US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 7, FEBRUARY 13, 1995
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:

1. Overview of the FY 1996 International Affairs Budget--Secretary 
Christopher 
2. The United States and South Korea: An Unshakable Partnership--
Secretary Christopher, South Korean Foreign Minister Gong
3. U.S. Efforts To Expand and Strengthen The Fight Against Illegal 
Immigration--President Clinton 
4. U.S.-Japanese Leadership In the New Pacific Community--Deputy 
Secretary Talbott
5. Keeping Faith With the People of Haiti--Madeleine K. Albright, UNSC 
Resolution
6. Efforts To Resolve Dispute Between Peru and Ecuador--Alexander Watson
7. White House Statements: 
     President Clinton Meets With President of Eritrea 
     U.S. Concern Over Hostilities Between Peru and Ecuador  
8. U.S. Accession to the UN Convention On the Law of the Sea--David A. 
Colson
9. Current Issues in International Fishery Conservation and Management--
David A. Colson
10. Treaty Actions
11. What's in Print



ARTICLE 1

Overview of the FY 1996 International Affairs Budget
Secretary Christopher
Statement on the 1996 Department of State budget submission, Washington, 
DC, February 6, 1995 [introductory and closing remarks deleted]

I am here to give you an overview of the 1996 international affairs 
budget, which funds the State Department and related international 
affairs agencies. I will be joined by Craig Johnstone, who will take you 
through all the details.

By any measure, this new budget is an austere budget. Since 1984, the 
international affairs budget has been reduced by 45% in real terms. It 
now represents around 1% of total federal spending, notwithstanding the 
extraordinary array of challenges we face--some of them new challenges. 
Our 1996 spending request of just over $21 billion is essentially what 
we are spending in the current fiscal year.

We have been tough-minded in putting this budget together. I believe the 
resources that we are requesting are the rock-bottom minimum that we 
need to defend and advance America's interests.

Last November's elections certainly changed many things, but they were 
not a license to lose sight of our global interests or to walk away from 
our commitments around the world. This budget does maintain our 
commitments. Approving it will be a stern test of our nation's 
willingness to dedicate the resources necessary to protect the security 
and protect the prosperity of the American people. It is essentially a 
test of our commitment to lead.

Just consider what the world would be like without American leadership 
in the last two years alone. We would have four nuclear states in the 
former Soviet Union, instead of one, with Russian missiles still 
targeted at our homes. We would have a full-throttled nuclear program in 
North Korea; no GATT agreement and no NAFTA; brutal dictators still 
terrorizing Haiti; very likely, Iraqi troops back in Kuwait; and an 
unresolved Mexican economic crisis, which would have threatened 
stability on our border.

For the coming year, I have identified five specific areas of 
opportunity for American foreign policy, as you all know. I would like 
to mention each of them and describe how each is supported in this new 
budget.

First, we must maintain the momentum to open new markets. To do so, we 
will begin to implement the Uruguay Round agreement and the free trade 
commitments we have here in the Western Hemisphere, as well as in the 
Asia-Pacific region. American companies and workers must be able to take 
advantage of these opportunities, and this budget requests some $900 
million to promote exports and investments through programs run by the 
Exim Bank, OPIC, USAID, and other agencies. In the last two years, these 
efforts have supported over one million high-paying jobs.

Second, we will continue to build a new European security structure. 
Secretary Perry will be discussing our overall commitments to NATO, but 
I want to emphasize that our budget provides $85 million to help 
countries participate in the Partnership for Peace --of course, a key 
element in extending NATO's reach to the new democracies to the East, as 
well as in laying the groundwork for NATO expansion. Through the $480-
million program that we have requested in the SEED program, we maintain 
our assistance for democratic and economic reform in Central and Eastern 
Europe.

This budget also requests $788 million in support of democratic reform 
in Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union, with more 
than half going to New Independent States other than Russia. This 
investment in Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union 
remains the least expensive investment that we can make for our long-
term security. Russia's indiscriminate and excessive use of force in 
Chechnya has certainly dealt a setback to reform in that country, but it 
has not altered our fundamental interest in helping Russian reformers 
build a nation that finally is at peace with itself and its neighbors.

Our third area of opportunity in the coming year is advancing peace and 
security in the Middle East. This budget maintains our commitments there 
by allocating $5.24 billion to sustain our effort at a time when the 
peace process stands at a decisive moment. Our critical support for that 
peace process in the Middle East simply must not be allowed to falter.

Fourth, we will intensify our efforts to stop the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. This budget meets that threat. Among other 
things, it supports the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. It provides 
assistance to the International Atomic Energy Agency, an organization 
that's vital in our program to halt the nuclear program in North Korea. 
It replenishes the non-proliferation fund, which we use to combat 
nuclear smuggling, to enforce export controls, and to ensure missile 
dismantlement.

Fifth, the budget will help us intensify the fight against global 
terrorism. It provides a foundation for an intensive campaign against 
narcotics trafficking. It more than doubles our funding to fight 
international crime. Taken together, this budget requests $240 million 
for these vital efforts.

Of course, this budget, in addition to the five areas of opportunity, 
covers a number of other important foreign policy objectives. I will 
just mention a few of them here today. The budget makes a $1.5 billion 
commitment to democracy around the world. In addition to our support for 
reform in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, we 
provide $220 million for countries in transition, such as Haiti, Angola, 
and Cambodia. We believe that this support can make a vital difference 
in the pursuit of democracy and stability in these countries.

This budget also supports international peace-keeping. As I have said 
before, where our vital interests are at stake, we must be prepared to 
defend them alone. But sometimes by leveraging our power and resources, 
by leading through alliances and institutions, we can achieve better 
results at a far lower cost to our national treasure and in human life. 
Of course, if we can do that, that is a sensible bargain that I know the 
American people support. We strongly oppose efforts in Congress that 
threaten to remove peacekeepers from vital troubled areas of the world 
and that threaten to leave the President with an unacceptable choice 
when a crisis occurs--a choice between acting alone and doing nothing.

The Administration has made a commitment to address a number of long-
term threats to the future of the nation--threats that were too often 
ignored to our detriment; threats such as environmental degradation, 
unsustainable population growth, and the endemic poverty that feeds 
instability and blocks prosperity.

Among other efforts, the budget that we have before us today funds 
programs to curb air pollution, to improve basic education, and to 
implement health initiatives for women and children that were agreed to 
in the Cairo summit. All told, this budget requests just over $1 billion 
for global population and environmental programs.

Our ability to advance these interests, of course, depends upon 
equipping the men and women who serve in our international affairs 
agencies--giving them the skills and resources they need to do the job. 
Like our soldiers, they must be prepared to fight for America's 
interests.

Clearly, no American wants to live in a world in which nuclear weapons 
have fallen into the wrong hands; a world in which America has retreated 
from economic leadership; a world in which the post-Cold War momentum 
toward peace and freedom has been reversed. I believe this budget meets 
the minimum but essential test. It sustains our intensive, effective 
engagement on behalf of these vital interests around the world. I will 
be making that case to the Congress and the American people.  

Summary of Function 150 Budget Request

We reaffirm our commitment to provide strong American leadership to 
build a more peaceful, democratic, and prosperous world. With the end of 
the Cold War comes the unprecedented opportunity to shape a world 
consistent with our core values--a world of open societies and open 
markets.

Since 1984, the International Affairs budget has been reduced by over 
45% in real dollars. The Administration's FY 1996 budget request of 
$21.21 billion ends this debilitating decline. Nonetheless, the request 
constitutes barely 1% of total federal spending.  

This International Affairs budget will:

--  Create jobs in America by promoting American exports ($900 million);

--  Help make our country more secure by consolidating the gains we have 
achieved with the end of the Cold War. This budget supports market 
reform and democracy in the former Soviet Union, Central Europe, and 
other key countries ($1.5 billion);

--  Protects the future of our nation by attacking threats to the global 
environment and overpopulation ($1 billion);

--  Helps prevent regional crises by supporting economic growth and 
stability and democratic reform in Asia, Latin America, and Africa ($3.9 
billion);

--  Promotes our own national security by supporting the Middle East 
peace process and enhancing regional security ($5.3 billion);

--  Protects us all from the dangers of nuclear proliferation and 
weapons of mass destruction ($170 million);

--  Maintains our support for international peace-keeping to contain 
regional crises and minimize the requirements for unilateral U.S. 
engagement ($545 million);

--  Fortifies and extends our fight against international narcotics 
trafficking, terrorism, and organized crime ($240 million);

--  Maintains our long-standing commitment to humanitarian principles by 
assisting refugees and victims of disasters ($1.7 billion); and

--  Preserves our ability to protect and serve the interests of the 
American people around the world with the best people and the most 
efficient foreign affairs infrastructure ($4.5 billion).  

(###)



ARTICLE 2

The United States and South Korea: An Unshakable Partnership
Secretary Christopher, South Korean Foreign Minister Gong
Remarks prior to their meeting, Washington, DC, February 6, 1995

Secretary Christopher. Good morning, again. I am very pleased to welcome 
Foreign Minister Gong on his first trip to Washington since taking 
office as the new Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea.

Deputy Secretary Talbott told me of his good discussions along with 
Assistant Secretary Lord when they were in Seoul last week--good 
discussions with the new Foreign Minister, as well as with President Kim 
Yong-Sam. I am looking forward to getting acquainted with the new 
Minister and carrying on the very friendly discussions we always have 
between our two countries.

The Foreign Minister assumes his important new duties at a time when the 
relationships between our two countries, I believe, are stronger than 
ever. Our ties, of course, are anchored in a solemn treaty alliance and 
an unshakable commitment by the United States to the security of the 
Republic of Korea. Our commitment, indeed, is reflected in the presence 
of our military forces standing shoulder to shoulder with those of the 
Republic of Korea in the Demilitarized Zone.

Our shared belief in democratic values has strengthened the already 
strong bond of ties between our people. The same is true of our 
expanding commercial links, which have helped both of our economies 
grow. We are cooperating in a number of regional and world fora such as 
APEC, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the World Trade Organization. Their 
contributions to UN peace-keeping are well-known.

In short, we are doing a great many things together as our friendship 
grows and ripens. But this friendship and alliance, I think, has proven 
most important and most durable in the crucible of the common challenge 
represented by the North Korean nuclear program.

With the Framework accord, the United States and South Korea have shaped 
a program for dealing with the North Korean nuclear situation--an 
approach that attains all of our strategic objectives. It safeguards 
both South Korea and Japan. It lifts the specter of a nuclear threat 
from all of Northeast Asia. It bolsters, in a very important way, the 
non-proliferation regime at a critical time. It provides a basis for the 
reduction of tensions in the area as a whole.

There are so many positive elements of the Framework accord that I think 
it behooves us to work very hard and effectively for its implementation, 
and that is what has been going on in recent days and weeks. Permanent 
peace and security in the peninsula, of course, depends upon a 
determined effort by both North and South Korea. As part of the 
Framework accord, North Korea has pledged to resume its dialogue with 
South Korea on matters affecting peace and security. We have made it 
clear to the North Koreans that resuming that dialogue is essential to 
the ultimate success of the Framework accord. We would not have gone 
ahead with the Framework accord if the North Koreans had not been 
willing to meet that stipulation.

Our commitment to the fulfillment of that particular provision of the 
Framework accord has not changed; and we will be watching, along with 
the South Koreans, for evidence that the North is willing to engage in 
the important and, indeed, essential dialogue with the South.

As we go about implementing the Framework, of course, we will be in the 
closest consultation with our allies in Japan and South Korea. That is 
why I went to Seoul last November; that is why Secretary Talbott was 
there only about two weeks ago; and that is why the Foreign Minister is 
visiting here today. I look forward to working with him on the Framework 
accord but also on the many other elements of our important bilateral 
relationship and friendship.

Welcome, Mr. Minister. I am delighted to have you here and to begin to 
get to know you.


Foreign Minister Gong. Thank you so much. I thank Secretary Christopher 
for his very warm welcome. As he mentioned, this is my first visit in my 
current portfolio. The purpose of my visit is to exchange our views on a 
broad range of issues, not only bilateral, but also multilateral, which 
could affect our common interests.

As Secretary Christopher has rightly noted, we have witnessed no 
shortage of evidence of our growing partnership. Our close cooperation 
to resolve the North Korean nuclear program is an excellent example of 
such a partnership. In fact, the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework late 
last year was the outcome of our well-coordinated efforts to resolve the 
issues through negotiations.

The Government and people of the Republic of Korea fully support the 
agreement and are committed to play their own part to secure its 
faithful implementation. We believe that this agreement will lay the 
groundwork for easing tensions in our part of the world. But we also 
realize that this is only the beginning of the process toward a full 
resolution of the issue. This is why the international community should 
continue to keep a close and constant eye on the implementation process. 
In this regard, I wish to emphasize that inter-Korean dialogue, among 
other things, is a key to the success of this agreement.

As Secretary Christopher has also pointed out, South and North Korea 
should play important roles in securing permanent peace and security on 
the Korean Peninsula. My government will do whatever we can to dismantle 
the relics of the Cold War on our peninsula. But as it takes two to 
tango, we expect genuine change in the attitude of North Korea. In this 
respect, the Republic of Korea sincerely hopes that the Agreed Framework 
will serve as a very powerful tool for such purpose.

Meanwhile, our two countries' partnership goes beyond the area of 
nuclear and security programs. We share many common agendas in APEC, 
ASEAN Regional Forum, UN, WTO, and other international fora. As we set 
out to build on those achievements already made, I assure Secretary 
Christopher and all of you of my government's resolve to continue to 
work together to secure peace and prosperity, not only in our region, 
but throughout the world as well.

