U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH 
VOLUME 5, NUMBER 51, DECEMBER 19, 1994 
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
 
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE: 
l.  A Time of Historic Challenge for NATO--Secretary Christopher 
2.  North Atlantic Council Final Communique  
3.  Contact Group Meeting on Bosnia-Herzegovina--Secretary Christopher, 
Contact Group Members 
4.  U.S. Commitment to Middle East Peace and Israel's Security--
Secretary Christopher 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 1: 
 
A Time of Historic Challenge for NATO 
Secretary Christopher 
Beginning the Process of NATO Expansion 
Opening statement at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO 
Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, December 1, 1994. 
 
Mr. Secretary General, distinguished colleagues, and friends:  I am 
privileged to serve as your President d'Honneur at our first formal 
meeting since we selected Willy Claes to succeed the brilliant and 
dedicated Manfred Woerner. 
 
Secretary General Claes has taken charge at a time of historic 
opportunity and challenge for the alliance.  As we build European 
security for the 21st century, we are fortunate to have this statesman 
of strength and experience at NATO's helm. 
 
The two greatest struggles of the 20th century--the battles against 
fascism and communism--are over.  The fallen Iron Curtain has revealed a 
window of opportunity for open societies and open markets to prevail 
across a continent at peace. 
 
It is important to recall that NATO played an essential role in bringing 
us to this hopeful point.  For more than four decades it kept the peace, 
preserved our freedom, kindled hope in oppressed peoples, and, finally, 
helped bring the Cold War to an end--a victory for all who love freedom. 
 
For half a century, NATO also provided the foundation on which our 
nations built the greatest community of peace and prosperity the world 
has ever seen.  It cemented close relations among former adversaries in 
Western Europe.  It formed the core of our transatlantic community--
forging links that can never be broken.  The ideals embodied in the 
Treaty of Washington--democracy, liberty, and the rule of law--proved no 
less powerful than the arsenals of this alliance.  Dean Acheson said it 
best. 
 
The importance of NATO in the long run goes far beyond the creation of 
military strength. . . .  Future hope lies in the development of a 
community of free peoples. . . . 
 
But NATO is not just about yesterday.  It is about today and tomorrow--
about Dean Acheson's "future hope." 
 
First, let me be clear about my own nation's conviction.  American power 
and purpose are here in Europe to stay.  This alliance will continue to 
be the anchor of American engagement in Europe, the linchpin of 
transatlantic security.  Through more than four decades, under 
Democratic and Republican administrations, we have maintained a 
bipartisan commitment to a free, stable, secure, and prosperous Europe.  
Today, we are committed to keep 100,000 American troops on European soil 
as part of our continuing engagement. 
 
As we meet today to continue to adapt this great alliance, we are keenly 
aware that the end of the Cold War has brought not only opportunities, 
but serious challenges.  The terrible conflict in Bosnia continues to 
resist resolution.  It has challenged NATO and all the institutions that 
have dealt with it.  Frankly, when this conflict emerged from the ashes 
of the Cold War, the international community was insufficiently 
prepared.  The world ultimately turned to the United Nations to shoulder 
the principal responsibility. 
 
For its part, NATO has done whatever has been asked of it by the United 
Nations.  It has established a no-fly zone and prevented the conflict 
from becoming an air war.  It has maintained the sanctions pressure, and 
it has been instrumental in preventing the spread of the conflict.  
Contrary to some reports, NATO has not ruled out the use of air power.  
NATO stands ready to use air power, when requested, pursuant to United 
Nations resolutions. 
 
Now our task continues to be to seek a peaceful, negotiated end to the 
conflict, one that will preserve Bosnia's territorial integrity.  We 
should renew our efforts to seek an immediate cease-fire and general 
cessation of hostilities.  We should pursue with the parties the terms 
for a settlement, building on the Contact Group plan. 
 
Let me stress one important fact:  The crisis in Bosnia is about Bosnia 
and the former Yugoslavia; it does not diminish NATO's enduring 
importance.  The allies remain committed to NATO's irreplaceable role as 
the key to European security.  There is no disagreement among us on this 
point. 
 
The tragedy of the war and bloodshed in Bosnia does not diminish our 
responsibility to build a comprehensive European security architecture 
that consolidates stability, addresses today's conflicts, and prevents 
others from happening in the future.  On the contrary, the tragedy in 
the former Yugoslavia underscores the urgency of that task.  Central to 
building a comprehensive security architecture for Europe is a measured 
process of NATO expansion, along with continued European integration and 
a determination to strengthen the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe. 
 
Yesterday's NATO helped to reconcile old adversaries, to embed free 
countries in strong and solid institutions, and to create an enduring 
sense of shared purpose in one another's security.  Today's NATO must do 
the same--with new countries but with an enduring purpose.  This 
alliance must preserve its core defensive role and adapt its military 
forces to meet the new demands of crisis management and peace-keeping.  
It must also help new partners learn Western standards of cooperation 
and draw them into NATO's practical work of providing stability in 
Europe. 
 
Last January, at the NATO summit, the alliance committed itself to 
deepen its ties with Europe's emerging democracies when it approved 
President Clinton's proposal for a Partnership for Peace.  In less than 
a year, the partnership has come to life.  Twenty-three nations, 
including Russia, have joined.  Belarus has just announced its intention 
to become our 24th partner.  Tonight, NATO and Russia will agree on 
broad possibilities for cooperation, including Russia's program for the 
Partnership for Peace.  And troops that for half a century faced each 
other in the Cold War are now coming together in joint military 
exercises. 
 
Our leaders also declared last January that the alliance is open to new 
members.  Today, we take an important step in the process that will lead 
to NATO expansion.  I urge that we agree to begin now our internal 
deliberations on expansion and, in 1995, to discuss with partners the 
obligations and implications of membership. 
 
This process will be steady, deliberate, and transparent.  I want to 
stress that expansion must not and will not dilute NATO.  But NATO must, 
over time, be ready to include nations that are willing and able to 
assume the necessary alliance obligations and commitments and whose 
membership advances the goals of the alliance and broader European 
security.  Expansion, when it comes, will occur in a manner that 
increases stability for all of Europe--for members and non-members 
alike. 
 
