U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 5, JANUARY 30, 1995
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS


ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE

1.  Strengthening American Security Through World Leadership
-- President Clinton
2.  A Comprehensive Strategy for Halting North Korea's
Nuclear Program -- Secretary Christopher
3.  Exercising American Leadership and Restoring Financial
Confidence in Mexico -- Secretary Christopher
4.  American Leadership and Effective UN Peacekeeping --
Secretary Christopher
5.  The Social Summit:  Reaffirmation, Reinvention, and an
Opportunity for Consensus Building -- Douglas J. Bennet, Jr.
6.  Terrorism in the Middle East -- President Clinton, White
House Fact Sheet



ARTICLE 1:

Strengthening American Security Through World Leadership
President Clinton
Excerpt relating to foreign policy from State of the Union
address, Washington, DC, January 24, 1995

A lot of people think that the security concerns of America
today are entirely internal to our borders.  They relate to
the security of our jobs and our homes, our incomes and our
children, our streets, our health, and protecting those
borders.  Now that the Cold War has passed, it is tempting
to believe that all the security issues, with the possible
exception of trade, reside here at home.  But it is not so:
Our security still depends upon our continued world
leadership for peace and freedom and democracy.  We still
cannot be strong at home unless we're strong abroad.

The financial crisis in Mexico is a case in point.  I know
it's not popular to say it tonight, but we have to act--not
only for the Mexican people, but for the sake of the
millions of Americans whose livelihoods are tied to Mexico's
well-being.  If we want to secure American jobs, preserve
American exports, safeguard America's borders, then we must
pass the stabilization program and help to put Mexico back
on track.

Now let me repeat:  It is not a loan; it is not foreign aid;
it is not a bail out.  We will be given a guarantee like co-
signing a note with good collateral that will cover our
risks.  This legislation is the right thing for America.
That's why the bipartisan leadership has supported it, and I
hope you in Congress will pass it quickly.  It is in our
interest, and we can explain it to the American people,
because we're going to do it in the right way.

This is the first State of the Union address delivered since
the beginning of the Cold War when not a single Russian
missile is pointed at the children of America.  And along
with the Russians, we are on the way to destroying the
missiles and the bombers that carry 9,000 nuclear warheads.
We've come so far so fast in this post-Cold War world that
it's easy to take the decline of the nuclear threat for
granted.  But it's still there, and we aren't finished yet.

This year, I'll ask the Senate to approve START II, to
eliminate weapons that carry 5,000 more warheads.  The
United States will lead the charge to extend, indefinitely,
the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty--to enact a
comprehensive nuclear test ban  and to eliminate chemical
weapons.  To stop and roll back North Korea's potentially
deadly nuclear program, we will continue to implement the
agreement we have reached with that nation.  It's smart;
it's tough; it's a deal based on continuing inspection with
safeguards for our allies and ourselves.

This year, I'll submit to Congress comprehensive legislation
to strengthen our hand in combatting terrorists--whether
they strike at home or abroad.  As the cowards who bombed
the World Trade Center found out:  This country will hunt
down terrorists and bring them to justice.

Just this week, another horrendous terrorist act in Israel
killed 19 and injured scores more.  On behalf of the
American people and all of you, I send our deepest sympathy
to the families of the victims.  I know that in the face of
such evil, it is hard for the people in the Middle East to
go forward, but the terrorists represent the past, not the
future.  We must and we will pursue a comprehensive peace
between Israel and all her neighbors in the Middle East.

Accordingly, last night I signed an executive order that
will block the assets in the United States of terrorist
organizations that threaten to disrupt the peace process.
It prohibits financial transactions with these groups.
Tonight, I call on our allies and peace-loving nations
throughout the world to join us with renewed fervor in a
global effort to combat terrorism.  We cannot permit the
future to be marred by terror and fear and paralysis.

From the day I took the oath of office, I pledged that our
nation would maintain the best-equipped, best-trained, and
best-prepared military on earth.  We have, and they are.
They have managed the dramatic downsizing of our forces
after the Cold War with remarkable skill and spirit.  But to
make sure our military is ready for action and to provide
the pay and the quality of life the military and their
families deserve, I'm asking the Congress to add $25 billion
in defense spending over the next six years.

I have visited many bases at home and around the world since
I became President.  Tonight, I repeat that request with
renewed conviction.  We ask a very great deal of our armed
forces.  Now that they are smaller in number, we ask more of
them.  They go out more often to more different places and
stay longer.  They are called to service in many, many ways.
And we must give them and their families what the times
demand and what they have earned.

Just think about what our troops have done in the last year,
showing America at its best--helping to save hundreds of
thousands of people in Rwanda, moving with lightning speed
to head off another threat to Kuwait, and giving freedom and
democracy back to the people of Haiti.

We have proudly supported peace and prosperity and freedom
from South Africa to Northern Ireland, from Central and
Eastern Europe to Asia, from Latin America to the Middle
East.  All these endeavors are good in those places, but
they make our future more confident and more secure.

(###)



ARTICLE 2:

A Comprehensive Strategy for Halting North Korea's Nuclear
Program
Secretary Christopher
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, DC, January 24, 1995

It gives me great pleasure to appear for the first time
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the 104th
Congress.  I look forward in the coming year to working
closely with the committee to advance our vital national
interests, beginning with our discussion today of
implementation of the Agreed Framework between the United
States and North Korea.

Before taking your questions, Secretary Perry and I will
review this Administration's strategy for resolving the
North Korea nuclear issue, how it advances our interests in
Asia, and how it supports our overall efforts to stop the
spread of weapons of mass destruction.  As I said in my
speech last week outlining this Administration's foreign
policy, curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction is among the most vital security challenges
facing the United States today.

The Agreed Framework is the product of months of determined
diplomacy and firm negotiation.  It attains all of our
strategic objectives.  It safeguards our allies South Korea
and Japan.  It lifts the specter of a nuclear arms race from
northeast Asia.  It bolsters a non-proliferation regime
essential to global stability.  And it provides a basis for
a potential reduction of tensions in the region.  I am
pleased to report that implementation of the framework is
proceeding smoothly.

Mr. Chairman, the United States has an enduring interest in
a stable, non-nuclear Korean Peninsula.  Thirty-seven
thousand American troops stand ready to defend that interest
on what is now the world's most fortified frontier.  They
carry on a commitment to South Korea's freedom and
prosperity that was first sealed by the lives of more than
30,000 brave Americans almost  half a century ago.  As
President Clinton said before South Korea's National
Assembly, "that sacrifice affirmed some old truths:
vulnerability invites aggression; peace depends on
deterrence."  We came to the Framework negotiations with
those cardinal principles foremost in mind.

We are also under no illusions about the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea.  North Korea remains an isolated,
totalitarian regime.  In the past, it has regularly engaged
in aggression and terrorism, from the seizure of the USS
Pueblo in 1968 to the attack on South Korean cabinet members
in Burma in 1983 and the bombing of a South Korean airliner
in 1987.