I look forward to very constructive and useful discussions with 
Secretary Christopher and to forging an excellent working relationship 
with him in the future as my predecessor had enjoyed. 

(###)



ARTICLE 3

U.S. Efforts To Expand and Strengthen The Fight Against Illegal 
Immigration 
President Clinton
Remarks at immigration policy event, Washington, DC, February 7, 1995

Good morning. Two years ago, when I took office, I was determined to do 
a better job of dealing with the problem of illegal immigration. About 
two years ago this week, when I discussed with Janet Reno the 
possibility of her becoming attorney general, we had a talk about this, 
and for the last two years we have been hard at work trying to fix a 
system that everyone agrees has serious problems.

The Vice President and I have just been briefed by Attorney General 
Reno; Doris Meissner, the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization 
Service; our Secretary of Labor, Bob Reich; Maria Echaveste, the 
Director of the Wage and Hour Division of the Labor Department; 
Silvestre Reyes, Chief Border Patrol Agent of the El Paso Sector; Gus de 
la Vina, the Director of the Western Region of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service; Doug Crum, the U.S. Border Chief; and George 
Weise, our Customs Commissioner.

After our meeting, I signed a presidential directive to the heads of all  
executive departments instructing them to very quickly expand and 
strengthen our program to reduce illegal immigration in four key areas: 
first, protecting our borders; second, protecting the interests of our 
workers in the workplace; third, removing more criminal aliens; and 
fourth, providing more assistance to the states which are burdened with 
the problem of illegal immigration. 

For example, I have asked the attorney general to increase those 
elements of our border patrol strategy that are proving most effective, 
including the use of helicopters, night scopes, and all-terrain 
vehicles. I have asked the members of the Cabinet to create--for the 
first time--a national detention and removal plan to dramatically 
increase the identification and removal of deportable illegal aliens. 
These are just a few examples, and, of course, you will get more in a 
moment when the people behind me give a more extensive background 
briefing.

One of the cornerstones of our fight against illegal immigration has 
been a get-tough policy at our borders. We initiated Operation Hold the 
Line at El Paso, Operation Gatekeeper in  San Diego, and Operation 
Safeguard in Arizona, all with one clear intention: to secure the 
Southwest border.

As we speak, these initiatives are making a substantial difference. 
Illegal immigration is down; crime is down,  and my immigration budget 
and strategy build on that success. Here are the elements of the 
initiative: 

First, I have asked Congress for an additional $1 billion to fight 
illegal immigration in the coming fiscal year.

I want to emphasize that while most of the talk yesterday was about 
cutting the budget--and we do have $140 billion in budget cuts--there 
are some things we should spend more money on.

We recommended spending more money on education, on medical research in 
AIDS, on crime, in the community policing bill, and on veterans 
interests; and we recommended a billion more dollars to fight illegal 
immigration. Under the budgets already passed, we have added 1,000 new 
border patrol agents just in the Southwest. By the end of 1996, our 
Administration will have increased overall border personnel by 51% since 
1993.

Second, I have asked for more funds to protect American jobs by 
increasing the number of workplace investigators by 85%. Our 
Administration will begin to test different methods of helping employers 
verify a worker's employment authorization. This was, as I am sure you 
will remember, one of the key recommendations of the Jordan Commission. 
Barbara Jordan wanted to be here with us today, but in pursuit of that 
commission's work, she is traveling the country. She has sent us a 
letter endorsing the proposals in this package.

The fact is that employer sanctions have been in the law on illegal 
immigration since 1986, but no prior administration made a serious 
attempt to enforce them. With this budget and with legislation I will 
soon be sending to Congress, we will be able to crack down on employers 
who knowingly hire illegal immigrants. If we turn off the employment 
stream for illegal workers, far, far fewer of them will risk the 
difficult journey here.

Incidentally, our financial support package for Mexico over the long run 
also will reduce pressure on illegal immigration. With a healthier 
economy, the Mexican people will find more opportunities for jobs at 
home.

Third, I have asked for new funds to double the deportation of criminal 
aliens next year and to triple them by 1996. And, finally, ours is the 
first administration to reimburse states for a share of the costs that 
they bear related to illegal immigration, including the incarceration of 
illegal aliens. I have asked Congress for a total of $550 million for 
state reimbursement, which more than doubles the fund that now exists.


Whether through the budget, the directive I have just signed, or the 
legislation I will soon send to Congress, our goals are the same: 
tougher border enforcement, more protection for American workers, faster 
deportation of criminal aliens, and additional assistance to the states. 
That is a comprehensive strategy that is already beginning to work and 
that will work much better if this plan is implemented by the 
Administration and by Congress. We need help from Congress to implement 
this plan.

I want Congress to move quickly on this issue, just as we have moved 
quickly on a number of fronts. I am proud of the speed the INS showed 
recently in moving 62 border patrol agents in 24 hours to Nogales, 
Arizona, to reinforce that border. In the future, if our budget becomes 
law, that kind of movement will not be necessary. For the first time 
ever, there will be a rapid-response team to enable the border patrol to 
react quickly to buildups at any particular border spot.

We have accomplished a lot in just two years. As I said in the State of 
the Union address, we are a nation of immigrants, and we should all be 
proud of it, but we are also a nation of laws. It is wrong and 
ultimately self-defeating for a nation of immigrants to permit the kind 
of abuse of our immigration laws that we have seen in recent years. 
There is too much of it, and we must do much more to stop it.

(###)



ARTICLE 4
U.S.-Japanese Leadership in The New Pacific Community
Deputy Secretary Talbott
Address before the National Press Club, Tokyo, Japan, January 25, 1995 
[introductory remarks deleted] 

Let me tell you about why my colleagues and I have come here. We are at 
the beginning of an Asia-Pacific tour that will include South Korea, 
Cambodia, New Zealand, and Australia. Here in Tokyo, our purpose is to 
build on the momentum in U.S.-Japan relations that President Clinton and 
Prime Minister Murayama generated at their meeting in Washington two 
weeks ago. 

As it happens, the timing of our visit also gives us a chance to offer 
to your government and to your people our deep sympathy and continuing 
support in the wake of the earthquake in Kobe. As President Clinton told 
Prime Minister Murayama, the United States stands ready to assist in any 
way it can. 

The city of Kobe is a symbol of the enduring ties between your country 
and mine. Starting in the mid-19th century, when it was a trading center 
and storage depot for Western merchants and missionaries, Kobe quickly 
became a conduit for the flow of goods, ideas, and people from west to 
east, and from east to west. That interaction has sustained our 
relationship for over a century. The large American community now living 
in Kobe testifies to the vitality of this link between the United States 
and Japan. Ambassador Mondale and I would like to use this opportunity 
to thank Japanese authorities and rescue workers for all that they have 
done to assure the safety of the very large American community living in 
the Kobe area, along, of course, with the hard work that they had to do 
on behalf of the Japanese citizens in the stricken area. 

Even though I have been to Japan before, I have never had a keener sense 
of history than I do on this occasion. As we all know, 1995 marks the 
50th anniversary of the end of the Second World War--which was the most 
devastating conflict in human history. The challenge that the American 
and Japanese people face together is to observe the anniversary of that 
war-- not only by mourning its dead, not only by caring for its 
survivors, but also by rededicating ourselves to the cause of peace. 

Peace is a simple word, indeed a simple concept, but it is an 
exceedingly difficult, complex political endeavor; all the more reason, 
therefore, to appreciate that the world is at peace today to an extent 
unprecedented in human history. To be sure, we have seen and are seeing 
horrible conflicts in Bosnia, Sudan, and Rwanda. Each of those outbreaks 
of carnage constitutes an offense to humanity, a threat to the security 
and stability of the surrounding areas, and a challenge to the will and 
statesmanship of the international community. Nonetheless, the global 
context in which we deal with regional conflict today is different from 
what it has ever been before. For the first time in human history, not 
only are none of the great powers at war with each other, but none of 
them sees any of the others as an enemy. 

That welcome state of affairs is the result of two mutually reinforcing 
trends: one, the spread of democracy and two, the spread of market 
economics. Over the last decade, and particularly in the last five 
years, there has been an emerging consensus around the globe over how 
nations should organize themselves politically and economically. On 
every continent, repressive regimes have given way to freely elected 
government, and command economies have given way to the free market. We 
have seen market democracy ascendant in Latin America, in Southern 
Africa, in Central and Eastern Europe and the former U.S.S.R., and in 
Asian and Pacific nations from Mongolia to Cambodia to the Republic of 
Korea to the Philippines.

It is no accident, of course, that these trends have coincided with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the Soviet empire, and the Soviet system. 
The end of the Cold War is the seminal event of our times.

I realize that from Japan's vantage point, there are still deeply 
worrisome vestiges of the Cold War. The Northern Territories issue--on 
which we support Japan's position--remains unresolved. The demilitarized 
zone that divides the Korean Peninsula is as dangerous a manifestation 
of Cold War divisions as was the Berlin Wall--and unlike the wall, the 
DMZ still exists. 

Still, the global rivalry that dominated the last 50 years is over. No 
longer is the world divided into two camps. No longer must the United 
States dedicate itself above all else to the containment of an immense, 
aggressive, and malignant superpower. Now we can devote far more of our 
energies to the consolidation of essentially favorable forces--including 
in parts of the world that used to be, ideologically at least, enemy 
territory.

For example, China, having emerged from the isolation and dogmatism of 
the Maoist era, is opening up to the outside world and is becoming a 
manufacturing and trading giant. Meanwhile, the fledgling democracies of 
the former Soviet Union and the former Warsaw Pact are knocking at the 
door of the institutions, like NATO and GATT, that used to be anathema 
to their former communist rulers. As a result, Japan, the United States, 
and the other industrialized democracies have an opportunity to remake 
the world as an inclusive, integrated community of nations, organized 
according to the principles of economic and political freedom.

That integration is the strategic objective of American foreign policy 
in the post-Cold War era. By definition, it is a task we can accomplish 
only if we work closely, persistently, patiently, and boldly with 
others, and particularly with those countries with which we share long-
range interests and core values.

Japan is the cardinal example. All over the world, American and Japanese 
leadership and cooperation will be essential if we are to make progress 
toward common goals. Nowhere is that more true than in the Asia-Pacific 
neighborhood. This region has always been marked as much by its cultural 
diversity as by its geographical expanse.  All-too often, diversity has 
meant division, and division has sometimes meant war. Yet today, the 
most dynamic forces in the Asia-Pacific are those that are knitting 
economies, societies, and cultures more closely together. Those forces 
include vigorous trade, high-speed transportation, and rising education 
levels. In that sense, the Asia-Pacific region, vast as it is, is a 
microcosm of what is happening on the planet as a whole.

Recognizing these trends, President Clinton came here in July 1993 on 
his first official overseas visit. In his address to the students of 
Waseda University, the President outlined his vision of "a new Pacific 
community, based on shared strength, shared prosperity, and a shared 
commitment to democratic values."  He noted that security, economic 
growth, and democracy are interrelated--and that the United States and 
Japan must work together to develop a coherent approach on all three 
fronts. Strong U.S.-Japan cooperation lies at the heart of our efforts 
to promote peace, prosperity, and freedom in the region. Let me touch on 
each of these three priorities in turn.

First, the quest for peace: As I have already indicated, regional 
security problems are no less complicated than they were during the Cold 
War. In some ways, they are more so. With the passing of the single, 
overriding threat posed by the Soviet Union, our attention has shifted 
to security problems that involve multiple, often conflicting interests. 
Consider the current dispute over rights to the South China Sea. There 
are six parties to that dispute, each with its own territorial claims to 
potentially rich resources. 

Security threats posed by non-governmental forces--crime cartels, drug 
lords, and terrorists--now demand increasing attention, and then there 
is the continued menace posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. 

It is on that last issue that I would like to concentrate for a moment. 
The United States and Japan, together with the Republic of Korea, have 
been working together on the most serious post-Cold War threat to this 
region's security--North Korea's nuclear program--and we will continue 
to work together. The Agreed Framework, which the U.S. reached with 
North Korea in October, promises to end that threat. The Framework has 
already halted the North Korean nuclear program and will eventually roll 
it back. It also encourages South-North dialogue and cooperation on the 
Korean Peninsula, and it creates an opportunity for greater stability 
throughout Northeast Asia, including improved relations between North 
Korea and Japan.

We now need to implement the Framework. In this endeavor, the United 
States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea--together with other nations--
all have parts to play. We warmly welcomed Prime Minister Murayama's 
assurances to President Clinton that Japan will play a significant role 
in the new Korean Energy Development Organization, or KEDO. 

Our common interest in averting nuclear proliferation is also a factor 
in American and Japanese policy toward the former Soviet Union. This is 
an issue on which I have worked closely with my friends and counterparts 
in the Gaimusho. Japan and the United States have cooperated in 
assisting Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union to enhance 
the safety and security of the nuclear facilities and materials that 
they inherited from the Soviet era. Japan's contribution of over $100 
million for this purpose has already had a significant impact. But the 
challenge here is still huge, and we hope that Japan will continue to 
allocate resources to the effort, just as the United States is doing 
through programs authorized and funded by our Congress. To put it 
bluntly, we need to make sure that the explosive material in warheads, 
atop missiles in silos, does not someday end up in suitcase bombs 
available to nuclear smugglers and terrorists. 

As part of that effort, we look to Japan to use its considerable 
influence with other countries to support the indefinite extension of 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Despite the dire predictions of many 
experts a few years ago, the campaign to stop the spread of nuclear 
weapons has been remarkably successful so far. But we are approaching 
the moment of truth--the NPT review conference in April, and as we 
approach the NPT review conference, some states are wavering; either 
that, or they are making foolish and shortsighted linkages between their 
votes and other issues. They need to hear from both the United States 
and Japan how high a value we place on making this vital treaty regime a 
permanent fixture.