As we pursue NATO expansion, we must also strengthen other structures of 
security cooperation.  No single institution has the mandate or the 
capability to meet every challenge in Europe.  Our NATO alliance must be 
complemented by other institutions that can address the full range of 
challenges facing Europe's future.  We recognize an important role for 
European integration, supported by the European Union.  There is also an 
important institution with untapped potential:  the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe.  We must build on its unique 
strengths as a structure for conflict resolution and prevention and as 
an institution that embodies the ideal of an undivided Europe. 
 
Speaking as your President d'Honneur, I say with confidence that the 
alliance is prepared to take up both the challenges of the moment and 
the future.  And speaking as a representative of President Clinton and 
the American people, I say with equal confidence that as we do so, the 
commitment of the United States to participate actively in maintaining 
the security, prosperity, and freedom of Europe remains unshakable. 
 
 
Developing the New European Security Architecture 
Intervention at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO 
Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, December 1, 1994. 
 
Mr. Secretary General, distinguished colleagues, and friends:  I am 
pleased to join you at this very important meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council.  Allow me also to salute once again our new Secretary General.  
He assumes his responsibilities at a defining moment in the history of 
NATO and of Europe. 
 
These are times of great change in Europe.  But  America's interests in 
Europe have not changed.  Neither have the basic principles guiding our 
engagement--principles that have long commanded bipartisan support. 
 
The first principle is that NATO is and will remain the anchor of 
America's engagement in Europe and the core of transatlantic security.  
The United States has enduring political, military, economic, and 
cultural links to Europe that must and will be preserved. 
 
A second core principle of American engagement remains our support for 
European integration and our partnership with the European Union.  The 
United States has supported European integration from its inception.  
The EU remains a vital partner in trade, diplomacy, and, increasingly, 
in security, where we cooperate to combat weapons proliferation and 
terrorism. 
 
A capable European defense identity and effective cooperation between 
NATO and the Western European Union are critical elements of this 
relationship.  Fortifying the European pillar of the alliance 
contributes to European stability and to transatlantic burden-sharing.  
And it improves our collective capacity to act.  I welcome the November 
14 call by WEU ministers to accelerate work on the Combined Joint Task 
Force concept.  CJTF offers a practical vehicle for making NATO assets 
and capabilities available to the WEU under certain circumstances. 
 
A moment ago, I noted that America's interests in Europe have not 
changed.  What has changed in the last few years is that the sphere of 
political and economic freedom in Europe is wider than ever before.  
This leads me to the third core principle of our engagement:  Breaking 
down the barriers that divide West from East will serve our collective 
interest in wider European stability.  Our alliance of democracies can 
help consolidate democracy across an undivided Europe at peace.  We can 
help design a comprehensive and inclusive architecture that enhances 
security and freedom for all. 
 
Our strategy of integration offers tangible rewards.  It will help 
promote stability in Europe's eastern half--the region where two world 
wars and the Cold War began.  It will strengthen the hand of forces 
committed to political, military, and economic reform.  And it will help 
assure that no part of Europe will revert to a zone of great power 
competition or a sphere of influence and that no nation is left hanging 
in isolation. 
 
The challenge we face today is not unlike the one we faced--and met--in 
Western Europe 50 years ago.  After World War II, President Truman and 
Secretaries of State Marshall and Acheson understood that security and 
economic cooperation were essential to the defense of democracy.  Within 
five years of D-Day, America and its Allies had launched the Marshall 
Plan, established NATO and the GATT, and laid the foundations for what 
became the EU and the OECD.  These institutions helped us produce 
unparalleled peace and prosperity for half a century--but only for half 
a continent. 
 
Now, five years have passed since the Berlin Wall fell.  We must build a 
security community of all democratic nations in the Euro-Atlantic 
region--one that endures where the Congress of Vienna, the Concert of 
Europe, and Versailles ultimately failed, and one that builds on the 
strength of our post-war success in Western Europe. 
 
Developing the new European security architecture begins with 
reinforcing its foundation--the alliance that has preserved our liberty 
and prosperity for half a century.  NATO has always been far more than a 
transitory response to a temporary threat; it has been a guarantor of 
European democracy and a force for European stability.  The core values 
it champions--democracy, liberty, and the rule of law--are now ascendant 
around the world.  For all these reasons, NATO's benefits are clear to 
Europe's new democracies. 
 
Since the NATO summit last January, we have taken remarkable strides to 
renew and invigorate the alliance.  We have achieved our historic goal 
of deepening ties with the new democracies to the east.  In less than a 
year, the Partnership for Peace has evolved from a bare idea to a bold 
reality. 
 
The United States considers the Partnership for Peace an integral and 
lasting part of the new European security architecture.  That is why 
President Clinton indicated in July that he will ask Congress to 
designate $100 million in the coming fiscal year to advance the 
partnership's goals.  I am pleased to say that Congress has already 
authorized an additional $30 million to strengthen the partner-ship's 
joint exercise program over the next year.  I hope that other NATO 
members will soon announce comparable contributions and that we can 
coordinate our efforts to maximize the impact.  But, of course, it will 
fall mainly to partners to ensure that the partnership realizes its full 
potential. 
 
The United States is seeking agreement on additional measures for next 
year.  First, we urge putting exercise programs for 1995 and beyond on a 
five-year planning cycle and building toward progressively more complex 
and diverse training scenarios.  Second, NATO must ensure sufficient 
funding for the alliance's partnership-related costs.  Finally, we 
should strive to have a partnership defense-planning process established 
and operational by early 1995. 
 
The partnership is a critical tool in its own right.  It is also the 
best path to membership for countries wishing to join the alliance.  As 
both President Clinton and Vice President Gore have emphasized, NATO 
must be open to expansion.  An exclusionary policy would risk 
maintaining old lines of division across Europe--or creating arbitrary 
new ones.  The United States believes that Europe's institutional 
arrangements should be determined by the objective demands of the 
present, not by the tragedies of Europe's past. 
 
