US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH 
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 6, FEBRUARY 6, 1995 
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
 
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE: 
 
1.  START II Treaty Bolsters U.S. Security and Supports Broader Foreign 
Policy Goals -- Secretary Christopher 
 
2.  A Year of Decision:  Arms Control And Non-proliferation in 1995 -- 
Anthony Lake 
 
3.  Hidden Killers:  U.S. Policy On Anti-personnel Landmines -- 
Secretary Christopher 
 
4.  Fact Sheet:  U.S. Initiatives For Demining and Landmine Control 
 
5.  America's Fundamental Dedication To Human Rights -- Secretary 
Christopher, Text of Overview of Human Rights Practices, 1994 
 
6.  U.S. Aid Package to Mexico -- Secretary Christopher, Treasury 
Secretary Rubin 
 
7.  The United States and the United Nations:  Confrontation or 
Consensus? -- Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Permanent Representative to 
the United Nations 
 
8.  Department Statements 
      Easing Sanctions Against North Korea 
      Opening of U.S.-Vietnamese Liaison Offices 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 1 
 
START II Treaty Bolsters U.S. Security and Supports Broader Foreign 
Policy Goals 
Secretary Christopher 
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 
January 31, 1995  
 
Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to appear before you as the committee and 
the Senate resume consideration of the START II Treaty.  I will be 
followed today by Ambassador Linton Brooks, who will describe the 
details of START II, and John Holum, Director of the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, who will explain how the treaty fits into our 
overall approach to arms control in the post-Cold War world.  Before 
taking your questions, allow me to begin by discussing how START II 
supports our foreign policy goals. 
 
Last week, I testified before committees of the Congress on four 
occasions, twice before this committee.  A common theme running through 
my testimony was that the United States must stay engaged in the world.  
Our engagement is essential to our security and prosperity, a central 
lesson of this century. 
 
Your consideration of the START II Treaty comes during a period of 
historic opportunity created by the end of the Cold War.  Today, no 
great power views another as an immediate military threat.  Our 
challenge is to seize this opportunity in a way that bolsters our 
security and enhances the prospects for future cooperation. 
 
Prompt ratification of START II will enable us to start taking advantage 
of this opportunity now.  As my colleague Tony Lake said yesterday: 1995 
is a "year of decision" for the United States and the world on arms 
control and non-proliferation.  That year of decision begins with this 
committee and this hearing. 
 
START represents a dramatic break from the Cold War arms control 
stalemate.  Instead of just controlling nuclear weapons, START reduces 
them:  When fully implemented, START I and START II will cut U.S. and 
Russian strategic nuclear forces by two-thirds. 
 
By eliminating U.S. and Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles with 
multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles, START II will enhance 
stability and lower the chances of a massive nuclear conflict.  Its deep 
reductions will enable us to further a central goal of our foreign 
policy: curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  Its 
implementation will encourage further cooperation between the United 
States and Russia. 
 
At the same time, START II will allow us to retain a strong and capable 
deterrent.  It has tough, effective verification procedures that will 
allow us to effectively monitor compliance. 
 
I first appeared before this committee to testify in favor of START II 
in May 1993.  At that time, I told you that this Administration had 
reviewed the details of the START II Treaty and concluded that the 
treaty was sound and should be approved without change.  That remains 
the case today.  Subsequent to my testimony, the Administration and the 
committee agreed to suspend consideration of START II while we worked to 
overcome the delays in bringing START I into force.  We needed to do so 
because, as you are aware, START I is a pre- condition for the 
implementation of START II. 
 
At their summit last September, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin  
confirmed their intention to bring START I into force and then to seek 
early ratification of START II.  Early last month in Budapest, the 
President's efforts to bring START I into force paid off.  Ukraine 
presented its instrument of accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT).  Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazahkstan received security 
assurances from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia--and 
subsequently from France.  Then the United States, Russia, and three 
former Soviet states exchanged instruments of ratification that brought 
START I into force.  Not only did we succeed in concluding an important 
arms reduction agreement, we ensured that out of the former Soviet Union 
came just one nuclear state, not four. 
 
We must now take another step in strengthening our security by ratifying 
START II.  START II completes much of the work we began in START I.  
Where START I reduces the number of ICBMs with multiple warheads, START 
II bans them.  Where START I eliminates half of the Russian SS-18 heavy 
ICBM force, START II requires the elimination or conversion of all SS-18 
launchers and the elimination of the missiles themselves.  At the same 
time, START II preserves the U.S. force structure needed for nuclear 
deterrence. 
 
Taken on its own, START II mandates significant cuts in strategic 
forces.  By January 1, 2003, strategic forces on both sides will be cut 
to 3,500 warheads or to about one-third of their pre-START I levels. 
 
More important than the reductions themselves, however, is the 
elimination of ICBMs with multiple warheads.  The ban on these systems 
marks the final repudiation of discredited first-strike strategies 
symbolized by systems such as the SS-18.  The United States has long 
regarded these heavy ICBMs as the greatest threat to strategic 
stability.  No single act better symbolizes the end of the superpower 
arms race and the Cold War era of nuclear confrontation than their 
elimination. 
 
But true to its name, START is only the beginning of a further possible 
evolution of our strategic forces envisioned by the United States and 
Russia.  At their September summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin 
agreed to examine additional steps to adapt nuclear forces and practices 
to the changed international security situation.  This could include the 
possibility, after ratification of START II, of further nuclear force 
reductions and limitations and additional confidence- building measures.  
We are also already engaged in discussions regarding the transparency 
and irreversibility of nuclear warhead reductions.  
 
Moreover, in a very important development, Presidents Clinton and 
Yeltsin also agreed that we should not wait until 2003 to achieve the 
full benefits of START II.  Once the treaty is ratified, the United 
States and Russia will deactivate all strategic delivery systems slated 
for reduction under START II by removing their nuclear warheads or 
taking other steps to remove them from alert status. 
 
START II strengthens the new relationship we are seeking with Russia in 
nuclear arms control.  It builds on the significant steps we have taken 
in this area in recent years.   
 
Under President Bush, these steps included the nuclear initiatives of 
late 1991 and early 1992 during the breakup of the Soviet Union and the 
early deactivation of forces slated for elimination under START I.  
Under President Clinton, the United States worked with Russia to 
negotiate the January 1994 Trilateral Statement that was crucial to the 
denuclearization of Ukraine.  We undertook a mutual commitment not to 
target each other (or any country) with our strategic nuclear missiles.  
And we agreed, among other steps, to develop a reciprocal monitoring 
regime for inventories of nuclear material resulting from nuclear arms 
reductions.  That commitment increases in importance as we see the risks 
posed by nuclear smuggling. 
 
This continuing cooperation on arms reduction is a key component of the 
new partnership that the United States and Russia are forging in those 
areas where our interests coincide.  Our relationship with Russia is 
central to America's security.  Our steady policy of engagement and 
cooperation has paid off for every American--from reducing the nuclear 
threat, to stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to 
advancing peace in the Middle East. 
 
Indeed, the United States has an enormous stake in the outcome of 
Russia's continuing transformation.  A stable, democratic Russia is 
vital to building a secure Europe, to resolving regional conflicts, and 
to fighting proliferation.  An unstable Russia that reverts to 
authoritarianism or slides into chaos would be a disaster--an immediate 
threat to its neighbors and, with its huge nuclear arsenal, a renewed 
strategic threat to the United States. 
 
That is why President Clinton has reaffirmed his determination to 
maintain our substantial assistance for democratic and economic reform 
in Russia and why that assistance merits the continued support of 
Congress.  That is also why we have repeatedly stressed to the Russian 
leadership the importance of continued reform. 
 
Like each of you, we are deeply concerned about the conflict in 
Chechnya--about the tragic loss of life there, the excessive and 
indiscriminate use of military force, and the corrosive effect that it 
has had on the future of Russian democracy.  As I said once again in my 
meeting with Foreign Minister Kozyrev recently in Geneva, the United 
States has repeatedly stressed to Russia that the conflict must be 
brought to a rapid end.  A process of reconciliation must begin--a 
process which takes into account the views of the people of Chechnya and 
which provides them with the humanitarian relief that they need and 
deserve. 
 
As you know, we have strongly supported the efforts of the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to address the human 
rights aspect of the conflict in Chechnya.  Yesterday, the leader of the 
OSCE mission to Chechnya reported his conclusion that both sides had 
violated fundamental human rights  and that the Russian use of force was 
"disproportionate and indiscriminate."  We call on the parties to make 
sure that these violations end, that human rights are respected, and 
that the urgent humanitarian needs of the people of the region are met.  
I was struck by the statement of the OSCE mission leader urging a 
humanitarian cease-fire.  We call on the parties to heed this call. 
 
We do not want to see Russia in a military quagmire that erodes reform 
and tends to isolate it in the international community.  We have urged 
the leaders of Russia to revitalize the democratic coalition that has 
made such great strides toward economic and political reform. 
 
Russia continues to face economic difficulties and the challenges of 
constructing a democracy after centuries of authoritarianism.  A 
reduction in nuclear arsenals will help Russia to turn its attention to 
strengthening democratic institutions and encouraging free markets 
rather than focusing on the strategic nuclear balance and the burden of 
maintaining a large and unnecessary nuclear force. 
 
But let me emphasize that whatever the state of reform in Russia--and it 
is very important that it continue--it is my belief that START II 
remains firmly in the national interest of the United States.  While 
economic pressures may well force Russia to reduce strategic offensive 
weapons below START I levels, only the START II Treaty can ensure that 
Russia does so in a stabilizing way and that it does not return to old 
force levels. 
 
The benefits of START II are not confined to the United States and 
Russia.  The deep reductions mandated by the treaty will enhance 
international security more broadly and prevent the potential for the 
diversion of nuclear material and improve the prospects for extension of 
the NPT.  As I emphasized two weeks ago in a speech outlining our 
foreign policy opportunities for 1995, curbing the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction is among the most vital challenges facing 
the United States today. 
 
Indeed, with the demise of the Soviet Union, the proliferation of these 
weapons poses the principal direct threat to the survival of the United 
States and our key allies.  This is a challenge that this Administration 
is determined to meet, through our ratification of START II, the U.S.-
D.P.R.K. Agreed Framework, and our support for the UN monitoring of 
Iraq's weapon programs.  Our global and regional strategies for 1995 
comprise the most ambitious non-proliferation agenda in history. 
 
The centerpiece of our global non-proliferation strategy remains the 
indefinite and unconditional extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty.  The treaty's greatest achievement is invisible--weapons not 
built and material not diverted.  But the impact of the treaty is clear:  
The nightmare of a profusion of nuclear states predicted so widely a 
decade ago has not come to pass.  Thus, I think that history will record 
that the NPT is one of the most important treaties of all time. 
 
Ratification of START II will send a strong signal to the non-nuclear 
weapon states that we are taking significant steps to live up to our 
obligations under Article VI of the NPT to reduce our nuclear arsenals.  
Prompt endorsement and consent to START II by the Senate and the Russian 
Duma will provide a powerful boost to our determination to gain 
indefinite extension of the NPT at the review conference this spring. 
 
Mr. Chairman, as I noted in my last appearance before you on this topic, 
START II is an unusual treaty, negotiated by one administration to be 
ratified and implemented by a successor administration of a different 
party.  It serves as a symbol of the bipartisanship that has long been 
the hallmark of American foreign policy.  Since my first week in office, 
I have consulted closely with both parties in Congress on every 
important issue on our agenda.  Our consultations on START will be no 
different.  As the Administration and the new Senate begin to work 
together to promote American interests and enhance American security, we 
could take no better step than the prompt approval of START II.  
Therefore, on behalf of the President, I urge the Senate to give its 
advice and consent to the ratification of this historic 
treaty.  (###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 2 
 
A Year of Decision:  Arms Control And Non-proliferation in 1995 
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President For National Security Affairs 
Address before the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
Washington, DC, January 30, 1995 
 
I would like to speak to you today about an issue at the very top of 
President Clinton's agenda:  reducing the threat of nuclear weapons. 
 
