1.  Building the Structures of Peace and Prosperity in the New Middle 
East--Secretary Christopher  
2.  Casablanca Declaration
3.  The Increasing Role of Regional Organizations in Africa--Deputy 
Secretary Talbott, Assistant Secretary Moose
4.  Overview of Trip to East Asia and the Pacific And the APEC Meetings-
-Joan Spero, Winston Lord
5.  Principle, Power, and Purpose In the New Era--Madeleine K. Albright
6.  Status of Efforts To Obtain Iraq's Compliance With UNSC Resolutions-
-President Clinton
7.  Update on U.S. Policy Toward Cuba --Alexander Watson 
8.  Haiti's Recovery Program--Mark L. Schneider 
9.  Supporting Peace in Northern Ireland


Building the Structures of Peace and Prosperity in the New Middle East
Secretary Christopher
Remarks at the Royal Palace, Casablanca, Morocco, October 30, 1994

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen:  On behalf of President Clinton and 
the American people, I am delighted to attend this historic Middle 
East/North Africa Economic Summit.  We all owe King Hassan our deepest 
gratitude for hosting this unique event.  Building on his vision of 
Middle East peace, the King has brought us together to remove walls and 
build bridges between the people of the Middle East and the world.

President Clinton and the United States are pleased to be co-sponsoring 
this summit together with President Yeltsin and the Russian Federation.  
Let me express our appreciation to Les Gelb and the Council on Foreign 
Relations and to Klaus Schwab and the World Economic Forum for their 
outstanding efforts to structure and organize this important gathering.

This summit convenes at an extraordinary time.  I have just accompanied 
President Clinton on his recent trip to the Middle East.  Let me share 
with you our assessment.  The Middle East is undergoing a remarkable 

--  Jordan and Israel have signed a peace treaty;
--  The Israeli-PLO Declaration is being implemented;
--  Morocco and Tunisia have established ties with Israel;
--  Israel and Syria are engaged in serious negotiations; and 
--  Arab nations are taking steps to end the boycott of Israel.

These monumental events mean that the Arab-Israeli conflict is coming to 
an end.  The forces of the future can, they must, they will succeed.  
The peacemakers will prevail.

Securing the future is what brings us here today.  Our mission is clear:  
We must transform the peace being made between governments into a peace 
between people.  Governments can make the peace.  Governments can create 
the climate for economic growth.  But only the people of the private 
sector can marshall the resources necessary for sustained growth and 
development.  Only the private sector can produce a peace that will 

Three years ago to the day, nations gathered in Madrid for a conference 
whose significance grows with each passing month.  As we realize now, 
Madrid opened the pathway to peace.  Here, this week, let us declare 
that the Casablanca conference will open the pathway to economic ties 
and growth.  Madrid shattered taboos on political contacts between 
Israel and its Arab neighbors.  Let us ensure that Casablanca shatters 
taboos on private sector cooperation.

Let this summit send a message to the world:  The Middle East and North 
Africa are now open for business.

Over the course of the 20th century, the world has learned a powerful 
lesson:  Peace cannot be sustained when there is widespread suffering 
and misery.  Following World War II, wise leaders applied this lesson to 
the reconstruction and integration of Western Europe.  They built 
structures of cooperation, beginning with economic ties, to lessen the 
likelihood of conflict among nations.  Our purpose in Casablanca is to 
apply that same lesson to this region, as we work to create a more 
peaceful and secure Middle East.

On Wednesday night in Jordan, President Clinton became the first 
American President to address an Arab parliament.  There, he underscored 
the importance of generating the economic benefits of peace.  As he 

If people do not feel these benefits, if poverty persists in breeding 
despair and killing hope, then the purveyors of fear will find fertile 
ground.  Our goal must be to spread prosperity and security to all.

The Madrid conference of 1991 started us on the way.  It not only 
launched a series of bilateral negotiations to resolve the region's 
political disputes; it also created a framework of meaningful 
multilateral talks among some 40 nations to promote Arab-Israeli 
cooperation on a region-wide scale.  Joint projects are already underway 
to check the spread of the desert, to quench the region's thirst for 
water, and to protect the environment from oil spills.  Under the 
leadership of the European Union, the working group on economic 
development has drawn up a list identifying priority sectors for 
economic cooperation.

Israel, Jordan, and the United States are working together to create 
opportunities for private sector investment in areas that were 
unthinkable only months ago.  An ambitious master plan for the 
development of the Jordan Rift Valley has been completed.  Joint efforts 
to promote tourism in the Red Sea ports of Aqaba and Eilat are already 
attracting millions of dollars of investment in hotels, infrastructure, 
and tourist facilities.

Progress toward Arab-Israeli peace has opened the door to economic 
cooperation in support of peace.  Now, together, we must take a bold 
step through that door.  We must form a public sector-private sector 
partnership for government and business to bring their political and 
economic power jointly to bear.  

I have seen the situation from both sides--from the private sector, 
where I have spent most of my career, and from the public sector during 
my three tours in government.  I have also been heavily involved in the 
affairs of the Middle East for the past two years.  Let me offer a 
challenge and a prediction:  If the forces of peace prevail and if 
governments here adopt free market reforms, the Middle East and North 
Africa will enjoy an era of economic growth that exceeds anything they 
have seen in this century.  There is no reason why the economic miracles 
that are transforming parts of Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America 
cannot also transform this region.  I can foresee a day when the 300 
million people of the Middle East and North Africa, so long held back by 
strife and hatred, can finally join the mainstream of international 

The presence here in Casablanca of almost 1,000 of the world's business 
leaders is proof that you understand the vast potential of this region.  
I salute your vision.  But I also know that you are hard-nosed realists.  
The new Middle East holds no monopoly on attracting your attention or 
your capital.

That is why the Middle East, even a Middle East at peace, cannot be 
complacent; it must compete.  The world must know that the Middle East 
is not only at peace but committed to long-term reform if world-class 
companies are to invest in this region.

Almost 150 American firms are here in Casablanca.  They are well-poised 
to take advantage of the opportunities this region presents.  American 
companies do not fear risk; they thrive on it.  But like serious 
companies everywhere, they need confidence--confidence in a business 
environment that makes it possible to do business.

To create a climate for economic growth and development, we need 
commitment and action by governments inside the region as well as those 
outside.  For decades, governments dominated economic development here, 
building infrastructure and national industries.  In the process, they 
incurred massive foreign debts.  Since 1970, the countries of the Middle 
East have borrowed more than $90 billion from abroad.  Over 90% of this 
borrowing was absorbed by the public sector, where it was too often 
steered toward the military or inefficient state enterprises.

Not surprisingly, private capital and the private entrepreneurs that 
went with it fled the region.  In the last 20 years, capital outflows 
from the Middle East and North Africa have exceeded $180 billion.  This 
capital flight has had enormous practical consequences.

We must work to reverse this destructive trend.  It is time for the 
region's private sectors to invest in their nations, in their peoples, 
and in their futures.  They must bring their capital home.  But if they 
are to do so, governments must take steps to create a favorable economic 
environment.  How can you expect foreigners to invest here when citizens 
of the Middle East do not invest?

Governments here must undertake serious economic reform.  Morocco has 
begun that process.  Privatization is proceeding, stock market 
capitalization is rising, foreign investment is expanding, and growth is 
taking off.  Other countries in the region, such as Tunisia, Israel, 
Egypt, and Jordan, have also begun to take similar steps.

But more must be done.  Governments need to end trade restrictions and 
overcome other barriers to trade and investment.  They must reform and 
modernize their tax systems and commercial dispute mechanisms.  They 
need to ensure predictable, transparent, and fair legal systems and 
business practices.  They need private financial markets.  They must 
lift the heavy hand of government regulation that stifles entrepreneurs.

An important political step to make the region's environment more 
attractive to global companies must be taken as well.  The last remnants 
of the boycott aimed against Israel must be eliminated.  Last month, 
Saudi Arabia and its partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council announced 
an end to the secondary and tertiary boycotts.  This means enormous 
opportunities for investment and trade.  Now it is time for other Arab 
leaders to follow the GCC's example.  Indeed, it is time for the Arab 
League to dismantle the boycott entirely.

Governments outside the Middle East and North Africa must also do their 
part to create a climate conducive to economic growth.  They can take 
steps to encourage their companies to invest in the joint ventures that 
will become the stuff of Middle East peace.  They can provide incentives 
and reduce risks for foreign investors.  They can encourage trade by 
reducing barriers.  They can create the financial mechanisms that will 
help mobilize capital for regional projects.

The United States is already taking concrete steps in all these areas:

--  Through our Overseas Private Investment Corporation, we have 
established a $75 million Regional Investment Fund to encourage 
investment in regional projects like those envisaged in the Jordan Rift 
Valley development plan.

--  We have also used OPIC guarantees to help a group of American 
business leaders from the Arab and Jewish communities foster Palestinian 
economic development.  These builders for peace have already launched 
five OPIC-backed private sector projects in the West Bank and Gaza.

--  We are exploring practical means of expanding trade and investment 
opportunities, including initiatives to lessen barriers to trade and 
bilateral investment treaties.

--  President Clinton, in consultation with interested governments, has 
decided that the U.S. will take the lead in supporting a Middle East and 
North Africa Bank for Cooperation and Development.

Other governments outside the region are engaged in similar efforts to 
support the involvement of their private sectors in the development of 
the Middle East and North Africa.  But we all need to do more.  This is 
the opportunity presented by the Casablanca summit.  We must seize it.

Here in Casablanca, our focus must be practical.  Our work must not be 
limited to exhortation.  We must generate specific outcomes, with 
mechanisms to act on our proposals.

Specifically, in this conference the United States will call for the 

First, adoption of principles leading to the free movement of goods, 
capital, ideas, and labor across the borders of the Middle East and 
North Africa.

Second, the establishment of a Middle East and North Africa Bank for 
Cooperation and Development.  A bank, properly structured, can serve as 
a financing mechanism for viable regional projects.  It should be 
available for the private sector as well as the public sector, and 
should facilitate a regional economic dialogue.

Third, the creation of a regional tourism board.  Tourism is one of the 
clearest and quickest ways to generate hard currency revenues.  The 
Middle East and North Africa abound with incredible archeological and 
religious sites.  Millions of tourists will flock to visit as package 
tours across previously closed borders become available.

Fourth, the development of a regional business council--a chamber of 
commerce, if you will.  This entity will promote intraregional trade 
relations and commercial opportunities.

To move expeditiously on each of these proposals, this conference must 
establish two on-going bodies:  first, a steering committee, to meet 
within one month; second, an executive secretariat, located in Morocco, 
that will serve as a clearing house of information.  It will be an 
"address" for the private sector by sharing data, promoting contracts, 
and furnishing project information.

Finally, the United States will call for a follow-on conference in Amman 
in 1995.  Casablanca represents the launching of a process to promote 
regional economic development and cooperation.  Amman will represent the 
next milestone and point all of us to seeking very tangible 
accomplishments by the 1995 conference.

In a golden age over a millennium ago, the Middle East was the 
commercial and cultural crossroads of the world.  Harkening back to the 
glorious economic and cultural history of the old Middle East, this 
summit heralds a new Middle East in the heart of the global economy once 
again.  We have the opportunity--and the responsibility--to build a more 
peaceful, more prosperous, and more integrated Middle East and world.  
Working together in a public-private endeavor, let us dedicate ourselves 
to making that vision a reality.

If I may borrow the famous Humphrey Bogart line, this conference could 
be the beginning of a beautiful friendship.

Thank you very much.  



Casablanca Declaration
Released at the Middle East/North Africa Economic Summit, Casablanca, 
Morocco, October 30-November 1, 1994.

1.  At the invitation of His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco and with 
the support and endorsement of Presidents Bill Clinton of the United 
States and Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation, the representatives 
of 61 countries and 1114 business leaders from all regions of the world, 
gathered for a Middle East/North Africa Economic Summit in Casablanca 
from October 30 to November 1, 1994.  The participants paid tribute to 
His Majesty, King Hassan II, in his capacity as President and Host of 
the Conference and praised His role in promoting dialogue and 
understanding between the parties in the Middle East conflict.  They 
also expressed their appreciation to the Government and people of 
Morocco for their hospitality and efforts to ensure the success of the 

2.  The Summit leaders feel united behind the vision that brought them 
to Casablanca, that of a comprehensive peace and a new partnership of 
business and government dedicated to furthering peace between Arabs and 

3.  Government and business leaders entered into this new partnership 
with a deeper understanding of their mutual dependence and common goals.  
Business leaders recognized that governments should continue to forge 
peace Agreements and create foundations and incentives for trade and 
investment.  They further recognize the responsibility of the private 
sector to apply its new international influence to advance the diplomacy 
of peace in the Middle East and beyond.  Governments affirmed the 
indispensability of the private sector in marshalling, quickly, adequate 
resources to demonstrate the tangible benefits of peace.  Together, they 
pledged to show that business can do business and contribute to peace as 
well; indeed, to prove that profitability contributes mightily to the 
economic scaffolding for a durable peace.

4.  The Summit commended the historic political transformation of the 
Region as a consequence of significant steps towards a just, lasting and 
comprehensive peace, based on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 
338, a process that began with the 1979 Treaty of Peace between Egypt 
and Israel and enlarged dramatically by the Madrid Peace Conference, 
three years ago.  That process has born fruit in Israel-Palestine 
Liberation Organization Declaration of Principles.  The recent signing 
of the Treaty of Peace between Israel and Jordan gave a new dimension to 
the process.  The decisions of Morocco and Tunisia to establish, 
respectively, liaison offices and liaison channels with Israel 
constituted another new positive development.  These accomplishments and 
the next stages of rapid movement toward a comprehensive peace in the 
region, including Syria and Lebanon, need to be powerfully reinforced by 
solid economic growth and palpable improvement of the life and security 
of the peoples of this region.  The Summit stressed that Syria and 
Lebanon have an important role to play in the development of the region.  
The Summit expressed a strong hope that they will soon be able to join 
the regional economic effort.

