US DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
VOLUME 5, NUMBER 46, NOVEMBER 14, 1994 
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
 
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE: 
1.  Ensuring Peace and Stability On the Korean Peninsula--Secretary 
Christopher 
2.  The New Geopolitics:  Defending Democracy in the Post-Cold War Era--
Deputy-Secretary Talbott 
3.  American Power and American Diplomacy--Anthony Lake 
4.  Middle East Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources 
 
 


ARTICLE 1: 
 
Ensuring Peace and Stability On the Korean Peninsula 
Secretary Christopher 
Remarks to the Korea-America Friendship Society, Seoul, Korea, November 
9, 1994 
 
It gives me great pleasure to be the first Secretary of State to address 
the Korea-America Friendship Society.  You certainly have deepened our 
appreciation of the heritage of Korean-Americans, who have made such 
remarkable contributions to our nation.  Let me also commend your 
efforts to improve tolerance and understanding between peoples of quite 
different backgrounds, a mission that is extremely important at this 
critical time. 
 
Earlier today, I met with President Kim, Foreign Minister Han, and their 
colleagues.  In these meetings, I commended the President on his 
announcement that the Republic of Korea is willing to take step-by-step 
measures to encourage economic cooperation with the North.  And I hope 
that North Korea will respond positively and promptly. 
 
I am here this afternoon to reaffirm the enduring commitment of the 
United States to the security of the Republic of Korea and to peace and 
stability on the Korean peninsula.  As President Clinton said when we 
were together here in Seoul last year, "geography has placed our nations 
far apart, but history has drawn us close together."  Our friendship was 
sealed when our troops fought and died together to defend this soil 
against aggression.  It broadened as we took full advantage of the peace 
that followed to build commercial ties.  It matured as the "second 
miracle on the Han"--Korea's democratic miracle--strengthened our common 
bonds. 
 
Now our friendship and our alliance have been proven once again in the 
crucible of a common challenge.  By working together, we produced an 
agreement on the nuclear situation in North Korea that will assure a 
more secure Republic of Korea and a more secure Asia. 
 
The development of our alliance reflects America's engagement in the 
Asia-Pacific region.  America is and will remain a Pacific power.  We 
will stand by our security commitments, we will maintain our forward 
military presence, and we will sustain our non-proliferation efforts.  
We will promote integration and growth through the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation forum, and through relations with the region's key economic 
powers.  And we will continue to support political freedom and human 
rights--for these are the ultimate guarantors of security and 
prosperity. 
 
We are working to achieve a Pacific future where our allies and partners 
are free from the fear of war; where nations are made prosperous by the 
free exchange of goods and ideas; and where citizens can participate in 
the decisions that affect their lives.  These elements of our 
comprehensive Asia-Pacific strategy--security, prosperity, and 
democracy--are mutually reinforcing. 
 
That strategy has produced significant results in recent months: 
 
--  A nuclear agreement that can lead to a more secure Korean peninsula; 
--  The launching of an historic regional security dialogue in the Asia-
Pacific; 
--  Agreements with Japan to open key domestic markets to foreign 
competition; 
--  Improved ties with Vietnam resulting from the fuller accounting they 
have given us for our POW/MIAs; 
--  A reinvigorated relationship with China, with movement on both arms 
control and human rights. 
 
These achievements advance not just America's interests, but those of 
our Asian allies and friends as well. 
 
But as President Clinton told your National Assembly last year, "we must 
always remember that security comes first."  Over the past decade, the 
United States has been working with you to halt North Korea's 
development of nuclear weapons.  Almost two years ago, North Korea's 
announcement of its intentions to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty threatened to plunge the region into crisis, if not 
into war. 
 
Now, our determined diplomacy--made possible by America's unshakable 
partnership with the Republic of Korea--has put the nuclear issue on the 
road to resolution.  The Agreed Framework will achieve the central 
strategic objectives shared by our two countries.  It pulls us back from 
the brink of a crisis that could have spiraled into armed conflict, it 
lifts the specter of a nuclear arms race from Northeast Asia, and it 
bolsters a nonproliferation regime that is so essential to stability in 
this region and the world. 

We achieved the Agreed Framework by maintaining clear and consistent 
objectives and priorities, and by making it plain to the North Koreans 
that our negotiating positions reflected the unified views of the United 
States and the Republic of Korea.  President Kim was an active partner 
every step of the way.  And I assure you that without our partnership, 
the negotiations could not have succeeded and there would have been no 
agreement. 
 
Let me outline what the framework requires, and why it is good for the 
Republic of Korea, the United States, Asia, and the world. 
 
First, the agreement immediately freezes the North Korean nuclear 
program.  The North has agreed not to restart its 5 megawatt reactor.  
It will seal its reprocessing facility and not operate it again.  It 
will not reprocess the spent fuel from the 5 megawatt reactor and will 
ship that fuel out of the country in due course.  In short, North 
Korea's current capacity to separate or produce plutonium--the raw 
material for nuclear weapons and the most toxic substance on earth--will 
come to an end.  And all of these steps will take place with the 
oversight of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and with the 
careful scrutiny of the international community. 
 
Second, the North has agreed to freeze construction of its 50 and 200 
megawatt reactors and of its reprocessing plant.  Ultimately, these 
large nuclear facilities will be dismantled, along with related 
facilities in North Korea.  Absent this agreement, the two large 
reactors, once completed, would have been capable of producing enough 
plutonium for not just one or two bombs, but dozens of bombs each year.  
Within a decade, the Republic of Korea, the United States, this region, 
and the world could have faced the greatest threat to international 
security since the Cuban missile crisis. 
 
Third,  under the Agreed Framework, North Korea must fully disclose its 
past nuclear activities.  The IAEA is to have access to the information 
it needs.  North Korea is obligated to cooperate with the measures the 
IAEA deems necessary--including special inspections--to resolve 
questions about its past activities.  Implementation will take place 
over a period of time.  But the safeguards agreement must be implemented 
fully before any significant nuclear components of the first light-water 
reactor are delivered to North Korea--and that is very significant. 
 
Finally, North Korea will remain a party to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, and must also fulfill additional obligations that 
go well beyond it.  These are technical, but they are important.  These 
include an end to plutonium separation, the shipment of spent fuel 
containing plutonium out of the country, and the dismantlement of the 
entire gas graphite reactor system. 
 
These are the elements of the agreement.  Each is very important. 
 
But the signing of the agreement brings a new challenge for the United 
States and the Republic of Korea.  This is an important moment.  We are 
moving to a second and critical phase in resolving the North Korea 
nuclear issue.  We are moving from negotiation to implementation, from 
words to deeds.  In the coming weeks, we will be taking five concrete 
steps toward implementation: 
 
--  First, together with the Republic of Korea and Japan, we will 
establish the Korean Energy Development Organization.  This consortium 
of many countries will provide South Korea-type light-water reactors and 
alternative energy to the North.  South Korean companies will play a 
central role in the provision of the reactors, just as the Republic of 
Korea will play a central role in the management of KEDO.  The United 
States, the ROK, and Japan will meet this month to prepare for a KEDO 
conference we plan to hold before the new year. 
 
--  Second, American representatives will meet with North Korea this 
weekend in Pyongyang to discuss safe storage of the spent fuel under 
IAEA scrutiny until it is shipped out of the country at a later time. 
 
--  Third, later this month in Beijing, the United States and North 
Korea will begin to discuss the light-water reactor project. 
 
--  Fourth, the IAEA will soon meet with the North to agree how to 
monitor the freeze of the North's nuclear program. 
 
--  Finally, in early December, we will meet with the North Koreans in 
Washington to discuss establishing liaison offices in our two capitals. 
 