This year--1995--is a year of decision.  It presents more than 
opportunity; it is a moment of choice.  In the coming months, we can 
turn a corner in our efforts to combat the spread of these and other 
weapons of mass destruction, and I am here to tell you that we in this 
room have an obligation to work together and get things done--now. 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, we have witnessed a world transformed.  
Today, the American people worry less about nuclear war than at any time 
in a generation.  But the weapons still exist, and they can still 
destroy our nation.  That is why you are here.  You have devoted your 
lives to making people safer.  As we move into the year ahead, let's not 
forget what is at the heart of our efforts:  ensuring that when all of 
our families turn out the lights at night, they can sleep in greater 
safety than ever before in their lives.  This is not ultimately about 
the intricacies of missile throw-weights or the half-life of fissile 
materials.  This is about protecting people. 
 
That is why President Clinton vowed when he took office to do everything 
in his power to reduce the danger posed by these weapons, and we have 
come a long way toward this goal.  We have begun dismantling a huge part 
of the global nuclear arsenal.  At the same time, we have maintained the 
strategic nuclear forces necessary to protect our most vital interests. 
 
We are now at a crossroads--a point where some of the most important 
arms control goals we set during the Cold War can be formally realized.  
That is why, today, I want to issue a call to arms--or to arms control.  
We have a new and ambitious agenda.  It will require a vast amount of 
work from all of us:  educating the public, pushing for action on 
Capitol Hill, and lining up support in the international community.  You 
and I are bound to disagree on individual points--and should.  But we 
must also keep our eyes on what is most important--on our fundamental 
goals.  Because if we let our differences dominate the headlines, we 
will fail.  That won't be just an embarrassment; it will gravely weaken 
the safety we want for our families and for our country. 
 
Because of the strides we have made, we are in a position to make 
tremendous progress.  Consider this:  In 1995, in this year of decision, 
we must gain ratification of START II by the U.S. Senate and the Russian 
Duma, so that--as Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin have agreed--the treaty 
can be entered into force at their next summit.  The presidents also 
agreed we can then begin warhead removal immediately and ahead of 
schedule.  This year, as President Clinton said in the State of the 
Union address, America also will lead the charge to extend indefinitely 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty.  This is absolutely crucial.  In addition, 
we must pursue a comprehensive test ban treaty, as well as a convention 
cutting off production of fissile material and more measures to 
safeguard nuclear materials in Russia and the other New Independent 
States.  We will push for Senate ratification of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention.  We will seek to strengthen the Biological Weapons 
Convention.  We should aim to complete the ABM treaty talks on the 
demarcation between theater and strategic missile defenses--all this 
year. 
 
We have an agenda like this be- cause we have made real progress on 
these issues over the past two years as we worked to reduce existing 
weapons and to prevent nations or groups from acquiring nuclear weapons 
or the materials to make them.  Let's look at where we stand. 
 
A couple of years ago, some doubted that the START I Treaty negotiated 
by Presidents Reagan and Bush could ever be brought into force.  When 
the Soviet Union collapsed, there was a genuine danger that several 
nuclear powers would emerge in its place.  Today, our diplomacy has 
overcome that danger.  The determined efforts of President Clinton and 
Vice President Gore, as well as those of the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Kazakhstan, culminated in the ceremony last month in 
Budapest at which START I entered into force.  Ukraine, Belarus, and 
Kazakhstan all put their signatures on the dotted line:  They all agreed 
to foreswear nuclear weapons entirely and sign the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty.  START I will eliminate delivery systems that carry 9,000 
nuclear warheads.  We are currently dismantling these nuclear weapons 
literally as fast as we can--in all, 2,000 nuclear weapons a year--and 
the Russians are also deactivating their weapons years ahead of 
schedule. 
 
The ceremony in Budapest was one sign of just how much the end of the 
Cold War has created new opportunities to make us safer.  We are 
striving to take the fullest advantage of that change. 
 
President Clinton reached an agreement last year with President Yeltsin 
to stop targeting each other's territories.  For the first time in a 
generation, Russian missiles are not aimed at our cities and our 
citizens.  If a Russian missile were accidentally launched, it would not 
hit our country. 
 
Our new partnership with Russia and our arms control progress over the 
past six years also served our security interests in allowing reduction 
in our strategic programs.   
 
--  For every 10 U.S. military personnel whose duty just a few years ago 
was working on strategic forces, today, there are only three. 
 
--  The development of such programs as the Midgetman, the MX Rail 
Garrison basing system, and the Lance follow-on nuclear missile could 
safely be terminated. 
 
--  We have cut U.S. defense budget expenditures for strategic weapons 
by almost two-thirds. 
 
Pulling back from the Cold War nuclear precipice in this way helps our 
citizens in their daily lives.  It allows us to save some $20 billion a 
year on strategic nuclear forces alone.  So now we can shift resources 
to needs like getting our economic house in order by paying down the 
deficit, boosting the readiness of our conventional forces, and putting 
more police on our streets.  Our success in reducing nuclear arms means 
a stronger, safer America. 
 
While the post-Cold War era has opened new arms control possibilities, 
in some ways it has made our work harder on the non-proliferation front.  
Thanks to technology and the collapse of the Soviet Union, nations and 
even terrorist groups have a better shot today than during the Cold War 
at getting the materials they need to build a bomb.  Ironically, the 
very reductions in nuclear arsenals increase the risk that dismantled 
warhead materials will be diverted.  We see this in a new and deeply 
disturbing phenomenon:  nuclear smuggling--with the greatest threat 
coming from the theft of bomb materials in the stockpiles of the former 
Soviet Union.  Now we face the danger that states and terrorists could 
try to become nuclear powers without investing in expensive development 
programs.  One arrest has followed another, and the weight of the seized 
materials has climbed ominously from ounces into pounds.  That is one 
reason why President Clinton has given non-proliferation such a high 
priority and why the U.S. has proposed a comprehensive approach to 
fissile material control. 
 
We have agreed with Russia on the shutdown of its remaining plutonium 
production reactors by the year 2000, and verification measures will 
ensure that none of the spent fuel from these reactors is used for 
weapons purposes. 
 
Thanks to the farsighted legislation by Senators Nunn and Lugar, we are 
helping Russia and the New Independent States transport, safeguard, and 
destroy nuclear weapons.  Nunn-Lugar also employs nuclear scientists in 
non-military projects, and our nuclear labs have worked directly with 
their Russian counterparts to upgrade security at the Kurchatov 
Institute, in a program that we will be expanding further.  At the same 
time, we reduced the total amount of material needing protection.  Under 
an agreement we reached last year with Russia, 500 tons of highly 
enriched uranium will be converted to low enriched reactor fuel that 
cannot be used for nuclear weapons. 
 
In a major operation called "Sapphire," we also arranged for the airlift 
of nearly 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium from Kazakhstan to 
secure storage in the United States.  That would have been enough to 
make dozens of nuclear weapons. 
 
For the first time ever, we have also moved beyond the elimination of 
thousands of nuclear delivery vehicles to eliminating the nuclear 
warheads that have been deployed on those systems, and Presidents 
Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to pursue measures to ensure that the process 
is irreversible, including steps to exchange data and conduct reciprocal 
inspections of nuclear material storage facilities. 
 
To help make the weapons dismantlement process irreversible, we have 
begun the process of placing nuclear material from the U.S. military 
stockpile under IAEA safeguards.  President Clinton remains committed to 
strong support for the IAEA, including its vital safeguards function.  
The success of the regime and the adherence of additional countries to 
the NPT places new responsibilities on the agency.  It needs our 
support, and we have provided an additional $10 million this year in our 
voluntary contribution.   
 
Even as we seek to put in place arms control and non-proliferation 
measures that make the world safer and more stable, we must deal with 
some serious regional proliferation problems.  We will continue to 
integrate non-proliferation concerns into our regional strategies in 
South Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere. 
 
Over the past two years, we have put our bilateral relationships--
including those with Moscow and Beijing--on the line in order to 
strengthen the Missile Technology Control Regime.  We now have 
commitments from four key potential missile suppliers--Russia, Ukraine, 
China, and South Africa--to control the transfer of ballistic missiles 
and related technology. 
 
We have also confronted the North Korean nuclear threat, and we have 
stopped it in its tracks.  Our agreement with Pyongyang freezes and will 
dismantle their nuclear program.  It is not built on trust.  Instead, 
the Framework sets up a system of international monitoring, and the 
monitors have already confirmed that the North Koreans have frozen their 
program.  Plutonium that could have been processed into weapons 
materials will be put under IAEA supervision.  Construction on reactors 
that would have produced more such material has ended.  If at any time 
North Korea fails to meet its obligations, we will withdraw the benefits 
of the Framework. This is a deal that is good for America and good for 
the region--which is why our allies in Japan and South Korea are 
committed to support it financially as well as politically. 
 
These are solid achievements, but they will mean little if we don't 
build on them in 1995.  It is the year of decision.  Let me outline for 
you the extraordinary and necessary agenda before us. 
 
First, this year we hope to raise the barrier against developing new 
generations of nuclear weapons by negotiating a comprehensive test ban 
treaty.  Second, we will continue work to prevent more nations from 
building their own nuclear weapons by pressing for an indefinite 
extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.  Third, but by no means less 
important, we will also work to cut even deeper into the global arsenal 
by pushing to ratify START II.  And fourth, we will work on a number of 
other efforts to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
including a fissile material cut-off convention.  Let me discuss each of 
these briefly. 
 
One of the Administration's foremost goals is completing the 
negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty at the earliest possible 
date.  When President Clinton arrived in office, he declared a 
moratorium on U.S. nuclear testing and, in a major reversal of the 
policy of Presidents Reagan and Bush, instructed U.S. delegates to take 
the lead in negotiating a CTB.  This weekend, the President made three 
decisions that underscore his determination to achieve as much progress 
as possible before the NPT Extension Conference convenes in April. 
 
First, on the assumption that a treaty will be signed before September 
30, 1996, and subject to the same understandings that govern our current 
moratorium, the President has decided to extend the moratorium on its 
nuclear tests until a CTB treaty enters into force. 
 
Second, the President has directed our CTB negotiator, Ambassador 
Ledogar, to propose that the Conference on Disarmament remain in session 
through August if the negotiation is not concluded during the round now 
scheduled to end in April. 
 
Third, the President has directed that at tomorrow's session of the 
Geneva negotiations, the U.S. will withdraw its proposal for a special 
"right to withdraw" from the CTB treaty 10 years after it enters into 
force.  Let me also note that the CTB will contain a traditional 
"supreme national interest" clause.  In articulating his national 
security strategy last July, President Clinton declared that the United 
States will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any 
future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear 
forces from acting against our vital interests and to convince it that 
seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile.  In this regard, the 
President considers the maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear 
stockpile to be a supreme national interest of the United States.  
 
One of the most complicated and challenging issues in the CTB 
negotiations is the question of what kinds of experiments and other 
stockpile stewardship activities will be permitted under the treaty--
what our negotiators call "treaty compliant activities."  The U.S. 
position with regard to these activities is determined on the basis of 
three criteria: 
 
--  The CTB treaty must be comprehensive and promote our vital national 
interest in curbing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons; 
 
--  The CTB treaty must not prohibit activities required to maintain the 
safety and reliability of our nuclear stockpile; and 
 
--  The CTB treaty must be signed by all declared nuclear states and as 
many other nations as possible. 
   