In times of transition like this one, it is important that we maintain 
the arrangements and institutions that allowed us to prevail in the Cold 
War and that will serve as the foundation for post-Cold War security 
structures. In Europe and the transatlantic community, that means NATO. 
In Asia and the Pacific community, it means the U.S. alliance 
commitments in the region, notably including the U.S.-Japan Treaty on 
Mutual Cooperation and Security, and our forward military presence. 
These have been the cornerstones of American engagement in this region, 
and they will remain so. At the same time, the new security challenges I 
have mentioned require us to be innovative, to design and put in place 
new mechanisms. I have in mind the Northeast Asia Security Dialogue that 
seeks to bring together Japan, the U.S., China, Russia, the Republic of 
Korea, and the North Koreans. We also strongly support the ASEAN 
Regional Forum--the Pacific's first broadly inclusive body concerned 
with security issues. Last July, I attended the first meeting of the 
regional forum, in Bangkok. The forum has the potential to play an 
important role in easing tensions, constraining arms races, cultivating 
habits of consultation, encouraging greater military transparency, and 
eventually becoming a venue for members to collaborate in peacekeeping 
operations, disaster relief, and conflict prevention. 

The U.S. supports the ASEAN Regional Forum and similar mechanisms 
because they serve the larger cause of integration. That is, they 
encourage the countries of the region to assume the obligations and reap 
the benefits that come with membership in the international community.  

I would like to say a particular word about China in this connection: 
Regional stability requires China's involvement in building new security 
and economic relationships. That is why we welcome China's own 
participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum. We look forward to China's 
full integration into the world community, and have engaged the Chinese 
military in discussions to encourage transparency with regard to its 
strategic intentions.  At the same time, we believe China cannot be a 
full partner in the world community until it respects international 
obligations and agreements on human rights, free and fair trading 
practices, and strict controls on the export of destabilizing weapons 
and military technology. 

Let me now say something about the close relationship between security 
and economics--and peace and trade. The logic here is simple:

--  Countries that trade together are less likely to make war against 
each other;

--  Countries that invest heavily in their consumer and export 
industries are less likely to invest in bloated military establishments; 
and

--  Countries that experience economic growth tend to have citizens with 
hope in the future. Their citizens are, therefore, less likely to harbor 
the anger and despair that fuels the fires of extremism, terrorism, 
radicalism, and fundamentalism--which, in turn, threaten civic and 
international peace.

All of that amounts to a powerful argument for free trade. International 
commerce helps overcome national differences and highlight common 
interests across even deep-seated political and historical barriers. In 
Asia, the most startling recent examples of this phenomenon have been 
the economic links among Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the People's Republic of 
China, and those between South Korea and the P.R.C.

For this reason, APEC--even though it is, strictly speaking, an economic 
organization--contributes to security because it fosters 
interdependence, which, in turn, promotes peaceful relations among 
states. The APEC meeting in Seattle in 1993 brought the region's leaders 
together for the first time; it dramatized the economic potential of the 
Pacific community, and helped ensure the successful completion of the 
Uruguay Round of the GATT. Then, last November, under Indonesia's 
leadership, APEC's leaders made a historic commitment to achieve free 
and open trade and investment across the region by 2020. As part of this 
commitment, APEC's leaders directed their ministers to develop a 
concrete action agenda, or blueprint, to implement this goal.

As APEC chair this year, Japan has the opportunity--and the challenge, 
of making sure that we follow through on these commitments. Our success 
will be measured by a Leaders' Agreement on an ambitious and 
comprehensive action plan.

We see APEC as a model for the kind of regional organization that is 
needed in our global economy. APEC serves the overall goal of global 
integration; that is, while lowering barriers within this region, it 
will not erect barriers around this region. For us, that is key. 
Regional groupings are a positive development if they look outward and 
open doors, rather than looking inward and building walls. 

Let me now say a few words about bilateral trade issues. At the Clinton-
Murayama Summit, our two leaders set a positive tone for the 
relationship. We have reached important agreements over the past year in 
financial services, telecommunications, medical equipment, and several 
other areas. But we still have hard, important work ahead of us, both to 
implement agreements we have reached, and to make progress on the 
crucial and thorny issues of the automotive sector and deregulation. If 
we can push through to success in this complicated, sometimes vexing 
process, we will have served the interests of both sides. American 
businesses will feel they have fair access to Japanese markets, Japanese 
consumers will benefit because of lower prices and broader choices, and 
the economic dimension of our relations will be as sound as the rest of 
our partnership, which is very sound indeed.

The theme of my remarks, as I hope is already apparent, is the benefit 
of openness. Let me carry that theme to one more point: democracy. If 
open markets and open sea lanes promote security and prosperity in the 
Pacific, so, too, do open societies. Democracies make good neighbors. 
The historical record shows that they are far less likely to wage war, 
sponsor terrorism, or generate refugees. Conversely, closed societies 
and isolated and oppressive governments pose the greatest threats to a 
region's security. In the age of the microchip and the modem, economic 
development falters when citizens must fight suspicious, dictatorial 
authorities simply for the right to own a fax machine, make copies of a 
document, or talk on the telephone. 

In recent months, there has been a great deal of commentary about the 
differences between East and West over human rights, about differences 
in the "political cultures" of Asia on the one hand, and Western Europe 
and North America on the other. Some have questioned the importance of 
democracy, or at least the efficacy of giving democracy prominence on 
the diplomatic agenda. 

I believe it is high time to discard the myth that only the West cares 
about freedom or that Asia is predisposed to authoritarianism. To be 
sure, there are various forms of democracy. Different political cultures 
do emphasize different values and virtues, but there is an irreducible--
and I would contend universal--principle that transcends those 
differences: All of us want our governments to treat us with fairness 
and dignity; and all of us want to participate in the decisions that 
affect our destinies. Many Asians have devoted their lives, even given 
their lives, for these values. That is why, last year, Cambodian farmers 
and monks and former soldiers crossed minefields and defied death 
threats--all in order to vote. That is why the people of Burma still 
hope that their regime will release Aung San Suu Kyi and relax its grip 
on power. 

That is surely one reason why Japan--which is not just an economic 
superpower, but also one of the world's most enduring and vital 
democracies-- has made substantial contributions to peace-keeping and 
democracy-building efforts in Southeast Asia, the Caribbean, and Africa. 
That is why the United States will continue to place political openness 
high on of its foreign-policy agenda in every part of the world--without 
arrogance or apology. We will endeavor to do so with respect for every 
nation's sovereignty and uniqueness, but with clarity and conviction. 

In recent years, democratic reforms and reformers have emerged all 
across Asia and the Pacific. But this region has not yet developed its 
own multilateral institutions to promote democracy--institutions like 
the OSCE in Europe and the OAS in the Western Hemisphere. We should now 
begin to explore some new approaches in this regard.  

But it will take time to develop the consensus necessary for effective 
multilateral structures and activities in the Asia-Pacific region. 
During that time, before those structures can be put in place, Japan and 
the United States must lead together and they must lead by example. We 
must lead by harmonizing our policies and priorities to the greatest 
extent possible.  Strengthening, deepening, broadening our bilateral 
relationship is important not only to the two of us, but to the region 
and to the world as a whole. 

In that spirit and for that reason, we should look for ways to increase 
the ties that exist between our two societies and increase them in both 
directions. At their summit meeting two weeks ago, President Clinton and 
Prime Minister Murayama both expressed support for enhancing student and 
citizen exchanges between Japan and the United States. Right now there 
are a great number of Japanese students studying in the United States--
some 47,000--while there are rather few American students studying in 
Japan--something around 1,700. That deficit, like others, needs to be 
redressed. We hope our governments will work intensively to develop 
initiatives that will lead to a broader presence of American students in 
Japan.

One of the most hopeful and promising features of our bilateral 
relationship is the U.S.-Japan Common Agenda, a joint program to pool 
the resources of our two governments in tackling global issues. A year-
and-a- half after its founding, the Common Agenda now sponsors 20 
projects--ranging from the environment and technology, to population 
issues, AIDS, children's health care, narcotics, and women in 
development. These undertakings promote all three of the common 
interests I have stressed today: security, economic growth, and 
democratic values. In closing, I would just say that this shared 
dedication to a safer, freer, and more prosperous world should be a 
major theme in this year's observance of the legacy of the last half-
century. Yes, 1995 is a year of commemoration, but it is also an 
occasion for looking ahead, toward our mutual goals--our common agenda--
for the 21st century.

(###)



ARTICLE 5

Keeping Faith With the People of Haiti
Madeleine K. Albright, UNSC Resolution

Madeleine K. Albright
Statement by the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations 
before the UN Security Council, New York City, January 30, 1995.

Today marks a planned but important point of transition in Haiti's 
journey from tyranny to democracy. The Multinational Force authorized by 
the UN Security Council last July has fulfilled its mission. Planning 
for the transfer of responsibility to a UN force is well underway. 
Today's vote verifies that the transition will occur by the end of 
March.

The men and women of the Multinational Force deserve our recognition and 
gratitude. They have performed difficult tasks with consummate skill. To 
the family of Sergeant First Class Gregory Dale Cardott, we acknowledge 
a special debt--our hearts and prayers are with you.

The U.S. Government is pleased to have led the Multinational Force, and 
we warmly thank the other nations who have contributed to it. We note 
with satisfaction the strong bond that has developed between these 
forces and the Haitian people.

We also thank the members of this council, the Friends of Haiti, and the 
Secretary General and his staff for their commitment to responding 
dynamically and creatively to the Haitian crisis. Together, we have 
served well the UN Charter's pledge to pursue "social progress and 
better standards of life in larger freedom."

Over the past four months, because of our efforts and those of the 
Organization of American States along with the wisdom of Haiti's leaders 
and the resilience of the Haitian people, welcome changes have been 
achieved. Once-dormant markets are now vibrant with life. Neighborhoods 
once shadowed by terror echo now with laughter and renewed hope. Mothers 
no longer fear their sons will be shot or their daughters raped by the 
keepers of official order. Police stations are used now for training, 
not torture; boats are built for fishing, not flight; and political 
activity has resumed. The threads of economic life have been identified 
and now must be rewoven.

Last July, the Security Council responded to the unique circumstances in 
Haiti with a strategy in two parts. In the first phase, the 
Multinational Force was to create a secure and stable environment within 
which democratic institutions could begin to function. The Multinational 
Force has achieved that purpose. The illegal leaders departed 
peacefully. President Aristide and the legitimately elected government 
have returned to power. More than 21,000 weapons have been purchased or 
seized. A new police force is being recruited, and the Haitian army is 
being reduced and reformed.

We are now approaching the second phase. Today, we have authorized the 
Secretary General to recruit and deploy up to 6,000 military and 900 
civilian police to continue the tasks thus far so well advanced. The UN 
Mission in Haiti--UNMIH--will work with Haiti's Government and other 
donors to build a new, civilian police force. It will assist the 
Government of Haiti in assuring public order. It will help establish an 
environment conducive to free and fair elections. It will complete its 
assigned tasks by February 1996.

The U.S. Government has worked hard with the Multinational Force and 
with the Secretariat staff to ensure a seamless transfer of 
responsibility--a transition without marked change. More than half of 
the military personnel and about one-third of the civilians in UNMIH 
will be veterans of the Multinational Force. Overall, there will be no 
dramatic alteration in mission size, troop capabilities, or quality of 
command. The UN troops will have the right to use force to defend 
themselves, including the right to oppose forcible attempts to impede 
the discharge of their functions.

As the Secretary General noted in his most recent report to the Council, 
"there is a feeling of liberty and a sense of security [in Haiti] which 
did not exist previously."  The organized and semi-organized bands of 
thugs operating under official protection have been disbanded. But Haiti 
is by no means a tranquil land.

The greedy, the embittered, and the desperate retain the capacity for 
violence. Criminal forces may see this transition--and the upcoming 
election campaign--as an opportunity for bolder action. But let no one 
doubt: If this UN force is pushed, it has the leadership, the mandate, 
the firepower, and the will to push back.

The economic reconstruction of Haiti is not part of the UN peace-keeping 
mission, but efforts to that end are complementary. The U.S. Government 
joins with the Secretary General in calling upon nations, development 
agencies, the UN system, and regional and non-governmental organizations 
to work together with the Haitian Government to implement the emergency 
economic recovery program. The door to private investment must be open. 
There is no better answer to inequality, corruption, and strife than 
freedom, jobs, basic education, and food on the table.

As the resolution we have approved today recognizes, the future of Haiti 
rests--as it must--in Haitian hands. Democratic institutions cannot be 
imposed upon a society; they must be nourished from within. The road 
ahead remains an uphill road. But the international community can be 
satisfied that those with the commitment to build a free Haiti now have 
that opportunity. By allowing that chance, this council has kept faith 
with the people of Haiti, with the cause of freedom, and with the 
Charter of this great institution.


