U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 5, NUMBER 35, AUGUST 29, 1994
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE
1. The Cairo Conference: Defining an Agenda of Hope, Opportunity, and
Progress--Vice President Gore
2. Country Fact Sheet: Egypt
3. Cuban Refugees--President Clinton, Secretary of Defense William
Perry, Attorney General Janet Reno, Under Secretary for Political
Affairs Peter Tarnoff
4. Recent Developments in Efforts To Achieve Peace and Security in
Bosnia--President Clinton
5. U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka--
Robin Raphel
6. Treaty Actions
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ARTICLE 1:
The Cairo Conference: Defining an Agenda of Hope, Opportunity, and
Progress
Vice President Gore
Address before the National Press Club, Washington, DC, August 25, 1994
I'd like to talk today about population, sustainable development, and
the challenge of preparing for the 21st century.
In the aftermath of the Cold War, the community of nations has been
freed from many of the divisions of the past, and nations are moving
ever closer together--economically, ecologically, and politically. In
this transition period, the United States and all nations have an
opportunity and responsibility to address long neglected, future-
oriented concerns that will determine what kind of world we leave to our
children and grandchildren.
To make this transition successfully, we first must come to accept and
understand the profoundly altered nature of the relationship between
human civilization and the ecological system of the earth. Three
factors have produced a radical change in this relationship--one
philosophical and two physical. The philosophical change has to do with
our attitude toward the earth and toward our own future: specifically, a
habit of denying responsibility for the long-term consequences of our
actions and behaviors. I have discussed this at length elsewhere and do
not intend to go into depth here today. The other two factors are
physical in nature; and while both of them have occurred in only a
millisecond on the scale of geological time, both are unique to this
century.
The first is the dramatic and unprecedented revolution in science and
technology--still accelerating-- which has enhanced our quality of life
but also has given us the power to alter the life-support systems upon
which our communities, our economies, and our lives are based. And
again, this is a topic I have explored elsewhere and will not dwell upon
today. The second, of course, is the rapid growth of human population,
the topic I want to address today in the context of sustainable economic
development.
Population Growth
If you were to draw a chart depicting the population of the earth over
time, you would start in the beginning. For the sake of argument, if
you assume that the scientists are right, roughly 200,000 years ago,
events took place which led to the emergence of modern Homo sapiens.
The population slowly began to rise some 10,000 years ago with the
agricultural revolution. By the birth of Christ, the population on
earth had reached roughly 250 million. By the time Christopher Columbus
sailed to the New World, it was roughly 500 million people.
By the time the Declaration of Independence was written, it was roughly
1 billion people. At that point, during the scientific revolution,
population began to increase dramatically. And by the end of World War
II--when I was born, and many of you were born--the world had reached a
population of 2 billion people.
Now, to recap, it took roughly 10,000 generations to reach a population
of 2 billion. And yet in my 46 years, we have gone from a little over 2
billion to almost 6 billion. And if I'm fortunate enough to live
another 46 years, the world's population will almost certainly increase
to nearly 9 billion.
If it takes 10,000 generations to reach a population of 2 billion, and
then we move in a single human lifetime from 2 billion to 9 billion,
clearly that is a dramatic change. Also, if you overlay on this same
graph trends in deforestation, the accumulation of greenhouse gases,
depletion of ozone levels, disappearance of living species, loss of
topsoil, and others, most of those trends show a sharp correlation to
this underlying pattern.
To put it another way, global population is now growing, by far, at the
fastest rate ever. It is growing by almost 100 million people every
year. You could say we are adding the equivalent of another Mexico every
12 months; we are adding the equivalent of another China every 10 years.
It's not so much the empirical data that is disturbing; it is the
foreseeable consequences of such rapid population growth for tomorrow
that should instill in all Americans and in all nations a sense of
urgency and resolve to address these unprecedented developments. Let me
just name a few:
-- For the environment, of course, rapid population growth often
contributes to the degradation of natural resources--as does the pattern
of consumption in the more stable and more prosperous developed nations-
- it's important to add that. -- Economically, population growth often
contributes to the challenge of addressing persistent low wages,
poverty, and economic disparity. While there are certainly some
circumstances where rapid population growth can meet the need for
unfulfilled demand for labor and become a positive factor, in the real
world in which we live today, it almost always adds to the challenge of
addressing low wages and poverty. -- Population trends also challenge
the ability of societies and economies and governments to make the
investments they need in both human capital and infrastructure. -- At
the level of the family, demographic trends have kept the world's
investment in its children low and unequal, especially where girls are
concerned. -- For individuals, population growth and high fertility are
closely linked to the poor health and welfare of millions upon millions
of women, infants, and children. -- And population pressures often put
strains on hopes for stability at the national and international level.
Look, for example, at the 20 million refugees the world is now
attempting to deal with. The growing migration flows across
international borders are often fed, in part, by unsustainable
population growth.
It is impossible to say that rapid population growth is ever, by itself,
the cause of instability in a society. But neither is it irrelevant to
note that last year, in Africa, the nation with the highest population
density of all was Rwanda. Nor is it irrelevant to note that the nation
in Africa with the fastest rate of population growth of all was Somalia.
While there is not a direct cause-and-effect relationship, common sense
surely reveals that rapid, unsustainable population growth makes it more
difficult for societies and nations to deal with the kinds of political
and economic and other problems that all nations have to deal with. On
a global scale, the implications are ones which must be dealt with. But
it is important to note that at the local and national level the
implications also must be dealt with. There has been, for example, a
great deal written recently about problems in Africa in countries like
Nigeria. Nigeria has a population that has tripled in the past 40
years. The problems in a society like that of Nigeria have many causes.
But when the population triples in 40 years it makes these problems more
difficult for any society to deal with. Nigeria, to use that example
again, is on a pathway that will lead its population to triple again in
the next 40 years. It will have more people 40 years from now than the
entire continent of Africa had in the 1950s. To take another example,
the fastest growing country in the world is Afghanistan. It is on a
trajectory that will double its population in only the next 10 years.
Sustainable Development And Population Stabilization
These snapshots of a world that is becoming increasingly complex point
us toward the need for what I believe must be a centerpiece of
international cooperation in the post-Cold War period: realizing the
vision of sustainable development. With courage, conviction, consensus,
and common strategies, we can no doubt rise to the great challenges of
stabilizing global population and realizing sustainable development.
These challenges have proven hard to accept, for there is nothing more
difficult for individuals or societies than to change the way we think.
And the issues we confront require, above all, new ways of thinking
about our world and our relationship to it.
Of the various factors that have shaped this new situation, none is more
difficult to discuss than the issue of rapid population growth. It is
on our minds and on our agenda as the third major world conference on
population in this century nears early next month. Ten years ago, the
U.S. delegation sat on the sidelines as nations met for the second world
conference on population in Mexico City. This was not just a setback
for America's long history of leadership, but also for progress and
momentum in international population efforts throughout the 1980s.
Ten years later, change has come--the United States is back, and
President Clinton has restored U.S. leadership on the critical
challenges of population and sustainable development. The Cairo
conference, or the International Conference on Population and
Development, as it is officially known--and parenthetically, let me urge
every member of the press to resist the shorthand description of this
conference as "the conference on population"--is officially, and in
fact, a conference on "population and development"--and that linkage is
crucial to the world's ability to forge a consensus that allows us to
address both of these challenges in concert--that will begin on our
Labor Day.
This conference seeks to affirm the interdependent nature of the world
and the need for all nations to work together to sensibly stabilize
global population; to integrate economics, the environment, and
development; to reaffirm enduring values for the family, individual, and
collective responsibility; and to place priority on global education,
health care, and the empowerment of women and all people.
You might not know it from the most salient recent press accounts, but,
in truth, preparations for the Cairo conference have been most notable
for the remarkable consensus that has formed around a comprehensive set
of strategies to realize these goals. Where once there were a few who
suggested that population growth was not a problem, now there is virtual
unanimity about the need for all nations to address population and
sustainable development on a priority basis. And incidentally, the
Catholic Church, for example, about which I will have more to say in a
few moments, acknowledges that stabilizing world population is a
legitimate goal.
Also, where once this discussion broke down on north-south lines, there
is now agreement that cooperation is in the interest of all nations,
north and south. Where once there was disagreement about whether family
planning or economic progress was a prerequisite to progress in either
area, there is now a broad recognition that both are important in their
own right, but that they work best when pursued together. Where once
there was a narrow focus on only one aspect of a global strategy, common
cause has been forged around a comprehensive effort that links
education, health, women's empowerment, and economic progress to the
dream of improving the quality of life for all people.
So, clearly, much has been learned in the 30 years since concern about
rapid population growth emerged in a serious way through the work of
John D. Rockefeller III and others. These lessons characterize the
promising but unfinished plan of action that nations will work to
finalize in Cairo. And I want to discuss movement toward consensus in
the draft Cairo document--for women, for children, for the environment,
and much else besides. But we must not allow this dramatic progress to
be obscured by an issue rooted in deep moral, philosophical, and
religious differences--I'm referring, of course, to abortion.
Population Policies and Programs
In this area, more than in any other, full consensus is unlikely, even
among men and women deliberating in a spirit of candor and mutual
goodwill. It is essential that the partial agreement that may be within
reach not be thwarted by misunderstanding. I want to set the record
straight and ensure that the Administration's views are clear. My
friend, Michael Novak gave me a quote recently from John Courtney
Murray, S.J., to the effect that "nothing is more difficult than to
establish a disagreement." Often disagreements will float around in
imprecise form and seem to be much larger and more imposing than they
really are.