The United States believes it is time to begin the process--to begin 
deliberate consideration of the practical requirements for adding new 
members to the alliance.  It is imperative that we agree, as an 
alliance, on our aims and our purpose in this historic evolution.  The 
Washington Treaty is not a paper guarantee.  New members will assume 
solemn obligations and responsibilities, just as we will extend our 
solemn commitments to them.  This will require careful consideration and 
preparation. 
 
We are deciding today that the alliance begin its internal deliberations 
on expansion.  A process has begun.  It is also essential that we begin 
to present our views to interested partners during 1995.  I expect the 
next several months to be particularly intense as we formulate a joint 
allied presentation.  We have already provided your governments with our 
initial thinking, and we would propose building on that to develop 
allied consensus.  I am personally committed to moving forward on this 
matter. 
 
Our presentation to the partners should explain the practical 
implications and obligations of NATO membership.  Let us be clear:  
These initial exchanges are not intended to be the beginning of 
accession negotiations.  Neither will they indicate that any partner is 
necessarily a candidate for admission.  But they will reflect our 
determination that the process for expansion be open and inclusive from 
the start. 
 
The process of expansion should be steady, deliberate, and transparent.  
Each nation should be considered individually.  No country outside of 
NATO will have a veto over any other.  In our view, there are, however, 
certain fundamental requirements for membership that are reflected in 
the Washington Treaty.  New members must be market democracies committed 
to responsible security policies and able to make a contribution to the 
alliance. 
 
As I noted earlier this morning, we cannot pursue NATO expansion in 
isolation.  The new security architecture for Europe's future must be 
supported by other strong pillars.  No single institution has the 
mandate or the capability to meet every challenge in Europe. 
 
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe--the CSCE--has 
proven experience and untapped potential as an organization that can 
help ease tensions and prevent future conflicts.  With its comprehensive 
membership and unique experience in preventive diplomacy, human rights 
protection, and dispute resolution, the CSCE can complement NATO's 
essential role.  To make it more effective, however, we need to refine 
its mission. 
 
At the CSCE summit in Budapest next week, the United States will work 
with our allies and partners to enhance the CSCE's capabilities.  
President Clinton will urge his colleagues to approve his proposal to 
strengthen the role and structure of the organization.  We hope to 
clarify the CSCE's role in the European security architecture and 
improve its ability to prevent future Yugoslavias. 
 
Our economic and security institutions are gradually breaking down the 
outdated frontiers of the Cold War.  The security and prosperity of all 
of Europe is inextricably linked to the stable development of Europe's 
emerging democracies in the East. 
 
Our goal is the successful transformation of post-communist Europe into 
a community of sovereign, democratic states.  A key component is the 
development of a democratic, market-oriented Russia.  No less vital is 
the emergence of a stable, democratic, non-nuclear Ukraine and the 
realization of the promise of greater security embodied in the START I 
and START II agreements.  In Budapest, we will take a significant step 
forward when President Clinton joins President Yeltsin and Prime 
Minister Major in receiving Ukraine's accession to the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty and signs security assurances for Ukraine, Belarus, and 
Kazakhstan.  This action will pave the way for START I to enter into 
force. 
 
We welcome democratic Russia in assuming a full role in the common 
effort of building new structures.  We welcome the agreement we will 
sign tonight on the NATO-Russia Individual Partnership Program.  It 
sends an unmistakable signal of our alliance's desire to include Russia 
in a cooperative approach to security in Europe. 
 
At the same time, we will continue to pursue avenues for cooperation 
between NATO and Russia outside the Partnership for Peace.  The United 
States welcomed the first meeting between an alliance working group and 
Russia on the question of nuclear weapons dismantlement.  We also 
support intensifying Russia's cooperation with the G-7.  And we are 
sponsoring Russia's membership in the GATT and its successor, the World 
Trade Organization. 
 
Integration will enhance Russia's security in a wider Europe and expand 
Russia's access to markets and capital.  But it also carries obligations 
that all Western nations share.  GATT membership will make Russia's 
trade practices consistent with world standards.  Expanded ties with 
NATO and the EU, along with strengthened CSCE principles, will 
strengthen Russian democracy and promote respect for the sovereignty of 
its neighbors. 
 
Our support for Russian policies that adhere to these core principles 
will serve our vital interests and Europe's--especially the nations that 
so recently broke free from communist rule.  By the same token, 
expanding Western institutions to Central Europe will benefit Russia. 
 
In taking the steps I have outlined today, we will advance our shared 
interest in building a democratic, prosperous, integrated Europe at 
peace.  These steps reflect the core principles of our engagement in 
Europe--our unwavering commitment to NATO, our continued support for 
European integration, and our determination to enhance security and 
stability in the East.  The United States understands that our 
leadership remains indispensable if we are to achieve these goals.  And 
we are determined to provide it.  (###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 2: 
 
North Atlantic Council Final Communique 
Final Communique released following the Ministerial Meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council (NAC), Brussels, Belgium, December 1, 1994. 
 
1.  We have met today in Brussels for the first time under our new 
Chairman and the Alliance's new Secretary General, Mr. Willy Claes.  We 
paid tribute to the outstanding achievements of the late Secretary 
General, Dr. Manfred W”rner, who served the Alliance with great 
distinction, leadership and vision. 
 
2.  We have noted the progress achieved in implementing the January 1994 
NATO Summit decisions with regard to Partnership for Peace, our full 
support for the development of the European Defence and Security 
Identity and for the Western European Union, the development of the 
Combined Joint Task Forces concept, our approach to the problem of the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, 
and the Mediterranean region.  However, much remains to be done. 
 
3.  We discussed today the essential role NATO continues to play in 
reinforcing stability and security in Europe.  NATO has always been a 
political community of nations committed to promoting shared values and 
defending common interests.  These and NATO's defensive capabilities are 
the firm foundation which make it possible for the Alliance to 
contribute to stability and cooperation in the whole of Europe.  A 
strong trans-Atlantic partnership and a continued substantial presence 
of United States forces in Europe, as reconfirmed by the January Summit, 
are fundamental not only to guarantee the Alliance's core functions but 
also to enable our Alliance to contribute effectively to European 
security.  We are committed to continuing the process of adaptation of 
the Alliance, which began in 1990 and was carried forward at the Summit 
in the context of a broad approach to building political, military and 
economic stability for all European countries.  We will continue to 
consult closely and in an open manner with all our Partners about the 
evolution of the security architecture of Europe. 
 