Resolution 975  (January 30, 1995) 

The Security Council, 

Recalling the provisions of its resolutions 841 (1993) of 16 June 1993, 
861 (1993) of 27 August 1993, 862 (1993) of 31 August 1993, 867 (1993) 
of 23 September 1993, 873 (1993) of 13 October 1993, 875 (1993) of 16 
October 1993, 905 (1994) of 23 March 1994, 917 (1994) of 6 May 1994, 940 
(1994) of 31 July 1994, 944 (1994) of 29 September 1994, 948 (1994) of 
15 October 1994 and 964 (1994) of 29 November 1994, 

Recalling also the terms of the Governors Island Agreement (S/26063) and 
the related Pact of New York (S/26297), 

Recalling its determination in resolution 940 (1994) that the situation 
in Haiti constituted a threat to peace and security in the region which 
required the successive deployment of the Multinational Force in Haiti 
(MNF) and the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), 

Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General dated 18 October 
1994 (S/1994/1180), 21 November 1994 (S/1994/1322) and 17 January 1995 
(S/1995/46 and Add.1), and having considered the reports of MNF, dated 
26 September 1994 (S/1994/1107, annex), 10 October 1994 (S/1994/1148, 
annex), 24 October 1994 (S/1994/1208, annex), 7 November 1994 
(S/1994/1258, annex), 21 November 1994 (S/1994/1321, annex), 5 December 
1994 (S/1994/1377, annex), 19 December 1994 (S/1994/1430, annex), 9 
January 1995 (S/1995/15, annex) and 23 January 1995 (S/1995/70, annex), 

Noting in particular the MNF commander's statement of 15 January 1995 
and the accompanying recommendation, based on the MNF commander's 
report, of the States participating in the MNF (S/1995/55), regarding 
the establishment of a secure and stable environment in Haiti, 

Noting the recognition in these reports and recommendations that a 
secure and stable environment has been established in Haiti, 

Taking note of the letter dated 27 January 1995 from the Permanent 
Representative of Haiti to the United Nations (S/1995/90), 

Underlining the importance of ensuring that force levels of peace-
keeping operations are suited to the tasks involved, and noting the need 
for the Secretary-General to keep the force levels of UNMIH under 
constant review, 

Recognizing that the people of Haiti bear the ultimate responsibility 
for national reconciliation and reconstruction of their country, 

1. Welcomes the positive developments in Haiti, including the departure 
from Haiti of the former military leadership, the return of the 
legitimately elected President, and the restoration of the legitimate 
authorities, as envisaged in the Governors Island Agreement and 
consistent with resolution 940 (1994); 

2. Commends the efforts of the States participating in the MNF to work 
closely with the United Nations to assess requirements and to prepare 
for the deployment of UNMIH; 

3. Expresses appreciation to all Member States who have contributed to 
the MNF; 

4. Expresses its appreciation to the Organization of American States 
(OAS) and for the work of the International Civilian Mission (MICIVIH) 
and requests that the Secretary-General, bearing in mind the expertise 
and potential of the OAS, consult with the Secretary-General of the OAS 
regarding other appropriate measures which might be taken by both 
organizations consistent with this resolution and to report to the 
Council on the results of these consultations; 

5. Determines, as required by resolution 940 (1994) and based on the 
recommendations of the Member States participating in the MNF and in 
concurrence with paragraph 91 of the report of the Secretary-General of 
17 January 1995 (S/1995/46), that a secure and stable environment, 
appropriate to the deployment of UNMIH as foreseen in the above-
mentioned resolution 940 (1994), now exists in Haiti; 

6. Authorizes the Secretary-General, in order to fulfil the second 
condition specified in paragraph 8 of resolution 940 (1994) for the 
termination of the mission of the MNF and the assumption by UNMIH of its 
functions specified in that resolution, to recruit and deploy military 
contingents, civilian police and other civilian personnel sufficient to 
allow UNMIH to assume the full range of its functions as established by 
resolution 867 (1993) and as revised and extended by paragraphs 9 and 10 
of resolution 940 (1994); 

7. Further authorizes the Secretary-General, working with the MNF 
commander, to take the necessary steps in order for UNMIH to assume 
these responsibilities as soon as possible, with the full transfer of 
responsibility from the MNF to UNMIH to be completed by 31 March 1995; 

8. Decides to extend the existing mandate of UNMIH for a period of six 
months, that is until 31 July 1995;

9. Authorizes the Secretary-General to deploy in Haiti, in accordance 
with resolution 940 (1994), up to 6,000 troops and, as recommended in 
paragraph 87 of his report of 17 January 1995 (S/1995/46), up to 900 
civilian police officers; 

10. Recalls the commitment of the international community to assist and 
support the economic, social and institutional development of Haiti and 
recognizes its importance for sustaining a secure and stable 
environment; 

11. Recognizes that the situation in Haiti remains fragile and urges the 
Government of Haiti, with the assistance of UNMIH and the international 
community, to establish without delay an effective national police force 
and to improve the functioning of its justice system; 

12. Requests the Secretary-General to establish a fund, in addition to 
that authorized in paragraph 10 of resolution 867 (1993), through which 
voluntary contributions from Member States can be made available to 
support the international police monitoring programme and assist with 
the creation of an adequate police force in Haiti; 

13. Further requests that the Secretary-General apprise the Council at 
an early date of the modalities of the transition from the MNF to UNMIH, 
and also submit to the Council no later than 15 April 1995 a progress 
report on the deployment of UNMIH; 

14. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

VOTE: 14-0-1 (China abstaining). 

(###)



ARTICLE 6

Efforts To Resolve Dispute Between Peru and Ecuador
Alexander Watson, Assistant Secretary For Inter-American Affairs
Remarks at a State Department briefing, Washington, DC, February 7, 1995

Some of you may be aware that this dispute between Peru and Ecuador is a 
very, very long-  standing one that really originated in the 
independence period at the beginning of the last century. It got red hot 
back in the 1940s. There was a war; the Ecuadorians lost a lot of their 
territory. There was an agreement called the Rio Protocol--the Protocol 
of Rio de Janeiro of 1942--which drew the line and established the 
conditions for separation of forces and drew the boundary between the 
two countries.

Four friendly neighbors--the United States, Brazil, Argentina, and 
Chile--were asked to be guarantors of that Rio Protocol, and that is 
what we have been over the last few years, helping them try to settle 
all the spats and disputes that have arisen from this over the years.

The issue at question right now is complicated to understand. I will try 
to give it to you in about two sentences. In the Rio Protocol, a border 
is described by points, saying it goes from the confluence of these two 
rivers to this point to that point. But it was not actually demarcated 
originally. Then three years later, in 1945, a Brazilian military 
cartographer actually demarcated the border--all but a 78-kilometer 
stretch and a particularly difficult area to reach--in which he gave 
some opinions as to how that border should be demarcated following a 
line of mountains there.

What happened a few years later was that the U.S. Air Force, doing some 
aerial photography for maps, discovered a river that nobody had known 
existed before, thus changing the knowledge about the geographic area 
and thus, according to the Ecuadorians, affecting exactly how this line 
should be drawn.

I do not want to get into how that line should be drawn or how this 
process should be worked out, but that is the basis of the dispute: The 
Peruvians say the original line is the correct one, and the Ecuadorians 
say the decision was made in the absence of relevant information and 
that it should be looked at again. That issue has been the basis of 
disputes over the years. In this particular instance, skirmishes broke 
out in this area between Peruvian forces and Ecuadorian forces that had 
moved over time into small outposts in this disputed area.

Our job as the guarantors at that point was not to resolve the 
underlying dispute by any means, but to try to end the current fighting, 
stop the bloodshed, and, if we could, set up a mechanism by which the 
underlying dispute could be addressed in an effective way. We were 
successful in bringing the parties together to discuss this crisis; and, 
as you know, that is sometimes the most difficult part of a negotiating 
process.

The meeting we had lasted all week--from late Tuesday all the way 
through to Sunday--and produced a proposal which would end the current 
crisis and would provide a vehicle for pursuing a long-term resolution 
of the issue. It calls for a cease-fire, a separation of forces, a total 
demilitarization in the theater of conflict, withdrawal of troops from 
the border, and establishment of an observer mission by the guarantor 
countries. It would not be a permanent mission, in all probability;  it 
would just go in there to make sure that the troops were moving out when 
they are supposed to--and also set up a forum in which the two countries 
would be able to meet under the aegis, if you will, or with the support 
of the guarantor countries to look at the unresolved issues between 
them.

The Rio Protocol does not give to the guarantor countries authority to 
determine or impose a solution. Our job is to facilitate and assist the 
two parties--Peru and Ecuador--in arriving at that; and that is what we 
were doing down there.

The talks were very intense and conducted in good faith by all, and 
where it stands now is that we are awaiting a response from the 
Ecuadorian Government to this proposal that was produced by all six of 
us at that meeting last week.

We are continuing to work together chiefly in Brasilia now. The 
Brazilians are the leaders of the guarantor group. Their acting foreign 
minister, who is really the vice foreign minister, was the leader of our 
guarantor group. He will continue to have that role. Our ambassador in 
Brazil as well as the ambassadors of Chile and Argentina will continue 
to work very, very closely in their roles as representatives of the 
guarantor countries. Those ambassadors were in all of our meetings in 
Rio, so they were very well apprised of what took place there and are 
well versed on the issue itself.

We are still optimistic and hopeful that the two parties can find a way 
to reach an agreement. This is really a tragedy for them and for the 
hemisphere as a whole. What we tried to say in the statement we issued 
on Sunday afternoon in Rio was that we urged the two parties to suspend 
any hostilities and any threats or any provocative moves that could make 
the situation worse, and try to create a climate for: 

1. Ending the current fighting; and 
2. A longer-term constructive engagement to resolve the underlying 
issues.

We will be fully committed and prepared to work intensely with Peru and 
Ecuador as may be required.

Our information concerning what is actually going on on the ground in 
this very remote area is very, very weak, but we do not think that there 
were many hostilities taking place over the weekend. But whatever there 
was, it is too much as far as we are concerned. We hope that both sides 
will draw back.

The Ecuadorians are sending--their President visited Brazil,  Argentina, 
and Chile from Sunday night through yesterday to talk to leaders there, 
and the Ecuadorians are sending a delegation chaired by the president of 
their congress--a fellow named Heinz Mueller--to Washington to visit 
with us to talk about the crisis.

I should say that throughout this entire effort, there has been very, 
very high-level involvement, including by the Secretary of State, who 
has talked to the presidents of Ecuador and of Peru on several occasions 
during this effort to help them find a peaceful solution to this 
immediate crisis and a longer-term arrangement for resolving underlying 
issues.

(###)



ARTICLE 7

White House Statements

President Clinton Meets With President of Eritrea
Statement by White House Press Secretary Michael McCurry, Washington, 
DC, February 1, 1995.

The President met today with President Isaias Afwerki in the Oval Office 
for 30 minutes. The two Presidents welcomed the excellent relations that 
exist between the two countries and discussed ideas for broadening the 
relationship, especially in the areas of commerce and security.

The President expressed his appreciation for Eritrea's good start on the 
road to democracy and free markets in the nearly two years since its 
independence. He pledged continued U.S. support for Eritrea's efforts to 
rebuild after its decades-long struggle for independence. At the same 
time, the President applauded the emphasis that the Eritrean Government 
has placed on encouraging international trade and investment as the 
engine for Eritrean development.

The Presidents also discussed the need for peace and stability in the 
Horn of Africa, especially Sudan and Somalia. They agreed that a 
peaceful resolution to the civil war in Sudan is essential, not only for 
the long-suffering people of that nation, but for the security of 
Sudan's neighbors. They reaffirmed their commitment to work together and 
with the nations of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Development to achieve that goal.

The Presidents also underscored their joint effort to promote food 
security throughout the region. They agreed that the President's greater 
Horn of Africa initiative, developed by the U.S. Agency for 
International Development, provides a solid basis for a preventive 
approach to food crises in this 10-nation region. They agreed that a 
regional conference should be held soon to coordinate measures that 
could use humanitarian relief as a stimulus for recovery and sustainable 
development.

President Isaias also met at the White House with Anthony Lake, 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. During his 
visit to Washington, President Isaias also has had meetings with 
Secretary of Defense William Perry and other senior Administration 
officials.


U.S. Concern Over Hostilities Between Peru and Ecuador
Statement by White House Press Secretary Michael McCurry, Washington, 
DC, February 2, 1995.

This morning, President Clinton wrote to President Fujimori of Peru and 
President Duran-Ballen of Ecuador to express his serious concern over 
the continuing hostilities between Peru and Ecuador and to urge them to 
accept an immediate cease-fire agreement. He stressed that the fighting 
is a tragedy for the people of both countries.

As one of the guarantors of the 1942 Rio Protocol, the United States has 
been working closely and actively throughout the current conflict with 
the other guarantors--Argentina, Brazil, and Chile--to facilitate an 
agreement based on this accord that would end the fighting and create 
conditions for a durable peace between the two countries. Intense 
negotiations involving the guarantors, Peru, and Ecuador are continuing 
in Rio de Janeiro.

In this search for peace, Secretary Christopher has telephoned both 
Presidents Fujimori and Duran-Ballen. Assistant Secretary of State for 
Inter-American Affairs Alexander Watson is leading the U.S. delegation 
to the talks in Rio de Janeiro. Our ambassadors in Quito and Lima have 
been in constant contact with their host governments. On January 29, the 
U.S. co-sponsored a resolution at the Organization of American States 
which urged "an immediate stop to the hostilities." The United States is 
prepared to participate in a mission to observe a cease-fire once one is 
in place. 

(###)



ARTICLE 8

U.S. Accession to the UN Convention On the Law of the Sea

David A. Colson, Deputy Assistant Secretary For Oceans and International 
Environmental And Scientific Affairs
Address before an international symposium, Georgetown University, 
Washington, DC, January 27, 1995

Thank you very much for this opportunity to address the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea and the important implications it has 
for all Americans. I am honored to be part of this meeting which brings 
together a group of people that has worked through the years to make the 
Law of the Sea Convention a reality.

