1.  Ukraine's Future and the Future of Europe--Deputy Secretary Talbott  
2.  Fact Sheet:  U.S. Assistance to Ukraine 
3.  U.S. Support for UN Security Council Resolutions Concerning Bosnia--
Madeleine K. Albright, UN Security Council Resolutions 
4.  UN Security Council Establishes International Tribunal For Rwanda--
Madeleine K. Albright, UN Security Council Resolution  
5.  Treaty Actions 
Ukraine's Future and the Future of Europe 
Deputy Secretary Talbott 
Address before the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
Washington, DC, November 18, 1994 
Thank you, Bill [Maynes], both for the kind introduction and for the 
hospitality of the Carnegie Endowment.  For reasons Bill has made clear, 
I have a strong sentimental attachment to the endowment.  I can't 
imagine a better forum--and a better assemblage of friends and 
colleagues.  I cannot help but call special attention to the presence of 
two Carnegie senior associates:  Anders Aslund, who is now serving as an 
economic adviser to the Kuchma Government, and Sherm Garnett, who has, 
under Carnegie's auspices, been doing important work--both here and in 
Kiev--on developments in Ukrainian foreign policy and Russian-Ukrainian 
My topic this afternoon is Ukraine's vital role in the transformation of 
Europe, and America's equally vital role in helping Ukraine to become a 
stable, secure, independent, democratic, and prosperous state.  Let me 
repeat those adjectives, because they summarize both the aspirations of 
the Ukrainian people and the objectives of American policy: stable, 
secure, independent, democratic, and prosperous.  President Clinton and 
Secretary Christopher believe--and I hope Anders and Sherm agree--that 
with each passing month, our hopes for a Ukraine that meets that 
description are moving closer to becoming a reality. 
When President Kuchma meets President Clinton on Tuesday, it will, 
auspiciously, be the anniversary of a memorable date in the history of 
the Ukrainian quest for independence.  In 1917, after the collapse of 
the tsarist regime in Russia, the people of Ukraine established, for the 
first time in their long history, a truly representative governing body, 
which they called the Central Rada.  And 77 years ago next Tuesday, on 
November 22, 1917, the Central Rada declared, for the first time in 
history, the establishment of an autonomous Ukrainian Republic.  This 
was a major stepping stone toward full independence two months later. 
Therefore, Tuesday's event offers an appropriate opportunity to reflect 
a bit on the legacy of Mykhaylo Hrushevsky, the great scholar of 
Ukrainian history and President of that first Rada.  Hrushevsky, whom 
many Ukrainians regard as one of the founding fathers of their country, 
is said to have been both a romantic and a pragmatist.  This is a 
combination of designations that rather appeals to me, having often been 
ac-cused of being the former and having long aspired to being the 
latter.  Hrushevsky's love and knowledge of Ukrainian language, 
literature, and history was unrivaled.  But he also understood 
geography; he pondered the consequences of Ukraine's location, putting 
it "at the center of the vast plains that join Central Europe to Central 
To Hrushevsky, that place on the map meant that a Ukrainian Republic 
could never survive as a narrowly, exclusively ethnic state; that it 
would flourish only if it embraced all the people--Russians, Jews, 
Poles, Georgians, Armenians, and all the rest-- within its boundaries. 
To Hrushevsky, geography meant that Ukraine would always have to work 
hard to get along with its diverse neighbors, notably including the very 
large one to the north.  Invasions, civil war, and Bolshevism put an end 
to Hrushevsky's presidency and to the first Ukrainian Republic.  But the 
reasons for such a republic to exist endured over the next 70 years. 
So did the yearning of the people of Ukraine for freedom and 
Hrushevsky's dream that they might find that freedom in a state and a 
society that were tolerant and inclusive.  Now they have another chance.  
We and much of the rest of the world are determined to do everything in 
our power to see to it that, this time, Ukraine does not just survive 
but that it thrives.  We undertake that task not just for the sake of 
the Ukrainian people but also so that they will become a model for the 
other new multi-ethnic states that have finally been liberated from 
Stalin's prison-house of nations. 
Next Monday, we will be welcoming to Washington the leader of a country 
that has, in three short but eventful years, already come a very long 
way and that is now moving in the right direction.  Not only has Ukraine 
emerged from the Soviet Union, it has moved back from the brink of an 
abyss, from the potential catastrophe of post-independence meltdown. 
In Ukraine, as in the United States, as in most places, the promise of 
economic growth can go a long way toward reducing social, regional, and 
ethnic tensions and thus toward encouraging a sense of national 
solidarity, which, of course, is especially important in a new 
independent state.  It is useful in this connection to recall how, and 
why, Ukraine chose independence in the first place, almost exactly three 
years ago. 
In the first instance, of course, it had to do with the intense struggle 
of the people of Ukraine for statehood; it had to do with a 
determination to cast off the yoke of Soviet domination, but also--if 
you'll pardon me--the economy, stupid. 
What I mean is this:  One major reason that more than 90% of the 
Ukrainian electorate voted for independence in December of 1991 was that 
the different sectors of the Ukrainian population--farmers and eastern 
factory workers, Ukrainians, Russians, and Poles--all believed that they 
were more likely to be able to give their families a better future if 
they were governed from Kiev rather than from Moscow.  The referendum 
endorsing the idea of a sovereign Ukrainian state was in part a vote of 
confidence in the proposition that a democratic government closer to 
home would be more responsive to their basic economic needs. 
However, even after Ukraine broke free from the Soviet Union, it did not 
immediately liberate itself from the legacy of the Soviet communist 
system, from the institutions and patterns of governance that had been 
so deeply ingrained during all those years of Soviet rule.   
What followed the breakup of the U.S.S.R., therefore, was not just the 
miracle of hard-won, much-deserved independence but also a period of 
some indecisiveness.  As a consequence, there was widespread 
disillusionment and disappointment.   
