U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DISPATCH VOLUME 5, NUMBER 45
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1. Building the Structures of Peace and Prosperity in the New Middle
East--Secretary Christopher
2. Casablanca Declaration
3. The Increasing Role of Regional Organizations in Africa--Deputy
Secretary Talbott, Assistant Secretary Moose
4. Overview of Trip to East Asia and the Pacific And the APEC Meetings-
-Joan Spero, Winston Lord
5. Principle, Power, and Purpose In the New Era--Madeleine K. Albright
6. Status of Efforts To Obtain Iraq's Compliance With UNSC Resolutions-
-President Clinton
7. Update on U.S. Policy Toward Cuba --Alexander Watson
8. Haiti's Recovery Program--Mark L. Schneider
9. Supporting Peace in Northern Ireland
ARTICLE 1:
Building the Structures of Peace and Prosperity in the New Middle East
Secretary Christopher
Remarks at the Royal Palace, Casablanca, Morocco, October 30, 1994
Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen: On behalf of President Clinton and
the American people, I am delighted to attend this historic Middle
East/North Africa Economic Summit. We all owe King Hassan our deepest
gratitude for hosting this unique event. Building on his vision of
Middle East peace, the King has brought us together to remove walls and
build bridges between the people of the Middle East and the world.
President Clinton and the United States are pleased to be co-sponsoring
this summit together with President Yeltsin and the Russian Federation.
Let me express our appreciation to Les Gelb and the Council on Foreign
Relations and to Klaus Schwab and the World Economic Forum for their
outstanding efforts to structure and organize this important gathering.
This summit convenes at an extraordinary time. I have just accompanied
President Clinton on his recent trip to the Middle East. Let me share
with you our assessment. The Middle East is undergoing a remarkable
transformation:
-- Jordan and Israel have signed a peace treaty;
-- The Israeli-PLO Declaration is being implemented;
-- Morocco and Tunisia have established ties with Israel;
-- Israel and Syria are engaged in serious negotiations; and
-- Arab nations are taking steps to end the boycott of Israel.
These monumental events mean that the Arab-Israeli conflict is coming to
an end. The forces of the future can, they must, they will succeed.
The peacemakers will prevail.
Securing the future is what brings us here today. Our mission is clear:
We must transform the peace being made between governments into a peace
between people. Governments can make the peace. Governments can create
the climate for economic growth. But only the people of the private
sector can marshall the resources necessary for sustained growth and
development. Only the private sector can produce a peace that will
endure.
Three years ago to the day, nations gathered in Madrid for a conference
whose significance grows with each passing month. As we realize now,
Madrid opened the pathway to peace. Here, this week, let us declare
that the Casablanca conference will open the pathway to economic ties
and growth. Madrid shattered taboos on political contacts between
Israel and its Arab neighbors. Let us ensure that Casablanca shatters
taboos on private sector cooperation.
Let this summit send a message to the world: The Middle East and North
Africa are now open for business.
Over the course of the 20th century, the world has learned a powerful
lesson: Peace cannot be sustained when there is widespread suffering
and misery. Following World War II, wise leaders applied this lesson to
the reconstruction and integration of Western Europe. They built
structures of cooperation, beginning with economic ties, to lessen the
likelihood of conflict among nations. Our purpose in Casablanca is to
apply that same lesson to this region, as we work to create a more
peaceful and secure Middle East.
On Wednesday night in Jordan, President Clinton became the first
American President to address an Arab parliament. There, he underscored
the importance of generating the economic benefits of peace. As he
said:
If people do not feel these benefits, if poverty persists in breeding
despair and killing hope, then the purveyors of fear will find fertile
ground. Our goal must be to spread prosperity and security to all.
The Madrid conference of 1991 started us on the way. It not only
launched a series of bilateral negotiations to resolve the region's
political disputes; it also created a framework of meaningful
multilateral talks among some 40 nations to promote Arab-Israeli
cooperation on a region-wide scale. Joint projects are already underway
to check the spread of the desert, to quench the region's thirst for
water, and to protect the environment from oil spills. Under the
leadership of the European Union, the working group on economic
development has drawn up a list identifying priority sectors for
economic cooperation.
Israel, Jordan, and the United States are working together to create
opportunities for private sector investment in areas that were
unthinkable only months ago. An ambitious master plan for the
development of the Jordan Rift Valley has been completed. Joint efforts
to promote tourism in the Red Sea ports of Aqaba and Eilat are already
attracting millions of dollars of investment in hotels, infrastructure,
and tourist facilities.
Progress toward Arab-Israeli peace has opened the door to economic
cooperation in support of peace. Now, together, we must take a bold
step through that door. We must form a public sector-private sector
partnership for government and business to bring their political and
economic power jointly to bear.
I have seen the situation from both sides--from the private sector,
where I have spent most of my career, and from the public sector during
my three tours in government. I have also been heavily involved in the
affairs of the Middle East for the past two years. Let me offer a
challenge and a prediction: If the forces of peace prevail and if
governments here adopt free market reforms, the Middle East and North
Africa will enjoy an era of economic growth that exceeds anything they
have seen in this century. There is no reason why the economic miracles
that are transforming parts of Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America
cannot also transform this region. I can foresee a day when the 300
million people of the Middle East and North Africa, so long held back by
strife and hatred, can finally join the mainstream of international
commerce.
The presence here in Casablanca of almost 1,000 of the world's business
leaders is proof that you understand the vast potential of this region.
I salute your vision. But I also know that you are hard-nosed realists.
The new Middle East holds no monopoly on attracting your attention or
your capital.
That is why the Middle East, even a Middle East at peace, cannot be
complacent; it must compete. The world must know that the Middle East
is not only at peace but committed to long-term reform if world-class
companies are to invest in this region.
Almost 150 American firms are here in Casablanca. They are well-poised
to take advantage of the opportunities this region presents. American
companies do not fear risk; they thrive on it. But like serious
companies everywhere, they need confidence--confidence in a business
environment that makes it possible to do business.
To create a climate for economic growth and development, we need
commitment and action by governments inside the region as well as those
outside. For decades, governments dominated economic development here,
building infrastructure and national industries. In the process, they
incurred massive foreign debts. Since 1970, the countries of the Middle
East have borrowed more than $90 billion from abroad. Over 90% of this
borrowing was absorbed by the public sector, where it was too often
steered toward the military or inefficient state enterprises.
Not surprisingly, private capital and the private entrepreneurs that
went with it fled the region. In the last 20 years, capital outflows
from the Middle East and North Africa have exceeded $180 billion. This
capital flight has had enormous practical consequences.
We must work to reverse this destructive trend. It is time for the
region's private sectors to invest in their nations, in their peoples,
and in their futures. They must bring their capital home. But if they
are to do so, governments must take steps to create a favorable economic
environment. How can you expect foreigners to invest here when citizens
of the Middle East do not invest?
Governments here must undertake serious economic reform. Morocco has
begun that process. Privatization is proceeding, stock market
capitalization is rising, foreign investment is expanding, and growth is
taking off. Other countries in the region, such as Tunisia, Israel,
Egypt, and Jordan, have also begun to take similar steps.
But more must be done. Governments need to end trade restrictions and
overcome other barriers to trade and investment. They must reform and
modernize their tax systems and commercial dispute mechanisms. They
need to ensure predictable, transparent, and fair legal systems and
business practices. They need private financial markets. They must
lift the heavy hand of government regulation that stifles entrepreneurs.
An important political step to make the region's environment more
attractive to global companies must be taken as well. The last remnants
of the boycott aimed against Israel must be eliminated. Last month,
Saudi Arabia and its partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council announced
an end to the secondary and tertiary boycotts. This means enormous
opportunities for investment and trade. Now it is time for other Arab
leaders to follow the GCC's example. Indeed, it is time for the Arab
League to dismantle the boycott entirely.
Governments outside the Middle East and North Africa must also do their
part to create a climate conducive to economic growth. They can take
steps to encourage their companies to invest in the joint ventures that
will become the stuff of Middle East peace. They can provide incentives
and reduce risks for foreign investors. They can encourage trade by
reducing barriers. They can create the financial mechanisms that will
help mobilize capital for regional projects.
The United States is already taking concrete steps in all these areas:
-- Through our Overseas Private Investment Corporation, we have
established a $75 million Regional Investment Fund to encourage
investment in regional projects like those envisaged in the Jordan Rift
Valley development plan.
-- We have also used OPIC guarantees to help a group of American
business leaders from the Arab and Jewish communities foster Palestinian
economic development. These builders for peace have already launched
five OPIC-backed private sector projects in the West Bank and Gaza.
-- We are exploring practical means of expanding trade and investment
opportunities, including initiatives to lessen barriers to trade and
bilateral investment treaties.
-- President Clinton, in consultation with interested governments, has
decided that the U.S. will take the lead in supporting a Middle East and
North Africa Bank for Cooperation and Development.
Other governments outside the region are engaged in similar efforts to
support the involvement of their private sectors in the development of
the Middle East and North Africa. But we all need to do more. This is
the opportunity presented by the Casablanca summit. We must seize it.
Here in Casablanca, our focus must be practical. Our work must not be
limited to exhortation. We must generate specific outcomes, with
mechanisms to act on our proposals.
Specifically, in this conference the United States will call for the
following:
First, adoption of principles leading to the free movement of goods,
capital, ideas, and labor across the borders of the Middle East and
North Africa.
Second, the establishment of a Middle East and North Africa Bank for
Cooperation and Development. A bank, properly structured, can serve as
a financing mechanism for viable regional projects. It should be
available for the private sector as well as the public sector, and
should facilitate a regional economic dialogue.
Third, the creation of a regional tourism board. Tourism is one of the
clearest and quickest ways to generate hard currency revenues. The
Middle East and North Africa abound with incredible archeological and
religious sites. Millions of tourists will flock to visit as package
tours across previously closed borders become available.
Fourth, the development of a regional business council--a chamber of
commerce, if you will. This entity will promote intraregional trade
relations and commercial opportunities.
To move expeditiously on each of these proposals, this conference must
establish two on-going bodies: first, a steering committee, to meet
within one month; second, an executive secretariat, located in Morocco,
that will serve as a clearing house of information. It will be an
"address" for the private sector by sharing data, promoting contracts,
and furnishing project information.
Finally, the United States will call for a follow-on conference in Amman
in 1995. Casablanca represents the launching of a process to promote
regional economic development and cooperation. Amman will represent the
next milestone and point all of us to seeking very tangible
accomplishments by the 1995 conference.
In a golden age over a millennium ago, the Middle East was the
commercial and cultural crossroads of the world. Harkening back to the
glorious economic and cultural history of the old Middle East, this
summit heralds a new Middle East in the heart of the global economy once
again. We have the opportunity--and the responsibility--to build a more
peaceful, more prosperous, and more integrated Middle East and world.
Working together in a public-private endeavor, let us dedicate ourselves
to making that vision a reality.
If I may borrow the famous Humphrey Bogart line, this conference could
be the beginning of a beautiful friendship.
Thank you very much.
(###)
ARTICLE 2:
Casablanca Declaration
Released at the Middle East/North Africa Economic Summit, Casablanca,
Morocco, October 30-November 1, 1994.
1. At the invitation of His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco and with
the support and endorsement of Presidents Bill Clinton of the United
States and Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation, the representatives
of 61 countries and 1114 business leaders from all regions of the world,
gathered for a Middle East/North Africa Economic Summit in Casablanca
from October 30 to November 1, 1994. The participants paid tribute to
His Majesty, King Hassan II, in his capacity as President and Host of
the Conference and praised His role in promoting dialogue and
understanding between the parties in the Middle East conflict. They
also expressed their appreciation to the Government and people of
Morocco for their hospitality and efforts to ensure the success of the
Summit.
2. The Summit leaders feel united behind the vision that brought them
to Casablanca, that of a comprehensive peace and a new partnership of
business and government dedicated to furthering peace between Arabs and
Israelis.
3. Government and business leaders entered into this new partnership
with a deeper understanding of their mutual dependence and common goals.
Business leaders recognized that governments should continue to forge
peace Agreements and create foundations and incentives for trade and
investment. They further recognize the responsibility of the private
sector to apply its new international influence to advance the diplomacy
of peace in the Middle East and beyond. Governments affirmed the
indispensability of the private sector in marshalling, quickly, adequate
resources to demonstrate the tangible benefits of peace. Together, they
pledged to show that business can do business and contribute to peace as
well; indeed, to prove that profitability contributes mightily to the
economic scaffolding for a durable peace.