Just about everyone in every corner of the world wishes to make abortion
rare. That is America's aim; that is the aim of women's groups,
environmentalists, the Catholic Church, leaders of all major religions.
Indeed, that is the aim of all involved in this issue, though many of us
pursue that goal in different ways. For example, I believe that when
fewer women feel abortions are necessary, they will be less frequent.
And that when women rarely feel they are necessary, they will be rare.
And that is the commitment of our Administration. That is not the
situation we face today; it is not rare. Around the world today, there
are more than 25 million abortions annually. There are places where it
is not uncommon for women to have seven or eight abortions in their
lifetime.
In fact, there are entire nations, such as the Russian Republic, where
contraceptives are not easily and widely available, and where the
average number of abortions a woman has in her lifetime is seven to
eight. And, for a variety of reasons, there are more than 200,000 women
worldwide who die each year from medically unsafe abortions. We cannot
sweep this situation under the rug or pretend that it does not exist--
and no one is trying to.
One of the questions for those meeting in Cairo and for all the world's
citizens is: What are we going to do about it? How can we make
abortions rare? Our Administration believes that it is desirable to
make available the broadest possible range of health and reproductive
options. But we are well aware that views about abortion are as diverse
among nations as among individuals. Today, 173 nations have laws
setting forth the circumstances in which abortion is permitted and
setting forth the manner in which it is restricted.
We believe that decisions about the extent to which abortion is
acceptable should be the province of each government within the context
of its own laws and national circumstances. Therefore, throughout these
negotiations, we have supported language and sought to have added to the
text language that clearly establishes this principle for all of the
Cairo recommendations. And we fully expect--and will insist at Cairo--
that this principle be affirmed in the final document. Let me repeat:
We have previously supported this language; we have previously urged
that it be added; we will continue to do so; we expect that it will be.
Respect for national sovereignty does not imply neutrality on this
issue. We believe that the incidence of abortion must be reduced.
Abortion is not the strategy by which the nations of the world can or
should reduce population growth. We do not promote abortion. We abhor
and condemn coerced abortions, whether the coercion is physical,
economic, psychological, political, or in any other way.
There have been allegations made that the United States has used undue
influence related to the availability of development assistance to
nations that do not support our population policies and programs. That
is unambiguously and absolutely wrong. We are aware that some
statements have been made to this effect; we respect the fact that
people of goodwill can have a misunderstanding about the truth, and we
have requested specific information. No reasonable person would
countenance such behavior. And I will say this: If there is evidence
supporting the existence of this behavior at any stage in the
preparatory process for Cairo or at Cairo or after Cairo, we will take
immediate and decisive disciplinary action. These allegations are
outrageous. But if they were found to be true, we would reinvent
government right there on the spot.
We do not believe that abortion should be viewed as a method of family
planning. It should not be and cannot be seen as a method of family
planning, although tragically--in countries where contraception is not
readily available--it is today all too often used for this purpose. And
we certainly do not regard abortion as morally equivalent to
contraception. There is, as acknowledged by all participants in the
debate, a different moral sensibility brought to a choice for one option
as compared to all of the others.
Let me be clear: Our Administration believes that the U.S. Constitution
guarantees every woman within our borders a right to choose, subject to
limited and specific exceptions. We are unalterably committed to that
principle. But let us take a false issue off the table--the United
States has not sought, does not seek, and will not seek to establish any
international right to an abortion. That is a red herring.
Now, the principles I've just articulated represent the long-standing
position of the Administration and of the United States on this issue--
on these points. In his authoritative speech to the National Academy of
Sciences in June, President Clinton said this:
Now, I want to be clear about this, contrary to some assertions, we do
not support abortion as a method of family planning. We respect,
however, the diversity of national laws--except we do oppose coercion
wherever it exists. Our own policy in the United States is that this
should be a matter of personal choice, not public dictation. And, as I
have said many times, abortion should be safe, legal, and rare. In
other countries where it does exist, we believe safety is an important
issue. And if you look at the mortality figures, it is hard to turn
away from that issue. We also believe that providing women with the
means to prevent unwanted pregnancy will do more than anything else to
reduce abortion.
Since that speech, before that speech, but many times since that speech-
-the President has personally reaffirmed to me and others on numerous
occasions that where abortion does occur, it should be safe. Each
nation should determine it. We are opposed to coercion. We abhor it.
And we should pursue other policies that reduce the number of abortions.
Let me repeat. We want to do everything we can to reduce the incidence
of abortion around the world. And our view is that the most effective
way to reduce population growth and abortion is through a comprehensive
global strategy that makes family planning information and services as
widely available as possible, that promotes sustainable economic
development, increases child survival rates and literacy, fosters
women's health, strengthens families, and focuses on the education and
empowerment of women. This is a conclusion brought home to us by hard
experience.
A Foundation of Universal Human Aspirations
During the past generation, we have learned that family planning by
itself rarely succeeds, and that economic development by itself does not
automatically reduce population growth. In fact, in my opinion, the
real story of the preparatory process and the conference itself is the
extent to which a new worldwide consensus has congealed around this more
sophisticated, holistic, richer view--that the means by which the world
can stabilize population is a multifaceted strategy that includes:
making contraception available under appropriate circumstances with
respect for the cultures in which it is made available; putting emphasis
on educating and empowering women to take part in the choices that
relate to family size, sustainable and equitable economic development--
which is historically associated with the demographic transition and the
stabilizing of population; an emphasis on improving child health and
child survival to influence the choices that parents make about the size
of the families they wish to have, because when children survive, then
the desire for much larger families is greatly diminished.
Let me read a communication which came last spring to Dr. Nafis Sadik,
the Secretary General of the Cairo conference, from Pope John Paul II.
He said this:
There is widespread agreement that a population policy is only one part
of an overall development strategy. Accordingly, it is important that
any discussion of population policies should keep in mind the actual and
projected development of nations and regions. At the same time, it is
impossible to leave out of the count the very nature of what is meant by
the term "development." All development worthy of the name must be
integral--that is, it must be directed to the true good of every person
and of the whole person. True development cannot consist in the simple
accumulation of wealth, and in the greater availability of goods and
services, but must be pursued with due consideration for the social,
cultural, and spiritual dimensions of the human being. Development
programs must be built of justice and equality, enabling people to live
in dignity, harmony, and peace. They must respect the cultural heritage
of peoples and nations, and those social qualities and virtues that
reflect the God-given dignity of each and every person, and the divine
plan which calls all persons to unity. Importantly, men and women must
be active agents of their own development. For to treat them, men and
women, as mere objects in some scheme or plan would be to stifle that
capacity for freedom and responsibility, which is fundamental to the
good of the human person.
How the world needs to hear that perspective. And how the world needs
to hear what the great religions of the world have to say about all of
the issues we confront.
The Catholic Church as well as other Christian and non-Christian
religions have a mission that sometimes has to be distinct from that of
the political authorities. The religious leaders try to encourage
morally strong attitudes with respect to material goods and
socioeconomic relationships. The political leadership has a
responsibility to listen very carefully to what the religions are
saying--even if they cannot always honor it. This dialogue is very
important. We want to make Cairo a time of dialogue instead of a pre-
fixed confrontation--especially since there is so much agreement on so
much of the preparatory document.
We agree, also, with Pope John Paul II that these issues are the most
important issues of the 21st century, and that they will determine the
future of humankind. I have argued in the past that, in spite of the
disagreements which persist, the broad nature and strength of what is
agreed makes for a natural alliance between, on the one hand, those of
us serving in government who believe we must stabilize population,
protect the environment, promote sustainable development, and create a
future that is worthy of our children and grandchildren, and the
Catholic Church, on the other hand--which despite its well-known
opposition to contraception, historically is one of the most forceful
and effective advocates in the entire world--bar none--for literacy and
education programs, for measures to dramatically reduce infant
mortality, and for other steps that we now understand are, in fact,
crucial in stabilizing population and producing a pattern of sustainable
development.
The whole point is to build a humane and comprehensive strategy on the
foundation of universal human aspirations. As one part of this
comprehensive strategy, a goal at Cairo and beyond is to strengthen the
ability of prospective parents to choose how many children to have and
when to have them. Every country has a responsibility to determine the
appropriate services that are necessary to prevent unintended
pregnancies, ensure maternal health, and reduce the incidence of
abortion. Every country should strive to make the services that it has
chosen for itself available to all its citizens. And in those
circumstances in which a nation chooses to make abortion legal it should
be medically safe.
If we can increase life expectancy and child survival rates, if we can
improve people's lives through education and economic opportunity, if we
can expand their aspirations and widen their horizons, we can reduce the
forces that fuel population growth. Family planning, equitable and
sustainable development, empowerment for all citizens--we now realize
that these are not rival strategies but, rather, crucial and mutually
consistent elements of the comprehensive approach our common, global
future demands.
This is the framework that will guide us as we work toward common ground
in Cairo. We do not imagine that we will ever put the abortion debate
to rest--differences go too deep. But we believe that our approach
maximizes the range of possible consensus and reduces the remaining
disagreements to manageable proportions. After all, most of the Cairo
document--more than 90%, in fact--has already been agreed to, far more
than in previous international conferences. And many of the differences
that remain can be resolved with hard work, respectful dialogue, and
reasoned reconciliation, which we call for today.
