommittee today. 
 
Let me begin by reviewing our policy. We support the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. It is our hope--which 
is to say we believe it is in our own nation's interest--that Russia 
evolves as a stable, prosperous democracy, secure in its current 
borders. We oppose attempts to alter international boundaries by force, 
whether in the form of aggression by one state against another or in the 
form of armed secessionist movements such as the one led by Dzhokhar 
Dudayev. That is why we have said from the beginning that we regard 
Chechnya as a matter which the Russian Government and the people of 
Chechnya will have to resolve together peacefully by political means. 
 
At the same time, our policy holds that Russia has an obligation to 
observe international standards in the way it deals with internal 
problems. In addition to the Helsinki Act and other general OSCE and UN 
commitments, we expect Russia to adhere to the Code of Conduct which was 
endorsed by all the heads of state, including President Yeltsin, at the 
December 1994 Budapest summit. This means that Russia has committed 
itself to cooperate in support of humanitarian assistance to alleviate 
suffering among civilian populations and to create conditions favorable 
to a political solution and the cessation of hostilities. 
 
Last fall, we repeatedly made the point that, although Chechnya is an 
integral part of the Russian Federation, Moscow should limit any use of 
force to a minimum, and respect human rights. As the fighting grew 
heavier, the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and 
Ambassador Pickering all reiterated that Moscow should seek a negotiated 
settlement and respect international commitments. We also repeatedly 
called for a halt to human rights violations by both sides and strongly 
supported the OSCE mission to Chechnya, including its call for a 
humanitarian cease-fire. 
 
Russia's leaders now face the daunting challenge of repairing the 
domestic and international damage it has sustained as a result of 
Chechnya. The episode has been a serious setback for the cause of reform 
throughout Russia. The Chechen campaign, far more protracted and bloody 
than expected, has shaken the faith of many Russians in their 
government. It has reduced President Yeltsin's base of approval and 
support to an all-time low. It has fed pessimism both inside Russia and 
abroad about whether Russia can stay the course of reform--whether it 
can avoid the dangers of disintegration on the one hand or a return to 
authoritarianism on the other. It has, literally and figuratively, 
broadcast to the world an image that conjures up the worst memories of 
Russia's past and clouds the best visions of its future. In short, 
Chechnya has raised questions, old and new, about where Russia is going 
and what kind of state it will be in the next century. 
 
Our Administration sees the seriousness of the current situation and the 
danger of what could happen as clearly as anyone. We believe that Russia 
must end the violence and killing, urgently seek a peaceful solution, 
and reach out for a reconciliation with the people of Chechnya. At the 
same time, we believe it is premature to interpret the debacle of 
Chechnya as the death of democracy, freedom, and reform all across 
Russia.  
 
While Chechnya has exposed shortcomings on the part of the Russian 
Government, it also has provided reminders of how much Russia on the 
whole has changed for the better. An active, highly critical press has 
accurately reported what is going on in Chechnya and has played a vital 
role in shaping public opinion. The Russian parliament has vigorously 
and openly debated what has happened and what is to be done. Critics of 
Kremlin policy have spoken out freely and often angrily and have 
traveled abroad to encourage international criticism of their 
government's behavior. Reformers, notably including ministers of the 
executive branch as well as deputies of the parliament, have pressed for 
a political solution to the crisis and have warned that the costs must 
not scuttle macroeconomic stabilization. Obviously, these groups have 
not yet been able to force the combatants to the peace table in 
Chechnya, but that seems to us to be all-the-more reason to step up our 
efforts to support them. As President Clinton said in Cleveland last 
month, "if the forces of reform are embattled, we must renew, not 
retreat from, our support for them." 
 
Russia in 1995 is a very different country from the Soviet Union of only 
a few years ago. Many--not all, but many--of those differences are 
welcome. They are welcome to the Russian people and to us. And they have 
come about because of the policies pursued, often in the face of 
ferocious opposition, by Boris Yeltsin, Victor Chernomyrdin, Anatoli 
Chubyas, and the other reformers. 
 
As President Yeltsin, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, and their colleagues 
make the hard choices about what to do next, they will give priority to 
keeping Russia together. It was the primacy of that objective that led 
them to risk the cost, and now pay the price, of the Chechen affair. But 
at the same time, we urge them to work for peace in Chechnya and to keep 
very much in mind three other, interrelated objectives--recovering the 
lost momentum for reform, rebuilding domestic support for their 
leadership, and restoring the confidence of the international community. 
Progress on these three fronts would restore credibility to what they 
had achieved before the Chechnya debacle--and what they, and other 
reformers, can achieve if they succeed in putting Chechnya behind them. 
They must convince the people of Russia and the international community 
that this dreadful episode is an exception rather than the rule, an 
aberration rather than part of a new pattern.  
 
Russian reform has survived earlier crises. In the spring of 1993, 
President Yeltsin faced down the Soviet-era parliament and won a 
national referendum on his leadership; in September, he suspended the 
parliament; in October, he ordered troops to attack the White House 
after supporters of mutinous deputies took to the streets with automatic 
weapons and rocket-propelled grenades. Two months later, Vladimir 
Zhirinovskiy and other opponents of reform made sweeping gains through 
the ballot box. At each of these moments, the forces of reform seemed 
threatened--and, some argued, beaten. But in each case, they rallied, 
survived, and pressed ahead. 
 
Chechnya is another test of the resilience of reform. But it is, in one 
sense, the most worrisome to date because it has called into question 
the intentions and direction of the Russian leadership itself.  
 
I use the word leadership advisedly--a collective noun, implying a wide-
-in fact, ever-widening--array of individuals. We must remember that 
Russia is no longer an autocracy. Its politics are open and pluralistic. 
Boris Yeltsin is Russia's only president and the first democratically 
elected one. But it is part of Yeltsin's achievement that he is now only 
one of many figures with whom we must--and do--engage.  
 