President Kim has also made it clear that the Republic of Korea is 
determined to move forward.  As the President indicated, the agreement 
has provided a basis for lifting your country's ban on business contacts 
with North Korea.  As the framework is implemented, these links can 
demonstrate to the North the concrete benefits of ending its isolation.  
It really can mark the beginning of a better future for all Koreans. 
 
The United States and the Republic of Korea are determined that North 
Korea's commitments be fully implemented.  This agreement, like any good 
agreement, rests on compliance and verification--not on good faith and 
not on trust. 
 
The path to full implementation has defined checkpoints. If at any 
checkpoint North Korea fails to fulfill its obligations, it will lose 
the benefits of compliance that it so clearly desires.  If it reneges, 
it will remain isolated.  And throughout the process, as I assured 
President Kim this morning, we will always take the steps necessary to 
assure the security of the Republic of Korea and the region. 
 
In implementing every phase of the Agreed Framework, we will continue to 
work with the Republic of Korea.  Our collective effort will open the 
door to a new and productive dialogue between the Koreas.  We share the 
conviction that the agreement cannot be fully implemented unless that 
dialogue moves forward. 
 
Let there be no doubt that we share serious concerns with the Republic 
of Korea about other aspects of North Korea's behavior--including the 
forward deployment of its conventional forces, missile proliferation, 
past support for terrorism, and disregard for human rights.  These 
concerns must be resolved if North Korea is to be brought fully into the 
family of civilized nations. 
 
We recognize that, at times, our resolve and our mettle will be tested.  
But I am convinced our common efforts will raise the possibility that 
the last bitter legacy of the Cold War, the division of the Korean 
peninsula, can finally be overcome. 
 
As we go down this untraveled road together, I want to make a pledge to 
you on behalf of President Clinton and the American people:  The United 
States will stand by you.  We will remain unshakably committed to your 
defense. 
 
We know that North Korea continues to present both a nuclear and 
conventional threat.  Accordingly, American soldiers, at the existing 
force level of approximately 37,000 troops, will continue to stand watch 
with the ROK armed forces over the most fortified frontier in the world.  
As President Clinton has pledged, "our troops will stay here as long as 
the Korean people want and need us here." 
 
The bedrock of our security commitment to the region will remain our 
forward military presence, supported by our treaty alliances with not 
only the ROK but also with Japan, Australia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand.  We now have nearly the same number of troops in Asia as in 
Europe.  We will maintain our force levels and their military readiness 
in Korea and elsewhere in this vital region. 
 
In Asia, just as in Europe and the Middle East, the future is being 
shaped by a central geostrategic fact:  No great power now views another 
as an immediate military threat.  The end of the Cold War means that we 
and our allies can now work with China and Russia to resolve common 
security concerns in the Asia-Pacific region.  That is why we are 
encouraging new regional security dialogues among past and potential 
adversaries. 
 
In this respect, we welcomed the inauguration of the ASEAN Regional 
Forum last July, and we applaud the important role that the Republic of 
Korea has played in its creation.  The inclusion of China, Russia, and 
Vietnam in the forum reflects the enormous changes and opportunities 
transforming the Asia-Pacific region.  The Northeast Asian security 
dialogue also provides a valuable forum for advancing our common 
interest in regional stability, and we encourage that dialogue to 
continue. 
 
We seek to turn enmity to understanding, and suspicion to cooperation.  
For example, we are encouraging Chinese leaders to allay the concerns of 
their neighbors by being more open about their defense planning.  We 
have also been working with China to advance important nonproliferation 
goals.  Last month, we agreed to work for a global ban on producing 
fissile materials for nuclear weapons.  And Beijing pledged not to 
export missiles that fall under the Missile Technology Control Regime.  
These agreements are the most recent example of the ways in which our 
engagement with China is producing positive results for the region and 
the world. 
 
The United States' commitment to security and stability in the Asia-
Pacific region safeguards our nation's enduring stake in the region's 
remarkable prosperity.  Expanding trade and investment with the world's 
fastest growing region is vital to our economic security.  Asia's 
markets now support 2.5 million American jobs.  Through APEC, GATT, and 
our bilateral dialogues, the United States is working to widen our 
opportunities to participate in Asia's economic boom. 
 
Last year in Seattle, President Clinton convened the historic first 
meeting of leaders from the APEC members.  Later this week, I will be in 
Jakarta, along with Foreign Minister Han, for this year's APEC 
Ministerial meeting, and the President will soon arrive for the Leaders' 
Meeting.  With the help of the Republic of Korea and other APEC members, 
we hope to fuel the momentum for liberalization and cooperation 
generated last year.  We fully support the ambitious agenda of President 
Soeharto, this year's APEC chairman, to establish the goal of free and 
open trade in the region by a set date.  I thought that President Kim 
had it exactly right when he told me this morning that last year the 
APEC leaders had a vision when they met in Seattle.  This year, in 
Indonesia, they can begin to turn that vision into reality. 
 
Ratifying the GATT Uruguay Round agreement is another critical step in 
opening markets and spurring growth.  As you know, the President is 
committed to GATT ratification and open trade.  I trust that all our 
Pacific partners--including Korea--will show similar resolve in 
ratifying the Round now. 
 
The United States and the Republic of Korea share a growing stake in the 
economic dynamism of the Asia-Pacific region, and in an open world 
trading system.  The Korean people have made their economy the 13th 
largest in the world.  We are your largest export market; you are our 
seventh largest. 
 
The Dialogue for Economic Cooperation (DEC) initiated in July 1993 by 
President Kim and President Clinton is an example of the new maturity of 
our bilateral and economic relationship.  Now we must build on the 
progress we made through the DEC to overcome the barriers that remain to 
imports in important sectors like agriculture and autos. 
 
Under President Kim, Korea is integrating its economy into the world 
trading system.  It is driving an ambitious regional trade 
liberalization effort through its leadership of APEC's Trade and 
Investment committee.  And in its bid to become a member of the OECD--a 
bid strongly backed by the United States--it is signaling its 
willingness to assume the leadership responsibilities of a developed 
nation.  Once a recipient of foreign aid, the Republic of Korea is now 
an aid donor. 
 
As a successful democratic nation, Korea has many lessons to share.  
Korea has demonstrated that a developing market economy flourishes best 
alongside robust political competition and free trade unions.  And it 
has shown that sustained economic development is more likely where 
government is accountable to the people, where the rule of law protects 
property and contracts, and where people have access to uncensored 
media. 
 
No one needs to tell the Korean people that democracy is not a Western 
export.  Indeed, you have reminded us that the yearning for freedom is 
based on a fundamental respect for human dignity that is common to all 
cultures.  As President Kim has said:  "Respect for human dignity, 
plural democracy, and free market economics have firmly taken root as 
universal values."  And let me add that our alliance is so much stronger 
than ever because that conviction enunciated by President Kim has 
prevailed here in the Republic of Korea. 
 
Presidents Clinton and Kim have strengthened the ties between our two 
nations.  Each is committed to reform and economic renewal.  Each is 
committed to our solemn alliance.  I know that President Clinton 
especially admires President Kim's personal courage and dedication to 
democracy. 
 
The common aspirations of our peoples have brought us to this hopeful 
point.  The future holds even greater promise:  a Korean peninsula 
finally liberated from the ever-present fear of conflict; an open door 
to the resolution of Korea's greatest tragedy, the division of its 
people; and our two nations working together in partnership for a more 
secure, prosperous, and democratic Asia. 
 
On the eve of the next century, the United States and the Republic of 
Korea face this future in a spirit of confidence and cooperation. 
 
Let me conclude by commenting briefly on yesterday's mid-term 
Congressional elections in the United States.  It is an almost unbroken 
tradition that the party that holds the presidency--currently the 
Democrats--loses seats in the Congress in the mid-term elections.  
History tells us that the President's party will suffer losses at mid-
term.  Tonight in America, that is certainly the case. 
 