4. The Summit commended the historic political transformation of the
Region as a consequence of significant steps towards a just, lasting and
comprehensive peace, based on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and
338, a process that began with the 1979 Treaty of Peace between Egypt
and Israel and enlarged dramatically by the Madrid Peace Conference,
three years ago. That process has born fruit in Israel-Palestine
Liberation Organization Declaration of Principles. The recent signing
of the Treaty of Peace between Israel and Jordan gave a new dimension to
the process. The decisions of Morocco and Tunisia to establish,
respectively, liaison offices and liaison channels with Israel
constituted another new positive development. These accomplishments and
the next stages of rapid movement toward a comprehensive peace in the
region, including Syria and Lebanon, need to be powerfully reinforced by
solid economic growth and palpable improvement of the life and security
of the peoples of this region. The Summit stressed that Syria and
Lebanon have an important role to play in the development of the region.
The Summit expressed a strong hope that they will soon be able to join
the regional economic effort.
5. In this connection, the participants noted that the urgent need for
economic development of the West Bank and Gaza Strip requires special
attention from the international community, both public and private, in
order to support the Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization
Declaration of Principles and subsequent implementing agreements to
enable the Palestinian people to participate on equal bases in the
regional development and cooperation. They stressed the equal
importance of moving ahead on Jordanian-Israeli projects as well as on
cooperative projects between Israel and Jordan in order to advance the
Jordanian-Israeli Treaty of Peace.
6. The participants recognized the economic potential of the Middle
East and North Africa and explored how best to accelerate the
development of the Region and overcome, as soon as possible, obstacles,
including boycotts and all barriers to trade and investment. All agreed
that there is a need to promote increased investment from inside and
outside the Region. They noted that such investment requires free
movement of goods, capital and labour across borders in accordance with
market forces, technical cooperation based on mutual interest, openness
to the international economy and appropriate institutions to promote
economic interaction. They also noted that the free flow of ideas and
increased dialogue, especially among the business communities in the
Region, will strengthen economic activity. In this context, the
participants noted favourably the decision of the Council for
Cooperation of the Gulf States regarding the lifting of the secondary
and the tertiary aspects of the boycott of Israel.
7. Based on the agreements between Israel and the PLO, it is important
that the borders of the Palestinian Territories be kept open for labor,
tourism and trade to allow the Palestinian Authority, in partnership
with its neighbours, the opportunity to build a viable economy in peace.
8. The participants paid tribute to the multilateral negotiations
initiated in Moscow in 1992 which have significantly advanced the
objectives of the peace process. The governments represented at
Casablanca will examine ways to enhance the role and activities of the
multilateral negotiations, including examining regional institutions
which address economic, humanitarian and security issues. The
participants noted that the progresses made in the peace process should
go along with a serious consideration of the socio-economic disparities
in the Region and require to address the idea of security in the Region
in all its dimensions: social, economic and political. In this
context, they agreed that these issues need to be addressed within the
framework of a global approach encompassing socio-economic dimensions,
safety and welfare of Individuals and Nations of the Region.
9. The participants recognized that there must be an ongoing process to
translate the deliberations of Casablanca into concrete steps to advance
the twin goals of peace and economic development and to institutionalize
the new partnership between governments and the business community. To
this end:
a) The governments represented at Casablanca and private sector
representatives stated their intention to take the following steps:
--Build the foundations for a Middle East and North Africa Economic
Community which involves, at a determined stage, the free flow of goods,
capital and labour throughout the Region.
--Taking into account the recommendations of the regional parties
during the meeting of the sub-committee on finances of the REDWG
monitoring committee, the Casablanca Summit calls for a group of experts
to examine the different options for funding mechanisms including the
creation of a Middle East and North Africa Development Bank. This group
of experts will report on its progress and conclusions within six months
in the light of the follow on Summit to the Casablanca Conference.
--The funding mechanism would include appropriate bodies to promote
dialogue on economic reform, regional cooperation, technical assistance
and long-term development planning.
--Establish a regional Tourist Board to facilitate tourism and
promote the Middle East and North Africa as a unique and attractive
tourist destination.
--Encourage the establishment of a private sector Regional Chamber
of Commerce and Business Council to facilitate intra-regional trade
relations. Such organizations will be instrumental in solidifying ties
between the private and public sectors of the various economies.
b) The participants also intend to create the following mechanisms
to implement these understandings and embody the new public-private
collaboration:
--A Steering Committee, comprised of government representatives,
including those represented in the Steering Committee of the
multilateral group of the peace process, will be entrusted with the task
of following up all issues arising out of the Summit and coordinating
with existing multilateral structures such as the REDWG and other
multilateral working groups. The Steering Committee will meet within
one month following the Casablanca Summit to consider follow on
mechanisms. The Committee will consult widely and regularly with the
private sector.
--An executive Secretariat to assist the Steering Committee,
located in Morocco, will work for the enhancement of the new economic
development pattern, thus, contributing to the consolidation of the
global security in the Region. The Secretariat will assist in the
organization of a Regional Chamber of Commerce and a Business Council.
It will work to advance the public-private partnership by promoting
projects, sharing data, promoting contacts and fostering private sector
investment in the Region. The Secretariat will assist in the
implementation of the various bodies referred to in the present
Declaration. The Steering Committee will be responsible for the funding
arrangements, with the support of the private sector.
10. The participants welcomed the establishment of a Middle East/North
Africa Economic Strategy Group by the Council on Foreign Relations.
This private sector group will recommend strategies for regional
economic cooperation and ways to overcome obstacles to trade and private
investment. It will operate in close association with the Secretariat
and submit its recommendations to the Steering Committee.
11. The participants also welcomed the intention of the World Economic
Forum to form a business interaction group that will foster increased
contacts and exchanges among business communities and submit its
recommendations to the Steering Committee.
12. The participants in the Casablanca Summit pledged to transform this
event into lasting institutional and individual ties that will provide a
better life for the peoples of the Middle East and North Africa. They
resolved that the collaboration of the public and private sectors that
constituted the singularity of the Casablanca Summit will serve as a
milestone in the historic destiny that is now playing itself out in the
Middle East/North Africa Region.
13. The participants expressed their appreciation to the Council on
Foreign Relations and to the World Economic Forum for their substantive
contribution to the organization of the Casablanca Summit.
14. The participants expressed their intention to meet again in Amman,
Jordan, in the first half of 1995 for a second Middle East/North Africa
Economic Summit, to be hosted by His Majesty King Hussein.
(###)
ARTICLE 3:
The Increasing Role of Regional Organizations in Africa
Deputy Secretary Talbott, Assistant Secretary Moose
Deputy Secretary Talbott
Address to the Zimbabwe Staff College, Harare, Zimbabwe, October 22,
1994.
My colleagues and I are very glad to be here with you today. I am
joined here at the podium by Assistant Secretary of State for Africa,
George Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for International
Organizations, Doug Bennet, and Assistant Administrator of the Agency
for International Development, John Hicks. They will join me in the
discussion we will have when I conclude these remarks.
Permit me to begin on a personal note. I was last here 16 years ago, in
1978, when your country and its capital had different names--and, far
more importantly, when the majority of the people did not have the full
rights of citizenship. So having once visited a place called Salisbury,
Rhodesia, it is deeply gratifying to return to Harare, Zimbabwe.
I mention this simply to underscore that I have my own sense of the
extraordinary transition that you have been through--and the
extraordinary transformation that you have accomplished. However, I
speak not just for myself but for my traveling companions and for all
Americans when I say that we admire and congratulate you.
Yours is a nation with which the United States feels a special affinity:
We are both former colonies of Britain; we have both won our
independence; and we have both embraced democracy. Moreover, you have
blazed the trail for another former British colony, South Africa, whose
people are now, like you--and, also, like us in the U.S.--embarked on
the great task of building a truly tolerant, truly inclusive multi-
racial democracy.
I have another reason for welcoming the chance to meet with you today.
You are soldiers; therefore, representatives of a profession that is as
old as the human race. But, more importantly, in this era of dramatic
global change, you are also soldiers of the future. I say that because
you are defenders of democracy. You are safeguarding your country's
independence and your people's freedom.
Also, you are soldiers of the future in that the armed forces of
Zimbabwe are participating in peace-keeping missions in other countries.
It is one of the most important features of our time that democracy is
on the rise all over the world, and especially here in Africa.
Since 1989, multi-party elections have been held in 26 African
countries, with a dozen more expected by 1996. As our Vice President,
Al Gore, has put it: The spread of democracy in Africa "is one of the
great, but quiet revolutions of our age." With this favorable trend has
emerged a generation of African leaders who are actively committed to
improving the lives of their fellow citizens. As a result, there is now
an unprecedented potential for collective regional action to foster
political stability and economic development.
Each of those, of course, depends on the other. Over the long haul, you
cannot have political stability without economic development, and you
cannot have economic development without political stability. And, you
cannot have either without peace.
The need for collective regional action in defense of peace and
democracy has never been more urgent. In recent years, the peoples of
Africa have inspired the world by demonstrating tremendous resiliency--
and genuine heroism--in overcoming truly horrific disasters, both man-
made and natural.
Ethiopia and Uganda are now making encouraging progress toward democracy
and economic reconstruction. In Eritrea, former soldiers are now
working to remove land mines, rebuild roads, plant trees, and teach
basic literacy. Two years ago, the nations of Southern Africa survived
the worst drought in a century; now they are producing food surpluses.
Yet in spite of all that has been accomplished, several nations on the
continent are now in danger of collapsing into political violence.
As in other parts of the post-Cold War world, there is remarkably little
conflict between states in Africa, but conflict within states continues,
stubbornly and brutally. This bloodshed matters to all of us. It is
not just the business of the countries involved; it is also the concern
of the international community as a whole. Why? Your Foreign Minister,
Dr. Shamuyarira--whom I had the privilege to meet in Washington two
weeks ago and again here this morning --could not have put it better
when he addressed the United Nations General Assembly. He said, and I
quote:
What are initially regarded as internal or local conflicts have the
potential, if left unattended, to grow into trouble spots threatening
international peace and security.
The question facing us on every continent is how to translate
international concern into international action. The traditional
methods of diplomacy, which were designed to resolve state-to-state
conflicts, are not adequate to the job of resolving internal conflicts.
We need to be bold and innovative, and we need to look for ways to act
collectively, wherever and whenever we can. This means assembling
regional and international coalitions aimed, as much as possible, at
preventing conflicts before they occur and, to the extent necessary, at
resolving conflicts quickly when they do erupt.
In Cambodia, in Haiti, and in several African states, we have seen that
such multinational coalitions can give people the chance--after years of
turmoil and repression--finally to begin building democratic
institutions. Even in those tragic cases where the people in conflict-
ridden states are not ready for peace, such as Bosnia and Somalia, there
is still much that the international community can do. It can
ameliorate the humanitarian catastrophes and the refugee outflows that
accompany political violence and ethnic turmoil or it can take steps to
prevent the spread of the fighting--to prevent, in other words, civil
war from becoming regional war.
The United Nations has an important role to play in these efforts, as it
has demonstrated many times in Africa and around the globe. Despite the
current uncertainties about Somalia's future, more than 500,000 people
there who might have died of war-induced famine are alive today because
of UN peace-keeping efforts.
In Mozambique, the UN Mission and the High Commissioner for Refugees are
helping to repatriate more than 1 million refugees and to reintegrate
into society some 3 million internally displaced Mozambicans. Next
week, the UN Mission in Mozambique will help to supervise that country's
first free and fair elections. In Angola, it is anticipated that by the
end of this month, the Government of Angola and UNITA will initial a
national reconciliation agreement. If this happens, as we hope it will,
an expanded UN force will be needed to monitor the cease-fire and the
implementation of the agreement.
The nations that are participating in these and other UN Missions--and
that includes Zimbabwe--have every reason to be proud of what they have
accomplished. But it must also be acknowledged that the United Nations
is already overworked and is at risk of being overwhelmed by the number,
magnitude, complexity, and difficulty of the peace-keeping missions that
it has been asked to undertake. In addition to Somalia, Mozambique, and
Angola, the UN is also involved in Rwanda, Liberia, and Western Sahara.