As the euphoria of independence gave way to the reality of economic 
woes, particularly the evaporating value of the currency, a national 
sense of purpose gave way to doubts and divisions.  In a very real 
sense, Ukraine was not completely independent, since it was living under 
the cruel tyranny of hyperinflation.  In August of 1993, the black 
market rate of the Ukrainian coupon was depreciating at a rate of 7% a 
day against the dollar.  Annual inflation in 1993 was over 10,000%.  In 
large part because of this disastrous economic situation, the rifts 
inside Ukraine were widening. 
Ukraine's many friends around the world feared that the greatest 
jeopardy to Ukraine's independence and sovereignty came not from beyond 
its borders but from within.  Many Ukrainians saw the danger too.  Back 
when he was Prime Minister in the Kravchuk Administration in the spring 
of 1993, Mr. Kuchma warned that "essentially [the threat to the survival 
of Ukraine] all comes down to one thing--the ravaged economy." 
To their credit, a number of tough-minded, far-sighted Ukrainian 
officials have confronted the challenge head-on.  Beginning in January 
1994, the president of Ukraine's national bank, Viktor Yushenko, brought 
Ukraine out of hyperinflation by tightening monetary policy.  And a 
little more than five weeks ago, on October 11, President Kuchma 
unveiled a comprehensive package of economic reforms. 
This package was developed in part by a new generation of Ukrainian 
economists led by Roman Shpek, Serhei Ossyka, and Ihor Mityukov.  It 
sets ambitious goals in the areas of price and currency liberalization, 
deficit reduction, tight monetary policy, land reform, and mass 
privatization.  At a watershed meeting of the G-7 in Winnipeg on October 
27--with President Kuchma in attendance--Michel Camdessus, managing 
director of the IMF, characterized this new Ukrainian approach as "a 
fundamental break with the past" and noted that "it is anchored on a 
strong, comprehensive, and coherent program."   
If it succeeds, the Ukrainian reform effort will give the people of 
Ukraine--from Donetsk to Simferopol to Lviv--an opportunity for a 
brighter future, and they will, therefore, share a common stake in 
reform and a common interest in preserving the unity of the Ukrainian 
state.  For Ukraine to grow and prosper in that way is in the vital, 
common interests of its own people, but it is in our vital interests, 
too.  Let me explain why that is true.   
Ukraine is a linchpin of the new, post-Cold War Europe.  If Ukraine 
successfully makes the transition from its Soviet past, other states in 
the region embarked on that same path--in Central Europe, in Russia, and 
elsewhere in the former U.S.S.R.--are more likely to succeed. 
Conversely, if Ukraine slips backward or falls into instability, it 
could drag much of the region with it.  We can, and must, help make sure 
that doesn't happen.  As part of their reform effort, Ukrainians will 
have to endure the pain of price increases, the specter of unemployment 
and bankruptcies, and a strained social safety net. 
They must not be left to face these struggles alone.  As Mr. Camdessus 
put it in Winnipeg:  The Ukrainian Government's new approach will 
provide the breakthrough we have all been looking for only if it is 
implemented steadfastly, and only if it is supported by strong 
cooperation--especially financial assistance--from the international 
The Clinton Administration has, since soon after it came into office, 
urged the Ukrainian Government to launch the necessary economic reforms.  
We simultaneously promoted support for the Ukrainian economy among our 
G-7 partners.  At the July G-7 summit in Naples, President Clinton 
spurred agreement on a $4-billion assistance package for Ukraine.  At 
Winnipeg, our Administration pledged to provide up to $100 million in 
balance-of-payments support for Ukraine over the next several months to 
help meet food and energy needs for this winter.  
This balance-of-payments pledge is truly a one-of-a-kind measure.  We 
have not done this for any other new independent state.  We have also 
allocated $350 million in FREEDOM Support Act assistance to Ukraine, 
primarily to help with privatization and the start of new businesses.  
Representatives of Russia and Turkmenistan came to Winnipeg, too, and we 
are pleased to see that those two countries are cooperating with Kiev on 
rescheduling Ukraine's energy debt. 
Now President Clinton is redoubling his efforts to convince the European 
Union and Japan to step up their own financial support for Ukrainian 
reform.  By working together with the international community, we will 
help Ukraine to gain much-needed breathing room as it tackles the 
challenges of building a market economy. 
Let me now address another key area:  security.  As Hrushevsky himself 
often pointed out, the word "Ukraine" originally meant "frontier."  For 
their entire history, the people of Ukraine have lived with the kind of 
danger that so often comes with life on a frontier.  In the past 
millennium, their lands have been overrun and ravaged by foreign 
The Clinton Administration recognizes that Ukraine still has real 
security concerns.  We will continue to work hard to address those 
concerns in our own policy toward Ukraine and the region as a whole, so 
as to create an environment--a neighborhood--in which Ukraine stands the 
best possible chance of developing as a sovereign, secure, and 
prosperous state within its current borders. 
Clearly, good relations between Ukraine and Russia are a key factor in 
the stability and security of the neighborhood.  No one understands that 
better than Leonid Kuchma and Boris Yeltsin.  But Bill Clinton 
understands that interaction, too.  Our own policy toward both countries 
is rooted in this simple, reciprocal premise.  Just as reform in Ukraine 
that increases its stability and prosperity is in Russia's interest, so 
continued reform in Russia is vital to Ukraine's interests and national 
We define reform in the former Soviet Union in three respects: 
-- Economic reform, which means the growth of the market; 
-- Political reform, which means the growth of democracy; and 
-- Foreign-policy reform, which means respect for the independence, 
sovereignty, and territorial integrity of other states in the region. 
According to that principle, an important objective of our policy toward 
Russia is to welcome and encourage policies and patterns of behavior 
that will enable Russia's neighbors, notably Ukraine, to fulfill their 
own aspirations for freedom and security. 
Virtually all the Ukrainians with whom I met during my own six visits to 
Kiev in the past two years--no matter how suspicious they are about 
Russian strategic intentions and how pessimistic about the future of 
Russian politics--have acknowledged that the fate of Ukrainian reform is 
profoundly linked to the fate of Russian reform.  We believe that, too.  
We believe that by supporting Russian reform we are also supporting 
Ukrainian independence. 
Let me say a word or two about the nuclear question.  This issue has 
loomed large in U.S.-Ukrainian relations during two American 
administrations.  From the outset of our own Administration, our policy 
was grounded in several propositions. 