That being said, the question of the day is: What lessons will the 
Russian leadership learn from Chechnya? Will Russia's leaders uphold the 
rule of law and human rights or will they give priority to "order" and 
"security" in a fashion that ends up undermining both, as it did so 
spectacularly and fatally during the Soviet period of Russian history? 
Will they embrace the obligations that come with membership in the 
international community, or will they choose the path of self-enforced 
isolation and economic and political back- wardness?  
 
This is not a new question. President Clinton posed it starkly when he 
visited Moscow and participated in a televised, nationwide town meeting 
just over a year ago, in January 1994. He asked the Russian people: "How 
will you define your role in the world as a great power? Will you define 
it in yesterday's terms, or tomorrow's?" 
 
Now, as before, we know what choices we want Russia to make and what 
kind of state we want it to be. We want Russia to be a strong democracy; 
we want it to be observant of its own constitution; respectful of the 
human and civil rights of its own citizens; secure in its current 
borders while being a good neighbor to the other states in the region; 
integrated into the economic and political life of the rest of the 
planet. These, of course, are not just our aspirations for Russia--they 
are also the wishes of the great majority of the people of Russia. They 
are also the aspiration of the 100 million citizens of the 11 non-
Russian New Independent States. So let me turn now to our assistance 
program as an instrument for increasing the chances that Russia will 
continue to move in that direction.  
 
Because Russian reform is as diverse and decentralized as Russia itself 
is vast, U.S. assistance programs have been designed to support reform 
wherever we find it, within government or--much more often--outside of 
it. The same principle applies to the other NIS. There, as in Russia, we 
are looking for partners in the private and non-governmental sectors, 
outside the capitals, at the grass-roots level. More than two-thirds of 
FREEDOM Support assistance has gone to entities other than central 
governments, and over three-quarters has gone to support programs 
outside of national capitals. The FREEDOM Support funds that do go to 
central governments in the NIS go primarily to support the institutional 
reforms that directly promote democracy and market reform, such as 
election assistance, the drafting of commercial codes, and the setting 
up of privatization programs.  In keeping with a strategy we have had in 
mind for two years, we are steadily shifting the emphasis to the non-
Russian NIS. Russian reform was at a crossroads as we prepared the FY 
1994 budget. Our program that year was designed to jump-start real 
reform, demonstrate U.S. leadership, and leverage additional assistance 
from our G-7 partners and the international financial community. This is 
why, in FY 1994, the non-Russian NIS received only about one-third of 
FREEDOM Support funds. In FY 1995, they received over one-half. For FY 
1996, we have targeted a full two-thirds of FREEDOM Support funds for 
these 11 states. This means that in FY 1995 and 1996, six New 
Independent States--Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and 
Kyrgyzstan--will receive higher FREEDOM Support Act assistance per 
capita than Russia. 
 
We also need to keep in mind that no assistance program should go on 
forever. In foreign aid, as in international peace-keeping, we need an 
exit strategy. In the case of the NIS, we have plans to end most 
assistance by the end of this decade. For example, the Russian program 
identifies 1998 as the last year for new obligations.  
 
We plan to distribute FY 1996 FREEDOM Support Act funds to each New 
Independent State in accordance with the three-phase strategy which 
makes our tight timetables possible. In the first phase, we concentrated 
on humanitarian aid, to cushion the initial shock of a transition to a 
market economy; then came technical and economic assistance, to support 
fundamental economic and political reforms; and finally, support for the 
private sector trade and investment that will enable those reforms to 
endure. By the dawn of the new century, we expect that such private 
sector trade and investment will be the normal basis for U.S. economic 
relations with all or most of the New Independent States.  
 
In 1992 and 1993, most of our resources went for emergency food, fuel, 
and medicine, both through government-to-government programs and through 
private voluntary organizations. Thanks to these efforts, millions have 
been fed, millions have kept warm, and millions have been provided with 
essential medical services. Armenia, which of all the NIS has received 
by far the most per capita assistance so far, has received the bulk of 
its aid in this form.  
 
As economies have stabilized in many NIS states, humanitarian aid has 
become less necessary. However, our FY 1996 request reflects the fact 
that such assistance will remain essential in Armenia, Georgia, and 
Tajikistan.  
 
When countries demonstrate a political commitment to pursue democracy 
and open markets, then we should be ready to help by providing 
substantial training and know-how and modest amounts of capital. Here, 
our partners number in the thousands rather than in the millions, but 
they are the reformers and decision-makers who make the laws and 
policies and provide the examples for the millions. 
 
With the help of FREEDOM Support Act programs, most of the countries in 
the NIS already have been successful in creating the fundamental 
building blocks of democracy and economic opportunity--national 
constitutions, political parties, systems of fair and free elections, 
and private ownership. In this regard, it is hard to overestimate the 
significance of last year's elections in Ukraine and Belarus, which led 
to a peaceful and    orderly transfer of power in both countries and to 
new and substantial commitments toward economic reform. 
 
But, as I said earlier, our primary emphasis always has been on programs 
that strengthen democracy at the grass-roots level, such as independent 
media and legal institutions. And of course, we must continue to 
facilitate market reforms and encourage the start of new businesses when 
and where the opportunity arises, not just at the national but also at 
the regional and local levels.  
 
Let me address each of these needs--for the press, for the courts, and 
for markets--in turn. 
 
Freedom of the Press And Independent Media 
 
FREEDOM Support Act funds support the development of a free and 
independent media throughout the NIS. One prominent example is our 
support for Internews, an American NGO which takes local news stories 
from independent television stations across the region, edits them, and 
then provides a weekly uncensored news program called "Local Time."   
The viewership of "Local Time" has risen as the number of independent 
television stations in the region has increased. For instance, in 1992, 
there were six independent television stations in Russia; in 1993, there 
were 20; by the end of 1994, there were over 40 such stations, creating 
a combined potential audience for "Local Time" of over 100 million 
people. In Ukraine, Internews has helped create a network of independent 
stations that has a wider viewership than Ukrainian state television. 
 
We are already beginning to see payoffs for our support for independent 
media. The war in Chechnya has underscored the importance of free press. 
On this and other important public policy issues, programs such as 
"Local Time" and other independent media are dramatically widening the 
scope of public debate.  
 