Outside of Africa, the UN is engaged in the Golan Heights and Southern
Lebanon in the Middle East; Kuwait in the Persian Gulf; Jammu and
Kashmir in South Asia; Georgia and Tajikistan in the former Soviet
Union; Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean; Croatia, Bosnia, and
Macedonia in the Balkans; and El Salvador and Haiti in the Western
Hemisphere.
As a result of the UN's being over-burdened, the international community
is in danger of not being able to respond quickly enough to new crises
when they occur. Quick response is often vital. At the beginning of
many peace operations, time is of the essence: A cease-fire may be
fragile; a peace settlement may be tentative; large numbers of people
may be within days or weeks of starving. In such circumstances,
competent forces need to be deployed urgently. The timely arrival of
even a token force may buy just enough time for a larger one to get to
the scene. Yet in several cases, recently, it has taken three to six
months to organize and deploy UN forces. Furthermore, the United
Nations has, in several instances, mounted only a small operation where
a larger one might have made the difference between failure and success.
As just one example, the UN observer operation in Angola in 1992 had too
few observers to monitor the peace settlement and elections adequately.
I assure you that the United States is committed to working with the UN
to improve its peace-keeping capabilities, particularly in the area of
support for logistics and planning.
But my main message to you today--I'm sure you anticipated it; I hope
you welcome it--is that even with every imaginable reform and
improvement, the UN will still be unable to carry the burden of global
peace-keeping alone. It needs help from regional organizations that are
much better prepared to handle peace-keeping than they are today. For
example, the nations of East Asia and the Pacific Rim are just beginning
to discuss collective security under the aegis of the ASEAN Regional
Forum. Even the more well-established regional organizations are only
now beginning to consider their roles in humanitarian and peace-keeping
operations.
The Organization of American States has just this year broken new ground
by playing a vital role in helping to restore democracy in Haiti. In
Europe, NATO, CSCE, and other regional organizations are struggling to
pass their first severe test of the post-Cold War era in the former
Yugoslavia. Here in Africa, the international community, in general,
and our government, in particular, looks to the OAU to develop its
capacity for conflict-resolution and peace-keeping on this continent.
While the OAU has a very long way to go in this regard, there is reason
to hope that it will prove to be up to the task. After all, African
nations already have considerable experience managing and participating
in such operations. At the present time, 22 Sub-Saharan African
countries--Zimbabwe prominently among them--have military personnel
committed to a total of 10 UN and two African peace-keeping operations.
In June 1992, the assembly of heads of state and government of the OAU
took a historic step when it decided to create its own conflict
resolution mechanism. The establishment of a conflict prevention
"command center" at OAU headquarters in Addis Ababa was an important
preliminary step in building this mechanism into an effective
institution.
Last April, the OAU played a vital role in monitoring the first free and
fair elections in South Africa. Now OAU observers are helping to
establish an environment for reconciliation in Burundi and Rwanda. In
Burundi, where our delegation visited yesterday, the OAU has also played
a crucial role in the political transition that recently culminated in
the emergence of a new president and a new government.
The OAU has shown that it can work effectively with subregional
organizations, such as the Economic Community of West African States.
While the tragedy in Liberia is far from over, the joint OAU and ECOWAS
peace-keeping effort there has helped contain a disastrous civil war and
save thousands of lives. Despite continued fighting, we are hopeful
that this initiative will eventually lead to the restoration of
democracy and a durable peace in Liberia. That subject will be high on
our agenda when we visit Ghana and the Cote d'Ivoire next week. I
should also note the successful conflict resolution efforts undertaken
in Lesotho by Presidents Mugabe, Mandela, and Masire on behalf of the
Southern Africa Development Community.
It is our hope that by the end of the decade, the OAU will have the
capability to mount significant peace-keeping operations--under the UN
Charter. We will do what we can to that end. The U.S. has pledged both
financial and technical assistance to the OAU's conflict resolution
mechanism. We recognize, as you do, that the best way to solve a crisis
is to prevent it. That is why USAID, led by Administrator Brian Atwood
and Assistant Administrator Hicks, is now working with nations in the
Horn of Africa, African regional organizations, and the international
donor community to develop a long-term strategy to prevent food
shortages and famine.
A key element of our strategy lies in supporting democratic governments
and institutions. In Africa as elsewhere, democracies have shown a
greater capacity than non-democratic states for avoiding violent
conflict and meeting the aspirations of their people. They have also
shown a greater willingness and ability to play a constructive role in
the international community.
We also recognize that one of the greatest enemies of democracy is
destitution. That is why we are committed to working with the other G-7
nations to write off a substantial portion of the debts of those African
nations that carry the heaviest burdens. Democracy-building must go
hand-in-hand with programs to reduce poverty and curb rapid population
growth. Therefore, we support the agenda set by the 170 nations that
attended the Cairo conference last month--an agenda that will eventually
bolster families, improve the social and economic status of women, and
provide the kinds of family planning and health services that
sustainable development requires.
Let me conclude by reiterating why all this matters so much to the
United States--13,000 kilometers away from you. It is because our
President and our people know that, in this increasingly interdependent
world of ours--a world of shrinking distances, instant communications,
growing international trade, and ever-more porous borders-- our own
prosperity and our own security depend, to a significant extent, on
whether people in lands far away are at peace with each other.
President Clinton puts it simply and succinctly when he says, as he
often does: "We're all in this together."
Assistant Secretary Moose
Opening statement at a press briefing, Washington, DC, October 31, 1994.
Good afternoon. As most of you know, Deputy Secretary Talbott returned
to Washington last Thursday following, roughly, a week-long visit to
Africa. I accompanied him on that trip as did Assistant Secretary for
International Organization Affairs, Doug Bennet and USAID Assistant
Administrator for Africa, John Hicks.
The purpose of the visit was twofold: the first being to reiterate our
support for democratic transitions, of which there are many taking place
on the African continent; the second was to examine, with African
leaders and organizations, what the U.S. and others could do to support
African efforts to address conflict resolution, conflict prevention, and
peace-keeping.
The principal stops on the trip were chosen with those two principal
things in mind. We stopped very briefly in Burundi as part of our
continuing effort to encourage the parties there to sustain Burundi's
very fragile transition to democracy and thereby avert the eruption of
broader violence.
We had a very substantive stop in Zimbabwe, speaking with the Zimbabwean
leadership about the growing regional context for conflict resolution
and conflict prevention, as most recently evidenced by the frontline
states enlarged grouping with respect to Lesotho and with respect to
Mozambique. We can come back to Mozambique in just a minute. Moreover,
in the course of that stop, we talked about the very explicit linkage
which the member states of SADCC draw between their regional
peacekeeping initiatives and the defense and protection of democracy
throughout that subregion.
Appropriately, we stopped in Malawi, a country that has just come
through its first multi-party elections and which, at the same time, is
indicating its willingness to assume a role in regional and subregional
peace-keeping, most notably by its participation in the UNAMIR peace-
keeping operation in Rwanda. We made a very brief stop in Kinshasa and
met at the airport with Zairean Prime Minister Kengo. That was the
continuation of conversations we had with Prime Minister Kengo when he
was here a few weeks ago in New York, where he met with the Deputy
Secretary and here in Washington, where he met with others. The purpose
of that visit--that stop--was, again, to encourage the efforts being
undertaken by the Zairean Government to end the political impasse that
has paralyzed that country for the last three years and to show our
support for the plans that have been outlined by the Prime Minister
which aim at reform both in the economic and political sphere, with a
view to ending Zaire's two- to three-year slide into a very difficult
situation.
We went on from Zaire to Ghana. We had meetings, again, with very senior
Ghanaian officials. President Rawlings is now, since September, the
Chairman of ECOWAS--the Economic Community of West African States--and
in that capacity is leading the effort to restore an agreement with
respect to the solution of the problem in Liberia. Ghana has been a
leading force not only for subregional peace-keeping initiatives and
conflict resolution, but a major participant in international peace-
keeping around the world. The purpose there, again, was to solicit
African views about what the United States and other partners might do
to strengthen the capacity of African institutions and organizations in
dealing with conflict resolution and peace-keeping.
Finally, we stopped in Abidjan, where the theme was very similar--to
touch on the kind of cooperation which is already taking place within
the subregion and the additional kinds of collaboration that might take
place in the future, not only with respect to Liberia--although that
remains the issue of greatest immediacy--but to talk broadly about the
kind of cooperation that is taking place and is possible in the future
in dealing with regional and subregional conflicts. Let me share some
general conclusions from our visit:
The first is a very obvious one. Indeed, it was part of the underlying
decision to go, and that is that there is a strong commitment on the
part of African states to assume greater responsibility for conflict
prevention and conflict management on the continent. That was evident
in every stop we made. Most of the countries we visited are already
active participants in various forms of regional peace-making and peace-
keeping. The conversations we had reaffirmed their desire to play a
greater role in these areas.
Secondly, we discovered in all of our stops strong support for efforts
to enhance the capacity of the premier regional organization--the
Organization of African Unity--in developing its capabilities to play a
greater role in peace-making and peace-keeping. At the same time, there
was recognition that the effort to strengthen the regional organization
needs to be complimented by a greater willingness of subregional
institutions and organizations to become involved--to wit--ECOWAS in
West Africa and SADCC in Southern Africa. There was--in addition, as
you might imagine--a clear African consensus that in order to be
successful, African states require greater understanding and support
from their international partners in helping them to develop their
institutions and to strengthen the capacity of their organizations.
I prefer to say that in all of these visits, we, obviously, encountered
problems and obstacles that exist to the current effort to develop these
capacities. I think that is understandable. But in certain respects,
what is happening in Africa parallels--in certain ways, maybe a bit in
advance--things that are taking place in other parts of the world,
whether it is in Latin America or in Asia. There are discussions
underway there about a security dimension to Asian cooperation; or in
Europe with the CSCE and other institutions, which are evolving in their
roles. So what we see, in the African context, is very much a part of a
larger evolution of assumption by regions of greater responsibility for
dealing with the problems in their respective areas. That evolution,
though, is neither contrary nor in contradiction to an assumption that
all of this must be done within a broader international context--for
example, within the terms and provisions of the UN Charter--as a
necessary way of ensuring that actions taken by regional or subregional
organizations are in conformity with established international practice
and principle, and that it does not lead inadvertently to eroding the
basis of international cooperation.
There are a number of follow-on actions we will be taking. Many of
those involve further consultations with our friends and allies. You
will recall that Foreign Secretary Hurd, in his speech to the UN General
Assembly, also set out some notions for how we and others might work
more cooperatively with African organizations to strengthen their
capacities in these areas.
There will be, I think, more extensive consultations with other partners
as well, including the European Union, which is looking at this issue
very actively. I will be in Europe--in Brussels--the first of December,
and we expect that this whole issue of African regional initiatives and
peacekeeping and peace-making will be on that agenda--and what our
support could be.
Finally, and not least, is discussions with UN officials and others
about how the evolving collaboration between the United Nations and
these regional organizations might proceed over the next several months.
Turning very briefly to Mozambique, let me just say that we are, indeed,
very pleased and encouraged by the results of the voting that ended on
Saturday--October 29. We were also admiring the initiatives that were
taken by regional leaders--SADCC--and, in particular, the meeting that
took place on October 25 in Harare with a view to encouraging that
process.
The initial indications are that the turnout has been between 80% and
90%. I think that is remarkable considering the difficulties that
people faced in going to the polls. I think it is also a very clear
indication of the strong desire on the part of the Mozambicans to put
the past--the most recent 10 to 15 years of Mozambican history--behind
them.
The results, of course, will not be known probably before another week
to two weeks. The counting is now taking place. It is, of course, up
to the UN Special Representative and his team also to certify the
results of those elections. Certainly, the initial indications are that
the elections were held in a very commendable fashion, and, again, we
were encouraged that this is part of the basis for peace and a return to
prosperity in Mozambique, with implications for it throughout the
region.
(###)
ARTICLE 4:
Overview of Trip to East Asia and The Pacific and the APEC Meetings
Joan E. Spero, Under Secretary for Economic and Agricultural Affairs,
Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary For East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Opening statements at a State Department press briefing, Washington, DC,
November 3, 1994
Assistant Secretary Lord
Let me give you the overview of both the President's and the Secretary's
schedule. Of course, on the President's trip, the White House will be
giving you further and most of the details--it is an integrated
operation here--then some of the objectives and themes of this trip, and
then I will turn it over to Joan to give you a more in-depth treatment
of the economic and APEC issues.