4.  Allies have already taken important steps to expand cooperation 
through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and through the decisions 
of the January 1994 Summit, including the creation of the Partnership 
for Peace.  Partnership for Peace is developing into an important 
feature of European security, linking NATO and its Partners and 
providing the basis for joint action with the Alliance in dealing with 
common security problems.  Active participation in the Partnership for 
Peace will also play an important role in the evolutionary process of 
the expansion of NATO. 
 
We are pleased with the rapid progress to date in the implementation of 
Partnership for Peace.  Twenty-three countries so far have joined the 
Partnership.  Ten Individual Partnership Programmes have been agreed and 
several more are close to completion.  The Partnership Coordination Cell 
at Mons is fully operational and practical planning work has begun, 
especially with regard to the preparation for Partnership exercises in 
1995. Together with Allies, eleven Partner countries already have 
appointed Liaison Officers at the Cell.  Partner countries' 
representatives have taken up their dedicated office facilities in the 
new Manfred W”rner Wing at NATO Headquarters.  We strongly encourage 
full Partner participation both at NATO Headquarters and in the 
Partnership Coordination Cell. 
 
The three Partnership for Peace exercises held this Autumn with broad 
participation by both Allied and Partner nations launched a practical 
military cooperation that will improve our common capabilities.  We will 
tomorrow present to our Partners a substantial exercise programme for 
next year.  We welcome and encourage the large and growing number of 
exercises nationally sponsored in the spirit of Partnership for Peace.  
We also welcome and endorse a defence planning and review process within 
the Partnership, based on a biennial planning cycle, which will advance 
interoperability and increase transparency among Allies and Partners, 
and invite Partners to participate in a first round of this process 
beginning in January 1995. 
 
We have also tasked the Council in Permanent Session, the NATO Military 
Authorities and the Partnership Coordination Cell to expedite the 
implementation of the Individual Partnership Programmes.  We reaffirm 
our commitment to provide the necessary resources.  In this regard, we 
have requested the Council in Permanent Session to examine how best to 
allocate, on an annual basis, existing resources within the NATO budgets 
to support the Partnership and to report back to us at our Spring 
meeting.  We have also noted the effort of Allies to provide substantial 
bilateral assistance in support of Partnership objectives and agreed to 
exchange information on our respective national efforts with a view to 
ensuring the maximum effectiveness in their use.  However, all this can 
only supplement, not replace, the efforts of Partners to undertake the 
short-term and long-term planning necessary to fund their own 
participation in Partnership for Peace. 
 
5.  Our Heads of State and Government reaffirmed that the Alliance, as 
provided for in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, remains open to 
membership of other European states in a position to further the 
principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North 
Atlantic area.  We expect and would welcome NATO enlargement that would 
reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary 
process, taking into account political and security developments in the 
whole of Europe.  Enlargement, when it comes, would be part of a broad 
European security architecture based on true cooperation throughout the 
whole of Europe.  It would threaten no one and would enhance stability 
and security for all of Europe.  The enlargement of NATO will complement 
the enlargement of the European Union, a parallel process which also, 
for its part, contributes significantly to extending security and 
stability to the new democracies in the East. 
 
6.  Accordingly, we have decided to initiate a process of examination 
inside the Alliance to determine how NATO will enlarge, the principles 
to guide this process and the implications of membership.  To that end, 
we have directed the Council in Permanent Session, with the advice of 
the Military Authorities, to begin an extensive study.  This will 
include an examination of how the Partnership for Peace can contribute 
concretely to this process.  We will present the results of our 
deliberations to interested Partners prior to our next meeting in 
Brussels.  We will discuss the progress made at our Spring meeting in 
The Netherlands. 
 
7.  We agreed that it is premature to discuss the timeframe for 
enlargement or which particular countries would be invited to join the 
Alliance. We further agreed that enlargement should strengthen the 
effectiveness of the Alliance, contribute to the stability and security 
of the entire Euro-Atlantic area, and support our objective of 
maintaining an undivided Europe.  It should be carried out in a way that 
preserves the Alliance's ability to perform its core functions of common 
defence as well as to undertake peacekeeping and other new missions and 
that upholds the principles and objectives of the Washington Treaty.  In 
this context, we recall the Preamble to the Washington Treaty: 
 
"The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the UnitedNations and their desire to live 
in peace with all peoples and all governments.  They are determined to 
safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their 
peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and 
the rule of law.  They seek to promote stability and well-being in the 
North Atlantic area.  They are resolved to unite their efforts for 
collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security." 
 
All new members of NATO will be full members of the Alliance, enjoying 
the rights and assuming all obligations of membership.  We agreed that, 
when it occurs, enlargement will be decided on a case-by-case basis and 
that some nations may attain membership before others. 
 
8.  We affirm our commitment to reinforce cooperative structures of 
security which can extend to countries throughout the whole of Europe, 
noting that the enlargement of NATO should also be seen in this context.  
Against this background, we wish to develop further our dialogue and 
consolidate our relations with each of our Partners. Having just 
overcome the division of Europe, we have no desire to see the emergence 
of new lines of partition.  We are working towards an intensification of 
relations between NATO and its Partners on the basis of transparency and 
on an equal footing.  NATO's right to take its own decisions, on its own 
responsibility, by consensus among its members will in no way be 
affected. 
 