This year, we will begin a program that will expand our support for 
independent media by creating partner- ships between NIS and American 
media outlets. These partnerships will provide much-needed training, 
and, most importantly, they will help ensure that these fledgling 
independent media become self-sustaining. 
 
Jury Trials 
 
Early on, we recognized that the revival of the jury trial in Russia, 
where it had been missing since 1917, would be one of the most important 
factors in the emergence of the rule of law in that country. To that 
end, FREEDOM Support programs have been training judges, prosecutors, 
defense lawyers, and jurors, as well as providing transcription machines 
and other kinds of courtroom technology. One Russian judge who came to 
Drake University in Iowa on an exchange program commented that "for the 
first time in my life, I was able to see how a jury trial works and it 
was not just from an American movie." 
 
The first jury trial was held in Saratov in December 1993; they have now 
taken hold in nine Russian regions. We have just received word that four 
new regions have, on their own initiative, decided to join our jury 
trial program--a good sign that this reform has great potential 
throughout the region. With continued support, we can expect it to 
become more and more commonplace for Russian juries to stand up to the 
power of state prosecutors and to acquit defendants against whom the 
state has failed to present convincing evidence. 
 
Economic Reform 
 
Privatization has been and will continue to be the necessary first step 
for economic reform in the region. U.S. assistance goals here are 
ambitious but finite--to help dismantle the edifice of state-owned 
enterprises that survives as one of the principal legacies of communism 
and replace it with the institutions of market democracy. 
 
After three years of FREEDOM Support programs, this goal is now within 
reach in several of the New Independent States. Russia already has 
privatized nearly 100,000 businesses representing 70% of Russian 
industry and 40% of the Russian workforce. Over 30% of Russian 
households now occupy homes they own themselves. Russian privatization 
officials have told Administration officials--and visiting Congressional 
delegations--that U.S. support has been the most responsive and 
effective of any international donor.  
 
In FY 1994 and earlier years, our technical assistance programs focused 
disproportionate resources on the four New Independent States that made 
the earliest commitments to both political and economic reform--Russia, 
the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, and Kazakhstan. But starting in FY 1995 
and continuing in FY 1996, we are directing increased resources for the 
"second wave" of states that are now moving along the reform path--
Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, and Belarus. After years of delay and decay, 
the governments of these states are taking important steps toward 
democracy and markets, and the United States has moved swiftly to lead 
the international response to those efforts. 
 
We are continuing to encourage the states that have been hesitant, such 
as Uzbekistan, to move in this direction as well. 
 
Following Ukrainian President Kuchma's bold decision this fall to 
undertake a comprehensive economic reform program, we moved quickly to 
support him. Key to Ukraine's ability to secure financing for its 
economic program from the international financial institutions was the 
additional $200 million of support that President Clinton committed at 
the summit in November. That support included a $72-million energy 
sector grant that covered both balance-of-payments assistance and 
specific energy sector reforms. The energy sector grant was truly 
unprecedented--we have provided this kind of direct financial support to 
a central government neither in Russia nor any of the other New 
Independent States. Along with this assistance for macroeconomic 
stabilization, we are providing key support for a massive privatization 
program--with assistance from USAID, Ukraine plans to auction 8,000 
state-owned firms over the next two years, about 75% of Ukrainian 
industry. 
 
Our experiences to date show that privatization produces both economic 
and political benefits. For example, as soon as the Vladimir Tractor 
Factory was privatized, the new stockholders, many of whom were workers 
in the factory, got to choose the CEO. The two contenders were the old 
Soviet-era manager and a younger deputy who had received an MBA in the 
United States. The young MBA told the stockholder/workers the true 
condition of the plant and what would be necessary to make it 
profitable. The old manager promised job guarantees. In that first 
election, the Soviet-style bureaucrat won. But less than a year later, 
it became clear that the old way of doing business was failing, and 
another election was held. This time, the young reformer won. 
 
Of course, privatization is only a part of the reform story. Over the 
long run, economic growth will depend primarily on successful new 
businesses, large and small, sprouting up all over the former Soviet 
Union. Here, too, the United States is playing an important role through 
our training and exchange programs. Iowa farmers have taken their know-
how to their Ukrainian counterparts, Uzbek students are studying 
business administration in Kansas, and retired American executives are 
sharing their expertise in the Kyrgyz Republic. A young man from 
Yakutsk, whom we brought to Anchorage, Alaska for training, became 
fascinated with the convenience store concept and returned home to open 
a 24-hour store, fully stocked with American goods and American-style 
services. Farmers from Arizona have assisted in the start-up of a 
chicken hatchery in Sakhalin oblast using higher hatch-rate American 
eggs, thus providing competition to the two state-owned firms that had 
previously dominated the local Russian market. 
 
As economic stability takes hold under the conditions of markets and 
democracy, our support will be mostly directed toward the private sector 
trade and investment that provides    the foundation for normal economic 
relations. Using funds both from the FREEDOM Support Act and their own 
appropriations, OPIC, TDA, and the Export-Import Bank are responding to 
increasing numbers of project proposals from firms, which reflect the 
budding market environment in the region. In 1994, Russian-American 
ventures were the primary beneficiaries of our trade and investment 
assistance, given the continuing progress of reform in Russia. But 
Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and others should receive increased support as 
reform in these countries proceeds and the climate for doing business 
improves. 
 
Joint ventures with American companies are already having a dramatic 
ripple effect on the structure of the Russian economy and are producing 
high-wage jobs here in America. For example: 
 
-- We helped TPC/Giant open two large retail food stores in Vladivostok 
and Nakhodka. The company has contracted for produce from local green- 
houses and other farm producers, introduced sweet corn to Russian 
consumers, trained the directors and 400 staff of the two stores in 
business and computer operations, and is generating exports of U.S. 
equipment and food products to Russia. 
 
-- With our help, Ben & Jerry's Ice Cream, headquartered in Vermont, has 
set up a joint venture to manufacture and distribute their products all 
across Russia. The plant is in Karelia, and they plan to open retail 
stores in several cities. 
 
