U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH

VOLUME 5, NUMBER 50, DECEMBER 12, 1994

PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS



ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:



1.  1994 Summit of the Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe--
President Clinton, Fact Sheets 

2.   GATT:  Fulfilling Responsibilities at Home and Abroad--President 
Clinton

3.   The Agreed Framework:  Advancing U.S. Interests with North Korea--
Robert 
L. Gallucci

4.   The Americas in the 21st Century:  The U.S.-Brazilian Relationship-
-
Alexander F. Watson

5.   Treaty Actions 



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ARTICLE 1:



1994 Summit of the Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe

President Clinton, Fact Sheets



President Clinton

Remarks at plenary session, Budapest, Hungary, December 5, 1994.



Thank you, President Klestil, President Goncz.  I am delighted to be 
here in this great city in Central Europe at this historic meeting.



The United States is committed to building a united, free, and secure 
Europe.  We believe that goal requires a determined effort to continue 
to reduce the nuclear threat; a strong NATO adapting to new challenges; 
a strong CSCE, working--among other things--to lead efforts to head off 
future Bosnias; astrong effort to cooperate with the United Nations; and 
an effort by all thenations of Europe to work together in harmony on 
common problems andopportunities.



In the 20th century, conflict and distrust have ruled Europe.  The steps 
weare taking today will help to ensure that in the 21st century, peace 
andprosperity rein.



The forces that tore Europe apart have been defeated.  But neither peace 
nordemocracy's triumph is assured.  The end of the Cold War presents us 
with theopportunity to fulfill the promise of democracy and freedom.  It 
is ourresponsibility, working together, to seize it--to build a new 
securityframework for the era ahead.  We must not allow the Iron Curtain 
to bereplaced by a veil of indifference.   We must not consign new 
democracies to agray zone.



Instead, we seek to increase the security of all; to erase the old 
lineswithout drawing arbitrary new ones; to bolster emerging 
democracies; and tointegrate the nations of Europe into a continent 
where democracy and freemarkets know no borders, but where every 
nation's border is secure.



We are making progress on the issues that matter for the future.  Today, 
here,five of this organization's member states--Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Russia,Ukraine, and the United States--will bring the START I treaty 
into force andreduce the nuclear  threat that has hung over our heads 
for nearly a half-century.



START I will eliminate strategic bombers and missile launchers that 
carriedover 9,000 warheads, and it opens the door to prompt ratification 
of START II,which will retire another 5,000 warheads.  These actions 
will cut the arsenalsof the United States and the former Soviet Union by 
more than 60% from theirCold War peak.  The world will be a safer place 
as a result.  


But even as we celebrate this landmark gain for peace, the terrible 
conflictin Bosnia rages not 300 miles from this city.  After three years 
of conflict,the combatants remain locked in a terrible war no one can 
win.  Now each facesthe same choice:  They can perpetuate the military 
standoff, or they can stopspilling blood and start making peace.



The government of Bosnia-Herzegovina has made the right choice by 
acceptingthe international peace plan and agreeing to recent calls for a 
cease-fire. So I say again to the Bosnian Serbs:  End the aggression and  
agree to the cease-fire and renewed negotiations on the basis of the 
Contact Group plan. Settle your differences at the negotiating table, 
not on the battlefield.



We must not let our frustration over that war cause us to give up our 
effortsto end it.  The United States will not do so.  If we have learned 
anythingfrom the agony of Bosnia, it clearly is that we must act on its 
lessons.  In other parts of Europe, ethnic disputes and forces of hatred 
and despair--anddemagogues who would take advantage of them--threaten to 
reverse the new wave of freedom that has swept the continent.



So, as we strive to end the war in Bosnia, we must work to prevent 
future Bosnias.  We must build the structures that will help newly free 
nations complete their transformation successfully to free market 
democracies and preserve their own freedom.



We know this is not something that will happen overnight, but over time, 
NATO, the CSCE, and other European and transatlantic institutions, 
working in close cooperation with the United Nations, can support and 
extend the democracy, stability, and prosperity that Western Europe and 
North America have enjoyed for 50 years.  That is the future we are 
working to build.



NATO remains the bedrock of security in Europe, but its role is changing 
as the continent changes.  Last January, NATO opened the door to new 
members and launched the Partnership for Peace.  Since then, 23 nations 
have joined that partnership to train together, conduct joint military 
exercises, and forge closer political links.



Last week, we took further steps to prepare for expansion by starting 
work on the requirements for membership.  New members will join, country 
by country, gradually and openly.  Each must be committed to democracy 
and free markets and be able to contribute to Europe's security.  NATO 
will not automatically exclude any nation from joining.  At the same 
time, no country outside will be allowed to veto expansion.  As NATO 
does expand, so will security for all European states, for it is not an 
aggressive but a defensive organization.  NATO's new members-- old 
members and non-members alike--will be more secure.  

As NATO continues its mission, other institutions can and should share 
the security burden and take on special responsibilities.  A strong and 
vibrant Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is vital.



For more than a decade, the CSCE was the focal point for courageous men 
and women who, at great personal risk, confronted tyranny to win the 
human rights set out in the Helsinki Accords.  Now, the CSCE can help 
build a new and integrated continent.  It has unique tools for this 
task.  The CSCE is the only regional forum to which nearly every nation 
in Europe and North America belongs.  It has pioneered ways to 
peacefully resolve conflicts--from shuttle diplomacy to longstanding 
missions--in tense areas.  Now that freedom has been won in Europe, the 
CSCE can play an expanding role in making sure it is never lost again.



Indeed, its proposed new name--the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe--symbolizes the new and important mission we 
believe it must undertake.  The CSCE should be our first, flexible line 
of defense against ethnic and regional conflicts.  Its rules can guard 
against the assertion of hegemony or spheres of influence.  It can help 
nations come together to build prosperity.  And it can promote Europe's 
integration piece by piece.



By focusing on human rights, conflict prevention, and dispute 
resolution, the CSCE can help prevent future Bosnias.  We are taking 
important steps at this meeting for that crucial goal--by strengthening 
the High Commissioner for National Minorities, establishing a code of 
conduct to provide for democratic, civilian control of the military, 
reinforcing principles to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, and preparing to send CSCE monitors and peacekeepers to 
potential trouble spots outside Bosnia.  These actions will not make 
triumphant headlines, but they may help to prevent tragic ones.



The principles adopted in Rome made clear that any peace-keeping mission 
must aim for a freely negotiated settlement by the parties themselves, 
not a solution imposed from the outside.  And they hold that no country 
can use a regional conflict, however threatening, to strengthen its 
security at the expense of others.



I am very encouraged that, with the support and involvement of the 
Russian Federation, we are on the verge of an agreement that the CSCE 
will lead a multinational peace-keeping force in Nagorno-Karabakh.  The 
United States appreciates the willingness of many nations to contribute 
troops and materiel for this mission.  The continuing tragedy in 
Nagorno-Karabakh demands that we redouble our efforts to promote a 
lasting cease-fire and a fair settlement.  The United States strongly 
supports this effort and calls upon all CSCE members to contribute 
toward it.



The CSCE also has an important role to play in promoting economic growth 
while protecting Europe's resources and environment.  We should 
strengthen its efforts to increase regional and cross-border 
cooperation.  Such efforts can bring people together to build new 
highways, bridges, and communication networks--the infrastructure of 
democracy.



Since 1975--when the countries of Europe expressed the desire to form a 
community founded on common values and founded the CSCE--more progress 
has occurred than even dreamers might have hoped.  We know that change 
is possible.  We know that former enemies can reconcile.  We know that 
eloquent intentions about democracy and human rights can promote peace 
when transformed from words into actions.