As the negotiations proceed, the United States will continue to review 
its position on this issue to ensure it meets these criteria. 
 
The Non-Proliferation Treaty has been a key reason why there are not 
scores of nations armed with nuclear weapons--as many in the past 
imagined there would be.  But if we want to keep it that way, this year 
we must focus on our efforts on permanently extending this treaty.  The 
President, Vice President, and Cabinet are committed to this necessary 
work.  There are no more important negotiations before us. 
 
Failure to secure permanent extension would open a Pandora's box of 
nuclear trouble.  Such a failure would help backlash states--isolated 
nations with rigid ideologies and expansionist aims--that are bent on 
acquiring the most dangerous of weapons, and other countries might 
seriously reconsider their own decisions to forego the nuclear option. 
 
Anything less than permanent extension will leave doubts about the 
international community's resolve.  NPT extension is in our deepest 
security interest and in the interest of all nations. 
 
Non-nuclear weapons states should vote for the indefinite and 
unconditional extension of NPT, not as a gift to the declared nuclear 
powers, but because it is fundamentally important to their own security.  
The truth is that the NPT is not only the cornerstone of our strategy to 
prevent nuclear weapons proliferation, but also the foundation of our 
efforts to prevent proliferation of all other weapons of mass 
destruction.  Remove it and the architecture collapses. 
 
I know you all agree with that, but let me also raise an issue of 
disagreement between us and some of you.  Some of you accuse us of being 
disingenuous, of moving too slowly away from the Cold War while 
demanding extension of the NPT.  I think the evidence shows you are 
wrong.  The United States is committed to pursue its obligations under 
Article VI of the NPT.  As our progress in START and other initiatives 
shows, we are moving to reduce the threat from nuclear weapons as fast 
as we can. 
 
The problem, quite frankly, is that when some of you proclaim the death 
of the NPT every time we fail to act on other issues in exactly the way 
you prescribe, you simply offer ammunition to the enemies of the NPT and 
risk a self-fulfilling prophecy of defeat.  Certainly, let us disagree 
when we must, but let us not do so in a self-destructive way.  I hope 
all true friends of the NPT will agree. 
 
In all the ways I have just discussed, we are working hard to prevent 
the spread of weapons of mass destruction.  But in this year of 
decision, we must also reduce the threat from the nuclear arsenals that 
already exist. 
 
At the President's urging, the Senate will begin ratification hearings 
tomorrow with testimony from Secretary Christopher on START II, which 
will eliminate more than 5,000 nuclear weapons.  Together with START I, 
that will reduce by two-thirds the number of strategic warheads deployed 
at the end of the Cold War. 
 
We hope the Senate will move with dispatch.  President Clinton and 
President Yeltsin have vowed to exchange instruments of ratification at 
their next summit, and we want to get started on implementation. 
 
In this year of decision, we must also not lose sight of other critical 
tasks.  
 
--  We will work toward a treaty banning the production of the fissile 
materials that go into weapons. 
 
--  We will try to conclude negotiations to clarify the distinction in 
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty between theater missile defense and 
strategic ABMs.  In these negotiations, we are guided by two objectives:  
preserving the viability of the ABM Treaty and ensuring that we can test 
and deploy highly effective theater missile defenses. 
 
--  We will continue the fight against international terrorism with the 
initiative the President announced in his State of the Union address, 
and we will redouble our efforts to stop nuclear smuggling and nuclear-
related crimes through stepped up cooperation with our allies and 
others. 
 
--  We will ask the Senate to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention, 
which will advance us toward the goal of eliminating chemical weapons 
under rigorous international inspection. 
 
--  We will negotiate legally binding measures to strengthen compliance 
with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. 
 
--  We will continue to work for strengthened export controls, including 
a new regime to succeed COCOM. 
 
--  We will push for ratification of the Convention on Conventional 
Weapons, which will advance President Clinton's initiative to eliminate 
the most deadly of landmines. 
 
I want to make a plea that even as we are working hard to reduce the 
threat posed by the very largest weapons, we must not forget the 
terrible toll now being taken by some of the smallest.  I was reminded 
of this on a recent trip to Africa--particularly when I visited Angola--
which has more mines than people.  I was outraged by what I saw around 
the once beautiful town of Kuito, which now lies in near-rubble.  It was 
not only the children I saw who had lost limbs-- terrible as that is; it 
seemed to me a metaphor for the terrible waste of this war in Angola 
that I could see, across the fields outside town, mangoes in the trees 
that no one could pick for fear of the minefields. 
 
Time is of the essence.  The achievements of the past two years are 
truly remarkable--if not always remarked upon.  But they have to be 
built upon, and 1995 is the year to do it. 
 
We have made real progress by weaving our goals of eliminating weapons 
of mass destruction into the fabric of our diplomacy.  These are not 
separate issues any more.  We tie our economic and political relations 
with scores of nations to progress on arms control issues. 
 
We can help write a new set of ground rules for the post-Cold War 
period.  We can strengthen our own security by negotiation, which is 
cheaper and safer than matching arms for arms.  We can work to create a 
world where nations depend on commitments--to each other and to their 
own people--no less than on arms.  Or we can undermine our own cause by 
forgetting the things that really count through indifference or 
unnecessary differences. 
 
We are present at the creation of a new era in world affairs--an era 
that demands full American engagement.  In a world with too many 
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, there is also a world of 
opportunity to do something about it.  President Clinton wants to press 
ahead:  to extend the NPT forever; to sign a test ban treaty;  to reap 
the benefits of START for the American people--so they may feel  
and be more secure.  I hope you will help us make 1995 the year of right 
decisions.   (###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 3 
 
Hidden Killers:  U.S. Policy On Anti-personnel Landmines 
Secretary Christopher 
Remarks upon the release of 1994 report on landmines, Washington, DC, 
January 27, 1995 
 
Good morning.  It is a pleasure to share the stage today with the people 
who are most active in developing our policy on landmines.  Senator 
Leahy and Representative Evans were vital forces in achieving the U.S. 
moratorium on anti-personnel landmine exports.  They continue to keep 
the world's attention focused on this global problem, and, literally, we 
would not be here without their leadership. 
 
A vital participant in this meeting is the report, Hidden Killers:  The 
Global Landmine Crisis, 1994.  This report describes the staggering 
problem that unexploded landmines pose to the world today.  Between 80 
and 110 million of these weapons are scattered in 64 countries.  They 
claim 500 victims every week.  They do not distinguish between civilians 
and combatants; indeed, they probably kill more children than soldiers.  
And they do not cease to kill when peace treaties are signed and the 
guns of war fall silent. 
 
Last September at the UN General Assembly, President Clinton dedicated 
our nation to the global fight against this deadly scourge.  Our 
ultimate goal is the total elimination of anti-personnel landmines.  As 
a first step, the President has called on all nations to join us in 
negotiating an agreement to reduce the number and availability of these 
terrible weapons. 
 
Landmines may be the most ancient weapons on our arms control agenda.  
During the American Civil War, they were called "land torpedos" in 
official records; ordinary soldiers knew them simply as "infernal 
devices."  But, today, at the end of a century in which war has been 
waged increasingly against civilians, landmines are employed for 
depressingly modern ends.  Around the world, mines strewn in farmlands 
and paddyfields, in schoolyards, and on country roads make entire 
communities uninhabitable.  They drive people from their land.  They 
keep refugees from returning home. 
 
These devices have been called "slow-motion" weapons of mass 
destruction.  It is no exaggeration to say that they have also become 
weapons of mass migration.  That is evident in the depopulated areas of 
Mozambique, where every major road system is blocked by uncleared mines.  
It is evident in the barren hills of Afghanistan, where mines have been 
placed indiscriminately around agricultural lands, water wells, and 
irrigation canals. 
 
Landmines also make it harder for nations to move from conflict to 
reconstruction, reconciliation, and growth.  They isolate roads, 
railways, power lines, and bridges from repair.  They delay relief 
shipments.  They disrupt internal markets.  This report vividly 
describes the results:  "Every task required to rebuild a war-shattered 
society is put on hold until the mines are cleared." 
 
The Clinton Administration is pursuing a comprehensive strategy to 
address the global landmine crisis.  We are helping countries plagued by 
landmines to cast away their unwanted inheritance.  We are leading 
diplomatic efforts to curb the proliferation and irresponsible use of 
these weapons. 
 
The U.S. Demining Assistance Program provides training, equipment, and 
funds to clear mines and to teach people how to avoid them in countries 
like Afghanistan, Eritrea, Mozambique, and Nicaragua.  In Cambodia, we 
have pledged $6 million to support a demining effort that has been 
absolutely vital to the success of peace- making in that country.  We 
hope to expand our assistance program to include other nations, 
including Rwanda and Angola. 
 
We are also working with the UN to organize an international meeting on 
mine clearance, which will be held in late May in Geneva.  We hope the 
meeting will raise a large percentage of the UN's proposed $67-million 
demining budget. 
 
In 1993, the United States extended for three years its unilateral 
moratorium on landmine exports.  We have urged other nations to follow 
suit.  In 1994, we spearheaded a successful resolution at the UN General 
Assembly to ban exports of anti-personnel mines.  Consistent with 
President Clinton's initiative at the General Assembly, we have also 
developed a proposal for a multilateral control regime to restrict the 
production, stockpiling, and export of anti-personnel landmines.  The 
regime will reduce reliance on those kinds of landmines that cause the 
greatest damage to civilians--those that remain lethal indefinitely, 
instead of self-destructing or deactivating. 
 
I also want to call on the Senate to ratify promptly the Convention on 
Conventional Weapons, which contains restrictions on landmine use.  We 
want to work to strengthen this accord--to protect civilians, to improve 
minefield marking and recording, and, most important, to expand its 
rules to cover internal conflicts. 
 
The United States will continue to work with other governments, with the 
UN, and with private relief organizations to solve the landmine problem.  
We know that this is an immense challenge, but we will meet that 
challenge because we also know that ridding the world of these hidden 
killers will save tens of thousands of  lives in the years to come.   
(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 4 
 
Fact Sheet:  U.S. Initiatives For Demining and Landmine Control 
 
Anti-personnel landmines are the weapon of choice for many government 
and insurgent groups.  They are cheap, easy to manufacture and use, 
difficult to detect, and expensive and dangerous to remove.  Usually, 
landmines are not removed following armed conflicts.  They are left for 
populations and, more recently, peacekeepers to deal with. While the 
U.S. military employs landmines responsibly and in accordance with 
international law, others often use them in unconventional and 
indiscriminate ways against civilian populations to generate fear, 
inhibit refugee repatriation, disrupt economic reconstruction, and 
generally create chaos in fragile governments. 
 
Addressing the horrible toll in innocent civilian casualties caused by 
the irresponsible and indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines is 
a high priority of the Administration.  In his address to the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September 1994, President Clinton 
called on all nations to join with the U.S. to "conclude an agreement to 
reduce the number and availability" of anti-personnel landmines.  Given 
the immediacy and the complexity of the problem, the U.S. has developed 
a comprehensive, four-track strategy. 
 
Demining Initiatives.  The U.S. currently assists demining programs in 
Cambodia, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and Mozambique.  These follow five 
steps:  landmine assessment, training in mine awareness, education and 
training in mine clearance, transition of responsibility for the program 
to the host government or other designated entity (e.g., an 
international organization or a private non-governmental organization), 
and follow-on assistance.  Using this general plan, the Administration 
is initiating, this year, support of demining efforts in Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Honduras, and Costa Rica.  There are significant landmine 
problems in Angola, Somalia, Rwanda, and Liberia as well, but unrest in 
those countries has prevented the implementation of U.S. assistance.  
The U.S. has programs in at least nine countries where landmines are a 
serious problem.  The Administration hopes to expand the program to 
other countries.  
 