But it is also a tradition that whatever the outcome of the mid-term 
elections, there is a strong continuity in American foreign policy.  
Just before coming down here, I spoke to President Clinton.  I want to 
assure this international audience that we intend to go forward in the 
spirit of bipartisanship and continuity.  We will remain strong and 
steadfast in our commitments around the world. 
 
Our policy toward Asia and particularly toward Korea has strong 
bipartisan support.  I am confident that there will be continuity in our 
unshakable commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea, and to 
the maintenance of our troop levels here in the ROK. 
 
I am also confident that the Agreed Framework, which puts the North 
Korea nuclear issue on the road to resolution, will command strong 
bipartisan support.  That agreement, and the North-South dialogue, are 
in the best interest of the United States, the Republic of Korea, and 
indeed all the nations in the region, and as such, they merit unswerving 
support. 
 
Our partners in the global economy should know that there will also be 
continuity in our Administration's approach to international economic 
policy and our commitment to open trade. 
 
As Secretary of State, I have devoted considerable time to close 
consultation with our Congress, both with Democrats and Republicans.  
The major elements of our foreign policy have had bipartisan support, 
and I look forward to working with the new Congress to forge a 
bipartisan foreign policy. 
 
Thank you very much.   

(###) 
 
 
 

ARTICLE 2: 
 
The New Geopolitics:  Defending Democracy in the Post-Cold War Era 
Deputy Secretary Talbott 
Address at Oxford University, Oxford, England, October 20, 1994 
 
I have three reasons for being pleased to appear before you this 
afternoon.  The first is personal; the second is political; the third, 
historic.  
 
You are, I am sure, used to your transatlantic cousins wearing their 
hearts on their sleeves, so I won't disappoint you:  I love this place--
this city and this university.  They were good to me for three of the 
best years of my life.  I'm delighted to be back.  
 
Then there are the ties that bind your country to mine. Granted, we've 
had our bad moments, such as that time in 1814 when you folks set fire 
to my hometown.  But for the most part, the U.S.-British relationship 
has defied Lord Palmerston's famous dictum:  In some rare cases, 
permanent interests do make for permanent friendships or at least 
special relationships between nations.  The United Kingdom was our 
principal partner in the single-most important transformation of 
American foreign policy:  the U.S.'s emergence, a little more than a 
half-century ago, from a posture of not-so-splendid isolation to one of 
active engagement with the wider world.  That shift was triggered by the 
Anglo-American alliance in World War II, then rendered a permanent part 
of the way Americans think and act during the two generations that 
followed.   
 
Now, for the third reason I welcome your invitation to speak to you 
today:  It gives me a chance to discuss why the Clinton Administration 
believes it has a historic opportunity in U.S. foreign policy.   
 
A Historic Opportunity 
 
While every period is, by definition, a passage in human history, some 
mark the beginning of new chapters, even of new volumes.  This is one.  
We are now living through the third great defining moment of this 
turbulent century.  What brings us to this point is, of course, the end 
of the great struggle that has lasted for over 40 years--the global 
rivalry between two camps clustered around two superpowers.   
 
The end of the Cold War is, in one respect, similar to the periods of 
transition that have occurred when earlier, hot wars ended.  Out of the 
combatants' exhaustion comes a new resolve to establish new attitudes, 
arrangements, and structures.  Some of those then become fixtures on the 
international landscape.  Others evolve, others wither away, and still 
others blow up in our faces.  
 
For example, in the 17th century, the Thirty Years' War ended in the 
Treaty of Westphalia, which sought to impose order on the wreckage of 
the Holy Roman Empire.  Westphalia is often cited as the inception of 
the modern nation-state, in which people who spoke one language or 
worshipped one religion could band together under one flag within one 
set of boundaries:  not a bad idea but not a perfect one, either.  
Today, we are still coping with its more extreme imperfections, 
particularly in the disaster zone that used to be known as Yugoslavia.  
 
In the 19th century, the Napoleonic Wars ended with the Congress of 
Vienna, which enshrined balance-of-power as the guiding principle of 
international order.  The Concert of Europe was based on the premise 
that no one state on the continent should become too strong.  Again, not 
a bad idea but it, too, has its shortcomings.  The balance-of-power 
concept and, therefore, diplomacy based on it tend to be value-free.  
Proponents of balance-of-power hold that what matters about a state or 
its government is primarily its size and strength, not so much its 
nature.  The implication is that the difference between a democracy and 
a dictatorship is less important than whether they balance each other in 
brute strength.  
 
This view fosters the notion that the international community has an 
interest only in preserving equilibrium between and among states rather 
than in what happens inside those states. If applied too narrowly, that 
can become a standard for tolerance of the intolerable.  The obvious 
example from our century is the Holocaust.  It should have mattered to 
the world if Hitler's only victims had been German Jews.  But one 
wonders:  Would the world have ever done anything to stop him if Hitler 
had not combined genocide against Germany's citizens with aggression 
against Germany's neighbors, if he had been just as murderous at home 
but more restrained abroad?  Those questions haunt the balance-of-power 
school of international relations; they underscore the need for 
statecraft to incorporate principles drawn from ethics as well as those 
drawn from physics.   
 
Over the last 100 years, we have seen two world wars and two attempts at 
orchestrating world peace.  World War I was in many ways a double 
disaster.  It resulted not only in the slaughter of a generation but 
also in the squandering of the opportunity for peace that came at 
Versailles.   
 
My country, which contributed to success on the battlefields of that 
war, also contributed to the failure that followed.  The U.S. Congress 
rejected American participation in the League of Nations and then 
enacted the Smoot-Hawley Act, a monument to protectionism.  That 
legislation, it has often been said, helped put the "Great" in the Great 
Depression.  These and other follies of the interwar period created an 
international climate conducive, it turned out, to the rise of fascism 
and thus to another conflagration.  
 
The leaders of the great coalition that triumphed in the Second World 
War learned several, if not all, of the lessons from the aftermath of 
the first.  This time, instead of humiliating and impoverishing their 
defeated enemies, the victors helped rebuild Japan and Germany.  Through 
the Marshall Plan, GATT, and the international financial institutions 
born at Bretton Woods,  those statesmen who were present at the creation 
of the post-World War II world established the basis for a community of 
Western democracies and for an increasingly interdependent and 
prosperous global economy.  
 
World War II also spurred another attempt to establish an institution 
dedicated to international law, collective security, and the enforcement 
of peace.  The result--the United Nations--was a distinct improvement 
over the League of Nations, although it still has a long way to go 
before it fulfills the aspirations of its founders--and of its current 
members.  
 
Yet, in a very real sense, the peace that followed the Allied triumph 
over the Axis was not a real peace at all.  As Clausewitz might have put 
it, with the end of World War II, international politics became, for 
nearly half a century, the conduct of war by other means.   
 
Just as the Cold War was waged by different means--propaganda campaigns, 
proxy struggles in the Third World, nuclear rivalry--it was also waged 
over different issues from those that had traditionally pitted nations 
against one another.  Throughout previous eras, the cause of war and the 
spoils of victory were usually some combination of land and power.  Even 
in wars fought in the name of religion, the question almost always was:  
Who would plant what flag on what piece of real estate?   
 
The casus belli of the Cold War was different--not entirely different 
but significantly so.  The central issue over which Britain, America, 
and the West waged the Cold War against the Soviets and their satellites 
did, to be sure, involve land and power.  The map of the world--
certainly of Europe--was largely color-coded in blue--our side, and red-
-theirs. 
 