The recent shoot-down of an unarmed American helicopter
reminds us that tensions on the peninsula remain high.
North Korea fields an army of 1.1 million, much of it
deployed along the DMZ.  Its artillery threatens the capital
of South Korea.  Its ballistic missiles under development
can reach the coast of Japan.  Its sales of missile systems
to the Middle East undermine peace and security.  Beyond its
internal repression, North Korea's past behavior toward its
neighbors and the world has often placed it at odds with the
international community.

Over the last decade, successive administrations watched
with concern as North Korea pursued its nuclear program, its
development of ballistic missiles, and its build-up of
forces.  In 1987, during the Reagan Administration, North
Korea's 5-megawatt reactor became operational.  And in 1989,
during the Bush Administration, North Korea unloaded an
unknown amount of spent fuel that may have been reprocessed
into plutonium.

When North Korea sought to remove its nuclear program from
the constraint of international safeguards, President
Clinton moved quickly to meet the potential global threat
posed by its nuclear ambitions.  Left unchecked, North Korea
soon would have been in a position to produce hundreds of
kilograms of plutonium for nuclear weapons--and to provoke a
destabilizing nuclear arms race in northeast Asia.  It would
also have been able to sell nuclear material or nuclear
weapons to rogue states in the Middle East--just as it has
sold them ballistic missiles in recent years.

Our goal in crafting the Frame-work was thus three-fold:  to
stop the North's existing nuclear program; to devise a
larger strategy that would address the threat posed by the
North's missile program and conventional weapons build-up;
and to reduce tensions in the region by bringing North Korea
out of its international isolation and into the broader
community of nations.

The Clinton Administration's direct involvement with the
nuclear issue began in March 1993, when North Korea
announced its intention to withdraw from the nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty--NPT.  That declaration--coming after
the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, was unable
to resolve discrepancies in the way the North accounted for
its plutonium stocks--raised international alarm about North
Korea's nuclear program.

After the IAEA reported its findings to the Security Council
and the North announced its withdrawal, the Security Council
invited member states to take up the matter with North
Korea. When the United States first began to do so, we had
two objectives.  First, we wanted North Korea to remain in
the NPT and accept full-scope IAEA safeguards, including
special inspections.  This would ensure the integrity of the
NPT as the linchpin of global non-proliferation.  Second, we
wanted the North to implement the North-South Declaration on
Denuclearization, which it had negotiated with South Korea
in 1991.  That declaration would help ensure a non-nuclear
Korean Peninsula by requiring abandonment of any
reprocessing capability and acceptance of a bilateral
inspection regime.

In the first two rounds of negotiations, in June and July of
1993, we made it clear to the North Koreans that we could
only engage in dialogue so long as they accepted safeguards
to ensure non-diversion of nuclear material, refrained from
separating any more plutonium, and remained in the NPT.  If
they violated any of these conditions, we would turn to the
Security Council for sanctions.  We were determined not to
lose any ground while talks were under way.

To ensure the success of our approach, the United States
conducted intensive consultations with our allies South
Korea and Japan as well as other Security Council members.
And to ensure the security of South Korea in a period of
heightened tension, we also accelerated modernization of our
military forces there, a subject that I know Secretary Perry
will address.  We negotiated with North Korea from a
position of strength.

Some critics of the Framework say that we negotiated with no
sticks in hand.  Let me assure them that the Patriot
missiles, Apache helicopters, and Bradley fighting vehicles
that we sent to South Korea are not armed with carrots.

When North Korea took the unacceptable step of unloading
fuel from its 5-megawatt reactor last spring, we were
prepared to pursue a sanctions resolution in the Security
Council and to counter any hostile reaction--and the North
Koreans knew it.

After Kim Il Sung made a commitment to freeze North Korea's
nuclear program if the United States would agree to resume
talks, President Clinton responded immediately by defining
what an acceptable freeze would mean--that is, what North
Korea would have to agree to if talks were to resume.  The
President set a new, higher standard for maintaining
dialogue with the North by insisting that a freeze include a
commitment not to reload and operate its 5-megawatt reactor-
-not to produce any more plutonium.  This went beyond the
North's previous commitment not to undertake any
reprocessing or separation of plutonium.  The North quickly
accepted these terms--our terms--and we moved to a new round
of talks in Geneva.

The North Korean leadership made this decision because it
understood that if it did not, the United States would
pursue sanctions and was prepared to deal with the
consequences.  We had achieved a position of advantage--
which we would carry into the negotiations when they resumed-
-because a consistent policy had been supported by
successful diplomacy at the United Nations and evident
military readiness on the ground.

Our determined diplomacy also enabled us to expand our
objectives.  When the third and final round of negotiations
opened last fall, we still wanted to bring North Korea back
into compliance with its IAEA safeguard obligations.  But
the North's interest in light-water reactors--LWRs--opened
the door to a more far-reaching solution--dismantlement of
its existing nuclear facilities.  Even under IAEA
safeguards, these facilities posed a threat by enabling the
North to continue accumulating weapons-grade plutonium and
to do so at an accelerating rate.

We went back to the table in Geneva determined that any
resolution of the nuclear issue must show that the United
States would not walk away from a material violation of the
NPT and international safeguards.  There would be no
settlement that did not include full NPT compliance.  Beyond
that, the United States would not stand by while North Korea
accumulated significant amounts of weapons-grade plutonium,
even under IAEA safeguards.  There could be no settlement
that left intact the North Korean capability to produce and
possibly export large quantities of weapons-grade material.
We succeeded in securing both of these objectives.

In close consultation with our allies South Korea and Japan,
we ultimately concluded an Agreed Framework that addresses
all our concerns about the North Korean nuclear program.
Let me outline what it requires.

--  The Agreed Framework immediately froze the North Korean
nuclear program.  The North agreed not to restart its 5-
megawatt reactor.  It agreed to seal its reprocessing
facility and eventually dismantle it.  It agreed to
cooperate with the United States toEstore safely the spent
fuel from the 5-megawatt reactor--rather than reprocess it--
and eventually ship it out of the country.  In short, North
Korea's capacity to separate or produce plutonium was ended.
All these steps are now taking place under the careful
scrutiny of the IAEA.

--  The North agreed to freeze construction of its 50- and
200-megawatt reactors and ultimately dismantle them.  Absent
this agreement, the two reactors would have been capable of
producing enough plutonium for dozens of bombs each year.

--  Under the Agreed Framework, North Korea will remain a
party to the NPT.  As such, it must fully disclose its past
nuclear activities.  North Korea is obligated to cooperate
with whatever measures the IAEA deems necessary--including
special inspections--to resolve questions about its nuclear
program.

Let me stress that as a result of the Framework, North Korea
must fulfill additional obligations beyond its NPT
requirements.  These include no more reprocessing of spent
fuel, the shipment of spent fuel containing plutonium out of
the country, and dismantlement of the gas graphite reactor
system.