Efforts To Strengthen the Convention on Conventional Weapons 
(particularly Protocol II which governs the use of landmines).  The 
treaty has been transmitted to the Senate for advice and consent to 
ratification.  The U.S. is pressing for substantial improvements to the 
landmine protocol, such as making it applicable to internal conflicts, 
requiring all mines to have a substantial metallic content, requiring 
certain mines to be self-deactivating, and establishing verification 
procedures. 
 
Moratoria on Landmine Transfers.  In October 1992, the U.S. adopted a 
unilateral export moratorium on anti-personnel landmines.  This 
moratorium was extended in 1993 for three years.  In 1993 and 1994, the 
UNGA adopted U.S. resolutions calling for moratoria on exports of 
landmines that pose a grave risk to civilians.  The 1994 resolution 
contained additional language calling for the eventual elimination of 
anti-personnel landmines.  To date, 18 countries have declared formal 
moratoria; several have export controls in place. 
 
Establishment of an International Anti-personnel Landmine Control 
Regime.  The export moratoria are only temporary measures.  The U.S. has 
developed a proposal for an anti-personnel landmine control regime that 
would reduce both reliance on land- mines that threaten civilian 
populations most and the overall availability of anti-personnel 
landmines.  The ultimate goal is the eventual elimination of anti-
personnel landmines.  We can move most effectively toward that goal as 
viable and humane alternatives are developed.  As a first step, the 
control regime would impose restrictions on the production, stockpiling, 
and transfer of anti-personnel landmines.  The Administration is 
dedicated to building the international consensus necessary to bring 
about an effective control regime in the shortest possible time. (###) 
 
[Box] 
Anti-personnel Landmine Facts 
 
--  There are more than 85 million uncleared landmines in 62 countries 
around the world.  More than 65 million mines were laid in the last 15 
years. 
 
--  Landmines cause more than 150 deaths or injuries worldwide each 
week. Most of these are innocent civilian casualties. 
 
--  The United Nations estimates that there are 9-10 million landmines 
in Afghanistan; 9 million in Angola; 4-7 million in Cambodia; 5-10 
million in Iraq; 5-7 million in Kuwait; and 2-4 million in the former 
Yugoslavia. 
 
--  It costs between $150 and $1,000 to remove one landmine. 
 
--  The U.S. allocated more than $9 million to demining projects in FY 
1993; more than $12 million will be spent in FY 1994. 
 
--  There are more than 30,000 amputees in Cambodia and more than 20,000 
in Angola, according to International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
estimates.  Most are victims of mines. 
 
--  In 1991, the ICRC made almost 8,000 artificial limbs and 11,000 
orthopedic appliances for mine victims. in 14 countries. (###) 
 
 
[Box] 
Further Information 
 
For further information, see the 1994 report to the U.S. Congress, 
Hidden Killers:  The Global Landmine Crisis, released by the Department 
of State January 27, 1995.  For hard copy, contact the Bureau of 
Political-Military Affairs, tel. 202-647-6968.  The report also is 
available through the Department of State Foreign Affairs Network 
(DOSFAN) on the Internet by pointing your gopher client to 
dosfan.lib.uic.edu and selecting  Global Affairs, Arms Control.  The 
report will appear in the March 1995 edition of U.S. Foreign Affairs on 
CD-ROM, a new quarterly subscription sold by the Government Printing 
Office.  To order this CD-ROM, call 202-512-1800 or send a fax to 202-
512-2250.  A one-year subscription (4 discs) is $80 (domestic) and $100 
(foreign). (###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 5 
 
America's Fundamental Dedication To Human Rights  
Secretary Christopher, Text of Overview of Human Rights Practices, 1994 
 
Secretary Christopher 
Statement on the release of the annualæreport on human rights, 
Washington, DC, January 31, 1995. 
 
The Department of State's annual country reports on human rights, which 
I am sending to the Congress tonight, are far more than a statutory 
requirement.  They demonstrate the President's continuing dedication to 
encourage democracy and to protect human rights as a fundamental part of 
American foreign policy. 
 
I have a long-standing involvement with and respect for the country 
reports and their impact around the world.  The first reports were 
prepared under my direction in 1977 during my first year as Deputy 
Secretary of State. Those early reports were small in scale and narrow 
in scope compared to today's effort.  As Secretary of State, I am proud 
to have issued the 18th and now the 19th reports in a series that 
hasæbecome both comprehensive and institutionalized. 
 
America's strength in the world derives in large part from our ability 
to stand for something larger than ourselves.  We worked hard to make 
the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights a success--and to ensure that 
it reaffirmed the universality of humanity's aspirations for freedom. 
Two weeks ago, in an address at the John F. Kennedy School at Harvard 
University, I stressed the importance of human rights and democracy as 
one of the fundamental principles guiding our foreign policy in the 
post-Cold War era. 
 
Our commitment is not only consistent with American values:  It also 
rests on a sober assessment of our long-term interest in a world where 
stability is reinforced by accountable government and disputes are 
mediated by dialogue--a world where information flows freely and the 
rule of law protects not only political rights, but the essential 
elements of free market economies. 
 
Our nation's support for democracy, accountability, and the rule of law 
around the world is vital to many of the specific foreign policy goals 
and interests that we are pursuing:  a Russia at peace with itself and 
its neighbors; a stable Central Europe; market reform and economic 
development in nations such as China and Vietnam; and the fight against 
international crime, corruption, and terrorism--to name just a few. 
 
The last year saw remarkable triumphs for democracy and human rights 
around the world. We witnessed the birth of multiracial democracy in 
South Africa.  American leadership helped to remove a brutal 
dictatorship and restore democratic government in Haiti.  We also led 
the effort to create international institutions of accountability to 
bring war criminals from the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda to justice. 
 
It is a hopeful sign that courageous individuals such as Nelson Mandela, 
Lech Walesa, and Vaclav Havel, who once appeared in these reports as 
solitary victims of arbitrary arrest, censorship, and persecution, were 
welcomed this year in our country as heads of state.  Today, men and 
women such as Wei Jingsheng, Aung San Suu Kyi, and Wole Soyinka command 
equal attention and respect--because of the values we share, the people 
for whom they stand, and the potential they represent. 
 
The last year was also marked by serious setbacks.  Unspeakable horror 
engulfed Rwanda, and brutal violence continued in Bosnia.  The Chinese 
Government launched a disturbing crackdown on dissent.  Totalitarian 
dictatorships in countries such as Burma, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, 
Libya, and Sudan continued to resist change. And in our hemisphere, Cuba 
is now the last nation to hold out against the movement toward elected 
government.  The country reports describe these and all-too-many other 
violations of human rights. 
 
These reports help us shape our diplomacy and assistance and trade 
policies. We use them as we work with foreign governments, international 
organizations, and NGOs.  They are also important in their own right 
because they shine a bright light on human rights violations that might 
otherwise be shielded by a veil of secrecy and indifference. 
 
We recognize that the struggle for freedom often requires a long-term 
effort.  We know that the United States cannot, by itself, assure 
freedom's victory in any country in the world.  But our nation does have 
the capacity and the responsibility to make a difference.  We can make 
sure that when people sacrifice for human rights and democracy, we are 
prepared to notice, remember, and act.  These annual human rights 
reports are an essential tool in that vital effort. 
 
 
Overview of Human Rights Practices, 1994 
Text of the overview of the 1994 Report to Congress on Human Rights 
Practices, released February 1995. 
 
The Changing Nature Of Human Rights Problems 
 
During the Cold War, threats to human rights were seen as coming 
primarily from centralized authorities--strong governments ruling with 
an iron hand.  In response, the human rights community developed the 
forms of advocacy with which we are now familiar--monitoring, reporting, 
publicizing cases, advocacy on behalf of individual victims of human 
rights abuse, and advocacy of sanctions against strong governments. 
 
Today, in the post-Cold War world, much has changed.  Human rights 
abuses are still committed by strong central governments.  But we have 
become all-too familiar with abuses in countries with weak or 
unresponsive governments, committed by ethnic, religious, and separatist 
extremists, as well as governments themselves, and in extreme cases 
fanned into genocide by cynical political leaders, and made harder to 
resist by enormous economic, environmental, and demographic pressures.  
These conflicts present us with a devastating array of new human rights 
problems. 
 
At the same time, the post-Cold War environment offers opportunities for 
structural change both within countries and in the international 
community that could give internationally recognized human rights 
greater force than ever before.  This is due in large part to the fall 
of Soviet communism, but also to a powerful global movement for human 
rights and democratic participation.  This movement has been under way 
for some two decades.  The past five years have been especially 
dramatic, changing the political face of many parts of the world, from 
the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to South Africa, Zambia, 
Cambodia, El Salvador, Chile, Mongolia, and elsewhere. 
 
The movement for human rights and democracy is even beginning to show 
strength in diverse and unlikely places.  As the 1993 UN World 
Conference on Human Rights in Vienna dramatically demonstrated, this 
global movement is among the strongest grassroots forces in the world 
today.  Increasingly assertive and effective indigenous forces are 
pressing worldwide for government transparency and accountability, for 
basic democratic freedoms, and for internationally recognized human 
rights. 
 
All this is taking place at a time when states are engaging with each 
other in a growing range of challenges that transcend national borders--
trade, the environment, security, population, migration--issues that are 
creating powerful forces of integration in some cases and increasing 
conflict in others. 
 
In this new multipolar world, the traditional human rights "sticks" of 
sanctions and other punitive measures directed against abusive regimes 
still have an important role to play.  But sanctions need to be 
complemented by broader means of promoting human rights in countries 
that are in the midst of wrenching change and as a consequence are often 
mired in internal conflict. 
 
In short, with the passing of the Cold War we find ourselves in a new 
international strategic environment.  The human rights abuses of 
governments are accompanied by ethnic tension, breakdown of authority, 
and environmental destruction.  As a result, human rights promotion must 
synthesize familiar forms of pressure and advocacy with long-term 
structural reform and the support of grassroots movements for change. 
 
Indeed, we see a growing emphasis on multilateral action to support 
these movements:  first, through negotiated settlements of conflict, 
which often include provisions for internationally supported democratic 
elections; second, through institutions of accountability for human 
rights abuses such as war crimes tribunals, truth commissions, and 
judicial assistance programs; and third, through scores of peace-keeping 
operations and humanitarian assistance programs. 
 
Institutions of Accountability 
 
The appalling slaughter in Rwanda and the "ethnic cleansing" in the 
former Yugoslavia have cast into high relief the new human rights 
problems of our age.  These catastrophes have urgently demonstrated the 
need to develop a spectrum of institutions that will hold political 
leaders accountable to their constituents and to the international 
community as a whole. 
 
The mass murders in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia did not arise 
spontaneously.  They were fomented by persons who sought to gain 
political ends through these violent and hideous means.  Unless those 
persons are called to account for genocide, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity, justice will not be served, and reconciliation and 
reconstruction will not be possible.  This is why the United States 
supported the UN Security Council's creation of war crimes tribunals for 
the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. 
 
The tribunals are also necessary to lift the burden of collective guilt 
that settles on any society whose leaders have directed such terrible 
violence.  The assignment of responsibility enables the international 
community to differentiate between victims and aggressors, and it helps 
expunge the cynical illusion that conflicts with an ethnic dimension are 
hopelessly complex and therefore insoluble.  Moreover, the tribunals are 
essential if future crimes are to be deterred.  If basic human rights 
can be massively violated with impunity in Rwanda and the former 
Yugoslavia, the world is fair game for every conceivable form of terror. 
 