5.  In this connection, the participants noted that the urgent need for 
economic development of the West Bank and Gaza Strip requires special 
attention from the international community, both public and private, in 
order to support the Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization 
Declaration   of Principles and subsequent implementing agreements to 
enable the Palestinian people to participate on equal bases in the 
regional development and cooperation.  They stressed the equal 
importance of moving ahead on Jordanian-Israeli projects as well as on 
cooperative projects between Israel and Jordan in order to advance the 
Jordanian-Israeli Treaty of Peace.

6.  The participants recognized the economic potential of the Middle 
East and North Africa and explored how best to accelerate the 
development of the Region and overcome, as soon as possible, obstacles, 
including boycotts and all barriers to trade and investment.  All agreed 
that there is a need to promote increased investment from inside and 
outside the Region.  They noted that such investment requires free 
movement of goods, capital and labour across borders in accordance with 
market forces, technical cooperation based on mutual interest, openness 
to the international economy and appropriate institutions to promote 
economic interaction.  They also noted that the free flow of ideas and 
increased dialogue, especially among the business communities in the 
Region, will strengthen economic activity.  In this context, the 
participants noted favourably the decision of the Council for 
Cooperation of the Gulf States regarding the lifting of the secondary 
and the tertiary aspects of the boycott of Israel.

7.  Based on the agreements between Israel and the PLO, it is important 
that the borders of the Palestinian Territories be kept open for labor, 
tourism and trade to allow the Palestinian Authority, in partnership 
with its neighbours, the opportunity to build a viable economy in peace.

8.  The participants paid tribute to the multilateral negotiations 
initiated in Moscow in 1992 which have significantly advanced the 
objectives of the peace process.  The governments represented at 
Casablanca will examine ways to enhance the role and activities of the 
multilateral negotiations, including examining regional institutions 
which address economic, humanitarian and security issues.  The 
participants noted that the progresses made in the peace process should 
go along with a serious consideration of the socio-economic disparities 
in the Region and require to address the idea of security in the Region 
in all its dimensions:  social, economic and political.  In this 
context, they agreed that these issues need to be addressed within the 
framework of a global approach encompassing socio-economic dimensions, 
safety and welfare of Individuals and Nations of the Region.

9.  The participants recognized that there must be an ongoing process to 
translate the deliberations of Casablanca into concrete steps to advance 
the twin goals of peace and economic development and to institutionalize 
the new partnership between governments and the business community.  To 
this end:

   a)  The governments represented at Casablanca and private sector 
representatives stated their intention to take the following steps:

     --Build the foundations for a Middle East and North Africa Economic 
Community which involves, at a determined stage, the free flow of goods, 
capital and labour throughout the Region.

     --Taking into account the recommendations of the regional parties 
during the meeting of the sub-committee on finances of the REDWG 
monitoring committee, the Casablanca Summit calls for a group of experts 
to examine the different options for funding mechanisms including the 
creation of a Middle East and North Africa Development Bank.  This group 
of experts will report on its progress and conclusions within six months 
in the light of the follow on Summit to the Casablanca Conference.

     --The funding mechanism would include appropriate bodies to promote 
dialogue on economic reform, regional cooperation, technical assistance 
and long-term development planning.

     --Establish a regional Tourist Board to facilitate tourism and 
promote the Middle East and North Africa as a unique and attractive 
tourist destination.

     --Encourage the establishment of a private sector Regional Chamber 
of Commerce and Business Council to facilitate intra-regional trade 
relations.  Such organizations will be instrumental in solidifying ties 
between the private and public sectors of the various economies.

   b)  The participants also intend to create the following mechanisms 
to implement these understandings and embody the new public-private 

     --A Steering Committee, comprised of government representatives, 
including those represented in the Steering Committee of the 
multilateral group of the peace process, will be entrusted with the task 
of following up all issues arising out of the Summit and coordinating 
with existing multilateral structures such as the REDWG and other 
multilateral working groups.  The Steering Committee will meet within 
one month following the Casablanca Summit to consider follow on 
mechanisms.  The Committee will consult widely and regularly with the 
private sector.

     --An executive Secretariat to assist the Steering Committee, 
located in Morocco, will work for the enhancement of the new economic 
development pattern, thus, contributing to the consolidation of the 
global security in the Region.  The Secretariat will assist in the 
organization of a Regional Chamber of Commerce and a Business Council.  
It will work to advance the public-private partnership by promoting 
projects, sharing data, promoting contacts and fostering private sector 
investment in the Region.  The Secretariat will assist in the 
implementation of the various bodies referred to in the present 
Declaration.  The Steering Committee will be responsible for the funding 
arrangements, with the support of the private sector.

10.  The participants welcomed the establishment of a Middle East/North 
Africa Economic Strategy Group by the Council on Foreign Relations.  
This private sector group will recommend strategies for regional 
economic cooperation and ways to overcome obstacles to trade and private 
investment.  It will operate in close association with the Secretariat 
and submit its recommendations to the Steering Committee.

11.  The participants also welcomed the intention of the World Economic 
Forum to form a business interaction group that will foster increased 
contacts and exchanges among business communities and submit its 
recommendations to the Steering Committee.

12.  The participants in the Casablanca Summit pledged to transform this 
event into lasting institutional and individual ties that will provide a 
better life for the peoples of the Middle East and North Africa.  They 
resolved that the collaboration of the public and private sectors that 
constituted the singularity of the Casablanca Summit will serve as a 
milestone in the historic destiny that is now playing itself out in the 
Middle East/North Africa Region.

13.  The participants expressed their appreciation to the Council on 
Foreign Relations and to the World Economic Forum for their substantive 
contribution to the organization of the Casablanca Summit.

14.  The participants expressed their intention to meet again in Amman, 
Jordan, in the first half of 1995 for a second Middle East/North Africa 
Economic Summit, to be hosted by His Majesty King Hussein.  


The Increasing Role of Regional Organizations in Africa
Deputy Secretary Talbott, Assistant Secretary Moose

Deputy Secretary Talbott
Address to the Zimbabwe Staff College, Harare, Zimbabwe, October 22, 

My colleagues and I are very glad to be here with you today.  I am 
joined here at the podium by Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, 
George Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for International 
Organizations, Doug Bennet, and Assistant Administrator  of the Agency 
for International Development, John Hicks.  They will join me in the 
discussion we will have when I conclude these remarks.

Permit me to begin on a personal note.  I was last here 16 years ago, in 
1978, when your country and its capital had different names--and, far 
more importantly, when the majority of the people did not have the full 
rights of citizenship.  So having once visited a place called Salisbury, 
Rhodesia, it is deeply gratifying to return to Harare, Zimbabwe.

I mention this simply to underscore that I have my own sense of the 
extraordinary transition that you have been through--and the 
extraordinary transformation that you have accomplished.  However, I 
speak not just for myself but for my traveling companions and for all 
Americans when I say that we admire and congratulate you.

Yours is a nation with which the United States feels a special affinity: 
We are both former colonies of Britain; we have both won our 
independence; and we have both embraced democracy. Moreover, you have 
blazed the trail for another former British colony, South Africa, whose 
people are now, like you--and, also, like us in the U.S.--embarked on 
the great task of building a truly tolerant, truly inclusive multi-
racial democracy.

I have another reason for welcoming the chance to meet with you today.
You are soldiers; therefore, representatives of a profession that is as 
old as the human race.  But, more importantly, in this era of dramatic 
global change, you are also soldiers of the future.  I say that because 
you are defenders of democracy.  You are safeguarding your country's 
independence and your people's freedom.

Also, you are soldiers of the future in that the armed forces of 
Zimbabwe are participating in peace-keeping missions in other countries.  
It is one of the most important features of our time that democracy is 
on the rise all over the world, and especially here in Africa.

Since 1989, multi-party elections have been held in 26 African 
countries, with a dozen more expected by 1996.  As our Vice President, 
Al Gore, has put it:  The spread of democracy in Africa "is one of the 
great, but quiet revolutions of our age."  With this favorable trend has 
emerged a generation of African leaders who are actively committed to 
improving the lives of their fellow citizens.  As a result, there is now 
an unprecedented potential for collective regional action to foster 
political stability and economic development.  

Each of those, of course, depends on the other.  Over the long haul, you 
cannot have political stability without economic development, and you 
cannot have economic development without political stability.  And, you 
cannot have either without peace.

The need for collective regional action in defense of peace and 
democracy has never been more urgent.  In recent years, the peoples of 
Africa have inspired the world by demonstrating tremendous resiliency--
and genuine heroism--in overcoming truly horrific disasters, both man-
made and natural.

Ethiopia and Uganda are now making encouraging progress toward democracy 
and economic reconstruction.  In Eritrea, former soldiers are now 
working to remove land mines, rebuild roads, plant trees, and teach 
basic literacy.  Two years ago, the nations of Southern Africa survived 
the worst drought in a century; now they are producing food surpluses.  
Yet in spite of all that has been accomplished, several nations on the 
continent are now in danger of collapsing into political violence.

As in other parts of the post-Cold War world, there is remarkably little 
conflict between states in Africa, but conflict within states continues, 
stubbornly and brutally.  This bloodshed matters to all of us.  It is 
not just the business of the countries involved; it is also the concern 
of the international community as a whole.  Why?  Your Foreign Minister, 
Dr. Shamuyarira--whom I had the privilege to meet in Washington two 
weeks ago and again here this morning --could not have put it better 
when he addressed the United Nations General Assembly.  He said, and I 

What are initially regarded as internal or local conflicts have the 
potential, if left unattended, to grow into trouble spots threatening 
international peace and security.

The question facing us on every continent is how to translate 
international concern into international action.  The traditional 
methods of diplomacy, which were designed to resolve state-to-state 
conflicts, are not adequate to the job of resolving internal conflicts.  
We need to be bold and innovative, and we need to look for ways to act 
collectively, wherever and whenever we can.  This means assembling 
regional and international coalitions aimed, as much as possible, at 
preventing conflicts before they occur and, to the extent necessary, at 
resolving conflicts quickly when they do erupt.

In Cambodia, in Haiti, and in several African states, we have seen that 
such multinational coalitions can give people the chance--after years of 
turmoil and repression--finally to begin building democratic 
institutions.  Even in those tragic cases where the people in conflict-
ridden states are not ready for peace, such as Bosnia and Somalia, there 
is still much that the international community can do.  It can 
ameliorate the humanitarian catastrophes and the refugee outflows that 
accompany political violence and ethnic turmoil or it can take steps to 
prevent the spread of the fighting--to prevent, in other words, civil 
war from becoming regional war.

The United Nations has an important role to play in these efforts, as it 
has demonstrated many times in Africa and around the globe.  Despite the 
current uncertainties about Somalia's future, more than 500,000 people 
there who might have died of war-induced famine are alive today because 
of UN peace-keeping efforts.

In Mozambique, the UN Mission and the High Commissioner for Refugees are 
helping to repatriate more than 1 million refugees and to reintegrate 
into society some 3 million internally displaced Mozambicans.  Next 
week, the UN Mission in Mozambique will help to supervise that country's 
first free and fair elections.  In Angola, it is anticipated that by the 
end of this month, the Government of Angola and UNITA will initial a 
national reconciliation agreement.  If this happens, as we hope it will, 
an expanded UN force will be needed to monitor the cease-fire and the 
implementation of the agreement.

The nations that are participating in these and other UN Missions--and 
that includes Zimbabwe--have every reason to be proud of what they have 
accomplished.  But it must also be acknowledged that the United Nations 
is already overworked and is at risk of being overwhelmed by the number, 
magnitude, complexity, and difficulty of the peace-keeping missions that 
it has been asked to undertake.  In addition to Somalia, Mozambique, and 
Angola, the UN is also involved in Rwanda, Liberia, and Western Sahara.

Outside of Africa, the UN is engaged in the Golan Heights and Southern 
Lebanon in the Middle East; Kuwait in the Persian Gulf; Jammu and 
Kashmir in South Asia; Georgia and Tajikistan in the former Soviet 
Union; Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean; Croatia, Bosnia, and 
Macedonia in the Balkans; and El Salvador and Haiti in the Western 

As a result of the UN's being over-burdened, the international community 
is in danger of not being able to respond quickly enough to new crises 
when they occur.  Quick response is often vital.  At the beginning of 
many peace operations, time is of the essence:  A cease-fire may be 
fragile; a peace settlement may be tentative; large numbers of people 
may be within days or weeks of starving.  In such circumstances, 
competent forces need to be deployed urgently.  The timely arrival of 
even a token force may buy just enough time for a larger one to get to 
the scene.  Yet in several cases, recently, it has taken three to six 
months to organize and deploy UN forces.  Furthermore, the United 
Nations has, in several instances, mounted only a small operation where 
a larger one might have made the difference between failure and success.

As just one example, the UN observer operation in Angola in 1992 had too 
few observers to monitor the peace settlement and elections adequately.  
I assure you that the United States is committed to working with the UN 
to improve its peace-keeping capabilities, particularly in the area of 
support for logistics and planning.

But my main message to you today--I'm sure you anticipated it; I hope 
you welcome it--is that even with every imaginable reform and 
improvement, the UN will still be unable to carry the burden of global 
peace-keeping alone.  It needs help from regional organizations that are 
much better prepared to handle peace-keeping than they are today.  For 
example, the nations of East Asia and the Pacific Rim are just beginning 
to discuss collective security under the aegis of the ASEAN Regional 
Forum.  Even the more well-established regional organizations are only 
now beginning to consider their roles in humanitarian and peace-keeping 

The Organization of American States has just this year broken new ground 
by playing a vital role in helping to restore democracy in Haiti.  In 
Europe, NATO, CSCE, and other regional organizations are struggling to 
pass their first severe test of the post-Cold War era in the former 
Yugoslavia.  Here in Africa, the international community, in general, 
and our government, in particular, looks to the OAU to develop its 
capacity for conflict-resolution and peace-keeping on this continent.

While the OAU has a very long way to go in this regard, there is reason 
to hope that it will prove to be up to the task.  After all, African 
nations already have considerable experience managing and participating 
in such operations.  At the present time, 22 Sub-Saharan African 
countries--Zimbabwe prominently among them--have military personnel 
committed to a total of 10 UN and two African peace-keeping operations.