In return for these steps, North Korea will receive some
benefits.  We will lead an international effort to provide
North Korea with proliferation-resistant, light-water
reactors. It will also receive heavy fuel oil shipments as
an interim energy source until the light-water reactors come
on line early in the next century.  Almost all financing for
the LWRs will come from others, primarily South Korea and
Japan.  We expect the heavy fuel oil to be provided by the
United States and other concerned countries.

Under the Agreed Framework, initial work on the LWR project
will begin, but there will be no delivery of any significant
nuclear components for the reactors until North Korea
complies fully with its safeguards obligations.  Put another
way, the North Koreans will not receive critical equipment
or technology for LWRs until the IAEA is satisfied that
questions about past North Korean nuclear activity are
resolved.

Also under the terms of the Agreed Framework, the North has
agreed to resume its dialogue with the Republic of Korea.
This is a critical provision for South Korea and the United
States if the Framework is to stand the test of time.
Finally, under the Framework, the United States will move
carefully toward more normal relations with North Korea.  To
ensure smooth implementation of the Framework, we will open
a liaison office in Pyongyang, and North Korea will open a
liaison office here.  I would stress, though, that full
normalization is explicitly linked to the North's
willingness to resolve many issues of concern to us.  We
have made clear to the North Koreans that our agenda begins
with their ballistic missile development and export
activities and their destabilizing conventional-force
deployment.

We designed the structure of the Agreed Framework to
maximize the benefits and minimize the risks to the United
States, South Korea, and Japan.  Let me explain how:

First, the burden of up-front performance falls on North
Korea, not the United States.  The North had to freeze
immediately all construction on its 50- and 200-megawatt
reactors.  It had to refrain from refueling and restarting
the 5-megawatt reactor and from taking any steps to
reprocess existing spent fuel and to separate plutonium.

The steps we are taking in response are carefully
calibrated.  Last week, we provided 50,000 tons of heavy
fuel oil to North Korea, equivalent to less than one-half of
one percent of its annual electrical energy production
capability and worth less than $5 million at current market
prices.  We are helping North Korea safely store spent fuel
until it is shipped out of the North.  As an alternative to
reprocessing, this is profoundly in our interest.  We also
have moved very selectively to ease commercial sanctions on
North Korea.  And we are moving ahead with the North Koreans
to resolve issues related to establishing liaison offices.

The most significant benefits for North Korea will come
several years later, after we have had time to judge North
Korean performance and intentions.  As I noted earlier, the
most important benefit that the North will receive under the
Agreed Framework--the sensitive nuclear components for LWRs-
-will not be provided until the North fully complies with
its safeguards obligations, which include accounting for its
past activities.

Second, the structure of the Framework enables us to monitor
closely North Korean compliance.  This is not an arrangement
that relies on trust.  The IAEA is in North Korea monitoring
the freeze and has received excellent cooperation.  Beyond
this, we have our own national technical means to verify the
North's compliance.

Third, the Framework also is structured so that we are not
disadvantaged in any significant way if the D.P.R.K. reneges
on its commitments at any time.  The path to full
implementation has defined checkpoints.  If, at any
checkpoint, North Korea fails to fulfill its obligations, it
will lose the benefits of compliance that it so clearly
desires.  If the North backs out of the deal in the next
several years, for example, it will have gained little
except modest amounts of heavy oil and some technical help
in ensuring the safe storage of spent fuel.  Should the
North renege when it is required to submit to IAEA special
inspections, Pyongyang still will be left with only the
empty shells of two LWRs.  Even if that happens, we still
will have benefited greatly.  Why?  Because the North's
entire nuclear program will have been frozen for years.

Fourth, the Framework places highest priority on the
elements of the North's program that most acutely threaten
U.S. security.  That means the accumulation of plutonium.
For example, we insisted that the Agreed Framework provide
for the removal of spent fuel from North Korea without being
reprocessed.  That fuel--enough to build about five bombs--
would have been a direct threat to our allies if it had ever
been reprocessed.

Let me now address the question of when the North would
account for its past activities.  It was vital to secure an
unambiguous commitment from the North to accept whatever
measures the IAEA deemed necessary--including special
inspections--to account for its past nuclear activities.
From a national security perspective, when those inspections
were conducted was less critical.  The information to be
obtained is not perishable.  We encourage the North to
accept those inspections even before they are required to
under the Framework.  But the more pressing security
imperative was to stop plutonium production and secure an
agreement to dismantle North Korea's nuclear program.

We are cautious but hopeful about the continued smooth
implementation of the Framework's terms.  The North has
frozen its nuclear program and is moving forward in
discussions with the IAEA to enact additional verification
measures.  It is cooperating with American experts to ensure
safe storage of the spent fuel at its Yongbyon nuclear plant-
-cooperation which has included the first visit by American
technicians to Yongbyon.

At the same time, we have made important progress toward
establishing the Korean Energy Development Organization--
KEDO--the international consortium that will have a key role
in implementing the Agreed Framework.  It is KEDO that will
ensure the provision of light-water reactors to North Korea,
the heavy fuel oil shipments, and the safe storage of the
spent fuel and its eventual shipment out of North Korea.
South Korea will play a central role and Japan will play a
significant role in the financing and construction of the
LWR project.  Both countries strongly support the Framework
as being in their national interest and have demonstrated
that support with their significant commitment to finance
its implementation.

After several productive meetings with the Republic of Korea
and Japan on KEDO, we also have begun to approach other
potential members of KEDO in Asia and Europe.  We hope to
hold the first KEDO meeting next month in the United States.

The United States is spending some $5 million to pay for the
first shipment of heavy fuel oil and relatively modest
additional funds for placing the North's spent fuel in safe
storage for eventual shipment.  In keeping with our central
role in KEDO and our vital interest in implementation of the
Framework, this Administration believes we should supplement
the significant financial contributions that will be made by
the Republic of Korea and Japan over the next decade.
Accordingly, we will seek to reprogram funds in FY 1995 and
new funds in the 1996 budget to contribute to KEDO and its
projects.

Specifically, in fiscal year 1995, up to $10 million will be
allocated by the Department of Energy to finance safe
storage of North Korea's spent fuel.  That will forestall
any reprocessing and allow its eventual shipment out of the
country.  Up to $5.4 million of reprogrammed State
Department funds will be spent on establishing KEDO, which
all three partners agree will be a small organization, with
a staff of about 35.

We anticipate that budget requests to support this
enterprise in 1996 and subsequent years will be on the order
of tens of millions of dollars, a modest contribution in
comparison to the billions of dollars our KEDO partners will
contribute.  These dollars represent a wise investment in
regional security.

Regional security, ultimately, is what the Agreed Framework
is designed to protect.  The North's efforts to develop
nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them have been a
clear and immediate threat to our allies South Korea and
Japan.  Continuing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, in
turn, have been a threat to security and prosperity
throughout Asia--the world's most dynamic economic region.