In addition to war crimes tribunals, a spectrum of institutions of 
accountability have contributed to reconciliation in a number of 
countries.  The Truth Commissions of Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Haiti, 
the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala, and the National Human Rights 
Commissions established in India and Mexico represent new and diverse 
ways of providing accountability for human rights abuses.  
Accountability is also being furthered in a number of countries by 
assistance programs aimed at developing the administration of justice 
and the rule of law.  For example, the recently established UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights placed human rights monitors in Rwanda and 
is planning to work with the U.S. and other countries to help rebuild 
the Rwandan legal system. 
 
Armed Conflict 
 
Around the world, a number of hard-fought conflicts have moved toward 
long-sought resolution.  A cease-fire was negotiated in Northern Ireland 
and is holding, despite several incidents which could have led to 
renewed violence.  Despite increasing violence and terror, Israel and 
the Palestine Liberation Organization began to implement their 
Declaration of Principles through their agreement on the Gaza and 
Jericho areas.  We also witnessed the beginnings of Palestinian self-
government in these areas.  For the first time, this human rights report 
will examine Palestinian human rights practices in areas under 
Palestinian jurisdiction.  Israel and Jordan signed a treaty formally 
establishing peace.  In Mozambique, a UN-negotiated peace accord led 
ultimately to elections and the installation of a new government.  And 
in El Salvador, the UN-sponsored peace accord moved closer to full 
implementation with the dissolution of the former National Police and 
creation of a new civilian police force. 
 
Even so, armed conflict continued to generate significant human rights 
abuse--most visibly in Rwanda and in the former Yugoslavia--but in many 
other places as well. 
 
To prevent Chechnya's secession from Russia, Russian troops crossed into 
Chechnya on December 11, 1994.  This action included massive aerial and 
artillery bombardment of civilian areas in Chechnya's capital, Grozny, 
resulting in a major humanitarian and human rights crisis. 
 
In Angola, the bloody civil war, which erupted anew after the failed 
1993 election, raged throughout much of 1994, with perhaps 100,000 dead, 
mostly civilians. 
 
Guerrilla violence and military actions continued to give Colombia one 
of the highest violent death rates in the world. 
 
The Turkish Government's continued armed struggle against the terrorist 
Kurdistan Workers Party (or PKK) has resulted in violence against 
civilians and abuses of rights within Turkey, including the arrest and 
trial of Turkish parliamentarians and many other citizens for expressing 
their views, while the widespread use of torture in prisons and 
detention facilities has continued with impunity. 
 
Since 1992 Algeria has been embroiled in civil strife, pitting armed 
Islamist groups and their sympathizers against the government, with 
killings and other human rights abuses on both sides. 
 
The dismal human rights situation in the Sudan further deteriorated in 
the face of intensified civil war, as both the government and insurgents 
engaged in massacres, extrajudicial killings, kidnappings, forced 
conscriptions, and the obstruction of humanitarian aid. 
 
Much of Kabul was destroyed as the Afghan civil war was renewed in early 
1994.  The Red Cross estimated from its clinical records that 34,000 
civilians were killed or wounded in street fighting and heavy weapons 
attacks on Kabul alone.  Over 1 million more Afghans were displaced by 
the fighting. 
 
Torture, Arbitrary Detention, Impunity of Abusers 
 
Flagrant and systematic abuses of basic human rights continued at the 
hands of the world's authoritarian and repressive regimes, such as 
China, Iraq, Iran, Burma, North Korea, and Cuba.  In those and other 
countries, denial of basic freedoms of expression, association, and 
religion; persecution of minorities; and the suppression of civil 
society remain the norm. 
 
In a departure from a recent trend toward openness, the Indonesian 
Government revoked the licenses of three prominent publications.  
Security forces serving in East Timor and elsewhere continued to be 
responsible for significant abuses, and the government prepared a draft 
decree which, if implemented, could severely curtail the activities of 
many Indonesian non-governmental organizations. 
 
Nigeria's military regime, which annulled that country's 1993 elections, 
continued to crack down on the opposition, despite a massive strike by 
the labor force.  The regime killed and wounded protesters, employed 
arbitrary detention and mass arrest, perpetrated extrajudicial killings 
and torture, and engaged in other abuses. 
 
In Saudi Arabia, abuses including torture, incommunicado detention, 
restrictions on freedom of speech and religion and suppression of ethnic 
and religious minorities, and pervasive discrimination against women 
continued. 
 
In several less thoroughly repressive countries, including some with 
functioning democratic institutions, significant human rights abuses 
occurred. 
 
The Government of Singapore continued to intimidate opposition parties 
and their leaders and to regularly restrict freedoms of speech, 
association, and assembly. 
 
In Egypt, the government's security services and terrorist groups 
remained locked in a cycle of violence and there continued to be 
widespread human rights violations. 
 
India has a long-standing democracy with a free press, independent 
judiciary, and active political and civic life.  Nonetheless, 
significant human rights abuses are committed by military and security 
forces in areas of unrest, particularly Kashmir.  These include 
extrajudicial killings and other political killings, torture, deaths in 
custody, and violence against women. 
 
Despite the inauguration of a former human rights ombudsman as president 
in 1993, the human rights situation in Guatemala remained troubling, 
with both sides in the civil war committing major violations, including 
extrajudicial killing, kidnaping, and torture. 
 
Economics and Human Rights 
 
An increasingly important issue placed squarely in the public eye in 
1994 was the relationship between economic development and trade on the 
one hand and the promotion of human rights and democracy on the other.  
This was most vividly the case with regard to the U.S. decision to de-
link China's most-favored-nation status from China's human rights 
performance. 
 
The relationship between trade and human rights has taken on special 
salience as extensive networks of international trade have emerged and 
as nations have lifted trade barriers that have inhibited full exchange 
among their peoples.  The suggestion in some quarters that there is an 
inescapable trade-off between economic development and human rights 
promotion is ultimately false. 
 
It is precisely because the United States has an interest in economic 
development, political stability, and conflict resolution around the 
world that it promotes human rights and accountable government.  As 
President Clinton said last November on the eve of his departure for 
Southeast Asia,  
 
In societies where the rule of law prevails, where governments are held 
accountable to their people and where ideas and information freely 
circulate, we are more likely to find economic development and political 
stability. 
 
And as we have seen in nations undergoing economic transformation, 
market reformers who enjoy popular legitimacy are more likely to win 
popular support for tough economic choices.  Trade relations by 
themselves are no substitute for vigorous human rights advocacy.  
Moreover, as the world trading system grows increasingly robust, care 
must be taken to incorporate the promotion of worker rights into 
bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. 
 
Economic growth, trade, and social mobility may not be sufficient 
conditions for political pluralism, but they do create powerful 
pressures for political change.  Open trade can support the movement 
toward freedom by strengthening independent institutions of civil 
society, by exposing isolated nations to the possibility of other ways 
of life, and because of the inescapable truth that free and open markets 
can be meaningfully sustained over the long haul only by open societies 
that respect basic rights and the rule of law. 
 
Worker Rights 
 
With the expansion of global trade, worker rights take on renewed 
urgency.  The new World Trade Organization will have to face the effects 
of worker rights on trade. 
 
The universal right most pertinent to the workplace is freedom of 
association, which is the foundation on which workers can form and 
organize trade unions, bargain collectively, press grievances, and 
protect themselves from unsafe working conditions.  In many countries, 
workers have far to go in realizing their rights.  Restrictions on 
workers range from outright state control of all forms of worker 
organization to webs of legislation whose complexity is meant to 
overwhelm and disarm workers. 
 
In 1994, we continued to see practices of forced and bonded labor and 
child labor in a number of places.  In Burma, citizens are taken off the 
streets and pressed into slave labor.  Small children work on carpet 
looms, in garment factories, and myriad other occupations in India, 
Pakistan, and in dozens of other countries around the world.  Trade 
unions are banned outright in a number of countries, including several 
in the Middle East, and in many more there is little protection of 
worker efforts to organize and bargain collectively.  Some protesting 
workers have paid with their lives; others, most notably in China and 
Indonesia, have gone to jail simply for trying to inform fellow workers 
of their rights.  We also see inadequate enforcement of labor 
legislation, especially with regard to health and safety in the 
workplace. 
 
Democracy 
 
Democracy is by definition a system which provides for the participation 
of ordinary citizens in governing their country, and depends for its 
success on the growth of democratic culture along with democratic 
institutions.  Elections are one essential dimension of participation 
and accountability.  Democracy's most stirring triumphs of the year were 
Nelson Mandela's election as President in South Africa and the 
restoration of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and the democratically 
elected Government of Haiti. 
 
In South Africa, concerted efforts by all sides eventually brought all 
parties into the political process, resulting in profound structural 
change that has ended institutional apartheid and sharply decreased the 
violence it engendered.  In Haiti, President Aristide was peacefully 
returned to power through U.S. leadership and the international 
community's resolute stand against the violent usurpers who had deposed 
him and perpetrated massive human rights abuses on the people. 
 
Away from the headlines, democracy has also made strides in little- 
noticed places: 
 
In Malawi, voters defeated former President-for-Life H. Kamuzu Banda in 
free elections in May. 
 
The countries of the former Soviet bloc continued their halting 
transitions from closed to open societies.  The newly independent states 
of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan held elections 
with varying degrees of freedom and fairness and in the shadow of 
continuing significant human rights abuse.  The picture was brighter in 
the countries of Central Europe, though dimmed in some places by 
disturbing encroachments on freedom of speech and the press. 
 
Democracy is not a one-time event but a process of governance and of 
history.  As President Aristide said upon his return to Haiti, "The true 
test of a democracy is its second free election when power is 
transferred freely and constitutionally."  These important milestones in 
democratic development were passed in a number of countries. 
 
Several Latin American countries, such as Uruguay, Chile, and Brazil, 
which were formerly ruled by the military, held new rounds of elections 
and inaugurated new presidents in 1994, further consolidating their 
democracies. 
 
After Nepal's second parliamentary election since its democratic 
revolution in 1990, an opposition party formed a coalition government 
and peacefully assumed power. 
 
There were significant setbacks for democracy as well.  The long-delayed 
return of democracy to Nigeria was again blocked by a military dictator-
ship's refusal to accept the outcome of elections.  In The Gambia, the 
military overthrew the elected civilian government.  In Burma, the 
military regime continued its refusal to abide by the results of the 
1990 elections, keeping Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi under 
house arrest and silencing all opposition. 
 
Civilian Control of the Military And Law Enforcement 
 
As countries make the transition from authoritarian government to open 
societies, few issues become more crucial than the civilian control of 
the military and law enforcement authorities.  Indeed, in many 
countries, human rights abuses and democratic setbacks resulted from the 
inability of civilian authorities to control armed forces and security 
services.  In other countries, there were examples of progress. 
 
In Argentina, the Senate rejected the promotion of two navy commanders 
because of their admitted role in torture during the years of military 
rule.  In Guatemala, the Congress held hearings on the killing of a 
student by security forces during rioting in November, marking a step 
forward in congressional oversight. 
 
In Sri Lanka, the government set up regional commissions to investigate 
allegations of disappearances and began prosecution proceedings against 
accused extrajudicial killers. 
 
While members of Colombia's security forces and guerrilla groups 
continue to commit serious human rights abuses, the new administration 
has taken a number of steps aimed at reducing the incidence of official 
abuses and punishing those who commit them. 
 
In Nigeria, on the other hand, the military regime that seized power 
after annulling the free and fair elections of 1993 continued to ride 
roughshod over the opposition and ruin hopes for political or economic 
progress. 
 