Now, almost 20 years later, our challenge is to help the freedoms we 
secured spread and endure.  The task will require energy and strength.  
Old regimes have crumbled, but new legacies and mistrust remain.  
Nations have been liberated, but ethnic hatred threatens peace and 
tolerance.  Democracy and free markets are emerging, but change 
everywhere is causing fear and insecurity.



Three times before in this century, our nations have summoned the 
strength to defeat history's dark forces.  They have left us still with 
a great responsibility and an extraordinary opportunity.  Our mission 
now is to build a new world for our children--a world more democratic, 
more prosperous, and more secure.  The CSCE has a vital role to play.  
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.





President Clinton

Remarks at the signing of denuclearization agreements, Budapest, 
Hungary, December 5, 1994.



President Yeltsin, President Kuchma, President Lukashenko, President 
Nazarbayev, Prime Minister Major:  Today, we herald the arrival of a new 
and safer era.  We have witnessed many signatures.  Together, they 
amount to one great stride to reduce the nuclear threat to ourselves and 
to our children.



The path to this moment has been long and hard.  More than a decade has 
passed since the first negotiations on the START I treaty; but 
perseverance, courage, and common sense have triumphed.  

Skeptics once claimed that the nuclear threat would actually grow after 
the Soviet Union dissolved.  But because of the wisdom and statesmanship 
of the leaders who join me here, the skeptics have been proven wrong.  


Ukraine's accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty completes a bold 
move away from the nuclear precipice.  Ukraine has joined Belarus and 
Kazakhstan in ridding itself of the terrible weapons each inherited when 
the Soviet Union dissolved.  Presidents Lukashenko, Nazarbayev, and 
Kuchma have done a very great service for their own people, their 
neighbors, and, indeed, all the people of the world.



There is no greater service that the rest of us could do for our 
nations, our neighbors, and the people of the world than to follow the 
advice already advanced here by President Yeltsin and Prime Minister 
Major, and agree to the indefinite extension of NPT in 1995.



Creating security in the post-Cold War era requires that we unite, not 
divide.  The pledges on security assurances that Prime Minister Major, 
President Yeltsin, and I have given these three nations move us further 
in that direction.  They underscore our independence, our commitment to 
the independence, the sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of 
these states.



Today, we have also reached a milestone in fulfilling the promise of 
this new era by putting the START I treaty into force--the first treaty 
that requires nuclear powers to actually reduce their strategic 
arsenals.  It creates the most far-reaching verification system ever 
agreed upon and will eliminate over 9,000 warheads from our arsenals.  
It lays the foundation for even deeper arms reductions.



President Yeltsin and I have already vowed to work to put the START 
treaty into force at our next summit in 1995.  That will cut our 
arsenals by another 5,000 warheads.  Together, these treaties will leave 
the United States and the former Soviet Union with only a third of the 
warheads they possessed at the height of the Cold War.  They will help 
us to lead the future in a direction we have all dreamed of, one in 
which the nuclear threat that has hung over our heads for almost a half 
century is now dramatically reduced.



On this historic afternoon, we have shown that today's community of free 
nations can and will create a safer globe than did the divided world of 
yesterday.  Together, we have helped to beat back the threat of nuclear 
war and lit the way to a more peaceful day when the shadow of that 
destruction is finally vanquished from the earth.





Fact Sheet:  Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)



From Vancouver to Vladivostok, the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) brings a new kind of diplomacy--one built 
on respect for human rights and regional cooperation as the bases for 
security among Atlantic, European, and Eurasian countries.  

While its most prominent characteristic is furthering European security 
and cooperation by defining and protecting human rights, CSCE also 
fosters these goals through programs centered on press and culture, 
economics, conflict prevention, and military security.  CSCE is 
committed to developing democratic institutions at the grass-roots 
level, through local officials and activities, and through non-
governmental organizations.



Evolution of the CSCE



CSCE began during the Cold War as a way to promote dialogue and decrease 
tensions between East and West.  In August 1975, 35 nations signed the 
Helsinki Final Act, a politically binding declaratory understanding of 
the democratic principles governing relations among nations.  The act 
contained a provision to continue regular discussions on a broad range 
of concerns--from migration and military security to the environment and 
media relations--in what became known as the "Helsinki process."



During the 1980s, follow-on meetings in Madrid, Stockholm, and Vienna 
reviewed implementation of CSCE agreements and continued the opportunity 
for discussion.  Although CSCE had no permanent headquarters and no 
enforcement capability, important progress was made to establish firm 
standards for the protection of human rights and to increase confidence 
through the advance notification of military activities and the exchange 
of military information.



With the end of the Cold War, all CSCE states for the first time 
accepted the principles of pluralism and free markets as the basis for 
their cooperation.  This made it possible for CSCE to explore ways to 
act on its rigorous principles and to ensure that they were upheld.  To 
do this, CSCE in 1990 established the Secretariat in Prague, Conflict 
Prevention Center in Vienna, and Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights in Warsaw.  A decision to create an office of Secretary 
General was made at the December 1992 Stockholm meeting of CSCE Foreign 
Ministers.



During 1992, the decision to move from principle to action was most 
marked in a new Helsinki document which established a number of 
practical tools that help CSCE work with NATO, the EU (European Union), 
and other international bodies to defend human rights and manage the 
unprecedented changes now taking place in Europe.  In particular, it 
sets out an ambitious role for the CSCE in conflict resolution and 
"preventive diplomacy."



CSCE is also an important framework for conventional arms control in 
Europe.  The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, signed in 
November 1990, limits non-nuclear ground and air forces from the 
Atlantic to the Urals.  A separate political agreement, concluded in 
July 1992, covers personnel in the same region.  Through continued 
negotiation, confidence-building measures have been extended and higher 
expectations for treaty compliance and verification have been set.  A 
new security negotiation--the Forum for Security Cooperation--opened in 
Vienna on September 22, 1992.



CSCE and European Conflicts



The civil war in the former Yugoslavia has been an early test of the 
CSCE's ability to take an active part in conflict prevention.  On August 
6, 1992, the U.S. Government called on the CSCE to help monitor the 
human rights situation in the Balkans and inhibit the spread of the 
conflict.



The CSCE quickly sent fact-finding and rapporteur missions to the region 
and supported the sanctions and humanitarian measures taken by the UN 
and the EU.  The CSCE then established a completely new kind of presence 
in the areas adjacent to the conflict.  These "missions of long 
duration" provided an early warning system for any spill-over of the 
hostilities into the regions of Serbia and Montenegro--Kosovo, 
Vojvodina, and Sandzak--and into The Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia.  Until the missions in Serbia and Montenegro were expelled in 
July 1993 by Belgrade authorities, they made a significant contribution 
to stability, as the mission in The Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia continues to do.  Missions also have been sent to Serbia and 
Montenegro, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina to investigate alleged 
violations of CSCE principles.



In August 1992, the London Conference on the Former Yugoslavia asked the 
CSCE to assist in monitoring sanctions compliance.  There are now 
missions in Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, The Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Ukraine, and Albania.  The post of Sanctions Coordinator was 
created to oversee the CSCE-EU sanctions missions in the countries 
around Serbia and Montenegro.



The CSCE is in the forefront of conflict resolution in other parts of 
the region as well:  

--  Under CSCE auspices, the Minsk Group--11 nations (including 
Azerbaijan and Armenia)--is the focus of international efforts to solve 
the crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh.

--  The CSCE mission in Georgia is assessing the political and human 
rights situations in the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia, 
as well as monitoring peace-keeping forces and participating in 
political negotiations in South Ossetia.
  
--  Rapporteur missions have been sent to the new Central Asian 
republics to assess the governmental and human rights situations.

--  In February 1993, CSCE agreed to send a long-term, conflict-
prevention CSCE mission to Moldova and a mission to Estonia to promote 
integration and better understanding between communities there.

--  In October 1993, the CSCE agreed to send a mission to Latvia to 
monitor Latvian-Russian minority issues.