Our business intern program, which enables Russian scientists and 
business managers to train in U.S. workplaces, has resulted in a number 
of such productive joint ventures: 
 
-- A Wisconsin cattle-breeding firm formed a joint-venture with its 
trainee and is now selling beef to McDonalds in Moscow. 
 
-- An Illinois aerospace company established long-term supplier 
relationships with former trainees and their firms in Russia. 
 
-- A New Jersey housing construction firm got established in Russia 
through the efforts of its trainee upon his return from training. 
 
-- Following his training with a Houston oil-drilling equipment firm, a 
Russian trainee gave briefings to 26 Russian oil executives on drilling 
techniques; as a result, the Houston company was able to make several 
mud-drilling technology sales to enterprises in Russia and the other 
NIS. 
 
As these training programs and other exchange programs have become 
firmly established, we have been able to increase the number of 
individuals participating without sacrificing quality. Almost 12,000 
people from the NIS came here on such training and exchange programs in 
1994, up from 5,400 in 1993. Ten thousand more are projected to come 
this year, meaning that by the end of 1995 we easily will have matched 
the 24,000 Europeans that the Marshall Plan brought over on exchanges 
after World War II. 
 
As I stated earlier, the FREEDOM Support Act is transitional by design. 
But it would be a mistake of historic proportions to abandon our efforts 
prematurely. As Secretary Christopher put it in his recent Kennedy 
School address: 
 
America stands at the threshold of a new century and faces a challenge 
that recalls the opportunities and dangers that we confronted at the end 
of the First and Second World Wars. Then, as now, two paths lay before 
us: to claim victory and withdraw, or to provide American leadership to 
build a more peaceful, free, and prosperous world. 
 
It is for that reason that President Clinton has reaffirmed his 
determination to maintain our substantial assistance for democratic and 
economic reform in the New Independent States, and that is why that 
assistance merits the continued support of Congress.  
 
(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 5 
 
Advancing American Interests Through the United Nations 
Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations 
Statement before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human 
Rights of the House International Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 
February 8, 1995. 
 
Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee.  I am pleased 
to be here to discuss with you the Administration's policy of advancing 
American interests through our participation and leadership at the 
United Nations. I also want to thank you for your willingness to 
accommodate my schedule by moving the hearing up. This will allow me to 
be in New York for Security Council action this afternoon on Angola. 
 
As arranged, the Administration's testimony will be in two parts. I will 
bring you up to date on key issues before the Security Council. My 
colleague, Doug Bennet, Assistant Secretary of State for International 
Organization Affairs, will present and respond to questions concerning 
the Administration's fiscal year 1996 budget request. 
 
In the interests of time, I will not repeat the points I made during my 
testimony before a closed session of the full committee on January 20. I 
have, however, appended to my statement today a copy of my opening 
remarks from that session [see p. 127], and I would be grateful if those 
remarks were included in the record of today's hearing. They provide a 
useful context for understanding the turbulent world within which we 
operate and use our participation and leadership at the UN on America's 
behalf. 
 
With respect to H.R. 7, I will observe simply that the version approved 
by the committee remains fatally flawed. It would infringe seriously 
upon the constitutional powers of the presidency, and it would harm 
American interests and endanger world peace by removing UN peace-keeping 
as an option for responding to international conflicts and crises. We 
urge its defeat. 
 
Angola 
 
One of the reasons that we oppose H.R. 7 so strongly is that it would 
preclude the UN from responding in the future to situations such as that 
which we now see in Angola, the topic to which I will now turn. 
 
U.S. interests would be well served by an end to the civil war in Angola 
and a transition to a stable and democratic system of government. Angola 
is a nation rich with minerals, including oil; it has enormous untapped 
economic potential. An end to the violence would reduce also the immense 
humanitarian costs, which now amount to more than $90 million for the 
United States alone. 
 
As Chairman Gilman pointed out in his letter to the President last 
December, the effort to achieve an enduring peace in Angola is making 
progress,  but remains fragile. The deployment of additional UN 
observers to monitor the cease-fire and authorization for an effective 
peace-keeping force to implement fully the Lusaka accords could create 
the confidence and momentum necessary to achieve peace. 
 
In accordance with the President's policy on peace operations, we have 
been working to see that questions of cost, risk, mandate, scope, and 
duration of mission are addressed satisfactorily before a full-scale 
peace-keeping force is deployed. We have been pressing hard for a 
commitment from the parties to underwrite a portion of the costs of the 
operation. And we have sought to structure the mission's mandate in a 
way that will give both sides a strong incentive to live up to the 
agreements they have made. 
 
Under the resolution we expect to vote on this afternoon, advance 
elements of the peace-keeping force will deploy immediately to complete 
logistical preparations. The decision to deploy infantry units--bringing 
the force eventually to as many as 7,000--will be made only after the 
Secretary General has reported that the cease-fire is holding, that the 
parties have provided all relevant military data, and that UNITA forces 
are ready to move into the quartering areas prepared for them. This 
arrangement will test whether the parties are, indeed, committed to 
peace. If they are, the UN force will allow the process of 
demobilization and reconciliation to go forward more smoothly and with 
greater confidence than would otherwise be the case. 
 
Former Yugoslavia 
 
With the winding down of missions in Somalia and Mozambique, UNPROFOR--
the UN Protection Force in the Former Yugoslavia--accounts now for more 
than half of the troops and costs associated with UN peace operations. 
It is a central preoccupation of the Security Council and a matter of 
ongoing concern to the United States. 
 
Earlier this year, President Tudjman of Croatia notified the Council of 
his intention not to support the renewal of UNPROFOR's mandate in 
Croatia. Although we understand Croat frustration with the stalemate 
that has developed between the government and Croat-Serb forces, we are 
concerned that the withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops could result in a 
renewed outbreak of hostilities and lead to wider war. 
 
We believe also that UNPROFOR has a number of important missions in 
Croatia. It serves, for example, as the headquarters for UNPROFOR 
throughout the former Yugoslavia and has been helpful in facilitating 
the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Bosnia, especially Bihac and 
Banja Luka. 
 