In June 1992, the assembly of heads of state and government of the OAU 
took a historic step when it decided to create its own conflict 
resolution mechanism.  The establishment of a conflict prevention 
"command center" at OAU headquarters in Addis Ababa was an important 
preliminary step in building this mechanism into an effective 

Last April, the OAU played a vital role in monitoring the first free and 
fair elections in South Africa.  Now OAU observers are helping to 
establish an environment for reconciliation in Burundi and Rwanda.  In 
Burundi, where our delegation visited yesterday, the OAU has also played 
a crucial role in the political transition that recently culminated in 
the emergence of a new president and a new government.

The OAU has shown that it can work effectively with subregional 
organizations, such as the Economic Community of West African States. 
While the tragedy in Liberia is far from over, the joint OAU and ECOWAS 
peace-keeping effort there has helped contain a disastrous civil war and 
save thousands of lives.  Despite continued fighting, we are hopeful 
that this initiative will eventually lead to the restoration of 
democracy and a durable peace in Liberia.  That subject will be high on 
our agenda when we visit Ghana and the Cote d'Ivoire next week.  I 
should also note the successful conflict resolution efforts undertaken 
in Lesotho by Presidents Mugabe, Mandela, and Masire on behalf of the 
Southern Africa Development Community.

It is our hope that by the end of the decade, the OAU will have the 
capability to mount significant peace-keeping operations--under the UN 
Charter.  We will do what we can to that end.  The U.S. has pledged both 
financial and technical assistance to the OAU's conflict resolution 
mechanism.  We recognize, as you do, that the best way to solve a crisis 
is to prevent it.  That is why USAID, led by Administrator Brian Atwood 
and Assistant Administrator Hicks, is now working with nations in the 
Horn of Africa, African regional organizations, and the international 
donor community to develop a long-term strategy to prevent food 
shortages and famine.

A key element of our strategy lies in supporting democratic governments 
and institutions.  In Africa as elsewhere, democracies have shown a 
greater capacity than non-democratic states for avoiding violent 
conflict and meeting the aspirations of their people.  They have also 
shown a greater willingness and ability to play a constructive role in 
the international community.

We also recognize that one of the greatest enemies of democracy is 
destitution. That is why we are committed to working with the other G-7 
nations to write off a substantial portion of the debts of those African 
nations that carry the heaviest burdens.  Democracy-building must go 
hand-in-hand with programs to reduce poverty and curb rapid population 
growth.  Therefore, we support the agenda set by the 170 nations that 
attended the Cairo conference last month--an agenda that will eventually 
bolster families, improve the social and economic status of women, and 
provide the kinds of family planning and health services that 
sustainable development requires.

Let me conclude by reiterating why all this matters so much to the 
United States--13,000 kilometers away from you.  It is because our 
President and our people know that, in this increasingly interdependent 
world of ours--a world of shrinking distances, instant communications, 
growing international trade, and ever-more porous borders-- our own 
prosperity and our own security depend, to a significant extent, on 
whether people in lands far away are at peace with each other.  
President Clinton puts it simply and succinctly when he says, as he 
often does:  "We're all in this together."

Assistant Secretary Moose
Opening statement at a press briefing, Washington, DC, October 31, 1994.

Good afternoon.  As most of you know, Deputy Secretary Talbott returned 
to Washington last Thursday following, roughly, a week-long visit to 
Africa.  I accompanied him on that trip as did Assistant Secretary for 
International Organization Affairs, Doug Bennet and USAID Assistant 
Administrator for Africa, John Hicks.

The purpose of the visit was twofold:  the first being to reiterate our 
support for democratic transitions, of which there are many taking place 
on the African continent; the second was to examine, with African 
leaders and organizations, what the U.S. and others could do to support 
African efforts to address conflict resolution, conflict prevention, and 

The principal stops on the trip were chosen with those two principal 
things in mind.  We stopped very briefly in Burundi as part of our 
continuing effort to encourage the parties there to sustain Burundi's 
very fragile transition to democracy and thereby avert the eruption of 
broader violence.

We had a very substantive stop in Zimbabwe, speaking with the Zimbabwean 
leadership about the growing regional context for conflict resolution 
and conflict prevention, as most recently evidenced by the frontline 
states enlarged grouping with respect to Lesotho and with respect to 
Mozambique.  We can come back to Mozambique in just a minute.  Moreover, 
in the course of that stop, we talked about the very explicit linkage 
which the member states of SADCC draw between their regional 
peacekeeping initiatives and the defense and protection of democracy 
throughout that subregion.

Appropriately, we stopped in Malawi, a country that has just come 
through its first multi-party elections and which, at the same time, is 
indicating its willingness to assume a role in regional and subregional 
peace-keeping, most notably by its participation in the UNAMIR peace-
keeping operation in Rwanda.  We made a very brief stop in Kinshasa and 
met at the airport with Zairean Prime Minister Kengo.  That was the 
continuation of conversations we had with Prime Minister Kengo when he 
was here a few weeks ago in New York, where he met with the Deputy 
Secretary and here in Washington, where he met with others.  The purpose 
of that visit--that stop--was, again, to encourage the efforts being 
undertaken by the Zairean Government to end the political impasse that 
has paralyzed that country for the last three years and to show our 
support for the plans that have been outlined by the Prime Minister 
which aim at reform both in the economic and political sphere, with a 
view to ending Zaire's two- to three-year slide into a very difficult 

We went on from Zaire to Ghana. We had meetings, again, with very senior 
Ghanaian officials.  President Rawlings is now, since September, the 
Chairman of ECOWAS--the Economic Community of West African States--and 
in that capacity is leading the effort to restore an agreement with 
respect to the solution of the problem in Liberia.  Ghana has been a 
leading force not only for subregional peace-keeping initiatives and 
conflict resolution, but a major participant in international peace-
keeping around the world.  The purpose there, again, was to solicit 
African views about what the United States and other partners might do 
to strengthen the capacity of African institutions and organizations in 
dealing with conflict resolution and peace-keeping.

Finally, we stopped in Abidjan, where the theme was very similar--to 
touch on the kind of cooperation which is already taking place within 
the subregion and the additional kinds of collaboration that might take 
place in the future, not only with respect to Liberia--although that 
remains the issue of greatest immediacy--but to talk broadly about the 
kind of cooperation that is taking place and is possible in the future 
in dealing with regional and subregional conflicts.  Let me share some 
general conclusions from our visit:  

The first is a very obvious one.  Indeed, it was part of the underlying 
decision to go, and that is that there is a strong commitment on the 
part of African states to assume greater responsibility for conflict 
prevention and conflict management on the continent.  That was evident 
in every stop we made.  Most of the countries  we visited are already 
active participants in various forms of regional peace-making and peace-
keeping.  The conversations we had reaffirmed their desire to play a 
greater role in these areas.

Secondly, we discovered in all of our stops strong support for efforts 
to enhance the capacity of the premier regional organization--the 
Organization of African Unity--in developing its capabilities to play a 
greater role in peace-making and peace-keeping.  At the same time, there 
was recognition that the effort to strengthen the regional organization 
needs to be complimented by a greater willingness of subregional 
institutions and organizations to become involved--to wit--ECOWAS in 
West Africa and SADCC in Southern Africa.  There was--in addition, as 
you might imagine--a clear African consensus that in order to be 
successful, African states require greater understanding and support 
from their international partners in helping them to develop their 
institutions and to strengthen the capacity of their organizations.

I prefer to say that in all of these visits, we, obviously, encountered 
problems and obstacles that exist to the current effort to develop these 
capacities.  I think that is understandable.  But in certain respects, 
what is happening in Africa parallels--in certain ways, maybe a bit in 
advance--things that are taking place in other parts of the world, 
whether it is in Latin America or in Asia.  There are discussions 
underway there about a security dimension to Asian cooperation; or in 
Europe with the CSCE and other institutions, which are evolving in their 
roles.  So what we see, in the African context, is very much a part of a 
larger evolution of assumption by regions of greater responsibility for 
dealing with the problems in their respective areas.  That evolution, 
though, is neither contrary nor in contradiction to an assumption that 
all of this must be done within a broader international context--for 
example, within the terms and provisions of the UN Charter--as a 
necessary way of ensuring that actions taken by regional or subregional 
organizations are in conformity with established international practice 
and principle, and that it does not lead inadvertently to eroding the 
basis of international cooperation.

There are a number of follow-on actions we will be taking.  Many of 
those involve further consultations with our friends and allies.  You 
will recall that Foreign Secretary Hurd, in his speech to the UN General 
Assembly, also set out some notions for how we and others might work 
more cooperatively with African organizations to strengthen their 
capacities in these areas.

There will be, I think, more extensive consultations with other partners 
as well, including the European Union, which is looking at this issue 
very actively.  I will be in Europe--in Brussels--the first of December, 
and we expect that this whole issue of African regional initiatives and 
peacekeeping and peace-making will be on that agenda--and what our 
support could be.

Finally, and not least, is discussions with UN officials and others 
about how the evolving collaboration between the United Nations and 
these regional organizations might proceed over the next several months.  
Turning very briefly to Mozambique, let me just say that we are, indeed, 
very pleased and encouraged by the results of the voting that ended on 
Saturday--October 29.  We were also admiring the initiatives that were 
taken by regional leaders--SADCC--and, in particular, the meeting that 
took place on October 25  in Harare with a view to encouraging that 

The initial indications are that the turnout has been between 80% and 
90%.  I think that is remarkable considering the difficulties that 
people faced in going to the polls.  I think it is also a very clear 
indication of the strong desire on the part of the Mozambicans to put 
the past--the most recent 10 to 15 years of Mozambican history--behind 

The results, of course, will not be known probably before another week 
to two weeks.  The counting is now taking place.  It is, of course, up 
to the UN Special Representative and his team also to certify the 
results of those elections.  Certainly, the initial indications are that 
the elections were held in a very commendable fashion, and, again, we 
were encouraged that this is part of the basis for peace and a return to 
prosperity in Mozambique, with implications for it throughout the 


Overview of Trip to East Asia and The Pacific and the APEC Meetings
Joan E. Spero, Under Secretary for Economic and Agricultural Affairs, 
Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary For East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Opening statements at a State Department press briefing, Washington, DC, 
November 3, 1994

Assistant Secretary Lord

Let me give you the overview of both the President's and the Secretary's 
schedule.  Of course, on the President's trip, the White House will be 
giving you further and most of the details--it is an integrated 
operation here--then some of the objectives and themes of this trip, and 
then I will turn it over to Joan to give you a more in-depth treatment 
of the economic and APEC issues.

In brush strokes, the Secretary will be leaving Monday morning, Novem-
ber 7, heading out to Korea as the first stop.  He gets in Tuesday 
night, November 8.  We will stay there until Thursday morning, November 
10.  Then he goes to Indonesia as the ministerial representative for the 
U.S. at APEC as well as having some bilaterals in Indonesia from 
November 10 to 12.  On the evening of November 12, he will join the 
President for the President's State visit to the Philippines.  They will 
be there until Sunday, November 13.  Then the President and the 
Secretary go to Indonesia for several days for the Leaders' Meeting in 
Bogor, as well as the President's bilateral visit to Indonesia in 
Jakarta.  There will be other meetings around the edges of the APEC 
sessions, through November 16.

Then, as the President heads homeward, the Secretary goes on his own to 
Thailand, getting in the evening of November 16--staying there about a 
day, and then coming back to the U.S. by November 18.

We feel that these trips come at a very auspicious time, frankly, in 
U.S. foreign policy.  We believe there is considerable momentum, 
generally in foreign policy--Haiti, Kuwait, the Middle East; even a 
supporting role in Northern Ireland, and the agreement on nuclear issues 
with North Korea--which we believe strengthens the President's hand, 
generally, as he goes on this very important trip to East Asia and 

We happen to think, of course, that we have been pursuing a brilliant 
policy from the very beginning.  But some of these issues require 
patient diplomacy over time.  Many of these successes have come to a 
head at the same time.  Of course, we have remaining problems as well.

Secondly, in Asia--more specifically, in addition to the North Korean 
nuclear agreement, you have our recent trade agreement with Japan; a 
more positive, although still challenging, relationship with China; 
moving ahead with Vietnam on the MIA question, and opening up liaison 
offices in the near future; and many other areas, including on the 
security side--to complement the President's Pacific Community concept 
to APEC on the economic side--the Bangkok initial meeting of the ASEAN 
Regional Forum, bringing all the top nations of Asia-Pacific together 
for the first time for a security dialogue.

So that is the general framework for this trip which, as we say, we 
think is quite auspicious.   The President is going out to this dynamic 
region to continue working with our friends there to build this Pacific 
Community.  The Secretary will be playing, of course, a very important 
supportive role to him.

I would say that at the most general level, the themes of these trips 
once again underline the importance of this region for the United 
States; above all, for the U.S. economy, exports, and jobs, given the 
fact that this is the most dynamic region in the world in those 
respects--but also in security and promoting freedom, the environment, 
and many other issues.  Underlining this for the American audience, but 
also at the same time another theme--once again underlining our 
commitment and engagement to the Asia-Pacific region in our self-
interest.  Throughout this is going to be an America's Desk theme, as 
the Secretary has mentioned, of promoting jobs, exports, and investments 
in this dynamic region.

More specifically, as you know from past pronouncements by the President 
and others, there are three essential pillars in this Pacific Community:

--  Promoting security; 
--  Promoting economic prosperity; and 
--  Promoting political freedom, democracy, and human rights.  

Those will be constant themes on his trip.

The first stop of the Secretary is Korea, where non-proliferation and 
security, both bilateral and regional, will be highlighted.  The 
Indonesian stop will have a heavy economic dose, of course, as well as 
attention to human rights and other issues--both the APEC meetings and 
our bilateral relationship with a very dynamic economy in Indonesia.  A 
constant motif throughout this trip is the fact that he is promoting 
freedom as well, which we think is important for both security and 

I would note that Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand--three stops for 
the Secretary--in addition to being treaty allies are also democracies.  
So that theme will be very evident in those countries as well as 
promoting it elsewhere in Asia.