First, security in the late 20th and 21st centuries should not depend on 
the possession of nuclear weapons.  Germany and Japan are perhaps the 
most dramatic examples; they have achieved security and global power as 
non-nuclear-weapons states. 
Second, halting and reversing the spread of nuclear weapons is one of 
the most important tasks facing all of us.  It is a global task, but it 
is an especially acute challenge in the former Soviet Union, where the 
collapse of one old state left weapons of mass destruction on the 
territory of four new ones. 
Third, uncertainty over Ukraine's intentions with regard to nuclear 
weapons would only exacerbate Ukraine's insecurity.  It would, in short, 
be destabilizing--and dangerous to Ukraine.  Why?  Because absent 
Ukraine's clear fulfillment of its obligation under the Lisbon Protocol 
to become a non-nuclear weapon state within the NPT, other states in the 
region would take countermeasures; they would reassess their own 
policies and options in ways potentially detrimental to Ukraine's 
security.  Those with nuclear weapons would be less likely to dismantle 
them, and those without nuclear weapons would be more likely to ponder 
the possibility of acquiring them. 
Fourth, and finally, uncertainty about Ukraine's intentions on the 
nuclear question would at a minimum distract attention from Ukraine's 
economic emergency and perhaps undermine trust in Ukraine's reliability 
as an international partner. 
For all these reasons, our Administration came into office determined to 
resolve the old business of the nuclear question as quickly as possible 
so that we could, as President Clinton might say, focus like a laser on 
the new business of supporting economic reform and development.  That is 
why President Clinton, Vice President Gore, Secretary Christopher, 
Secretary Aspin, Secretary Perry, and the rest of us have all worked so 
hard, first with the Kravchuk Administration and now with the Kuchma 
Administration, to bring the issue to closure in a way that serves 
Ukraine's security interests as well as those of the region and the 
A key moment occurred just over a year ago, when Secretary Christopher 
traveled to Kiev and made clear that our support for the economic 
development of Ukraine was not linked to progress on the nuclear 
question.  Three months later, President Clinton visited Kiev, and then, 
in Moscow, signed, with Presidents Kravchuk and Yeltsin, the trilateral 
statement on the removal of all nuclear weapons for Ukraine. 
Thanks to the skillful, persistent, and courageous leadership of 
President Kuchma, the Ukrainian Parliament, two days ago, took the 
final, conclusive step of acceding to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by a 
vote of 301 to 8.  With justifiable pride, Foreign Minister Udovenko 
hailed the vote as a "triumph of Ukrainian diplomacy and Ukrainian 
Ukraine has now formally and irrevocably committed itself to being a 
non-nuclear weapons state.  Now we and our European partners must work 
hard to strengthen Ukraine's ties to key institutions such as NATO, 
CSCE, and the European Union.  Through the Partnership for Peace, 
Ukraine can build practical ties to NATO and address common security 
We welcome Ukraine's decision to become the first of the former Soviet 
states to join the Partnership for Peace earlier this year and to send 
Ukrainian troops to the first Partnership for Peace exercises in Poland 
and the Netherlands this fall.  We are also expanding bilateral U.S.-
Ukrainian defense and military cooperation.  U.S. and Ukrainian troops 
will train together during their first joint peace-keeping exercise in 
Ukraine next spring.   
In this regard, let me remark that one reason that we have such high 
hopes for Leonid Kuchma's presidency of Ukraine is the quality of his 
personnel appointments, and I would like to single out one in 
particular:  designation of Valery Shmarov as Minister of Defense.  Mr. 
Shmarov has achieved the auspicious--and we hope pattern-setting-- 
distinction of being the first civilian minister of defense in the 
former Soviet Union. 
Like Ukraine, virtually all the nations of Central Europe and the former 
Soviet Union are in the process of redefining themselves, and they will 
be doing so for a long time to come.  Because of its geographical 
position, its size, and its wealth in human and natural resources, 
Ukraine will have an especially powerful influence on the economic, 
political, and security landscape of the entire region.  It is with that 
in mind that President Kuchma has vowed that Ukraine will combine close 
ties with its neighbors to the West with strong, mutually beneficial 
relations with Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union. 
President Clinton supports precisely that vision of Ukraine, in part 
because it coincides with his own vision of an undivided Europe.  
American support for European integration entails, as a high priority 
and, indeed, as a prerequisite, support for a unitary and indepen- dent 
Ukraine.  How to build on the compatibility and mutually reinforcing 
quality of their objectives will, no doubt, be topic A when the two 
Presidents meet in the Oval Office next Tuesday.  In that sense, the 
Clinton-Kuchma summit next week will set the scene in both tone and 
substance for a larger meeting in Budapest 12 days later--the meeting of 
leaders from the 52 active member states of the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe, which promises to be a watershed in advancing 
the goal of European integration.  It is no exaggeration, I think, to 
say that the realization of that goal for the continent as a whole 
depends on the realization of Ukraine's hopes for itself--and of 
America's hopes for Ukraine. 
In closing these remarks--and in anticipation of our Administration's 
forthcoming efforts to develop a bipartisan foreign policy with the 
104th Congress--I would stress the need for consistency, continuity, 
steadiness, and determination, both in Kiev and in Washington. 
U.S.-Ukrainian relations are, on the eve of President Kuchma's arrival 
here, at their high point.  Yet we must, on both sides, manage the 
relationship skillfully and realistically.  Developments in Ukraine are 
the most promising they have been since independence.  Yet there is a 
long and very rocky road ahead. 
As I have already indicated, the future is going to be difficult in part 
because of the tough, correct, economic-policy choices that the Kuchma 
Government is making right now--choices it is making on the assumption 
that it will get the help it needs to vindicate tomorrow the political 
courage and economic good sense it is showing today. 
In Ukraine, as in the other states of the former Soviet Union, the 
future of reform is not certain; the success of reform is not 
guaranteed.  A titanic struggle is underway.  We, the United States, and 
we, the community of industrialized democracies, are not neutral 
bystanders.  We know which forces we want to prevail.  Moreover, we have 
a stake in their prevailing.  We have the capacity, through economic 
assistance and active diplomacy, to help them do so.  Therefore, we 
cannot and will not stint or waiver.  