9.  A cooperative European security architecture requires the active 
participation of Russia.  We reaffirm our strong support for the 
political and economic reforms in Russia, and we welcome the 
considerable contributions that Russia can make towards stability and 
security in Europe on a wide range of issues.  We also reaffirm our 
commitment to developing a far-reaching relationship, corresponding with 
Russia's size, importance and capabilities, both inside and outside the 
Partnership for Peace, based on mutual friendship, respect and benefit, 
and we are encouraged by the progress and plans that have been made in 
the various elements of that relationship. We welcome also an initial 
programme of consultations and cooperation between the Alliance and 
Russia, on the basis of the Summary of Conclusions of 22 June 1994 
agreed at the meeting of Russian Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev with the 
Council, in areas where Russia has a unique or particularly important 
contribution to make. In this context and with the aim of increasing 
European and global security, we propose using the opportunity of our 
regular Ministerial meetings to meet with Russian Ministers whenever 
useful.  In the same spirit, we also propose that our experts discuss 
key issues like true partners. We welcome the completion of the 
withdrawal of Russian troops from Germany and the Baltic States, which 
represents a significant contribution to security as well as benefitting 
general stability in Europe.  We also welcome the agreement between the 
Russian Federation and Moldova which provides for the withdrawal of the 
Russian 14th Army from the territory of Moldova. 
 
10.  We attach considerable importance to developing our relationship 
with Ukraine.  An independent, democratic and stable Ukraine is of great 
importance for European security and stability.  We are pleased that 
Ukraine was involved in the two Partnership for Peace field exercises in 
Poland and in The Netherlands.  We look forward to the completion of its 
Individual Partnership Programme. We want to develop our cooperation 
with Ukraine still further.  We welcome the Ukrainian Parliament's vote 
in favour of Ukraine's accession to the NPT, which is a fundamental step 
to enable this country to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon 
state. 
 
11.  We meet only four days before the Budapest CSCE Summit, a crucial 
opportunity to progress further towards our vision of a Europe whole and 
free.  We will work individually and collectively to ensure that the 
CSCE fulfils effectively the vital role it should have in the 
construction of an inclusive security architecture.  The Helsinki 
Accords and other CSCE documents remain the basic definition of our 
common goals and standards, and the CSCE defines both the values and 
goals of a broad community of security and cooperation.  NATO respects 
and upholds the principles of the CSCE.  The CSCE has developed useful 
methods for conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy which provide 
the important first line of efforts to attack the root causes of 
conflict.  Much progress has been made in this direction since the 1992 
Helsinki Summit, but the challenges have expanded since then. 
 
12.  As a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the 
CSCE should play a key role for conflict prevention and crisis 
management and resolution in its area. In accordance with Article 52 of 
the UN Charter, CSCE Participating States should make every effort to 
achieve the peaceful settlement of local disputes through the CSCE 
before referring them to the UN Security Council.  We support the 
objectives of the forthcoming CSCE Summit to: 
 
--  reinforce our commitment to the CSCE as the comprehensive forum for 
consultation and cooperation in Europe; 
 
--  strengthen further the CSCE's capabilities, including in decision-
making, and effectiveness; 
 
--  adopt substantial agreements reached in the Forum for Security 
Cooperation:  the Code of Conduct on Security Matters, the agreement on 
global exchange of military information and the increased focus on non-
proliferation issues, together with a further enhancement of the Vienna 
Document on confidence-building measures, which will represent a solid 
step forward in the field of arms control and cooperative security; 
 
--  develop further the CSCE's capabilities in early warning, conflict 
prevention, crisis management and peacekeeping; 
 
--  reaffirm and strengthen the CSCE's fundamental role in the 
protection of human rights and the promotion of democratic institutions; 
 
--  foster good neighbourly relations through the conclusion of 
bilateral and regional agreements between and among Participating 
States; and 
 
--  enhance transparent and effective arms control and confidence- 
building measures throughout the CSCE area and at regional levels. 
 
We fully support the activities of the CSCE to achieve a peaceful 
solution to the conflict in and around Nagorno-Karabakh.  This will be 
an opportunity to demonstrate the political determination of all the 
Participating States to put the CSCE principles into practice. 
 
13.  We welcome the success of the process initiated in Paris for the 
conclusion of a Pact for Stability in Europe.  The launching of two 
"regional tables" has demonstrated the progress that rapprochement among 
European states can bring.  This initiative makes a substantial 
contribution to stability in our continent.  We recommend continuation 
of this close co-operation for conclusion of the Pact for Stability in 
Europe, as an active contribution to good neighbourly relations in 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
14.  We welcome the endorsement by the WEU Council of Ministers in 
Noordwijk of preliminary conclusions on the formulation of the common 
European Defence Policy taking also into account the results of the NATO 
Brussels Summit.  We welcome the WEU's decision to initiate reflection 
on the new European security conditions, including the proposal put 
forward by France that this should lead to a white paper on European 
security.  We attach great importance to the process of cooperation that 
NATO and the WEU are engaged in, aimed at the effective implementation 
of the Summit results, especially with regard to the Combined Joint Task 
Forces (CJTF) concept and the possibility of making assets and 
capabilities of the Alliance available to the WEU.  We take note that a 
report on criteria and procedures for effective use of CJTF has been 
prepared by the WEU and presented to a joint Council meeting of NATO and 
the WEU on 29 June 1994. 
 
15.  We have taken note of the work undertaken on the development of the 
CJTF concept, which is an essential part of the Alliance's continuing 
effort to adapt and adjust its structures and procedures, in order to 
conduct more efficiently and flexibly the Alliance's missions, including 
peacekeeping, to provide separable but not separate military 
capabilities that could be employed by NATO or the WEU and to facilitate 
operations with participating nations outside the Alliance.  Much 
remains to be done to adapt Alliance structures and procedures and, in 
this context, to develop the CJTF concept, and to move the whole process 
forward as quickly as necessary.  Work is in hand to develop this 
concept in detail, in coordination with the WEU and with the advice of 
the NATO Military Authorities, as a means to implement the Alliance's 
readiness to make its collective assets available, on the basis of 
consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations.  We 
have tasked the Council in Permanent Session to continue its work and to 
examine ways that would enable further development of the CJTF concept, 
including, as soon as appropriate, through pilot trials and look forward 
to a progress report at our next meeting. 
 