In brush strokes, the Secretary will be leaving Monday morning, Novem-
ber 7, heading out to Korea as the first stop. He gets in Tuesday
night, November 8. We will stay there until Thursday morning, November
10. Then he goes to Indonesia as the ministerial representative for the
U.S. at APEC as well as having some bilaterals in Indonesia from
November 10 to 12. On the evening of November 12, he will join the
President for the President's State visit to the Philippines. They will
be there until Sunday, November 13. Then the President and the
Secretary go to Indonesia for several days for the Leaders' Meeting in
Bogor, as well as the President's bilateral visit to Indonesia in
Jakarta. There will be other meetings around the edges of the APEC
sessions, through November 16.
Then, as the President heads homeward, the Secretary goes on his own to
Thailand, getting in the evening of November 16--staying there about a
day, and then coming back to the U.S. by November 18.
We feel that these trips come at a very auspicious time, frankly, in
U.S. foreign policy. We believe there is considerable momentum,
generally in foreign policy--Haiti, Kuwait, the Middle East; even a
supporting role in Northern Ireland, and the agreement on nuclear issues
with North Korea--which we believe strengthens the President's hand,
generally, as he goes on this very important trip to East Asia and
Pacific.
We happen to think, of course, that we have been pursuing a brilliant
policy from the very beginning. But some of these issues require
patient diplomacy over time. Many of these successes have come to a
head at the same time. Of course, we have remaining problems as well.
Secondly, in Asia--more specifically, in addition to the North Korean
nuclear agreement, you have our recent trade agreement with Japan; a
more positive, although still challenging, relationship with China;
moving ahead with Vietnam on the MIA question, and opening up liaison
offices in the near future; and many other areas, including on the
security side--to complement the President's Pacific Community concept
to APEC on the economic side--the Bangkok initial meeting of the ASEAN
Regional Forum, bringing all the top nations of Asia-Pacific together
for the first time for a security dialogue.
So that is the general framework for this trip which, as we say, we
think is quite auspicious. The President is going out to this dynamic
region to continue working with our friends there to build this Pacific
Community. The Secretary will be playing, of course, a very important
supportive role to him.
I would say that at the most general level, the themes of these trips
once again underline the importance of this region for the United
States; above all, for the U.S. economy, exports, and jobs, given the
fact that this is the most dynamic region in the world in those
respects--but also in security and promoting freedom, the environment,
and many other issues. Underlining this for the American audience, but
also at the same time another theme--once again underlining our
commitment and engagement to the Asia-Pacific region in our self-
interest. Throughout this is going to be an America's Desk theme, as
the Secretary has mentioned, of promoting jobs, exports, and investments
in this dynamic region.
More specifically, as you know from past pronouncements by the President
and others, there are three essential pillars in this Pacific Community:
-- Promoting security;
-- Promoting economic prosperity; and
-- Promoting political freedom, democracy, and human rights.
Those will be constant themes on his trip.
The first stop of the Secretary is Korea, where non-proliferation and
security, both bilateral and regional, will be highlighted. The
Indonesian stop will have a heavy economic dose, of course, as well as
attention to human rights and other issues--both the APEC meetings and
our bilateral relationship with a very dynamic economy in Indonesia. A
constant motif throughout this trip is the fact that he is promoting
freedom as well, which we think is important for both security and
prosperity.
I would note that Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand--three stops for
the Secretary--in addition to being treaty allies are also democracies.
So that theme will be very evident in those countries as well as
promoting it elsewhere in Asia.
Let me give you just a little bit more detail on each of those stops,
and then I will turn it over to Joan. I think I cleverly left my
outline. I can remember it.
With respect to Korea, we will reinforce what we believe are the virtues
of the nuclear agreement with North Korea, not only to the leaders we
meet with, but also to the body politic and the National Assembly there.
We think it is an excellent agreement for reasons you have heard before,
and I won't go into it now.
We think it serves South Korea's interest. This will underline the fact
that we have closely consulted throughout this process, and we will work
just as closely with Korea, as well as Japan and others, on the
implementation of this agreement--which will be, in many ways, as
challenging as the negotiation.
We will also reaffirm our vigilance, our readiness, our force levels,
and the fact that there is still a major conventional threat there.
This is the point that Secretary Perry made on a trip (during which I
accompanied him) two weeks ago. We are not reducing our force levels.
This is a residual security problem that requires vigilance as well as
implementing the nuclear agreement. Even as we would hope to reduce
tensions on the peninsula and work in conjunction with the South, let us
try to do that.
We are also underlining the importance of the South/North dialogue to
determining the future of that peninsula.
We would expect the Secretary to make a major speech on these issues in
Korea while he is there. Again, heavy emphasis on this stop on
security. But, of course, this is also a country that has moved toward
democracy, and we have very strong economic interests--both ratification
of the Uruguay Round as well as bilateral interests with Korea.
In the Philippines, the President will be underlining the commemoration
of World War II in some moving ceremonies. There will be a whole series
of these commemorative acts over the coming year, and there will be two
themes. One, paying tribute to the veterans and to those who fell in
battle, but also pointing how far this region has come in the last 50
years and how we now have a great opportunity in the future. The second
thing will be the future prospects in the region--working with former
enemies as friends and making sure their current friends do not become
enemies as we move forward for greater peace and prosperity in the
region.
Also in the Philippines, we will be highlighting the fact that, under
President Ramos' dynamic leadership, that economy has really begun to
take off. For many years, it was considered the weak partner in ASEAN.
But now it is growing at 4%. It is attracting investment. We will
highlight the investment opportunities there. We will also underline
the fact that they have a democracy. And, as a model for Asian
countries, the fact is that political freedom and economic growth can,
should, and do go hand-in-hand.
Finally, it will signal a more mature relationship with the Philippines-
-post-semicolonial period, post-bases--replaced by an effective defense
relationship but of a different nature, and one that is increasingly
dependent on trade and investment, not on foreign aid.
On into Indonesia, where the Secretary will have been, and now will be
with the President. Again, the details will be given by Joan Spero. I
would just say that if last year at Seattle the President generated a
great momentum at APEC by having the first Leaders' Meeting for APEC--
there was a vision--this year we would hope to see a goal. That goal is
to free up as much trade and investment as we can--eliminating barriers
to these over the coming years. We will try to have a blueprint for
that in the coming year after that. So this is an ongoing process.
We also have important economic interests with Indonesia. It is a very
dynamic and large economy. I would expect some contract signings there.
I should point out that Ambassador Kantor and Secretary Ron Brown will
also be on this trip. They will have an important part, and it will be
an integral team working together, including on the economic side. So
that will be a heavy emphasis.
We will also deal very frankly with our Indonesian hosts on the human
rights question. We have been doing that for a couple of years. This
is not something we have discovered. This is going to be a long-term
prospect and issue.
We have many positive elements in our relations with Indonesia. Those
should be kept in mind--economic security, diplomatic. But we also talk
as friends, frankly, about some of the human rights concerns which we do
have. That will certainly be on our agenda.
Finally, the last stop for the Secretary will be Thailand. Here, all
the themes come together. It is a democracy. It is one of our most
important security allies, and it has a very dynamic economy. So I
would expect sort of a summing-up there of the entire trip.
Last point: We would hope as a result of this trip to achieve the
objectives I outlined at the beginning and, more specifically, if
possible, to repeat the so-called triple-play type of international
economic initiative and achievement that was achieved last fall---with
NAFTA, the APEC Leaders' Meeting, and the Uruguay Round--this year with
an APEC Leaders' Meeting that sets forth a bold political vision,
followed by ratification of Uruguay Round legislation and a successful
Summit of the Americas.
Without further ado, let me turn this over to Under Secretary Spero.
Under Secretary Spero
I will try to give you a very brief overview of some of the key economic
issues that will come up at the APEC Ministerial and Leaders' Meetings.
I gave a speech a couple of weeks ago on this issue to a business
audience and will make that speech available. It may be useful for you.
Let me summarize quickly. I will start off by trying to put this set of
meetings in context, and that is that they are a key part of our overall
strategy of global engagement and of opening markets, spurring growth,
and promoting jobs at home. I think you need to understand the APEC
efforts in that context.
As Winston talked a bit about the triple play, I would describe it by
saying, first of all, the overarching setting for all of this is the
Uruguay Round--the implementation, the passage of the Uruguay Round
agreement. We are committed to achieving that and having that in place
by the beginning of December.
So our multilateral strategy then is the Uruguay Round. We also have a
very active bilateral strategy throughout the world but most
specifically in Asia, to open markets, to create rules for fair trade,
and to promote U.S. exports. Many of you are familiar with our
bilateral talks with Japan. We are heavily engaged in bilateral talks
with China. I think with virtually every Asian country and every member
of APEC, we are engaged on a day-to-day basis in a whole variety of
market- opening activities.
And then third, we also use our regional strategy--a regional strategy
including APEC, and including the Summit of the Americas as two key
examples coming up this fall.
With that overall context then--multilateral, regional, and bilateral
approaches to opening markets--let me just mention some of the key
economic issues that will be on the agenda in Jakarta and in Bogor.
As you know, Indonesia is the chair of APEC this year. They have
identified four key themes for the meetings, issues that they want to
discuss and that have been agreed to by the other APEC members. One is
increasing the role of the private sector, and increasing the role of
small and medium-sized enterprises within the APEC region. Another one
is addressing the region's tremendous infrastructure needs--the
development of infrastructure, and then human resource development. One
of the major focuses, and the final one that I want to mention, that
Indonesia has put squarely on the agenda is the effort to promote
increased trade and investment within APEC.
The theme of promoting trade and investment is going to be one of the
key themes, both at the Ministerial Meeting and at the Leaders' Meeting.
As I see it--and I think the best way to describe it is to think of this
promotion of trade and investment in two parts.
The first part is what I would call the "vision thing." The vision
thing is how we can advance trade and investment in the region; whether
we can make a political commitment to eliminate barriers to trade and
investment in the region by a date certain.
So a political commitment, if and when it takes place, will take place
at the Leaders' Meeting--the Bogor meeting, and that really is under the
leadership of President Soeharto. He believes that it is possible to
make a political commitment to removing trade and investment barriers in
the region by a date certain.
The second piece of that overall trade and investment strategy is what I
would call the practical side--and the practical side is the following
two parts:
-- First of all, after this political commitment--which I think you
should see as far-reaching but, as I say, more of a vision than
something concrete--the first point is how can we work after Bogor on
the road to Tokyo--which is where the next meeting will take place--to
come up with a blueprint for what that really means. What does
achieving freer trade in the region, removing these barriers--what does
that really mean and how can we develop a blueprint in the coming year
to make that a reality? And that we expect also will come out of the
leaders' meeting.
We anticipate--we cannot say for certain--that there will be a call for
freer trade in the region and a call upon the ministers to work in the
coming years to come up with an actual blueprint for how to make that
happen.
-- Secondly, on the practical side, I want to emphasize that there is a
lot of very real, practical, nitty-gritty stuff going on in APEC all the
time that is also about opening markets and removing barriers and
promoting exports. This is in addition to the bilateral efforts that
the U.S. is doing. I am talking about multilateral work within APEC.
I think too few people realize that there is a lot of work--as I say,
technical, nitty-gritty stuff--not the stuff, unfortunately, of
headlines and of sound bites--that goes on in APEC all the time.
Let me just try to give you a couple of examples to make that real and
then I will stop talking. Last year, APEC created a Committee on Trade
and Investment. That committee has been examining a program for how to
facilitate trade and investment throughout the region. Its goals are to
simplify and harmonize customs procedures and standards to identify and
begin to address administrative barriers to trade, to develop a set of
non-binding investment principles, and to work to harmonize Uruguay
Round implementation among the APEC member economies.
So this is not just removing barriers; it is saying how can we harmonize
customs and standards; how can we remove administrative barriers; how
can we work together so that as we implement the Uruguay Round--we do it
on a common-enough basis that it will facilitate trade among the APEC
members.
In addition to this work in the Committee on Trade and Investment, APEC
has a whole series of working groups. I often think of APEC as sort of
the policy level, the committee level, and then the very nitty-gritty
working level, working groups, in a whole variety of areas.
These working groups are interesting and in my view unique, because they
include not only government officials but also private sector people.
Our companies very often sit at the table working with government
officials on these various committees.