But the Cold War was not just about land and power.  It was also a 
conflict--protracted, ruthless, and, in fact, quite often rather hot--
between competing concepts of how to organize the political and economic 
lives of individual human beings, of individual states, and of the 
planet as a whole.  Power, of course, played its part.  NATO, as is 
often said, proved to be the most successful military alliance in 
history. The signature Western policies of deterrence and containment 
succeeded spectacularly.  
 
But this was not just a case of one group of states banding together to 
defeat another.  Rather, it was one set of ideas winning out over 
another.  There were adherents and proponents of those victorious ideas 
on both sides of the battle lines--or, more to the point, on both sides 
of what used to be the Iron Curtain.  The liberal values that unite the 
NATO member states have taken hold, in varying degrees, from Estonia on 
the Baltic to Albania on the Adriatic to Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia on the 
frontier of China and to Vladivostok on the Pacific.  
 
To be sure, there are still a few countries that continue to decorate 
their flags with red stars and pay lip service to Marx, Engels, and 
Lenin.  They include the most populous country on earth--China.  But 
these holdout communist states, too, offer reason for what might be 
called strategic optimism--albeit tempered with tactical patience, 
prudence, and firmness.   
 
One reason for optimism is the communications revolution--the 
permeability of even the most heavily fortified borders to radio and 
television broadcasts, as well as to subversively interactive influences 
such as telefax and e-mail.  Among the forces that tore holes in the 
Iron Curtain was the steady bombardment by the Voice of America, Radio 
Free Europe and Radio Liberty, and the BBC.  The communications 
revolution has not just permitted the transmission of news--it has 
helped bring about the single-most important and pervasive good news of 
our time:  the decline of dictatorship and the rise of democracy. 
 
A Consensus for Democracy And Free Markets 
 
As the peoples of the world approach the 21st century, they are arriving 
at an unprecedented consensus about how we should organize ourselves 
within as well as among states.  There is an increasingly universal 
sense--shared and championed by people on every continent--that 
democracy is the best form of political organization and the free market 
is the most successful form of economic organization.  
 
To be sure, elections are neither a panacea for social ills nor a 
guarantee of enlightened government.  Hitler's National Socialist Party, 
it is often pointed out, won at the polls in 1932.  Vladimir 
Zhirinovskiy's grotesquely misnamed Liberal Democratic Party did all-too 
well for anyone's comfort except its own in the Russian parliamentary 
elections of last December. Nonetheless, as a general proposition, 
democracy helps bring prosperity to its people and peace to its 
neighbors. 
 
As evidence, let me cite developments on my side of the Atlantic.  As 
recently as 15 years ago, most of the nations in Latin America were 
ruled by military dictatorships.  Now, every government except Cuba's 
has a genuine claim to democratic legitimacy.  As these states have 
moved toward democracy, they have also moved away from statist economic 
policies.  Democratically elected leaders in Mexico, Argentina, Chile, 
and Brazil have been able to push through comprehensive economic 
reforms.  
 
South Asia, too, has moved decisively toward democracy and markets.  In 
the past decade, 260 million people in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal 
have regained the right to vote in free and fair elections.  In India, 
where democratic institutions are firmly established, Prime Minister Rao 
and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh are in the midst of an impressive 
series of reforms that will transform their country's economy--they have 
made the rupee a convertible currency, sharply reduced import barriers, 
and they are in the process of a sweeping overhaul of the banking sector 
and the privatization of state-owned industries.  There are similar 
success stories in Asia and Africa--in nations as diverse as South 
Korea, South Africa, and Malawi.   
 
In all these cases, there is a close linkage between democratic politics 
and free-market economics.  All over the world, democratically elected 
leaders have shown themselves more inclined than their authoritarian or 
totalitarian predecessors to choose the economic and social policies 
that will best benefit their people.  
 
This is the case even in the world's poorer regions. Harvard economist 
and Oxford don Amertya Sen has noted that no substantial famine has ever 
occurred in a country with a democratic form of government and a 
relatively free press.  India, for example, continued to have famines 
right up to the time of independence in 1947.  The last famine--and one 
of the largest--occurred in 1943, when an estimated 2-3 million people 
died.  Since independence and the founding of a multiparty democratic 
system, there has been no substantial famine, even though severe crop 
failures and food scarcities have occurred all-too frequently.  
 
Similarly, famine prevention programs run by democratically elected 
governments in Botswana and Zimbabwe enabled these nations to withstand 
severe crop failures in the early 1980s. During the same period, Sudan 
and Ethiopia--with comparatively smaller declines in food production but 
with the huge disadvantage of anti-democratic regimes--suffered major 
famines.   
 
The rise of democracy has also contributed to a dramatic reduction in 
acts of aggression by one state against another.  Latin American states, 
for instance, skirmished regularly among themselves for most of this 
century.  There were full-scale wars between Costa Rica and Panama, 
Bolivia and Paraguay, Peru and Ecuador, and Honduras and El Salvador.  
But here is the point:  At the time those conflicts occurred, all the 
nations involved were governed by dictatorships.  Since democracy began 
to spread rapidly through the Western Hemisphere in the early 1980s, no 
Latin American nation has gone to war with any other.  The one case of a 
Latin American country that started a war against a European power is 
instructive in more ways than one.  I am referring, of course, to the 
fate of Argentina's military rulers after their misadventure in the 
Falklands.  They were subsequently convicted of human rights abuses and 
succeeded by democratically elected civilians.  
 
With each passing year, it becomes increasingly apparent that the 
proposition "democracies don't go to war with one another" is not just a 
bromide--it is as close as we are likely to get in political science to 
an empirical truth.  
 
Partly for that reason, as Secretary of State Christopher has noted, we 
are now living in a unique historical moment, when none of the great 
powers views any other as an immediate military threat.   
 
To be sure, the United States still has disputes with Russia and with 
China--and, for that matter, on certain issues with your government, as 
well as with France, Germany, and Japan. But there is, for the first 
time, no defining polarization of world politics; no match-up between 
two giants whose own zero-sum game establishes the rules for the rest of 
the world--contestants and bystanders alike.  There is no equivalent, 
say, to Sparta versus Athens, or Rome versus Carthage, or Britain versus 
Spain in the 16th century--or any of the other titanic rivalries that 
have provided so much of the plot of history.   
 
This state of affairs is in large part the result of an increasingly 
widespread, increasingly uncontested commitment to democracy, free 
trade, and free markets.  For the first time in human history, virtually 
all of the world's leading economic and military powers are multi-party, 
free-market democracies.  So, too, are most of the allies of the great 
powers.  
 
That is why President Clinton believes that our generation has a 
historic opportunity to shape our world.  He believes that since it is, 
above all, the triumph of democracy and markets that has brought us 
victory in the Cold War, it must be, above all, the defense of democracy 
and markets that should guide us now. 
 
Sustaining Democracy 
 
It is overwhelmingly in our best interests to sustain the trend of 
democratization.  If that trend is reversed, our well-being will suffer.  
A military rivalry among the great powers is far more likely to arise 
should one or more of those powers abandon its commitment to free trade, 
open markets, and open society, and slip back into totalitarian politics 
and command economics.  By the same token, it is significant that we 
face menaces to our common security today from Iraq and North Korea, two 
states that have resisted the global tide of democracy.   
 
While democracy and market economics are ascendant, they are not 
everywhere established--far from it.  In many nations that have begun 
the transition, the necessary institutions--the political and economic 
cultures-- are in their infancy.  As Secretary Christopher has said on a 
number of occasions, it is precisely the newborn democracies that are 
most in need of international support.   
 