--  The previous Chairman-in-Office (Sweden) sent a personal 
representative to investigate the situation in Tajikistan, which led to 
a December 1993 decision to send a mission there.  The Tajikistan 
mission has a mandate to foster confidence-building, democracy, and 
human rights.

--  In 1994, the CSCE established preventive diplomacy missions in 
Ukraine and Bosnia.



As a charter member of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, the United States has been central in the promotion of 
uncompromising humanitarian standards and their practical 
implementation.  From the beginning, CSCE has embodied America's hopes 
for a unified, democratic, and prosperous Europe.  Americans continually 
have worked to ensure that the CSCE process remains flexible, 
innovative, and unbureaucratic.  The United States established the first 
permanent delegation to the CSCE in Vienna in August 1992, charting a 
course for other nations to follow. 

CSCE Participating States



Albania

Armenia

Austria

Azerbaijan

Belarus

Belgium

Bosnia-Herzegovina

Bulgaria

Canada

Croatia

Cyprus

Czech Republic

Denmark

Estonia

Finland

France

Georgia

Germany

Greece

The Holy See

Hungary

Iceland

Ireland

Italy

Kazakhstan

Kyrgyzstan

Latvia

Liechtenstein

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Malta

Moldova

Monaco

Netherlands

Norway

Poland

Portugal

Romania

Russia

San Marino

Slovak Republic

Slovenia

Spain

Sweden

Switzerland

Tajikistan

Turkey

Turkmenistan

Ukraine

United Kingdom

United States

Uzbekistan

Yugoslavia*



*  Excluded from all CSCE meetings





Fact Sheet:  CSCE Structure



The Charter of Paris, signed in November 1990, committed Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) member states to a substantial 
enhancement of CSCE decision-making bodies, mechanisms, and institutions 
in order to give permanence and strength to a 16-year-old process of ad 
hoc political consultations.  Since the signing of that document, CSCE 
has gained several new institutions and a number of expanded 
consultative mechanisms geared toward intensifying the pan-European 
discussions commonly referred to as the Helsinki process.



Council of Ministers (COM).  CSCE members agreed at the Paris summit to 
establish a Council of Ministers (COM)--comprised of foreign ministers--
as its highest decision-making body which would meet at least annually.  
The Charter of Paris set a broad mandate for the COM to deal with any 
issues relevant to security and cooperation in Europe.  The state 
hosting a COM meeting assumes the chairmanship of CSCE and holds the 
position until the opening of the next ministerial; Italy is the current 
CSCE Chairman-in-Office.



Committee of Senior Officials (CSO).  The Charter of Paris also 
established a subsidiary working group/executive body at the 
ambassadorial/political director level.  The Committee of Senior 
Officials (CSO)-- acting as the agent of the ministers--is charged with 
preparing for meetings of ministers, carrying out their decisions, 
reviewing current issues, and considering future work of the CSCE, 
including its relations with other international organizations.  CSO 
meetings are held at least quarterly.  Several additional meetings have 
been called to deal with the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and 
Nagorno-Karabakh.  The state chairing the COM also heads CSO meetings.



Secretary General.  The Stockholm COM agreed to establish the position 
of Secretary General as the CSCE's chief administrative officer to 
manage CSCE structures and operations, work closely with the Chairman-
in-Office in the preparation and guidance of CSCE meetings, and ensure 
implementation of CSCE decisions.



CSCE Secretariat.  The CSCE Secretariat opened in Prague in February 
1991.  It is charged with administrative support of the COM and CSO; the 
maintenance of archives; and the dissemination of information to the 
public, non-CSCE states, and other international organizations.



Parliamentary Assembly.  Legislators from CSCE states have agreed to 
meet on an annual basis.  The first session was held in Helsinki in July 
1993.  The assembly has a consultative role in the CSCE process.



Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR).  The Office 
for Free Elections (OFE) started operations in April 1991, with a 
general mandate to collect and disseminate information on elections 
within CSCE states.  In 1992, CSCE states agreed to expand the OFE into 
an Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.  In addition to 
its original OFE duties, the office now serves as a central information 
source for all aspects of democratic institution-building and organizes 
seminars on specific topics in this area.  It is responsible for 
organizing periodic meetings to review CSCE human dimension commitments.  
It also supports use of the expanded Human Dimension Mechanism (HDM) and 
the activities of the newly created High Commissioner for National 
Minorities.



High Commissioner on National Minorities.  Acting under CSO aegis  as an 
instrument of conflict prevention, the High Commissioner on National 
Minorities will provide "early warning" and, as appropriate, "early 
action" on tensions involving national minority issues which have the 
potential to affect peace, stability, or relations between participating 
states.



Conflict Prevention Center (CPC).  The first CSCE institution to open--
in Vienna in January 1991--was the Conflict Prevention Center, which is 
charged primarily with overseeing the sharing of data on military forces 
in Europe and hosting annual implementation meetings and those called 
under the Unusual Military Activities mechanism.  The CPC is in charge 
of supporting implementation of the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes 
mechanism.  In February 1993, the CSO approved a plan to have the CPC 
provide operational support for the CSCE's ever-growing diplomatic, 
conflict-prevention, and peace-keeping missions.



Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC).  At the 1992 Helsinki summit, CSCE 
established this forum as the only pan-European forum for security 
dialogue and arms control negotiations.  The Helsinki summit also 
established a program of immediate action which includes development of  
further confidence- and security-building measures, and exchange of 
global military information, cooperation on non-proliferation, and 
cooperation on regional measures.  The FSC convened in September 1992 in 
Vienna and will continue to meet in semi-
permanent session.



Permanent Committee.  Created by the Rome Council in 1993, the Permanent 
Committee is responsible for the day-to-day operational tasks of the 
CSCE.  It conducts comprehensive and regular consultation, and when the 
CSO is not in session it takes decisions on all issues pertinent to the 
CSCE.  It meets in Vienna. 



Fact Sheet:  Confidence- and Security-Building Measures



Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) are designed to 
enhance transparency and increase mutual understanding about military 
forces and activities.  CSBMs foster contacts, cooperation, and 
consultation among participating states through agreed mechanisms for 
sharing and verifying military information.  The flexibility of CSBMs 
makes them especially helpful for building confidence in the new, more 
fluid European security environment.  

Over the past two decades, the array of confidence-building measures has 
expanded steadily.  Within the framework of the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Stockholm Document in 1986 and the 
Vienna Document in 1990 established a politically binding regime of 
CSBMs.  While not explicitly linked to the CSBM regime, nor to various 
European arms control agreements, the Open Skies Treaty, signed in 1992, 
introduced into CSCE detailed procedures for aerial observation and 
established a new framework for contacts, cooperation, and consultation 
among the treaty's participants. 

The present CSBM regime, contained in "Vienna Document 1992,"  was the 
result of negotiations held from November 1990 to March 1992.  CSCE 
members adopted the document on March 4, 1992.  Key provisions include:



--  An annual exchange of military data on personnel and equipment 
holdings, major weapons and equipment systems, and defense budgets;

--  Risk reduction measures including mandatory consultations in the 
case of unusual military activities, cooperation on hazardous military 
incidents, and voluntary visits to dispel concerns about military 
activities;

--  A framework of military-to-military contacts, including air base 
visits, cultural, sporting, and educational contacts, and demonstrations 
of new weapons and equipment following their deployment;

--  The right to observe military activities meeting certain size and 
type thresholds;

--  Provision of an annual calendar forecasting military activities of a 
certain size and type for the following year; 

--  Constraints on the frequency of military activities involving more 
than 40,000 troops or 900 battle tanks;

--  Visits to evaluate and verify data on forces and weapons systems; 
and 

--  An annual implementation assessment meeting held in Vienna to 
discuss the annual exchange of information and other security topics as 
agreed by CSCE members.