Let me give you just a little bit more detail on each of those stops, 
and then I will turn it over to Joan.  I think I cleverly left my 
outline.  I can remember it.

With respect to Korea, we will reinforce what we believe are the virtues 
of the nuclear agreement with North Korea, not only to the leaders we 
meet with, but also to the body politic and the National Assembly there.  
We think it is an excellent agreement for reasons you have heard before, 
and I won't go into it now.

We think it serves South Korea's interest.  This will underline the fact 
that we have closely consulted throughout this process, and we will work 
just as closely with Korea, as well as Japan and others, on the 
implementation of this agreement--which will be, in many ways, as 
challenging as the negotiation.

We will also reaffirm our vigilance, our readiness, our force levels, 
and the fact that there is still a major conventional threat there.  
This is the point that Secretary Perry made on a trip (during which I 
accompanied him) two weeks ago.  We are not reducing our force levels.  
This is a residual security problem that requires vigilance as well as 
implementing the nuclear agreement.  Even as we would hope to reduce 
tensions on the peninsula and work in conjunction with the South, let us 
try to do that.

We are also underlining the importance of the South/North dialogue to 
determining the future of that peninsula.

We would expect the Secretary to make a major speech on these issues in 
Korea while he is there.  Again, heavy emphasis on this stop on 
security.  But, of course, this is also a country that has moved toward 
democracy, and we have very strong economic interests--both ratification 
of the Uruguay Round as well as bilateral interests with Korea.

In the Philippines, the President will be underlining the commemoration 
of World War II in some moving ceremonies.  There will be a whole series 
of these commemorative acts over the coming year, and there will be two 
themes.  One, paying tribute to the veterans and to those who fell in 
battle, but also pointing how far this region has come in the last 50 
years and how we now have a great opportunity in the future.  The second 
thing will be the future prospects in the region--working with former 
enemies as friends and making sure their current friends do not become 
enemies as we move forward for greater peace and prosperity in the 

Also in the Philippines, we will be highlighting the fact that, under 
President Ramos' dynamic leadership, that economy has really begun to 
take off.  For many years, it was considered the weak partner in ASEAN.  
But now it is growing at 4%.  It is attracting investment.  We will 
highlight the investment opportunities there.  We will also underline 
the fact that they have a democracy.  And, as a model for Asian 
countries, the fact is that political freedom and economic growth can, 
should, and do go hand-in-hand.

Finally, it will signal a more mature relationship with the Philippines-
-post-semicolonial period, post-bases--replaced by an effective defense 
relationship but of a different nature, and one that is increasingly 
dependent on trade and investment, not on foreign aid.

On into Indonesia, where the Secretary will have been, and now will be 
with the President.  Again, the details will be given by Joan Spero.  I 
would just say that if last year at Seattle the President generated a 
great momentum at APEC by having the first Leaders' Meeting for APEC--
there was a vision--this year we would hope to see a goal.  That goal is 
to free up as much trade and investment as we can--eliminating barriers 
to these over the coming years.  We will try to have  a blueprint for 
that in the coming year after that.  So this is an ongoing process.

We also have important economic interests with Indonesia.  It is a very 
dynamic and large economy.  I would expect some contract signings there.  
I should point out that Ambassador Kantor and Secretary Ron Brown will 
also be on this trip.  They will have an important part, and it will be 
an integral team working together, including on the economic side.  So 
that will be a heavy emphasis.

We will also deal very frankly with our Indonesian hosts on the human 
rights question.  We have been doing that for a couple of years.  This 
is not something we have discovered.  This is going to be a long-term 
prospect and issue.

We have many positive elements in our relations with Indonesia.  Those 
should be kept in mind--economic security, diplomatic.  But we also talk 
as friends, frankly, about some of the human rights concerns which we do 
have.  That will certainly be on our agenda.

Finally, the last stop for the Secretary will be Thailand.  Here, all 
the themes come together.  It is a democracy.  It is one of our most 
important security allies, and it has a very dynamic economy.  So I 
would expect sort of a summing-up there of the entire trip.

Last point:  We would hope as a result of this trip to achieve the 
objectives I outlined at the beginning and, more specifically, if 
possible, to repeat the so-called triple-play type of  international 
economic initiative and achievement that was achieved last fall---with 
NAFTA, the APEC Leaders' Meeting, and the Uruguay Round--this year with 
an APEC Leaders' Meeting that sets forth a bold political vision, 
followed by ratification of Uruguay Round legislation and a successful 
Summit of the Americas.

Without further ado, let me turn this over to Under Secretary Spero.

Under Secretary Spero

I will try to give you a very brief overview of some of the key economic 
issues that will come up at the APEC Ministerial and Leaders' Meetings.  
I gave a speech a couple of weeks ago on this issue to a business 
audience and will make that speech available.  It may be useful for you.

Let me summarize quickly.  I will start off by trying to put this set of 
meetings in context, and that is that they are a key part of our overall 
strategy of global engagement and of opening markets, spurring growth, 
and promoting jobs at home.  I think you need to understand the APEC 
efforts in that context.

As Winston talked a bit about the triple play, I would describe it by 
saying, first of all, the overarching setting for all of this is the 
Uruguay Round--the implementation, the passage of the Uruguay Round 
agreement.  We are committed to achieving that and having that in place 
by the beginning of December.

So our multilateral strategy then is the Uruguay Round.  We also have a 
very active bilateral strategy throughout the world but most 
specifically in Asia, to open markets, to create rules for fair trade, 
and to promote U.S. exports.  Many of you are familiar with our 
bilateral talks with Japan.  We are heavily engaged in bilateral talks 
with China.  I think with virtually every Asian country and every member 
of APEC, we are engaged on a day-to-day basis in a whole variety of 
market- opening activities.

And then third, we also use our regional strategy--a regional strategy 
including APEC, and including the Summit of the Americas as two key 
examples coming up this fall.

With that overall context then--multilateral, regional, and bilateral 
approaches to opening markets--let me just mention some of the key 
economic issues that will be on the agenda in Jakarta and in Bogor.

As you know, Indonesia is the chair of APEC this year.  They have 
identified four key themes for the meetings, issues that they want to 
discuss and that have been agreed to by the other APEC members.  One is 
increasing the role of the private sector, and increasing the role of 
small and medium-sized enterprises within the APEC region.  Another one 
is addressing the region's tremendous infrastructure needs--the 
development of infrastructure, and then human resource development.  One 
of the major focuses, and the final one that I want to mention, that 
Indonesia has put squarely on the agenda is the effort to promote 
increased trade and investment within APEC.

The theme of promoting trade and investment is going to be one of the 
key themes, both at the Ministerial Meeting and at the Leaders' Meeting.  
As I see it--and I think the best way to describe it is to think of this 
promotion of trade and investment in two parts.

The first part is what I would call the "vision thing."  The vision 
thing is how we can advance trade and investment in the region; whether 
we can make a political commitment to eliminate barriers to trade and 
investment in the region by a date certain.

So a political commitment, if and when it takes place, will take place 
at the Leaders' Meeting--the Bogor meeting, and that really is under the 
leadership of President Soeharto.  He believes that it is possible to 
make a political commitment to removing trade and investment barriers in 
the region by a date certain.

The second piece of that overall trade and investment strategy is what I 
would call the practical side--and the practical side is the following 
two parts:

--  First of all, after this political commitment--which I think you 
should see as far-reaching but, as I say, more of a vision than 
something concrete--the first point is how can we work after Bogor on 
the road to Tokyo--which is where the next meeting will take place--to 
come up with a blueprint for what that really means.  What does 
achieving freer trade in the region, removing these barriers--what does 
that really mean and how can we develop a blueprint in the coming year 
to make that a reality?  And that we expect also will come out of the 
leaders' meeting.

We anticipate--we cannot say for certain--that there will be a call for 
freer trade in the region and a call upon the ministers to work in the 
coming years to come up with an actual blueprint for how to make that 

--  Secondly, on the practical side, I want to emphasize that there is a 
lot of very real, practical, nitty-gritty stuff going on in APEC all the 
time that is also about opening markets and removing barriers and 
promoting exports.  This is in addition to the bilateral efforts that 
the U.S. is doing.  I am talking about multilateral work within APEC.

I think too few people realize that there is a lot of work--as I say, 
technical, nitty-gritty stuff--not the stuff, unfortunately, of 
headlines and of sound bites--that goes on in APEC all the time.

Let me just try to give you a couple of examples to make that real and 
then I will stop talking.  Last year, APEC created a Committee on Trade 
and Investment.  That committee has been examining a program for how to 
facilitate trade and investment throughout the region.  Its goals are to 
simplify and harmonize customs procedures and standards to identify and 
begin to address administrative barriers to trade, to develop a set of 
non-binding investment principles, and to work to harmonize Uruguay 
Round implementation among the APEC member economies.

So this is not just removing barriers; it is saying how can we harmonize 
customs and standards; how can we remove administrative barriers; how 
can we work together so that as we implement the Uruguay Round--we do it 
on a common-enough basis that it will facilitate trade among the APEC 

In addition to this work in the Committee on Trade and Investment, APEC 
has a whole series of working groups.  I often think of APEC as sort of 
the policy level, the committee level, and then the very nitty-gritty 
working level, working groups, in a whole variety of areas.

These working groups are interesting and in my view unique, because they 
include not only government officials but also private sector people.  
Our companies very often sit at the table working with government 
officials on these various committees.

Again, let me give you just a little taste of some of the things these 
committees have been doing.  APEC has launched an EDI--electronic date 
interchange pilot project--that is intended to reduce air cargo 
clearances from days to hours or minutes.  If you come from business, 
you understand that time is money and access to markets has a lot to do 
with clearing customs as it does with trade barriers.

Another example:  In telecommunications--a very active working area of 
APEC again with private sector participation--APEC members have 
committed to work together to harmonize equipment approval processes.  
They have agreed to work on region-wide principles to make it easier to 
operate value-added telecommunications services.  That means things like 
e-mail or on-line data bases or computer processing networks throughout 
the region.  That is expected to provide real, tangible benefits for our 

These are just a couple of examples of the kind of nitty-gritty work 
that is going on--removal of barriers, facilitation, common standards, 
and development.

I want to stress that all of this, in my view, is very much oriented 
toward business.  It is the role of APEC in these economic issues to get 
government out of the way.  Business is already creating APEC.  It is 
already creating an Asia-Pacific region, and those working on the 
economic side of APEC see that it is their role to try to facilitate 
that process that is already taking place in the market place.

So if you do look at my speech, you will see there is a great emphasis 
to say that the business of APEC is business, and the business of APEC 
on the economic side is getting governments out of the way and letting 
businesses do their thing in the region.  


Principle, Power, and Purpose In the New Era
Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United 
Address to the Secretary's Open Forum, Washington, DC, October 28, 1994

I want to begin by thanking Rosemary O'Neill for the invitation to be 
here.  The Open Forum provides a superb service, and she directs it 
superbly.  Addressing the forum is something I have wanted to do for a 
long time because I love challenges.  There are few things more 
challenging than discussing our foreign policy with people who have not 
yet eaten lunch. 

So I thought I would start by saying what a great job you are all doing.  
I say this because I want you to ask easy questions--and because it is 
true.  For the past 20 months, I have seen nothing but hard work, 
dedication, and applied talent here at the Department of State, at the 
U.S. Mission to the UN in New York, and at our embassies abroad--this, 
despite the fact that recognition is rare and public cynicism more 
widespread than we would like.  Our armed forces have been praised 
justly for the job they are doing in the Caribbean and Persian Gulf, but 
there are medals due on the diplomatic front as well, beginning with the 
Haiti task force and Ambassador Swing and his colleagues in Port-au-

News from around the world these past few weeks has been very good.  
That is gratifying, but it should not be surprising.  The fundamental 
elements of our foreign policy are solid.  Just as Wagner's music has 
been described as better than it sounds, so our foreign policy has 
accomplished more than--at least until very recently--has been widely 

In the Middle East, Secretary Christopher and his team have exhibited 
remarkable skill for noble ends with wondrous results.  Building on the 
work of Secretary Baker and President Bush, they have refused to let the 
momentum for peace in the Middle East stall.  They have given confidence 
to the healers and yielded nothing to the bomb-throwers.  They have done 
historic service to the region and for our own interest in a stable and 
secure Middle East. 

Earlier this week, as I watched President Clinton speak so movingly of 
America's support for those who have opened their hearts and borders to 
peace, I was proud to be part of this Administration, and doubly proud 
of my country. 

Our approach to Russia and the other New Independent States also serves 
American interests well.  We have been steadfast in supporting reform; 
we have worked cooperatively to reduce the risk that nuclear materials 
will fall into the wrong hands; we have successfully encouraged the 
departure of Russian troops from Baltic soil; we have established strong 
bilateral ties throughout the region;  and we are making steady progress 
toward the most significant and elusive goal of this century--a secure, 
integrated, and fully democratic Europe. 

In Asia, we have reached an accord with North Korea that South Korean 
President Kim has called the "foundation for a complete solution to the 
nuclear issue and . . . peace in the Korean peninsula."  In South 
Africa, as President Mandela has graciously acknowledged, American 
influence was vital in ending apartheid and installing democracy.  And 
thanks to the Vice President, Under Secretary Wirth, and Brian Atwood, 
American leadership on the environment and sustainable development has 
been restored. 

On the economic front, President Clinton negotiated the side agreements 
and did the hard work needed to gain congressional approval for NAFTA.  
Under his leadership, we broke the deadlock on GATT and completed a 
world trade agreement--that will be ratified.  Soon, he will travel to 
Indonesia for a meeting of APEC, striving to expand economic cooperation 
with Asia, upon whose markets millions of American jobs depend.  This is 
what Secretary Christopher means when he talks about an "America's Desk" 
here at State and in our foreign policy.  The success of these 
initiatives will fatten the pay envelopes of American workers, create 
new jobs, and spur the global economy for generations to come. 

Finally, in New York, we are gaining ground in our effort to revitalize 
and reorient the United Nations.  We have established a UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights and an office with the functions of an 
inspector general.  We have won support for a series of arms control 
measures and for a more balanced approach to the Middle East.  And we 
have more than held our own in debates within the Security Council. 