Fact Sheet:  U.S. Assistance to Ukraine 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 brought an end to 
the Cold War and created the opportunity to build bilateral relations 
with the New Independent States (NIS) as they began a political and 
economic transformation.  On December 25, 1991, the United States 
officially recognized the independence of Ukraine.  It upgraded its 
consulate in the capital, Kiev, to embassy status on January 21, 1992.  
The U.S. ambassador to Ukraine is William Miller, sworn in on October 
13, 1993. 
The United States attaches great importance to the success of Ukraine's 
transition to a democratic state with a flourishing market economy.  
Following a period of economic decline characterized by high inflation 
and a continued reliance on state controls, the Ukrainian Government, 
under the leadership of newly elected President Leonid Kuchma, began 
taking steps in the fall of 1994 to reinvigorate economic reform and 
achieve macroeconomic stabilization.  The Ukrainian Government's new 
determination to implement comprehensive economic reform is a welcome 
development, and the U.S. is committed to strengthening its support for 
Ukraine as it embarks on this difficult path.  
In January 1992, the U.S. initiated the Coordinating Conference on 
Assistance to the New Independent States in response to the humanitarian 
emergencies facing these states.  The resulting Operation Provide Hope 
supplied desperately needed food, fuel, medicine, and shelter.  
A cornerstone for the continuing U.S. partnership with Ukraine and the 
other NIS has been the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian 
Democracies and Open Markets (FREEDOM) Support Act, enacted in October 
1992.  In September 1993, a new $2.45-billion assistance package for the 
NIS, funded with a combination of fiscal year (FY) 1993 and 1994 
supplemental appropriations, was passed by Congress and signed into law 
by President Clinton.  The legislation continues to address political 
and economic transformation and humanitarian needs. 
The U.S. has consistently encouraged Ukraine's transition to a free, 
democratic society with a prosperous market economy.  Over the past 
three years, the U.S. and Ukraine have signed a series  
of bilateral agreements designed to enhance economic, technical, 
environmental, and cultural cooperation.  During the visit of former 
Ukrainian President Leonid M. Kravchuk to Washington on March 3-5, 1994, 
he and President Clinton reached agreement on an expanded economic 
assist- ance package that will provide up to $700 million to Ukraine:  
$350 million in technical and humanitarian assistance in FY 1994 funds 
and $350 million in Nunn-Lugar funds (FY 1992-95 funds) to assist with 
nuclear dismantlement, non-proliferation programs, and industrial 
partnerships.  From 1992 through September 1994, the U.S. had obligated 
about $196 million in humanitarian assistance and $201 million in 
technical assistance to Ukraine, not including nuclear weapons 
dismantlement programs. 
State Visit to United States 
President Leonid Kuchma is making a state visit  to Washington, DC,  
Novem-ber 21-23.  In response to President Kuchma's commitment to work 
with the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in implementing 
comprehensive economic reforms, the U.S. is spearheading an effort to 
mobilize international financial assistance for Ukraine.  In this 
context, the U.S. made an exceptional decision to provide $100 million 
to help Ukraine meet its financial obligations in the first phase of the 
reform program.  Of that, $72 million will be structured as an energy 
sector grant for the purchase of natural gas for Ukraine's heating and 
electricity needs this winter.  Ukraine has agreed to undertake energy 
sector reforms as a condition for receiving the grant. 
Assistance To Support the Transition to a Market Economy   
U.S. technical assistance to support transition to a market economy has 
focused primarily on economic restructuring, development of the private 
sector, and energy sector reform.  Recently, the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) completed the printing of tens of 
thousands of certificates to support Ukraine's plan for the mass 
privatization of state enterprises.  U.S. advisers have provided 
technical assistance in financial sector reform, tax policy and 
administration, bankers' training, land legislation, small-scale and 
municipal services privatiza- tion, agricultural development and 
agribusi-ness, corporatization of the electric power sector, energy 
pricing and efficiency, and public education concerning the environment.  
The Western NIS Enterprise Fund, announced by President Clinton in 
January 1994 to promote private sector business development in Ukraine, 
Moldova, and Belarus, has recently started up operations in Kiev. 
U.S. exchanges and training programs have enabled Ukrainians to 
participate in a broad range of programs in the U.S.  These include coal 
mine safety, nuclear reactor safety, private land ownership and real 
estate markets, local government finance, banking, tax accounting, labor 
statistics, telecommunications, labor-management relations, promotion of 
agricultural development, security and defense conversion, international 
trade and investment, entrepreneurship and small business development, 
and public health and hospital management and finance.  Three medical 
partnerships have been established between U.S. and Ukrainian medical 
institutions.  Peace Corps volunteers are working in Ukraine with a 
focus on small business development and English teaching. 
Funding also has been provided for studies in air traffic control and 
airport construction, establishment of an agricultural center to provide 
training on U.S. agricultural equipment, and the conversion of a coal-
power plant to gas.  The U.S. has provided grain storage facilities. 
Assistance To Support the Transition to Democracy   
The U.S. is promoting Ukraine's democratic transition by supporting 
programs on participatory  political systems, independent media, rule of 
law, local governance, and civil society, as well as a wide range of 
exchanges and training. 
USAID has provided Ukraine with technical assistance related to 
elections, the development of political parties and grass-roots civic 
organizations, and the development of independent media.  A USAID-funded 
rule-of-law consortium has been working with Ukrainian officials and 
non-profit organizations to create a legal system supportive of a 
democratic government and a market-based economy.  The rule-of-law 
project has been further expanded to promote cooperation between U.S. 
law enforcement agencies and their Ukrainian counterparts to reform the 
criminal justice system. 
Thus far in 1994, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) has brought nearly 
800 Ukrainians to the U.S. on academic exchanges.  A total of 68 
Ukrainian business people, journalists, local government officials, and 
other professionals participated in other exchanges.  USIA visitor 
program participants included Parliamentary Speaker Moroz in October 
The Department of Commerce's Special American Business Internship 
Training (SABIT) program and the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) 
Cochran Fellowship Program have brought nearly 100 business executives, 
scientists, and agriculturalists to the U.S. for internships and 
training programs. 