A revised version of the Vienna Document, adopted by the Review 
Conference in preparation for the December 1994 CSCE Summit in Budapest, 
further strengthened the CSBM regime.  Notable changes include:



--  A new provision to provide greater transparency in states' defense 
planning, which includes information on states' intentions regarding the 
size, structure, training, and equipment of their armed forces and their 
defense policy, doctrines, and related budgets;

--  Increased opportunities for military-to-military contacts among CSCE 
states, including expanded contacts between members of the armed forces 
at all levels and between military units and exchanges of visits of 
naval vessels and air force units; and

--  Steps to enhance the operation of the CSCE communications network, 
including specifying use of standard operating procedures and 
establishing a communications group that will address issues concerning 
the viability and effectiveness of the network.  

(###)







ARTICLE 2:



GATT:  Fulfilling Responsibilities at Home and Abroad

President Clinton

Remarks at an event at the White House in support of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Washington, DC, November 28, 1994



Thank you very much, Mr. Vice President.  Jim Miller and Jim Baker, 
thank you for your moving and compelling remarks.  Mr. Speaker, Leader 
Michel, Members of the Congress, members of the Cabinet, and to all of 
you who have come here from previous administrations and from different 
walks of life, proving that this GATT agreement not only tears down 
trade barriers, it also bulldozes differences of party, philosophy, and 
ideology:  I thank you all for being here.



We have certainly demonstrated today that there is no partisan pride of 
ownership in the GATT agreement.  It is not a Republican agreement or a 
Democratic one; it is an American agreement, designed to benefit all the 
American people in every region of our country from every walk of life.



Jim Baker spoke so eloquently about how this represents yet another 
historic choice for the United States in the 20th century.  When we 
walked away from our leadership and engagement responsibilities, as we 
did after the First World War, the world paid a terrible price.  When we 
have attempted to lead, as we did after the Second World War, it has not 
only helped the world, it has helped the people of the United States.  
We saw the greatest expansion of the middle class and increase in 
prosperity for working families in our country in the years after we 
tried to put together a system that would preserve peace and security, 
and promote prosperity after World War II.



We have done as much as we could here at home to try to deal with the 
difficult and daunting economic challenges we face--to bring the deficit 
down, to shrink the size of the government, to simultaneously increase 
our investment in education and technology and defense conversion.  But 
we know that without the capacity to expand trade and generate more 
economic opportunities we will, first of all, not be able to fulfill our 
global responsibilities and, secondly, not be able to fulfill our 
responsibilities to the American people.



I would like to address a third argument, if I might, just from my 
heart.  It has been raised against this agreement and raised against 
NAFTA.  Jim Miller adequately disposed of the arguments that GATT is a 
budget buster and that it somehow impinges on our sovereignty, which is 
not true.  And he did a very compelling job of that.  But let me say 
that there is another big argument against this trade agreement that no 
one has advanced today but that is underlying all of this.  I saw it in 
an article the other day--written by a columnist generally sympathetic 
to me.  He said there he goes again with one of his crazy, self-
defeating economic ideas, pushing this GATT agreement, which is one more 
prescription for the demise of the lower-wage working people in America, 
which is the reason the Democratic Party is in the trouble it is in 
today--doing things like this that just kill working people.  

That is a wrong argument.  But it is really the undercurrent against 
GATT.  The idea is that since we live in a global economy and there are 
people in other places who can work for wages we cannot live on, if we 
open our markets to them, they will displace our workers and aggravate 
the most troubling trend in modern American life, which is that the 
wages of non-college-educated male workers in the United States have 
declined by 12% after you take into account inflation over the last 10 
years.



Now, that has great superficial appeal.  Why is it wrong?  It is wrong 
because, number one, if we don't do anything, we will have some 
displacement from foreign competition.  But if we move and lead, we will 
open other markets to our products.  And our nation has gone through a 
wrenching period over the last several years of improving its 
productivity--its ability to compete.  We can now sell and compete 
anywhere.  

When we did NAFTA, they made the same argument.  But what happened?  One 
hundred thousand new jobs this year:  What happened?  A 500% increase in 
exports of American automobiles to Mexico:  What is the biggest 
complaint in Detroit now?  The autoworkers have to work too much 
overtime.  If you think about where we were 10 years ago, that is what, 
at home, we call a high-class problem. 

Now, that is the problem we face in America.  And the resentments of 
people who keep working harder and falling further behind, and feel like 
they have played by the rules and they have gotten the shaft--they will 
play themselves out, these resentments, in election after election after 
election in different and unpredictable ways--just as they did in 1992 
and 1994.  But our responsibility is to do what is right for those 
people over the long run.  The only way to do that is to open other 
markets to American products and services even as we open our markets to 
them.  

Yes, we have to improve the level of lifetime training and education for 
the American work force.  Yes, we have to deal with some of the serious, 
particular problems of the American economy.  But in the end, the 
private sector in this country and the working people of this country 
will do their jobs if they have half a shot at the high-growth areas of 
the world.  Which are the highest-growth areas of the world?  They are 
not the wealthy advanced economies, but Latin America, Asia, and other 
places.  

GATT, along with NAFTA and what we are trying to do with the Asia-
Pacific countries, and what we're going to try to do at the Summit of 
the Americas--this keeps America leading the world in ways that permit 
us to do both things we have to do at the end of the Cold War--to 
continue to be engaged, to continue to lead, to work toward a more 
peaceful, secure, and prosperous world, and, at the same time, to deal 
with the terrible, nagging difficulties that so many millions of 
American families face today.  

There is no other way to deal with this.  There is no easy way out.  
There is no slogan that makes the problems go away.  This will help 
solve the underlying anxiety that millions and millions of Americans 
face--and, I might add, millions of Europeans and millions of Japanese 
and others in advanced economies all around the world--and at the same 
time, make the world a better place and the future more secure for our 
children.  We have to do it now.  We cannot wait until next year.  We do 
not want to litter it up like a Christmas tree and run the risk of 
losing it. 

Every time I talked to a world leader in the last six months, they asked 
me the same thing:  When is the United States going to act on GATT?  The 
rest of the world is looking at us.



We have a golden opportunity here to add $1,700 in income to the average 
family's income in this country over the next few years--to create 
hundreds of thousands of high-wage jobs, to have the biggest global tax 
cut in history, and to fulfill our two responsibilities--our 
responsibility to lead and remain engaged in the world and our 
responsibility to try to help the people here at home get ahead.  We 
need to get on with it and do it now.  Thank you very much.  

(###)







ARTICLE 3:



The Agreed Framework:  Advancing U.S. Interests With North Korea

Robert L. Gallucci, Ambassador-at-Large

Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Washington, DC, December 1, 1994



Mr. Chairman, I welcome this opportunity to discuss our efforts to 
resolve the North Korean nuclear issue.  This is a problem that 
developed over the last decade and that previous administrations have 
worked to resolve.



I have been intimately involved in this issue since June 1993 when the 
Clinton Administration began bilateral discussions with the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in New York.  After on again, off 
again negotiations over the next 15 months, we concluded the October 21, 
1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework in Geneva.  That document represents an 
important step toward resolving our differences with the DPRK.



Today, I would like to discuss: 

1.  The contents of the Agreed Framework and, particularly, what it 
accomplishes; 

2.  Why we, and our close allies in Asia, believe the Agreed Framework 
is an important step in the right direction; and



3.  Steps both sides have taken to begin implementation of the framework 
since it was concluded on October 21.



DPRK Obligations Under the Agreed Framework



Our goal has been to head off the potential threat posed by North 
Korea's nuclear program.  To do so, we have formulated an approach to 
deal with the current nuclear program of the DPRK, the potential future 
growth of that program, and the program's past, specifically, how much 
plutonium did the North produce in the late 1980s.  That approach is 
embodied in the October 21 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework which, in our 
view, addresses these concerns.  Indeed, the Agreed Framework achieves 
more than we and the international community thought possible when the 
U.S. first began talking to North Korea some 18 months ago.