16.  Work on the Summit initiative on the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and their delivery means has been taken forward through 
the creation of the Joint Committee on Proliferation and two expert 
groups, the Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation and the 
Senior Defence Group on Proliferation.  We took note of the report of 
the Joint Committee on Proliferation on the work undertaken by these 
Groups, which is based on the basic principles of the Alliance Policy 
Framework that we adopted and made public at our Istanbul Ministerial.  
We welcome the progress made in intensifying and expanding NATO's 
political and defence efforts against proliferation, which remains one 
of the greatest concerns for the Alliance.  We have instructed that the 
Groups should move forward in implementing their agreed work programmes 
in order to examine, without replacing or duplicating efforts underway 
in other fora, the means available to prevent and respond where 
necessary to proliferation, and to facilitate NATO defence activities in 
the field of proliferation.  We look forward to another progress report 
at our meeting in May.  We welcome the consultations with all 
Cooperation Partners in the framework of the NACC and look forward to ad 
hoc consultations with Russia on proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and their means of delivery. 
 
17.  We remain fully committed to the indefinite and unconditional 
extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(NPT) at next year's Extension and Review Conference.  We urge the other 
States Parties to the Treaty to do likewise.  We will continue to 
support other ongoing efforts to strengthen the international non-
proliferation system. In this context, we urge other states yet to 
accede to the Treaty to do so well before the upcoming NPT Conference.  
We will also work to enhance the verification regime for the NPT.  In 
this context, we consider the recent "agreed framework" between the 
United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a step 
towards bringing the Democratic People's Republic of Korea into full 
compliance with its NPT commitments and as a contribution towards the 
maintenance of peace and stability in the region. 
 
18.  We continue to attach particular importance to full compliance with 
and fulfilment of all obligations resulting from existing disarmament 
and arms control agreements.  In this context, we welcome the successful 
completion of the second reduction phase of the CFE Treaty.  This 
Treaty, which remains the cornerstone for European security and 
stability, must be fully and firmly implemented and its integrity must 
be preserved.  The process of elimination of former Soviet weapons of 
mass destruction must rapidly be advanced further.  We welcome the 
contribution made by some Allies to that effect.  We attach great 
importance to the negotiation of a universal and verifiable 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.  It is also important to achieve a 
universal ban on the production of fissile material for weapons 
purposes.  We continue to consider as essential tasks the early entry 
into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the elaboration of 
measures to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. Noting the 
importance of the Open Skies Treaty in promoting openness and 
transparency of military forces and activities, we reiterate our hope 
that all signatories who have not yet ratified the Treaty will do so and 
that all instruments of ratification necessary for the entry into force 
of the Treaty will be deposited at the earliest possible time. 
 
19.  We reaffirm the importance we attach to developments around the 
Mediterranean.  At our meeting in Athens we encouraged all efforts for 
dialogue and cooperation which aim at strengthening stability in this 
region. In this context, we welcome the recent positive steps in the 
Middle East peace process, which will help remove the obstacles to a 
more constructive relationship between the countries of the region as a 
whole.  The NATO Summit in January reiterated the conviction that 
security in Europe is greatly affected by security in the Mediterranean.  
As agreed at our meeting in Istanbul, we have examined proposed measures 
to promote dialogue and are ready to establish contacts, on a case-by-
case basis, between the Alliance and Mediterranean non-member countries 
with a view to contributing to the strengthening of regional stability.  
To this end, we direct the Council in Permanent Session to continue to 
review the situation, to develop the details of the proposed dialogue 
and to initiate appropriate preliminary contacts. 
 
20.  We deplore the continuing conflict in Bosnia, which has brought 
about large-scale suffering, most recently in and around the Safe Area 
of Bihac.  We reiterate our strong support for the continued efforts of 
the international community, including those of the Contact Group, in 
attempting to bring peace to the region.  We continue to believe that 
the conflict must be settled at the negotiating table.  We call on the 
Bosnian Serbs and all those forces which support them to end their 
offensive in Bihac and on all parties to agree to and honour a cease-
fire and allow humanitarian aid to flow to that beleaguered population 
and throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The Bosnian Serbs should immediately 
and without conditions release all UN personnel currently being denied 
freedom of movement.  We reaffirm our commitment to provide close air 
support for UNPROFOR and to use NATO air power, in accordance with 
existing arrangements with the United Nations. We will continue, 
together with the WEU, the maritime embargo enforcement operations in 
the Adriatic.  We are determined to maintain Alliance unity and cohesion 
as we work together with the international community to find a just and 
peaceful solution in Bosnia and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. 
 
21.  The situation in Southern Caucasus continues to be of special 
concern.  We welcome the cease-fire that has been established, but 
lasting peaceful and just solutions to ongoing conflicts in the region, 
particularly in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, can only be reached under 
the aegis of the UN and through CSCE mechanisms. We hope that the CSCE 
will be in a position to contribute effectively to the peace process on 
Nagorno-Karabakh, including through the establishment of a CSCE 
multinational peacekeeping operation based on the principles of Chapter 
III of the Helsinki Document 1992. 
 
22.  We reiterate the Alliance's condemnation of international terrorism 
as stated at the NATO Summit in January. 
 
23.  We reaffirm our commitment to the Alliance's common-funded 
programmes.  We consider these programmes vital elements in underpinning 
our military structures, providing essential operating capability and 
strengthening Alliance cohesion. We have directed the Council in 
Permanent Session, taking account of the Fundamental Review of the 
Military Budget and the Civil Budget Priorities Review, to engage in a 
wide-ranging examination of Alliance budgetary management, structures 
and procedures to ensure that the appropriate resources are directed 
towards the programmes which will have the highest priority and to 
report initially at the Spring session. 
 
24.  The Spring 1995 meeting of the North Atlantic Council in 
Ministerial Session will be held in Noordwijk, The Netherlands, in May.  
(###) 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 3: 
 
Contact Group Meeting on Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Secretary Christopher, Contact Group Members 
Opening statements at a press conference following meeting, Brussels, 
Belgium, December 2, 1994 
 
German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel.  Let me begin by apologizing very 
much for having made you wait so long.  We had originally indicated 8:00 
as the starting time for the press conference, but we had not finished.  
It was not that we were arguing--simply that the problems are very 
serious ones, and we had to deal intensively with all of the outstanding 
questions. 
 