The background of the group illustrates the important bipartisan nature 
of the U.S. approach. Each administration has consistently searched for 
a widely accepted international framework within which to advance U.S. 
ocean interests. All administrations have been of the strongly held 
belief that a comprehensive, international consensus--versus ad hoc 
regional or bilateral arrangements--is the best way to promote, protect, 
and preserve those interests. I will not detail those interests at this 
stage, as others will discuss them in depth throughout the day. Let us 
just say, for now, that they are massive; they are vital. They range 
from national security interests to those that now fall under the rubric 
of sustainable use of ocean resources.

The Law of the Sea Convention, as now modified, provides the 
comprehensive, international framework that our country has sought for 
many years. Apart from the recently concluded trade agreement, it is 
perhaps the most significant example of the attainment of consensus in a 
major multilateral negotiation since the establishment of the United 
Nations--a consensus which in all respects serves to buttress U.S. 
national security needs while providing important tools to protect our 
marine environment and promote the sustainable use of ocean resources. 
It would be a great achievement in international law for the United 
States to join with other major maritime powers and now formally consent 
to accession to this convention.

My approach here today is to outline for you very practical ways in 
which the amended Law of the Sea Convention is beneficial to the United 
States.  Second, I want to speak directly to the opposition in our 
country to new UN institutions and the costs that are expected to be 
associated with this institution. Finally, I would like to bring you up 
to date on events since last July when the amending agreement was signed 
and demonstrate that a 180-degree turn has been made since the U.S. 
decision not to sign the convention in 1982.

Practical Ways in Which the Treaty Is Beneficial to American Interests
There is much talk today of the establishment of an "America  desk" at 
the State Department. Well, I have news for everyone: There is an 
"America desk," at least when it comes to ocean issues--the issues 
within the province of the bureau in which I work--Oceans and 
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. We do not do the 
bidding of other countries. We do not serve international institutions. 
We are, and we have been, in business to support and promote U.S. 
interests in the ocean, and that is what we do.

Sometimes I think the convention's very title, with its legal and 
theoretical connotations, does not adequately convey the fact that the 
convention provides the practical, day-to-day basis upon which to pursue 
vital U.S. national interests. Why do I say this?  I say this because 
this convention champions the rights and interests of the American 
people throughout its many provisions.

In the vital area of national security, the treaty champions the 
constitutional covenant between the American people and their government 
to defend their rights and interests, for the first and most important 
obligation of the U.S. Government to its citizens is to promote and 
defend the lives, liberties, and prosperity of the American people. This 
treaty protects the territorial integrity of the United States by 
obtaining international recognition and acceptance of our borders, 
including our territorial sea. This occurred through peaceful means at 
the bargaining table. The extension of the U.S. territorial sea from 
three to 12 nautical miles gave the U.S. an area the size of the State 
of Texas. The treaty fully recognizes this claim, as it does the U.S. 
claim to a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone--bringing 4.1 
million square miles of ocean under U.S. jurisdiction--an area one and a 
half times the size of the U.S. land area or 7% of the world's land 
area. The U.S. EEZ is, by far, the largest and richest of any in the 
world.

What this illustrates is the tremendous gains for the United States that 
have been confirmed by this sea treaty on ocean law. Many of us have 
worked long and hard in this field, and we tend to take "boilerplate" 
provisions for granted. It behooves us to take a few steps back and look 
at the accomplishments represented by the convention's provisions which 
address maritime claims and zones of national jurisdiction.

Boundaries have been the root of many a war throughout the history of 
civilization. This convention and the acceptance that it has secured 
throughout the world, largely as the result of U.S. leadership, is truly 
remarkable. Through 10 years of tenacious negotiations, such 
understandings and commitments were obtained with over 160 governments. 
To bring international stability to claims of national jurisdiction in 
the oceans is the convention's greatest accomplishment.

Vital U.S. security interests are protected by the treaty. Spokesmen 
from the Defense Department are here to address these issues, so let me 
note only that in the post-Cold War era the United States must ensure 
that the lines of communication over and under the sea and through the 
air are freely available in order to project power to distant regions. 
Constant vigilance and a willingness to assert our rights is always 
required. But the job is easier if there is fundamental international 
agreement on a comprehensive, widely accepted convention. We had better 
think long and hard before we discard the sea treaty on ocean law--an 
agreement that contains a consensus on these basic fundamental issues, 
not only among our long-time NATO allies and the OECD countries, but 
among the countries of the former Soviet Union, the former Eastern bloc 
nations, the Middle East countries, and China, among others.

This treaty champions the rights of the American people in the 
environmental arena. How does it do this?  It is the strongest and most 
comprehensive environmental treaty in existence or likely to emerge for 
quite some time. The convention establishes, for the first time, a 
comprehensive legal framework for the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment. By addressing all sources of marine pollution, such 
as pollution from vessels, seabed activities, ocean dumping, and land-
based sources, it promotes the continuing improvement in the health of 
the world's oceans. This treaty effectively and expressly finds the 
right balance between economic and environmental interests. Of 
particular note, it finds the right balance between America's interests 
as a coastal state in protecting its environment and natural resources 
with the American armed forces' rights and freedoms of navigation around 
the world.

This convention champions the rights of the American people as they 
enter the information age. It provides explicitly for the laying of 
submarine cables and other telecommunications equipment on the ocean 
floor and continental shelves. This is key to maintaining our 
technological lead in this field. Submarine cables include telegraph, 
telephone, and high-voltage power cables, which are essential to modern 
communications. In light of the extraordinary costs and increasing 
importance to the world economy of undersea telecommunications cables, 
particularly the new fiber optic cables, it is significant that the 
convention strengthens the protections for their owners and operators.

The treaty champions the rights of the American people in the 
conservation of their offshore living marine resources, particularly 
fish. Ninety percent of the living marine resources are harvested within 
200 miles of the coast. The convention confirms the validity of the 
United States Exclusive Economic Zone, proclaimed by President Reagan in 
1983. The treaty's provisions relating to the conservation and 
management of living marine resources are consistent with U.S. law, 
policy, and practice. Its provisions on the conservation of high seas 
fishery resources are more critical today than they were a few years ago 
because of the dramatic overfishing that has occurred worldwide just in 
the past decade. The dispute settlement provisions of the convention as 
they relate to high seas fisheries will help us ensure that overfishing 
does not occur on the high seas adjacent to our 200-mile zone in a 
manner detrimental to the interests of our fishing industry.

The convention champions the rights of the American people to protect 
the marine mammals that inhabit the vast ocean space. Americans care 
about whales and giant sea turtles and other important sea creatures. 
Poll after poll confirms this interest, and the treaty sets up the 
mechanisms whereby the United States can work to respond to these 
uniquely international issues.

The convention champions the rights of the American people to engage in 
international commerce. As we enter the global village--and every day 
that goes by demonstrates the global nature of trade--the shipping lanes 
that handle that trade become increasingly more important. How can we 
say they do not? American importers, exporters, shippers, and other 
merchants will be provided with greater certainty as standardized rules 
of the road are adopted in conformity with this all-important treaty.

The convention champions the rights of the American people to oil and 
gas resources off the coast to the farthest reaches of the outer edge of 
the continental margin. The standards and procedures for delimiting the 
outer edge of the margin will help avoid uncertainty and disagreement 
over the maximum extent of coastal-state continental shelf jurisdiction. 
This clarity is enormously important, both to advance the resource 
management of the U.S. continental shelf to its farthest point and the 
commercial interests of the U.S. oil and gas industry, whether operating 
at home or abroad. This amended convention is truly America's 
convention.

Last, but not least, the convention champions the rights of the American 
people to learn more about the oceans. Its marine scientific research 
provisions support the activities of U.S. scientists, promotes their 
access to waters under the jurisdiction of other nations, and fosters 
the free flow of resulting scientific data and information.

UN Institutions: An Insurance Policy

We are keenly aware of the move toward less regulation, smaller 
institutions, and limited government that is sweeping our nation. The 
election of November 8 confirmed this trend. The same winds have been 
blowing within the UN system for some time now. The issue of cost to 
States Parties provided the opening the UN Secretary General used to 
draw states into discussions in the late 1980s, which led to a 
successful resolution of outstanding issues and the resulting amending 
agreement that fixed the convention's deep seabed mining provisions. 
Many states had expressed the view that such costs must be kept low. The 
resulting amending agreement provides for a much more limited apparatus 
and one in which the United States will have a say commensurate with our 
interests.

To be sure, there will be costs associated with these institutions.  It 
is our belief that we have done everything in our power to limit these 
costs, and, all things considered, they will be relatively small. For 
one thing, the United States and the four other largest contributors to 
the International Seabed Authority are guaranteed a seat on the Finance 
Committee. This committee has jurisdiction over all budgetary and 
financial matters until the organization no longer is financed by 
assessed contributions. Because the Finance Committee must make 
decisions by consensus, the United States has a veto. The Congress must, 
of course, appropriate whatever money we would contribute.

The United States is also guaranteed a seat on the Council of the 
Authority. Decisions on the distribution of revenues from mining, the 
adoption of rules and regulations, and the approval of amendments to the 
convention's seabed mining provisions must be made by consensus. Hence, 
they also are subject to a U.S. veto. Other substantive decisions of the 
council are made by a chambered voting arrangement, the effect of which 
is to allow the United States and two other industrialized countries 
acting in concert to block a decision.

The anticipated total budget for the International Seabed Authority for 
1995 is a little under $2.5 million, and we would normally fund no more 
than 25% of that--no more than $650,000. This will cover conference 
services for three meetings and personnel costs to support a secretariat 
staff of six professionals and 17 support staff.

One way to look at these limited costs is that they serve as a sort of 
insurance premium paid to ensure and stabilize the vast benefits 
outlined above that will accrue to the American people. Compared to our 
expenditures for national defense, these expenses are well below de 
minimus. Or, compared to the funding of other inter- national 
institutions established by other multilateral treaties to which we are 
a party, we get an extremely good bang for this American buck in terms 
of the promotion of the array of U.S. ocean interests. What we are 
currently looking at in terms of costs is less than the contribution we 
make to many international commissions and institutions that we are 
party to by treaty, and it is a drop in the bucket against our 
contribution to UN institutions.

Compare this $650,000 to the $22 million of a U.S. Air Force C-130-- 
which is not the most sophisticated or costly of military machines. That 
was the cost of the plane shot down by Peru as it attempted to enforce 
an excessive maritime claim. Not only that, but an airman lost his life. 
In recent weeks, in light of entry into force of the convention and the 
solid momentum building in support of its provisions, Peru stated that 
it is reviewing its policies with an eye toward a public referendum. 
This is very significant. This is what we want to see. The more 
certainty that is achieved in the way we use the oceans, the less the 
cost to the American taxpayers and the American armed forces in terms of 
assets and preparedness.

It is too early to tell what out-year budgets will be for the 
implementation of this convention, but certainly for the foreseeable 
future, they should not be too different. The 1996 budget and following 
budgets will have to pass through the Finance Committee, which will 
include the United States and other major contributors. Through its veto 
power in the Finance Committee, the United States will be able to ensure 
that the budget of the Authority remains reasonable in relation to the 
tasks that it must perform. You can be sure that our allies, including 
Russia, will perform this watchdog function along with us. Even if costs 
were to triple, a 25% U.S. share would still be well within reasonable 
limits, considering the magnitude of the security of investment provided 
by this treaty to innumerable American interests and in comparison to 
the amount we contribute to other international institutions.

Development of Consensus Since 1982

We have come a long way since President Reagan decided not to sign the 
convention in July of 1982. The President made that decision after 
reviewing the entire convention. His decision to withhold U.S. signature 
was based on six points he outlined having to do with Part XI--the deep 
seabed section of the convention. He was quite clear, in an ocean policy 
statement released in March 1983, when he proclaimed a 200-nautical mile 
exclusive economic zone, that the United States accepted the balance of 
interests reflected in the other parts of the convention and that we 
would abide by those sections.

In 1988, President Reagan, once again acting with the convention as 
benchmark, extended the U.S. territorial sea, by proclamation, to 12 
nautical miles for international purposes. These actions emphasize the 
importance of the convention and our support for it--apart from Part XI. 
Part XI alone had always been the problem.

In 1982, a mission undertaken by a special emissary of the President--
Donald Rumsfeld--to U.S. allies revealed similar dissatisfaction over 
Part XI. Some important allies, such as the United Kingdom and Germany, 
stood with the U.S. in opposing Part XI and withheld signature. Other 
allies, such as France, Japan, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands, 
signed but made statements to the effect that ratification would not 
occur until an acceptable solution was found regarding the seabed mining 
section.

Commentators, such as Ken Adelman, who participated in the Rumsfeld 
mission, have written recent op-ed pieces that remain critical of the 
convention. What is of concern is that they fail to take into account 
the advances made in the seabed mining provisions, not to mention that 
they ignore or discount the protection the convention provides for 
fundamental U.S. interests, such as a 12-mile limit to coastal 
sovereignty, freedom of navigation, protection of the marine 
environment, and management of fisheries. All of these interests are 
clearly American interests and should be guaranteed protection. John 
Whitehead, also an important player in the Reagan Administration as the 
Deputy Secretary of State, made these points in a recent piece he wrote 
in the Washington Times. He concluded that our objectives have been 
achieved, and we should now support the outcome.

Over the past few years, a quiet negotiation under the auspices of the 
UN Secretary General worked to reform Part XI of the convention. The 
agreement that was achieved addressed satisfactorily each of the U.S. 
concerns articulated during the 1980s. Market-based principles now guide 
the operation of this section of the convention. The objectionable 
technology-transfer provisions are gone. New voting formulas guarantee 
the United States a place at the table and influence commensurate with 
our interests and the ability to control--through the Finance Committee-
-the size and shape of the ocean institutions that will be created.