One of our main concerns about the DPRK's current nuclear effort has 
been the disposition of the spent nuclear fuel currently stored in the 
pond at the 5 megawatt (mw) research reactor at Yongbyon.  That fuel 
contains up to 30 kilograms of plutonium.  Our objective was to make 
sure that fuel was not reprocessed, and that the plutonium was not 
separated.  Under the Agreed Framework, the fuel will remain safely 
stored in the pond and will eventually be shipped out of the country.



A second objective was to ensure that no additional plutonium was 
produced, specifically, that the North did not restart its research 
reactor.  Under the Agreed Framework, that reactor will remain shut 
down.



Third, we wanted to make sure that the reprocessing facility--which the 
North calls the radiochemical laboratory--would remain dormant and that 
there would be no reprocessing of fuel from any source.  Under the 
Agreed Framework, that reprocessing facility will be sealed and subject 
to inspection as deemed necessary by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) to confirm that it remains shut down.



As for the future, our concerns focused on two new nuclear reactors 
currently under construction, a 50 mw reactor and a 200 mw reactor.  
Those reactors would have been completed sometime in the next few years.  
Once operational, they would have been able to produce hundreds of 
kilograms of plutonium by the end of this decade.  As a result, the 
North might have produced a substantial stockpile of nuclear weapons and 
could have become an exporter of plutonium to other countries.  Under 
the Agreed Framework, construction of both these facilities is frozen.  
The framework also provides for the eventual dismantlement of these 
reactors, the existing research reactor, the reprocessing plant, and all 
other facilities associated with the North's current fuel cycle.



With regard to past DPRK nuclear activities, our objective has been to 
verify its initial inventory of nuclear material--how much plutonium it 
actually separated.  In other words, we were seeking to answer the 
question:  Was the initial declaration of the DPRK to the IAEA an 
accurate one or did it separate kilogram quantities of plutonium?  The 
IAEA had reason to doubt the DPRK's declaration and requested access to 
two nuclear waste sites which might provide further information.  The 
DPRK refused this request.



Under the terms of the Agreed Framework, the DPRK accepts the 
requirements of the IAEA for full scope safeguards.  It agrees to take 
all steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA to resolve questions 
about its initial inventory.  The implementation of those steps, as you 
know, is not required until later in the settlement process.



What Does the DPRK Get in Return?



In return for DPRK agreement to freeze and eventually dismantle its 
current program and resolve concerns about the past, the United States 
has agreed to lead an international effort to provide the DPRK with 
other sources of energy.  That means more proliferation-resistant light 
water nuclear reactors (LWR) and heavy fuel oil.  The heavy fuel oil is 
a near to mid-term substitute for the DPRK's operating nuclear research 
reactor and the two other reactors which would have been completed over 
the next few years.  These reactors would have provided the DPRK with 
some 255 megawatts of electrical generating capacity.



With respect to the light water reactors, the DPRK, in agreeing to 
completely abandon its gas graphite-moderated reactors and the prospect 
of building them in the future, will receive a light water reactor 
project rated at 2,000 mw, or two 1,000 mw electric light water 
reactors.  These reactors will be provided over some 8-10 years, the 
normal delivery period for reactors of that size.



Under the terms of the Agreed Framework, at a point when there has been 
some substantial investment in the LWR project, the DPRK commits to take 
whatever steps the IAEA requires to resolve past discrepancies in its 
plutonium declaration, including special inspections.  That time will 
come before any nuclear equipment or technology is delivered to the DPRK 
for the LWR project.  After the DPRK is in full compliance, the project 
can proceed.  As key nuclear components for the first reactor are 
delivered, the spent fuel will be shipped out of the DPRK.  
Dismantlement of existing facilities will begin with the completion of 
the first reactor and end with the completion of the second reactor.



Our plan is to establish a multilateral consortium, the Korean Energy 
Development Organization (KEDO), to implement some provisions of the 
Agreed Framework, including the LWR project and heavy oil shipments.  
The United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Japan will play a 
leading role in the consortium.  The ROK will also play a central role 
in financing and construction of the LWR project.  KEDO's structure will 
provide for broader international participation.  We have made good 
progress in discussions with the ROK and Japan on establishing KEDO and 
plan to meet again in December to continue our consultations.



Finally, under the terms of the Agreed Framework, the United States and 
North Korea agreed to take initial steps toward a more normal political 
and economic relationship.  Those steps include reducing some barriers 
to trade and investment within three months and moving toward the 
establishment of liaison offices in each other's capital.  Let me 
emphasize these are initial steps.  Further steps will only occur as 
progress is made on issues of concern to both sides.



Assessing the Agreed Framework



Mr. Chairman, any reasonable assessment of the Agreed Framework must 
balance what it achieves with the steps we have to take to secure our 
objectives.  Our view, and I might add the view of our close allies--
Japan and the Republic of Korea--is that the Agreed Framework is an 
important step toward resolving the North Korea nuclear issue.  It is 
also the best vehicle to resolve other problems which separate North 
Korea and the international community.



We arrived at this conclusion for two reasons.  First, the framework 
provides for a solution which goes beyond the requirements of existing 
international non-proliferation obligations.  Under the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), North Korea would be allowed to keep its 
existing gas graphite reactors and to accumulate stock-piles of 
plutonium, albeit under IAEA safeguards.  Under the Agreed Framework, 
North Korea must freeze and dismantle its existing nuclear facilities.  
The DPRK will not separate any additional plutonium and eventually will 
ship out existing nuclear material.  We have promised to lead an 
international consortium to provide other sources of energy--including 
more proliferation resistant reactors--only because the DPRK will take 
these far-
reaching steps.



Quite frankly, we would have preferred that, as a first step in this 
process, the DPRK resolve international concerns about its past 
activities by allowing IAEA special inspections.  We recognize the 
potential dangers posed by the less than 10 kilograms of plutonium the 
North may have produced in the past and the political importance of 
special inspections.  However, there were clearly more pressing 
priorities:  preventing the DPRK from reprocessing the spent fuel rods 
in its storage pond, and from producing any additional spent fuel from 
its reactors.  We decided that these problems had to be dealt with in 
the near-term, particularly since it is a scientific fact that 
information at the suspected waste sites is not perishable.



Second, our interests in Northeast Asia, those of our close allies, and 
those of other Pacific Rim states would be best served by increasing 
stability and fostering economic growth.  The Agreed Framework may make 
it possible--and I want to emphasize possible--to gradually open the way 
for all countries in the region to establish more normal political and 
economic relationships.  That would serve everyone's broader interests 
in regional stability and prosperity.  I would like to note in this 
context that steps toward improving North-South relations, as specified 
in the Agreed Framework, will be an important factor, both in resolving 
the nuclear issue and in serving these broader goals.



This path will be a difficult one to follow.  There is still much about 
North Korean behavior outside the nuclear area that should concern us.  
Indeed, as I have repeatedly emphasized, our "broad and thorough" 
approach to resolving this issue requires that we continue to address 
those issues of concern.  The two most prominent examples are North 
Korea's ballistic missile activities and its threatening conventional 
force deployments.  The fact that the Geneva agreement focused on 
nuclear matters should not be taken to mean that we are not concerned 
with North Korean behavior in these areas.  Indeed, it is our view that 
we can only get at these other important issues through engagement with 
the North Koreans and implementation of the commitments undertaken in 
Geneva.



In any event, our close ties with the Republic of Korea are and will 
remain firm.  That relationship is built on a security alliance of four 
decades, on increasingly close and dynamic economic ties, and on growing 
cooperation on important international issues.