Again, let me give you just a little taste of some of the things these
committees have been doing. APEC has launched an EDI--electronic date
interchange pilot project--that is intended to reduce air cargo
clearances from days to hours or minutes. If you come from business,
you understand that time is money and access to markets has a lot to do
with clearing customs as it does with trade barriers.
Another example: In telecommunications--a very active working area of
APEC again with private sector participation--APEC members have
committed to work together to harmonize equipment approval processes.
They have agreed to work on region-wide principles to make it easier to
operate value-added telecommunications services. That means things like
e-mail or on-line data bases or computer processing networks throughout
the region. That is expected to provide real, tangible benefits for our
companies.
These are just a couple of examples of the kind of nitty-gritty work
that is going on--removal of barriers, facilitation, common standards,
and development.
I want to stress that all of this, in my view, is very much oriented
toward business. It is the role of APEC in these economic issues to get
government out of the way. Business is already creating APEC. It is
already creating an Asia-Pacific region, and those working on the
economic side of APEC see that it is their role to try to facilitate
that process that is already taking place in the market place.
So if you do look at my speech, you will see there is a great emphasis
to say that the business of APEC is business, and the business of APEC
on the economic side is getting governments out of the way and letting
businesses do their thing in the region.
(###)
ARTICLE 5:
Principle, Power, and Purpose In the New Era
Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United
Nations
Address to the Secretary's Open Forum, Washington, DC, October 28, 1994
I want to begin by thanking Rosemary O'Neill for the invitation to be
here. The Open Forum provides a superb service, and she directs it
superbly. Addressing the forum is something I have wanted to do for a
long time because I love challenges. There are few things more
challenging than discussing our foreign policy with people who have not
yet eaten lunch.
So I thought I would start by saying what a great job you are all doing.
I say this because I want you to ask easy questions--and because it is
true. For the past 20 months, I have seen nothing but hard work,
dedication, and applied talent here at the Department of State, at the
U.S. Mission to the UN in New York, and at our embassies abroad--this,
despite the fact that recognition is rare and public cynicism more
widespread than we would like. Our armed forces have been praised
justly for the job they are doing in the Caribbean and Persian Gulf, but
there are medals due on the diplomatic front as well, beginning with the
Haiti task force and Ambassador Swing and his colleagues in Port-au-
Prince.
News from around the world these past few weeks has been very good.
That is gratifying, but it should not be surprising. The fundamental
elements of our foreign policy are solid. Just as Wagner's music has
been described as better than it sounds, so our foreign policy has
accomplished more than--at least until very recently--has been widely
perceived.
In the Middle East, Secretary Christopher and his team have exhibited
remarkable skill for noble ends with wondrous results. Building on the
work of Secretary Baker and President Bush, they have refused to let the
momentum for peace in the Middle East stall. They have given confidence
to the healers and yielded nothing to the bomb-throwers. They have done
historic service to the region and for our own interest in a stable and
secure Middle East.
Earlier this week, as I watched President Clinton speak so movingly of
America's support for those who have opened their hearts and borders to
peace, I was proud to be part of this Administration, and doubly proud
of my country.
Our approach to Russia and the other New Independent States also serves
American interests well. We have been steadfast in supporting reform;
we have worked cooperatively to reduce the risk that nuclear materials
will fall into the wrong hands; we have successfully encouraged the
departure of Russian troops from Baltic soil; we have established strong
bilateral ties throughout the region; and we are making steady progress
toward the most significant and elusive goal of this century--a secure,
integrated, and fully democratic Europe.
In Asia, we have reached an accord with North Korea that South Korean
President Kim has called the "foundation for a complete solution to the
nuclear issue and . . . peace in the Korean peninsula." In South
Africa, as President Mandela has graciously acknowledged, American
influence was vital in ending apartheid and installing democracy. And
thanks to the Vice President, Under Secretary Wirth, and Brian Atwood,
American leadership on the environment and sustainable development has
been restored.
On the economic front, President Clinton negotiated the side agreements
and did the hard work needed to gain congressional approval for NAFTA.
Under his leadership, we broke the deadlock on GATT and completed a
world trade agreement--that will be ratified. Soon, he will travel to
Indonesia for a meeting of APEC, striving to expand economic cooperation
with Asia, upon whose markets millions of American jobs depend. This is
what Secretary Christopher means when he talks about an "America's Desk"
here at State and in our foreign policy. The success of these
initiatives will fatten the pay envelopes of American workers, create
new jobs, and spur the global economy for generations to come.
Finally, in New York, we are gaining ground in our effort to revitalize
and reorient the United Nations. We have established a UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights and an office with the functions of an
inspector general. We have won support for a series of arms control
measures and for a more balanced approach to the Middle East. And we
have more than held our own in debates within the Security Council.
For example, two weeks ago, the Security Council acted to reinforce our
determination that Iraq will never again become a threat to regional
security and peace. When Iraqi spokesmen bewail the treatment they have
received from the international community these past three years, it
reminds me of the story about the schoolboy who came home with his face
bruised and his clothes torn. When his mother asked him how the fight
started, he said: "It started when the other guy hit back."
In short, our foreign policy priorities are on track. Our record
overall is good. We have reason to be satisfied. But despite recent
breakthroughs, the truth is that we are not satisfied, for our times do
not permit satisfaction.
Foreign policy without the Cold War is a little like baseball without
the World Series. It is not as clear where the daily battles lead. No
climactic showdown looms. The old reference points no longer apply, and
new ones have not yet fully emerged.
Today, the foreign policy journals are full of George Kennan wannabes--
reinventors eager to put their stamp on our era the way Kennan did on
his. Ironically, the George Kennan of our era may be Kennan himself.
Earlier this year, I had the privilege of attending the Ambassador's
90th birthday celebration. He said that evening that:
What [we] need are not policies--much less a single policy. What [we]
need are . . . principles . . . that accord with the nature, the needs,
the interests and the limitations of our country.
More recently, at the Foreign Affairs Training Center, Ambassador Kennan
cited favorably George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, John Quincy Adams,
and Abraham Lincoln as the source of principles appropriate to their era
and time. Now, Time magazine referred to me recently as "a blunt
instrument," but I am not about to compete in that league. So today, I
will outline not principles but some rules that I believe accord with
the nature, needs, interests, and limitations of our country.
These rules are in keeping with the fundamental goals of our foreign
policy as outlined by the President and Secretary Christopher. They
take into account both the imperative of American leadership and the
habit of American caution about entanglements overseas. And they
recognize the need to forge a new consensus about the use of American
power at a time when dangers to us are less clear and present--but no
less real--than in the past.
Four Rules for American Foreign Policy
Rule One. The first rule is basic: American foreign policy must be
guided by enduring American interests. This is, of course, easy to say.
The challenge is to define our interests usefully in this transformed
world. As a diplomat, I do not underestimate the difficulty. As a
former professor, I cannot resist the attempt.
Certainly, the heart of our national interest remains defense of
territory, citizens, allies, and economic well-being. This is the inner
circle, our vital interests. Our agreement with North Korea is designed
to defuse a problem that falls clearly within this circle. Our response
to Iraq's recent troop movements should erase any doubt that we will
defend these interests by any and all necessary means.
We have a second circle of interests that reflect the interdependence of
our age. We live in a nation that is democratic, trade-oriented,
respectful of the law, and possessed of a powerful military whose
personnel are precious to us. We will do better and feel safer in an
environment where our values are widely shared, markets are open,
military clashes are constrained, and those who run roughshod over the
rights of others are brought to heel.
The opportunities to help shape such a world are limitless, but our
resources are not. In defending this second circle of interests, we
must be selective, not reflexive. We must not flinch from needed action
in places like Haiti and Bosnia, but neither must we respond ourselves
to every outrage or battle.
Our challenge is to navigate a path between disengagement, which is not
possible, and over-extension, which is not sustainable. Our task will
be easier if we are able to prolong the opportunity for broad,
international cooperation that now exists and build effective mechanisms
for preventing, containing, and deterring armed conflict.
Finally, there is a third circle of interests that we share with all
others. These are the global concerns--health, development, the
environment, drugs, and crime. These are quality-of-life issues with
the potential to affect our vital interests but where the threats are
currently more diffuse, the efforts to respond long term, and the mode
of operation both national and multilateral.
Rule Two. In seeking to further the full range of our interests, we
will need--and we should use--every available foreign policy tool. This
is the second rule. We should not be boxed into rigid choices between
force and diplomacy, economic and political, unilateral and
multilateral. Nor should we be lured by what Emerson called "foolish
consistencies"--a foreign policy that responds in the same way
regardless of circumstance will be consistent only in its failure.
Foreign policy is not auto mechanics; it is an art. The tools we select
must be weighed against a matrix of past commitments, present
capabilities, future hopes, and constant values.
In each instance, we should seek to combine principle with pragmatism--
to do the right thing and to do the thing right. As we have been
reminded in recent days, American military power and the credibility of
its possible use remains the most potent force for international order
in the world today. As President Clinton has pledged, our military must
and will remain modern, mobile, ready, and strong.
Deciding whether or not to deploy American military forces is the
toughest judgment any president can make. It is doubly complicated in
this new era. Present day turbulence dictates that emergencies will
continue to arise in which the outcome will matter to us but not
directly impinge on the inner circle of our interests. That is why we
Americans have such a strong incentive to see that UN peace operations
work. Effective, rapidly deployable UN forces provide an option between
U.S. intervention and inaction.
Today we are working hard to upgrade UN capabilities and to impose
discipline upon the UN's decision-making process. We have helped the UN
develop a peace-keeping headquarters with a full range of functions from
planning to public affairs. We have provided a list of U.S. military
capabilities that might be available, under appropriate circumstances,
for use in peace operations. We are asking tough questions about
mission, risk, cost, scope, and duration before--not after--new
operations begin.
While working to improve what the UN can do, we should be realistic
about what it cannot do. Traditional peacekeeping can accomplish little
where government or civil society have broken down or where one or more
of the parties is not prepared to end the conflict. But if emergencies
occur and the UN does not respond, who will? The reality is that we
will have to continue to turn, at times, to individual countries acting
alone or in a coalition.
Since 1991, states or groups of states have acted with UN blessing in
Kuwait, Bosnia, Somalia, and Liberia. More recently, the UN has
sanctioned French action in Rwanda, authorized the multinational force
now in Haiti, and sent UN observers to monitor Russian peace-keepers in
Georgia.
As these examples illustrate, political and humanitarian crises are not
created equal. Each has its own history, its own cast of players, and
its own potential impact on our interests. We will decide whether to
support or participate in an international response in accordance with
the policy guidelines spelled out by the President. We will support the
efforts of others when they seem likely to be effective and when they
are conducted in accordance with international law. We will ensure that
no state uses the cloak of UN sanction to trample the rights of others.
This last point is particularly relevant to fears about Russian peace-
keeping operations within the former Soviet Union. As the recent summit
demonstrated, our relations overall with Russia are very good. We are
working together on a range of issues. But Russia's leaders, citing
concerns about regional turmoil, have become increasingly forceful in
asserting regional prerogatives; some of Russia's neighbors are uneasy
about their intentions. Today, Russian peace-keepers are in Georgia and
Tajikistan, and the Russian Army is based in several other republics,
which it has never left.
President Yeltsin and his key advisers did not create the Soviet empire;
they ended it. They risked their lives for democracy. They deserve to
be judged by what they do--not by what others fear. But history has
placed a heavy burden of proof on any government in Moscow. Russia has
a legitimate interest in stability along its borders, but it must
respect fully the sovereignty and integrity of the New Independent
States. America does not and will not recognize any extra-legal
privileges or so-called sphere of influence for Russia or any other
country beyond its own territory. In our approach to international
peace-keeping, we will continue to adapt as circumstances change,
mindful that ideal solutions will be rare and that the risks of action
in each case must be weighed against, among other things, the
consequences of inaction.
The need for flexibility and for making use of a variety of foreign
policy tools is evident also in our support for democracy. We promote
freedom of political institutions and thought because it serves our
interests and because it is right. But to do so effectively, avoid
quagmires, and protect other interests, the means we select to pursue
democratic goals will vary with the nature, history, and circumstances
of the country involved.
Haiti, for example, is not an example likely to be followed very often.