In the days ahead, we will be working with other Council members, with 
our allies, and with the Governments of Bosnia and Croatia to re-
establish momentum toward peace. These efforts will focus not only on 
the issue of the future of UNPROFOR in Croatia, but also on the 
opportunities presented by the current reduction in hostilities. 
 
We believe it is particularly important, for example, to solidify the 
relationship between the Bosnian Government and the Bosnian Croats. Last 
Sunday, we hosted a meeting in Munich to agree on the implementation of 
the federation principles signed in Washington last March. We were 
pleased that the parties agreed to work cooperatively to resolve 
disputes through binding arbitration, if necessary, and to form a 
standing commission in Sarajevo. The federation, which will govern the 
non-Serb parts of Bosnia in a final peace settlement, offers the best 
hope for the survival of a viable and democratic multi-ethnic state. 
 
The attitude of the Belgrade authorities will be important to any of our 
efforts. We view seriously reported sightings by UNPROFOR personnel this 
past week of helicopters flying in the area of Srebrenica. This--
combined with the Serb decision to deny UNPROFOR access to radar screens 
that might have allowed such flights to be tracked--raises new questions 
about whether Belgrade's promise to close its border with Bosnia in 
return for limited sanctions relief is being kept. Under the arrangement 
approved by the Security Council, the authorities in Belgrade must 
facilitate the work of the international monitors--including in this 
instance by permitting a thorough investigation of the helicopter 
incident--and they must punish any individuals found responsible for 
smuggling. 
 
Haiti 
 
In Haiti, we have reached an important milestone. On January 30, the 
Security Council voted to recruit and deploy up to 6,000 military and 
900 civilian police by the end of March. The UN Mission in Haiti will: 
 
--  Replace the American-led multinational force; 
 
--  Work with Haiti's Government and other donors to train a new 
civilian police force; 
 
--  Help maintain a secure and stable environment conducive to free and 
fair elections; and 
 
--  Complete its assigned tasks by February 1996. 
 
We have worked hard with the UN to ensure a seamless transfer of 
responsibility. More than half of the military personnel and about one-
third of the civilians in the UN mission will be veterans of the 
multinational force. Overall, there will be no dramatic alteration in 
mission size, troop capabilities, or quality of command. The UN troops 
will have the right to use force to defend themselves, including the 
right to oppose forcible attempts to impede the discharge of their 
functions. 
 
I want to stress that, just as the U.S. benefited from Security Council 
support during the Persian Gulf war, so we have been helped by the 
Council's backing in Haiti. The key Council resolutions have helped us 
to gain the participation of other countries in the multinational force, 
to achieve broader diplomatic support, and to plan for a transfer to a 
UN operation that will cost us far less and require fewer U.S. troops 
than if we had to continue on our own. 
 
Rwanda 
 
The situation in Rwanda remains extremely fragile. UN member states have 
not been willing to contribute significant numbers of troops for the 
dangerous task of providing security in refugee camps. As an 
alternative, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees is proceeding with a 
plan to train 1,500 Zairian soldiers to guard the camps under the 
supervision of private contractors. If this effort should prove 
insufficient, the resumption of fighting between Rwandan Government 
forces and extremist Hutu militia is a clear possibility. If that 
occurs, the violence could explode into a regionwide struggle for ethnic 
supremacy that would engulf neighboring Burundi as well. 
 
Although a larger UN peace-keeping force is not an alternative at the 
moment, efforts continue to address the ongoing humanitarian crisis and 
to help the Rwandan Government establish conditions under which the 
secure repatriation of refugees can occur. 
 
War Crimes Tribunal 
 
Finally, I want to bring you up to date on our effort to sustain support 
for the war crimes tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Last 
week's visit to Washington by Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic 
served as a reminder: The investigation and prosecution of war crimes is 
a responsibility of the entire international community and a test of our 
own commitment to the values of human dignity and law. 
 
Investigations in Rwanda have already gathered important information for 
the prosecutor, who will open his Kigali office in the next few weeks. 
The Yugoslav Tribunal is working at full speed and expects a number of 
additional indictments soon. We are impressed with the work of Chief 
Prosecutor Richard Goldstone and his staff and support them in their 
efforts to pursue as comprehensive a range of investigations as 
possible. 
 
To date, we have contributed $3 million voluntarily to the Yugoslav 
Tribunal, and--at our expense--made available more than 20 prosecutors, 
investigators, and other experts to assist at the prosecutor's office. 
We will be making a substantial contribution of money and personnel to 
the Rwanda Tribunal, as well. Already, we have notified you of our 
intention to contribute $1 million. The nature and scope of additional 
help will be worked out as the tribunal's precise needs become clear. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Mr. Chairman, America's continued participation and leadership at the UN 
serves our interests and is essential    to the very causes for which so 
much blood and treasure was sacrificed during the Cold War: to maintain 
peace, defend freedom, respect human dignity, and ensure that those who 
run roughshod over the law pay a price for their transgressions. 
 
These efforts do not in any way hamper our ability to take unilateral 
action in defense of America's core interests. Rather, in this 
interdependent world, multilateral approaches are a necessary means of 
supplementing what we can accomplish on our own. 
 
I want to thank you once again for the opportunity to testify here this 
morning. I look forward to working with you in the months ahead, and I 
would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have. 
 
Opening statement before the House International Relations Committee, 
Washington, DC, January 20, 1995. 
 
Good morning. I want to begin by thanking Chairman Gilman for the 
opportunity to meet with you informally today. Next week, Secretary 
Christopher will testify concerning our overall foreign policy 
priorities and goals. I will restrict my remarks to international peace-
keeping within the overall context of protecting and advancing American 
interests around the world and talk briefly about where we now stand on 
UN reform. I will also have some observations to make about legislation 
now pending before the committee. 
 
Let me stress at the outset that my job is to further American interests 
through our participation and leadership at the United Nations. That we 
have interests there in this age of turmoil and interdependence is 
evident in the range of issues dealt with there--from the proliferation 
of nuclear arms to the containment of destabilizing conflict, to human 
rights, to the prosecution of war crimes, to emergency humanitarian 
relief. Our goal is a United Nations that contributes to the solution of 
problems before they grow and endanger our security or economic well-
being. 
 