While the framework may be in our interest, we entered into this 
agreement without any uncertainty about past North Korean behavior.  The 
Agreed Framework is not based on trust.  IAEA officials are already on 
the ground in North Korea to verify that the program remains frozen.  
Additional IAEA measures to monitor the freeze are under discussion with 
the DPRK.  Also, the United States has its own national technical means 
for monitoring the DPRK's nuclear facilities.  Finally, we have 
structured the Agreed Framework so that we can withhold cooperation at 
any point we determine the DPRK is not meeting its obligations.  If the 
DPRK reneges on the deal, it will have gained little that is not 
reversible save some fuel shipments that represent only a fraction of 
its energy requirements.



Implementation of the Agreed Framework



The best indicator of North Korea's intentions will be how it implements 
this agreement.  Our past experience has taught us to be extremely 
cautious.  This agreement, in particular, will require a long and 
potentially complicated process of implementation.  So far, 
implementation of the framework has proceeded without difficulty in a 
number of key areas:



--  Nuclear freeze.  The DPRK has ceased construction at its important 
nuclear facilities.  We understand that recent discussions between the 
IAEA and the DPRK on enacting additional measures to monitor the freeze 
went well.  We expect another meeting to occur at the beginning of next 
year.  In the meantime, IAEA inspectors remain on the ground at Yongbyon 
to monitor North Korean activities.



--  Spent fuel storage.  The United States is prepared to provide the 
DPRK with technical assistance in safely storing its spent fuel in a 
manner consistent with eventual shipment to another country.  We held 
productive technical discussions in Pyongyang from November 14 to 18.  
During those discussions, our experts visited the Yongbyon nuclear 
facility, specifically the 5 mw reactor and spent fuel storage pond.  We 
expect another round of talks in mid-December.



--  Alternate energy.  We are nearing final arrangements for the first 
shipment of heavy fuel oil--50,000 metric tons--to North Korea by 
January 21, 1995, the time period specified in the Agreed Framework.  
While the U.S. will be funding that shipment, the burden of future 
shipments will be borne by the international consortium.



--  LWR contract talks.  Under the Agreed Framework, the DPRK and KEDO 
are required to reach agreement on a LWR supply contract by April 1995.  
We will begin those discussions with the DPRK and then hand them over to 
KEDO once that organization is established.  An initial administrative 
meeting is now underway in Beijing.



Establishing liaison office.  Following up on our September experts 
meeting in Pyongyang, we will be holding a second meeting with DPRK 
experts from December 6-9 in Washington, DC.  The two sides will discuss 
consular and technical issues involved in setting up liaison offices.  
We will also brief the DPRK on initial steps we will take to begin 
lifting restrictions on normal commercial relations between our two 
countries.



Conclusion



Mr. Chairman, in closing, I would like to emphasize that the October 21 
Agreed Framework is based on a hard-headed assessment of our own 
security interests, close consultations with our regional allies--
particularly Japan and South Korea--and a realistic view of North Korea.



The Agreed Framework is a deal that advances our interests.  It requires 
North Korea to take steps which go beyond existing international 
nonproliferation obligations to resolve the nuclear issue.  That is why 
we are willing to lead an international effort to provide the DPRK with 
energy sources.   The Agreed Framework may also open the way to 
addressing other issues separating North Korea from the international 
community.  Let me say once more that this framework is not based on 
trust.  The DPRK has agreed to allow the IAEA to monitor the freeze on 
its facilities and we have the added assurance of our own national 
technical means.  Finally, the framework is structured so that both 
sides must move down the road to implementation simultaneously.



We understand that there is a long road ahead of us as we implement this 
framework.  We look forward to working closely with Congress in the days 
ahead.  

(###)







ARTICLE 4

The Americas in the 21st Century:  The U.S.-Brazilian Relationship

Alexander F. Watson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs

Address before the Brazil-American Chamber of Commerce, New York City, 
November 22, 1994



Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.  I have just arrived from Brazil 
this morning; therefore, I am particularly pleased to be here to discuss 
the future of U.S.-Brazilian relations.  It is always a pleasure to talk 
about Brazil because of the richness and variety of the country and the 
warmth of the Brazilian people.  I have a personal fondness for Brazil 
since I spent six years of my life there--I served in Bahia and 
Brasilia--and my daughter-in-law is Brazilian.



I am particularly fond of a characterization of Brazil from the last 
century, which remains valid today.  In his 1869 Explorations of the 
Highlands of Brazil, Richard Burton commented that 

Hospitality is the greatest delay in Brazilian travel.  It is the old 
style of Colonial greeting; you may do what you like; you may stay for a 
month, but not for a day.



That's how I feel every time I visit Brazil.



Before we turn specifically to Brazil and the U.S., however, I believe 
it is important to consider the global and hemispheric context that 
frames U.S.-Brazilian relations.



In today's world, with its sophisticated and far-reaching 
communications, no individual country or bilateral relationship is 
immune from world developments.  And world affairs today, more than ever 
before, are characterized by rapid change.  In the multi- polar, 
interconnected world, new ideas and influences penetrate countries and 
decision-makers and influence relationships instantly--sometimes 
dramatically and sometimes almost imperceptibly.



The challenge for democratic leaders is to channel change in ways which 
maintain and reinforce our national ideals.  This effort to steer change 
in a positive direction is reflected in our own policies and how we 
manage our international relationships.  High-level activism in support 
of our foreign policy objectives is the norm.  President Clinton, 
recently returned from the Middle East and the APEC summit in Jakarta, 
will soon visit Hungary and will host the Miami Summit of the Americas 
in December.



To celebrate the ascendance of democracy and economic reform in the 
Americas, President Clinton has invited the elected leaders of the 
Western Hemisphere to a summit meeting in Miami on December 9-11.  The 
Summit of the Americas will be the largest gathering of Western 
Hemisphere leaders in history and the first such meeting in almost three 
decades.  It will be a testimony to the democratic revolution which has 
taken place in Latin America and the Caribbean.  But the summit will not 
be just a celebration of past events; it will also look to the future.



The summit will represent our future commitment to strengthening 
democracy, respect for human rights, economic integration led by free 
trade, sustainable development, stewardship of the environment, and good 
governance.  It will also deal with the struggles against corruption and 
narcotics and measures aimed at eradicating poverty--such as ensuring 
equitable access to basic health services and universal access to 
quality primary education.  A broad range of other issues will be 
treated, ranging from capital-markets liberalization to developing a 
hemispheric information infrastructure.  Emerging from these discussions 
will be agreement on a set of principles and a future plan of action for 
the hemisphere.



In essence, the summit will represent a pledge to work with the 
countries of the region to create a better future.  As President Clinton 
has said, the summit will be a unique opportunity to build a community 
of free nations, diverse in culture and history, but bound together by a 
commitment to responsive and free government, vibrant civil societies, 
open economies and rising standards of living for all our people.



The U.S. approach to the hemisphere is consistent with developments in 
Latin America and the Caribbean.  While events in the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe have caught the world's attention and 
imagination in recent years, another part of the world--Latin America 
and the Caribbean--was already well on the road to democracy and 
economic reform.  Although seemingly less dramatic than throwing off 
communism, these developments were equally compelling.



The people of Latin America were ahead of the times.  They understood 
that only democratic government is sufficiently flexible, strong, and 
supple to accommodate rapid change in policies without destroying 
institutions and basic freedoms.  And they recognized that only open 
economies can produce growth and better opportunities for citizens.



The importance of democracy to the region cannot be overemphasized.  It 
is generally recognized throughout our hemisphere that democracy is the 
indispensable condition for peoples and countries to realize their 
personal and national potential.  Democracy brings the freedoms and 
fundamental human rights that undergird economic, social, and further 
political development.  Only one nation in the hemisphere--Cuba--
continues to reject democracy.  And we see the results vividly in 
political repression, economic deprivation, and human suffering.