Support for the Social Sector   
The U.S. is assisting Ukraine's efforts to maximize equity in reform and 
to sustain social welfare and stability during and beyond the 
transition.  Toward this end, USAID is providing assistance to local 
governments in redefining the roles of the public and private sectors in 
providing social services to allow government to focus limited resources 
on key social sectors.  Training and technical assistance is being 
provided to Ukrainian institutions and government agencies on reforms of 
health care financing and delivery of medical services.  A number of 
medical partnerships between U.S. and Ukrainian health care institutions 
have been established to improve both patient care and institutional 
management.  Also, USAID is providing training and technical assistance 
on ways to improve reproductive health, focusing on providing family 
planning services and reducing the use of abortion. 
Humanitarian Assistance   
The U.S. provided $25,000 in response to the January 1994 flood disaster 
in Ukraine's Zakarpatska oblast.  In October 1993, $25,000 was provided 
in international disaster funding for the drilling of water wells in the 
flood-stricken area of Rivne.  The U.S. has provided funding for non-
governmental organizations to deliver surplus Department of Defense food 
and medicines, in addition to providing transport for privately donated 
food, medicines, medical supplies, and clothing. 
Operation Provide Hope has delivered food worth about $46,000 and 
medicines and medical supplies worth $16 million.  A large portion of 
these supplies were designated for hospitals treating victims of the 
Chernobyl nuclear accident.  Under the Medical Assistance Initiative, 
Project HOPE, a private voluntary organization, has shipped more than 
$26 million worth of pharmaceutical and medical supplies to Ukraine. 
In response to an epidemic of diphtheria, the U.S. sent two assessment 
advisers from the Centers for Disease Control and vaccines, syringes, 
and needles with a value of $1.3 million under the Emergency Medicines 
Initiative.  Under the Emergency  Immunization Program, through Project 
HOPE, measles vaccine was provided, allowing for the vaccination of all 
Ukrainian children up to two years of age during 1993.  In response to a 
1994 request from the Ukrainian Government, the U.S. provided diphtheria 
vaccines for adults and children to help Ukraine eradicate this deadly 
disease.  In FY 1994, USDA provided Ukraine with more than 70,000 metric 
tons of food aid, valued at about   $24 million, and in FY 1995, it will 
provide $25 million in PL 480 assistance. 
Bilateral Trade Issues  
The U.S.-Ukraine Trade Agreement, effective June 22, 1992, provides 
reciprocal most-favored-nation tariff treatment to the products of each 
country.  Since January 1994, the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC) has approved investment insurance totaling more than 
$23 million for three projects in Ukraine.  OPIC has also sponsored 
conferences and exchanges to encourage joint ventures between U.S. and 
Ukrainian companies.  U.S. Export-Import Bank programs are currently 
closed in Ukraine, but the bank is continuing to reassess Ukraine's 
creditworthiness in light of recent government economic reforms with a 
view to reopening lending activities as soon as possible.  In March 
1994, Presidents Clinton and Kravchuk signed treaties on bilateral 
investment and double taxation. 
Security Issues 
In  Lisbon on May 23, 1992, the United States signed a protocol to the 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, 
and Kazakhstan (those states on whose territory strategic nuclear 
weapons of the former Soviet Union are located).  The protocol makes the 
four states party to the START Treaty and commits all signatories to 
reductions in strategic nuclear weapons within the seven-year period 
provided for in the treaty.  Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan also 
agreed to join the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as  non-
nuclear weapons states.   
The U.S. has pledged to provide $350 million to Ukraine under the Nunn-
Lugar program to assist in the dismantlement of strategic offensive 
arms, defense conversion, nuclear reactor safety and fissile material 
control, and accounting.  The U.S. also has pledged $10 million to 
assist in the establishment of a Science and Technology Center designed 
to provide peaceful employment opportunities to scientists and engineers 
formerly involved with weapons of mass destruction and their delivery 
U.S. Support for UN Security Council Resolutions Concerning Bosnia 
Madeleine K. Albright, UN Security Council Resolutions 
Ambassador Albright Statement by the U.S. Permanent Representative to 
the United Nations before the UN Security Council, New York City, 
November 19, 1994. 
Let me begin by reminding members of this Council why we must continue 
to meet on the subject of Bosnia.  Last July, a peace plan, developed by 
the Contact Group, was endorsed by this Council.  Since then, the 
Government of Bosnia has accepted the plan; so have the Bosnian Croats; 
only the Bosnian Serbs have refused. 
It is the failure of the Bosnian Serbs to sign the peace plan that has 
caused the fighting in Bosnia to continue and to escalate.  I know there 
are those who condemn Bosnia for its recent attacks on Bosnian Serb 
forces in parts of central and western Bosnia.  My government regrets 
all continued fighting.  But let us not confuse attacks made to recover 
territory lost to aggression with aggression itself.  Let us not confuse 
the actions of a government that has declared its desire for peace with 
that of a faction unyielding in its pursuit of war.  The Bosnian 
Government did not start this war and is willing to end it.  The Bosnian 
Serbs began this war, and it is they who refuse to sign an agreement to 
end it. 
Now we face a new threshold.  In support of Bosnian Serb aggression, the 
so-called Krajina Serbs are collaborating in an attack on the sovereign 
territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  They are presenting the Government of 
Croatia with a difficult dilemma.  The unification of territory held by 
the so-called Krajina Serbs with territory controlled by the Bosnian 
Serbs could cause the Government of Croatia to intervene and thus spawn 
a new spiral of war.  The Government of Croatia has so far shown 
commendable restraint. 
But let no member of this Council doubt this:  Krajina Serb 
collaboration with Bosnian Serb aggression could spark a wider Balkan 
war.  Krajina   Serb forces have violated an international border.  
Their attacks from the air and from the land are jeopardizing civilians 
in Bihac, not to mention UN troops deployed there. 