The Cold War is over, and the Soviet empire is gone. But today's 
uncertain environment still presents threats to our security. These 
include: 
 
--  The possibility that weapons of mass destruction will fall into the 
wrong hands; 
 
--  Attempts by regional powers hostile to U.S. interests to dominate 
their respective regions through aggression, intimidation, or terror; 
 
--  Ethnic or other conflicts that undermine stability, impede 
democratic reform, and stifle economic growth; and 
 
--  Transnational criminal enterprises, which thrive where national 
governments are either weak or complicit. 
 
As a global power, we use our armed forces to protect our interests and 
advance our foreign policy around the world. One of the principal 
challenges we face in this new era is deciding where, when, and under 
what conditions it will be necessary to deploy those forces. We have 
identified three basic categories of cases. 
 
The first is when our vital interests are endangered--our territory, 
citizens, allies, or economic health. We will do then whatever is 
necessary, including--when required--the unilateral and decisive use of 
military power. 
 
The second category involves cases in which important, but not vital, 
U.S. interests are threatened or where inattention could endanger vital 
interests not now at immediate risk. Here, we would consider the use of 
force to advance U.S. interests if we felt that we could do so 
successfully; if the costs and risks were commensurate with the 
interests at stake; and if other means would not succeed. 
 
The third category involves primarily humanitarian interests. Generally, 
the military is not the best tool to address humanitarian concerns. But 
under certain conditions, where the need is urgent and only a military 
response will be effective, the use of our armed forces may be 
appropriate. 
 
Contingency Operations 
 
The term "contingency operations" refers to deployments of American 
forces in the second or third category of cases; that is, situations 
where American interests of important, but not vital, concern are at 
stake. In these cases, we will want to use force selectively and in a 
manner that is proportional to our interests. 
 
Today, most of the U.S. troops deployed on contingency operations   are 
working unilaterally, or as part of ad hoc coalition or alliance, to 
deter or isolate potential aggressors. For example: 
 
--  15,000 U.S. military personnel are enforcing no-fly zones over Iraq 
and policing the economic embargo against that country; 
 
--  1,400 participate in Operation Provide Comfort, which assists the 
Kurdish minority in northern Iraq; and 
 
--  5,800 are involved in the enforcement of the Bosnian no-fly zone and 
sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro.  
 
In addition: 
 
--  5,700 Americans are in Haiti, as part of the multinational force 
that restored democracy and ended the humanitarian crisis in that 
country; 
 
--  984 participate in a multinational observer force in the Sinai, to 
monitor compliance with the Camp David accords; and 
 
--  700 are involved in the airlift of humanitarian supplies to 
civilians in Bosnia. 
 
During 1994, U.S. forces also participated in operations to intercept 
tens of thousands of individuals seeking to enter America illegally by 
sea and to save Rwandan refugees. 
 
The majority of current deployments are not new but, rather, date back 
several years. Cumulatively, they amount to only a tiny fraction of what 
our armed forces do, but they yield large dividends by deterring 
aggressive behavior, attaching a price to lawlessness, addressing urgent 
humanitarian needs, and promoting democratic values in areas of 
substantial strategic concern to the United States. 
 
UN Peace Operations and U.S. Interests 
 
UN peace operations, which may or may not include Americans, can also 
serve our interests. In fact, the more able the UN is to contain or end 
conflict, the less likely it is that we will have to deploy our own 
armed forces. 
 
Administrations from both parties have long looked upon UN peace 
operations as a means for gaining international participation, 
financing, and backing for objectives we support. Today, of the more 
than 67,000 UN peacekeepers deployed in 17 missions, less than 2% are 
American. Yet, each operation is serving a purpose or purposes of 
interest to the United States. For example: 
 
On the Golan Heights, more than 1,000 UN troops ensure the observance of 
a cease-fire between Israel and Syria, keeping open the possibility for 
a breakthrough in Middle East peace negotiations. 
 
Along the Iraq-Kuwait border, a 1,200-person observer mission--financed 
largely by Kuwait--monitors Iraqi troop movements, demonstrating the 
world's continued resolve against the expansionist ambitions of Saddam 
Hussein. 
 
In Cyprus, 1,200 UN troops--financed partly by Cyprus and Greece--have 
prevented a flareup of violence between two key NATO allies and provide 
insurance against the spread of tensions across the Aegean. 
 
On the tense border between India and Pakistan, UN troops monitor a 
cease-fire between two regional rivals presumed to have nuclear weapons. 
 
In Haiti, a U.S.-led operation has helped to restore democratic 
processes to an impoverished nation close to our shores, has stemmed a 
tide of refugees to the U.S., and has helped to alleviate human rights 
abuses and suffering. When this operation is turned over to the UN later 
this spring, the number of U.S. troops participating--and the U.S. share 
of costs--will be reduced by more than half. 
 
In Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, UN forces-- 
including almost 800 Americans--are helping to prevent a wider Balkan 
war. 
 
In Bosnia, the UN has worked in a sometimes uneasy partnership with NATO 
to restore a semblance of normal life to Sarajevo, prevent mass 
slaughter in "safe areas," and maintain a humanitarian lifeline that has 
kept hundreds of thousands alive, despite bitter fighting. These 
efforts, which have been welcomed by the Bosnian Government, have helped 
preserve the possibility for a negotiated end to the fighting. 
 
In El Salvador, where America invested more than $1 billion in economic 
and military aid during the 1980s, the UN brokered an end to the civil 
war, disarmed and reintegrated the rebel forces into society, monitored 
human rights and elections, and oversaw the creation of a new civilian 
national police. 
 
In Mozambique--where our concerns are humanitarian and political--the UN 
has succeeded in demobilizing bitter military foes, repatriating 
refugees, and creating a climate within which elections could be held. 
In so doing, it has contributed to greater stability in the whole of 
Southern Africa. 
 
Small observer missions in Georgia and Tajikistan provide a useful 
window on events in two New Independent States where Russian forces are 
deployed and where societies are struggling to gain stability, assert 
sovereignty, and overcome ethnic clashes. 
 