We need not be and must not become adversaries in the course of this
endeavor. We must, rather, be co-laborers and friends in this historic
effort to forge policies that affirm the dignity and worth of every
human being on earth--and policies that affirm the importance of the
family. We believe family life is the initiation into a responsible
life in society. For example, if you want an environmentally
responsible society, you must strengthen the family. Governments have a
duty to ensure the political freedom to establish a family and raise
children in keeping with that family's religious faith. All governments
need to protect the stability of marriage and the institution of the
family and to protect the health of the family. Stressing the family is
critical, we believe, because issues such as women's health and women's
education, in many countries, must be approached through the prism of
the family.
A Global Agenda
It is in this context, then, that the Cairo conference is remarkable for
its effort to define a global agenda of hope, opportunity, and progress.
Already, even in the absence of agreement on all issues, this is--by
far--the best population document ever developed. And let me say that
these efforts--and the United States itself--have benefited greatly from
the talent, creativity, and careful guidance of Tim Wirth, our Under
Secretary of State for Global Affairs. Through Tim's work and that of
others, this conference will make a historic embrace of the need for
integrating--on a global scale--economic and environmental policies and
recognizing the relationship between sustainable development and
population stability.
I also want, in advance, to thank President Mubarak who, as host, has
made an immeasurable contribution to the successful outcome we expect in
Cairo. And like the Earth Summit in Rio, this conference recognizes the
importance of engaging citizens and non-governmental organizations,
elevating their role and contribution to the international dialogue.
This is a conference noted for its unprecedented involvement of
citizens--particularly women--on the road to Cairo. Their contribution
has been historic and extraordinary.
The Cairo conference also has recognized that these are not solely the
matters of poor countries. They affect and involve the citizens of
developed countries as well. We are connected to our neighbors by
concern and compassion. Rapid population growth is closely linked with
poverty, injustice, and human suffering. Americans are not indifferent
to these issues.
So, in closing, we know that the challenges are great, and that is why
our commitment runs so deep. Integration of population, the
environment, and development is an imperative for peace and national
security, for human health and well-being, and for the quality of life
on Earth. The Clinton Administration is determined to meet this need.
And on the population and development issue, we are determined to help
lead the way.
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ARTICLE 2:
Country Fact Sheet: Egypt
PEOPLE AND HISTORY
Egypt is the most populous country in the Arab world and the second-most
populous on the African Continent. Nearly 100% of the country's 58
million people live in Cairo and Alexandria; elsewhere on the banks of
the Nile; in the Nile delta, which fans out north of Cairo; and along
the Suez Canal. These regions are among the world's most densely
populated, containing an average of over 1,540 person per square
kilometer (3,820 per sq. mi.).
Small communities spread throughout the desert regions of Egypt are
clustered around oases and historic trade and transportation routes.
The government has tried with mixed success to encourage migration to
newly irrigated land reclaimed from the desert. However, the proportion
of the population living in rural areas has continued to decrease as
people move to the cities in search of employment and a higher standard
of living. The Egyptians are a fairly homogeneous people of Hamitic
origin. Mediterranean and Arab influences appear in the north, and
there is some mixing in the south with the Nubians of northern Sudan.
Ethnic minorities include a small number of Bedouin Arab nomads in the
eastern and western deserts and in the Sinai, as well as some 50,000-
100,000 Nubians clustered along the Nile in upper Egypt.
The literacy rate is about 48% of the adult population. Education is
free through university and compulsory from ages six through 12. About
87% of children enter primary school; half drop out after their sixth
year. There are 20,000 primary and secondary schools with some 10
million students, 12 major universities with about 500,000 students, and
67 teacher colleges. Major universities include Cairo University
(100,000 students), Alexandria University, and the 1,000-year-old Al-
Azhar University, one of the world's major centers of Islamic learning.
Egypt's vast and rich literature constitutes an important cultural
element in the life of the country and in the Arab world as a whole.
Egyptian novelists and poets were among the first to experiment with new
styles of Arabic literature, and the forms they developed have been
widely imitated. Egyptian novelist Naguib Mahjfouz was the first Arab
to win the Nobel prize for literature. Egyptian books and films are
available through the Middle East.
Egypt has endured as a unified state for more than 5,000 years, and
archeological evidence indicates that a developed Egyptian society has
existed for much longer. Egyptians take pride in their "pharaonic
heritage" and in their descent from what they consider mankind's
earliest civilization. The Arabic word for Egypt is Misr, which
originally connotated "civilization" or "metropolis."
Archeological findings show that primitive tribes lived along the Nile
long before the dynastic history of the pharaohs began. By 6000 B.C.,
organized agriculture had appeared.
In about 3100 B.C., Egypt was united under a ruler known as Mena, or
Menes, who inaugurated the 30 pharaonic dynasties into which Egypt's
ancient history is divided--the Old and the Middle Kingdoms and the New
Empire. For the first time, the use and managements of vital resources
of the Nile River came under one authority.
The pyramids at Giza (near Cairo) were built in the fourth dynasty,
showing the power of the pharaonic religion and state. The Great
Pyramid, the tomb of Pharaoh Khufu (also known as Cheops), is the only
surviving example of the Seven Wonders of the Ancient World. Ancient
Egypt reached the peak of its power, wealth, and territorial extent in
the period called the New Empire (1567-1085 B.C.). Authority was again
centralized, and a number of military campaigns brought Palestine,
Syria, and northern Iraq under Egyptian control.
Persian, Greek, Roman, And Arab Conquerors
In 525 B.C., Cambyses, the son of Cyrus the Great, led a Persian
invasion force that dethroned the last pharaoh of the 26th Dynasty. The
country remained a Persian province until Alexander the Great. The
Roman/Byzantine rule of Egypt lasted for nearly 700 years.
Following a brief Persian reconquest, Egypt was invaded and conquered by
Arab forces in 642. A process of Arabization and Islamization ensued.
Although a Coptic Christian minority remained--and remains today,
constituting about 10% of the population--the Arab language inexorably
supplanted the indigenous Coptic tongue. Ancient Egyptian ways--passed
from pharaonic times through the Persian, Greek, and Roman periods and
Egypt's Christian era--were gradually melded with or supplanted by
Islamic customs. For the next 1,300 years, a succession of Turkish,
Arabic, Mameluke, and Ottoman caliphs, beys, and sultans ruled the
country.
European Influence
Napoleon Bonaparte arrived in Egypt in 1798. The three-year sojourn in
Egypt (1798-1801) of his army and a retinue of French scientists opened
Egypt to direct Western influence. Napoleon's adventure awakened Great
Britain to the importance of Egypt as a vital link with India and the
Far East and launched a century-and-a-half of Anglo-French rivalry over
the region.
An Anglo-Ottoman invasion force drove out the French in 1801, and,
following a period of chaos, the Albanian Mohammed Ali obtained control
of the country. Ali ruled until 1849, and his successors retained at
least nominal control of Egypt until 1952. He imported European culture
and technology, introduced state organization of Egypt's economic life,
improved education, and fostered training in engineering and medicine.
His authoritarian rule was also marked by a series of foreign military
adventures. Ali's successors granted to the French Promoter, Ferdinand
de Lesseps, a concession for construction of the Suez Canal--begun in
1859 and opened 10 years later.
Their regimes were characterized by financial mismanagement and personal
extravagance that reduced Egypt to bankruptcy. These developments led
to rapid expansion of British and French financial oversight. This
produced popular resentment, which, in 1879, led to revolt.
In 1882, British expeditionary forces crushed this revolt, marking the
beginning of British occupation and the virtual inclusion of Egypt
within the British Empire. During the rule of three successive British
High Commissioners between 1883 and 1914, the British agency was the
real source of authority. It established special courts to enforce
foreign laws for foreigners residing in the country. These privileges
for foreigners generated increasing Egyptian resentment. To secure its
interests during World War I, Britain declared a formal protectorate
over Egypt on December 18, 1914. This lasted until 1922, when, in
deference to growing nationalism, the U.K. unilaterally declared
Egyptian independence. British influence, however, continued to
dominate Egypt's political life and fostered fiscal, administrative, and
governmental reforms.
In the post-independence period, three political forces competed with
one another: the Wafd, a broadly based nationalist political
organization strongly opposed to British influence; King Fuad, whom the
British had installed in the throne during the war; and the British
themselves, who were determined to maintain control over the canal.
Although both the Wafd and the King wanted to achieve independence from
the British, they competed for control of Egypt. Other political forces
emerging in this period included the communist party (1925) and the
Muslim Brotherhood (1928), which eventually became a potent political
and religious force.
During World War II, British troops used Egypt as a base for Allied
operations throughout the region. British troops were withdrawn to the
Suez Canal area in 1947, but nationalist, anti-British feelings
continued to grow after the war. Violence broke out in early 1952
between Egyptians and British in the canal area, and anti-Western
rioting in Cairo followed.
On July 22-23, 1952, a group of disaffected army officers led by Lt.
Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser overthrew King Farouk, whom the military blamed
for Egypt's poor performance in the 1948 war with Israel. Following a
brief experiment with civilian rule, they abrogated the 1923
constitution and declared Egypt a republic on June 19, 1953. Nasser
evolved into a charismatic leader, not only of Egypt but of the Arab
world.
Nasser and his "free officer" movement enjoyed almost instant legitimacy
as liberators who had ended 2,500 years of foreign rule. They were
motivated by numerous grievances and goals but wanted especially to
break the economic and political power of the land owning elite, to
remove all vestiges of British control, and to improve the lot of the
people, especially the fellahin (peasants).