This could not have been achieved without the strong stance taken 
against Part XI voiced by President Reagan, Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher, and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the united opposition of 
industrialized governments. Now these governments have joined with the 
United States to sign the deep seabed agreement that has reformed the 
objectionable treaty provisions. Today, 83% of the world's GDP is 
represented by governments that have indicated support for the amended 
convention. Seventy percent of the world's population is represented by 
those same governments. This includes all of the OECD countries. Russia, 
already a signatory to the convention, recently agreed to provisionally 
apply the deep seabed mining agreement. This decision was transmitted to 
the Secretary General on January 5, 1995. We are pleased with this 
development, and we will work with Russia to keep costs associated with 
the convention down.

In recent weeks, we polled our OECD colleagues to inquire as to their 
plans for ratification. We learned that most, if not all, will complete 
ratification this year or in the first few months of 1996. Germany, 
which was with us in 1982, has ratified, as have Australia and Italy. 
France and New Zealand expect to do so by mid-year. Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Luxembourg look for ratification by year's end. Greece, 
Austria, Portugal, and Ireland expect to ratify soon, certainly before 
the end of the year. Spain, a most important strait state, will likely 
ratify this year as well. The United Kingdom and Japan are both moving 
forward and expect the required parliamentary action by early 1996. 
Indeed, we know of no case of doubt that a major country will approve 
the convention by 1996.

Some may argue that the United States should not bother to fix the one 
unacceptable part of the treaty. The problem with this argument is that 
that treaty part has been fixed. Those of us involved with this within 
the executive branch believe we should accede to this convention. It is 
largely America's convention. We created it. In concept and in its 
details, it is largely what we want--then and now. As a maritime power 
concerned with freedom of navigation and overflight--military   and 
commercial--and as a coastal nation concerned with proper management of 
our off-shore resources and protection of the marine environment, 
America's interests are well served    by a universally accepted 
convention that provides the rules and framework to advance U.S. ocean 
interests into  the 21st century. 

(###)

[BOX INSERT]  Text of The Letters of Transmittal and Submittal and 
Commentary of the Law of the Sea Convention have been published as 
Dispatch Supplement, Volume 6, Number 1, February 1995.  (###)



ARTICLE 9

Current Issues in International Fishery Conservation and Management
David A. Colson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans And International 
Environmental and Scientific Affairs
Statement before the Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife, and Oceans of 
the House Committee on Resources, Washington, DC, January 25, 1995

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I appreciate the opportunity 
to testify before the committee on several current international fishery 
conservation and management issues. With your permission, I will discuss 
the topics raised in the Chairman's letter of January 11, and mention a 
number of other related international fisheries developments.

The State Department's involvement with fisheries issues dates from the 
earliest history of the United States. In 1789, Thomas Jefferson, when 
he was Secretary of State, submitted a report to Congress describing the 
decline of New England fisheries harvests. Until recently, many have 
considered the seas to be an inexhaustible source of fish. Living marine 
resources are now known to be under extreme stress.

World harvests of marine species peaked at about 86 million mt in 1989. 
The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization reports that the 
catch of marine species declined to 82 million mt in 1992. Absent 
concerted efforts to bring about responsible fishing practices, we can 
expect this downward trend to continue. The fishing power in the world 
is simply too great; new care must be taken to conserve the fishery 
resources of the sea so that they can be used sustainably by future 
generations and play their central role in the marine ecosystem, and so 
that they contribute to the global economy.

As we consider these facts, however, two other points need to be noted: 
First, since about 90% of the world's fish catch occurs in the 200-mile 
exclusive economic zone of coastal states, most of the responsibility 
lies with individual countries to conserve and manage the resources for 
which they are responsible. Second, our awareness of the importance of 
fisheries to our economies and way of life, and the need to be prudent 
and wise in our international fisheries management, emerges at the same 
time that the world's population continues to explode. Our ocean 
resources cannot help but come under increasing pressure from this fact 
alone. We must be very wise in the years ahead to ensure the 
sustainability of the world's fishery resources.

The Department of State has aggressively taken the initiative in the 
international community to address fishery conservation and management 
issues, both bilaterally and multilaterally, with an emphasis on solving 
high seas fisheries problems. We have recently concluded several 
agreements which will help maintain viable international fisheries and 
which will thus be to the long-term benefit of U.S. fishermen. I would 
like to discuss some of these agreements, and describe what remains to 
be done to implement them. In this regard, I note that there are a 
number of items, supported by the   Administration, that the House acted 
favorably upon last year, but that did not become law. My comments today 
will be based on these measures as they were considered by the last 
Congress, since the Administration has not reviewed bills recently 
introduced in the 104th Congress.

I am accompanied today by Mr. Rolland Schmitten of the National Marine 
Fisheries Service, NOAA, and Mr. Gary Edwards of the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service.

High Seas Fisheries Licensing Act
This bill was approved by the full House during the last Congress, as 
Title I of the "Oceans Act of 1994," H.R. 4852. It is especially 
important because it implements two treaties that are key elements of 
the strategy I have just outlined. These are:

1. The Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation 
and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas--commonly 
referred to as the FAO "Flagging" Agreement; and 

2. The Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock 
Resources in the Central Bering Sea--also called the "Donut Hole 
Convention."  

The Senate has given advice and consent to ratification to both of these 
treaties. We await the passage, however, of this bill before we deposit 
our instruments of ratification. So that you will understand the need 
for this legislation, I would like to explain the status and the 
significance of each agreement.

The FAO Flagging Agreement

On June 28, 1994, I testified, on behalf of the Administration, in 
support of the FAO Flagging Agreement before the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations. The agreement was adopted at Rome by consensus of the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations on November 24, 
1993. The full Senate gave its advice and consent to accept the 
agreement on October 6, 1994. To date, six countries, including Canada, 
have accepted the agreement, and many other countries are in the process 
of doing so.

The agreement was largely the initiative of the United States, and it 
was gratifying to receive the Senate's approval. The agreement 
represents one critical element of our efforts to bring fishing 
conducted on the high seas under greater control in order to maintain 
the productivity of high seas fisheries over the long term.

The agreement rests on the legal framework established in the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. It builds upon one of 
the convention's basic obligations--that states whose vessels fish on 
the high seas are to cooperate in the conservation and management of 
high seas resources. It seeks to ensure that there is a genuine link 
between those states and the vessels that fly their flag.

The agreement addresses a growing threat to the integrity of multi- 
lateral fishery organizations. Fishing vessels flying the flag of some 
states participating in such organizations have increasingly reflagged 
to non-member states as a means of avoiding fishing restrictions that 
would otherwise apply to them.

However, reflagging is only part of a larger problem. A growing number 
of newly built high seas fishing vessels are registered directly in 
states that are not members of the major multilateral fishery 
organizations. The agreement also addresses the problems caused by this 
practice. Implementation of the agreement by the United States requires 
new legislation. We  will not deposit the United States instrument of 
acceptance until such implementing legislation is passed. We encourage 
you to consider this legislation favorably at an early date, because the 
United States, as a member of most important fishery organizations whose 
measures will be strengthened by the agreement, stands to benefit 
considerably from its entry into force and effective implementation.

Central Bering Sea "Donut Hole" Agreement

On June 16, 1994, representatives of China, Korea, Russia, and the 
United States signed the Convention on the Conservation and Management 
of Pollock Resources in the Central Bering Sea. I was pleased to sign 
the convention on behalf of the United States, following three years of 
intense negotiations to address high seas over- fishing of the pollock 
resources in the high seas area of the Bering Sea known as the "Donut 
Hole."  Japan and Poland--the other participating countries in the 
preparation of the agreement--subsequently signed the convention in July 
and August 1994, respectively. Unregulated fishing on that part of the 
pollock stock which migrates from the U.S. and Russian zones to the high 
seas Donut Hole area is of great concern to us. Vessels of Japan, China, 
Korea, and Poland began fishing without restraint in the mid- to late 
1980s on the pollock stock in the Donut Hole. The result was a dramatic 
decrease in the size of the stock. This decrease also raised serious 
concerns about possible long-term adverse impacts on ecologically 
related species.

Under the convention, harvest levels of pollock in the Donut Hole will 
be based on the best scientific and technical information available. 
There are strong enforcement and compliance provisions to ensure 
responsible fishing. Chief among these are the requirements that each 
and every vessel fishing for pollock in the central Bering Sea use a 
real-time satellite position fixing device; that each carry scientific 
observers; and that each consent to boarding and inspection by 
enforcement officials--the U.S. Coast Guard--to ensure compliance with 
the convention.

These are provisions that, with others, make the convention a unique, 
forward-looking agreement. Representatives of the U.S. fishing industry, 
government agencies, and congressional representatives strongly 
supported the U.S. negotiating effort. The regime the convention creates 
will aid in ensuring the continued viability of the U.S. pollock 
industry. It will also serve as an effective forum for closer and 
improved international coordination of fishery enforcement activities on 
the high seas of the North Pacific. The benefits to be derived from the 
convention will make its establishment extraordinarily worthwhile.

The Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the convention 
on October 6, 1994. The High Seas Fisheries Licensing Act of 1994, as 
passed by the House of Representatives during the last session of 
Congress, contained measures sufficient to implement the convention, and 
for that reason as well, we request your support for early passage of 
the legislation.

I should note that the Russian Parliament and President Yeltsin have 
taken the necessary steps to approve the Donut Hole convention and that 
the other governments concerned are moving ahead with their respective 
legislative and constitutional requirements. We need to pass this act. 
We certainly do not want to be the last to ratify the Donut Hole 
convention that we all worked so hard for.

Sea of Okhotsk "Peanut Hole"

Mr. Chairman, related to the Donut Hole, I would like to note that there 
are occasionally rumors that some U.S. vessels may wish to enter the Sea 
of Okhotsk off the Russian Far East. There are indications that they may 
wish to fish in the high seas "Peanut Hole" area of that sea. The 
central Sea of Okhotsk Peanut Hole area is currently facing a very 
serious conservation problem with its pollock stocks, not unlike the 
central Bering Sea Donut Hole. Vessels of Japan, Korea, China, and 
Poland have, in recent years, been fishing without restraint in the 
Peanut Hole on its pollock stocks. As a result, the stocks have 
reportedly been decimated.

Negotiations initiated by Russia with the fishing countries have been 
unsuccessful toward reaching an agreement to conserve and manage the 
stock, although agreement was reached that no fishing would occur in 
1994. I want to stress the importance of a solid, positive fisheries 
relationship with Russia in the North Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea. Were 
U.S. vessels to enter the Peanut Hole, our cooperation with Russia on a 
broad range of fishery issues would be jeopardized and implementation of 
the Donut Hole agreement could be frustrated.

The Sea of Okhotsk Fisheries Enforcement Act of 1994 was passed by the 
House of Representatives on October 7, 1994, as Title VI of the Ocean 
Act of 1994. The Administration strongly recommends and supports 
enactment of the bill.

The bill would amend the Central Bering Sea Fisheries Enforcement Act of 
1992. It would expand the prohibition on U.S. vessels and nationals from 
conducting fishing operations in the central Bering Sea, except where 
such fishing operations are conducted in accordance with an 
international fishery agreement to which the United States and Russia 
are parties, to include the central Sea of Okhotsk.

Enactment of the bill would further our bilateral efforts, particularly 
with Russia, to protect the marine environment and to ensure sustainable 
fisheries in the central Bering Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk. It would 
fulfill the intention of Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, as announced at 
the Vancouver Summit in April 1993, to expand and improve joint work in 
the area of environmental protection, including further development of 
bilateral cooperation on fisheries in the Bering Sea, the north Pacific 
Ocean, and the Sea of Okhotsk, including for the purpose of preservation 
and reproduction of living marine resources.

I urge the committee to again consider and take favorable action on the 
bill.

Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967

Mr. Chairman, you may recall that, last summer, Canada imposed a fee on 
each U.S. fishing vessel which sought to transit the "Inside Passage" 
between Vancouver Island and mainland British Columbia. Negotiations on 
the management regime under the Pacific Salmon Treaty had broken down, 
and Canadian officials thought that the imposition of a $1,100 (U.S.) 
"transit fee" would advance the negotiating process. It did not.

But it did establish the possibility of dangerous confrontations between 
U.S. fishermen in small boats seeking the safe transit offered by the 
Inside Passage and armed Canadian authorities. Concerned west coast 
Members of Congress and many of us involved in the negotiations sought a 
way to avoid these confrontations. In the end, we encouraged fishermen 
to pay the transit fee, and congressional interests and the 
Administration agreed that we would seek authority to reimburse the 
fishermen from funds on hand in one of two programs authorized under the 
Fishermen's Protective Act.

Let me emphasize that we did not then, nor do we now, have the legal 
authority to make those payments. This is not an appropriations issue. 
The issue is that if we are to reimburse at least the 258 fishermen who 
we now know paid the fee, the Fishermen's Protective Act must be 
amended. Again, H.R. 4852, passed by the full House on October 7, 1994, 
contained language that would have allowed us to make those payments. In 
fact, Section 502 of H.R. 4852 reflected a compromise between House and 
Senate approaches to this problem, and it met most of the "scoring" and 
"pay-go" requirements of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990.

We are prepared to work with staff to resolve any remaining concerns 
about this legislation, and we need it if we are to reimburse the 
fishermen who paid the fee.

Mr. Chairman, I have outlined three legislative actions which need to be 
taken if we are to get our laws up to speed on where we are on 
international fishery issues: the High Seas Fisheries Licensing Act; the 
Sea of Okhotsk Fisheries Enforcement Act; and an amendment to the 
Fishermen's Protective Act. I am aware of no opposition to these in the 
Senate or in the industry. I hope that both Houses can pass the 
necessary bills swiftly early this year.

Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic 
Fisheries

I would also like to discuss the Convention on Future Multilateral 
Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries--the convention done at 
Ottawa on October 24, 1978. The convention established the Northwest 
Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), which regulates fisheries on 
straddling stocks in that portion of the Atlantic. The convention 
provides for conservation and management of fish stocks--cod, redfish, 
yellowtail flounder, American plaice, and other groundfish species--that 
occur outside national zones of jurisdiction. It also provides a 
framework for scientific cooperation on fisheries of the Northwest 
Atlantic Ocean.

While the Senate approved this convention in 1983, due to the absence of 
implementing legislation, the United States has not yet acceded to the 
convention. The time has come for us to do so if we have an interest in 
the fisheries of this region and if our fishermen are going to fish 
there. Our policy--on a wide range of international conservation issues-
-is to participate in regional conservation and management regimes. We 
make it a cornerstone of our laws and policies to encourage others to do 
so. Our failure to participate in the NAFO regime for stocks in the 
Atlantic, which U.S. fishermen occasionally harvest, is inconsistent 
with our policies to encourage cooperation in international resource 
management and to ensure the sustainable use of fisheries resources 
through participation in international management agreements.

Some segments of the fishing industry have not been supportive of the 
United States joining NAFO. However, last year, the House adopted 
implementing legislation for NAFO in H.R. 3188, which became Title II of 
the "Oceans Act of 1994," passed by the House on October 7. Again, I 
urge you to consider this measure favorably.

It is deeply important if we are to use commercial fisheries on a 
sustainable basis that any fisherman who fishes outside his national 
zone fishes pursuant to rules established through the relevant 
conservation and management organization for the region.

Governing International Fishery Agreements (GIFAs)

Under the Magnuson Act, a governing international fisheries agreement 
(GIFA) is the mechanism through which foreign countries accept all the 
provisions of the Magnuson Act, including the basic objectives of the 
act concerning Americanization of all fisheries within the U.S. 
exclusive economic zone. The U.S. Departments of State and Commerce are 
committed to these basic objectives of the act and to working with U.S. 
industry groups to achieve these objectives. Should there be surplus 
stocks of fish, any allocation thereof would be considered in light of 
U.S. domestic fishing interests. We remain concerned about a proposal 
advanced by some U.S. industry groups to amend the Magnuson Act to 
prohibit allocation of surplus stocks to our GIFA partners. Their 
proposed amendment is unwise, as it could foreclose potential access to 
surplus fish stocks of other coastal states by U.S. vessels. The 
amendment is unnecessary, because domestic fishing interests are taken 
into consideration in allocation decisions.

But GIFAs are particularly useful for other purposes. The domestic 
industry may be interested in using joint ventures possible under GIFAs 
to tap foreign expertise or investment to the benefit of U.S. fishermen-
-to develop domestic processing or marketing capabilities, for example. 
In addition, GIFAs facilitate bilateral cooperation on a wide range of 
fisheries issues, and provide a forum for continuing dialogue on 
fisheries issues of mutual interest. The United States currently has 
GIFAs with Korea, Poland, the People's Republic of China, Latvia, 
Estonia, and Lithuania. We also have a Mutual Fisheries Relations 
agreement with Russia--a reciprocal agreement which provides our 
fishermen with the opportunity to conduct operations in the Russian 200-
mile zone.

We believe the Estonia GIFA is an important sign of U.S. support for an 
emerging democracy. At present, the Estonian distant water fleet is 
burdened by excessive fuel costs, and we do not expect the Estonian 
Government to request permission to fish in the U.S. zone at any time 
during the  requested two-year extension of this agreement, nor do we 
see the likelihood that surplus resources would be available. The 
President transmitted the Estonia GIFA to Congress on January 19, 1995.

Similarly, the People's Republic of China is not expected to request 
permission to fish in the U.S. zone, but as the world's largest 
harvester of marine fish, China needs to be brought to the table in 
important fishery management discussions, particularly in the Pacific 
and the Indian Oceans. The GIFA enables us to encourage responsible 
fishing practices by the Chinese fleet. The President transmitted this 
agreement to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives just before the end of the last session of Congress.

Mr. Chairman, as you are aware, the Magnuson Act provides that a GIFA--
or extension--may enter into force following its transmittal to Congress 
and 60 days of continuous session, and that Congress may act on a GIFA 
before that 60-day period expires. We support the extension of these two 
agreements.

Atlantic Tunas Convention Act of 1975

The Atlantic Tunas Convention Act implements the convention which 
established the International Commission for the Conservation of 
Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT). ICCAT is a difficult forum in which to operate 
effectively, because  of the large number of countries involved--22 from 
five different continents--the many different relationships and 
interests among these nations, and the fact that the U.S. is not the 
dominant influence in the commission.

But it is the right forum--most of the countries that should participate 
do so, and it is properly structured to adopt binding conservation and 
management measures throughout the full range of the species when 
necessary. During the past few years, ICCAT has done a much better job 
in its conservation efforts. We believe it is now on the right track for 
effective conservation of Atlantic bluefin tuna and swordfish stocks--
the species of primary interest to the United States.

At the 1994 ICCAT meeting, the countries of the commission took a 
historic decision by agreeing to a procedure providing for the 
possibility of trade sanctions by member countries against non-members 
whose vessels fish in a manner which undermines agreed ICCAT 
conservation measures. We will be working hard in the months ahead to 
ensure the effective implementation of this procedure.

Mr. Chairman, I believe the committee should consider several other 
developments in international fisheries. With your permission, I would 
like to summarize each of these issues for the committee.

United Nations Conference on   Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks

This conference is one of several follow-up actions from the 1992 UN 
Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro. We 
believe that can produce a number of positive results for the United 
States. Fundamentally, we seek to fix weak elements of the current 
international fishery management system, particularly by strengthening 
enforcement of the relevant regimes.

We are now focusing our attention on dispute settlement, port state 
enforcement, and other enforcement and compliance concerns. The form of 
the outcome of the conference is important. We support a strong, binding 
convention. We also support the concept of precautionary reference 
points as elements in the effective conservation and management of 
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks, both within and 
beyond the exclusive economic zone.

FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing

Mr. Chairman, in addition to the FAO "Flagging Agreement," I am pleased 
to report that the FAO is working to develop a broader International 
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing, in  which the United States is 
actively involved. The code will address such areas as fishing 
operations, fishery management practices, fair trade practices, 
aquaculture development, coastal fisheries and coastal area management, 
and fishery research.

Last year, the FAO drafted the General Principles of the code. 
Consultations are scheduled to continue this spring to finalize it. The 
FAO should conclude its work on the code and adopt it by the end of this 
year.

The code will be voluntary in nature. It should greatly advance 
responsible fishing everywhere--in coastal areas as well as on the high 
seas. The United States fully supports development of the code and will 
continue to be an active participant in discussions on the code.

Large-Scale High Seas Driftnet Fishing

I am pleased to report to the committee that the Administration 
continues to ensure the full and effective implementation of the United 
Nations global moratorium on large-scale high seas driftnet fishing. As 
you are aware, the United States was a major proponent of the United 
Nations General Assembly resolution on large-scale high seas driftnet 
fishing and the global moratorium on such fishing.

Toward this end, in December 1993, we concluded an agreement with the 
People's Republic of China to ensure effective cooperation and 
implementation of the moratorium. This agreement was recently extended 
for a two-year period. Under terms of the agreement, the Coast Guard may 
carry on board its cutters patrolling in the North Pacific a PRC 
enforcement official who would assist in any boarding of a PRC flag 
vessel suspected of using or equipped to use large-scale driftnets. In 
1994, the Coast Guard did not detect any large-scale driftnet fishing in 
the North Pacific. We believe and remain generally pleased that the 
moratorium is being effectively implemented in the North Pacific.

With regard to the Northeast Atlantic and Mediterranean Sea, we remain 
seriously concerned over continuing reports of fishing inconsistent with 
the moratorium and European laws by some vessels from European 
countries. We have repeatedly encouraged the relevant governments to 
take responsible enforcement action to ensure that vessels flying their 
flag are in compliance with the moratorium. They report that they have 
implemented stringent enforcement procedures. We are also seeking 
independently to confirm reports of activity inconsistent with the 
moratorium, and will continue to follow this issue closely.

South Pacific Fisheries

One of the most fruitful international fisheries agreements to which the 
United States is a party is the "Treaty on Fisheries Between the 
Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and the Government of the 
United States of America," popularly known as the "South Pacific 
Regional Fisheries Treaty."  The treaty entered into force on June 15, 
1988, and in 1992, the United States and the 16 Pacific Island parties 
extended the treaty arrangements through June 15, 2003. As a result of 
the agreement, we now enjoy close, cooperative fisheries relations with 
the nations of the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA). In fact, the treaty has 
come to be much more than a fisheries agreement: It is a fundamental 
component of U.S. relations with the Pacific Island States. It is not an 
exaggeration to say that the treaty has become a cornerstone of U.S. 
relations with the countries of the region. The treaty is also of 
significant benefit to the U.S. tuna industry, since it provides fishing 
access on fair terms and conditions to nearly 10 million square miles of 
ocean. The U.S. fleet has done an excellent job of following the rules 
and making the treaty work from a practical point of view. It is of the 
utmost importance to U.S. foreign policy and fisheries policy interests 
in the South Pacific that the U.S. commitment to compensate the FFA 
pursuant to the treaty continue to be funded.

While the treaty is of great importance to us, it is basically an access 
agreement. It does not provide for conservation and management of the 
region's tuna stocks. Also, there is no multilateral forum where 
fisheries matters can be discussed with the full range of nations 
involved in the fisheries. So, there is something of an institutional 
gap which needs to be addressed. In this regard, a high-level 
multilateral fisheries conference took place in Honiara, Solomon 
Islands, December 5-9, 1994. This conference was the first time that all 
of the coastal states and distant water fishing nations involved in the 
region had met together to discuss fisheries issues of mutual interest. 
The conference was successful in beginning a process of multilateral 
dialogue on fisheries science, regional enforcement mechanisms, and 
agreed operational rules. We will be following up on the outcome of the 
conference, in close cooperation with the FFA, the Pacific Island 
States, and the U.S. tuna industry.

Eastern Tropical Pacific Tuna Fisheries

The most difficult issue in this area in recent years has been the 
tuna/dolphin controversy. I do not wish to discuss this matter in any 
detail at this time, but I would like the subcommittee to be aware that 
the dolphin protection program of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna 
Commission has been phenomenally successful, to the point where 
accidental dolphin kills have been reduced to extremely low levels. The 
tuna embargoes required by the Marine Mammal Protection Act are harming 
our relations with the embargoed countries. We would be interested in 
exploring with Congress during the year ahead how to resolve the embargo 
problem while not lessening the protection of dolphins.

Thank you very much.

(###)



ARTICLE 10

Treaty Actions

Multilateral

Arbitration 
Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards. Done at New York June 10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959; 
for the U.S. Dec. 29, 1970. TIAS 6997; 21 UST 2517.
Accessions: Mali, Sept. 8, 1994; Mongolia, Oct. 24, 19941; Portugal, 
Oct. 18, 19941; Senegal, Oct. 17, 1994; Zimbabwe, Sept. 29, 1994.

Chemical Weapons 
Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, 
stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction, with 
annexes. Done at Paris Jan. 13, 19932. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 103-21.
Signature: Chad, Oct. 11, 1994.
Ratifications: Greece, Dec. 22, 1994; Mongolia, Jan. 17, 1995; Paraguay, 
Dec. 1, 1994; Spain, Aug. 3, 19941; Tajikistan, Jan. 11, 1995; Uruguay, 
Oct. 6, 1994 1.

Children
Convention on protection of children and cooperation in respect of 
intercountry adoption. Done at The Hague May 29, 19932.
Signatures: Cyprus, Nov. 17, 1994; Peru, Nov. 16, 1994.
Ratification: Mexico, Sept. 14, 1994 1.

Copyright
Berne convention for the protection of literary and artistic works of 
Sept. 9, 1886, revised at Paris July 24, 1971, and amended in 1979. 
Entered into force for the U.S. Mar. 1, 1989. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-
27.
Accession: Russian Federation, Dec. 9, 19941.

Genocide
Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. 
Adopted by the UN General Assembly at Paris  Dec. 9, 1948. Entered into 
force Jan. 12, 1951; for the U.S. Feb. 23, 1989.
Accessions: Malaysia, Dec. 20, 1994; Namibia, Nov. 28, 1994.

Human Rights 
International covenant on civil and political rights. Adopted by the UN 
General Assembly Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976; for 
the U.S. Sept. 8, 1992.
Signature: South Africa, Oct. 3, 1994.
Accessions: Kyrgyzstan, Oct. 7, 1994; Namibia, Nov. 28, 1994.

Optional protocol to the international covenant on civil and political 
rights. Adopted by the UN General Assembly Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into 
force Mar. 23, 1976 3. 
Accessions: Kyrgyzstan, Oct. 7, 1994; Namibia, Nov. 28, 1994; Paraguay, 
Jan. 10, 1995.

International covenant on economic, social, and cultural rights. Adopted 
by the UN General Assembly Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 
19763.
Signature: South Africa, Oct. 3, 1994.
Accessions: Kyrgyzstan, Oct. 7, 1994; Namibia, Nov. 28, 1994.