That, in essence, is why your government and ours have joined forces 
with 28 other nations in Haiti, making possible last Saturday's 
extraordinary celebration in Port-au-Prince of the restoration of that 
country's democratic government.  United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 940, authorizing the deployment of the multi- national 
coalition, was a watershed.  For the first time, the UN gave the defense 
of democracy standing as justification to use "all necessary means"-- in 
other words, military force.   
 
The UN mission in Haiti establishes that the international community can 
take action not just when regimes attack their neighbors but when they 
savage their own people as well.  There are--and will always be--
disagreements about how far the international community's responsibility 
runs and in what cases it applies.  But there can be no doubt that we 
are in the process of redefining geopolitics.   
 
At the same time, we have not by any means abandoned traditional 
concepts of sovereignty or security, nor have we foresworn the 
traditional means to deter and, if necessary, rebuff those who would 
jeopardize or violate the peace.  
 
Witness the UN's response to Saddam Hussein's latest aggressive 
mobilization.  In this episode, we have acted upon geopolitical 
considerations of a more conventional sort than in Haiti.  In Iraq, the 
international community has backed down a bully who was threatening his 
neighbor and endangering global energy supplies.  Yet this 
confrontation, too, contains dramatic evidence of how the world has 
changed for the better with the end of the Cold War--after some initial 
reluctance, Russia joined the U.S., U.K., and the rest of the UN 
Security Council in Resolution 949, which further limits Saddam's 
ability to deploy his army in a threatening manner. 
 
Europe and the New Geopolitics 
 
Let me now say a few words about how the new geopolitics--our attempt to 
redefine national and international  security--applies to this region of 
the world, Europe.  The European continent, after all, was the primary 
battleground of the Cold War.  This is where that struggle was won.  
This is where we must consolidate the gains of victory.  It is here in 
Europe, as much as anywhere on earth, that we must apply the principle 
of defending democracy where it is most fragile and vulnerable.   
 
We in the community of established market democracies need to stay with 
the post-communist reformers.  We must be as persistent as they are.  It 
would be a terrible mistake to assume, complacently, that without our 
help democracy and markets will succeed everywhere they now have a 
foothold.  An even worse mistake would be to succumb, fatalistically, to 
the fear that even with our help, reforms in these countries are doomed 
to fail.   
 
Throughout the Cold War, Western resolve had indispensable allies in 
Eastern reformers and in the people themselves--a fact often lost in the 
smug and triumphalist rhetoric of some in the West.  The victims of 
communism became the victors over communism--and we must include them in 
our planning for the post-Cold War world.  
 
This is a first principle of the American Government's policy toward 
Europe.  It is a large part of the reason why, when he came to Europe 
three times earlier this year, President Clinton stressed his commitment 
to the goal of integration:  to work within the Transatlantic 
Partnership to build an undivided Europe--a Europe united by a shared 
commitment to democracy, free-market economies, and mutual respect for 
borders.  
 
What does this mean in practical terms?  It means bringing Eastern 
states into Western economic institutions--into the GATT, into the 
European Union, and into the OECD.  If the countries of Central Europe 
and the former Soviet Union have the courage to take the painful but 
necessary steps of economic reform, then we must be prepared to do our 
part as well.  As President Clinton has said, "it will make little sense 
for us to applaud their market reforms on the one hand while offering 
only selective access to our markets on the other."  
 
Integration also means that we must continue to develop the first post-
Cold War security structure--the Partnership for Peace.  Two weeks ago, 
Armenia became the 23rd nation to join.  Since its launching at the NATO 
summit in January, the Partnership has taken on practical content, 
coherent shape, and promising direction.  Already it has produced the 
remarkable spectacle of former adversaries from NATO and the old Warsaw 
Pact exercising together in Poland.  A second such exercise will take 
place in the Netherlands later this month.   
 
NATO itself is also evolving.  As President Clinton, Vice President 
Gore, Secretary of State Christopher, and Secretary of Defense Perry 
have all vowed, NATO will, in due course, take in new members.  It will 
do so on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the interests and the 
will of the member states, and no other power will have a veto over the 
process.   
 
If handled properly--and it will be handled properly--NATO expansion can 
serve the larger cause of European integration, security, and political 
stability.  Or, to put the same point differently:  NATO's evolution can 
help guide the evolution of Europe itself.  The addition of new members 
to NATO need not--and indeed must not--lead to new divisions between 
East and West. 
 
In this regard, we must also continue to develop other avenues of 
security cooperation which--like the Partnership for Peace--can or do 
encompass all the nations of the Euro-Atlantic world.  Right now, in 
Budapest, the 52 nations that participate in the CSCE--the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe--are exploring how the CSCE can be 
made a more effective instrument for regional conflict management and 
for establishing a common security space based on shared values and 
principles of behavior.  The United States will work hard to ensure the 
success of this effort.   
 
But this effort will be all-the-more difficult if we do not meet the 
challenge of the former Yugoslavia.  The situation in that benighted 
corner of Europe remains dire.  The Bosnian Serbs are still committing 
atrocities and defying the will of the international community.  Bosnian 
Muslims and Croats face a terrible winter under siege.  If the fighting 
spreads, we could, with gruesome symmetry, close out this century with a 
sequel to the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913.  
 
Moreover, Bosnia dramatizes a global problem--of nationalistically 
inspired separatism and civil war, feuds among tribes that fly the 
banner of self-determination--in other words, a new world disorder, a 
phenomenon that might be called Westphalia and Versailles run amok.  We 
have seen failed states in Rwanda and Somalia; we've seen ethnic 
conflict stir regional instability in the Transcaucasus.  This kind of 
disintegration within states poses a major obstacle to the goal of 
integration among states, all of which is an additional reason why we 
cannot ignore the conflict in Bosnia.  In the days and weeks ahead, we 
will be working closely with our colleagues in the Contact Group--the 
U.K., France, Russia, and Germany, which represents the European Union.  
We shall work to strengthen the still-fragile Federation in Bosnia.  We 
shall seek ways to seal the border between Serbia and Bosnia more 
tightly.  We shall urge stricter enforcement of UN-protected exclusion 
zones.   
 
There may even be glimmers, however tentative, of good news amidst the 
horror of the former Yugoslavia.  The effort to end the conflict has 
seen the UN Security Council for the first time use NATO as an 
instrument to enforce the will of the United Nations.UNPROFOR--the 
United Nations Protection Force--has brought together many members of 
the Partnership for Peace, including not only the United Kingdom, 
Canada, and France but also former Warsaw Pact states such as Poland, 
Ukraine, and Russia.  Russia's willingness to join forces--diplomatic 
and military--with the West in the common cause of ending the conflict 
is among the more striking pieces of evidence that we are indeed living 
in a new world.   
 
This leads me, in closing my remarks, to say a bit more about Russia--
the country whose language, literature, culture, and history I studied 
while I was a student here.  
 
Many in Moscow are worried that their country will end up being excluded 
from an expanded and integrated European security structure.  More 
specifically, they are concerned that the Partnership for Peace and the 
intention to expand NATO are, in their essence, directed against Russia.  
Last month, Vice President Gore sought to allay this concern.  
Addressing an audience in Berlin, he explained why the expansion of NATO 
would not be incompatible with the security interests of Russia.  He 
noted that "instability in Central Europe, that seedbed of European 
wars, has twice in this century brought tragedy to the continent."  The 
Russian people, who suffered greatly from those tragedies, have as much 
reason as any to fear further instability in Central Europe.  Therefore, 
Russia has as much reason as any to want to see stability in Central 
Europe--and that is precisely the goal of an expanded NATO.  Expansion, 
when it comes, should be viewed not as an action directed against anyone 
but as an important component of regional security and stability. 
 