A secular nationalist, Nasser developed a foreign policy characterized
by advocacy of pan-Arab socialism, leadership of the "nonaligned" of the
"Third World," and close ties with the Soviet Union. He sharply opposed
the Western-sponsored Baghdad Pact. When the United States held up
military sales in reaction to Egyptian neutrality vis-a-vis Moscow,
Nasser concluded an arms deal with Czechoslovakia in September 1955.
When the U.S. and the World Bank withdrew their offer to help finance
the Aswan High Dam in mid-1956, he nationalized the privately owned Suez
Canal Company. The crisis that followed, exacerbated by growing
tensions with Israel over guerrilla attacks from Gaza and Israeli
reprisals, resulted in the invasion of Egypt that October by France,
Britain, and Israel.
While Egypt was defeated, the invasion forces were quickly withdrawn
under heavy pressure from the U.S. The Suez war (or, as the Egyptians
call it, the Tripartite Aggression) instantly transformed Nasser into an
Egyptian and Arab hero.
He soon after came to terms with Moscow for the financing of the Aswan
High Dam--a step that enormously increased Soviet involvement in Egypt
and set Nasser's Government on a policy of close ties with the Soviet
Union.
In 1958, pursuant to his policy of pan-Arabism, Nasser succeeded in
uniting Egypt and Syria into the United Arab Republic. Although this
union had failed by 1961, it was not officially dissolved until 1984.
Nasser's domestic policies were arbitrary, frequently oppressive, and
yet generally popular. All opposition was stamped out, and opponents of
the regime frequently were imprisoned without trial. Nasser's foreign
policies, among other things, helped provoke the Israeli attack of June
1967 that virtually destroyed Egypt's armed forces along with those of
Jordan and Syria. Israel also occupied the Sinai peninsula, the Gaza
Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. Nasser, nonetheless, was
revered by the masses in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world until his
death in 1970.
After Nasser's death, another of the original "free officers," Vice
President Anwar el-Sadat, was elected President. In 1971, Sadat
concluded a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union but, a year
later, ordered Soviet advisers to leave. In 1973, he launched the
October war with Israel, in which Egypt's armed forces achieved initial
successes but were defeated in Israeli counterattacks.
Camp David and The Peace Process
In a momentous change from the Nasser era, President Sadat shifted Egypt
from a policy of confrontation with Israel to one of peaceful
accommodation through negotiations. Following the Sinai Disengagement
Agreements of 1974 and 1975, Sadat created a fresh opening for progress
by his dramatic visit to Jerusalem in November 1977. This led to
President Jimmy Carter's invitation to President Sadat and Prime
Minister Begin to join him in trilateral negotiations at Camp David.
The outcome was the historic Camp David accords, signed by Egypt and
Israel and witnessed by the U.S. on September 17, 1978. The accords led
to the March 26, 1979, signing of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, by
which Egypt regained control of the Sinai in May 1982. Throughout this
period, U.S.-Egyptian relations steadily improved, but Sadat's
willingness to break ranks by making peace with Israel earned him the
enmity of most other Arab states.
In domestic policy, Sadat introduced greater political freedom and a new
economic policy, the most important aspect of which was the infitah or
"open door." This relaxed government controls over the economy and
encouraged private investment. Sadat dismantled much of the policy
apparatus and brought to trial a number of former government officials
accused of criminal excesses during the Nasser era.
Liberalization also included the reinstitution of due process and the
legal banning of torture. Sadat tried to expand participation in the
political process in the mid-1970s but later abandoned this effort. In
the last years of his life, Egypt was racked by violence arising from
discontent with Sadat's rule and sectarian tensions, and it experienced
a renewed measure of repression.
On October 6, 1981, President Sadat was assassinated by Islamic
extremists. Hosni Mubarak, Vice President since 1975 and air force
commander during the October 1973 war, was elected president later that
month. He was re-elected to a second term in October 1987 and to a
third term in October 1993. Mubarak has maintained Egypt's commitment
to the Camp David peace process, while at the same time re-establishing
Egypt's position as an Arab leader. Egypt was readmitted to the Arab
League in 1989. Egypt has also played a moderating role in such
international fora as the UN and the Nonaligned Movement.
Mubarak was elected chairman of the Organization of African Unity in
1989, and again at the OAU summit in Cairo in June 1993. Domestically,
since 1991, Mubarak has undertaken an ambitious reform program to reduce
the size of the public sector and expand the role of the private sector.
There has also been a democratic opening and increased participation in
the political process by opposition groups. The November 1990 National
Assembly elections saw 61 members of the opposition win seats in the
454-seat assembly, despite a boycott by several opposition parties
citing possible manipulation by Mubarak's National Democratic Party
(NDP). The opposition parties have been weak and divided and are not
yet credible alternatives to the NDP.
Freedom of the press has increased greatly. While concern remains that
economic problems could promote increasing dissatisfaction with the
government, President Mubarak enjoys broad support.
For several years, domestic political debate in Egypt has been concerned
with the phenomenon of "Political Islam," i.e., a movement which seeks
to establish a state and society governed strictly by Islamic doctrine.
The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928, is legally proscribed,
but operates more or less openly. Egyptian law, however, prohibits the
formation of religion-based political parties. Members of the
Brotherhood have been elected to the People's Assembly as independents
and have been elected to local councils as candidates on the Socialist
Labor Party ticket.
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS
The Egyptian constitution provides for a strong executive. Authority is
vested in an elected president who can appoint one or more vice
presidents, a prime minister, and a cabinet. The president's term runs
for six years. Egypt's legislative body, the People's Assembly, has 454
members--444 popularly elected and 10 appointed by the president. The
constitution reserves 50% of the assembly seats for "workers and
peasants." The assembly sits for a five-year term but can be dissolved
earlier by the president. There is also a 258-member National Shura
(consultative) Council, in which 86 members are appointed and 172
elected for six-year terms. Below the national level, authority is
exercised by and through governors and mayors appointed by the central
government and by popularly elected local councils.
Although power is concentrated in the hands of the president and the
National Democratic Party majority in the People's Assembly, opposition
party organizations make their views public and represent their
followers at various levels in the political system.
In addition to the ruling National Democratic Party, there are nine
other recognized parties. Since 1990, the number of recognized parties
has doubled from five to 10. The law prohibits the formation of parties
along class lines, thereby making it illegal for communist groups to
organize formally as political parties.
The process of gradual political liberalization begun by Sadat has
continued under Mubarak. Egyptians now enjoy considerable freedom of
the press, and recognized opposition political parties operate freely.
Although the November 1990 elections are generally considered to have
been fair and free, there are significant restrictions on the political
process and freedom of association for non-governmental organizations.
Opposition parties continue to make credible complaints about electoral
manipulation by the government. For example, in the 1989 Shura Council
elections, the ruling NDP won 100% of the seats.
Egypt's judicial system is based on European (primarily French) legal
concepts and methods. Under the Mubarak Government, the courts have
demonstrated increasing independence, and the principles of due process
and judicial review have gained greater respect. The legal code is
derived largely from the Napoleonic Code. Marriage and personal status
(family law) are primarily based on the religious law of the individual
concerned, which for most Egyptians is Islamic Law (Sharia).
Principal Government Officials
President--Muhammad Hosni Mubarak
Prime Minister--Atef Sedky
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs--Amre Moussa
Ambassador to the United States--Ahmad Maher El-Sayyed
Ambassador to the United Nations--Nabil El-Araby
Egypt maintains an embassy in the United States at 3521 International
Court NW, Washington, DC 20008 (tel. 202-895-5400). The Washington
consulate has the same address (tel. 202-966-6342). The Egyptian
mission to the United Nations is located at 36 East 67th Street, New
York, NY (tel. 212-879-6300). Egyptian consulates general are located
at: 1110 Second Avenue, New York, NY 10022 (tel. 212-759-7120); 2000
West Loop South, Suite 1750, Control Data Building, Houston, TX 77027
(tel. 713-961-4915); 505 N. Lake Shore Drive, Suite 4902, Chicago, IL
60611 (tel. 312-670-2655); and 3001 Pacific Avenue, San Francisco, CA
94115 (tel. 415-346-9700).
ECONOMY
Under comprehensive economic reforms initiated in 1991, Egypt has
relaxed many price controls, reduced subsidies, and partially
liberalized trade and investment. Manufacturing is still dominated by
the public sector, which controls virtually all heavy industry. A
process of public sector reform and privatization has begun, however,
which could enhance opportunities for the private sector. Agriculture,
mainly in private hands, has been largely deregulated, with the
exception of cotton and sugar production. Construction, non-financial
services, and domestic marketing are largely private.
Agriculture
More than one-third of Egyptian labor is engaged directly in farming,
and many others work in the processing or trading of agricultural
products. Practically all Egyptian agriculture takes place in some 2.5
million hectares (6 million acres) of fertile soil in the Nile Valley
and Delta. Some desert lands are being developed for agriculture, but
other fertile lands in the Nile Valley and Delta are being lost to
urbanization and erosion.
Warm weather and plentiful water permit several crops a year. Further
improvement is possible, but agricultural productivity is already high,
considering the traditional methods used. Egypt has little subsistence
farming. Cotton, rice, onions, and beans are the principal crops.
Cotton is the largest agricultural export earner.
The United States is a major supplier of wheat to Egypt, through
commercial sales and the PL 480 (Food for Peace) program. Other Western
countries have also supplied food on concessional terms.
"Egypt," wrote the Greek historian Herodotus 25 centuries ago, "is the
gift of the Nile." The land's seemingly inexhaustible resources of
water and soil carried by this mighty river created in the Nile Valley
and Delta the world's most extensive oasis. Without the Nile, Egypt
would be little more than a desert wasteland.