Not surprisingly, the strengthening of democracy in Latin America and 
the Caribbean has been accompanied by correspondingly dramatic economic 
liberalization.  Brazil is a case in point which I will treat later in 
my presentation.  But there are other examples.  In Argentina, the 
"convertibility plan" renewed economic policy credibility through a 
fixed exchange-rate regime that has drastically cut inflation to the 
current yearly rate of 3.4%.  The plan has fostered a stable investment 
climate and a return to sustained growth.



El Salvador's economic reform program includes elimination of price 
controls, breaking up government monopolies in coffee and sugar exports, 
reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers, and adopting a free-market 
exchange-rate system.  The Government of Trinidad and Tobago has moved 
decisively to transform its state-controlled economy to a market-driven 
one.  Jamaica, similarly, is opening its economy by proceeding with 
plans to reduce public-sector operations by privatizing public entities.



The region as a whole has matched its democratic transformation with a 
dramatic shift from trade-restricting import substitution to a free-
trade, export-driven model.  This shift toward more open markets has 
energized the growth of trade within the region--including with the 
United States.  U.S. exports to Latin America and the Caribbean have 
grown at an average annual rate of 12% from 1989 to 1993 and hit $78 
billion in 1993.  That is more than the U.S. exported to Japan and 
almost as much as our exports to all the developing countries of Asia 
combined.



Brazil



Now, I would like to examine briefly our relationship with Brazil in 
this promising global and hemispheric context.



Brazil is, by key measures--GDP, population, territory, and its activism 
in the international arena--the dominant country in South America.  It 
is the world's fifth-largest state, with a territory larger than the 
continental U.S. and a population of over 150 million, and it is the 
tenth-largest economy, with a GDP of $467 billion in 1993.  To get a 
sense of the scale of the Brazilian economy, it is worth noting that the 
state of Sao Paulo's GDP is greater than Argentina's, and the state of 
Rio de Janeiro's GDP exceeds that of Chile.



Our exports to Brazil grew at an average annual rate of 6% from 1989 to 
1993.  In the first seven months of 1994, our exports grew at an even 
faster pace, with an increase of 22% over the same period in 1993.  
Brazil is host to over $16 billion in U.S. foreign investment, more than 
any other country in Latin America and the Caribbean.



The U.S. and Brazil share many attributes.  We are countries of 
immigrants from many different lands yet we are at peace with our 
neighbors.  We have diverse cultures and history but are bound together 
by a commitment to freedom and improving the lives of our citizens.  We 
share the desire to invigorate our societies and increase opportunity 
for all.  We are proud of our sovereignty and national identity but are 
open to the world.



The U.S. and Brazil:  A Strong Working Relationship



One often hears about the disagreements that characterize U.S. relations 
with Brazil rather than our extensive cooperation.  This perspective may 
stem from the propensity of analysts to focus on the negative.  I have 
spent a good portion of my career working in U.S.-Brazil relations.  
Although there is an ebb and flow, relations have always been good, and 
now we are in an especially constructive period.



I think it is crucial to keep in mind that the U.S. and Brazil share a 
basic approach to the world and world problems.  In the first instance, 
we have a common political system--democracy--and both nations subscribe 
to the fundamental structures of the international system.  We are both 
members of the UN, the GATT, the OAS, the IMF, and the other fundamental 
international institutions.  We both believe in security and stability 
for nations and that governments should foster prosperity for their 
people.  To those ends, we work together in multilateral forums to 
resolve disputes peacefully and to build confidence among states.



When our two nations disagree, it is usually about emphasis rather than 
about the fundamental approach to an issue; it is a tactical difference 
rather than strategic disagreement.  The debates reflect competition 
within the broad system to which we both subscribe and are about means 
rather than ends.  They are not disputes that threaten the relationship.



Because we increasingly recognize the commonality of our objectives, 
U.S.-
Brazilian relations are characterized by a strong working relationship.



Let me here pay a special tribute to President Itamar Franco.  As Vice 
President Gore told him during our March visit to Brasilia, the U.S. 
greatly appreciates President Franco's steadfast and successful effort 
to strengthen Brazilian democracy during a particularly difficult 
period.  In addition, he has maintained the conditions for economic 
reform and injected a new sense of national confidence and pride in 
Brazil.  Under President Franco's leadership, Brazil has pursued a 
policy of active international cooperation, including with the United 
States.  President Franco's success was amply demonstrated by the 
victory in the October 3 presidential election of one of his ministers, 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso.



Our shared commitment to democracy and free-market economics has enabled 
the U.S. and Brazil to work together constructively on a broad range of 
issues.  At the UN, we have both sought the best path for the 
restoration of democracy in Haiti and the solution to the problems in 
Mozambique and Angola.  In the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, we 
negotiated together to create a more open trading system.



Through multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, the U.S. and 
Brazil are cooperating on implementation of key environmental projects 
such as the program to conserve the Brazilian rain forest.  Other areas 
of cooperation include climate research; development of satellite 
imagery to monitor deforestation; projects on forest fire prevention and 
management; training courses on hazardous wastes, pesticides, and toxic 
substances; and workshops on carbon emissions.



We also have worked closely with the Franco government on nuclear non-
proliferation issues, including in connection with Brazil's adoption of 
International Atomic Energy Agency--IAEA--full-scope nuclear safeguards 
and Brazil's quadripartite agreement with the IAEA and Argentina on 
inspection and control of nuclear facilities.  We were very pleased that 
Brazil waived into force the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which bans nuclear 
weapons in the Western Hemisphere--a major accomplishment.



In another significant contribution to global security, Brazil has 
expressed interest in joining the Missile Technology Control Regime--
MTCR--and has agreed to abide by MTCR guidelines.  We continue to 
cooperate with Brazil in this important effort.



Economic and Trade Cooperation



Our two countries have also cooperated closely on a broad range of 
economic and trade issues.



Since 1990, Brazil has opened its markets substantially by sharply 
lowering its tariffs and eliminating quotas on imports.  These measures 
have spurred substantial growth in our bilateral trade--in the first 
half of 1994 our exports to Brazil rose 22% and Brazilian exports to the 
U.S. jumped 20%.



The U.S. Government has actively and consistently supported Brazil's 
efforts to normalize its relations with the international financial 
community.  Most recently, to ensure the viability of Brazil's April 
1994 "Brady-like" debt deal with foreign commercial banks, the U.S. took 
the unusual step of filing an amicus brief in New York District Court, 
noting that the arrangement was consistent with U.S. interests in 
stabilizing international financial markets.



We have worked with Brazil on trade issues such as lowering tariffs, 
eliminating import quotas, and ending the market reserve in informatics.  
Together, we negotiated and resolved our differences on intellectual 
property protection, and we look forward to the approval of implementing 
legislation by the Brazilian congress.  These accomplishments show how 
we can work together to achieve our common goals.



As the U.S. pursued economic integration through NAFTA, Brazil worked 
with its Southern Cone neighbors to form the Southern Common Market 
(Mercosul).  Even though NAFTA and Mercosul are different in many 
respects, both are dedicated to expanding free trade.  We look forward 
to working with Brazil to bring our respective trade initiatives closer 
together.



Cooperation in Other Areas



In addition to our cooperation on political and economic issues, we have 
made significant progress in other fields.



We are energetically implementing our bilateral science and technology 
agreement and are cooperating in a number of areas, including 
environmental protection, medical research, and space cooperation.



We are working closely with Brazil on environmental cooperation.  Some 
examples include USAID's Global Climate Change Program, which works with 
Brazil to reduce global emission of greenhouse gases by reducing 
deforestation in Brazil's Amazonian states.  The U.S. Forest Service has 
initiated cooperative programs with key Brazilian institutions to 
monitor deforestation and biodiversity, including one with the Brazilian 
Institute for the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources on fire 
prevention and management.