But, one might ask--and many do--what about the stability of Russia 
itself?  Quite simply, we do not know for sure what kind of state Russia 
will be in the 21st century.  That vast, proud, rich, accomplished, 
troubled land is in the process of redefining itself, and it will be 
doing so for some considerable time to come.  But we do know, very much 
for sure, what kind of state we want Russia to be:  We want it to be a 
strong, prosperous democracy; we want it to be integrated into the 
economic and political life of the rest of the world; we want it to be 
secure in its current borders and respectful of the independence, 
sovereignty, and territorial integrity of its neighbors, notably 
including those neighbors who were, like Russia itself, republics of the 
U.S.S.R.  
 
That is not just our hope for Russia--it is many Russians' wish for 
their own country.  That includes many leaders of Russia today and many 
who aspire to be its leaders in the future. Theirs, of course, are not 
the only aspirations at play in the rough-and-tumble of the Duma and the 
Federation Council--and on the hustings, now that real politics has 
finally come to that country.  There are forces very much in the open, 
as well as behind the scenes and underground and in the dark alleys, 
that are ugly, threatening, retrograde, and worse.  
 
There is, in short, a great struggle underway in Russia for its future, 
its identity, its soul, and its place in Europe.  As President Clinton 
has put it, the Russian people must ask themselves "what does it mean to 
be a great power in this 21st century?  Will they define it in 
yesterday's terms, or tomorrow's?"  Or, to put it most starkly:  Will 
they choose imperialism and repression or integration and freedom? 
 
What we must do is everything in our power to encourage the forces that 
we want to see prevail, over time, in that struggle. Those are the same 
forces that will, if they do prevail, allow Russia to achieve genuine 
security and prosperity.   
 
What we must not do is prejudge the outcome of that struggle--and 
especially we must not base our prejudgment on prejudice, on historical 
stereotypes, on warmed-over Cold War ideology--lest we commit the 
fallacy of the self-fulfilling prophecy.  We must heed Voltaire, who 
warned against mistaking our nightmares for premonitions of the future.   
 
To put it bluntly, if we were to base our policies on the pessimistic 
presumption that Russia will regress rather than evolve, then we would  
have committed, in the final years of this century, a strategic blunder 
equal to the one committed in the opening years, at Versailles and 
afterward.  
 
But let me also put the same point more positively--more in the spirit 
of strategic optimism that Bill Clinton believes should inform American 
foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.  We can seize the opportunities 
in this period of transition.  We are more likely to do so if we 
understand why all those earlier attempts at lasting peace-- Westphalia, 
Vienna, Versailles, Munich, and Yalta--failed or fell short.  We can 
learn from the lessons and build on the legacies of our past as we 
develop a strategy for our future.  And this time, we can get it right.   

(###) 
 
 
 

ARTICLE 3: 
 
American Power and American Diplomacy  
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President For National Security Affairs 
Address at Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, October 21, 
1994 
 
I want to speak with you about the relationship between power and 
diplomacy--particularly American power and American diplomacy--in a 
dramatically changed world. 
 
This is an extraordinary moment in world affairs.  The single, 
overarching threat of the Cold War has vanished.  The international 
environment is starkly new--a far cry from the old strategic landscape, 
in which every move and every alteration was interpreted in relation to 
the Soviet threat.  But even in this new era there are some old truths. 
 
Old Truths 
 
The first is that divisions and debates about our role in the world are 
as old as our Republic.  On one side stand severely limited forms of 
foreign engagement and protectionism; on the other, active American 
engagement abroad on behalf of democracy and on behalf of expanded 
trade. 
 
After World War II--thanks in large part to the threat posed by the 
Soviet Union--that debate was resolved in favor of active engagement.  
Today, as in the late 1940s, we face again the old impulse to retrench.  
And today, as in the late 1940s, our interests demand that we check that 
impulse.  But our task is more difficult now, because we undertake it in 
circumstances not of the late 1940s but of the 1920s:  Much of our 
society now, as in the 1920s, seeks a rest from the rigors of 
international activism, and there is no single threat against which to 
rally public opinion. 
 
A second old truth is this:  Ideas matter.  They are at stake in most of 
the daily struggles we see around the world.  As the President has said:  
 
We face a contest as old as history--a struggle between freedom and 
tyranny; between tolerance and isolation.  It is a fight between those 
who would build free societies governed by laws and those who would 
impose their will by force.  Our struggle today, in a world more high-
tech, more fast-moving, more chaotically diverse than ever, is the age-
old fight between hope and fear. 
 
This brings me to the third old truth in this new era:  Power still 
matters.  We are not the world's police officer.  But in this struggle 
between hope and fear, our power will make the critical difference, as 
it did in two world wars and the Cold War.  And at the heart of American 
power lies the threat or use of military force.  Without it, Haiti would 
not today be at the dawn of a difficult but exciting democratic 
opportunity.  And without it, Iraq would today be threatening its 
neighbors with a dangerous military deployment on the borders of Kuwait. 
 
Negotiating From a Position of Strength 
 
In short, diplomacy disconnected from power usually fails.  At the same 
time, power without diplomacy is dangerously lacking in purpose. 
 
This, I know, is not a novel thought.  In antiquity, Thucydides set out 
with graphic horror in the Melian dialogue the weakness of diplomacy 
without the backing of force.  The sound arguments of the Melians for 
preserving their independence provided no defense against an Athens bent 
on subjugation.  Without the power to back their positions, Melos's men 
were put to the sword; women and children were sold as slaves. 
 
The same arguments many centuries later in Europe in the late 1930s were 
resolved by Hitler and his policy by panzer, and in the Pacific by Pearl 
Harbor.  Following World War II, far-sighted statesmen like Dean Acheson 
worked to keep that lesson in the American mind.  Acheson and other wise 
men knew that the United States needed all the instruments of diplomacy 
and power to defend vital interests and prevail over the long haul in 
the Cold War.  It was Acheson who coined the phrase, "negotiate from a 
position of strength." 
 
The New Global Economy 
 
Today, of course, American diplomacy draws considerable strength from 
its economic power and the power of our example. 
 
It is not only that our global economic reach makes the American voice 
an important one on almost every global issue that we can think of.  The 
new global economy may also be causing a small revolution in the nature 
of diplomacy.  As the economy of every nation depends increasingly on 
participation in the single world marketplace, most economies thus 
become more vulnerable also to the effects of economic isolation. 
 
This means that they may be more susceptible to both economic inducement 
and economic penalties.  South Africa presents a wonderful example of 
this.  And we have seen just how effective both incentives and sanctions 
can be in our negotiations with North Korea over their nuclear weapons 
program.  We welcome, of course, the North Korean decisions that led to 
the agreement being signed today.  I think it is a hell of a deal.  The 
agreement is in their interest, as well as ours, for it can help end 
their economic and political isolation.  But it may not have been 
accidental that real progress in the talks occurred last summer when it 
became clear we were about to take a sanctions resolution to the United 
Nations Security Council. 
 
We also see the power of sanctions in the case and behavior of Serbia.  
Indeed, you can draw a direct line from the dramatic effects of the 
isolation of the Serbian economy to the evolving policy of Slobodan 
Milosevic. 
 
Military Force:  The Threat Of America's Power 
 
But at the very heart of America's power is military force.  This is why 
President Clinton has vowed that our armed forces will remain the best 
trained, the best equipped, and the best prepared military in the world.  
I say "remain" the best, because the efficient and rapid way in which 
our military conducted their recent operations in the Gulf and Haiti can 
leave no doubt about their current readiness and strength. 
 
The Cassandras attacking our readiness are simply wrong:  We have 
prepositioned arms in hot spots like the Persian Gulf, expanded our sea- 
and airlift capabilities, and increased funding for operations and 
maintenance in fiscal year 1995 by over 5%.  There are indeed readiness 
and mobility concerns for the future that we must and will address, but 
our troops' rapid and highly effective successive deployments to Haiti 
and Iraq confirmed our confidence:  We remain prepared to fight and win 
two major regional conflicts almost simultaneously. 
 