I will report in the following way on the Contact Group meeting.  First 
of all, we said that the awful situation in the former Yugoslavia cannot 
be resolved militarily.  A solution has to be found at the negotiating 
table.  The situation in and around Bihac is extremely worrying, and we 
agreed that it was necessary to have an immediate cease-fire.  The 
United Nations is negotiating with the parties to the conflict at the 
moment on such a cease-fire.  The five members of the Contact Group 
support this process as far as possible through all conceivable 
channels.  The cessation of hostilities in the whole of Bosnia-
Herzegovina then has to be achieved, and there, too, the UN is working 
on the spot with the parties to the conflict. 
 
A further objective is getting humanitarian supplies to the population.  
They are in a desperate situation, and we insist on full freedom of 
movement for UNPROFOR troops and for the humanitarian aid organizations 
which alone are able to provide for the supply of Bosnia.  We reinforce 
the need for full implementation of the resolutions of the UN Security 
Council and of the decisions taken in that framework. 
 
There was agreement that the UNPROFOR troops remain on the spot as long 
as the risk is not insupportable.  The basis for future negotiations 
remains the Contact Group plan, the 51-49 arrangement remains, and the 
commitment to the integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina has to 
be guaranteed.  We [MISSING TEXT] arrangements have to be developed 
while maintaining the integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
and there must be a balanced treatment of both sides.  We welcomed the 
agreement reached between Zagreb and the Krajina Serbs. This agreement 
represents an important first step toward the modus vivendi between the 
people in the area. 
 
We called on the parties to the conflict to draw up the international 
plan as quickly as possible, and we want all of the states of the former 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to be recognized in their existing 
borders as quickly as possible.  You will be given a text immediately 
after the press conference here.  Let me stress that it was very 
important in the view of all of us that we preserve the unity of the 
Contact Group.  The Bosnian Serbs should not fall prey to the illusion 
that international solidarity can be broken up in order to obtain 
advantages for their side.  So that is all I have to say; perhaps I 
could ask my colleagues if they have anything to add and to do so. 
 

Secretary Christopher.  I might briefly try to respond to the question 
that is probably on all of your minds, and that is:  What is the 
significance of tonight's meeting; what does it mean? 
 
I think you can consider that only in light of the options that we had 
before us.  One option would be to suggest the engagement of all-out 
struggle on behalf of the allied forces to dominate the situation and 
bring the war to an end.  That would take several hundred-thousand 
troops and would no doubt prolong the killing, and that is an option 
that we reject.  A second option is to simply disengage and to walk away 
from the situation, and I think we find it too serious to do so.  The 
third option is the one we followed, and that is to use diplomatic means 
to bring all the resources that we have available to us to bear on 
seeking a diplomatic solution.  That means sanctions; that means the 
continuation of economic pressure; and that means the pressure that can 
be brought by the five nations here. 
 
So it was an important meeting--important in the sense that we leave 
here unified in our determination to bring about a settlement if we 
possibly can.  I will make just three points about the agreement that we 
reached tonight.  Foreign Minister Kinkel has elaborated  on the 
agreement, but I would emphasize three things about it.   
 
First, we all agree that the Contact Group plan with its 51-49 division 
of territory must be the basis for a settlement of the conflict.   
 
Second, we agree that any settlement reached must respect the 
territorial integrity and independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina.   
 
Third, we have agreed among us that the constitutional arrangements are 
for the parties to determine and the Contact Group shall not determine 
arrangements of that kind for the parties. 
 
So, in that context, we go forward united and determined to see if we 
can assist the parties in achieving a settlement of this terrible 
conflict.  Thank you, Klaus, for chairing this meeting so expertly. 

 
Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev.  I, too, believe that this was 
an important event.  After a number of ambiguities and apprehensions 
that arose as to whether the world community or individual members 
thereof would be able to go along the right road, we have reaffirmed the 
plan of the Contact Group and all previous decisions taken by the 
Contact Group, and reaffirmed that there is no alternative to a 
negotiated peace settlement. 
 
I think it is very important that we supported UNPROFOR--the forces in 
Bosnia that are heroically serving; this also includes Russian 
peacekeepers.  We shall press to ensure that the risks to them do not 
exceed an acceptable level, but we are not going to be overly hasty--
pressing them, withdrawing them--and we give due credit to their 
service.  Finally, it seems important to us that we have reaffirmed the 
necessity of a UN-monitored cessation of hostilities throughout Bosnia-
Herzegovina, including Bihac.  We really did reaffirm the necessity to 
reach agreement--that the agreement should be reached among all parties.  
Concerning constitutional arrangements, in other words, not unilateral 
measures taken by any one people ensuring the equality of their rights 
and solutions reached by common consent--although there is nothing new 
here in the present circumstances, this is, nevertheless, an extremely 
important result.  Of course, it was not possible to achieve everything 
we would have wished, but that is the essence of compromise and of 
politics--the art of politics.  I would like to thank Klaus Kinkel for 
his firm and skilled guidance in our work and all of our colleagues who 
demonstrated the capacity not only to firmly uphold their respective 
positions, but also to come to an agreement. 

 
U.K. Foreign Secretary Douglas  Hurd.  I am sure it was right that we 
should work and succeed in coming together again as a Contact Group and 
relaunching the search for a negotiated settlement.  No one believes 
that that will be at all easy, but, as Warren Christopher said, the 
alternatives are more dangerous, even disastrous.  You will see from the 
text and from what has already been said that we reaffirm the basic--the 
two main pillars of the Contact Group plan:  a massive--a substantial 
withdrawal of Bosnian Serb forces from lands they now occupy, to the 51-
49 proportion, and a commitment to the integrity and sovereignty of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.  That is the basis.  The territorial proposal can be 
adjusted if the parties agree among themselves.  The constitutional 
arrangements also have to be agreeable to the parties, and we are 
talking about allowing equitable and balanced arrangements for the 
Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb entities to preserve the integrity of the 
country as a whole. 
 