The Agreed Framework not only stops North Korea's nuclear
program in its tracks; it provides a basis for reducing
tensions in the region by opening the way for the
establishment of more normal political and economic
relationships between the United States and North Korea and,
prospectively, between North and South Korea.  As part of
the Framework, North Korea has pledged to resume dialogue
with South Korea on matters affecting peace and security on
the peninsula.  We have made clear that resuming North-South
dialogue is essential to the success of the Framework--so
important that we were prepared to walk away from the
Framework if North Korea had not been willing to meet that
condition.

We are determined to use our engagement with North Korea to
address other troubling aspects of its behavior, including
its conventional-force posture, ballistic missile
activities, and past support for terrorism.  But development
of more normal relations between North Korea and the United
States will not affect our close ties with the Republic of
Korea.  That relationship, built on a rock-solid alliance,
shared democratic values, and thriving economic ties, will
remain unshakable.

The benefits of the Framework also extend well beyond our
interests in Asia.  The Framework supports our overarching
goal of a strong global non-proliferation regime.  It
maintains the integrity of the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty.  It prevents future North Korean sales of nuclear
weapons or materials to the Middle East.  And it gives us an
opportunity to curb North Korean sales of missile technology
to those same countries.

These two goals--peace and security in Asia and effective
global non-proliferation--have always commanded strong
bipartisan support.  I believe that by furthering these
goals in a manner consistent with the national interest, the
U.S.-D.P.R.K. Agreed Framework is worthy of that same
bipartisan support.

The negotiations with North Korea have reflected constancy
and resolve.  We saw a threat to U.S. interests.  We took
diplomatic and military steps to confront that threat.  Then
we negotiated from a position of strength to secure an
accord that removed that threat and advanced our interests.

(###)



ARTICLE 3:

Exercising American Leadership and Restoring Financial
Confidence in Mexico
Secretary Christopher
Statement before the House Committee on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs, Washington, DC, January 25, 1995

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.  I welcome this opportunity to join
Secretary Rubin and Chairman Greenspan in supporting urgent
congressional approval of the U.S. Government's proposed
loan guarantee package for Mexico.

As you know, it is somewhat rare for me to appear before
this committee.  But I consider my appearance here this
morning to be a direct exercise of my responsibility as the
President's principal foreign policy adviser.  The plain
fact is that the United States has a fundamental national
interest in making sure that financial confidence in Mexico
is restored.

Our immediate aim is to help Mexico overcome its short-term
liquidity crisis so it can turn its attention back to
economic reform and growth.  But the package is about far
more than Mexico's economic future.  It is about American
leadership, in this hemisphere and beyond.  It is about
American jobs, the security of our borders, and the future
of trade and economic cooperation in our hemisphere.  Most
fundamentally, it is about stability in a nation in which
the United States has a vital strategic stake as our close
neighbor, and a vast economic interest as our third-largest
trading partner.

Today, I want to highlight the fundamental foreign policy
and national security interests that are served by acting
now.

First and foremost, America has an immense economic and
political stake in Mexico's stability.  If we support Mexico
by providing this loan guarantee package, President Zedillo
will be better able to implement his plan to keep Mexico on
the path of steady economic growth and reform and to regain
investor confidence.  If we fail to act decisively now,
American investment to Mexico will be imperiled.  American
exports--now $40 billion a year--will diminish.  And many of
the 700,000 American jobs those exports support could be
jeopardized.

By helping Mexico restore financial liquidity and investor
confidence, the package will enhance its government's
ability to control inflation and to sustain the growth
necessary for stability and reform.  Without our support,
Mexico could be hobbled economically.  Its society could
come under increasing strain.  Its progress toward reform
could be stifled and even reversed.

In the short term, economic distress and political
instability in Mexico could add to the pressure that already
pushes thousands of illegal immigrants across the 2,000-mile
border that we share.  A Mexican financial crisis could
cause additional social, economic, and law enforcement
problems along our entire southern border.  Indeed, our
determined efforts to control illegal immigration could be
overwhelmed.

Moreover, Mexico's capacity to cooperate with us on a range
of other issues--from narcotics trafficking and money
laundering to the environment--could be severely strained.
Over the long term, such instability would drain American
resources and undermine our ability to cooperate with all
our neighbors to meet these threats.

Second, approval of this loan guarantee package will have
far-reaching implications for the prosperity and stability
of Latin America and of emerging market economies around the
world.  Already, reverberations from the peso devaluation
have been felt in many countries where sound market reforms
have been rewarded by accelerated economic growth and
increased foreign investment--and where American firms have
gained new opportunities.  Mexico's crisis, if left
unaddressed, can disrupt other emerging economies at similar
stages of development.  It is essential that Mexico's crisis
be ended so that the remarkable progress toward open trade
and investment in this hemisphere and beyond is sustained.

Third and perhaps most important, this is a test of American
leadership.  By extending this package to Mexico, the United
States will demonstrate its unwavering commitment to lead
this hemisphere toward stability and prosperity--a
commitment we reaffirmed at the Summit of the Americas six
weeks ago.  Only the United States has the capacity to offer
this leadership.

Mr. Chairman, over the past decade we have witnessed a
remarkable transformation of this hemisphere.  Where once
country after country stagnated under military rule, today
we are a hemisphere of 34 democracies.  Where once economy
after economy was caught in the grip of closed markets,
choking debt, and hyper-inflation, today this is the second-
fastest-growing region in the world and the fastest-growing
regional market for American exports.  It would be a
historic miscalculation to stand aside and watch that
progress falter in a nation of 90 million people across our
border.

The triumph of democracy and open markets in our hemisphere
is certainly reflected in Mexico's experience over the last
few years.  Let us not forget that the Mexico of today is
not the Mexico of the early 1980s.  A decade ago the
response to a similar crisis in Mexico might have been very
different:  a return to statist policies, nationalization of
key sectors, and the imposition of trade barriers to
American products.

Mexico has embarked on a historic process of democratic and
market reform that President Zedillo is committed to extend.
It is essential that this delicate process not be damaged or
reversed by economic and social instability.

Like many members of Congress, the Clinton Administration
has both immense hopes and serious concerns about Mexico
that go well beyond the specific issues involved in this
crisis.  Mexico has many complex problems that will not be
solved immediately.  But its current liquidity crisis must
be solved immediately.  If it is not, we will have little
hope of helping Mexico to continue meeting the long-term
challenge of modernizing its economy, strengthening its
democracy, and addressing the environmental, labor, and
immigration issues that affect both of our nations.

We must resist the temptation to load up the loan guarantee
package with conditions unrelated to the urgent matter at
hand.  By encumbering a package vital to the health of the
Mexican economy, such conditions could undermine their own
intended goal of encouraging further reform in Mexico.

As former President Bush urged last week, this measure
should be considered in the Congress on its financial
merits.  The Congress should not attach extraneous political
considerations to this legislation.