For example, two weeks ago, the Security Council acted to reinforce our 
determination that Iraq will never again become a threat to regional 
security and peace.  When Iraqi spokesmen bewail the treatment they have 
received from the international community these past three years, it 
reminds me of the story about the schoolboy who came home with his face 
bruised and his clothes torn.  When his mother asked him how the fight 
started, he said:  "It started when the other guy hit back." 

In short, our foreign policy priorities are on track.  Our record 
overall is good.  We have reason to be satisfied.  But despite recent 
breakthroughs, the truth is that we are not satisfied, for our times do 
not permit satisfaction. 

Foreign policy without the Cold War is a little like baseball without 
the World Series.  It is not as clear where the daily battles lead.  No 
climactic showdown looms.  The old reference points no longer apply, and 
new ones have not yet fully emerged. 

Today, the foreign policy journals are full of George Kennan wannabes--
reinventors eager to put their stamp on our era the way Kennan did on 
his.  Ironically, the George Kennan of our era may be Kennan himself.  
Earlier this year, I had the privilege of attending the Ambassador's 
90th birthday celebration.  He said that evening that: 

What [we] need are not policies--much less a single policy.  What [we] 
need are . . . principles . . . that accord with the nature, the needs, 
the interests and the limitations of our country. 

More recently, at the Foreign Affairs Training Center, Ambassador Kennan 
cited favorably George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, John Quincy Adams, 
and Abraham Lincoln as the source of principles appropriate to their era 
and time.  Now, Time magazine referred to me recently as "a blunt 
instrument," but I am not about to compete in that league.  So today, I 
will outline not principles but some rules that I believe accord with 
the nature, needs, interests, and limitations of our country. 

These rules are in keeping with the fundamental goals of our foreign 
policy as outlined by the President and Secretary Christopher.  They 
take into account both the imperative of American leadership and the 
habit of American caution about entanglements overseas.  And they 
recognize the need to forge a new consensus about the use of American 
power at a time when dangers to us are less clear and present--but no 
less real--than in the past. 

Four Rules for American Foreign Policy

Rule One.  The first rule is basic:  American foreign policy must be 
guided by enduring American interests.  This is, of course, easy to say.  
The challenge is to define our interests usefully in this transformed 
world.  As a diplomat, I do not underestimate the difficulty.  As a 
former professor, I cannot resist the attempt. 

Certainly, the heart of our national interest remains defense of 
territory, citizens, allies, and economic well-being.  This is the inner 
circle, our vital interests.  Our agreement with North Korea is designed 
to defuse a problem that falls clearly within this circle.  Our response 
to Iraq's recent troop movements should erase any doubt that we will 
defend these interests by any and all necessary means. 

We have a second circle of interests that reflect the interdependence of 
our age.  We live in a nation that is democratic, trade-oriented, 
respectful of the law, and possessed of a powerful military whose 
personnel are precious to us.  We will do better and feel safer in an 
environment where our values are widely shared, markets are open, 
military clashes are constrained, and those who run roughshod over the 
rights of others are brought to heel. 

The opportunities to help shape such a world are limitless, but our 
resources are not.  In defending this second circle of interests, we 
must be selective, not reflexive.  We must not flinch from needed action 
in places like Haiti and Bosnia, but neither must we respond ourselves 
to every outrage or battle. 

Our challenge is to navigate a path between disengagement, which is not 
possible, and over-extension, which is not sustainable.  Our task will 
be easier if we are able to prolong the opportunity for broad, 
international cooperation that now exists and build effective mechanisms 
for preventing, containing, and deterring armed conflict. 

Finally, there is a third circle of interests that we share with all 
others.  These are the global concerns--health, development, the 
environment, drugs, and crime.  These are quality-of-life issues with 
the potential to affect our vital interests but where the threats are 
currently more diffuse, the efforts to respond long term, and the mode 
of operation both national and multilateral. 

Rule Two.  In seeking to further the full range of our interests, we 
will need--and we should use--every available foreign policy tool.  This 
is the second rule.  We should not be boxed into rigid choices between 
force and diplomacy, economic and political, unilateral and 
multilateral.  Nor should we be lured by what Emerson called "foolish 
consistencies"--a foreign policy that responds in the same way 
regardless of circumstance will be consistent only in its failure.  
Foreign policy is not auto mechanics; it is an art.  The tools we select 
must be weighed against a matrix of past commitments, present 
capabilities, future hopes, and constant values. 

In each instance, we should seek to combine principle with pragmatism--
to do the right thing and to do the thing right.  As we have been 
reminded in recent days, American military power and the credibility of 
its possible use remains the most potent force for international order 
in the world today.  As President Clinton has pledged, our military must 
and will remain modern, mobile, ready, and strong. 

Deciding whether or not to deploy American military forces is the 
toughest judgment any president can make.  It is doubly complicated in 
this new era.  Present day turbulence dictates that emergencies will 
continue to arise in which the outcome will matter to us but not 
directly impinge on the inner circle of our interests.  That is why we 
Americans have such a strong incentive to see that UN peace operations 
work.  Effective, rapidly deployable UN forces provide an option between 
U.S. intervention and inaction. 

Today we are working hard to upgrade UN capabilities and to impose 
discipline upon the UN's decision-making process.  We have helped the UN 
develop a peace-keeping headquarters with a full range of functions from 
planning to public affairs.  We have provided a list of U.S. military 
capabilities that might be available, under appropriate circumstances, 
for use in peace operations.  We are asking tough questions about 
mission, risk, cost, scope, and duration before--not after--new 
operations begin. 

While working to improve what the UN can do, we should be realistic 
about what it cannot do.  Traditional peacekeeping can accomplish little 
where government or civil society have broken down or where one or more 
of the parties is not prepared to end the conflict.  But if emergencies 
occur and the UN does not respond, who will?  The reality is that we 
will have to continue to turn, at times, to individual countries acting 
alone or in a coalition.

Since 1991, states or groups of states have acted with UN blessing in 
Kuwait, Bosnia, Somalia, and Liberia.  More recently, the UN has 
sanctioned French action in Rwanda, authorized the multinational force 
now in Haiti, and sent UN observers to monitor Russian peace-keepers in 

As these examples illustrate, political and humanitarian crises are not 
created equal.  Each has its own history, its own cast of players, and 
its own potential impact on our interests.  We will decide whether to 
support or participate in an international response in accordance with 
the policy guidelines spelled out by the President.  We will support the 
efforts of others when they seem likely to be effective and when they 
are conducted in accordance with international law.  We will ensure that 
no state uses the cloak of UN sanction to trample the rights of others. 

This last point is particularly relevant to fears about Russian peace-
keeping operations within the former Soviet Union.  As the recent summit 
demonstrated, our relations overall with Russia are very good.  We are 
working together on a range of issues.  But Russia's leaders, citing 
concerns about regional turmoil, have become increasingly forceful in 
asserting regional prerogatives; some of Russia's neighbors are uneasy 
about their intentions.  Today, Russian peace-keepers are in Georgia and 
Tajikistan, and the Russian Army is based in several other republics, 
which it has never left. 

President Yeltsin and his key advisers did not create the Soviet empire; 
they ended it.  They risked their lives for democracy.  They deserve to 
be judged by what they do--not by what others fear.  But history has 
placed a heavy burden of proof on any government in Moscow.  Russia has 
a legitimate interest in stability along its borders, but it must 
respect fully the sovereignty and integrity of the New Independent 
States.  America does not and will not recognize any extra-legal 
privileges or so-called sphere of influence for Russia or any other 
country beyond its own territory.  In our approach to international 
peace-keeping, we will continue to adapt as circumstances change, 
mindful that ideal solutions will be rare and that the risks of action 
in each case must be weighed against, among other things, the 
consequences of inaction. 

The need for flexibility and for making use of a variety of foreign 
policy tools is evident also in our support for democracy.  We promote 
freedom of political institutions and thought because it serves our 
interests and because it is right.  But to do so effectively, avoid 
quagmires, and protect other interests, the means we select to pursue 
democratic goals will vary with the nature, history, and circumstances 
of the country involved. 

Haiti, for example, is not an example likely to be followed very often.  
The combination of circumstances there were exceptional:  a blatant 
theft of democracy, brutal repression, violated agreements, proximity to 
our shores, relatively low military risk, and strong international 
interest and support.  The process of restoring democracy has gone, thus 
far, exceptionally well.  American credibility has been reinforced and 
the utility of cooperative action once again illustrated.  But, as a 
Haitian proverb says, "behind mountains there are more mountains."  The 
road to durable democracy in Haiti remains uphill, and its ultimate 
success or failure rests, as it must, in Haitian hands. 

In Cuba, we are continuing to use economic pressure to encourage the 
government there to reconsider its options and create more political 
space for its people.  From Central America to Central Europe, we are 
providing all the aid we can afford to emerging democracies.  Elsewhere, 
our tools include election monitors, radio broadcasts, quiet diplomacy, 
and public declarations. 

Not all of these tools work quickly, but none should be discounted.  It 
is worth recalling that, during the Cold War, we spoke up for freedom 
when and where freedom's cause seemed without hope.  For half a century, 
we refused to recognize the Soviet conquest of the Baltics.  For 
decades, we pled the cause of emigration for Soviet Jews.  Throughout 
the Cold War, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty sowed seeds of 
democratic hope on hard ground.  Despite the resistance of some, America 
ultimately joined in isolating South Africa's racist regime. 

There were times when these efforts seemed almost quixotic.  We could 
not stop the tanks that entered Budapest in 1956 or Prague 12 years 
later.  We could not save the victims of Soweto.  But we have lived to 
see Nelson Mandela, Vaclav Havel, Lech Walesa, and Boris Yeltsin sworn 
in as presidents of their countries.  Some dismiss symbolic steps to 
promote freedom as useless.  Others suggest that the promotion of 
democracy leads inevitably to dangerous over-reaching; both are wrong.  
It is no accident that perhaps the strongest supporters of democratic 
broadcasting in the world today are in Central Europe, or that--as 
President Yeltsin has said--every Russian schoolchild knows the names 
Jackson and Vanik. 

Rule Three.  A third rule that should guide our foreign policy is 
credibility:  What we promise, we must deliver.  Because we have unique 
capabilities and unmatched power, it is natural that others will turn to 
us in time of emergency.  In one sense, that is gratifying, but it also 
leads to difficult, damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you-don't choices.  It 
requires a long-term perspective in a sound-bite world, but we must be 
disciplined in our commitments, our rhetoric, and   our diplomacy.  We 
must act in a way commensurate with our interests.  When we make a 
commitment, we should keep it. 

In recent years, one of the major failures of the international 
community, of which we are part, has been in Bosnia.  The failure had 
its origins in a lack of foresight that has been dissected sufficiently 
elsewhere.  But its magnitude was amplified by our collective slowness 
to back promise with action.  The credibility of the Security Council, 
in particular, was compromised by resolutions that seemed to offer more 
than they delivered.  To this day, safe areas are not fully safe, 
exclusion zones are not really exclusive, and no-fly zones are not quite 

Progress in Bosnia always will be relative, but it can be maximized by 
using NATO power more effectively to enforce UN rules and by maintaining 
diplomatic unity to isolate the Bosnian Serbs.  Unfortunately, these 
goals sometimes have been difficult to reconcile.  Earlier this year, we 
agreed to join our allies in proposing a territorial settlement, with 
the understanding that if one party alone rejected that settlement, the 
consequences for that party would be severe.  This was a commitment made 
to us by our allies and by Russia; it is a commitment that should be 

The United States understands that going it alone in Bosnia would entail 
very grave risks.  Unilateral lifting of the arms embargo--which some 
suggest--would undermine other sanctions regimes, including those 
targeting Libya and Iraq.  It would also likely prompt the UN's 
departure and a preemptive Serb assault. 

A cooperative approach is greatly preferred, but that cooperation must 
be serious.  In the coming weeks, America will be pushing hard for joint 
strategies to make the Bosnian Serbs understand that settlement is their 
only option.  We will build on the progress made, with Russia's help, in 
driving a wedge between the regime in Belgrade and the Bosnian Serbs; we 
will encourage a stronger federation between the Bosnian Government and 
the Croats; we will argue for a more rapid and forceful response to 
violations; we will seek to tighten enforcement of sanctions; and, when 
I return to New York this afternoon, we will introduce a resolution in 
the Security Council to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia 
multilaterally, with implementation in six months if the Bosnian Serbs 
do not settle. 

The disintegration of former Yugoslavia presented the international 
community with its most complicated post-Cold War test.  Joint efforts 
have preserved a potentially viable and multi-ethnic Bosnian state, kept 
open the humanitarian lifeline, and prevented the conflict from 
spreading throughout the region.  But these are not sufficient 
achievements given the circumstances.  Now we must show the resolve 
necessary to bring this tragic chapter of history to a conclusion. 

Rule Four.  The dilemma in Bosnia brings up a fourth rule essential to a 
successful foreign policy:  We must have congressional and public 
support.  A policy must be supported by our citizens if it is to be 
sustained.  That is a truism.  The complicating factor is that 
measurements of American sentiment are inexact, and the nature of that 
sentiment is subject to sometimes rapid and dramatic change. 

A President must move our nation where he believes it is in our interest 
to go.  His--or her--duty is not to follow public opinion but to lead 

As I speak, the positive consequences of President Clinton's strong 
leadership are on display around the world.  Tomorrow there may be 
setbacks that will disappoint us but not dissuade us from our course.  
In today's environment, where images of horror and heroism are 
transmitted instantaneously around the globe and attention spans are far 
shorter than this speech, there is no certain formula for gaining and 
maintaining public support.  Certainly, frankness helps.  Consultations 
with Congress are essential, and we are consulting with congressional 
leaders of both parties to an unprecedented degree.  But we Americans 
are brutally fair.  As President Kennedy observed after the Bay of Pigs, 
success has a thousand fathers, while defeat is an orphan.  Ultimately, 
we will be judged not by our rhetoric or our rationales but by our 

The fact is that Americans have always been ambivalent about activism 
abroad.  We espouse principles of universal application, but we 
understand from our own history that the growth of those principles must 
come from within a society; they cannot be imposed.  As children, we 
were taught to mind our own business or, as Rosemary O'Neill's father 
once said, that "all politics is local."  But we were taught, as well, 
to honor Americans called upon to mind the world's business--in the 
Argonne, Normandy, Iwo Jima, Inchon, and, more recently, in Southeast 
Asia and the Persian Gulf. 