This Council has now clarified that the use of air power is authorized 
to attack targets in Croatia that threaten safe areas in Bosnia or UN 
troops operating in Bosnia.  Yesterday, Krajina Serbs attacked Bosnia, 
and the UN commander for former Yugoslavia, General De Lapresle, raised 
the issue of a NATO response from the air.  My government believes that 
an immediate, affirmative response would have been legally authorized by 
the resolutions of this Council. 
This morning, another attack, launched from the same airfield at Udbina, 
struck targets in the Bihac pocket.  Once again, the tragic result was 
civilian casualties.  Let us be clear:  What we are witnessing is a 
pattern of activity from the Udbina airfield that places at risk the 
safe area of Bihac, civilians in the Bihac pocket, and UNPROFOR troops 
deployed there. 
My government believes that this pattern of military activity justifies 
a military response from NATO.  Therefore, we welcome this resolution.  
It makes clearer yet the intention of this Council that the bombardment 
of Bosnia must be prevented.  We would expect that any request for NATO 
air strikes on Udbina--made today or in the future--would yield a 
positive response from all concerned. 

Resolution 958 
(November 19, 1994) 
The Security Council, 
Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions, and in particular its 
resolution 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993, 
Recalling also the statement of the President of the Security Council of 
13 November 1994 (S/PRST/1994/66) and 18 November 1994 (S/PRST/1994/69), 
and reiterating its concern about the deteriorating situation in and 
around the safe area of Bihac, 
Having considered the letter of 18 November 1994 from the Permanent 
Representative of the Republic of Croatia to the President of the 
Security Council (S/1994/1312), 
Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of the Republic of Croatia, 
Determining that the situation in the former Yugoslavia continues to 
constitute a threat to international peace and security, and determined 
to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate set out in 
paragraphs 5 and 9 of resolution 836 (1993), and, to this end, acting 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
Decides that the authorization given in paragraph 10 of its resolution 
836 (1993) to Member States, acting nationally or through regional 
organizations or arrangements, to take, under the authority of the 
Security Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-
General and the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), all 
necessary measures, through the use of air power,     in and around the 
safe areas in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina referred to in 
resolution 824 (1993) of   6 May 1993, to support UNPROFOR in the 
performance of its mandate set out in paragraphs 5 and 9 of resolution 
836 (1993) shall apply also to such measures taken in the Republic of 
VOTE:  Unanimous (15-0). 

Resolution 959 
(November 19, 1994) 
The Security Council, 
Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions on the conflict in the 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in particular its resolutions 824 
(1993) and 836 (1993), 
Reaffirming the need for a lasting peace settlement to be signed by all 
the Bosnian parties, and implemented in good faith by them, and 
condemning the decision by the Bosnian Serb party to refuse to accept 
the proposed territorial settlement (S/1994/1081), 
Reaffirming also the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Expressing special concern about the escalation in recent fighting in 
the Bihac pocket, including those in, from and around the safe areas, 
and the flow of refugees and displaced persons resulting from it, 
Bearing in mind the importance of facilitating the return of refugees 
and displaced persons to their homes, 
Taking note of the reports of the Secretary-General of 10 March 1994   
(S/1994/291) and 16 March 1994 (S/1994/300) and of his recommendations 
concerning the definition and implementation of the concept of safe 
areas in his report of 9 May 1994 (S/1994/555), 
Recalling the statements by the President of the Security Council of 6 
April 1994 (S/PRST/1994/14), 30 June 1994 (S/PRST/1994/31), 13 November 
1994 (S/PRST/1994/66) and 18 November 1994 (S/PRST/1994/69), 
Reaffirming its previous calls on all parties and others concerned to 
refrain from any hostile action that could cause further escalation in 
the fighting, and to achieve urgently a cease-fire in the Bihac area, 
Reiterating the importance of maintaining Sarajevo, the capital of the 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a united city and a 
multicultural, multi-ethnic and pluri-religious centre, and noting in 
this context the positive contribution that agreement between the 
parties on the demilitarization of Sarajevo could make to this end, to 
the restoration of normal life in Sarajevo, and to achieving an overall 
settlement, consistent with the Contact Group peace plan, 
Taking note of the communique on Bosnia and Herzegovina issued on 30 
July 1994 by the Troika of the European Union and the Foreign Ministers 
of the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the United States of America (S/1994/916) and, in 
particular, of their commitment to strengthen the regime of safe areas, 
1.  Expresses its grave concern over the recent hostilities in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina; 
2.  Condemns any violation of the international border between the 
Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
demands that all parties and others concerned, and in particular the so-
called Krajina Serb forces, fully respect the border and refrain from 
hostile acts across it; 
3.  Expresses its full support for the efforts by the United Nations 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR), to ensure implementation of the Security 
Council resolutions on safe areas; 
4.  Calls upon all the Bosnian parties to respect fully the status and 
functions of UNPROFOR and to cooperate with it in its efforts to ensure 
implementation of the Security Council resolutions on safe areas and 
demands that all parties and others concerned show maximum restraint and 
put an end to all hostile actions in and around the safe areas in order 
to ensure that UNPROFOR can carry out its mandate in this regard 
effectively and safely; 
5.  Requests the Secretary-General to update his recommendations on 
modalities of the implementation of the concept of safe areas and to 
encourage UNPROFOR, in cooperation with the Bosnian parties, to continue 
their efforts to achieve agreements on strengthening the regimes of safe 
areas taking into account the specific situation in each case, and 
recalls its request to the Secretary-General in the statement by the 
President of the Security Council of 13 November 1994 to report as soon 
as possible on any further measures to stabilize the situation in and 
around the safe area of Bihac; 
6.  Further requests the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR to intensify 
efforts aimed at reaching agreement with the Bosnian parties on the 
modalities of demilitarization of Sarajevo, bearing in mind the need for 
the restoration of normal life to the city and for free access to and 
from the city by land and air and the free and unimpeded movement of 
people, goods and services in and around the city in line with its 
resolution 900 (1994), particularly operative paragraph 2; 
7.  Requests the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of 
the present resolution by 1 December 1994; 
8.  Decides to remain seized of the matter. 
VOTE:  Unanimous (15-0).  