Rights of Women 
 
This year saw an increased international focus on women's human rights 
and the advancement of the status of women.  The International 
Conference on Population and Development, held in Cairo in September 
1994; the World Summit for Social Development, to take place in 
Copenhagen in March 1995; and the Fourth World Conference on Women, to 
be held in Beijing in September 1995 encourage greater attention to and 
understanding of human rights abuses against women.  Unfortunately, such 
abuses persisted in 1994. 
 
Of particular concern is the problem of violence against women.  In 
early 1994, the UN Human Rights Commission established a Special 
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women to examine its causes and 
consequences.  The 1994 Human Rights Reports document that physical 
abuse of women, including torture, systematic rape, female genital 
mutilation, domestic violence, sexual abuse, harassment, exploitation 
and trafficking of women, and female feticide continued throughout the 
world. 
 
In addition to physical abuse, the political, civil, and legal rights of 
women continue to be denied.  In 1994, women in many countries were 
subjected to discriminatory restrictions of their fundamental freedoms 
regarding voting, marriage, travel, property ownership and inheritance, 
custody of children, citizenship, and court testimony.  Women also faced 
sex-based discrimination in access to education, employment, health 
care, financial services including credit, and even to food and water. 
 
Looking Forward 
 
The emergence of non-governmental human rights organizations around the 
world is one of the most hopeful and arresting developments of the post-
Cold War era.  These organizations hold the key to the future if nations 
are to begin to hold each other accountable for human rights abuse.  
They have an especially vital role to play in the growth of human rights 
and democracy, precisely because they arise in and reflect the unique 
features of their respective societies.  With the changing times, 
grassroots groups have taken on new roles, such as election monitoring, 
active negotiating as part of democratic transitions, serving as 
ombudsmen, and creating institutions of accountability and 
reconciliation. 
 
Human rights violations span the globe, and no region has a monopoly on 
abuses.  The drive for realization of basic rights is a universal work-
in-progress, and the story is not always grim.  My counterpart in the 
Russian Government, Vyacheslav Bakhmin, was a Soviet prisoner of 
conscience on whose behalf I once campaigned.  He, like other human 
rights activists in scores of countries, risked their lives to bear 
witness and are now using their freedom to reform and rebuild their 
societies. 
 
One of those activists-turned-leaders, Vaclav Havel, has powerfully 
expressed what it means to make a commitment to human rights in this 
complex new world, where the triumph of freedom can so quickly be 
overshadowed by the horror of genocide, where the inauguration of Nelson 
Mandela can take place in the same month as the mass murders of Tutsis 
in Rwanda: 
 
     I am not an optimist because I am not sure that everything ends 
well.  Nor am I a pessimist, because I am not sure everything ends 
badly.  Instead, I am a realist who carries hope, and hope is the belief 
that freedom and justice have meaning . . . and that liberty is always 
worth the struggle.  (###) 
 
[Box] 
1994 Human Rights Report 
 
Copies of the 1994 Report to Congress on Human Rights Practices may be 
purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, DC 20402, tel. 202-512-1800; GPO stock no. 052-070-
06991-1. 
 
Electronic distribution of the full report is available through the 
Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) and through GPO's 
Federal Bulletin Board.   
 
On DOSFAN, the report is in "Publications and Major Reports."  DOSFAN 
may be accessed three ways on the Internet: 
 
--  Gopher: dosfan.lib.uic.edu 
--  URL: gopher://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ 
--  WWW: http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/dosfan.html 
 
On the Federal Bulletin Board, the report can be found in the Department 
of State Human Rights Library under Global Issues.  (###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 6 
 
U.S. Aid Package to Mexico  
Secretary Christopher, Treasury Secretary Rubin 
Opening statements at a news conference, Washington, DC, January 31, 
1995 
 
Secretary Christopher.  Good afternoon.  By some ancient tradition, as 
you know, the Secretary of State is the Senior Cabinet Officer.  It 
happens  that, chronologically, I am, too.  But I think you all know 
that Secretary Rubin has been the President's point person on this 
subject, and so I will not deprive you of him very long. 
 
I did think it might be useful to give you some background on the 
situation. As you know, yesterday, the peso had a very bad day:  It 
dropped more than 10%.  The prospects of default by the Mexican 
Government on their obligations became very real.  Last night, the White 
House was told by the congressional leadership that the prospects for 
passage of the loan guarantee legislation were quite poor, especially in 
any timeframe in the immediate future. 
 
As we looked at the markets today in anticipation, we felt that it would 
be a very disorderly day, much more disorderly than yesterday if nothing 
were done.  As a result, the President had urgent meetings last night 
and again early this morning.  I think he faced a dire situation, and he 
felt it was necessary to exercise firm leadership. 
 
As you know, the President met with the congressional leadership this 
morning and, essentially, laid out to them the two alternatives that he 
thought he faced at the present time.  One alternative would be to go 
forward with the loan guarantee legislation, but in the face of their 
statements to him that it was impossible to do this in the very near 
future.  It might be done over time with a long period of persuasion, 
but it was not possible to do it in  a short period of time. 
 
The second alternative was to take executive action under the Exchange 
Stabilization Fund.  That is a fund of about $25 billion which was 
created more than 50 years ago and has now grown from its initial fund 
of about $20 billion to around $25 billion. 
 
It is felt that $20 billion of that fund could be used for these 
purposes.  In the last 24 or 48 hours, the IMF, recognizing the 
seriousness of this problem, has increased the amount that it could make 
available to $17.8 billion, so that there is now available almost as 
much through this combination of the IMF and the Exchange Stabilization 
Fund as the earlier $40 billion of loan guarantees. 
 
In his meeting this morning with the congressional leadership, the 
President said that while he initially had preferred to go the 
congressional route in order to have their full participation, he 
thought, based upon their advice, that time no longer permitted that.  
So he was determined to go ahead and exercise--as a President must do at 
some point--firm executive leadership.  He told the leaders he was 
prepared to go ahead with the second alternative, and he asked for their 
support.  He said he felt that the chance of the program succeeding 
would be greater if he had their support.  I think that during the 
course of the day, it has been quite apparent that the markets would 
receive favorably indications of support from Capitol Hill.  As Mike 
McCurry just indicated to you, the four congressional leaders have now 
signed a statement endorsing the President's action. 
 
My judgment is that this was one of those moments when executive 
leadership proved necessary.  Time did not permit the education process 
that might have made congressional action possible, although the 
President had, about two weeks ago, received expressions of 
congressional support that had not ripened into congressional action.  
The situation was dire in Mexico.  There was the risk of default and of 
problems that would involve not only Mexico, but the United States and 
the world economy.  The President took the action that he felt was 
necessary in this situation. 
 
I would just say before I conclude that from my standpoint, the 
interests of the United States here are absolutely clear.  We have a 
very strong interest in the stability of Mexico for a wide range of 
reasons. 
 
First, because their economy's purchases support about 700,000 American 
jobs.  They are critical to us from the standpoint of many issues, such 
as narcotics, law enforcement, and migration.  So Mexico's future is 
very important to the United States.   
 
Second, this particular matter has ramifications well beyond Mexico.  It 
affects not only Latin America, but the emerging economies of the world.  
The situation in Latin America has vastly improved in the last several 
years to the point where we have 34 democracies now.  Much of that 
progress, particularly the economic progress, could be jeopardized if 
there were a situation in Mexico of the kind that I've described here.  
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this was a critical test of 
American leadership.  It will be read that way around the world.  The 
President met that test today.  The action he has taken will be seen 
over time as the right decision to take in a difficult situation.  
Though he was perhaps going against the grain, in the face of some 
public opinion polls that seem to be adverse, the President took the 
action that he concluded was in the best interest of the American 
people.  And from my standpoint as Secretary of State, it was an action 
that the United States will long regard as favorable. 
 
Now Secretary Rubin will be glad to spell out many more details than I 
have, and we'll both be glad to answer whatever questions you have.  
Bob. 
 
 
Secretary Rubin.  Thank you.  Secretary Christopher has exceedingly well 
expressed to you what this is about and what happened last night and 
this morning in what was quite a dramatic and  important set of meetings 
culminating, as Secretary Christopher said, in the meeting in the 
Cabinet Room at 8:45 a.m. this morning with the bipartisan leadership. 
 
The program that we have today was really motivated by three 
considerations. 
   
--  One has just been explained to you:  the bipartisan leadership 
informed the President that the Congress could not act in a timely 
fashion-- timely, relative to the circumstances that were developing in 
Mexico.  
 
--  Number two:  financial distress in Mexico had reached proportions 
that were exceedingly troubling.  The peso hit an all-time low 
yesterday; the stock market was down 8%.  It was our view that if this 
was not dealt with and dealt with quickly, it would reach dire 
proportions very quickly.   
 
--  Third, through the extraordinary good work of Under Secretary Larry 
Summers last night, the IMF increased its participation to $17.5 
billion--a multiple of the largest amount it has ever committed to any 
undertaking in the past.  That expressed both their concern about 
Mexico--concern parallel to ours with respect to its significance to the 
world's economies.  It also was, obviously, an enormously important 
component in being able to put together the package that we now have. 
 
The package itself consists of the following elements:  $20 billion from 
the Exchange Stabilization Fund, a fund first created in 1934.  It is an 
existent fund that will be used for either loan guarantees or loans; it 
will be subject to stringent conditions, and it will be supported by the 
oil facility that we have described with respect to the previous 
package. 
 
There will also be a fee, and the fee will reflect the risks that we 
feel are associated with this enterprise, plus a supplemental amount to 
make sure that this is not a low-cost funding mechanism for the Mexican 
Government.  
 
Two, there will be $17. 5 billion from the IMF, and that will be 
intermediate term money, just as our own money is intermediate term 
money, also subject to stringent conditions with respect to the kinds of 
financial issues that created the problem that we now face.  Three, 
there will be $10 billion from the BIS, which is basically a short-term 
stabilization facility.  There will be $1 billion from a consortium of 
Latin American countries, and $1 billion from Canada. 
 
Put together, the $37 billion of intermediate term money that we now 
have is the economic equivalent of the $40-billion loan guarantee that 
we originally contemplated.  We will begin working immediately with the 
Mexicans to finalize the conditions so that the economic integrity of 
our loans, or loan guarantee--whichever direction we take--are 
protected.  We feel that there is a very high probability that this will 
be successful and re-establish the confidence in Mexico, causing private 
capital markets to again work, and allowing the strong fundamentals of 
the Mexican economy to reassert themselves, which was the premise of 
this entire effort to begin with.  (###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 7 
 
The United States and the United Nations:  Confrontation or Consensus? 
Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations 
Address to the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, January 26, 
1995 
 
Good evening.  It is great to be here among so many friends, and the 
timing could not be better.  For decades, the Council on Foreign 
Relations has been at the heart of the bipartisan tradition of American 
foreign policy.  Because we are a democracy, that tradition is never 
honored perfectly nor, in truth, should we expect it to be.  But the 
history of this century demonstrates that we are stronger and more 
successful when the two parties agree on core policies and principles 
than when we do not.  On many past occasions, the council has helped 
bring us together.  That capacity has continued relevance in this period 
of turbulence and transition. 
 
As a former professor, I have many books at home that analyze the world 
as it was a decade ago.  They are about as useful now as archeology; 
they are ancient history.  Believe it or not, even the back issues of 
Foreign Affairs have lost some of their freshness. 
 
The whirligig of change has been in particular evidence where I work--
promoting and defending American interests at the UN.  Consider that 
only two years ago, shortly before he left office, President Bush 
observed that: 
 
The UN . . . [is] emerging as a central instrument for the prevention 
and resolution of conflicts and the preservation of peace. 
 
At about the same time, former President Reagan called for . . . a 
standing UN force--an army of conscience--equipped and prepared to carve 
out humanitarian sanctuaries through force if necessary. 
 