At the end of World War I, an American Army officer, stuck in Europe 
while the diplomats haggled at Versailles, wrote to his future wife 
about his yearning to go home:  "None of us cares if the Russian 
government is red or not red, [or] whether the king of Lollipops 
slaughters his subjects."  Thirty years later, that same man--Harry 
Truman--designed the framework of principle, power, and purpose that one 
day would defeat communism and promote democratic values and respect for 
human rights around the world. 

Today, under President Clinton and Secretary Christopher, we are called 
upon to develop a new framework for protecting our territory, our 
citizens, and our interests in a dramatically altered world.  In 
devising that framework, we will make full use of our own reserves of 
military and economic power.  We will invite help from old friends and 
new.  We will look beyond the horizon of the short term, recognizing 
that even seemingly distant problems and conflicts may, one day, come 
home to America.  We will work to develop a consensus within our own 
country about policy and purpose that will maintain unity at home and 
strengthen our hand abroad. 

Here in this building and at our missions abroad, amidst all the 
understandable concerns about grade, status, next assignments, and the 
cafeteria's caloric menu, let us never forget:  Even before America was 
a country, it was an idea.  We are the inheritors of a diplomatic 
tradition that dates back not to the court intrigues of inbred royalty 
but to the ambassadors and architects of human liberty. 

My own family came to these shores as refugees.  Because of this 
nation's generosity and commitment, we were granted asylum after the 
communist takeover of Czechoslovakia.  The story of my family has been 
repeated in millions of variations over two centuries in the lives not 
only of immigrants  but of those overseas who have been liberated or 
sheltered by American soldiers, empowered by American assistance, or 
inspired by American ideals. 

The greatest division in the world today is not between east and west, 
north and south, or right and left; it is between those who have become 
prisoners of history and those determined to shape it. 

We have a responsibility in our time--as others have had in theirs--to 
build a world not without conflict but in which conflict is effectively 
contained, a world not without repression but in which the sway of 
freedom is enlarged, a world not without lawless behavior but in which 
the law-abiding are progressively more secure.  That is what President 
Clinton has referred to, in a broader context, as a covenant with the 
future.  That is our mandate in this new era.  That is our joint 
assignment when we return to work this afternoon.  


Status of Efforts To Obtain Iraq's Compliance With UNSC Resolutions
President Clinton
Letter to Congress released by the White House, Office of the Press 
Secretary, Washington, DC, October 27, 1994

Dear Mr. Speaker:   
(Dear Mr. President:)

Consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq 
Resolution (Public Law 102-1), and as part of my effort to keep the 
Congress fully informed, I am reporting on the status of efforts to 
obtain Iraq's compliance with the resolutions adopted by the U.N. 
Security Council.

In light of the crisis on the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border that began in early 
October, this report begins with a brief account of the Iraqi 
provocation and U.S. responses through the U.N. Security Council vote of 
October 15.  Subsequent developments in this crisis will be covered in 
the next report.

Iraq's recent behavior with respect to Kuwait has shown the world that 
it has not changed its threatening ways and cannot be trusted.  In early 
October 1994, elements of the Hammurabi Division of the elite Iraqi 
Republican Guard were detected relocating to positions at Shaihah 
airfield in southern Iraq.  This was the southern most deployment of 
Republican Guard forces since the 1990-1991 Gulf War.  By October 8, the 
15th Mechanized Brigade of the Hammurabi Division had deployed to 
approximately 20 kilometers from the Kuwait border.  Its artillery 
assets were oriented south toward Kuwait.  At the same time, the Al Nida 
Division of the Republican Guard began moving from the Mosul rail yard 
and the Baghdad area to positions in southern Iraq.  All these units 
were fully equipped with ammunition, food, and fuel, leading us to 
conclude that this was no mere exercise.  

By October 8, these troop movements, combined with forces already in 
southern Iraq, brought Iraqi troop strength in southern Iraq to 64,000, 
organized into 8 divisions.  By October 9, indications were present that 
logistic sites were being established in the vicinity of these 
deployments.  Iraqi movements to the south continued, and by October 11, 
it was assessed that Iraq would be capable of launching an attack by 
October 13.

This provocation required a strong response.  Accordingly, on October 8, 
1994, I ordered the immediate deployment of additional U.S. military 
forces to the Persian Gulf.  These deployments included the USS George 
Washington Carrier Battle Group and its accompanying cruise missile 
ships, a U.S. Marine Corps Expeditionary Unit, a U.S. Army Mechanized 
Task Force, and personnel to operate two additional Patriot missile 
batteries.  On October 10, I further ordered the deployment of over 500 
U.S. Air Force and Marine Corps combat and supporting aircraft to the 

In response to these measures, the Iraqi government began ordering its 
forces to move to positions in the rear, around Nasariyah and Qalat 
Salih, north of Basra, but still within several hours of the Kuwaiti 
border.  Had these forces remained deployed around Nasariyah, it would 
have constituted a significant enhancement of Iraq's capabilities in 
southern Iraq.  By October 15, there were clear indications that most 
Iraqi forces that had been moved south since late September were being 
redeployed to their original locations.  On October 15, 1994, the 
international community also demonstrated its strong resolve regarding 
this latest provocation when it passed unanimously U.N. Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR) 949, which condemned Iraq's provocative behavior and 
demanded that Iraq immediately withdraw the units deployed in the south 
to their original positions, not utilize its forces to threaten its 
neighbors or U.N. operations, not redeploy or enhance its military 
capacity in southern Iraq, and cooperate fully  with the U.N. Special 
Commission (UNSCOM).

As this recent episode shows, we continue to witness an Iraq that has 
failed to demonstrate its readiness to comply with the will of the 
international community.  We will continue to insist that Iraq not 
threaten its neighbors or intimidate the United Nations as it takes 
steps to ensure that Iraq never again possesses weapons of mass 
destruction.  The sanctions will be maintained until Iraq complies with 
all relevant provisions of U.N. Security Council resolutions.  Indeed, 
these recent provocative Iraqi actions underscore the wisdom of the 
Security Council's September 14 decision not to modify the existing 
sanctions regime.

Cooperation by Iraq with the United Nations since 1991 has been meager, 
sporadic, selective, and opportunistic.  Taken as a whole, Iraq's record 
represents a stunning failure to meet the standard set by the Council 
when it set the terms for ending the Gulf War in UNSCR 687:  to assure 
the world community of its "peaceful intentions."  The purpose of the 
drafters of Resolution 687--to ensure that Iraq could never again pose a 
threat to its neighbors or to regional peace and security--remains 

Nonetheless, UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
are working hard, with the help of the United States and other 
supporting nations, to put in place a comprehensive and effective 
monitoring regime for Iraq.  During the month of August alone, UNSCOM 
and IAEA had seven different teams in Iraq building and testing 
monitoring capabilities.  This effort must be carefully designed if it 
is to be so thorough that Iraq cannot rebuild a covert nuclear program, 
as it did before the Gulf War, when it claimed to be in compliance with 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.  Continued vigilance is necessary 
because we believe that Saddam Hussein is committed to rebuilding his 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability.

Indeed, significant gaps in accounting for Iraq's past programs for WMD 
continue.  There are unresolved issues in each of the four weapons 
categories (nuclear, long-range missile, chemical, and biological).  
This has been particularly true in the chemical and biological weapons 
areas, where Iraq claims to have destroyed large amounts of 
documentation.  It is, therefore, extremely important that the 
monitoring regime be effective, comprehensive, and sustainable.  A 
program of this magnitude is unprecedented and will require continued, 
substantial assistance for UNSCOM from supporting nations.  Rigorous and 
extensive trial and field testing will be required before UNSCOM can 
judge the program's effectiveness.

Rolf Ekeus, the Chairman of UNSCOM, has told Iraq that it must establish 
a clear track record of compliance before he can report favorably to the 
Security Council.  We strongly endorse Chairman Ekeus' approach and 
reject any attempt to limit UNSCOM's flexibility by the establishment of 
a timetable for determining whether Iraq has complied with UNSCR 715.

The U.N. Sanctions Committee continues to consider and, when 
appropriate, approve requests to send to Iraq materials and supplies for 
essential civilian needs.  The Iraqi government, in contrast, has 
continued to maintain a full embargo against its northern provinces and 
has acted to distribute humanitarian supplies throughout the country 
only to its supporters and to the military.

The Iraqi government has refused to sell $1.6 million in oil as 
previously authorized by the Security Council in UNSCRs 706 and 712.  
Talks between Iraq and the United Nations on imple-menting these 
resolutions ended unsuccessfully in October 1993.  Iraq could use 
proceeds from such sales to purchase foodstuffs, medicines, and 
materials and supplies for essential civilian needs of its population, 
subject to U.N. monitoring of sales and the equitable distribution of 
humanitarian supplies (including to its northern provinces).  Iraq's 
refusal to implement UNSCRs 706 and 712 continues to cause needless 

Proceeds from oil sales also would be used to compensate persons injured 
by Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait.  Of note regarding 
oil sales, discussions are underway with Turkish officials concerning 
the possible flushing of Iraqi oil now in the Turkish pipeline that 
extends from Iraq through Turkey.  The objective is to prevent physical 
deterioration of the Turkish pipeline as a unique asset.  Discussions 
continue as to how to conduct the flushing in a manner consistent with 
the U.N. sanctions regime.

The "no-fly zones" over northern and southern Iraq permit the monitoring 
of Iraq's compliance with UNSCRs 687 and 688.  Over the last 3 years, 
the northern no-fly zone has deterred Iraq from a major military 
offensive in the region.  In southern Iraq, the no-fly zone has stopped 
Iraq's use of aircraft against its population.

However, the Iraqi government continues its harsh campaign against its 
perceived enemies, both in the north and south.  Baghdad's campaign of 
economic warfare against the people of northern Iraq continues.  Last 
month the Iraqi regime cut electrical power to the Aqrah/Shirwan 
districts of Dohuk Governorate.  Three hundred fifty thousand people now 
confront a lack of water, sanitation, and hospital services.  Also in 
northern Iraq, in the vicinity of Mosul, we are watching Iraqi troop 
movements carefully; Iraq's intentions are still unclear.  In the south, 
Iraq's repression of the Marsh Arabs and the implementation of a policy 
of environmental devastation represent a clear intent to target a 
specific area for reprisals without regard to the impact on innocent 
civilians.  Further, Iraqi forces still wage a land-based artillery 
campaign in the marshes, and the shelling of marsh villages continues.  
In the last few years, the population of the region, whose marsh culture 
has remained essentially unchanged since 3500 B.C., has been reduced by 
an estimated three-quarters.

Iraq still refuses to recognize Kuwait's sovereignty and the 
inviolability of the U.N. demarcated border, which was reaffirmed by the 
Security Council in UNSCRs 773 and 833.  Indeed, Iraq continues to view 
the issue of Kuwaiti sovereignty as an object of tactical moves rather 
than an opportunity to demonstrate peaceful intentions.  Further, it has 
not complied with Security Council demands to resolve the issue of 
Kuwaiti MIAs, return Kuwaiti property stolen during the occupation, and 
renounce terrorism.  Iraq also has not met its obligations concerning 
Kuwaiti and third-country nationals it detained during the war and has 
taken no substantive steps to cooperate  fully with the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), as required by UNSCR 687, beyond 
agreement to participate in a technical committee being organized by the 

The Special Rapporteur of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights (UNHRC), 
Max van der Stoel, continues to report on the human rights situation in 
Iraq, particularly the Iraqi military's repression against its civilian 
populations in the marshes.  The Special Rapporteur asserted in his 
February 1994 report that the Government of Iraq has engaged in war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, and may have committed violations of 
the 1948 Genocide Convention.  Regarding the Kurds, the Special 
Rapporteur has judged that the extent and gravity of reported violations 
place the survival of the Kurds in jeopardy.  The Special Rapporteur has 
noted that there are essentially no freedoms of opinion, expression, or 
association in Iraq.

Torture is widespread in Iraq and results from a system of state-terror 
successfully directed at subduing the population.  The Special 
Rapporteur repeated his recommendation for the establishment of human 
rights monitors strategically located to improve the flow of information 
and to provide independent verification of reports.  We are pressing for 
the deployment of human rights monitors.

Special Rapporteur van der Stoel will file additional reports to the 
U.N. General Assembly in the fall and to the UNHRC in early 1995.  We 
are also considering efforts to investigate and publicize Iraqi crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and other violations of international 
humanitarian law.

Examples of Iraqi noncooperation and noncompliance continue in other 
areas.  Dozens of Shi'a clerics are still imprisoned in Iraq without 
charge.  Reliable reports have indicated that the Government of Iraq is 
offering reward money for terrorist acts against U.N. and humanitarian 
relief workers in Iraq.  For 3 years there has been a clear pattern of 
criminal acts linking the Government of Iraq to a series of 
assassinations and attacks in northern Iraq on relief workers, U.N. 
guards, and foreign journalists, including a German journalist murdered 
in northern Iraq last spring.  Ten persons have been injured and two 
have been killed in such attacks this year.  These acts are indicative 
of Iraq's continuing disdain for the United Nations and, in our view, 
also constitute violations of UNSCRs 687 and 688.

The U.N. Compensation Commission (UNCC) has received about 2.4 million 
claims so far, with another 100,000 expected.  The United States 
Government has now filed a total of 3,100 individual claims with a total 
asserted value of over $215 million.  Earlier this year, one panel of 
UNCC Commissioners submitted its report on the first installment of 
individual claims for serious personal injury or death.  The UNCC 
Commissioners' report recommended awards for a group of about 670 
claimants, of which 11 were U.S. claimants.  The Governing Council of 
the UNCC approved the panel's recommendations at its session in late 
May.  This summer the first U.S. claimants received compensation for 
their losses.  The UNCC Commissioners are expected to finish reviewing 
by the end of the year all claims filed involving death and serious 
personal injury.