The river carves a narrow, cultivated floodplain, never more than 20
kilometers wide, as it travels northward from Sudan to form Lake Nasser,
behind the Aswan High Dam. Below the dam, just north of Cairo, the Nile
spreads out over what was once a broad estuary that has been filled by
riverine deposits to form a fertile delta about 250 kilometers wide (150
mi.) at the seaward base and about 160 kilometers (96 mi.) from south to
north.
Before the construction of dams on the Nile, particularly the Aswan High
Dam, the fertility of the Nile Valley was sustained by the water flow
and the silt deposited by the annual flood. Sediment is now obstructed
by the Aswan High Dam and retained in Lake Nasser. The interruption of
yearly, natural fertilization and the increasing salinity of the soil
have detracted somewhat from the high dam's value. Nevertheless, the
benefits remain impressive: more intensive farming on millions of acres
of land made possible by improved irrigation, prevention of flood
damage, and the generation of billions of low-cost kilowatt hours of
electricity.
The Western Desert accounts for about two-thirds of the country's land
area. For the most part, it is a massive sandy plateau marked by seven
major depressions. One of these, Fayoum, was connected about 3,600
years ago to the Nile by canals. Today, it is an important irrigated
agricultural area.
Natural Resources
In addition to the agricultural capacity of the Nile Valley and Delta,
Egypt's natural resources include petroleum, natural gas, phosphates,
and iron ore. Petroleum deposits are found primarily in the Gulf of
Suez, the Nile Delta, and the Western Desert. The petroleum and natural
gas sector accounted for approximately 10% of GDP in FY 1991-92.
Petroleum products represented about 45% of export earnings during that
period. The fall in world oil prices after the 1991 Gulf war pushed
Egypt's benchmark "Suez Blend" to an average price of $15 per barrel in
FY 1991-92, compared with $20 per barrel in FY 1990-91. Thus, the value
of Egyptian crude oil exports dropped to $1.2 billion in FY 1991-92
versus $1.5 billion in FY 1990-91.
Petroleum production dropped slightly in FY 1991-92 to 44 million tons
at 870,000 barrels per day. To limit the domestic consumption of oil,
Egypt is encouraging the production of natural gas. Natural gas output
continues to increase, and reached 7.2 million metric tons equivalent in
FY 1991-92.
Twelve petroleum exploration agreements were signed in 1992, under which
six companies are expected to spend over $90 million to drill 24 wells.
Since 1991, the government has tried to attract enough foreign
investment to maintain existing exploration and production and attract
new investment. In October 1991, the government adopted a market-
determined petroleum export pricing formula.
Transport and Communication
Transportation facilities in Egypt are centered on Cairo and largely
follow the pattern of settlement along the Nile. The major line of the
nation's 4,800-kilometer (2,800-mi.) railway network runs from
Alexandria to Aswan. The well-maintained road network has expanded
rapidly to over 21,000 miles, covering the Nile Valley and Delta,
Mediterranean and Red Sea coasts, the Sinai, and the Western oases.
Egyptair provides reliable domestic air services to major tourist
destinations from its Cairo hub (in addition to overseas routes). The
Nile River system (about 1,600 km. or 1,000 mi.) and the principal
canals (1,600 km.) are important locally for transportation. The Suez
Canal is a major waterway of international commerce and navigation,
linking the Mediterranean and Red Seas. Major ports are Alexandria,
Port Said, and Damietta on the Mediterranean, and Suez and Safraga on
the Red Sea.
Egypt has long been the cultural and informational center of the Arab
world, and Cairo is the region's largest publishing and broadcasting
center. There are eight daily newspapers with a total circulation of
more than 2 million, and a number of monthly newspapers, magazines, and
journals. The majority of political parties have their own newspapers,
and these papers conduct a lively, often highly partisan debate on
public issues.
Radio and television are owned and controlled by the government through
the Egyptian Radio and Television Federation. The Federation operates
two national television networks and three regional stations in Cairo,
Alexandria, and Ismailia. The government also beams daily satellite
programming to the rest of the Arab world, the U.K., and the U.S.
DEFENSE
Egypt's armed forces are among the largest in the region, and include
the army (290,000), air defense (70,000), air force (30,000), and navy
(20,000). The armed forces inventory includes equipment from the United
States, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, the former Soviet Union, and
China. Most of the equipment from the former Soviet Union is being
replaced by more modern American, French, and British equipment, of
which significant amounts are being built under license in Egypt. To
bolster stability and moderation in the region, Egypt has provided
military assistance and training to a number of African and Arab states.
FOREIGN RELATIONS
Egypt was readmitted to the Arab League in May 1989, and the Arab League
headquarters has returned to Cairo from Tunis. Former Egyptian Foreign
Minister Abdel Meguid is the present Secretary General of the Arab
League. President Mubarak chaired the Organization of African Unity
from 1989 to 1990 and again in 1993. In 1991, Egyptian Deputy Prime
Minister Boutros Boutros-Ghali was elected Secretary General of the
United Nations in a tightly contested election.
Egypt played a key role during the 1990-91 Gulf crisis. President
Mubarak helped assemble the international coalition and deployed 35,000
Egyptian troops against Iraq to liberate Kuwait. The Egyptian
contingent was the second largest in the coalition forces. In the
aftermath of the Gulf war, Egypt signed the Damascus declaration with
Syria and the Gulf states to strengthen Gulf security.
Egypt also played an important role in the negotiations leading to the
Madrid Peace Conference in 1991, which, under U.S. and Russian
sponsorship, brought together all parties in the region to discuss
Middle East peace. Since then, Egypt has been an active participant in
the peace process and has been a strong supporter of the bilateral
discussions.
Egyptian-Israeli relations improved after Labor's 1992 victory in
Israeli national elections, and Egypt and Israel are committed to
improving their bilateral relationship. By mid-1993, President Mubarak
and Prime Minister Rabin had met twice, and other senior-level bilateral
contacts have increased. There has also been progress on the return of
Sinai antiquities to Egypt and on issues relating to military personnel
missing in action. Agricultural cooperation continues to be the most
active area of Egyptian-Israeli technical cooperation.
U.S.-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS
President Mubarak has long been a supporter of a strong U.S.-Egyptian
relationship based on shared interests in regional security and
stability and the peaceful resolution of international disputes.
President Mubarak was the first Arab leader to visit the U.S. after
President Clinton's inauguration. The two countries have worked closely
together to promote a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict
and to resolve conflicts in Africa--including most recently
participation by Egyptian soldiers in UN peace-keeping efforts in
Somalia.
An important pillar of the bilateral relationship remains U.S. security
and economic assistance to Egypt, which expanded significantly in the
wake of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1979. In FY 1993, total
U.S. assistance levels to Egypt were $1.3 billion in Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) grants and $815 million in Economic Support Fund grants.
The Egyptians have used FMS to support their military modernization
program. PL 480 food aid in FY 1993 amounted to $50 million, down from
$150 million annually in previous years, due to Egypt's increased
commercial purchases.
U.S. assistance promotes Egypt's economic development, supports U.S.-
Egyptian cooperation, and enhances regional stability. U.S. economic
aid stimulates economic growth by funding major projects in electric
power generation, telecommunications, housing and transport, and the
financing of commodity imports such as raw materials and capital
equipment. Power plants built with U.S. assistance generate more
electricity than the Aswan High Dam.
Since 1975, the United States has provided $2.2 billion to improve and
expand water and sewage systems in Cairo, Alexandria, and other Egyptian
cities. U.S. military cooperation has helped Egypt modernize its armed
forces and strengthen regional security and stability. Under FMS
programs, the U.S. has provided F-4 jet aircraft, F-16 jet fighters, M-
60A3 and M1A1 tanks, armored personnel carriers, Apache helicopters,
antiaircraft missile batteries, aerial surveillance aircraft, and other
equipment.
The U.S. and Egypt also participate in combined military exercises,
including deployment of U.S. troops to Egypt. Units of the U.S. 6th
Fleet are regular visitors to Egyptian ports.
Principal U.S. Officials
Ambassador--Edward S. Walker, Jr.
Deputy Chief of Mission--Edmund J. Hull
Minister-Counselor for Economic Affairs--Russell A. Lamantia
Counselor for Political Affairs--Jeffrey Millington
Counselor for Commercial Affairs--Laron L. Jensen
Counselor for Public Affairs--Marjorie A. Ransom
Counselor for Agricultural Affairs--Franklin D. Lee
Counselor for Administrative Affairs--Warren E. Littrel, Jr.
Consul General--Dona Sherman Labor Affairs Officer--Barbara Leaf
Director, AID Mission--John Wesley
Defense Attache--Col. Joseph P. Engleheardt, USA
Chief, Office of Military Cooperation--MG Otto Habedanke, USAF
The U.S. embassy in Cairo is located on Lazoughli Street, Garden City,
near downtown Cairo. The mailing address for the embassy from the U.S.
is American Embassy, APO AE 09839-4900; from Egypt, it is 8 Sharia Kamal
El-Din Salah, Garden City, Cairo. The telephone number is (20) (2)355-
7371; fax (20) (2)355-7375; telex 93773 Amemb UN. The embassy is closed
on all U.S. federal holidays and some Egyptian holidays.
(###)
ARTICLE 3:
Cuban Refugees
President Clinton, Secretary of Defense William Perry, Attorney General
Janet Reno, Under Secretary for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff
President Clinton
Opening remarks at a White House press conference, Washington, DC,
August 19, 1994.