Most UN peace operations are small. The only missions that now require 
more than 2,000 personnel and that are expected to continue beyond the 
first months of 1995 are those in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and 
Lebanon; the only new operations of this size that are currently 
contemplated would be in Haiti and Angola. 
 
The total assessed cost to the United States of all UN peace-keeping 
operations in fiscal year 1994 was roughly $1 billion, about $4 per 
American, and less than one-half of one percent of our foreign policy 
and national security expenditures. Further, direct U.S. participation 
in UN peace operations is modest. As of January 1, 1995, the U.S. ranked 
26th among nations in the number of troops participating. Even after the 
UN mission to Haiti is deployed, with substantial U.S. participation, 
American forces will comprise less than 5% of the total of UN 
peacekeepers. 
 
Overall, UN peace-keeping contributes to a world that is more stable, 
free, productive, and secure than otherwise would be the case. We do not 
look to the UN to defend America's vital interests, nor can we expect 
the UN to be effective where the swift and decisive application of 
military force is required. But, in many circumstances, the UN will 
provide options for diplomatic, political, and military action we would 
not otherwise have. It enables us to influence events without assuming 
the full burden of costs and risks. And it lends the weight of law and 
world opinion to causes and principles we support. 
 
The Future of UN Peace-keeping 
 
Traditionally, most UN peace-keeping missions have operated in a non-
hostile environment. However, in Somalia and Bosnia, the UN has operated 
in a context where civil society has broken down or where one or more of 
the parties is not prepared to end the fighting. These operations have 
achieved important humanitarian goals, but the political and military 
complications they have faced have drained resources and tarnished the 
UN's reputation. This underscores our belief--shared by the Security 
Council--that large-scale, high-intensity peace operations are not now 
within the capacity of the UN to conduct on its own. 
 
If UN peace-keeping is going to work, we must be disciplined about when 
and under what circumstances we engage in it. Last May, President 
Clinton approved a policy requiring that tough questions be asked about 
the cost, size, risk, mandate, and duration of operations before they 
are started or renewed. The goal is to ensure that UN missions have 
clear and realistic objectives, that peacekeepers are equipped properly, 
that money is not wasted, and that an endpoint to UN action can be 
identified. The new policy is working and has resulted in fewer and 
smaller new operations, and better management of existing ones.  
 
--  Although one operation was expanded substantially--in Rwanda--there 
were no major new operations in 1994. In addition, the Security Council 
voted to terminate three missions, including two of the largest--in 
Somalia and Mozambique. As a result, the total number of UN peacekeepers 
at year's end was the lowest in almost two years. 
 
--  The only wholly new UN operations approved in 1994 were a small 
military observer mission in Tajikistan and a mission in Chad that was 
completed successfully in just six weeks. 
 
--  The UN has refrained from authorizing new missions in strife-torn 
states whose problems--under current conditions--are beyond the UN's 
ability to resolve. 
 
--  In Angola, the Security Council has insisted that full deployment of 
a peace-keeping force cannot take place until the parties to that 
conflict demonstrate that they are serious about observing cease-fire 
agreements they have signed. We concur fully in that requirement. 
 
--  The UN is increasingly looking to coalition operations, in which the 
Security Council authorizes one or more member states to lead and accept 
the financial responsibility for properly monitored peace operations. 
Recent examples include Liberia, Rwanda, and Haiti. 
 
Contingency Operations and U.S. Military Readiness 
 
Decisions to deploy U.S. armed forces on contingency missions include 
consideration of the potential impact of such operations on the 
military's readiness for warfighting. Contingency deployments should not 
jeopardize the ability of the armed forces to perform their primary 
mission. 
 
The greatest threat to readiness is that these unbudgeted missions are 
funded in the operations and maintenance accounts and may require 
deferral of other activities, including training, until reimbursement 
occurs. There can also be some wear and tear of equipment, and on 
extended operations, some erosion of warfighting kills that may or may 
not be offset by the value of hands-on experience. 
 
The Administration is seeking to mitigate these problems. 
 
First, we are supporting UN and regional peace-keeping forces as 
alternatives, where circumstances allow, to the deployment of American 
troops. 
 
Second, we are reducing the demands placed by contingency operations on 
active duty forces by making greater use of National Guard and Reserve 
forces and of civilian contractors. 
 
Third, we would like to work with you--the Congress--on ways to ensure 
timely supplemental funding. 
 
Improving the Way The UN Does Business 
 
This is the UN's 50th year. For many of those years, the organization 
was crippled by divisions that distracted it from its purpose. As a 
result, bad habits were developed, accountability eroded, and 
bureaucracy grew. 
 
With the help of like-minded nations, we are working to change the 
management culture at the UN to improve accountability, reduce waste, 
and improve results. This is a process that will take time, but we are 
making progress. 
 
There were two major developments last year. In late summer, the UN 
established an independent office with the functions of an inspector 
general. This is something we worked for very hard, with the strong 
support of many members from both parties of this committee. The head of 
the new office, Under Secretary General Paschke, began work on November 
15. We will do all we can to support the independence of the new office 
and to see that it receives the resources necessary to be effective. 
 
We are encouraged, as well, that the UN's new Under Secretary General 
for Administration and Management, Joseph Connor, has established a 
broad agenda for reform. Mr. Connor wants a personnel system that 
rewards merit and penalizes poor performance, a streamlined internal 
administration of justice system, and a reduction in duplication and 
unneeded staff. Mr. Chairman, I can tell you personally that I consider 
Under Secretary General Connor a breath of fresh air in an environment 
that sorely needs it. I hope you will all have a chance to meet with 
him, either in New York or--if you approve--we could set up a meeting 
down here. 
 
We are also working with other nations to convene a high-level working 
group to formulate proposals for restructuring the UN. The model we are 
using is the Vice President's initiative to "re-invent" government aimed 
at producing better results at reduced cost. 
 