UN Security Council Establishes International Tribunal For Rwanda 
Madeleine K. Albright, UN Security Council Resolution Ambassador 
Statement by the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations 
before the UN Security Council, New York City, November 8, 1994. 
Genocide occurred in Rwanda last spring.  Other grave violations of 
international humanitarian law also have ravaged that state.  This 
Council has been seized with these horrific events through much of this 
year.  The Council itself has not been immune from criticism.  But today 
marks the culmination of months of very hard and persistent work by our 
respective governments, the Secretariat, the Commission of Experts, and 
this Council to create a new ad hoc tribunal for the investigation and 
prosecution of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes in 
Rwanda and by Rwandan citizens in states neighboring Rwanda. 
We regret that the Government of Rwanda cast its vote against the 
resolution.  As other members of the Council have stated, the co-
sponsors worked hard to accommodate a number of Rwandan concerns, but we 
were not able to accommodate all of them.  While we understand their 
concerns regarding several key issues--indeed, on the death penalty we 
might even agree--it was simply not possible to meet those concerns and 
still maintain broad support in the Council.  Therefore, my government 
believes that the right choice is to establish the tribunal this tragedy 
demands rather than wait to achieve an agreement that would never come. 
Nonetheless, we urge the Government of Rwanda to honor its obligation to 
cooperate fully with the International Tribunal and the investigation it 
must undertake in order to prosecute those guilty of the unspeakable 
acts of genocide and other atrocities.  We appreciate the efforts of the 
UN Legal Counsel, Hans Corell, to consult with the Government of Rwanda 
in Kigali about this resolution and the statute for the tribunal.  Over 
the last few months, this Council has acted with determination to 
establish the tribunal at the earliest possible date. 
The prosecutor will need to work very closely with the Government of 
Rwanda to establish a presence in that country and to operate freely in 
his investigations and prosecutions.  My government fully supports the 
establishment of a tribunal office in Kigali and for a great deal of the 
tribunal's work necessarily to proceed in Rwanda.  We also look forward 
to further consultations on the official seat of the tribunal.  It is 
imperative that the tribunal operate efficiently, securely, and in a 
manner consistent with the overall development of international 
humanitarian law.  We will look forward to the views of the Secretary 
General and the prosecutor in our evaluation. 
As Chief Prosecutor, Justice Goldstone will bring to this endeavor the 
same integrity and skill that he already has infused into the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.  We look forward to 
assisting Justice Goldstone in whatever way we can to facilitate his 
work on Rwanda.  We also look forward to the selection of a Deputy 
Prosecutor for Rwanda who will have major responsibility for 
investigations and prosecutions. 
The establishment of the International Tribunal for Rwanda is only the 
beginning.  One major challenge ahead of us is adequate funding for the 
tribunal.  We urge all member states to make voluntary contributions.  
More importantly, the United Nations must provide sufficient funds for 
these early, critical months of the tribunal's work.  We stress, 
however, that with the growing budgetary needs of the International 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, our challenge will be to finance 
both ad hoc tribunals with enough resources to get the job done. 
The judicial system in Rwanda also  will require much rebuilding in 
order to take on the enormous task of daily law enforcement, as well as 
the prosecution of many of the suspects whom the tribunal will not be 
able to handle.  My government is prepared to assist Rwanda in this 
important task, and we encourage other governments to provide 
The investigation of genocide is, indeed, very grim work.  But we have a 
responsibility to see that the International Tribunal for Rwanda can 
accomplish its objective--one that this Council increasingly recognizes 
to hold individuals accountable for their violations of international 
humanitarian law.  As evident in the former Yugoslavia, in Rwanda there 
is an equal need to forge harmony among ethnic groups by bringing to 
justice the individuals who committed such heinous crimes, regardless of 
their position in society. 
In closing, let me express my government's hope that the step we have 
taken here today can promote both justice and national reconciliation, 
lest the Rwandan people be unable to escape the memory of madness and 
barbarism they have just lived through.  

Resolution 955 
(November 8, 1994) 
The Security Council, 
Reaffirming all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, 
Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General pursuant to 
paragraph 3 of resolution 935 (1994) of 1 July 1994 (S/1994/879 and 
S/1994/906), and having taken note of the reports of the Special 
Rapporteur for Rwanda of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
(S/1994/1157, annex I and annex II), 
Expressing appreciation for the work of the Commission of Experts 
established pursuant to resolution 935 (1994), in particular its 
preliminary report on violations of international humanitarian law in 
Rwanda transmitted by the Secretary-General's letter of 1 October 1994 
Expressing once again its grave concern at the reports indicating that 
genocide and other systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of 
international humanitarian law have been committed in Rwanda, 
Determining that this situation continues to constitute a threat to 
international peace and security, 
Determined to put an end to such crimes and to take effective measures 
to bring to justice the persons who are responsible for them, 
Convinced that in the particular circumstances of Rwanda, the 
prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law would enable this aim to be achieved and 
would contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the 
restoration and maintenance of peace, 
Believing that the establishment of an international tribunal for the 
prosecution of persons responsible for genocide and the other above-
mentioned violations of international humanitarian law will contribute 
to ensuring that such violations are halted and effectively redressed, 
Stressing also the need for international cooperation to strengthen the 
courts and judicial system of Rwanda, having regard in particular to the 
necessity for those courts to deal with large numbers of suspects, 
Considering that the Commission of Experts established pursuant to 
resolution 935 (1994) should continue on an urgent basis the collection 
of information relating to evidence of grave violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and should submit 
its final report to the Secretary-General by 30 November 1994, 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
1.  Decides hereby, having received the request of the Government of 
Rwanda (S/1994/1115), to establish an international tribunal for the 
sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other 
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the 
territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and 
other such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States, 
between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 and to this end to adopt the 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda annexed 
2.  Decides that all States shall cooperate fully with the International 
Tribunal and its organs in accordance with the present resolution and 
the Statute of the International Tribunal and that consequently all 
States shall take any measures necessary under their domestic law to 
implement the provisions of the present resolution and the Statute, 
including the obligation of States to comply with requests for 
assistance or orders issued by a Trial Chamber under Article 28 of the 
Statute, and requests States to keep the Secretary-General informed of 
such measures; 
3.  Considers that the Government of Rwanda should be notified prior to 
the taking of decisions under Articles 26 and 27 of the Statute; 
4.  Urges States and intergovernmental and non-governmental 
organizations to contribute funds, equipment and services to the 
International Tribunal, including the offer of expert personnel; 
5.  Requests the Secretary-General to implement this resolution urgently 
and in particular to make practical arrangements for the effective 
functioning of the International Tribunal, including recommendations to 
the Council as to possible locations for the seat of the International 
Tribunal at the earliest time and to report periodically to the Council; 
6.  Decides that the seat of the International Tribunal shall be 
determined by the Council having regard to considerations of justice and 
fairness as well as administrative efficiency, including access to 
witnesses, and economy, and subject to the conclusion of appropriate 
arrangements between the United Nations and the State of the seat, 
acceptable to the Council, having regard to the fact that the 
International Tribunal may meet away from its seat when it considers it 
necessary for the efficient exercise of its functions; and decides that 
an office will be established and proceedings will be conducted in 
Rwanda, where feasible and appropriate, subject to the conclusion of 
similar appropriate arrangements; 
7.  Decides to consider increasing the number of judges and Trial 
Chambers of the International Tribunal if it becomes necessary; 
8.  Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. 