Good afternoon. In recent weeks the Castro regime has encouraged Cubans
to take to the sea in unsafe vessels to escape their nation's internal
problems. In so doing, it has risked the lives of thousands of Cubans,
and several have already died in their efforts to leave.
This action is a cold-blooded attempt to maintain the Castro grip on
Cuba and to divert attention from his failed communist policies. He has
tried to export to the United States the political and economic crises
he has created in Cuba in defiance of the democratic tide flowing
throughout this region. Let me be clear: The Cuban Government will not
succeed in any attempt to dictate American immigration policy.
The United States will do everything within its power to ensure that
Cuban lives are saved and that the current outflow of refugees is
stopped. Today, I have ordered that illegal refugees from Cuba will not
be allowed to enter the United States. Refugees rescued at sea will be
taken to our naval base at Guantanamo, while we explore the possibility
of other safe havens within the region.
To enforce this policy, I have directed the Coast Guard to continue its
expanded effort to stop any boat illegally attempting to bring Cubans to
the United States. The United States will detain, investigate, and, if
necessary, prosecute Americans who take to the sea to pick up Cubans.
Vessels used in such activities will be seized.
I want to compliment the Coast Guard and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service for their efforts. And I want to thank Florida's
officials, including Governor Chiles and the Florida congressional
delegation, for their help in protecting and saving the lives of Cubans
who seek to escape the regime.
Secretary of Defense William Perry, Attorney General Janet Reno, Under
Secretary for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff
Remarks during a White House press briefing, Washington, DC, August 24,
1994.
Secretary Perry. On Monday, I made a trip to have a surveying
assessment of the ongoing migration of Cubans and the way we're handling
that problem. I flew to Key West and reviewed with the Coast Guard
officials there the programs they have underway. Then I went to
Guantanamo and observed the activities of our joint task force which is
handling both the Haitian and the Cuban refugees there. On the way
between Key West and Guantanamo, I flew over the areas and made very low
passes over the areas where the Coast Guard cutters and the Navy ships
are picking up the boat people.
I have to say my heart went out to the people in those rafts. These are
makeshift, homemade rafts--some of them made out of steel drums,
innertubes. They've been in those rafts for two or three days by the
time they have drifted out to the area where the Coast Guard ships are
picking them up. This is a very dangerous journey--shark-infested
waters. Some of those people are dying en route--those who are not
picked up by the cutters--and then drift with the Gulf Stream and go on
out to the open oceans. So anything we can do to discourage people from
making that very dangerous trip, we are trying to do.
The Coast Guard and the Navy are conducting basically a search and
rescue operation in that area--this area is about 25 to 30 miles off the
coast of Cuba, roughly north of Havana. It's a very difficult
operation, but it's being conducted very, very well--very
professionally. We have, all told, more than 30 Coast Guard ships--
cutters involved in this operation and seven Navy ships. By the next
day or two, there will be 10 Navy ships involved.
They are being picked up on the smaller cutters and then transferred to
larger cutters and Navy ships for the transport to Guantanamo. That's a
long trip; it takes almost two days to go from where they're picked up
to Guantanamo for unloading at the camps there.
To date, we have picked up about 9,000 Cubans, 7,000 of them who are on
board ship as we speak and another 2,000 that have already been dropped
off at Guantanamo.
The pipeline, if you think of it that way, is two or three days drifting
before they're picked up and then another two days to get--to make the
journey to Guantanamo. People who are being picked up in the last few
days are people who set out on their journey over the weekend.
We don't believe that the message of how dangerous this is or the
message that they're going to end up not in the U.S. but Guantanamo has
fully gotten through to the people who are on the boats that we have
picked up in the last day or two. And we hope that that message does
get through.
So we have a flood of boat people on the way to Guantanamo now. We
stand by our new policy toward Cuba. And we will not be intimidated by
Castro's cynical attempt to solve his domestic problems by encouraging
people to flee. We are doing our best to discourage these people. But
if we--to the extent we fail to do that, the next thing we're doing is
we're doing our best to save lives--the people who actually go to sea
and then taking them to Guantanamo.
At Guantanamo we are expanding the facility to accommodate that. I
don't want to cover this in great detail, but this is a map of the
Guantanamo area. This is the airfield; this is the fence on the United
States side. And this is the fence on the Cuban side. In between those
two fences is a no-man's land in which the Cubans have put thousands--
literally thousands--of mines.
The camp where we have the Haitians located is right here at McCalla
Field. We're putting the Cubans in new camps which are located more
than a mile from the Haitian camps on the other side of these ridges--
Camp Bulkeley, Radio Hill, and what's called Rifle Range.
The joint task force--the military joint task force--is doing, in my
judgment, an excellent job in putting these new camps together very
quickly.
We have, as of today, facilities for more than 23,000 refugees in these
two camps--the Haitian and the Cuban camp. By the end of the week we
will have facilities for 30,000, and, by the end of next week, we'll
have facilities for 40,000. We have significant capacity beyond that
and will expand beyond that if necessary.
While we are concerned about the large number of migrants fleeing in
Cuban boats, we are confident that we have the resources to deal with
this outflow. We will expand, as necessary, the facility at Guantanamo,
as I have indicated. In addition to that, we continue to work with our
friends in the region to provide safe havens for Cuban migrants in third
countries.
A final comment to make about the situation at Guantanamo--it has been
suggested that the Cuban Government might encourage hundreds or even
thousands of refugees to flood the gates here and into Guantanamo
through the back door. We see no evidence that that's happening. I
flew over this fence line on Monday, and there's no activity of any kind
there. If it were to happen, it would be very dangerous because of the
mines in this area--mines which have not been maintained for years and
which, I believe, the Cubans have probably lost track of their location.
It would be irresponsible of the Cuban Government to encourage this.
Indeed, it would be--we would regard this as being an unfriendly act
toward the United States and would take appropriate action.
I want to summarize by stressing three things. The first is a message
to the Cuban people: We discourage you from getting on these boats. It
is a very dangerous trip, and you will only end up in Guantanamo if you
do it. Secondly, we will do--we are doing what, I believe, is a first-
class, professional search and rescue operation to save the people who
do go on the boats--rescuing them. And finally, we are building up the
capacity for Guantanamo; between Guantanamo and the safe haven
facilities, we believe we can accommodate for the indefinite future the
flood of boat people that are coming out. I'd like now to turn the
podium over to Attorney General Reno.
Attorney General Reno. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I want to speak
directly to families in Miami--to Cuban families in Miami who may be
talking to their loved ones in Cuba. Some people feel that if you get
to Guantanamo, you're going to be able to come to the United States.
That is simply not so.
We've received calls saying, well they'll be processed at Guantanamo.
They will not be processed for admission to the United States. They
will be registered there; they will be counseled concerning their
location in a safe haven; but they will not be coming to the United
States. And you should urge your family not to make such trips. It is
unsafe. They risk their lives. And we are doing everything we can to
ensure that the legal migration procedures are available for those in
Cuba who can legally come to this country.
I want to speak to the people in Cuba: Do not risk your lives. It is
too dangerous. You have heard Secretary Perry describe these little
rafts in the open ocean. It is not something that should be done. And
you should not expect that you will come to the United States. You are
going to Guantanamo or to other safe havens, and you will not be
processed--not be processed--for admission to the United States.
We will continue efforts to ensure in-country refugee processing and
legal migration procedures. Now, I'd like to call on Under Secretary
Tarnoff.
Under Secretary Tarnoff. Thank you. What I would like to do very
briefly is to put the actions we've been taking into a foreign policy
context and to say that, as has been the case for more than 30 years,
all aspects of our policy are directed at promoting peaceful and
democratic change in Cuba.
At a time when democracy and free markets are sweeping the hemisphere,
and in Russia and other countries of the former Warsaw Pact--which have
traded communist dictatorship for freedom and democracy--a totalitarian
communist state is an anachronism. The current wave of Cubans fleeing
the island is a clear demonstration of the frustration and despair of
the Cuban people over the regime's unwillingness to provide basic human
freedoms and a hope for a better future. The solution to the crisis in
Cuba lies in Cuba itself and the unwillingness of the Castro Government
to heed the desires of its people for reform and an open market system
and democracy.
On the question of safe havens, we are giving a high priority to this.
We are working well with other nations in the hemisphere primarily to
identify some additional safe havens. First of all, we hope to conclude
shortly an agreement with the Turks and Caicos islands to open a safe
haven there. Secondly, Panamanian President-elect Perez Balladares
released the statement in Panama yesterday, indicating that he is
prepared to cooperate with the United States to seek a solution to the
problems created by the large number of Cubans leaving the island. And
third, in Suriname, the construction of safe havens for Haitians is
underway, and we are discussing with that government the possibility of
their taking Cubans as well.
(###)
ARTICLE 4:
Recent Developments in Efforts To Achieve Peace and Security in Bosnia
President Clinton
Text of a letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, August 22,
1994
Dear Mr. Speaker:
(Dear Mr. President:)
I last reported to the Congress on April 12 on our support for the
United Nations and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) efforts to
achieve peace and security in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I am informing you
today of recent developments in these efforts, including the use of
United States combat aircraft on August 5 to attack Bosnian Serb heavy
weapons in the Sarajevo heavy weapons exclusion zone.
Since the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 713 on
September 25, 1991, the United Nations has actively sought solutions to
the humanitarian and ethnic crisis in the former Yugoslavia. Under
United Nations Security Council Resolution 824 (May 6, 1993), certain
parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina have been established as safe areas.
Sarajevo is specifically designated a safe area that should be "free
from armed attacks and from any other hostile act."