President Clinton is determined to work with members of both
parties to keep this measure focused on solving this crisis
now.

Mr. Chairman, my fundamental responsibility is to help the
President safeguard the national security and vital
interests of the United States.  But in addition, I have
been an observer of American politics, and I know that for
many members of both parties, this will be a difficult vote.

I also know that at every moment in our national life when
America's vital interests have been at stake, Congress has
put aside partisan differences and put national security
first.  As Secretary of State I ask you to do that again,
for in this case our interests are crystal clear.  If
Mexico's liquidity crisis is allowed to undermine its
stability, America's security and prosperity will be put at
risk.

That is why it is imperative that we do the right thing--and
that we do it right away.  Thank you very much.

(###)



ARTICLE 4:

American Leadership and Effective UN Peace-keeping
Secretary Christopher
Statement before the House International Relations
Committee, Washington, DC, January 26, 1995

Thank you Mr. Chairman.  I am pleased to appear for the
first time before the new House International Relations
Committee, and to outline the Administration's views on
American foreign policy.

I approach the next two years with enthusiasm and
confidence.  Today, the United States has a remarkable
opportunity to shape a world conducive to American interests
and consistent with American values--a world of open
societies and open markets.  The Soviet empire is gone.  No
great power views any other as an immediate military threat.
And the triumph of democracy and free markets is
transforming countries from Europe to Latin America, and
from Asia to Africa.

Our strategy to shape this new world is driven by several
principles.  First, America must continue to engage and to
lead.  Second, we must maintain productive relations with
the world's other most powerful nations.  Third, we must
adapt and build institutions that will promote economic and
security cooperation.  And fourth, we must continue to
support democracy and human rights because it serves our
interests and our ideals.

I have discussed each of these principles in some detail in
my written testimony.  In this oral presentation, I would
like to focus on the first two--U.S. leadership and
relations with the great powers.  I do this in considerable
part because they touch on issues of current concern to this
committee and to the Congress:  UN peace-keeping and our
relations with Russia.

I am convinced that the imperative of American leadership is
a central lesson of our times.  Imagine what the world would
have been like without it in just the last two years alone.
We might now have four nuclear states in the former Soviet
Union instead of one.  We might have a full-throttle nuclear
program in North Korea.  We might have no GATT agreement or
NAFTA.  We might have brutal dictators still terrorizing
Haiti.  And we might very well have Iraqi troops back in
Kuwait.

American leadership requires that we be ready to back our
diplomacy with credible threats of force.  This means that
when our vital interests are at stake, we must be prepared
to act alone.  But sometimes, by mobilizing the support of
others, by leveraging our power and leading through
alliances and institutions, we will achieve much better
results at lower cost in human life and national treasure.

That is why the Clinton Administration, like its
predecessors, believes that international peace-keeping can
be an important and effective tool in our overall national
security strategy.  Peace-keeping, of course, is not an
answer to every crisis.  The United Nations may not be the
right answer when our vital interests are involved, but
under the right conditions, the UN is an appropriate and
valuable forum for gaining international participation and
financing for objectives the United States supports.

We have worked hard in the last two years to develop a clear
policy, and to ensure that UN missions have specific
objectives.  We have worked hard to ensure that peacekeepers
are properly equipped, that money is not wasted, and that
tough questions are asked before new missions are approved.
We are determined not to repeat the errors of either over-
commitment or mission creep.  We have also worked hard--and
I think, with increasing success--to improve our
consultation with Congress at every step.

In response to our efforts, and to those of the Congress,
the UN has established an independent office with the
functions of an Inspector General.  And the UN's new Under
Secretary-General for Administration and Management--Joseph
Connor, the former worldwide head of Price Waterhouse--is
aggressively pursuing a broad agenda for reform.

Let me focus for a moment on our concerns about H.R. 7, the
National Security Revitalization Act, and in particular the
proposal to deduct our voluntary contributions in support of
international peace and law from our peace-keeping
assessments.  In the current period, such a proposal would
eliminate all U.S. payments for UN peace-keeping.  It would
almost certainly lead our NATO allies and Japan to follow
suit, for they also make voluntary contributions of
considerable magnitude.  Under current circumstances, such a
proposal, if enacted in law, would threaten to end UN peace-
keeping overnight.

That would force the withdrawal of peacekeepers and monitors
from the Golan Heights between Israel and Syria, from the
Iraq-Kuwait border, from Cyprus, from Georgia, and from
Lebanon.  It would eliminate a tool that every President
from Harry Truman to George Bush has used to advance
America's interests--even in those years when the UN was
half-crippled by the Cold War.  It would leave us with an
unacceptable option when emergencies occur:  a choice
between acting alone and doing nothing.

It would certainly be ironic now, with the end of the Cold
War and when there is more flexibility for us in global
affairs, to be forced in every instance to a choice between
acting alone and doing nothing.

H.R. 7 does not accomplish the necessary task of making the
UN more effective and efficient.  It would deal peace-
keeping a lethal blow.  And certainly that is not in our
national interest.

The second tenet of our strategy, Mr. Chairman, is the
importance of constructive political and open commercial
relations with the world's most powerful nations:  our
Western European allies, Japan, China, and Russia.  Europe's
security and prosperity are essential to ours.  Our
partnership with Japan is the linchpin of our policy toward
Asia, the world's most dynamic economic region and an
extremely important market for American businesses.  And we
must also pursue constructive relations with China,
consistent with our overall objectives.

I would like to take a moment to comment on Russia in
greater detail.  The United States has an enormous stake in
the outcome of Russia's continuing transformation.  A
stable, democratic Russia is vital to a secure Europe and a
stable world.  An unstable Russia that reverts to
dictatorship or slides into chaos would be an immediate
threat to its neighbors and once again a strategic threat to
the United States.

Like each of you, we are deeply concerned about the conflict
in Chechnya--about the tragic loss of life, the excessive
use of military force, and the corrosive effect that this
particular episode has had on the future of Russian
democracy.  That is why I emphasized so strongly to Foreign
Minister Kozyrev when I met with him last week in Geneva
that the conflict must end.  A process of reconciliation
must begin, a process which takes into account the views of
the people of Chechnya and urgently provides them with the
humanitarian relief that they need and deserve.

We do not want to see Russia in a military quagmire that
erodes reform and tends to isolate it in the international
community.  We have urged the leaders of Russia to
revitalize the democratic coalition that has made such great
strides toward a market democracy.

Mr. Chairman, the disturbing events in Chechnya have not
altered our fundamental interests in Russia.  Precisely
because the future of reform in Russia is not assured, we
must persevere in our support of the people and institutions
struggling on its behalf.  Despite the setbacks that we all
knew Russia might encounter during this difficult and
historic transition, our steady policy of engagement with
Russia has paid dividends for every American--from reducing
the nuclear threat to advancing peace in the Middle East to
cooperating in the Baltics and Ukraine.  And Russian
missiles are no longer pointed at the United States.  Those
are big dividends.  We must not give up prematurely on the
process of democratization and reform in Russia.