It is not a new phrase; you will find it in what we said in Geneva in 
July, but we pulled it out again--picked it out again, in case it could 
be helpful.  We have said the Contact Group will facilitate--will help 
forward discussions between the parties looking toward a settlement.  
Now we will go out, as it were, into the field--the Contact Group will 
go out into the field and use the next weeks, because we know we don't 
have much time--use the next weeks, energetically, to put across what I 
believe is the best available plan for resolving this tragedy. 

 
French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe.  We have done some useful work 
here.  I would like to thank Klaus Kinkel for having chaired and led our 
work so effectively.  There are four points I would like to stress.  
 
First of all, a statement of fact, which you will find in our 
communique:  that is, the solution will come at the  negotiating table, 
and not on the battlefield.  It is very important that we have restated 
that today by common agreement. 
 
Secondly, a very clearly expressed requirement of the text for an 
immediate cease-fire in the safe area around Bihac and also the 
cessation of hostilities throughout the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
 
Third, a series of confirmations, which needed to be made because people 
might have doubted our common determination on these points:  What are 
they?  First of all, we support all of the UN Security Council 
resolutions, which have to be strictly imple-  mented; secondly, our 
support for the UNPROFOR mission, which is a mission of great 
importance, as stated in the text; and, finally, our support or 
attachment to the Contact Group and all of the communiques, which have 
been issued over the last months.   
 
Fourth, an initiative we are instructing the Contact Group and its 
expert formation, if I can call it that, to seek is to bring about a 
relaunch of negotiations on the basis that we have outlined.  And it 
will be their task to facilitate the resumption of these negotiations on 
the basis that has been explained by previous colleagues. 
 
I would stress two points in particular.  First of all, under the 51-49 
arrangement that has been mentioned, the territorial arrangements can be 
reached by common agreement between the two parties.  The second point 
to be stressed is this:  It is possible and, indeed, it may be 
necessaryto devise a constitutional arrangement which gives all of the 
constitutive entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina balanced and equitable 
arrangements. I think that really is the basis of the work that now 
remains to be done. 
 
Two words in conclusion:  What is important is consensus.  We reached 
agreement.  Contrary to everything that might have been said before this 
meeting, the unity of the Contact Group has not been broken.  Second and 
last point:  Everything will now depend upon our ability to take 
effective demarches with the different parties concerned--effective and 
convergent demarches, because if we do not converge in what we are 
doing, there is little chance of the objectives we have set being 
achieved. 

 
Greek Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias.  Today's meeting of the 
Contact Group was held at a very critical period after the recent 
outbreak of hostilities that has increased danger against security and 
stability in the wider region.  The unity of the Contact Group was 
reinstated once again.  This is a unity which is a basic precondition 
for the effectiveness of this Contact Group.  I would like to welcome 
the economic agreement between the Government of the Republic of Croatia 
and the Krajina Serbian authorities.  It is clear to all of us that we 
cannot have a solution to the Bosnian problem in the battlefield and 
that the only way out is the one of negotiations. 
 
I would also consider it important that we underline the necessity for a 
constitutional solution that will be acceptable to all parties and that 
we would like to ensure a balanced treatment of all sides.  Greece is a 
Balkan country.  It is very close to the war, and just as other Balkan 
countries, it has suffered particularly from the crisis in the former 
Yugoslavia.  Therefore, we would like to support wholeheartedly the 
efforts for a peaceful settlement of this tragedy.  Finally, I would 
like to thank Minister Klaus Kinkel for his excellent presidency that 
has allowed us to successfully arrive at an agreement.  (###) 
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 4: 
 
U.S. Commitment to Middle East Peace and Israel's Security  
Secretary Christopher 
Remarks upon arrival, Tel Aviv, Israel, December 6, 1994 
 
Good evening.  I am delighted to be back here in Israel.  I am looking 
forward to meeting tomorrow with Prime Minister Rabin and Foreign 
Minister Peres.  I have just come from Damascus, where I met with 
President Asad for 41/2 hours.  Our discussions, as usual, were very 
serious and detailed.  We are continuing the hard work of narrowing the 
gaps on this negotiating track.  Both sides have made it clear to us 
that they genuinely want to reach a mutually acceptable peace.  We will 
continue to work with them to try to achieve that goal. 
 
Let me say a word about achieving our goal of a comprehensive peace.  
The road to that goal is strewn with obstacles and challenges.  But over 
the last year, we have witnessed dramatic breakthroughs that promise to 
transform the Middle East forever. 
 
Resolving this conflict will not be quick or easy.  Breakthroughs have 
triggered efforts by extremists to destroy this process and to kill the 
chances and the hopes for peace.  These are desperate acts by those who 
would seek to keep Arabs and Israelis mired in a cycle of confrontation 
and despair.  Israelis have been particularly hard hit by these 
despicable acts of terror.  We will not, and cannot, allow these 
propagators of hate and violence to prevail and turn back the clock. 
 
We must continue to move forward.  There is no going back.  To accept 
the status quo would not only allow these extremists to prevail, but 
would miss a historic opportunity to achieve peace with security--an 
opportunity that is not likely to come again.  Indeed, the status quo is 
not an answer to violence or terror; it will only invite more terror. 
 
Pursuing peace does not mean pursuing peace recklessly.  We will not 
counsel Israel to make peace without ensuring its security.  That is why 
the security dimension of these negotiations is so critical.  That is 
why we have been pressing the Palestinians to ensure that they fulfill 
the commitments they undertook in their agreements to halt terror and 
violence against Israelis from the areas in which they have authority.  
Indeed, there cannot and will not be peace without security. 
 
Finally, I want to make it clear that the Clinton Administration stands 
firmly behind Israel's quest for peace.  Whatever doubts and 
uncertainties accompany this quest, Israel should never question or 
doubt the United States' unshakable commitment to its security and well-
being.  We have stood by Israel in the face of war.  We have stood by 
Israel in the pursuit of peace.  We will continue to stand by Israel 
until its people achieve the peace and security they have so long been 
denied.  (###) 
 
[END OF DISPATCH VOL 5, NO. 51]

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