The U.S. and Brazil have a long history of cooperation on medical 
research as well.  A U.S. Army Medical Research Unit works with its 
Brazilian counterparts to minimize global medical threats through basic 
and applied research on diseases endemic to South America.  Special 
emphasis is directed to malaria, hepatitis, leishmaniasis, and dengue 
and other arboviral diseases.



On space cooperation, NASA recently completed a sounding rocket campaign 
from Brazil's Alcantara launch facilities as part of an international 
scientific experiment to measure the earth's magnetic equator.  The U.S. 
looks forward to future cooperation with Brazil in the exciting field of 
space science.



On the anti-narcotics front, President Franco declared 1993 as the "year 
to fight narcotics."  Brazilian authorities have created a new anti-drug 
secretariat, a new permanent congressional committee on narcotics, and 
approved construction of the Amazon surveillance radar system (SIVAM)-- 
all of which contribute to our bilateral cooperation on this crucial 
issue.  Incidentally, we are pleased that the Raytheon Corporation--from 
my home state of Massachusetts--won the contract to construct SIVAM--the 
largest commercial contract for a U.S. firm in Brazil in many years.



In sum, the U.S. and Brazil have strengthened cooperation across the 
board by successfully addressing issues in many areas of mutual 
interest.



Continued Close Cooperation



We have very good reason, then, to be optimistic about our future 
relations with Brazil.  In this regard, we believe it is useful to look 
at our bilateral relations today as part of a historical continuum and 
of the broad, positive trends at work in the Western Hemisphere and the 
world.



We will build on the progress we have achieved over the past few years.  
The Summit of the Americas will give a major boost to our work.  We 
anticipate a healthy, dynamic relationship in which we maximize our 
areas of agreement.



President-elect Cardoso already has made clear that the first few months 
of his presidency will focus on securing Brazil's economic future.  If 
Dr. Cardoso can keep inflation low and his program on track, Brazil 
should enjoy continued growth and should attract long-term investment.



On the trade side, Brazil has pledged to strengthen patent, trade-
secret, and trademark protection.  Legislation now before Brazil's 
congress will represent an important step forward in this regard.  These 
measures and adequate enforcement of international conventions and 
Brazil's copyright law will provide new momentum in our trade 
relationship.



I cannot end my remarks without talking about some areas in which we are 
seeking further cooperation.  For instance, we would like to see Brazil 
continue its market-opening strategy by reducing investment restrictions 
in communications, mining, petroleum, health care services, 
construction, and financial services.  Brazil could also reduce limits 
on the entry of new foreign banks and cut restrictions on established 
foreign-owned banks, such as prohibitions on increasing capital and 
adding branches.



A concern for the U.S. is new "Buy Brazil" legislation stipulating very 
stringent price, technical, and local content requirements.  This would 
deny huge sales opportunities to U.S. telecommunications equipment, 
computer, and digital electronics firms that do not produce in Brazil.  
Although Brazil claims its restrictions mirror "Buy America" provisions, 
they cover a far larger share of Brazil's telecom market and create far 
more distortions.  This is one area which will require our careful 
attention.



Conclusion



I hope it is clear from these remarks that the U.S. and Brazil have--and 
will continue to have in the future--a full, rich relationship marked by 
cooperation and mutual respect.



We are fundamentally optimistic about the direction of that 
relationship.  I can say this with confidence because Brazil and the 
U.S. share similar views of where the world and this hemisphere are 
headed.  Those common perceptions will lead to converging objectives.



It is, in my view, particularly important that we achieve this result in 
international trade.  Our joint interest--as the two largest economies 
in the region--in fostering a freer, more open international trading 
system will result in greater prosperity for both nations.  The Summit 
of the Americas offers us a truly historic opportunity to launch this 
process vigorously.  We must not miss it.



Together, the U.S. and Brazil can contribute dynamic leadership to help 
secure a more democratic, prosperous, and secure world for our citizens.  

(###)







ARTICLE 5:



Treaty Actions

Multilateral



Arbitration

Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards.  Done at New York June 10, 1958.  Entered into force June 7, 
1959; for the U.S. Dec. 29, 1970.  TIAS 6997; 21 UST 2517.

Accession:  Mali, Sept. 8, 1994.



Chemical Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development, 
production,stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and on their 
destruction, with annexes.  Done at Paris Jan. 13, 19931.  [Senate] 
Treaty Doc. 103-21.

Ratifications:  Australia, May 6, 1994; Bulgaria, Aug. 10, 1994; Cook 
Islands, July 15, 1994; Germany, Aug. 12, 1994; Maldives, May 31, 1994; 
Mexico, Aug. 29, 1994; Sri Lanka, Aug. 19, 1994.



Patents

International convention for the protection of new varieties of plants 
of Dec. 2, 1961, as revised.  Done at Geneva Oct. 23, 1978.  Entered 
into force Nov. 8, 1981.  TIAS 10199; 33 UST 2703.

Accession:  Uruguay, Oct. 13, 1994.



Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations.  Done at Washington June 
19, 1970.  Entered into force Jan. 24, 1978.  TIAS 8733; 28 UST 7645.

Accession:  Uganda, Nov. 9, 1994.



Property 
Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization.  
Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967.  Entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for 
the U.S. Aug. 25, 1970.  TIAS 6932; 21 UST 1749.

Accession:  Lao People's Democratic Republic, Oct. 17, 1994.



Bilateral



Bangladesh

Project grant agreement for the Agrobased Industries and Technology 
Development Project (ATDP).  Signed at Dhaka Sept. 28, 1994.    Entered 
into force Sept. 28, 1994.



Cambodia

Economic, technical, and related assistance agreement.  Signed at Phnom 
Penh Oct. 25, 1994.  Entered into force Oct. 25, 1994.



International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations.  Signed 
at Phnom Penh and Washington Apr. 27 and Oct. 28, 1994.  Enters into 
force Jan. 1, 1995.



Egypt 
Memorandum of understanding concerning scientific and technical 
cooperation in the earth sciences, with annexes.  Signed at Reston and 
Cairo Aug. 26 and Sept. 26, 1994.  Entered into force Sept. 26, 1994. 

Germany 
Agreement on cooperation in research in the geosciences, with annex.  
Signed at Bonn Mar. 7, 1994.  Entered into force Mar. 7, 1994. 


Hungary 
Agreement on intellectual property, with protocol and exchanges of 
letters.  Signed at Washington Sept. 24, 1993.  Entered into force Nov. 
9, 1994.



Israel

Convention with respect to taxes on income.  Signed at Washington Nov. 
20, 1975.



Protocol amending the convention with respect to taxes on income signed 
at Washington on Nov. 20, 1975, with exchanges of notes.  Signed at 
Washington May 30, 1989. 


Second protocol amending the convention with respect to taxes on income 
of Nov. 20, 1975, as amended, with exchange of notes.  Signed at 
Jerusalem Jan. 26, 1993.  Entered into force Dec. 30, 1994.



Jordan 
Agreement regarding the reduction of certain debts related to foreign 
assistance owed to the Government of the United States, with annexes.  
Signed at Amman Sept. 29, 1994.  Entered into force Sept. 29, 1994.



Russian Federation

Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts 
owed to or guaranteed by the United States Government, with annexes.  
Signed at Moscow Oct. 25, 1994.  Enters into force following signature 
and receipt by Russian Federation of written notice from U.S. that all 
necessary U.S. domestic legal requirements have been fulfilled. 


Ukraine

Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official 
government employees.  Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Nov. 
21, 1994.  Entered into force Nov. 21, 1994.



1  Not in force.



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END OF DISPATCH VOL 5, NO. 50