In 1995, guided by the basic principles I have outlined, I
intend to focus on five areas that offer particularly
significant opportunities.

First, we must sustain the momentum we have generated toward
the more open global and regional trade that is vital to
American exports and good American jobs.  To that end, we
will implement the Uruguay Round and ensure that the new
World Trade Organization upholds vital trade rules and
disciplines.  We will work with Japan and our other APEC
partners to develop a blueprint for achieving open trade and
investment in the Asia-Pacific region no later than 2020.
We have already begun to implement the Summit of the
Americas Action Plan to open trade in this hemisphere by the
year 2005.

Let me add a word about something on all our minds today:
our effort to address the economic crisis of confidence in
Mexico.  Our immediate aim is to help Mexico overcome its
short-term liquidity crisis, so it can turn its attention
back to economic reform and growth.  But I want to emphasize
that the package is about far more than Mexico's economic
future.  It is about American jobs, the security of our
borders, and American leadership in this hemisphere.  Most
fundamentally, it is about stability in a nation in which
the United States has a vast strategic interest and a vast
economic interest.

As the President has said, we should resist the temptation
to load up this package with conditions unrelated to the
urgent matter at hand.  By encumbering a package vital to
the health of the Mexican economy, such conditions could
undermine our intended goal of encouraging further reform in
Mexico.

Mr. Chairman, I know that at virtually every moment in our
national life when America's vital interests have been at
stake, the Congress has put aside its differences and put
national security first.  In the case of Mexico, our
national security interests are crystal clear.  On a
bipartisan basis, I urge every member to make what I know
will be, for many of you, a difficult vote.  We must do the
right thing, and in my judgment, the time is now.

In our second area of opportunity, we are taking concrete
steps to build a new European security architecture.  NATO
remains the anchor of American engagement in Europe and the
linchpin of trans-Atlantic security.  During this year, we
will examine with our allies the process and objectives of
NATO expansion.  And by the end of this year, we intend to
share the conclusions of this study with all of the members
of the Partnership for Peace--a very important instrument of
NATO policy and an important instrument of American foreign
policy.

Mr. Chairman, I have been asked about our views on the "NATO
Revitalization and Expansion Act of 1995."  Let me say in
general that we welcome efforts to strengthen NATO and
certainly to help the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe participate in the Partnership for Peace and to work
toward NATO membership.  We've taken a number of steps in
this direction already.  As President Clinton announced last
summer in Warsaw, we intend to ask Congress to designate
$100 million in 1996 to aid in the development of the
Partnership for Peace, in addition to the $30 million
Congress already authorized for this fiscal year.  So I
think in general, in terms of strengthening NATO and helping
the states of Central and Eastern Europe prepare for NATO
membership, the Administration and Congress have very
similar objectives.

That said, I urge you most seriously that we be very careful
about trying to prematurely choose certain countries over
others for NATO membership, or to set specific timetables.
New members have to be in a position to undertake the
obligations and responsibilities of membership, just as we
will extend our solemn commitments to them.  Our step-by-
step approach to NATO expansion is designed to ensure that
each potential member is judged fairly and individually,
judged by those things that are and ought to be important:
the strength of its democratic institutions and its capacity
to contribute to NATO's goals.

By following the approach that is Administration policy, we
give every new democracy a strong incentive to consolidate
reform.  But if we were to lock in advantages for some
countries, we could discourage reformers in countries not
named and foster complacency in countries that are.

Our third area of opportunity is advancing peace and
security in the Middle East.  Over the past several years,
we have seen an extraordinary transformation in the
landscape of the Arab-Israeli conflict.  Of course, the
terrorist outrage in Israel last Sunday is a painful
reminder of the challenges still to be overcome.
Tragically, there are those who want to keep this region
mired in the conflicts of the past; who in the name of
religion employ terror to deny the peoples of this region
the security and prosperity they deserve.

Despite the tragic violence, I urge that we not lose faith.
Our Administration strongly supports the courageous decision
of the Government of Israel to go forward with the
negotiations.  The Israeli Government understands that we
must not reward terror by giving the terrorists what they
want.  What they want is an end to negotiations and a
turning back of the clock--and we must not comply.

To maintain the peace process, each side must feel and see
the benefits of peace in very concrete ways.  Israelis must
be secure, and must be reassured in a tangible way that the
Palestinian Authority is doing its part to stop violence and
control terror.  Palestinians must achieve real control over
the political and economic decisions that affect their
lives, and must see that Israel is doing its part to make
possible the emergence of Palestinian self-government as
called for in the Declaration of Principles.

Each must build the trust and confidence of the other so
that they can work together to confront the determined
efforts of those who would kill the chances of real peace by
these terrible terrorist acts.

The negotiations between Israel and Syria are also entering
a very crucial phase.  For a breakthrough to be achieved in
the next few months, critical decisions will have to be made
by both parties and the process will have to be accelerated.
President Clinton and I are continuing to do all we can to
assist the parties in these efforts.

In the Persian Gulf, we remain determined to contain the
dangers posed by Iraq and Iran.  Iraq must comply with all
UN obligations before there can be any legitimate
consideration of relaxing sanctions.  Let me make clear that
the United States, at least, has not changed its mind about
the perfidy of Saddam Hussein.

Iran supports terror and subversion throughout the Middle
East.  It is engaged in a crash effort to acquire nuclear
weapons.  We believe that the international community must
take concrete steps--and more steps than it has taken in the
past--to counter Iran's outlaw behavior.  That is why I will
continue to urge other countries to stop all concessionary
credits to Iran and to reject any cooperation at all with
Iran in the nuclear field.

Our fourth area of emphasis is to take specific steps to
stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their
means of delivery.  Our global and regional strategies for
1995 comprise the most ambitious non-proliferation effort in
history.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, you are going to
be hearing from me about this through the course of the year-
-1995 has to be a big year in the area of non-proliferation.

The centerpiece of our global strategy is to seek and obtain
the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which, as you know, is up for
renewal this year--and which I think history will record as
one of the most important treaties of all time.  With the
agreements President Clinton signed last December in
Budapest, we can also begin to implement the START I nuclear
reduction treaty.  Next week,   I will be the
Administration's lead witness in urging the Senate to
promptly ratify START II.

Mr. Chairman, two days ago Secretary Perry and I appeared
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to discuss our
Agreed Framework with North Korea.  Let me emphasize here
that the Framework achieved all of our strategic objectives.
It has the strong support of Japan and South Korea--whose
security it will protect and who will finance most of its
implementation.  Implementation of the Framework will be
based upon verification, not trust.  We are determined to
ensure that North Korea fulfills every obligation at every
step of the way.

As I said before your Senate colleagues, we are in for a
difficult period of vigilance.  But careful implementation
of the Agreed Framework is by far preferable to the
alternatives we were facing:  a North Korea going forward
with its nuclear program, a return to the Security Council
for sanctions, and a costly military build-up.