The combination of circumstances there were exceptional: a blatant
theft of democracy, brutal repression, violated agreements, proximity to
our shores, relatively low military risk, and strong international
interest and support. The process of restoring democracy has gone, thus
far, exceptionally well. American credibility has been reinforced and
the utility of cooperative action once again illustrated. But, as a
Haitian proverb says, "behind mountains there are more mountains." The
road to durable democracy in Haiti remains uphill, and its ultimate
success or failure rests, as it must, in Haitian hands.
In Cuba, we are continuing to use economic pressure to encourage the
government there to reconsider its options and create more political
space for its people. From Central America to Central Europe, we are
providing all the aid we can afford to emerging democracies. Elsewhere,
our tools include election monitors, radio broadcasts, quiet diplomacy,
and public declarations.
Not all of these tools work quickly, but none should be discounted. It
is worth recalling that, during the Cold War, we spoke up for freedom
when and where freedom's cause seemed without hope. For half a century,
we refused to recognize the Soviet conquest of the Baltics. For
decades, we pled the cause of emigration for Soviet Jews. Throughout
the Cold War, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty sowed seeds of
democratic hope on hard ground. Despite the resistance of some, America
ultimately joined in isolating South Africa's racist regime.
There were times when these efforts seemed almost quixotic. We could
not stop the tanks that entered Budapest in 1956 or Prague 12 years
later. We could not save the victims of Soweto. But we have lived to
see Nelson Mandela, Vaclav Havel, Lech Walesa, and Boris Yeltsin sworn
in as presidents of their countries. Some dismiss symbolic steps to
promote freedom as useless. Others suggest that the promotion of
democracy leads inevitably to dangerous over-reaching; both are wrong.
It is no accident that perhaps the strongest supporters of democratic
broadcasting in the world today are in Central Europe, or that--as
President Yeltsin has said--every Russian schoolchild knows the names
Jackson and Vanik.
Rule Three. A third rule that should guide our foreign policy is
credibility: What we promise, we must deliver. Because we have unique
capabilities and unmatched power, it is natural that others will turn to
us in time of emergency. In one sense, that is gratifying, but it also
leads to difficult, damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you-don't choices. It
requires a long-term perspective in a sound-bite world, but we must be
disciplined in our commitments, our rhetoric, and our diplomacy. We
must act in a way commensurate with our interests. When we make a
commitment, we should keep it.
In recent years, one of the major failures of the international
community, of which we are part, has been in Bosnia. The failure had
its origins in a lack of foresight that has been dissected sufficiently
elsewhere. But its magnitude was amplified by our collective slowness
to back promise with action. The credibility of the Security Council,
in particular, was compromised by resolutions that seemed to offer more
than they delivered. To this day, safe areas are not fully safe,
exclusion zones are not really exclusive, and no-fly zones are not quite
that.
Progress in Bosnia always will be relative, but it can be maximized by
using NATO power more effectively to enforce UN rules and by maintaining
diplomatic unity to isolate the Bosnian Serbs. Unfortunately, these
goals sometimes have been difficult to reconcile. Earlier this year, we
agreed to join our allies in proposing a territorial settlement, with
the understanding that if one party alone rejected that settlement, the
consequences for that party would be severe. This was a commitment made
to us by our allies and by Russia; it is a commitment that should be
kept.
The United States understands that going it alone in Bosnia would entail
very grave risks. Unilateral lifting of the arms embargo--which some
suggest--would undermine other sanctions regimes, including those
targeting Libya and Iraq. It would also likely prompt the UN's
departure and a preemptive Serb assault.
A cooperative approach is greatly preferred, but that cooperation must
be serious. In the coming weeks, America will be pushing hard for joint
strategies to make the Bosnian Serbs understand that settlement is their
only option. We will build on the progress made, with Russia's help, in
driving a wedge between the regime in Belgrade and the Bosnian Serbs; we
will encourage a stronger federation between the Bosnian Government and
the Croats; we will argue for a more rapid and forceful response to
violations; we will seek to tighten enforcement of sanctions; and, when
I return to New York this afternoon, we will introduce a resolution in
the Security Council to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia
multilaterally, with implementation in six months if the Bosnian Serbs
do not settle.
The disintegration of former Yugoslavia presented the international
community with its most complicated post-Cold War test. Joint efforts
have preserved a potentially viable and multi-ethnic Bosnian state, kept
open the humanitarian lifeline, and prevented the conflict from
spreading throughout the region. But these are not sufficient
achievements given the circumstances. Now we must show the resolve
necessary to bring this tragic chapter of history to a conclusion.
Rule Four. The dilemma in Bosnia brings up a fourth rule essential to a
successful foreign policy: We must have congressional and public
support. A policy must be supported by our citizens if it is to be
sustained. That is a truism. The complicating factor is that
measurements of American sentiment are inexact, and the nature of that
sentiment is subject to sometimes rapid and dramatic change.
A President must move our nation where he believes it is in our interest
to go. His--or her--duty is not to follow public opinion but to lead
it.
As I speak, the positive consequences of President Clinton's strong
leadership are on display around the world. Tomorrow there may be
setbacks that will disappoint us but not dissuade us from our course.
In today's environment, where images of horror and heroism are
transmitted instantaneously around the globe and attention spans are far
shorter than this speech, there is no certain formula for gaining and
maintaining public support. Certainly, frankness helps. Consultations
with Congress are essential, and we are consulting with congressional
leaders of both parties to an unprecedented degree. But we Americans
are brutally fair. As President Kennedy observed after the Bay of Pigs,
success has a thousand fathers, while defeat is an orphan. Ultimately,
we will be judged not by our rhetoric or our rationales but by our
results.
The fact is that Americans have always been ambivalent about activism
abroad. We espouse principles of universal application, but we
understand from our own history that the growth of those principles must
come from within a society; they cannot be imposed. As children, we
were taught to mind our own business or, as Rosemary O'Neill's father
once said, that "all politics is local." But we were taught, as well,
to honor Americans called upon to mind the world's business--in the
Argonne, Normandy, Iwo Jima, Inchon, and, more recently, in Southeast
Asia and the Persian Gulf.
At the end of World War I, an American Army officer, stuck in Europe
while the diplomats haggled at Versailles, wrote to his future wife
about his yearning to go home: "None of us cares if the Russian
government is red or not red, [or] whether the king of Lollipops
slaughters his subjects." Thirty years later, that same man--Harry
Truman--designed the framework of principle, power, and purpose that one
day would defeat communism and promote democratic values and respect for
human rights around the world.
Today, under President Clinton and Secretary Christopher, we are called
upon to develop a new framework for protecting our territory, our
citizens, and our interests in a dramatically altered world. In
devising that framework, we will make full use of our own reserves of
military and economic power. We will invite help from old friends and
new. We will look beyond the horizon of the short term, recognizing
that even seemingly distant problems and conflicts may, one day, come
home to America. We will work to develop a consensus within our own
country about policy and purpose that will maintain unity at home and
strengthen our hand abroad.
Here in this building and at our missions abroad, amidst all the
understandable concerns about grade, status, next assignments, and the
cafeteria's caloric menu, let us never forget: Even before America was
a country, it was an idea. We are the inheritors of a diplomatic
tradition that dates back not to the court intrigues of inbred royalty
but to the ambassadors and architects of human liberty.
My own family came to these shores as refugees. Because of this
nation's generosity and commitment, we were granted asylum after the
communist takeover of Czechoslovakia. The story of my family has been
repeated in millions of variations over two centuries in the lives not
only of immigrants but of those overseas who have been liberated or
sheltered by American soldiers, empowered by American assistance, or
inspired by American ideals.
The greatest division in the world today is not between east and west,
north and south, or right and left; it is between those who have become
prisoners of history and those determined to shape it.
We have a responsibility in our time--as others have had in theirs--to
build a world not without conflict but in which conflict is effectively
contained, a world not without repression but in which the sway of
freedom is enlarged, a world not without lawless behavior but in which
the law-abiding are progressively more secure. That is what President
Clinton has referred to, in a broader context, as a covenant with the
future. That is our mandate in this new era. That is our joint
assignment when we return to work this afternoon.
(###)
ARTICLE 6:
Status of Efforts To Obtain Iraq's Compliance With UNSC Resolutions
President Clinton
Letter to Congress released by the White House, Office of the Press
Secretary, Washington, DC, October 27, 1994
Dear Mr. Speaker:
(Dear Mr. President:)
Consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq
Resolution (Public Law 102-1), and as part of my effort to keep the
Congress fully informed, I am reporting on the status of efforts to
obtain Iraq's compliance with the resolutions adopted by the U.N.
Security Council.
In light of the crisis on the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border that began in early
October, this report begins with a brief account of the Iraqi
provocation and U.S. responses through the U.N. Security Council vote of
October 15. Subsequent developments in this crisis will be covered in
the next report.
Iraq's recent behavior with respect to Kuwait has shown the world that
it has not changed its threatening ways and cannot be trusted. In early
October 1994, elements of the Hammurabi Division of the elite Iraqi
Republican Guard were detected relocating to positions at Shaihah
airfield in southern Iraq. This was the southern most deployment of
Republican Guard forces since the 1990-1991 Gulf War. By October 8, the
15th Mechanized Brigade of the Hammurabi Division had deployed to
approximately 20 kilometers from the Kuwait border. Its artillery
assets were oriented south toward Kuwait. At the same time, the Al Nida
Division of the Republican Guard began moving from the Mosul rail yard
and the Baghdad area to positions in southern Iraq. All these units
were fully equipped with ammunition, food, and fuel, leading us to
conclude that this was no mere exercise.
By October 8, these troop movements, combined with forces already in
southern Iraq, brought Iraqi troop strength in southern Iraq to 64,000,
organized into 8 divisions. By October 9, indications were present that
logistic sites were being established in the vicinity of these
deployments. Iraqi movements to the south continued, and by October 11,
it was assessed that Iraq would be capable of launching an attack by
October 13.
This provocation required a strong response. Accordingly, on October 8,
1994, I ordered the immediate deployment of additional U.S. military
forces to the Persian Gulf. These deployments included the USS George
Washington Carrier Battle Group and its accompanying cruise missile
ships, a U.S. Marine Corps Expeditionary Unit, a U.S. Army Mechanized
Task Force, and personnel to operate two additional Patriot missile
batteries. On October 10, I further ordered the deployment of over 500
U.S. Air Force and Marine Corps combat and supporting aircraft to the
region.
In response to these measures, the Iraqi government began ordering its
forces to move to positions in the rear, around Nasariyah and Qalat
Salih, north of Basra, but still within several hours of the Kuwaiti
border. Had these forces remained deployed around Nasariyah, it would
have constituted a significant enhancement of Iraq's capabilities in
southern Iraq. By October 15, there were clear indications that most
Iraqi forces that had been moved south since late September were being
redeployed to their original locations. On October 15, 1994, the
international community also demonstrated its strong resolve regarding
this latest provocation when it passed unanimously U.N. Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR) 949, which condemned Iraq's provocative behavior and
demanded that Iraq immediately withdraw the units deployed in the south
to their original positions, not utilize its forces to threaten its
neighbors or U.N. operations, not redeploy or enhance its military
capacity in southern Iraq, and cooperate fully with the U.N. Special
Commission (UNSCOM).
As this recent episode shows, we continue to witness an Iraq that has
failed to demonstrate its readiness to comply with the will of the
international community. We will continue to insist that Iraq not
threaten its neighbors or intimidate the United Nations as it takes
steps to ensure that Iraq never again possesses weapons of mass
destruction. The sanctions will be maintained until Iraq complies with
all relevant provisions of U.N. Security Council resolutions. Indeed,
these recent provocative Iraqi actions underscore the wisdom of the
Security Council's September 14 decision not to modify the existing
sanctions regime.
Cooperation by Iraq with the United Nations since 1991 has been meager,
sporadic, selective, and opportunistic. Taken as a whole, Iraq's record
represents a stunning failure to meet the standard set by the Council
when it set the terms for ending the Gulf War in UNSCR 687: to assure
the world community of its "peaceful intentions." The purpose of the
drafters of Resolution 687--to ensure that Iraq could never again pose a
threat to its neighbors or to regional peace and security--remains
unfulfilled.