In historical terms, that was only yesterday.  Yet, today, some of the 
loudest voices propound sentiments far different:  The UN is "the 
longtime nemesis of millions of Americans" says one leader on Capitol 
Hill.  It is "a totally incompetent instrument anyplace that matters" 
says another.  Bills have been introduced in both the House and Senate 
designed not to reform UN peace-keeping but to kill it.  The goal, in 
the view of one advocate, is to bring "the UN back to where it was when 
it was created."  What a curious ambition. 
 
Tonight, I want to discuss what the consequences would be for America if 
that great leap backward were taken.  I want also to outline a forward-
looking vision of American leadership at the UN--a vision that reflects 
past lessons, current capabilities, future challenges, and enduring 
principles. 
 
The UN is 50 years old this year.  I doubt that I am alone in this room 
in remembering that on my 50th birthday, celebration took a back seat to 
reflection--and new resolve.  The power of the United Nations Charter--
which Americans wrote--can be found not only in its eloquence, but in 
its origins.  The authors of those lofty ideals understood well the 
lethal nature of isolationism's siren call.  They had seen arise in 
Europe and Asia after World War I great evil; they had seen the world 
react passively to savage crimes; they had seen leaders back away 
repeatedly from the possibility of war and thereby assure the reality of 
war. 
 
The battle-hardened generation of Roosevelt, Churchill, and De Gaulle 
viewed the UN as a practical response to an inherently contentious 
world; a necessity not because relations among states could ever be 
brought into perfect harmony but because they cannot. 
 
From the day we signed the UN Charter, Americans--Republican and 
Democrat--have viewed the UN not as an end in itself but as one 
instrument, among many, for advancing U.S. goals.  In the words of 
President Truman: 
 
We support the UN and keep this contract because the Charter expresses 
our fundamental aims in the world . . . to attain peace with justice, to 
assure freedom and to bring about economic and social progress for 
ourselves and all people. 
 
Let me assure you tonight:  This Administration will not allow the 
hullabaloo over a more recent contract to cause the Charter of the 
United Nations--the contract of Truman and Vandenberg and Dulles and FDR 
and Eleanor Roosevelt and the generation that triumphed over the Nazis--
to be ripped to shreds. 
 
UN Peace-keeping:  Advancing U.S. Goals 
 
Our generation is privileged to live in an era when our fundamental aims 
are not opposed by another superpower.  But threats and conflicts 
continue to arise that engage our interests.  Among these threats are: 
 
--  Efforts by rogue regimes to build or acquire weapons of mass 
destruction; 
 
--  Attempts by regional powers hostile to U.S. interests to dominate 
their respective regions through aggression, intimidation, or terror; 
 
--  Transnational criminal enterprises, which thrive where national 
governments are either weak or complicit; and 
 
--  What Leslie Gelb described recently as the "teapot wars"--internal 
conflicts among ethnic, national, religious, or tribal groups that 
undermine regional stability, impede democratic reform, and stifle 
economic growth. 
 
Because we face a multiplicity of threats, we need a multiplicity of 
options.  The ultimate guarantor of our security remains our capacity to 
act forcefully and, if we must, unilaterally. 
 
Our military must remain modern, mobile, ready, and strong--and, as 
President Clinton pledged in his address two nights ago, it will.  We 
must maintain vigorous alliances--and we are.  And we must conduct 
strong, steady, and creative diplomacy--and, under the leadership of 
Secretary of State Christopher, that is exactly what we are doing. 
 
In this new era, our energies remain focused on issues central to our 
security and economic well-being: 
 
--  Trade agreements that will create new, American jobs; 
 
--  Cooperation among the major powers, especially on the control of 
nuclear weapons; 
 
--  Creation of a secure, integrated, and fully democratic Europe; 
 
--  Stability in other key regions, such as the Middle East and the 
Korean Peninsula; and 
 
--  Continued momentum toward democracy and market economies. 
 
In pursuing these and other goals, we must be prepared to act alone, for 
our willingness to do so is often the key to effective joint action.  
But the recent debate between the proponents of unilateral and 
multilateral action assumes a false choice:  Multilateralism is a means, 
not an end. 
 
Just as military power is advanced by the integration of seapower with 
air and amphibious capabilities, so our diplomacy is advanced by the 
integration of unilateral with coalition and more broadly multilateral 
approaches.  Multilateral steps complement bilateral and unilateral 
efforts; they do not substitute for them.  And through our participation 
in the UN, we strive to resolve problems before they endanger directly 
our most vital interests. 
 
The Clinton Administration has continued strategies, begun under 
President Bush, to improve and reform UN peace-keeping so that it better 
serves our interests.  Peace-keeping has the capacity, under the right 
circumstances, to separate adversaries, maintain cease-fires, facilitate 
the delivery of humanitarian relief, enable refugees and displaced 
persons to return home, demobilize combatants, and create conditions 
under which political reconciliation may occur and free elections may be 
held.  In so doing, it can help nurture new democracies, lower the 
global tide of refugees, reduce the likelihood of unwelcome 
interventions by regional powers, and prevent small wars from growing 
into larger conflicts which would be far more costly in lives and 
treasure. 
 
The total assessed cost to the United States of UN peace-keeping in 
fiscal year 1994 was roughly $1 billion--about $4 per American and less 
than one-half of one percent of our foreign policy and national security 
expenditures.  Further, direct U.S. participation in UN peace operations 
is modest.  As of January 1, 1995, the U.S. ranked 27th among nations in 
the number of troops participating.  Even after the UN mission to Haiti 
is deployed, American forces will comprise less than 5% of the total of 
UN peacekeepers. 
 
We do not look to the UN to defend our vital interests, nor can we 
expect the UN to be effective where the decisive application of military 
force is required.  But in many circumstances, the UN will enable us to 
influence events without assuming the full burden of costs and risks.  
It lends the weight of law and world opinion to causes and principles we 
support.  And the more able the UN is to end or contain conflict, the 
less likely it is that we will have to deploy our armed forces. 
 
Traditionally, most UN peace missions have operated in a non-hostile 
environment.  But, as we have seen in Somalia and Bosnia, the challenge 
of keeping the peace is far simpler than that of creating a secure 
environment in the midst of ongoing conflict.  The UN Secretary General 
correctly pointed out recently that peace-keeping and peace enforcement 
are not adjacent points on a continuum.  In Bosnia, the Security Council 
sent forces equipped for peace-keeping on a mission that demanded much 
more.  We should not make that error again. 
 
Indeed, at our insistence, the Security Council has become far more 
disciplined about when and under what circumstances to begin a peace 
operation.  Today, the tough questions about the cost, size, risk, 
mandate, and duration of a mission are asked before one is started or 
renewed.  Our goal is to ensure that UN operations have clear and 
realistic objectives, that peacekeepers are equipped properly, that 
money is not wasted, and that an endpoint to UN action can be 
identified.  The policy is working, and it has resulted in fewer and 
smaller new operations and better management of existing ones. 
 
Although one operation--in Rwanda--was expanded, there were no major new 
UN peace missions in 1994.  In addition, the Security Council voted to 
terminate three missions, including two of the largest--in Somalia and 
Mozambique.  As a result, the total number of UN peacekeepers at year's 
end was the lowest in almost two years. 
 
From our perspective near millennium's end, we can look back at 
centuries of international efforts to deter conflict through a 
combination of force and law.  Before the UN, there was the League of 
Nations; before that, the Congress of Vienna; before that, the Treaty of 
Westphalia; before that, medieval nonaggression pacts; before that, the 
Athenian League. 
 
Still, no perfect mechanism for collective security has been found.  We 
have little basis in the behavior either of people or of nations to 
believe it ever will.  It is our lot to work with imperfect tools.  But 
tools can be sharpened, and we are endeavoring with other UN members and 
with the UN Secretariat to make peace-keeping more effective. 
 
Clearly, this is still a work in progress.  In the months ahead, we will 
be striving to implement reforms that will make budgeting for UN 
peacekeeping more rational, procurement more efficient, and training 
more meaningful.  We can expect that new operations will be unusual and 
that current ones will be reviewed with care.  We can predict that the 
Security Council will turn more often to individual member states or to 
ad hoc coalitions when threats arise that require a rapid and forceful 
response. 
 
One of the myths that has gained currency in recent months is that the 
United States is running around the world doing the bidding of the UN.  
In New York, much of the foreign diplomatic corps would argue that the 
reverse is closer to the truth.  Under the UN Charter, it is the 
Security Council that has responsibility for authorizing responses to 
lawless international behavior, including threats to peace.  As a 
permanent member of the Security Council, we have great influence over 
what it decides.  Frequently, a Security Council resolution will lend 
international backing to causes we support and make it easier to bring 
others aboard military or sanctions-enforcement operations in which 
American forces participate--thereby assuring that costs and risks are 
shared. 
 
Prior to Operation Desert Storm, President Bush sought explicit 
authority from the Security Council to respond to Iraqi aggression with 
"all necessary means."  Evidently he, for one, did not view the UN as 
"the nemesis of millions of Americans."  On the contrary, Council 
support helped the U.S. assemble a coalition of unprecedented breadth.  
After the war, the Administration gained the Council's approval for 
economic sanctions and other measures to ensure the end of Iraq's 
nuclear program, require recognition by Iraq of its border with Kuwait, 
protect Iraqi minorities, and mandate an accounting of missing Kuwaitis.  
International support remains of central importance to our efforts to 
contain and influence the behavior of the Iraqi regime. 
 
More recently, the Clinton Administration won Security Council 
authorization for deployment of a multinational force to Haiti that has 
restored democracy and eased the humanitarian crisis there.  Council 
support was instrumental in gaining agreement from more than a dozen 
other countries to participate in the multinational force, in maximizing 
global diplomatic support for the operation, and in allowing us to plan 
for a transition to a UN peace-keeping force in the near future. 
 
Opponents of American participation and leadership in the UN should 
understand this:  We do not face a choice between acting through the UN 
and acting alone.  An effective UN provides an indispensable, additional 
option for pursuing objectives important to us--objectives we might 
otherwise not be able to obtain as easily or at all. 
 
UN Reform 
 
Now there is a small minority of Americans who will always look askance 
at the UN simply because it is full of foreigners.  Others do not 
recognize that theæUN has moved beyond the anti-democratic, anti-
capitalist, sometimes anti-semitic rhetoric that echoed in the General 
Assembly a decade or two ago. 
 
Far more serious is concern about the traditional sloppiness of UN 
management, but here substantial progress toward reform is being made.  
During the Cold War, the UN was manipulated by all sides for purposes of 
propaganda and patronage.  Now its real responsibilities are increasing.  
It has to adapt, and--despite its unwieldy nature--it is.  Earlier this 
year, we established a new office with the functions of an inspector 
general.  The new Under Secretary for Management, Joseph Connor, is a 
former CEO of Price Waterhouse.  The concept of merit is beginning to 
creep into discussions of personnel policy.  The culture of governance 
is changing; we will do all we can to see that the momentum for reform 
does not slacken. 
 
The efforts now underway to destroy the U.S.-UN relationship are 
motivated not by a desire for reform but, rather, by irritation at the 
messy and inter-connected nature of the world in which we live. 
 
The High Cost of Pulling Out Of UN Peace Operations 
 
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, there were many who called for the 
U.S. to abandon the UN because it had failed to prevent the Korean war.  
There is a similar frustration now because the UN was unable to halt 
Rwandan genocide, transform Somalia, or bring peace with justice to the 
Balkans. 
 