In addition, we are continuing what is an uphill diplomatic effort to 
gain support from UN members for reducing the U.S. share of peace-
keeping costs from more than 30% to 25%. An open-ended working group has 
been established to consider this and related issues. I have reminded UN 
members that U.S. law mandates a reduction in U.S. payments to 25% after 
October 1, whether or not UN members agree. 
 
The National Security Revitalization Act 
 
Finally, let me turn to the provisions of H.R. 7, the National Security 
Revitalization Act. 
 
We recognize that it is an improvement in many respects over the 
national security provisions of the "Contract," which contained a number 
of obsolete and unworkable provisions. That said, I must tell you that 
the enactment of the NSRA--as written--would remove UN peace-keeping as 
an option for advancing American interests and undermine seriously our 
ability to gain support for U.S. positions within the Security Council. 
 
We have a number of serious problems with the bill--some procedural, 
some constitutional, some related to policy. Let me highlight three 
sections in particular. 
 
Section 501 would require that we deduct from our UN peace-keeping 
assessments the amount that we spend voluntarily on operations directly 
or indirectly in support of UN peace-keeping. If recent experience is 
any guide, this could eliminate, by our own calculation, all U.S. 
payments for UN peace-keeping. This prospect might seem attractive, but 
it would also: 
 
--  Make it impossible for the UN to budget accurately; 
 
--  Seriously erode UN peace- keeping's financial base; 
 
--  Violate our obligations under the UN Charter; 
 
--  Eliminate any possibility that we would be able to gain UN member 
agreement to reduce to 25% our official rate of assessment for peace-
keeping; and 
 
--  Invite chaos by prompting other countries to mimic our unilateral 
policy. For example, other NATO members might seek a credit for costs 
incurred in enforcing the Bosnia and Iraq no-fly zones; Japan might seek 
reimbursement for the fund it established to underwrite logistics costs 
in Somalia or for its large voluntary contributions to the UN peace 
operation in Cambodia; Russia might decide unilaterally to deduct from 
its payments to the UN the costs of its peace-keeping deployments in the 
New Independent States; France might seek a credit for its actions in 
Rwanda; and the Gulf States, Germany, and Japan could claim the largest 
credit of all for underwriting much of the cost of Operation Desert 
Storm. 
 
The result, in short, would be budgetary anarchy and a progressive 
inability on the part of the UN to plan, initiate, or sustain peace 
operations. This would eliminate UN peace-keeping as an option and leave 
us more and more with the stark choice between unilateral action and 
inaction when emergencies arise. 
 
Section 508 (b) would prohibit the Department of Defense from paying 
incremental costs associated with participation in UN peace-keeping 
activities unless Congress has appropriated funds for this purpose. This 
means that the President could not order American forces to participate 
in, or support, a UN peace-keeping operation without prior congressional 
authorization and appropriation of funds--even if the American 
participation was on a fully reimbursable basis. An act of Congress 
would be required to send a military observer to Georgia. This provision 
raises very serious constitutional and foreign policy concerns. 
 
Finally, Section 511 would have the unintended consequence, in my 
judgment, of reversing the progress we have been making on UN reform. It 
alters the criteria approved just last year governing the nature of the 
Office of Internal Oversight Services, or Inspector General. These 
criteria were negotiated successfully, although not easily, throughout 
the past summer. The legislation would require that we now go back to 
the UN and demand a series of changes, some of which have little or no 
chance of being accepted. 
 
For example, the provision would require that the OIOS have access to 
"all records and officials of the specialized agencies of the United 
Nations."  This would require separate negotiations with almost a dozen 
different autonomous governing bodies of agencies such as the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, the International Civil Aviation 
Organization, and the World Health Organization. Under the provision, 
20% of our regular UN budget contributions and 50% of peace-keeping 
funds would be withheld until all these negotiations have been completed 
successfully. This is an unworkable and ill-advised provision. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In summary, let me say that I do not believe America's interests would 
be served by destroying UN peace-keeping or by making it more difficult 
for us to achieve our objectives at the UN. I do believe, however, that 
we need to develop a better mechanism for ensuring that Congress has an 
appropriate role in decisions that result in new, unforeseen, and 
unbudgeted financial obligations. This includes the whole range of 
deployments of our armed forces on contingency operations. Regardless of 
how the current legislative debate is resolved, the Administration will 
do all it can to see that such a mechanism is developed. Continued 
effective U.S. leadership at the UN and around the world is a goal that 
both the executive and legislative branches share. We must work together 
to see that this goal is achieved. 
 
Periods of great historical transition are normally accompanied by 
unrest as the ambitious, the aggrieved, the insecure, and the just plain 
mule-headed look to see how far they can push without being pushed back. 
 
The United States is not the world's policeman, but we Americans have a 
deep stake in whether conflicts are contained, social disruptions are 
minimized, and international standards of behavior are respected. When 
emergencies arise, we will respond in accordance with our interests, 
sometimes on our own, sometimes as part of a coalition, and sometimes 
through the mechanism of an international organization. 
 
Our armed forces remain the most effective potential guarantor of 
international stability and peace. They will continue to do their share 
to deter aggressors, isolate rogue regimes, and participate in selected 
humanitarian and pro-democracy operations. At the same time, we will 
work to prevent conflict through vigorous diplomacy and to strengthen 
regional and UN peace-keeping as viable alternatives to the use of our 
own armed forces for operations other than war. 
 
In so doing, we can help to shape an international order that is more 
hospitable to our interests, more responsive to our leadership, and more 
reflective of our values than it otherwise would be. 
 
Thank you again for the opportunity to present the Administration's 
views. Now, I will be happy to respond to any questions you may have.  
 
(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 6 
 
Leveraging U.S. Resources Through the United Nations 
Douglas J. Bennet, Jr., Assistant Secretary for International 
Organization Affairs 
Statement before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human 
Rights of the House International Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 
February 8, 1995 
 
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I am delighted to be here, 
and I appreciate the opportunity to present the Administration's budget 
request for assessed and voluntary contributions to international 
organizations. 
 
UN organizations serve Americans' interests in all sorts of ways--from 
making it possible to send letters abroad, assuring international 
standards of airline safety, sharing weather data tha