A mortar attack on Sarajevo on February 4, 1994, caused numerous
civilian casualties, including some 68 deaths. The United Nations
Secretary General thereafter requested NATO to authorize, at his
request, air operations against artillery or mortar positions determined
by the United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) to have been involved
in attacks on civilians.
On February 9, 1994, NATO responded to the Secretary General's request
by authorizing air operations, if needed, using agreed coordination
procedures with UNPROFOR. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's
decision set a deadline for the withdrawal of heavy weapons within 20
kilometers of the center of Sarajevo or for the regrouping and placement
of such weapons under United Nations control. As of February 21, 1994,
all heavy weapons found within the Sarajevo exclusion zone, unless
controlled by UNPROFOR, would be subject to NATO air strikes. In
response to the NATO ultimatum, heavy weapons were removed from the
exclusion zone or placed in collection sites under UNPROFOR control.
On August 5, 1994, Bosnian Serb forces entered an UNPROFOR heavy weapons
collection site near the town of Ilidza and removed several heavy
weapons--a tank, two armored personnel carriers, and a 30mm anti-
aircraft system. An UNPROFOR helicopter dispatched to monitor the
situation was fired upon and was forced to make an emergency landing.
UNPROFOR troops were unsuccessful in attempting to regain custody of the
weapons. As a result, UNPROFOR requested assistance from NATO forces in
finding the weapons so they could be retrieved or destroyed. NATO
responded by making various French, Dutch, British, and U.S. aircraft
available for air strikes, if necessary.
Unable to locate the specific weapons removed from the collection site,
UNPROFOR and NATO decided to proceed against other targets in the
Sarajevo exclusion zone. Accordingly, on August 5, a U.S. A-10 aircraft
strafed a Bosnian Serb M-18 76mm self-propelled antitank gun located
inside the exclusion zone. No U.S. personnel were injured or killed nor
was U.S. equipment damaged in connection with this action. Later on
August 5, the Bosnian Serbs called the UNPROFOR Commander, General Rose,
and asked him to call off the attacks. They offered to return the heavy
weapons that they had taken from the storage site. General Rose agreed
and the weapons were returned to UNPROFOR's control.
I took these actions in conjunction with our allies in order to carry
out the NATO decision and to answer UNPROFOR's request for assistance.
As I earlier reported to you, our continued efforts are intended to
assist the parties to reach a negotiated settlement to the conflict. I
have directed the participation by U.S. Armed Forces in this effort
pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct the foreign relations
of the United States and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive.
I am grateful for the continuing support the Congress has provided, and
I look forward to continued cooperation with you in this endeavor. I
shall communicate with you further regarding our efforts for peace and
stability in the region.
Sincerely,
William J. Clinton
(###)
ARTICLE 5:
U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka
Robin Raphel, Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs
Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, August 11, 1994
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I am pleased to be here
today to testify on recent developments in and U.S. policy toward
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. While much of the
attention devoted to South Asia is rightly focused on India and
Pakistan, significant events are taking place in the other countries of
the region. I am grateful for the recognition of this reality by you
and the committee, as demonstrated by your request for today's hearing.
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka are sometimes labeled the
"smaller" nations of South Asia, but this is very much a relative
comparison. Like their more powerful neighbors, India and Pakistan,
they confront significant problems affecting large numbers of people.
To provide some perspective, I would note that the transition from
authoritarian rule to democracy is affecting more people in Bangladesh
and Nepal than in all of the former communist countries of Eastern
Europe combined, where a similar process began at about the same time.
Strengthening democracy is among the Administration's highest regional
priorities in South Asia, and is of particular importance in all but one
of the countries we will be discussing today--Afghanistan. While
democratic institutions are being tested in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri
Lanka, we are optimistic that these institutions will prevail. We
actively support the democratic process throughout the region, although
our approach varies from country to country to suit the circumstances.
Another area of importance to us in South Asian countries is economic
growth and development resulting, in large part, from liberalization of
trade and investment policies. Closely connected to this is our strong
interest in generating new opportunities for American business. As in
India and Pakistan, significant economic policy changes are underway in
Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. There has not yet been an explosion
of American commercial involvement with those countries, as there has
been in India. However, American participation has grown, particularly
in Sri Lanka. The Department of State and our embassies in South Asian
capitals are supporting American businesses pursuing new opportunities
in those countries.
While not caught up in the Indo-Pakistani dispute to any significant
degree, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka all must pay close attention to
relations with India. India, given its sheer size and extensive human
and other resources, has a special obligation to ensure that its smaller
neighbors feel they are treated fairly. Water allocation, power
generation, and refugee flows are among the significant issues between
them and their large neighbor which need to be resolved sooner rather
than later.
The three states recognize the importance of regional cooperation and
are strong supporters of the South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation. The United States also would like to see SAARC grow in
stature and effectiveness. We believe the organization could better
accomplish this by taking on greater responsibilities at the working
level.
I now wish to discuss each of these four countries individually.
Afghanistan
Mr. Chairman, Afghanistan is the sad exception to a tale of political
and economic progress in South Asia. Our primary goal there is a simple
one-- to help promote peace and security in a country torn by war
for almost 15 years. There are other important issues in Afghanistan,
including reconstruction of the economy and infrastructure, repatriation
of the refugees, combating narcotics trafficking, and putting an end to
the harboring of radical groups, all of which have important potential
for regional stability.
However, significant progress toward these or any other goals is
dependent on the end of fighting and the emergence of a government that
can assert authority throughout the country. We believe that only a
broad-based government with a mandate from all Afghans--both at home and
abroad--can bring the stability that Afghanistan needs. This political
process could include the former king, Zahir Shah, should he so desire.
Afghanistan was the last great battlefield of the Cold War. From 1978
to 1992, more than 1 million Afghans lost their lives in the struggle
against a regime imposed and supported by the Soviet Union.
Countless others were maimed by mines and other accidents of war. At
least 5 million more became refugees in Pakistan and Iran and 2 million
were internally displaced.
The whole world had hoped that the conflict and the suffering would end
with the fall of the regime of President Najibullah. But rivalries
among Afghan factions have fueled continuing warfare, and tens of
thousands more have been killed or wounded since 1992. Fighting
intensified in Kabul and northern Afghanistan this past January as
coalitions aligned with President Rabbani and Prime Minister Hekmatyar
struggled for supreme power. Since then, 23,000 more people have become
casualties, and another wave of refugees and displaced persons has been
generated.
Mr. Chairman, the peace so many Afghans desire has not been achieved, in
spite of their efforts and those of others, including the United States.
Fighting has continued between Afghan factional leaders who do not
appear to have the interests of their country and their people at heart.
Despite the history of our long involvement in Afghanistan, we find
factional leaders remain intransigent and seemingly oblivious to
persuasion or pressure. Our embassy in Kabul has been closed since
1989. Given the ongoing anarchy in the capital, we see no way we can
reopen it in the near future.
Under the circumstances, we believe the best approach is to support
coordinated efforts by the UN and other multilateral organizations to
encourage a political process which leads to a government in Kabul
acceptable to all Afghans. We have also worked bilaterally to this end,
urging all neighbors and other interested states to support peace
efforts. We were instrumental in the creation of the Friends of
Afghanistan--a group of concerned states at the UN. We worked through
the Security Council and the General Assembly for the dispatch of a UN
special mission to help Afghans resolve their differences peacefully.
In March and April this mission, led by former Tunisian Foreign Minister
Mahmoud Mestiri, went to Afghanistan and the region. The mission met
with Afghan leaders inside and outside the country, including former
King Zahir Shah, as well as officials of concerned governments. Mr.
Mestiri is now back in the region and we continue to strongly support
his mission.
Afghan factions clearly receive support from abroad. However, we have
no conclusive evidence demonstrating exactly what they receive and from
which sources. We are working to curb the flow of weapons and materiel
to the factions. We have received assurances from Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, India, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan that they are
not providing weapons or materiel. However, given Afghanistan's porous
borders, assistance from private groups in these and other countries may
well be continuing.
The absence of effective government and limited security in both the
capital and the countryside have made it very difficult to conduct
development programs in Afghanistan. We recently closed our bilateral
assistance program, in part, because of these circumstances. However,
the U.S. continues to provide substantial humanitarian assistance to the
Afghan people through UN agencies and non-governmental organizations.
Their programs support refugees, food-for-work projects, immunizations,
and demining.
Bangladesh
The United States has two primary objectives in Bangladesh: promoting
democracy and respect for human rights, and encouraging continued
economic growth and development.
The election of early 1991 was judged to be the first truly free and
fair election since Bangladesh's independence. Drawing on its clear
mandate, the government of Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia expanded
press freedoms and held both regional and local elections that were free
and fair.
However, there have been setbacks to the democratization process in
1994. Following allegations of vote-rigging in a March parliamentary
by-election, the opposition has boycotted Parliament. It has called for
new elections and demanded that the constitution be amended to provide
for a caretaker government to oversee them. The government has refused
this demand. The opposition leader, Sheikh Hasina, is calling for the
immediate resignation of the government and has threatened to use street
demonstrations to achieve this end. Political violence in the
universities also continues.
Through regular diplomatic contacts, the United States encourages the
government and opposition to engage in a more productive dialogue. This
is essential to resolving the current crisis. Adherence to the laws and
constitution of Bangladesh is vital for the survival and development of
democracy there.
The United States also provides assistance to strengthen democratic
institutions. Many Bangladesh parliamentarians have received USAID- and
USIA-funded training in the United States, and a variety of exchange
programs are designed to broaden the exposure of Bangladesh's academic,
political, labor, and military leaders to the concepts of Western
democracy and human rights. This year we provided about $2.5 million
for these programs.