VOTE: 13-1-1 (Rwanda against; China abstaining).  
Treaty Actions 
Consular Relations 
Convention on consular relations.  Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963.  
Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 1969.  TIAS 
6820; 21 UST 77. 
Accession:  Kyrgyz Republic, Oct. 7, 1994. 
Diplomatic Relations 
Convention on diplomatic relations.  Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961.  
Entered into force Apr. 24, 1964; for the U.S. Dec. 13, 1972.  TIAS 
7502; 23 UST 3227. 
Accession:  Kyrgyz Republic, Oct. 7, 1994. 
Convention concerning labor administration:  role, functions, and 
organization.  Done at Geneva June 26, 1978.  Enters into force 12 
months after date on which ratifications of two members have been 
registered with the Director-General; thereafter, 12 months after date 
on which ratification has been registered by any member.  Senate advice 
and consent to ratification:  Oct. 7, 1994. 
Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations.  Done at Washington June 
19, 1970.  Entered into force Jan. 24, 1978.  TIAS 8733; 28 UST 7645. 
Accession:  Mexico, Oct. 1, 1994. 
Budapest treaty on the international recognition of the deposit of 
micro-organisms for the purposes of patent procedure, with regulations.  
Done at Budapest Apr. 28, 1977.  Entered into force Aug. 19, 1980.  TIAS 
9768; 32 UST 1241. 
Accession:  Latvia, Sept. 29, 1994. 
Nice agreement, as revised, concerning the international classification 
of goods and services for the purposes of the registration of marks.  
Done at Geneva May 13, 1977.  Entered into force Feb. 6, 1979; for the 
U.S. Feb. 29, 1984. 
Accession deposited:  Latvia, Sept. 29, 1994. 


International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations.  Signed 
at Luanda and Washington Dec. 29, 1993 and Oct. 17, 1994.  Entered into 
force Dec. 1, 1994.  
Agreement concerning the settlement of certain property claims.  Signed 
at Washington Oct. 6, 1994.  Entered into force Oct. 6, 1994. 
Agreement confirming acceptance by Canada of the terms of the memorandum 
of understanding of Aug. 1, 1994, for a multinational observer group to 
monitor and advise on Haiti.  Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington Aug. 29, 1994.  Entered into force Aug. 29, 1994. 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of 
certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States 
Government and its agencies, with annexes.  Signed at Abidjan Aug. 26, 
1994.Entered into force Oct. 7, 1994. 
Czech Republic  
Memorandum of understanding on science and engineering cooperation, with 
annexes.  Signed at Prague July 13, 1994.  Entered into force July 13, 
Agreement concerning real property exchange, with attachments.  Signed 
at Bonn Sept. 23, 1994.  Entered into force Sept. 23, 1994. 
Agreement on encouragement of investment.  Signed at Washington Sept. 
12, 1994.  Entered into force Sept. 12, 1994. 
Memorandum of understanding concerning technical cooperation in 
chemistry, physics, and engineering measurement sciences.  Signed at 
Gaithersburg Sept. 12, 1994.  Entered into force Sept. 12, 1994. 
Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official 
government employees, with attachment.  Effected by exchange of notes at 
Chisinau Sept. 8 and 13, 1994.  Entered into force Sept. 13, 1994. 
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations.  Signed 
at Windhoek and Washington Sept. 30 and Oct. 24, 1994.  Entered into 
force Dec. 1, 1994. 
New Zealand  
Memorandum of agreement concerning the Navstar Global Positioning 
System, with annex.  Signed at Washington Sept. 2, 1994.  Entered into 
force Sept. 2, 1994. 
Palestine Liberation Organization  
Agreement on encouragement of investment.  Signed at Gaza and Washington 
Aug. 11 and Sept. 12, 1994.  Entered into force Sept. 12, 1994. 
Postal money order agreement.  Signed at Asuncion and Washington Oct. 5 
and 21, 1994.  Enters into force Dec. 1, 1994. 
Memorandum of understanding concerning scientific and technical 
cooperation in the earth sciences.  Signed at Warsaw Sept. 23, 1994.  
Entered into force Sept. 23, 1994. 
Russian Federation 
Agreement concerning the reciprocal exemption from income tax of income 
derived from the international operation of ships and aircraft.  
Effected by exchange of notes at Moscow     July 18 and 21, 1994.  
Entered into force July 21, 1994. 
Slovak Republic  
Memorandum of understanding on science and engineering cooperation, with 
annexes.  Signed at Bratislava July 14, 1994.  Entered into force July 
14, 1994. 
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations.  Signed 
at Seoul Sept. 13, 1994.  Entered into force Dec. 1, 1994.   

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