Our challenge is not only a matter of maintaining our military might.  
We also need a new national debate today on the critical questions of 
when, where, and how to use military force.  In the late 1940s and 
1950s, there was just such a wide-ranging discussion on questions of 
nuclear doctrine and limited war.  I believe we desperately need a 
similar exchange today, and you in this room have a central role to play 
in shaping the debate and thereby shaping our common future. 
 
When will we use force?  The short answer remains what it always has, or 
should have been--when our interests require us to do so.  What are 
these American interests? 
 
Defining National Interests 
 
During the Cold War, our interests were defined overwhelmingly in terms 
of the threat to the United States posed by Soviet nuclear weapons.  
That led to the policy of nuclear deterrence.  Thanks, in part, to that 
policy, we are free and alive and assembled here today. 
 
The policy of containment also flowed from America's definition of 
interest in the light of the Soviet threat.  The national consensus 
behind containment helped produce victory in the Cold War.  But as 
Vietnam showed, the relationship between means and ends in fighting 
limited wars was never satisfactorily defined. 
 
Today, with an ever-increasing choice of possible missions in a rapidly 
changing world, our thinking needs still finer resolution than it has 
ever had before. 
 
Just as in the promotion of democracy and open markets we concentrate on 
those areas where our interests are most deeply engaged, so we must be 
as clear as possible on when and where we will use military force.  For 
there is no more important decision a President makes. 
 
No matter how clear our military doctrine, that decision has and should 
always come down to a judgment that weighs the importance of a 
particular mission, defined in terms of our interests, against its 
presumed costs. 
 
Here, in general if not perfect order of priority, are the seven 
national interests, taken in some combination or even alone, that this 
Administration believes can merit the use of our military, especially in 
areas of greatest strategic significance: 
 
--  To defend against direct attacks on the United States, its citizens 
at home and abroad, and its allies. 
 
--  To counter aggression, which is central to preserving a peaceful 
world. 
 
--  To defend our most important economic interests, because it is here 
that Americans see their most immediate personal stake in our 
international engagement. 
 
--  To preserve, promote, and defend democracy, which, in turn, enhances 
our security and the spread of our values. 
 
--  To prevent the dangerous proliferation of nuclear weapons and other 
weapons of mass destruction, to prevent acts of terrorism, and to combat 
the deadly flow of drugs. 
 
--  To maintain our reliability.  When the U.S. makes commitments to 
other nations, we must keep our promises. 
 
--  And for humanitarian purposes, such as combating famine and other 
natural disasters and in cases of over- 
whelming violations of human rights. 
 
Setting Priorities 
 
An array of interests need not mean disarray in setting our priorities.  
By itself, none of the interests in this general hierarchy--with the 
certain exception of attacks on our nation and its allies and the 
possible exception of aggression elsewhere--should automatically lead to 
the use of force.  But the wider the range of these interests at stake, 
the more likely that we will call again on our military.  That is why, 
in Haiti, when we saw democracy denied, our borders threatened, our 
reliability on the line, and a reign of brutality so close to our own 
shores, we saw a compelling case for intervention. 
 
It is not our interests alone that decide when and where to use force.  
Against the interests at stake we must measure the costs and benefits of 
each specific operation, and answer such questions as:  Is there a 
clearly defined, achievable mission?  What is the environment of risk we 
are entering?  What are the prospects for success?  What is needed to 
achieve our goals?  What are the potential costs--both human and 
financial--of the engagement?  Do we have a realistic exit strategy? 
 
There is no algorithm here--no simple formula that asks us only to fill 
in the numbers in calculating the risks and the requirements of each 
mission.  But we do know that those are the factors we must consider as 
we decide when and where to send our young men and women into danger.  
There is also a set of guidelines that help shape how we use force, and 
its likely utility when we do. 
 
When we send American troops abroad, we will send them with a clear 
mission and the means to prevail.  And when we use force, we must be 
prepared to use it unflinchingly.  To do otherwise endangers the 
interests we seek to safeguard, as well as the troops we send. 
 
We should never delude ourselves:  Deploying our military often will not 
solve underlying problems, and we must carefully limit the missions we 
choose.  Force can defeat an aggressor, but it will not conjure 
democracy into existence or flip the switch on to prosperity.  It may 
only begin to make a solution possible farther down the road.  When we 
do act, we will do so with others when we can, but alone when we must.  
In some cases, in which we should not act unilaterally, we may choose to 
join in multilateral action as we share the burdens and spread the 
risks.  The United States has consistently led the effort to build 
coalitions to meet the needs of the international community.  Joining 
together in common cause makes us all stronger, and deepens our moral 
authority. 
 
The more deeply our interests are threatened, of course, the more 
inclined we are to act alone.  That is why we have said that we will act 
by ourselves in the Persian Gulf, if necessary--and did so earlier when 
the Iraqis plotted against the life of a former American President and 
thus against our whole people, as well. 
 
Finally, a cautionary note on another potential guideline.  Some have 
argued for a simpler policy:  That we should assert a sphere of 
influence in our own hemisphere and in limited areas beyond, leaving to 
others the task of maintaining stability and order in their own spheres.  
This view, I believe, is dangerously wrong. 
 
Certainly, proximity counts.  Had Haiti not been so close to our shores, 
we would have been less likely to act.  The dramatic advance of 
democracy in this hemisphere is one of the truly stirring developments 
of our time, and we have an obvious interest in preventing any 
unraveling of that achievement. 
 
We recognize that all nations have greater concerns for their immediate 
surroundings than they do for distant regions.  But as a great nation, 
whose interests and ideals are global in scope, we cannot--and will not-
-cede to others a right to intervene as they wish in the affairs of 
their neighbors without regard to international norms of behavior.  
Specifically, we must expect of others that they will respect the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of their neighbors, just as we do. 
 
These, then, are the calculations of interest and cost that have 
produced our past uses of military power and will guide us in the 
future. 
 
Putting Power Behind Diplomacy 
 
Every time we have used force, we have balanced interests against costs.  
And in each case, our use of our military has put power behind our 
diplomacy, allowing us to make progress we would not otherwise have 
achieved. 
 
Iraq poses a threat of aggression in which a broad range of American 
interests are engaged.  So we are leading a coalition under the 
authority of the United Nations--but are prepared to act alone if we 
must.  The result of the President's decisive action has been not only 
the near-resolution of the current crisis, but a new injunction by the 
Security Council against future Iraqi aggression. 
 
In Haiti, where lesser but nonetheless important interests are at stake, 
we also acted--but at a potentially lower cost.  Over three years, we 
had exhausted all avenues of negotiation and the use of economic 
sanctions in our efforts to redeem the pledges of two administrations to 
restore the democratically elected government there.  But in the end it 
was only the use of force that could finally bring success.  When the 
Haitian generals received the news that the 82nd Airborne Division was, 
in fact, airborne and headed their way--they gave way.  As a result, we 
achieved peacefully what we were prepared to do under fire.  I recall 
that Sunday afternoon vividly when it looked like we might have to use 
force.  If you are prepared to use force you may "subdue the enemy 
without fighting," to use Sun Tzu's words.  The ancient strategist 
called that "the acme of skill."   
 
In Bosnia, we have not seen all the progress that we would like, but 
when diplomacy has been married to military power, positive movement has 
been the result.  For example, the Sarajevo ultimatum succeeded 
primarily because the threat of NATO air strikes was concrete.  NATO's 
decision on the use of air power substantially eased the pressures on 
Sarajevo, prevented the fall of Gorazde, and provided the foundation for 
last spring's agreement between the Bosnians and Bosnian Croats to end 
their conflict and form a federation.  The recent NATO decision to seek 
greater clarity and flexibility from the United Nations in Bosnia is a 
step in the right direction. 
 