In October the Governing Council will consider reports from the UNCC 
Commissioners on two other groups of claims.  The first group involves 
approximately 50,000 persons, including approximately 200 U.S. 
claimants, who were forced to depart suddenly from Kuwait or Iraq during 
the invasion and occupation.  The second group will involve claimants 
who sustained itemized individual losses, e.g., lost salary or personal 

The United States Government also has submitted a total of approximately 
$1.5 billion in corporate claims against the Government of Iraq, 
representing about 140 business entities. Those claims represented a 
multitude of enterprises ranging from small family- owned businesses to 
large multinational corporations.  In addition, in late July, the United 
States Government filed five Government claims with the UNCC.  The five 
claims were for non-military losses, such as damage to Government 
property (e.g., the U.S. Embassy compound in Kuwait) and the costs of 
evacuating U.S. nationals and their families from Kuwait and Iraq.  
These Government claims have an asserted value of about $17 million.  In 
the future, the United States Government also expects to file one or 
more additional Government claim(s) involving the costs of monitoring 
health risks associated with oil well fires and other environmental 
damage in the Persian Gulf region.  The UNCC expects to begin processing 
corporate claims and government claims later this year or early 1995.

It is clear that Iraq can rejoin the community of civilized nations only 
through democratic processes, respect for human rights, equal treatment 
of its people, and adherence to basic norms of international behavior.  
Iraq's Government should represent all of Iraq's people and be committed 
to the territorial integrity and unity of Iraq.  The Iraqi National 
Congress (INC) espouses these goals, the fulfillment of which would make 
Iraq a stabilizing force in the Gulf region.

Neither in its words nor its deeds has Iraq convinced us it is no longer 
a threat to regional peace and security.  Any discussion of lifting the 
oil embargo and other sanctions cannot be limited to future Iraqi 
cooperation in the area of WMD, but must take into account all the 
issues that comprise the true test of Iraq's peaceful intentions.  Full 
Iraqi compliance with all relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions 
remains the objective of U.S. policy.

The Congress' continued support of our efforts is especially gratifying.

                William J. Clinton   


Update on U.S. Policy Toward Cuba
Alexander F. Watson, Assistant Secretary For Inter-American Affairs
Address before the Wall Street Journal Conference on the Americas, New 
York City, October 28, 1994

It is a pleasure to be with you today.  To begin today's discussion on 
the situation in Cuba, I would like to place Cuba in a hemispheric 

Had I stood before you even less than a decade ago, a tour d'horizon of 
the Western Hemisphere would have revealed a totally different picture.  
At that time, bloody civil wars were taking place in El Salvador, 
Nicaragua, and Guatemala.  Non-democratic regimes ruled in Haiti, 
Suriname, Paraguay, and Chile.  Human rights abuses were routine in many 
countries.  Many economists in the region still spoke in terms of 
dependencia and Yankee imperialism.  Public sector-dominated economies 
and runaway inflation were the norm rather than the exception.

What a difference a few years make.  Today, peace, democracy, and free 
trade have swept throughout the hemisphere.  The Sandinistas and FMLN 
are the democratic oppositions in their respective countries.  Last 
month, Comandante Joaquin Villalobos of the FMLN addressed the U.S. Army 
War College.  Cheddi Jagan in Guyana--an advocate of Marxism for over 
three decades--supports free trade policies for his country.  Sub-
regional trading groups are vying to see which can liberalize quickest.  
You would be hard-pressed to find significant differences on democracy, 
human rights, and free trade between officials of Michael Manley's PNP, 
the Salvadoran ARENA Party founded by Roberto d'Aubuisson, and Peronists 
in Argentina.

Recognizing this dramatic convergence of views, President Clinton has 
invited the leaders of 34 out of 35 nations in the hemisphere to Miami 
six weeks from today to participate in the Summit of the Americas.  This 
largest gathering of Western Hemisphere leaders in history, the first 
since Punta del Este in 1967, will consolidate this convergence and 
outline a common plan of action to advance the cause of democracy and 
bring the region closer to the goal of prosperity.

As you have undoubtedly noticed, I said 34 out of 35 countries in the 
Hemisphere have been invited.  One nation in the Hemisphere continues to 
stand in unsplendid, and self-imposed, isolation from its sister nations 
of the region.  That nation is Cuba.

Cuba is the single glaring exception to the movement in the Hemisphere 
toward greater political freedom, greater respect for human rights, and 
more open economies.  In Cuba, the French would certainly recognize the 
veracity of their proverb about apparent change often not being real 
change.  Farmers' markets are occasionally tried, discontinued, and 
dusted off again; foreign investment is shunned and then desperately 
sought; dollars are banned and then legalized.  But in 35 years, there 
has not been one free newspaper; one legalized opposition political 
party; or one free election.

In the past, the Castro regime enjoyed a degree of tacit support--even 
encouragement--from many Latin and Caribbean nations.  Those days are 
over.  Today, Fidel Castro and Cuban Foreign Minister Robaina hear the 
same message throughout the hemisphere and beyond:  To save your 
country, democratize, respect human rights, open your economy.  From the 
Ibero-American summit to Robaina's recent swing through South America 
and Europe, Castro and his representatives hear only the same urgent 
call for reform.  The Rio Group, comprising the largest and many smaller 
countries from Mexico south, which had never officially commented on the 
internal situation in Cuba, last month called for: "a peaceful 
transition to a democratic pluralistic system which respects human 
rights and freedom of opinion."  This is a significant statement.

I do not mean to imply that these countries totally support our policy 
toward Cuba.  Many have called for the lifting of the U.S. embargo as 
well.  But I believe virtually all agree that the solution to the 
Cubans' problems lies not in the fates or beyond Cuba's borders, but 
rather in themselves.  To escape from its current quagmire, the Castro 
regime clearly must look inward.

Let me clear up some misapprehensions about our policy toward Cuba.  We 
have no designs to overthrow the Castro regime by force.  Our goal is a 
peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba.  We oppose all violent 
actions.  We have no hostile intent toward the Cuban people.  Quite the 
contrary--the Cuban Democracy Act, which was passed with strong 
bipartisan support by the Congress in 1992, has the dual intent of 
putting pressure on the Cuban Government for change (what we call Track 
One), while reaching out to the Cuban people through humanitarian 
donations and enhanced communications (Track Two).

Track One is the better known of the two.  Our embargo, which has been 
in place since the Kennedy Administration, limits Cuba's ability to 
acquire the foreign exchange it uses to maintain its economic 
straitjacket and political grip on the Cuban people.  But it is not a 
blockade as inaccurately charged by the Cuban regime and does not 
prevent Cuba from trading with any other nation in the world.

The Cuban regime has stated that it sees the success of the recent 
migration talks as the first step toward a broader dialogue with the 
United States, leading to normalization of relations and a lifting of 
the embargo.  That is emphatically not the case.  We have repeatedly 
stated that, only when the Cuban Government implements meaningful 
political and economic reforms, will we respond with carefully 
calibrated measures.

When the regime takes concrete steps to end the monopoly of power of the 
communist party, to protect non-violent dissent, and to open the command 
economy, we will take appropriate steps.  But we will not take steps in 
the uncertain hope that progress will follow automatically in Cuba.  
There is no historical basis for that hope.  So we will not 
precipitously and prematurely lift the embargo.  It has been--and still 
is--our strongest leverage for democratic reform inside Cuba.  We will 
not help Fidel Castro hold on to power against the will of the Cuban 

The accomplishments on Track Two of our policy are far less known.  
Since passage of the CDA, we have licensed over $50 million of private 
humanitarian assistance to Cuba--making the American people one of the 
largest donors to the Cuban people during this period.  We encourage and 
work to facilitate such assistance with many NGOs, including groups that 
may not agree with our overall policy, but nevertheless share our 
interest in getting aid to the most needy individuals and NGOs in Cuba.  
We will intensify these efforts, and are urging our allies who provide 
assistance to Cuba to channel their aid to deserving NGOs.

Contrary to popular myth, the sale or donation of almost all U.S.-
manufactured medicines to Cuba is permitted so long as they are not re-
exported, used in the biotechnology industry, or for torture.  The well-
publicized decay of Cuba's health care system is not caused by the 
embargo, but by Castro's refusal to change a disastrous economic system.

The CDA called for the establishment of improved telecommunications 
between the U.S. and Cuba.  We took appropriate steps and, on October 4, 
the FCC, with the Department of State's encouragement and concurrence, 
approved applications by U.S. telecommunications companies for authority 
to provide direct telephone service between the U.S. and Cuba.  
Communications between the United States and the Cuban people will be 
greatly expanded in the near future--perhaps as soon as next month.

We will continue to seek additional ways of expanding contacts between 
the people of our two nations.  We plan to authorize American news 
organizations to establish permanent bureaus in Cuba.  We will continue 
to permit individual travel to and from Cuba for genuine humanitarian 
and human rights purposes, and for legitimate educational and research 

To meet the hunger for information in Cuba, the United States will 
maintain the increased broadcasting to  Cuba announced by the President 
on August 20.  We are also stepping up our donations of books to Cuban 
institutions.  There are no U.S. restrictions on sending to or receiving 
from Cuba informational materials, and I encourage all who can to make 
such donations.

It is indeed ironic that today, Haiti, the poorest country in our 
hemisphere with virtually no democratic tradition, has a democratically 
elected leader and considerable hope for the future, while its richer 
neighbor to the West harbors no such hopes.  Although the situations in 
Haiti and Cuba are in most ways distinct, there is one common theme:  
The Cuban people, like the Haitians, want to enjoy the most basic of 
rights, and the opportunity to build economic prosperity after years of 
despair.  Like the Haitians, our Cuban neighbors deserve freedom.  And 
Cubans, with all their skills and talents, should not be left behind 
while their neighbors prosper and enjoy the benefits of expanded 
hemispheric trade.

In stark contrast to Haiti, there is no movement toward democracy in 
Cuba.  For 35 years, Cubans have lived under dictatorship.  When Fidel 
Castro came to power in 1959, he promised elections within 18 months.  
Three decades later the Cuban people still wait for the chance to choose 
their own representatives.  Castro rules through repression and 
intimidation.  Cubans cannot speak freely.  They cannot meet freely or 
organize freely.  They have no recourse against governmental abuse.

At the same time, the Cuban economy has gone into free fall, with the 
Cuban people the victims.  The end of the $6 billion annual subsidy from 
the former Soviet Union has exposed the fundamental inefficiencies of 
Castro's command economy.  The regime's inability to meet the needs of 
the Cuban people has been laid bare.  Factories are closing; under- and 
unemployment may be approaching 40%.  This year's sugar harvest was the 
worst since 1918.  Foreign trade has fallen by 75%.  In the 1950s, for 
all its political and social problems, Cuba had a per capita income 
among the very highest in Latin America; today, it is among the very 
lowest.  Beginning last year we saw some tentative steps toward economic 
reform.  Such measures as dollarization and limited self-employment have 
enjoyed modest success.  But rather than being embraced by the regime as 
initial steps on a journey to a bright future, these modest measures are 
officially described as "regrettable and temporary."

The most recent visible symptom of the failure of the regime to provide 
hope for a better life to the Cuban people was the massing of thousands 
in Old Havana, the city's heart, on August 5 to find transport out of 
the country.  Castro's response to the demonstration that day--the most 
striking opposition event since he took power--was to lift controls on 
rafters--a cynical move to get rid of the messengers of despair rather 
than address the cause of despair.  Tens of thousands of Cubans--men, 
women, even small children and old people--risked their lives in flimsy 
rafts.  Tragically, many perished.

From the outset of the migration  crisis, the Clinton Administration's 
most immediate goal was to stop this dangerous, uncontrolled outflow and 
to save lives.  To that end, we reached an agreement on September 9 with 
the Government of Cuba under which it pledged to take effective action 
to prevent unsafe and irregular departures.  For our part, we will 
ensure that legal migration from Cuba increases to at least 20,000 per 
year.  There are residual problems stemming from the rafter exodus; in 
particular, the situation in Guantanamo.  These issues should not 
distract us from the real problem--the dire situation in Cuba that 
provoked this crisis--nor from our fundamental goal:  a peaceful 
transition to democracy, respect for the human rights of the Cuban 
people, and an open economy with opportunity for all.

Cuba floats at sea and must choose the destination to which it will 
sail.  The people of Cuba must set their course.  But we are ready to 
help them go the way of their neighbors in the region.  We look forward 
to the day when we will be able to work with a freely elected Cuban 
Government and welcome Cuba back into the community of democratic 

So the Summit of the Americas will take place in six weeks with the 
presence of all our sister nations of the Hemisphere except one--34 
nations which share the values of democracy, human rights, and 
prosperity for all their citizens.  Let us not forget what made this 
hemisphere different from the Old World:  a recognition of the rights of 
the individual to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.  Those 
values are as relevant today as they were 200 years ago.  And, in our 
half of the globe, Cubans are without hope that they are on their way to 
fulfillment.  Thank you.  


Haiti's Recovery Program 
Mark L. Schneider, Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, U.S. Agency for International Development
Opening remarks at a State Department press briefing, Washington, DC, 
October 26, 1994

Over the course of last week, I spent five days in Haiti, as part of the 
response to the return of President Aristide and the beginning of the 
implementation of our program of assistance to the restored 
constitutional government.

I want at the outset just to give you some sense of what I found there, 
which was that despite the poverty of the country--which remains the 
poorest in the Western Hemisphere--and despite the suffering during 
three years of de facto rule, there is a really impressive degree of 
optimism among the people, both in Port-au-Prince and outside.

I went out to a small community--Pignon--in the central plateau, and 
again there is a sense that it really meant something for the return of 
democracy.  It meant, in fact, a return of a sense of hope and optimism 
that had not been there before.

I also had a chance to talk with some of the victims of human rights 
abuse.  One of the programs that we've had is support for a human rights 
fund that goes through Haitian non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  
What was interesting there was a commitment on their part--these are the 
victims--to abide by President Aristide's call for reconciliation, and 
they essentially were agreed that the future in Haiti meant trying to 
work together with all of the people in the country, regardless of those 
who participated in the de facto regime.