Turning to our fifth area of emphasis, in 1995 we plan to
implement a comprehensive strategy to combat international
terrorists, criminals, and drug traffickers.  Our strategy
will include stricter asset forfeiture and money-laundering
laws, tougher penalties for alien smugglers, tighter
standards for obtaining U.S. visas, and strong diplomatic
efforts to ensure that other countries fulfill their
international obligations when they apprehend criminals:
either to prosecute them vigorously or to extradite them to
countries that want to do so.

With regard to terrorism, as you know, the President signed
an executive order on Monday freezing the assets in the
United States of 12 terrorist organizations and 18
individuals who threaten to disrupt the Middle East peace
process.  This is a new technique and we will work hard to
make it successful.  In addition, the Administration will
shortly submit to Congress comprehensive anti-terrorism
legislation to improve the prevention, apprehension, and
prosecution of terrorists and their acts.

I have listed five areas of particular opportunity for 1995.
But I also want to stress that we will continue to address
many other issues important to our interests, and important
to many of you, such as promoting stability and democracy in
Asia, Africa, and Latin America--where, for example, we hope
that in the near future, there will be a peaceful transition
to democracy in Cuba.  And we will continue working on
global issues like the environment and population, because
they have and deserve an important place on the foreign
policy agenda of the United States.

Mr. Chairman, the recent elections changed the balance of
power between the parties.  But they did not change--and
indeed, in my view, they enhanced--our responsibility to
cooperate on a bipartisan basis in foreign affairs.  The
election was not a license to lose sight of our nation's
global interests or to walk away from our commitments in the
world.  Leaders of both parties--and members of this
committee--certainly understand that well.

My extensive discussions with you Mr. Chairman, and many
members of the new Republican leadership, give me great
confidence that we will sustain our bipartisan foreign
policy.   It is America's tradition.  It is in America's
interest.  I look forward to working closely with you and
members on both sides of the aisle as we pursue America's
fundamental interests.

(###)



ARTICLE 5:

The Social Summit:  Reaffirmation, Reinvention, and an
Opportunity for Consensus Building
Douglas J. Bennett, Jr., Assistant Secretary for
International Organization Affairs
Address before the International Development Conference,
Washington, DC, January 16, 1995 (introductory remarks
deleted)

My message to you this morning is about reaffirmation and
reinvention:

--  Reaffirmation of the principles that have held the
development community together for decades and that have
driven us to toil hard for what we believe in urban slums,
remote villages, refugee camps, and--here I speak from
recent personal experience--even in stuffy office buildings;

--  Reaffirmation of faith in the capacity of human beings--
as individuals, communities, and societies--to develop, over
time, deeper understanding, broader opportunity, and greater
freedom;

--  Reaffirmation that preventive investments, when well-
planned and vigorously implemented, will pay off in ways
that enrich all our lives; and

--  Reaffirmation by the Clinton Administration that the
United States of America is committed to the cause of
sustainable development; we will strive to meet the needs of
this generation without compromising or stealing from the
future.

The elections last November did not affect our commitment or
our policies.  For the inescapable truth is that American
engagement in the world is not a choice, but an imperative--
a nonpartisan imperative--well understood by the American
people.

Consider, for example, the foremost symbol of international
cooperation--the United Nations.  If all you listened to
were the pundits and parrots of conventional wisdom, you
might think that most Americans would now be ready to pull
the plug on our participation.  In fact, the opposite is
true.  According to a recent New York Times poll, 77%
believe the United Nations is contributing to world peace;
89% say the U.S. should cooperate with other countries
through the UN; and 59% think we have "a responsibility to
contribute troops to enforce peace plans in trouble spots
around the world when [the UN asks]."

Based on these numbers, it seems that Main Street America is
literally overrun with multilateralists.  That does not mean
that most Americans sit up nights thinking about the UN or
the future of free market democracy in Central Africa.  But
Americans have developed a deep appreciation over the years
of the concept of burdensharing; we think others should bear
some of the costs and take some of the risks of maintaining
world order.  We understand well by the evidence of our own
lives that the line between "at-home" concerns and "out
there" events has become thoroughly blurred.

In fact, a sizable chunk of the frustration that voters feel
toward national governments--in America and elsewhere--is
that they often seem to be struggling separately and in vain
to deal with problems that by their very nature require
international cooperation.

Thirty years ago, I was a very young AID employee in India,
a country then described by my Indian colleagues as a
"basket case;" we all know where India is today.

Late last year, I was in Malawi where I caught a glimpse of
a new development effort beginning in a very different era--
at a time when strategies are clearer and more proven, when
relationships between the nation and international agencies
is more constructive and less abrasive, and when evidence of
success elsewhere makes some of the intense sacrifices more
palatable in a democratic context.  There is every reason
today to believe that the lives of the people of Malawi will
gradually improve; 30 years ago in India we were less sure.

Our focus today must be on future challenges, not past
accomplishments.  We have an historic opportunity, in the
words of Secretary of State Christopher, to "build and renew
the lasting relationships, structures, and institutions that
advance America's enduring interests," and that will
contribute to a more secure, free, and prosperous world.

This is where reinvention comes in.  Properly understood,
reinvention is a shared process, not an event.  Some has
been done; more needs to be.  If we are going to take
advantage of the forces at work in the world, we have to
acknowledge them, then harness them to our purposes.

--  Technology, capital flows, and communications have
integrated the world economy;

--  Free markets and democracy have replaced statism and a
global free trading system is in prospect;

--  The economic and demographic center of gravity is
shifting toward what we have traditionally called the less
developed world;

--  Many poor countries have developed rapidly;

--  Indigenous development capacity is high;

--  The gap between rich and poor remains among and within
nations;

--  There is growing consensus on key developmental issues--
e.g., family planning, debt, and structural adjustment.

We all know these facts, but we have barely begun to
incorporate them into our dialogue about development and
about the institutions that are in the development business.
The institutions themselves have facilitated these changes
and have adapted to them--in some cases more than others--
but we have yet to achieve sustainability.  Our task is to
begin creating a new and dynamic consensus on problems that
will require multilateral action in the future and to adjust
the institutions as necessary.

To succeed, we must recognize the linkages that exist
between and within societies.  We must combine international
partnership with national responsibility.  We must
incorporate the principles of sustainable development into
all that we do--at the UN, at the banks, and in our
bilateral and domestic policies.

The upcoming Social Summit in Copenhagen offers us a major
step toward greater consensus.  The Clinton Administration
will consider the summit a success if it:

--  Advances the global discussion on how to create more and
better jobs;

--  Reinforces global resolve to eradicate abject poverty in
the poorest countries by early next century; and

--  Highlights the need to empower women.

Let me take these three outcomes one at a time.