Nonetheless, UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
are working hard, with the help of the United States and other
supporting nations, to put in place a comprehensive and effective
monitoring regime for Iraq. During the month of August alone, UNSCOM
and IAEA had seven different teams in Iraq building and testing
monitoring capabilities. This effort must be carefully designed if it
is to be so thorough that Iraq cannot rebuild a covert nuclear program,
as it did before the Gulf War, when it claimed to be in compliance with
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Continued vigilance is necessary
because we believe that Saddam Hussein is committed to rebuilding his
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability.
Indeed, significant gaps in accounting for Iraq's past programs for WMD
continue. There are unresolved issues in each of the four weapons
categories (nuclear, long-range missile, chemical, and biological).
This has been particularly true in the chemical and biological weapons
areas, where Iraq claims to have destroyed large amounts of
documentation. It is, therefore, extremely important that the
monitoring regime be effective, comprehensive, and sustainable. A
program of this magnitude is unprecedented and will require continued,
substantial assistance for UNSCOM from supporting nations. Rigorous and
extensive trial and field testing will be required before UNSCOM can
judge the program's effectiveness.
Rolf Ekeus, the Chairman of UNSCOM, has told Iraq that it must establish
a clear track record of compliance before he can report favorably to the
Security Council. We strongly endorse Chairman Ekeus' approach and
reject any attempt to limit UNSCOM's flexibility by the establishment of
a timetable for determining whether Iraq has complied with UNSCR 715.
The U.N. Sanctions Committee continues to consider and, when
appropriate, approve requests to send to Iraq materials and supplies for
essential civilian needs. The Iraqi government, in contrast, has
continued to maintain a full embargo against its northern provinces and
has acted to distribute humanitarian supplies throughout the country
only to its supporters and to the military.
The Iraqi government has refused to sell $1.6 million in oil as
previously authorized by the Security Council in UNSCRs 706 and 712.
Talks between Iraq and the United Nations on imple-menting these
resolutions ended unsuccessfully in October 1993. Iraq could use
proceeds from such sales to purchase foodstuffs, medicines, and
materials and supplies for essential civilian needs of its population,
subject to U.N. monitoring of sales and the equitable distribution of
humanitarian supplies (including to its northern provinces). Iraq's
refusal to implement UNSCRs 706 and 712 continues to cause needless
suffering.
Proceeds from oil sales also would be used to compensate persons injured
by Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Of note regarding
oil sales, discussions are underway with Turkish officials concerning
the possible flushing of Iraqi oil now in the Turkish pipeline that
extends from Iraq through Turkey. The objective is to prevent physical
deterioration of the Turkish pipeline as a unique asset. Discussions
continue as to how to conduct the flushing in a manner consistent with
the U.N. sanctions regime.
The "no-fly zones" over northern and southern Iraq permit the monitoring
of Iraq's compliance with UNSCRs 687 and 688. Over the last 3 years,
the northern no-fly zone has deterred Iraq from a major military
offensive in the region. In southern Iraq, the no-fly zone has stopped
Iraq's use of aircraft against its population.
However, the Iraqi government continues its harsh campaign against its
perceived enemies, both in the north and south. Baghdad's campaign of
economic warfare against the people of northern Iraq continues. Last
month the Iraqi regime cut electrical power to the Aqrah/Shirwan
districts of Dohuk Governorate. Three hundred fifty thousand people now
confront a lack of water, sanitation, and hospital services. Also in
northern Iraq, in the vicinity of Mosul, we are watching Iraqi troop
movements carefully; Iraq's intentions are still unclear. In the south,
Iraq's repression of the Marsh Arabs and the implementation of a policy
of environmental devastation represent a clear intent to target a
specific area for reprisals without regard to the impact on innocent
civilians. Further, Iraqi forces still wage a land-based artillery
campaign in the marshes, and the shelling of marsh villages continues.
In the last few years, the population of the region, whose marsh culture
has remained essentially unchanged since 3500 B.C., has been reduced by
an estimated three-quarters.
Iraq still refuses to recognize Kuwait's sovereignty and the
inviolability of the U.N. demarcated border, which was reaffirmed by the
Security Council in UNSCRs 773 and 833. Indeed, Iraq continues to view
the issue of Kuwaiti sovereignty as an object of tactical moves rather
than an opportunity to demonstrate peaceful intentions. Further, it has
not complied with Security Council demands to resolve the issue of
Kuwaiti MIAs, return Kuwaiti property stolen during the occupation, and
renounce terrorism. Iraq also has not met its obligations concerning
Kuwaiti and third-country nationals it detained during the war and has
taken no substantive steps to cooperate fully with the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), as required by UNSCR 687, beyond
agreement to participate in a technical committee being organized by the
ICRC.
The Special Rapporteur of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights (UNHRC),
Max van der Stoel, continues to report on the human rights situation in
Iraq, particularly the Iraqi military's repression against its civilian
populations in the marshes. The Special Rapporteur asserted in his
February 1994 report that the Government of Iraq has engaged in war
crimes and crimes against humanity, and may have committed violations of
the 1948 Genocide Convention. Regarding the Kurds, the Special
Rapporteur has judged that the extent and gravity of reported violations
place the survival of the Kurds in jeopardy. The Special Rapporteur has
noted that there are essentially no freedoms of opinion, expression, or
association in Iraq.
Torture is widespread in Iraq and results from a system of state-terror
successfully directed at subduing the population. The Special
Rapporteur repeated his recommendation for the establishment of human
rights monitors strategically located to improve the flow of information
and to provide independent verification of reports. We are pressing for
the deployment of human rights monitors.
Special Rapporteur van der Stoel will file additional reports to the
U.N. General Assembly in the fall and to the UNHRC in early 1995. We
are also considering efforts to investigate and publicize Iraqi crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and other violations of international
humanitarian law.
Examples of Iraqi noncooperation and noncompliance continue in other
areas. Dozens of Shi'a clerics are still imprisoned in Iraq without
charge. Reliable reports have indicated that the Government of Iraq is
offering reward money for terrorist acts against U.N. and humanitarian
relief workers in Iraq. For 3 years there has been a clear pattern of
criminal acts linking the Government of Iraq to a series of
assassinations and attacks in northern Iraq on relief workers, U.N.
guards, and foreign journalists, including a German journalist murdered
in northern Iraq last spring. Ten persons have been injured and two
have been killed in such attacks this year. These acts are indicative
of Iraq's continuing disdain for the United Nations and, in our view,
also constitute violations of UNSCRs 687 and 688.
The U.N. Compensation Commission (UNCC) has received about 2.4 million
claims so far, with another 100,000 expected. The United States
Government has now filed a total of 3,100 individual claims with a total
asserted value of over $215 million. Earlier this year, one panel of
UNCC Commissioners submitted its report on the first installment of
individual claims for serious personal injury or death. The UNCC
Commissioners' report recommended awards for a group of about 670
claimants, of which 11 were U.S. claimants. The Governing Council of
the UNCC approved the panel's recommendations at its session in late
May. This summer the first U.S. claimants received compensation for
their losses. The UNCC Commissioners are expected to finish reviewing
by the end of the year all claims filed involving death and serious
personal injury.
In October the Governing Council will consider reports from the UNCC
Commissioners on two other groups of claims. The first group involves
approximately 50,000 persons, including approximately 200 U.S.
claimants, who were forced to depart suddenly from Kuwait or Iraq during
the invasion and occupation. The second group will involve claimants
who sustained itemized individual losses, e.g., lost salary or personal
property.
The United States Government also has submitted a total of approximately
$1.5 billion in corporate claims against the Government of Iraq,
representing about 140 business entities. Those claims represented a
multitude of enterprises ranging from small family- owned businesses to
large multinational corporations. In addition, in late July, the United
States Government filed five Government claims with the UNCC. The five
claims were for non-military losses, such as damage to Government
property (e.g., the U.S. Embassy compound in Kuwait) and the costs of
evacuating U.S. nationals and their families from Kuwait and Iraq.
These Government claims have an asserted value of about $17 million. In
the future, the United States Government also expects to file one or
more additional Government claim(s) involving the costs of monitoring
health risks associated with oil well fires and other environmental
damage in the Persian Gulf region. The UNCC expects to begin processing
corporate claims and government claims later this year or early 1995.
It is clear that Iraq can rejoin the community of civilized nations only
through democratic processes, respect for human rights, equal treatment
of its people, and adherence to basic norms of international behavior.
Iraq's Government should represent all of Iraq's people and be committed
to the territorial integrity and unity of Iraq. The Iraqi National
Congress (INC) espouses these goals, the fulfillment of which would make
Iraq a stabilizing force in the Gulf region.
Neither in its words nor its deeds has Iraq convinced us it is no longer
a threat to regional peace and security. Any discussion of lifting the
oil embargo and other sanctions cannot be limited to future Iraqi
cooperation in the area of WMD, but must take into account all the
issues that comprise the true test of Iraq's peaceful intentions. Full
Iraqi compliance with all relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions
remains the objective of U.S. policy.
The Congress' continued support of our efforts is especially gratifying.
Sincerely,
William J. Clinton
ARTICLE 7:
Update on U.S. Policy Toward Cuba
Alexander F. Watson, Assistant Secretary For Inter-American Affairs
Address before the Wall Street Journal Conference on the Americas, New
York City, October 28, 1994
It is a pleasure to be with you today. To begin today's discussion on
the situation in Cuba, I would like to place Cuba in a hemispheric
context.
Had I stood before you even less than a decade ago, a tour d'horizon of
the Western Hemisphere would have revealed a totally different picture.
At that time, bloody civil wars were taking place in El Salvador,
Nicaragua, and Guatemala. Non-democratic regimes ruled in Haiti,
Suriname, Paraguay, and Chile. Human rights abuses were routine in many
countries. Many economists in the region still spoke in terms of
dependencia and Yankee imperialism. Public sector-dominated economies
and runaway inflation were the norm rather than the exception.
What a difference a few years make. Today, peace, democracy, and free
trade have swept throughout the hemisphere. The Sandinistas and FMLN
are the democratic oppositions in their respective countries. Last
month, Comandante Joaquin Villalobos of the FMLN addressed the U.S. Army
War College. Cheddi Jagan in Guyana--an advocate of Marxism for over
three decades--supports free trade policies for his country. Sub-
regional trading groups are vying to see which can liberalize quickest.
You would be hard-pressed to find significant differences on democracy,
human rights, and free trade between officials of Michael Manley's PNP,
the Salvadoran ARENA Party founded by Roberto d'Aubuisson, and Peronists
in Argentina.
Recognizing this dramatic convergence of views, President Clinton has
invited the leaders of 34 out of 35 nations in the hemisphere to Miami
six weeks from today to participate in the Summit of the Americas. This
largest gathering of Western Hemisphere leaders in history, the first
since Punta del Este in 1967, will consolidate this convergence and
outline a common plan of action to advance the cause of democracy and
bring the region closer to the goal of prosperity.
As you have undoubtedly noticed, I said 34 out of 35 countries in the
Hemisphere have been invited. One nation in the Hemisphere continues to
stand in unsplendid, and self-imposed, isolation from its sister nations
of the region. That nation is Cuba.
Cuba is the single glaring exception to the movement in the Hemisphere
toward greater political freedom, greater respect for human rights, and
more open economies. In Cuba, the French would certainly recognize the
veracity of their proverb about apparent change often not being real
change. Farmers' markets are occasionally tried, discontinued, and
dusted off again; foreign investment is shunned and then desperately
sought; dollars are banned and then legalized. But in 35 years, there
has not been one free newspaper; one legalized opposition political
party; or one free election.
In the past, the Castro regime enjoyed a degree of tacit support--even
encouragement--from many Latin and Caribbean nations. Those days are
over. Today, Fidel Castro and Cuban Foreign Minister Robaina hear the
same message throughout the hemisphere and beyond: To save your
country, democratize, respect human rights, open your economy. From the
Ibero-American summit to Robaina's recent swing through South America
and Europe, Castro and his representatives hear only the same urgent
call for reform. The Rio Group, comprising the largest and many smaller
countries from Mexico south, which had never officially commented on the
internal situation in Cuba, last month called for: "a peaceful
transition to a democratic pluralistic system which respects human
rights and freedom of opinion." This is a significant statement.
I do not mean to imply that these countries totally support our policy
toward Cuba. Many have called for the lifting of the U.S. embargo as
well. But I believe virtually all agree that the solution to the
Cubans' problems lies not in the fates or beyond Cuba's borders, but
rather in themselves. To escape from its current quagmire, the Castro
regime clearly must look inward.