Judicial Procedure
Convention abolishing the requirement of legalization for foreign public 
documents, with annex. Done at The Hague  Oct. 5, 1961. Entered into 
force Jan. 24, 1965; for the U.S. Oct. 15, 1981. TIAS 10072; 33 UST 883.
Accessions: Australia, July 11, 19941; Mexico, Dec. 1, 1994; South 
Africa, Aug. 3, 1994.

Convention on the service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents 
in civil or commercial matters. Done at The Hague Nov. 15, 1965. Entered 
into force Feb. 10, 1969. TIAS 6638; 20 UST 361.
Accession: Venezuela, Oct. 29, 19931.
Ratification: Switzerland, Nov. 2, 19941,4.

Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in civil or commercial 
matters. Opened for signature at The Hague Mar. 18, 1970. Entered into 
force Oct. 7, 1972. TIAS 7444; 23 UST 2555.
Ratification: Switzerland, Nov. 2, 19941,4.

Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction. Done 
at The Hague Oct. 25, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 1, 1983; for the 
U.S. July 1, 1988. TIAS 11670.
Accession: Cyprus, Nov. 4, 1994.

Narcotics 
Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at New York Mar. 30, 
1961. Entered into force Dec. 13, 1964; for the U.S. June 24, 1967. TIAS 
6298; 18 UST 1407.
Accession: Kyrgyzstan, Oct. 7, 1994.

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at 
Geneva Mar. 25, 1972. Entered into force Aug. 8, 1975. TIAS 8118; 26 UST 
1439.
Accession: Ethiopia, Oct. 11, 1994.

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. 
Entered into force Aug. 16, 1976; for the U.S. July 15, 1980. TIAS 9725; 
32 UST 543.
Accessions: Kyrgyzstan, Oct. 7, 1994; Myanmar, June 20, 1994.
Ratification: Lebanon, Dec. 15, 1994.

United Nations convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances, with annex and final act. Done at Vienna Dec. 
20, 1988. Entered into force Nov. 11, 1990. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 101-4.
Accessions: Ethiopia, Oct. 11, 1994; Kyrgyzstan, Oct. 7, 1994.
Ratification: Norway, Nov. 14, 1994.

NATO--Status of Forces-- Germany
Agreement to amend the agreement of Aug. 3, 1959, as amended, to 
supplement the agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic 
Treaty regarding the status of their forces with respect to foreign 
forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany. Done at Bonn Mar. 
18, 1993 2.
Ratification: Germany, Dec. 20, 1994.

Agreement to amend the Protocol of Signature to the agreement of Aug. 3, 
1959, as amended by agreements of Oct. 21 and May 18, 1981, to 
supplement the agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic 
Treaty regarding the status of their forces with respect to foreign 
forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany. Done at Bonn May 
16, 19942.
Ratification: Germany, Jan. 3, 1995.

Open Skies 
Treaty on open skies, with annexes. Done at Helsinki Mar. 24, 19922. 
[Senate] Treaty Doc. 102-37.
Ratifications: Bulgaria, Apr. 15, 1994; Germany, Jan. 27, 1994.

Phonograms 
Convention for the protection of producers of phonograms against 
unauthorized duplication of their phonograms. Done at Geneva Oct. 29, 
1971. Entered into force Apr. 18, 1973; for the U.S. Mar. 10, 1974. TIAS 
7808; 25 UST 309.
Accession: Russian Federation, Dec. 9, 1994.

Prisoner Transfer
Convention on the transfer of sentenced persons. Done at Strasbourg Mar. 
21, 1983. Entered into force July 1, 1985. TIAS 10824.
Ratifications: Bulgaria, June 17, 1994; Poland, Nov. 8, 1994.

Racial Discrimination
International convention on the elimination of all forms of racial 
discrimination. Adopted by the UN General Assembly Dec. 21, 1965. 
Entered into force Jan. 4, 1969; for the U.S. Nov. 20, 1994.  [Senate] 
Ex. C, 95th Cong. 2d Sess.
Signature: South Africa, Oct. 3, 1994.
Ratification: United States, Oct. 21, 1994.
Accessions: Switzerland, Nov. 29, 1994; Tajikistan, Jan. 11, 1995; 
Turkmenistan, Sept. 29, 1994.

Refugees
Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at New York Jan. 31, 
1967. Entered into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. Nov. 1, 1968. TIAS 
6577; 19 UST 6223. 
Accession: Samoa, Nov. 29, 1994.

Seabed Disarmament 
Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and 
other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor and 
in the subsoil thereof. Entered into force May 18, 1972. TIAS 7337; 23 
UST 701.
Accession: Philippines, Nov. 5, 1993.

Slave Trade 
Convention to suppress the slave trade and slavery. Concluded at Geneva 
Sept. 25, 1926. Entered into force Mar. 9, 1927; for the U.S. Mar. 21, 
1929. TS 778; 46 Stat. 2183.

Protocol amending the slavery convention signed at Geneva on Sept. 25, 
1926, and Annex. Done at New York Dec. 7, 1953. Entered into force Dec. 
7, 1953 for the Protocol; July 7, 1955 for Annex to Protocol; for the 
U.S. Mar. 7, 1956. TIAS 3532; 7 UST 479.

Supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery, the slave trade, 
and institutions and practices similar to slavery. Done at Geneva Sept. 
7, 1956. Entered into force Apr. 30, 1957; for the U.S. Dec. 6, 1967. 
TIAS 6418; 18 UST 3201.
Succession: Dominica, Aug. 17, 1994.

Terrorism
Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against 
internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Adopted 
by the UN General Assembly Dec. 14, 1973. Entered into force Feb. 20, 
1977. TIAS 8532; 28 UST 1975.
Accessions: Liechtenstein, Nov. 28, 1994; Sudan, Oct. 10, 1994.

International convention against the taking of hostages. Adopted by the 
UN General Assembly  Dec. 17, 1979. Entered into force June 3, 1983; for 
the U.S. Jan. 6, 1985.
Accessions: India, Sept. 7, 19944; Liechtenstein, Nov. 28, 1994.

Convention on the safety of United Nations and associated personnel. 
Done at New York Dec. 9, 19942. Open for signature at United Nations 
Headquarters until Dec. 31, 1995.
Signatures: Argentina, Dec. 15, 1994; Bangladesh, Dec. 21, 1994; Canada, 
Dec. 15, 1994; Denmark, Dec. 15, 1994; Finland, Dec. 15, 1994; France, 
Jan. 12, 1995; Haiti, Dec. 19, 1994; Italy,  Dec. 16, 1994;  New 
Zealand, Dec. 15, 1994; Norway, Dec. 15, 1994; Panama, Dec. 15, 1994; 
Portugal, Dec. 15, 1994; Samoa, Jan. 16, 1995; Spain, Dec. 19, 1994; 
Sweden, Dec. 15, 1994; Ukraine, Dec. 15, 1994; United States, Dec. 19, 
1994.

Torture
Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment. Adopted by the UN General Assembly  Dec. 10, 
1984. Entered into force June 26, 1987; for the U.S. Nov. 20, 1994. 
[Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-20.
Ratification: United States, Oct. 21, 1994.
Accessions: Georgia, Oct. 26, 1994; Korea, Jan. 9, 1995; Namibia, Nov. 
28, 1994.

Treaties
Vienna convention on the law of treaties, with annex. Done at Vienna May 
23, 1969. Entered into force Jan. 27, 1980 3. 
Accession: Malaysia, July 27, 1994.

Vienna convention on the law of treaties between states and 
international organizations or between international organizations, with 
annex. Done at Vienna Mar. 21, 19862. 
Ratification: Denmark, July 26, 19944.
Accession: Croatia, Apr. 11, 1994.

War, Prevention of 
Convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes. Signed 
at The Hague Oct. 18, 1907. TS 536; 36 Stat. 2199.
Accession: Canada, May 10, 1994.

Weapons--Conventional
Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain 
conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or 
to have indiscriminate effects, with annexed protocols. Adopted at 
Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983 3.

Protocol on non-detectable fragments (Protocol I) to the convention on 
prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons 
which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have 
indiscriminate effects. Adopted at Geneva Oct. 10, 19803. Entered into 
force Dec. 2, 1983 3.

Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby-
traps, and other devices (Protocol II) to the convention on prohibitions 
or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be 
deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. 
Adopted at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983 3.

Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of incendiary 
weapons (Protocol III) to the convention on prohibitions or restrictions 
on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be 
excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. Adopted at 
Geneva Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 2, 1983 3.
Accession: Uruguay, Oct. 6, 1994.
Ratification: Canada, June 24, 1994; Italy, Jan. 20, 1995.

Wills 
Convention providing a uniform law on the form of an international will, 
with annex. Done at Washington Oct. 26, 1973. Entered into force Feb. 9, 
1978 3.
Territorial Application: Canada extended to Prince Edward Island, Sept. 
22, 1994.

Women 
Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against 
women. Adopted by the UN General Assembly Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into 
force Sept. 3, 19813. [Senate] Ex. R, 96th Cong. 2d Sess.
Accessions: Comoros, Oct. 31, 1994; Georgia, Oct. 26, 1994; Kuwait, 
Sept. 2, 1994; Papua New Guinea, Jan. 12, 1995.
Ratification: Cameroon, Aug. 23, 1994.

Bilateral

Algeria
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of 
certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States 
Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Algiers Dec. 15, 
1994. Enters into force following signature and receipt by Algeria of 
written notice from the U.S. that all necessary domestic legal 
requirements have been fulfilled.

Bolivia
Agreement amending the agreement of Oct. 13, 1992, as amended,  
regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of certain 
debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the U.S. Government and its 
agencies. Effected by exchange of notes at La Paz Aug. 9 and Oct. 21, 
1994. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1994.

Brazil
Agreement concerning mutual treatment of federal, state, and municipal 
taxes, with related exchange of letters. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Brasilia Dec. 2, 1994. Enters into force 30 days after both parties 
have each been notified that the respective domestic requirements have 
been completed.

Chile
Memorandum of understanding concerning scientific and technical 
cooperation in the earth sciences, with annexes. Signed at Reston and 
Santiago Sept. 30 and Nov. 17, 1994. Entered into force Nov. 17, 1994.

Ecuador
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of 
certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States 
Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Washington Jan. 19, 
1995. Enters into force following signature and receipt by Ecuador of 
written notice from the U.S. that all necessary domestic legal 
requirements have been fulfilled.

Indonesia
Memorandum of understanding concerning scientific and technical 
cooperation in the earth sciences. Signed at Jakarta Dec. 2, 1994. 
Entered into force Dec. 2, 1994.

Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture Tax 
reimbursement agreement. Signed at Washington Dec. 30, 1994. Entered 
into force Dec. 30, 1994.

Mexico
Agreement for the establishment of a cooperative biomedical research 
program, with annex. Signed at Bethesda Oct. 17, 1994. Entered into 
force Oct. 17, 1994.

Russian Federation 
Memorandum of understanding on scientific and technical cooperation in 
acoustic thermometry of ocean climate. Signed at Moscow Dec. 16, 1994. 
Entered into force Dec. 16, 1994.

Sierra Leone 
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts 
owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government, with 
annexes. Signed at Freetown Jan. 11, 1995. Enters into force following 
signature and receipt by Sierra Leone of written notice from the U.S. 
that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled.

Universal Postal Union 
Tax reimbursement agreement, with annex. Signed at Bern Jan. 12, 1995. 
Entered into force Jan. 12, 1995.
_______

1  With declaration(s). 
2  Not in force. 
3  Not in force for the U.S. 
4  With reservation(s).

(###)



ARTICLE 11

What's in Print
Foreign Relations Of the United States

The latest volume in the Department of State's Foreign Relations series 
has been released. It is Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-
63, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961-62. This volume documents U.S. policy 
toward the countries of the Near East during the first 18 months of the 
Kennedy Administration, through June 1962.

Encouragement of economic and social reform in Iran and a sharpened 
interest in U.S. policy toward Israel are two of the many issues 
documented in this volume. 

The Kennedy Administration was concerned about Iran's internal 
instability. An interdepartmental review of policy concluded that unrest 
among the burgeoning middle class was the greatest potential threat to 
Iran and that the solution was a strong, effective program of economic 
and social reform. When the Shah visited the U.S. in April 1962, 
President Kennedy and other U.S. officials urged him to undertake such a 
program, which he expressed willingness to do.

In August 1962, the Administration decided to sell the Hawk missile 
weapon system to Israel. This decision represented an important shift in 
U.S. policy toward Israel and eventually led to the U.S. replacing 
France as Israel's major arms supplier.

U.S. policy toward the United Arab Republic and its president, Gamal 
Abd'al Nasser, was the subject of much internal debate within the 
Administration. Even though plans were developed to expand U.S. economic 
aid to the UAR to improve relations with Nasser, President Kennedy 
resisted proposals to invite Nasser to visit Washington.

Other documentation included concerns the U.S. support for a British 
airlift to support Kuwait against a brief threat of an Iraqi invasion 
and support of an initiative by the UN Palestine Conciliation Commission 
to conduct indirect negotiations--though unsuccessful--between Israel 
and the Arab states toward a resolution of the Palestinian refugee 
problem.

This volume, one of 25 print volumes and six microfiche supplements 
documenting the foreign policy of the Kennedy Administration, may be 
purchased for $37 (postpaid); $46.26 for foreign orders. The GPO Stock 
No. is 044-000-02388-1. It is available from:

Superintendent of Documents
Government Printing Office
P.O. Box 371954
Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954

To FAX orders, call (202) 512-2250.  Checks made payable to the 
Superintendent of Documents are accepted, as are VISA and MasterCard. 
For further information, contact Harriet Dashiell Schwar at (202) 663-
1130; FAX (202) 663-1289. 

 (###)

[END OF DISPATCH VOL. 6, NO. 7]

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