In Rwanda and Somalia, our missions were primarily humanitarian, our 
interests more narrow.  Only the American military could have done what 
it did, saving hundreds and hundreds of thousands of lives, and we are 
very proud of that.  But over the longer run, our interests did not 
justify more than support for multilateral peace-keeping efforts once 
our own missions were concluded.  And there, as elsewhere, international 
peace-keeping efforts can only give a fractured society a window of 
opportunity--a time of relative security--in which to heal its own 
wounds.  No outside force can impose on any society what is, in the end, 
its own responsibility. 
 
Cooperation and Understanding 
 
A final point:  Policy, of course, does not succeed or fail in a vacuum.  
Public opinion and the Congress rightfully play central roles in how the 
United States wields its power abroad.  Perhaps the outstanding lesson 
we learned during Vietnam was the importance of what Les Gelb once 
called "the essential domino":  public opinion.  That conflict taught us 
to think more carefully about costs, more carefully about willpower as 
well as firepower, and more carefully about the length of engagement.  
But above all, it taught us that the United States cannot long sustain a 
fight without the support of public opinion. 
 
Public opinion is formed in our era in even more perplexing ways than 
during the Vietnam years.  This is especially true for humanitarian and 
other non-traditional interventions.  The quantum leap in coverage 
brought about by CNN and the other networks means that almost every day, 
every American must be beset by a painful ambivalence. 
 
Images of violence, misery, and brutality naturally call up the impulse 
to intervene.  The television screen transforms a particular incident 
into an apparently universal condition in that foreign society.  The 
camera, unfortunately, does not have peripheral vision.  My country and 
perhaps my country alone--the viewer feels--can do something about this 
carnage and must do something about this carnage. 
 
But when images of casualties--our casualties--appear, everything can 
change instantly.  The costs become painfully obvious, and the question 
arises:  Can this possibly be worth even one American life? 
 
Neither of these sentiments should surprise or dismay us.  Both 
reactions are expressions of the high value Americans place on human 
life.  And we are a better people for it. 
 
But while as individuals we all may share this painful ambivalence, it 
is the responsibility of government to make real choices and to act--
distinguishing between the essential and the tangential, acting on the 
basis of what is right, and then, when action is taken, doing so without 
hesitation or vacillation. 
 
To do this, there must be better understanding and cooperation between 
the Executive and the Congress.  We both, of course, must ultimately be 
responsible to the public for our decisions.  And this means a necessary 
and proper caution about incurring the costs of military action.  It is, 
after all, the American people who bear the burdens and pay the price. 
 
But we also know, from our most recent experience in the Persian Gulf, 
that the American people are not so averse to the use of force as some 
might think, especially if classic interests like security in Europe or 
Asia or the Middle East are in question.  And as a new Rand study 
indicates, they want to see our troops succeed once they are committed. 
 
Congress, we have seen, also supports the use of force whenever the 
nation's classic interests are at stake.  That is a great advantage, 
since it is imperative that the Executive branch and Congress work 
together on these issues. 
 
But in the post-Cold War world, we must also have the capacity for the 
limited use of force in new circumstances.  And too often in such cases, 
some in Congress react by emphasizing only the cautionary notes, seeing 
only costs and casualties rather than benefits and opportunities. 
 
And when we use force--to repeat--we must use it unflinchingly.  
Otherwise, we risk our objectives and we endanger our troops, both in 
the specific mission at hand and around the world.  When Congress almost 
automatically considers resolutions calling for an early withdrawal of 
our forces when deployed in non-traditional settings, it undermines our 
objectives and it compounds the risk for our troops.  It is virtually an 
invitation for the thug of the month to see if he can force our 
departure from some difficult corner of the world by attacking our 
soldiers there.  For this reason, among others, President Clinton 
opposed a hasty withdrawal from Somalia last fall.  That would have been 
the wrong way out and sent the wrong message around the world.  Instead, 
he raised our troop level before successfully drawing it down, over 
time, on schedule and without further casualties. 
 
This issue transcends the daily work we do in dealing with Congress.  
And recognizing Congress' role, this Administration has consulted with 
it in unprecedented ways--75 times alone in the case of Haiti. 
 
But what is needed is a war powers mechanism and system of consultations 
that work.  Next year, we will hold serious discussions with Congress on 
amending the War Powers Resolution in an effort to ameliorate a struggle 
between these branches of government that has lasted two centuries.  It 
will never be resolved, and perhaps never should be.  But the terms and 
tone of the competition over the making of national security policy must 
be improved, and must lose some of its current partisan cast, or our 
nation and troops could pay an unnecessary price for it. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Americans know that the passing of the Cold War, reassuring as that is, 
does not mean we live in a world of true safety.  We also know that we 
have before us an opportunity to build a world of more democracy, more 
tolerance, and more pluralism.  It is the kind of opportunity that 
comes, at most, once in an era.  To defeat the dangers and seize the 
day, we must summon our creativity and all of our diplomatic skill.  And 
to that skill, we must always harness our power.  So let us keep fixed 
in our minds the precept of one of the Enlightenment's great realists, 
Frederick the Great, who said:  "Diplomacy without arms is music without 
instruments." 
 
And let us remain alert to the danger of slippage and retreat.  We must 
reject the calls from the left and the right, as well as the rhetoric of 
neo-know-nothings of no particular view, to stay at home rather than 
engage.  You in this room may not believe that we are fighting a new 
round of the old struggle between engagement and retrenchment.  The 
debate is less clearly defined than it was in the period between the two 
world wars.  But every time a foreign aid bill is slashed, a troop 
deployment opposed on ideological rather than practical grounds, or a 
good trade agreement is attacked, it is part and parcel of that same 
traditional argument.  The impulse to  retreat from the world, like the 
fog, comes in on little cat feet.  So I ask you to join in efforts to 
keep our nation from becoming befogged in the face of a new world of 
continuing danger.  For it is also a time of immense  and wonderful 
opportunity.  I think we will seize it. 
(###). 
 
 
 

ARTICLE 4: 
 
Middle East Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources 
Statement by Acting Department Spokesman Christine Shelly 
Washington, DC, November 9, 1994. 
 
The Middle East Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources met in 
Athens, Greece, November 7-9, 1994.  Greek Foreign Minister Karolos 
Papaoulias addressed the plenary session and offered a Greek-led project 
and training course on water resources. 
 
Approximately 160 officials representing 45 delegations from around the 
world, including 13 parties from the Middle East, attended the meeting.  
The United States held the gavel for the meeting. 
 
The working group took substantial steps forward with its major ongoing 
projects: 
 
--  The Omani efforts to create a regional desalination research center 
in Muscat were strongly endorsed by all the regional parties. 
 
--  The group identified specific sites and next steps for the Israeli-
led project on rehabilitating municipal water supply systems. 
 
--  Nine delegations offered to conduct courses related to previously 
identified, specific needs for expertise in water matters in the Middle 
East. 
 
--  The group endorsed a detailed plan for compatible regional water 
data banks.  The United States and Canada offered financial support for 
the project. 
 
--  The Israelis, Jordanians, and Palestinians agreed to begin 
discussion on principles or guidelines for cooperation on water issues. 
 
--  The group agreed to undertake a German-led study that will analyze 
the various options for enhancing water supply in the region. 
 
The Group agreed on the need to create greater public awareness of the 
multilateral negotiations, and particularly to follow up on the 
Casablanca Economic Summit to further involve the private sector in the 
work of the Water Resources Working Group.  

(###) 
 
[END OF DISPATCH VOL 5, NO 46]

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