Let me clear up some misapprehensions about our policy toward Cuba. We
have no designs to overthrow the Castro regime by force. Our goal is a
peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba. We oppose all violent
actions. We have no hostile intent toward the Cuban people. Quite the
contrary--the Cuban Democracy Act, which was passed with strong
bipartisan support by the Congress in 1992, has the dual intent of
putting pressure on the Cuban Government for change (what we call Track
One), while reaching out to the Cuban people through humanitarian
donations and enhanced communications (Track Two).
Track One is the better known of the two. Our embargo, which has been
in place since the Kennedy Administration, limits Cuba's ability to
acquire the foreign exchange it uses to maintain its economic
straitjacket and political grip on the Cuban people. But it is not a
blockade as inaccurately charged by the Cuban regime and does not
prevent Cuba from trading with any other nation in the world.
The Cuban regime has stated that it sees the success of the recent
migration talks as the first step toward a broader dialogue with the
United States, leading to normalization of relations and a lifting of
the embargo. That is emphatically not the case. We have repeatedly
stated that, only when the Cuban Government implements meaningful
political and economic reforms, will we respond with carefully
calibrated measures.
When the regime takes concrete steps to end the monopoly of power of the
communist party, to protect non-violent dissent, and to open the command
economy, we will take appropriate steps. But we will not take steps in
the uncertain hope that progress will follow automatically in Cuba.
There is no historical basis for that hope. So we will not
precipitously and prematurely lift the embargo. It has been--and still
is--our strongest leverage for democratic reform inside Cuba. We will
not help Fidel Castro hold on to power against the will of the Cuban
people.
The accomplishments on Track Two of our policy are far less known.
Since passage of the CDA, we have licensed over $50 million of private
humanitarian assistance to Cuba--making the American people one of the
largest donors to the Cuban people during this period. We encourage and
work to facilitate such assistance with many NGOs, including groups that
may not agree with our overall policy, but nevertheless share our
interest in getting aid to the most needy individuals and NGOs in Cuba.
We will intensify these efforts, and are urging our allies who provide
assistance to Cuba to channel their aid to deserving NGOs.
Contrary to popular myth, the sale or donation of almost all U.S.-
manufactured medicines to Cuba is permitted so long as they are not re-
exported, used in the biotechnology industry, or for torture. The well-
publicized decay of Cuba's health care system is not caused by the
embargo, but by Castro's refusal to change a disastrous economic system.
The CDA called for the establishment of improved telecommunications
between the U.S. and Cuba. We took appropriate steps and, on October 4,
the FCC, with the Department of State's encouragement and concurrence,
approved applications by U.S. telecommunications companies for authority
to provide direct telephone service between the U.S. and Cuba.
Communications between the United States and the Cuban people will be
greatly expanded in the near future--perhaps as soon as next month.
We will continue to seek additional ways of expanding contacts between
the people of our two nations. We plan to authorize American news
organizations to establish permanent bureaus in Cuba. We will continue
to permit individual travel to and from Cuba for genuine humanitarian
and human rights purposes, and for legitimate educational and research
purposes.
To meet the hunger for information in Cuba, the United States will
maintain the increased broadcasting to Cuba announced by the President
on August 20. We are also stepping up our donations of books to Cuban
institutions. There are no U.S. restrictions on sending to or receiving
from Cuba informational materials, and I encourage all who can to make
such donations.
It is indeed ironic that today, Haiti, the poorest country in our
hemisphere with virtually no democratic tradition, has a democratically
elected leader and considerable hope for the future, while its richer
neighbor to the West harbors no such hopes. Although the situations in
Haiti and Cuba are in most ways distinct, there is one common theme:
The Cuban people, like the Haitians, want to enjoy the most basic of
rights, and the opportunity to build economic prosperity after years of
despair. Like the Haitians, our Cuban neighbors deserve freedom. And
Cubans, with all their skills and talents, should not be left behind
while their neighbors prosper and enjoy the benefits of expanded
hemispheric trade.
In stark contrast to Haiti, there is no movement toward democracy in
Cuba. For 35 years, Cubans have lived under dictatorship. When Fidel
Castro came to power in 1959, he promised elections within 18 months.
Three decades later the Cuban people still wait for the chance to choose
their own representatives. Castro rules through repression and
intimidation. Cubans cannot speak freely. They cannot meet freely or
organize freely. They have no recourse against governmental abuse.
At the same time, the Cuban economy has gone into free fall, with the
Cuban people the victims. The end of the $6 billion annual subsidy from
the former Soviet Union has exposed the fundamental inefficiencies of
Castro's command economy. The regime's inability to meet the needs of
the Cuban people has been laid bare. Factories are closing; under- and
unemployment may be approaching 40%. This year's sugar harvest was the
worst since 1918. Foreign trade has fallen by 75%. In the 1950s, for
all its political and social problems, Cuba had a per capita income
among the very highest in Latin America; today, it is among the very
lowest. Beginning last year we saw some tentative steps toward economic
reform. Such measures as dollarization and limited self-employment have
enjoyed modest success. But rather than being embraced by the regime as
initial steps on a journey to a bright future, these modest measures are
officially described as "regrettable and temporary."
The most recent visible symptom of the failure of the regime to provide
hope for a better life to the Cuban people was the massing of thousands
in Old Havana, the city's heart, on August 5 to find transport out of
the country. Castro's response to the demonstration that day--the most
striking opposition event since he took power--was to lift controls on
rafters--a cynical move to get rid of the messengers of despair rather
than address the cause of despair. Tens of thousands of Cubans--men,
women, even small children and old people--risked their lives in flimsy
rafts. Tragically, many perished.
From the outset of the migration crisis, the Clinton Administration's
most immediate goal was to stop this dangerous, uncontrolled outflow and
to save lives. To that end, we reached an agreement on September 9 with
the Government of Cuba under which it pledged to take effective action
to prevent unsafe and irregular departures. For our part, we will
ensure that legal migration from Cuba increases to at least 20,000 per
year. There are residual problems stemming from the rafter exodus; in
particular, the situation in Guantanamo. These issues should not
distract us from the real problem--the dire situation in Cuba that
provoked this crisis--nor from our fundamental goal: a peaceful
transition to democracy, respect for the human rights of the Cuban
people, and an open economy with opportunity for all.
Cuba floats at sea and must choose the destination to which it will
sail. The people of Cuba must set their course. But we are ready to
help them go the way of their neighbors in the region. We look forward
to the day when we will be able to work with a freely elected Cuban
Government and welcome Cuba back into the community of democratic
nations.
So the Summit of the Americas will take place in six weeks with the
presence of all our sister nations of the Hemisphere except one--34
nations which share the values of democracy, human rights, and
prosperity for all their citizens. Let us not forget what made this
hemisphere different from the Old World: a recognition of the rights of
the individual to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Those
values are as relevant today as they were 200 years ago. And, in our
half of the globe, Cubans are without hope that they are on their way to
fulfillment. Thank you.
(###)
ARTICLE 8:
Haiti's Recovery Program
Mark L. Schneider, Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the
Caribbean, U.S. Agency for International Development
Opening remarks at a State Department press briefing, Washington, DC,
October 26, 1994
Over the course of last week, I spent five days in Haiti, as part of the
response to the return of President Aristide and the beginning of the
implementation of our program of assistance to the restored
constitutional government.
I want at the outset just to give you some sense of what I found there,
which was that despite the poverty of the country--which remains the
poorest in the Western Hemisphere--and despite the suffering during
three years of de facto rule, there is a really impressive degree of
optimism among the people, both in Port-au-Prince and outside.
I went out to a small community--Pignon--in the central plateau, and
again there is a sense that it really meant something for the return of
democracy. It meant, in fact, a return of a sense of hope and optimism
that had not been there before.
I also had a chance to talk with some of the victims of human rights
abuse. One of the programs that we've had is support for a human rights
fund that goes through Haitian non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
What was interesting there was a commitment on their part--these are the
victims--to abide by President Aristide's call for reconciliation, and
they essentially were agreed that the future in Haiti meant trying to
work together with all of the people in the country, regardless of those
who participated in the de facto regime.
In general, the economic recovery program that we have put together, as
you may understand, is part of a multilateral effort together with the
World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the rest of the
international system, United Nations agencies, and other donors, and it
responds to a consensus analysis of Haiti's needs. It also responds to
the presentation that Haiti's economic team put together at a recent
informal donors meeting.
The program focuses on three areas: humanitarian needs, the needs in
the area of democracy and restoration of government, and the area of
economic recovery itself--that is, the infrastructure that permits
private industry, commerce, to begin to work, begin to create jobs, and
the establishment of a relationship with the international financial
community again.
The overall estimate of the requirements for the first year are
approximately $555 million, and those estimates were the consensus of
this international donors meeting that met recently in Paris, sponsored
by the World Bank.
Humanitarian Needs
In the area of humanitarian needs, we are talking about continuing a
program that has provided some million individuals--mostly the most
vulnerable parts of the Haitian population--children under five, women,
and the elderly--with one meal a day. It includes providing access to
health services to some 2 million Haitians through a network of non-
governmental organizations.
Our own program supports approximately 39 U.S. private voluntary
organizations (PVOs) and Haitian non-governmental organizations that
provide these health services in clinics across the country.
The third part of the humanitarian program is jobs--short-term jobs that
are linked to public health and public sanitation, cleaning the
irrigation canals, and picking up garbage. In August, we were funding
some 16,000 jobs. We are now up to about 35,000. We hope to get up to
about 50,000 by the end of the year--over the next two months, let's
say.
The overall estimate of need over the course of the first year in the
humanitarian area is approximately $95 million. The United States is
going to provide approximately $57 million, and other donors at the
various conferences have indicated their commitment to provide the other
funding.
Economic Recovery
The second area of concern is the area of economic recovery itself.
Over the course of the past year, an analysis by a joint World Bank-IDB
mission estimated the infrastructure requirements at approximately $210
million. That mission was undertaken a year ago, and, in two weeks,
there will be a new mission led by the Inter-American Development Bank
that will be reviewing those initial estimates. The expectation is
that, if anything, during the past year the situation has deteriorated.
The overall estimate of need in the area of economic recovery is
approximately $375 million. I mentioned approximately $210 million with
respect to infrastructure. The additional requirements relate to
clearing the arrears of Haiti to the international financial
institutions--the World Bank and the IDB and the IMF particularly.
The overall arrears by the end of October will be approximately $76.18
million--more than approximate--will be $76.18 million. By the end of
the year, those arrears would have risen to $83 million. About 10 days
ago, the United States Treasury Department organized a support group
meeting at which USAID pledged $25 million and some 15 other nations
present pledged the remaining $53 million, which means that we have
pledges now for $78 million, which covers the arrears beyond the end of
October.
In the next several days, we anticipate receiving other pledges from
several other countries present which will permit arrears to be cleared
for Haiti beyond the first of the year.
I think it is important to emphasize that what that will do is free up
approximately $260 million from either pipeline--from the World Bank and
the IDB--in projects which are essentially approved and have been frozen
during the period of the de facto government, or permit fast dispersing
balance-of- payments in the case of the IDB, somewhere between $30 and
$40 million and, similarly in the case of the World Bank, approximately
the same amount.
So it will mean that over the course of the next 12-15 months, the
clearing of arrears will permit major flows of capital into Haiti to
provide a reconstruction of the nation's infrastructure in the area of
electric power, roads, and ports on the physical side. It will also
permit, on the social side, investment in the physical infrastructure of
the health system and education system. These are fundamental elements
in permitting the economy to recover in Haiti.
Another area in the economic recovery that I want to mention is the
immediate requirements with respect to balance-of-payments. Haiti
obviously, during the period of embargo, has not had export earnings to
any degree, and at the same time they need vitally to obtain the inputs
to permit businesses to begin to produce again--the inputs of seed,
fertilizer, etc., for the agricultural sector to begin to operate again
effectively.
You have to remember that in Haiti, two-thirds of the labor force is
concentrated in agriculture--mostly very small holdings--and at the same
time, the vast majority of Haiti's poor are in the rural areas. So in
order to permit agricultural recovery, you have to begin to get
fertilizer, seeds, and implements into the country, and that is one of
the crucial concerns in providing approximately $15 million a month in
balance-of-payments support.
When I was in Haiti, I signed the first balance-of-payments agreement
for $15 million with President Aristide, and that will permit the
beginnings of imports. I