We are finding that few international conflicts offer the clarity 
provided by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait--where the aggression was clear, 
the stakes included oil and the possibility of a madman equipped with 
nuclear arms, the military terrain was favorable, the enemy was 
isolated, the finest armed forces in the world--ours--were fully 
engaged, and the bills were being paid by someone else.  Increasingly, 
threats to stability are not clear but devilishly complex:  violence 
caused not by international aggression but by civil war, fragile cease-
fires that do not hold, extremist political movements within strategic 
states, or ethnic violence that spills unpredictably across national 
lines. 
 
On Capitol Hill, prescriptions now circulating for responding to these 
challenges would remove the UN as an option.  The rationale is 
bewildering.  Sponsors say the cost of UN peace operations is too high 
and that the readiness of our armed forces is harmed by their support 
for what the UN does.  The irony is that if we put the UN out of 
business, our costs will go up, not down, for our interests will require 
that we act on our own more often, and the wear and tear on our military 
will be greater, not less. 
 
Those who advocate, in the words of one, "ending UN peace-keeping as we 
know it," should consider with care what would happen if they got their 
wish.  We could expect: 
 
First, that existing peace operations would be disrupted at great peril 
to world peace.  I can think of few quicker ways to undermine global 
stability than to rip UN peacekeepers out of Cyprus, Lebanon, Kashmir, 
and the border between Kuwait and Iraq. 
 
Second, the UN operation in the former Yugoslavia--UNPROFOR--would 
become unsustainable.  UNPROFOR now accounts for more than half the 
costs and personnel of UN peace-keeping.  Closing it down would be the 
only way to dramatically reduce short-term costs.  But despite its 
shortcomings, UNPROFOR has a purpose.  Its precipitous withdrawal could 
cause the resumption of full-escale war; sever the humanitarian lifeline 
that keeps hundreds of thousands of civilians alive; cause new outflows 
of refugees; and imperil further the survival of a viable, multi-ethnic 
Bosnian state. 
 
Withdrawal under nonpermissive conditions, moreover, would likely 
endanger the peacekeepers and those, including American troops, called 
upon to assist them.  The result would be greater risk and higher cost 
than maintaining UNPROFOR. 
 
Third, there would be no new or expanded UN peace operations.  In some 
cases, this would represent dollars saved.  But successful operations, 
such as those in Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, and Mozambique, reduce 
long-term costs.  They permit refugees to return home and create 
conditions under which domestic economies may rebuild.  As 
Representative Ben Gilman recently wrote to the President:  The cost of 
an expanded peace operation in Angola would certainly not exceed the 
amount currently devoted to humanitarian relief. 
 
In Haiti, if we are unable to make a transition, as now planned, from 
the current multinational force to a UN force, we will face the choice 
between carrying on alone--at far greater expense to us than under the 
UN--or abandoning Haiti's democratic government before it has the means 
to maintain internal order.  This latter course would damage American 
credibility, invite a coup, and risk a return to brutal human rights 
violations and desperate attempts by migrants to flee aboard unseaworthy 
vessels to our shores. 
 
Fourth, monitoring the actions of major regional powers would be more 
difficult.  Today, for example, small UN observer missions provide a 
useful window on events in Georgia and Tajikistan, where Russian peace-
keeping forces are deployed.  Verifying that peace-keeping is being 
conducted in accordance with international principles and with respect 
for the sovereignty of local governments would be complicated by the 
lack of a UN presence. 
 
Finally, if America pulls the plug on UN peace-keeping, our ability to 
lead at the UN will be damaged seriously.  Our influence would surely 
diminish over decisions ranging from maintaining sanctions against rogue 
states to UN reform to ensuring greater balance within the General 
Assembly on resolutions affecting the Middle East.  And our ability to 
argue that other nations should meet their obligations to the UN and to 
international law would be undermined. 
 
The question arises:  Why has such ill-advised legislation been 
introduced?  The answer, I think, is frustration.  There is a perception 
that the United States is somehow being played for a sucker--that we are 
turned to constantly for help by those who are unwilling to pay their 
own way or to take their own fair share of risks.  This perception is 
not new.  In the years immediately following World War II, similar 
emotions prompted opposition to American participation in NATO, to the 
Marshall Plan, and to aid to Greece and Turkey.  When President 
Roosevelt devised lend-lease to save a Great Britain bombarded daily by 
Nazi planes, the predictable complaints were heard:  We can't afford it; 
the British already owe us money; this is Europe's battle, not our own. 
 
Such feelings are understandable and often play well at home.  But they 
miss a very basic fact:  In each instance, when we have come to the aid 
of others, we have acted also in America's best interests.  That was 
true of lend-lease; it was true of the costly, but necessary, steps we 
took to contain communist expansion; and it is true of our participation 
in and support for United Nations peace-keeping and enforcement of UN 
resolutions against the likes of Serbia and Iraq.  America is not just 
another country; we are a global power with global interests, and if we 
do not lead, we cannot expect that others will.  Our position in the 
world may to some be grounds for complaint, but to most Americans, it is 
grounds for pride. 
 
Bipartisanship and Burdensharing 
 
Our interests would not be served by destroying UN peace-keeping or by 
making it more difficult for us to gain support for our objectives at 
the UN.  We do, however, need a better mechanism for ensuring that the 
Congress has an appropriate role in decisions that result in new, 
unforeseen, and unbudgeted financial obligations.  This includes the 
range of deployments of our armed forces from defense missions to 
sanctions enforcement to humanitarian relief to participation in UN 
operations.  The Administration is committed to working with the 
Congress to develop such a mechanism. 
 
Also, we will continue to ensure that others do their part to maintain 
international security and law.  We are seeking an official reduction in 
our share of UN peace-keeping costs, from more than 30% to 25%.  We will 
continue to ask--and I am confident we will continue to receive--fair 
reimbursement from the UN for the troops and services we provide to UN 
operations, and we will work to strengthen regional and United Nations 
peacekeeping as viable alternatives to the use of our own armed forces 
for operations other than war. 
 
With strong American leadership, the UN can be a valuable force for law 
and the extension of political freedoms.  When all is said and done, I 
am confident that we will have bipartisan support for providing that 
leadership.  The nature of the world today demands it.  Key leaders on 
Capitol Hill--most of them, anyhow--understand it.  The American people 
expect that kind of burdensharing.  And our participation in the UN 
always has had strong support from both parties. 
 
It is well known that Republican senators, such as Arthur Vandenberg of 
Michigan, played a key role in the drafting and ratification of the UN 
Charter.  It is less well known that one of those Republican senators, 
Warren Austin of Vermont, resigned his seat to serve President Truman in 
the job I now hold.  Ambassador Austin was a distinguished diplomat.  He 
did a particularly strong job debating with the Soviet Ambassador during 
the Korean war.  Only once did his sincerity get the better of him--when 
he declared during a Security Council debate on the Middle East that all 
would be well if only Arabs and Jews would settle their differences "in 
a true Christian spirit." 
 
Like multilateralism, bipartisanship in American foreign policy is a 
means, not an end.  Given our system of checks and balances, it is a 
necessary means for any president to employ where possible.  But a 
president must respond, in the end, to his or her own best judgment 
about where the enduring interests of America reside. 
 
Today, under President Clinton, we are called upon to develop a new 
framework for protecting our territory, our citizens, and our interests 
in a dramatically altered world.  In devising that framework, we will 
make full use of our own reserves of military and economic power.  We 
will invite help from old friends and new.  We will look beyond the 
horizon of the short term, recognizing that even seemingly distant 
problems and conflicts may, one day, come home to America.  And we will 
work to develop a consensus within our own country about the appropriate 
role for international organizations in promoting our objectives. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Let us not forget:  Even before America was a country, it was an idea.  
We are the inheritors of a tradition that dates back not to the court 
intrigues of inbred royalty or to the depredations of rapacious empire 
but, rather, to the architects of human liberty. 
 
My own family came to these shores as refugees.  Because of this 
nation's generosity and commitment, we were granted asylum after the 
communist takeover of Czechoslovakia.  The story of my family has been 
repeated in millions of variations over two centuries in the lives not 
only of immigrants, but of those overseas who have been liberated or 
sheltered by American soldiers, empowered by American assistance, or 
inspired by American ideals. 
 
We have a responsibility in our time, as our predecessors did in theirs, 
to build a world not without conflict but in which conflict is 
effectively contained; a world not without repression but in which the 
sway of freedom is enlarged; a world not without lawless behavior but in 
which the law-abiding are progressively more secure.  That is what 
President Clinton has referred to, in a broader context, as a covenant 
with the future.  That is our mandate in this new era.  (###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 8 
 
Department Statements 
 
Easing Sanctions Against North Korea 
Statement released by the Office of the Department Spokesman, 
Washington, DC, January 20, 1995. 
 
To implement the October 21, 1994, U.S.-D.P.R.K. Agreed Framework, we 
will take the steps listed below to ease economic sanctions against 
North Korea.  These initial steps are in response to North Korea's 
decision to freeze its nuclear program and facilities and cooperate with 
the U.S. and IAEA to verify the freeze and ensure safe storage of spent 
nuclear fuel.  Further relaxation of economic sanctions against North 
Korea will depend on further verified progress on the nuclear issue as 
well as progress in other areas of concern. 
 
Telecommunications and Information.  Authorize transactions related to 
telephone and telecommunications connections between North Korea and the 
United States, credit card use in connection with personal travel and 
other travel-related transactions, and the opening of offices by 
journalists. 
 
Financial Transactions.  Authorize the D.P.R.K. to use the U.S. banking 
system to clear transactions not originating or terminating in the 
United States.  Unblock frozen assets where there is no D.P.R.K. 
Government interest. 
 
Other Trade.  Authorize imports from the D.P.R.K. of magnesite, a 
refractory material used in the U.S. steel industry.  North Korea and 
the People's Republic of China are the primary sources of natural 
magnesia and magnesite in the world market. 
 
Other Steps To Implement the Agreed Framework.  Authorize transactions 
related to the future establishment and operation of liaison offices in 
Washington and Pyongyang.  Consider, on a case-by-case basis, 
participation by U.S. firms in the North Korean Light-Water Reactor 
project, the supply of alternative energy, and disposition of spent 
nuclear fuel, as provided by the Agreed Framework, in a manner 
consistent with applicable laws. 
 
 
Opening of U.S.-Vietnamese Liaison Offices 
Statement by Acting Department Spokesman Christine Shelly, Washington, 
DC, January 27, 1995. 
 
As the President indicated on February 3, 1994, when he announced the 
lifting of the embargo against Vietnam, achieving the fullest possible 
accounting for our prisoners of war and missing in action will remain 
our highest priority in our relations with Vietnam.  At that time, he 
also announced our intention to open a liaison office in Hanoi in order 
to promote further progress on POW/MIA issues, provide services for 
Americans there, and help us pursue a human rights dialogue with 
Vietnam.  Prior to opening a liaison office, we needed to reach an 
agreement to return each country's diplomatic properties.  On December 
9, after several months of negotiations, our representatives in Hanoi 
initialed an agreement on diplomatic properties. 
 
On January 28, 1995, in Hanoi, the Government of the United States and 
the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam will sign an 
agreement resolving the diplomatic property issue, thereby clearing the 
way for opening liaison offices in Washington and Hanoi.  In addition, 
the two governments will sign an agreement settling outstanding claims 
between the two countries. 
 
As of January 28, 1995, the United States will, therefore, open its 
liaison office in Hanoi.  A reciprocal Vietnamese liaison office will 
open in Washington, DC.  These offices will operate within the framework 
of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and will not 
constitute establishment of diplomatic relations between the two 
countries.  Consistent with the President's announcement last February, 
any decision on the establishment of diplomatic relations with Vietnam 
will depend on further progress on POW/MIA accounting from the Vietnam 
War.  (###) 
 
[END OF DISPATCH VOL 6, NO 6] 
 

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