First, the Social Summit should serve as an information
exchange on successful strategies for creating new and
better jobs.  This is one of many  areas where the United
States has much to learn from others, just as others have
much to learn from the United States.  We will go to
Copenhagen with an enviable record; more than five million
new jobs in the last 22 months and the lowest unemployment
rate in four years.  But even if these trends continue, we
Americans--like others--are acutely conscious of the need to
extend and broaden the benefits of economic growth, to
encourage individuals to learn new skills, and to help those
who lose one job find another.

Our second goal is eradicating poverty.  Here, again, is a
place for reaffirmation, for our commitment is based both on
humanitarian concerns and profound self-interest.  Poverty
demoralizes the spirit and saps human strength.  It drags
down communities and stifles economic growth.  It provides a
fertile ground for social instability, civil strife, and
war.

To fight poverty, we must stress the importance of education
and nondiscriminatory access to it.  We must strive to
improve health care, provide sanitation and safe drinking
water, and combat infectious and parasitic disease.  We must
continue our efforts to close the gap in food production and
to combat hunger and malnutrition.  We must constantly
exchange information so that strategies for alleviating
poverty that work in one country or region may be tried in
others.  And we must maintain and build on the consensus
developed at Cairo to restrain rapid population growth.

The Social Summit must be prepared to discuss eradicating
poverty in the poorest countries but also in all countries.
As the Declaration of Principles of the recently successful
Summit of the Americas states:

It is politically intolerable and morally unacceptable that
some segments of our populations are marginalized and do not
share fully in the benefits of growth.

The keys to eradicating poverty everywhere lie in universal
access to education; increasing employment opportunities;
equitable access to basic health services; strengthening the
role of women in society; and encouraging productive, high-
performance enterprises, including micro-enterprises and
small business.

Our third criterion for a successful Social Summit is the
empowerment of women, a theme that has run through
Administration initiatives from the 1993 Vienna Human Rights
Conference to the Cairo Conference on Population last
September, and which will be foremost on our agenda both in
Copenhagen and at the World Conference on Women in Beijing
this coming fall.

Ensuring full political and economic participation for women
is in the interest of a host of world objectives--for peace,
prosperity, environmental protection, and population
stabilization.  Women are global agents of needed changes in
all these areas.  Promoting the social, political, and
economic rights of women, and expanding our commitment to
female education, child survival, and safe motherhood help
to make the world more stable.  The return on these
initiatives--in terms of stability, environmental quality,
and economic productivity--will outweigh the costs for
generation after generation

To quote our Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright:

We need to shout from the rooftops the principle that women
are entitled to the full rights and protections of
citizenship in every nation.  This is fundamental to
sustainable development.  When women have the power and the
knowledge to make their own choices, birth rates decline,
environ-mental awareness increases, economic opportunity
expands, and socially constructive values are more likely to
be passed on to the young.

The Social Summit cannot be viewed in isolation.  It is part
of a continuum.  In recent years, the world community has
developed robust consensus goals.  The UN has provided the
meeting ground on which common political ground has been
established.  The Rio Summit, the Children's Summit,
Education for All, the Vienna Conference on Human Rights--
all emerged with charters for concerted international action
to address urgent and unmet global needs.  The Social Summit
is the next important opportunity for consensus building.

In the months ahead, we are going to face some important
choices.  By "we," I mean all of us--governments,
multilateral institutions, NGOs, and the private sector.  We
must choose how we will organize ourselves now that the Cold
War structure is gone.  Will we have a set of standards and
expectations that will bring us together in shared effort
and common hope?  Or will we allow ourselves to be divided,
with an ever-narrowing vision and a focus always on the
short term?

I, for one, am looking forward to the coming debate--in the
U.S. Congress and on the broader world stage.  I believe,
with Shridath Ramphal, that:

there is a spirit of human solidarity stirring in the world;
that many are ready to show by example that they  care about
their neighbor and recognize that their neighbor now is
everyone on earth; that a younger generation, in particular,
demands  to be heard in the cause of their inheritance.

Let us do all we can to summon  that spirit of solidarity
forward and to transform it into a mighty force reaffirming
basic principles, reinventing institutions, rejecting
excuses, building consensus, and embracing the future.

(###)



ARTICLE 6:

Terrorism in the Middle East
President Clinton, White House Fact Sheet

President Clinton

Statement on the terrorist bombing in Israel, released by
the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington,
DC, January 22, 1995.

I condemn in the strongest possible terms this horrendous
act of terrorist violence.  Once again, the enemies of peace
have struck down innocent people in an evil effort to
destroy the hopes of peaceful co-existence between Israelis
and Arabs.

I call on all those who have chosen the path of peace to
condemn this act and to redouble their efforts to achieve a
secure and lasting peace.  The perpetrators of terrorism and
their sponsors are determined to stop us from achieving this
goal.  I repeat what I said to them in the Middle East last
October:  You cannot succeed, you will not succeed, you must
not succeed, for you are the past, not the future.

On behalf of the American people, I extend our condolences
and deepest sympathy to the families of the victims.


Fact Sheet:  Executive Order on Transactions With Terrorists
who Threaten the Middle East Peace Process

Released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary,
Washington, DC, January 24, 1995.

--  The executive order issued under Presidential authority
contained in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
blocks property within the jurisdiction of the United States
of designated foreign persons or organizations that threaten
to disrupt the Middle East peace process.

--  The order also prohibits and transfers by U.S. persons
to the designated persons or organizations, including
charitable contributions of funds, goods, or services.

--  Twelve foreign organizations are named in the executive
order.  In addition, the Treasury Department has designated
18 foreign persons and has provided a number of pseudonyms
used by the organizations and individuals designated.  All
of these specially designated terrorists are subject to the
freeze and transfer prohibitions.  Included in the list are
35 variants of the names of these organizations and foreign
persons.  Additional organizations or variant names may be
added in the future.

--  This action is undertaken in response to recurrent acts
of international terrorism which threaten the Middle East
peace process, such as the bomb attack in Beit Lid over the
weekend, recent bus bombings in Israel, as well as earlier
threats against and attacks on Palestinian and Egyptian
authorities, and bombings in Buenos Aires and London.

--  As an element in our counterterrorism efforts, these new
measures will add to the arsenal of weapons available to
U.S. law enforcement agencies to combat potential funding of
these organizations from U.S. sources.

--  These measures are intended to deny terrorist groups
that threaten the peace process access to the U.S.
financial system by freezing any of their funds within U.S.
jurisdiction.

--  These measures are also intended to preclude diversion
of charitable contributions to fund terrorism activities by
prohibiting the transfer of funds by U.S. persons to these
groups.

--  Although we recognize that these groups receive most of
their financial support from sources outside the United
States, we hope these measures will discourage all donors
from contribution to groups that use violence to oppose the
peace process.  We hope our actions will serve to encourage
similar action by other nations.

--  The President will soon send to Congress comprehensive
anti-terrorism legislation which would strengthen our
ability to prevent terrorist acts, identify those who
perpetrate such violent acts, and bring them to justice.

(###)


[END OF DISPATCH VOL 6, NO 5]

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