In general, the economic recovery program that we have put together, as 
you may understand, is part of a multilateral effort together with the 
World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the rest of the 
international system, United Nations agencies, and other donors, and it 
responds to a consensus analysis of Haiti's needs.  It also responds to 
the presentation that Haiti's economic team put together at a recent 
informal donors meeting.

The program focuses on three areas:  humanitarian needs, the needs in 
the area of democracy and restoration of government, and the area of 
economic recovery itself--that is, the infrastructure that permits 
private industry, commerce, to begin to work, begin to create jobs, and 
the establishment of a relationship with the international financial 
community again.

The overall estimate of the requirements for the first year are 
approximately $555 million, and those estimates were the consensus of 
this international donors meeting that met recently in Paris, sponsored 
by the World Bank.

Humanitarian Needs

In the area of humanitarian needs, we are talking about continuing a 
program that has provided some million individuals--mostly the most 
vulnerable parts of the Haitian population--children under five, women, 
and the elderly--with one meal a day.  It includes providing access to 
health services to some 2 million Haitians through a network of non-
governmental organizations.

Our own program supports approximately 39 U.S. private voluntary 
organizations (PVOs) and Haitian non-governmental organizations that 
provide these health services in clinics across the country.

The third part of the humanitarian program is jobs--short-term jobs that 
are linked to public health and public sanitation, cleaning the 
irrigation canals, and picking up garbage.  In August, we were funding 
some 16,000 jobs.  We are now up to about 35,000.  We hope to get up to 
about 50,000 by the end of the year--over the next two months, let's 

The overall estimate of need over the course of the first year in the 
humanitarian area is approximately $95 million.  The United States is 
going to provide approximately $57 million, and other donors at the 
various conferences have indicated their commitment to provide the other 

Economic Recovery

The second area of concern is the area of economic recovery itself.  
Over the course of the past year, an analysis by a joint World Bank-IDB 
mission estimated the infrastructure requirements at approximately $210 
million.  That mission was undertaken a year ago, and, in two weeks, 
there will be a new mission led by the Inter-American Development Bank 
that will be reviewing those initial estimates.  The expectation is 
that, if anything, during the past year the situation has deteriorated.

The overall estimate of need in the area of economic recovery is 
approximately $375 million.  I mentioned approximately $210 million with 
respect to infrastructure.  The additional requirements relate to 
clearing the arrears of Haiti to the international financial 
institutions--the World Bank and the IDB and the IMF particularly.

The overall arrears by the end of October will be approximately $76.18 
million--more than approximate--will be $76.18 million.  By the end of 
the year, those arrears would have risen to $83 million.  About 10 days 
ago, the United States Treasury Department organized a support group 
meeting at which USAID pledged $25 million and some 15 other nations 
present pledged the remaining $53 million, which means that we have 
pledges now for $78 million, which covers the arrears beyond the end of 

In the next several days, we anticipate receiving other pledges from 
several other countries present which will permit arrears to be cleared 
for Haiti beyond the first of the year.

I think it is important to emphasize that what that will do is free up 
approximately $260 million from either pipeline--from the World Bank and 
the IDB--in projects which are essentially approved and have been frozen 
during the period of the de facto government, or permit fast dispersing 
balance-of- payments in the case of the IDB, somewhere between $30 and 
$40 million and, similarly in the case of the World Bank, approximately 
the same amount.

So it will mean that over the course of the next 12-15 months, the 
clearing of arrears will permit major flows of capital into Haiti to 
provide a reconstruction of the nation's infrastructure in the area of 
electric power, roads,  and ports on the physical side.  It will also 
permit, on the social side, investment in the physical infrastructure of 
the health system and education system.  These are fundamental elements 
in permitting the economy to recover in Haiti.

Another area in the economic recovery that I want to mention is the 
immediate requirements with respect to balance-of-payments.  Haiti 
obviously, during the period of embargo, has not had export earnings to 
any degree, and at the same time they need vitally to obtain the inputs 
to permit businesses to begin to produce again--the inputs of seed, 
fertilizer, etc., for the agricultural sector to begin to operate again 

You have to remember that in Haiti, two-thirds of the labor force is 
concentrated in agriculture--mostly very small holdings--and at the same 
time, the vast majority of Haiti's poor are in the rural areas.  So in 
order to permit agricultural recovery, you have to begin to get 
fertilizer, seeds, and implements into the country, and that is one of 
the crucial concerns in providing approximately $15 million a month in 
balance-of-payments support.

When I was in Haiti, I signed the first balance-of-payments agreement 
for $15 million with President Aristide, and that will permit the 
beginnings of imports.  It permitted, actually, the first cargo of 
petroleum to come into the country, and at the same time, the local 
currency generated is used by the government to finance its operations.

The third area is democratic institutions and governance.  Let me go 
back a second.  In the economic recovery area, the overall estimate with 
respect to the plan was $375 million, of which the U.S. contribution 
will be approximately $87 million; the remainder comes, as I indicated, 
from the international financial institutions and from other bilateral 

Democratic Institutions And Governance

The third area, as I said, is democracy and governance, and that covers 
helping the restored government to carry out local and parliamentary 
elections called for under the constitution, which are to take place 
before the second week in January.  We have already provided a grant to 
the UN electoral unit to provide technical assistance to the government.

The mission led by the head of the UN electoral unit will be traveling 
to Haiti tomorrow, along with the Haitian official who has been 
designated by President Aristide as his point person on elections.  They 
will be meeting with President Aristide and with the Haitian political 
leaders to define the calendar that will permit elections to take place 
during the constitutional period.  I understand that President Aristide 
is meeting tomorrow with some of those political leaders to attempt to 
reach some agreements with respect to that calendar.

Other issues in the area of governance include strengthening local 
governments, helping the new ministries which were gutted during the 
recent period--by "gutted," I mean furniture, equipment--everything that 
you can think of taken--helping them begin essentially to re-equip 
themselves, both on the physical side with respect to furniture and 
everything else, and, on the planning side, to work with them to develop 
sectoral plans in each of the ministries that will permit the government 
to carry out its overall plan.

I think it is important to emphasize that President Aristide's plan 
focuses on something which is unique in Haiti's history, which is the 
decentralization of authority and responsibility down to local 

One of the problems in Haiti traditionally has been the concentration of 
power--and, as a result, corruption--at the central level.  One of the 
reasons for the failure to create strong democratic institutions has 
been the failure to create them at the community level.One of the key 
elements in his plan, which we are supporting and which other 
institutions are supporting, is to strengthen local government.

The third issue is justice reform, which we will be working on with 
other countries and with the Minister of Justice.  That links to the new 
civilian police which also, as you know, was the major part of the 
overall program of restoration of the constitutional government.

Finally, in this area as well, we are providing support for the 
integration of ultimately demobilized members of the FAD-H and police 
over a six-month period to reintegrate back into civilian life.

One of the clear expressions of President Aristide's announced call for 
reconciliation is that every time that we have discussed with him this 
overall economic recovery plan, one of the first things that he asked is 
to be sure that the ex-members of the FAD-H do have jobs to go into as 
they get demobilized.


Let me just conclude by saying three things.

First, the overall plan that we are engaged in is part of an 
international effort to help ensure that the restoration of 
constitutional government is followed by the recovery of the Haitian 
economy and then to begin to provide new opportunities to include the 
vast majority of the Haitian people who traditionally have been excluded 
from the political life of the country--to permit them to participate.

Second, that we are very optimistic about the initial decisions that 
President Aristide has made with respect to the character of the plan 
that he has put forward and with respect to reaching out to all sectors 
of Haitian society to indicate his desire that they participate in this 

And, third, I mentioned the mission  from the international community 
that is going down in two weeks.  We are very optimistic about the 
international community's ability to provide the resources that are 
called for under this plan.  


Supporting Peace in Northern Ireland
Statement released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 
Washington, DC, November 1, 1994.

The United States attaches great importance to the search for peace and 
reconciliation in Northern Ireland, both in the context of its worldwide 
commitment to end terrorism and its desire to promote democratic 
solutions to conflicts.  U.S. close bonds of history, culture, and 
tradition with Ireland and the United Kingdom provides it with a unique 
role in helping to achieve those goals.

The U.S. has encouraged and supported the courageous efforts of Irish 
Prime Minister Albert Reynolds and British Prime Minister John Major to 
establish a new framework for peace and justice in Northern Ireland.  
For the first time in a generation, both Republican and Loyalist 
paramilitaries have declared cease-fires.  Each day that passes without 
terrorism strengthens the hope that the bomb and the bullet are gone for 
good from the politics of Ireland.

President Clinton has pledged to do all he can to support the building 
of peace in Northern Ireland.  The United States wants to assist in 
ensuring that peace brings to Ireland new opportunities for job growth 
and economic prosperity, which, in turn, will help ensure that this 
newfound peace is a stable and lasting one.

The promise of peace will allow Americans to build on the strong 
business, trade, political, and cultural links they already enjoy with 
Ireland-- north and south.  The United States is the most important 
source of internationally mobile investment in Northern Ireland and in 
the Republic.  Forty U.S. companies are already operating in Northern 
Ireland, providing some 9,000 jobs.  In addition, the Administration 
strongly supports the Inter- national Fund for Ireland (IFI), which 
provides a broad range of economic and social development projects.

This present opportunity for last-ing peace in Ireland is the chance of 
a generation; it must be seized and supported.  The President, 
therefore, has directed his Administration to undertake the following 
initiatives in the coming months to increase U.S. support for the 
political and economic revitalization of Northern Ireland and the border 

White House Conference For Trade and Investment

The President will host a White House Conference for Trade and 
Investment in Ireland.  The conference is planned for April 1995 in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  He has instructed the Department of State 
to name a coordinator to work with Commerce Secretary Ron Brown and his 
staff, the International Fund for Ireland, the Irish and British 
Governments, and private sector and political groups to organize and 
support the conference.  The President looks forward to participating in 
this conference, which will aim to show U.S. companies that sustained 
peace is dramatically improving business opportunities on the island of 
Ireland and, particularly, in Northern Ireland and the border countries.  
American businesses should be in on the ground floor of these new 
opportunities; this will be good for the U.S. and good for Irish peace 
and reconciliation.

Commerce Secretary Brown To Attend Belfast Investment Conference

Secretary Brown will lead a U.S. delegation to Belfast in December 1994 
to Prime Minister Major's Investment Conference for Northern Ireland.  
The President has instructed him to identify concrete new opportunities 
for increased business links between Northern Ireland and the United 
States.  Secretary Brown also will travel to Dublin for consultations.  
In both cities, he will prepare the groundwork for the White House 
Conference for Trade and Investment in Ireland.  The President also has 
asked Secretary Brown to present these new initiatives at the White 
House conference in April.

Increased Funding for the IFI

The President is committed to continued, strong U.S. support for the 
International Fund for Ireland.  In addition to a planned obligation of 
almost $20 million to the fund in fiscal year (FY) 1995, the U.S. will 
seek congressional concurrence to increase IFI funding by an additional 
$10 million in FY 1996 and FY 1997, for a total of about $30 million 
each year.  This increase will bring the total commitment of this 
Administration to the fund to roughly $100 million.  The IFI has 
steadily strengthened and adjusted its programs and management over the 
years.  Such progress is expected to continue.  This additional funding 
will support the IFI in undertaking the vital new initiatives that are 
needed to consolidate the gains of peace in Northern Ireland and the 
border countries and to build cross-community economic and political 
cooperation.  The U.S will work with it to strengthen its programs even 
further and, particularly, to address such entrenched problems as the 
high rates of long-term unemployment in Northern Ireland and the border 

Department of Commerce Programs

The President has directed the Department of Commerce to enhance U.S. 
cooperation with Northern Ireland in science and technology, especially 
through strengthened collaboration with U.S. Manufacturing Extension 
Partnerships and other programs to encourage technological innovation. 
The Commerce Department also will establish a Business Information 
Center for Trade and Investment and review other ways to promote 
business opportunities in Northern Ireland and the border countries.

In addition, the Department of Commerce will initiate a business intern 
training program to train managers and business technical experts to 
train in U.S. companies.  This program will expedite the learning of 
advanced management and production skills and begin operating in FY 1996 
with approximately $1 million in bilateral economic assistance funds.  
It will help improve the productive abilities of industry in Northern 
Ireland and the border countries and also will generate increased 
business between U.S. firms and companies in Northern Ireland--creating 
more jobs there and in the U.S.

U.S. Information Agency Programs

The President has instructed the U.S. Information Agency to expand its 
programs in Northern Ireland in view of the changing political climate, 
increasing exchanges of persons as well as planning speakers and 
seminars on such topics as conflict resolution.  In addition, USIA will 
open its grant competitions in areas such as conflict resolution to 
allow American non-profit organizations to submit project proposals in 
Northern Ireland to support peace and reconciliation.

National Endowment for Democracy

The President will encourage the National Endowment for Democracy, which 
currently is funding a political party training program in Northern 
Ireland, to seek additional opportunities to strengthen and expand its 

U.S. Agency for International Development

USAID will explore ways to work with the IFI to increase the impact of 
its business enterprise program on small and micro-enterprises.  Thomas 
A. Dine, USAID Assistant Administrator for Europe and the New 
Independent States, will travel through Northern Ireland and the border 
countries beginning November 19, to review existing IFI programs and 
determine whether approaches used by USAID elsewhere may have 
application in Northern Ireland.

U.S. Trade and Development Agency

The U.S. Trade and Development Agency will lead a technical delegation 
to Northern Ireland to identify infrastructure and industrial projects 
that represent mutually beneficial trade and investment opportunities.  
Depending upon the findings of the delegation, future activities might 
include the funding of feasibility studies and/or the sponsorship of 
reverse trade missions.

A Continuing Commitment

The U.S. will continue to look for opportunities to support the efforts 
of the British and Irish Governments and of democratic leaders in 
Northern Ireland to build on peace.  We encourage the millions of 
Americans who want to contribute to peace in Ireland to do the same.  


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