Compared with its predecessors, the current Bangladesh Government has
improved human rights practices. There is substantial freedom of the
press, the judiciary acts independently of government influence at the
appellate level and above, and the government has held a number of free
and fair elections at the local and national levels as well as
parliamentary by-elections.
However, the government's early response to the controversy over the
Bangladeshi feminist writer, Taslima Nasreen, has raised new questions
about protection of the rights of freedom of speech and religion in
Bangladesh. The U.S. repeatedly urged the Bangladesh Government to
safeguard Ms. Nasreen's right to free speech and to protect her from the
death threats of extremists. We were relieved to learn earlier this
week that she was allowed to leave the country after having been granted
bail on charges of insulting religious beliefs. In addition,
Bangladesh's Special Powers Act, which allows for lengthy detention
without charge, has been used by the government against its political
opponents. The Anti-Terrorism Law, which sets up special tribunals for
a wide range of crimes, also raises concerns due to its vague language,
but thus far it does not appear that it is being abused.
In sum, Mr. Chairman, the democratic institutions of Bangladesh, while
off to a promising start, are facing significant challenges. This is to
be expected as part of the growing pains of a new democracy. Experience
with the democratic system is still limited and institutions often are
fragile. However, the development of an educated and informed
electorate, vital to the democratization process, goes on. The United
States will continue to support the process of democratization through
diplomatic efforts and assistance to strengthen institutions, including
Parliament, the courts, and the press.
On the economic front, the United States continues to encourage and
support the ongoing process of reform and development. Since
Bangladesh's independence in 1971, U.S. assistance has helped Bangladesh
to reduce its population growth rate from 3% to 2.3%. Infant death
rates have gone from 200 per thousand to less than 100 per thousand.
Significant progress has been made in providing electricity and a
fertilizer distribution system to rural areas. A country once called a
basket case is now self-sufficient in rice production.
In spite of the notable success in curbing population growth rates, half
the country's population today is under the age of 15. As a result,
Bangladesh's population is expected to double within the next 30 years,
even with the lowered birth rates. Another sobering statistic is that
it is likely to take 75 years for the population to stabilize. Dramatic
economic growth will be needed to generate sufficient jobs. We are
pleased that increasing numbers of Bangladeshis are accepting a greater
role for the private sector in the economy as the surest way to increase
the rate of economic growth and development. As a result of reforms
already made, inflation is down and foreign currency reserves have
increased. However, much remains to be done.
Nepal
United States policy toward Nepal reflects the Administration's larger
foreign policy agenda. We are committed to:
-- First, promoting democracy and respect for human rights; -- Second,
increasing economic growth and opportunity, including trade and
investment for U.S. goods and services; and -- Third, addressing such
global challenges as population growth and threats to the environment.
Nepal's fledgling democracy is now undergoing a time of testing. Due
largely to splits within the ruling Congress party, the government fell
in mid-July. Prime Minister Koirala now heads a caretaker government,
pending scheduled elections on November 13. Although democracy was
restored in Nepal only four years ago, the Nepalis appreciate fully the
significance of this test to their democratic institutions. All parties
seem committed to participating in the election process and operating
within the framework of the constitution.
The leftist opposition has organized some protests and strikes and more
are planned this month. Such protests may well continue until the
elections in November. So far, these protests have remained largely
non-violent, with restraint shown by both demonstrators and police.
Ambassador Vogelgesang has met with leaders of all the major parties
and factions, underscoring the need for continued commitment to the
democratic process and urging all parties to forego violence. We are
reminding all concerned that Nepalis should not let violence on the
streets define their democratic destiny.
While recent developments are cause for some concern, we believe that
there is strong Nepalese commitment to preserving democracy. The major
issues are now predictable ones for this stage in democracy: how can
government meet the high expectations of the citizenry, and how can
party politicians shift gears from lives often spent in exile or jail to
the nitty-gritty of compromise in a parliamentary system?
Another issue is whether Nepal can hold free and fair elections. Based
on the record of their first national and local elections, the prospects
look good. To that end, senior government officials have indicated they
would welcome international observers.
Regarding economic growth and opportunity, Nepal has made remarkable
progress. The year 1994 has been the best year in a decade for the
Nepalese economy, with 7.8% real economic growth. Agricultural
production increased by 7.7%, led by record food, cash crop, and fruit
and vegetable harvests. Growth has been broad-based, with strong
performances in cottage industries, construction, transport, and
financial services. Inflation remains at a single-digit level.
The Government of Nepal, assisted by an active USAID program and strong
cooperation between the Nepalese and the donor community, has undertaken
an ambitious liberalization program. This program should further
enhance economic prospects in Nepal, including U.S. exports. Although
much more needs to be done, we are pleased by progress in liberalizing
foreign exchange and banking regulations, tax reform, and privatization
of public enterprises. The U.S. ambassador chairs quarterly meetings of
a newly formed American Business Forum, to facilitate investment and
trade for U.S. companies--especially in such promising areas as
hydropower, tourism, and the aviation sector.
Hydropower is Nepal's most significant natural resource. The Nepalese
have yet to tap even 1% of that potential for clean energy, despite the
fact that only 10% of Nepal's people have access to electric power and
the fact that power shortages place increasingly critical constraints on
the nation's growth. We are encouraging the Nepalese to pursue a
diversified energy strategy, with private-public partnerships exploring
opportunities for micro, medium, and large energy projects for use in
Nepal and the broader South Asian market.
Although Nepal remains one of the world's poorest nations, it is
important to keep in perspective the gains that have been made since the
country opened to the world in 1951. We are proud to have worked with
the people of Nepal, primarily through the programs of USAID and the
Peace Corps, to achieve, inter alia, a 56% drop in infant mortality, a
37% increase in literacy, and an 80% increase in agricultural
productivity.
In the area of global challenges, we continue to support Nepal. All
parts of the U.S. mission accord priority attention to environmental
challenges--from serious air and water pollution in Kathmandu to
deforestation throughout the nation. Much of the USAID program focuses
on such issues as family planning and the growing threat of the AIDS
epidemic in South Asia. We maintain active collaboration with the royal
Nepalese army, which has made an extraordinary contribution to United
Nations peace-keeping since the 1970s. The United States, and indeed
the entire international community--greatly appreciate and respect
Nepal's courageous commitment on behalf of global peace-keeping.
Sri Lanka
The primary concerns of the United States in Sri Lanka are promoting a
peaceful solution to the civil conflict, improving the human rights
situation, and expanding our economic relationship.
Sri Lanka has been a functioning democracy since independence in 1947.
However, the democratic process has been tested continually by the
ongoing civil war. Sri Lanka recently passed a very difficult test
following the tragic assassinations last year of the President and one
of the main opposition leaders. Parliament quickly elected a new
president, and democratic governance continued without interruption.
Just a few weeks later, the country held nation-wide provincial council
elections without serious incident.
In a few days, the country will hold parliamentary elections, and, by
the end of the year, Sri Lankans will elect a new president. By all
accounts the democratic process is thriving--a vigorous election
campaign is underway. We are, however, concerned that some random acts
of violence have marred this election period. The Sri Lankan Government
has requested election observers, including several Americans, for the
August polling and is likely to do so again for the presidential poll.
We look forward to working with whoever wins the elections as they
tackle Sri Lanka's problems.
Tamil grievances date back to at least the mid-1950s and concern
discrimination over language and job quotas, among other issues. In the
conflict with Tamil separatists, there is a stalemate after more than 10
years of fighting in the north and east. Government forces do not have
the strength to wrest control of the Jaffna Peninsula in the north from
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam. The LTTE, in turn, lacks the
capability to loosen the government's grip on the eastern coast.
Efforts to advance a political solution are also stalemated. The LTTE's
core demand remains the establishment of a separate state in northeast
Sri Lanka. The group continues to engage in terrorism as well as
conventional military activity in pursuit of that goal. With upcoming
elections, the government is reluctant to risk peace initiatives. When
a new government is in place, we will continue our ongoing efforts to
urge all sides to explore a political settlement.
We believe that the key to settling the conflict peacefully is only by
devising ways to devolve power. Local-body elections held in the east
in March were the first step toward meaningful devolution of power in
that troubled area. We hope that, through mutual confidence-building
measures, the government and the LTTE could come to trust each other
enough to have productive discussions. We have long held that the
conflict can be resolved only when all the relevant parties--not just
the government and the LTTE--come to the table. This includes other
Tamil groups, opposition parties, and representatives of the Muslims.
We think that this is achievable through the democratic process and are
pleased to see it thriving in Sri Lanka.
Much preparatory work needs to be done before meaningful negotiations
can take place. Until this work has gotten well under way, the
possibility of mediation by the U.S. or any other outsider is severely
limited. We are doing what we can to encourage establishment of the
necessary conditions for such talks. This has included exposing both
sides to concepts and techniques of conflict resolution; pressing both
parties to initiate a meaningful, good- faith dialogue on confidence-
building measures; and supporting election efforts and encouraging
strong elected provincial and local bodies.
We are working to ensure that the government keeps up the momentum on
human rights reforms, and also urging that the LTTE stop using violence
against innocent civilians to further its goals. The human rights
situation has improved in Sri Lanka since the end of the appallingly
violent conflict from 1988 to 1990 between the government and the JVP--a
Sinhalese Maoist organization--although the ongoing conflict with the
LTTE has also involved abuses on both sides.
Reported disappearances have dropped from thousands between 1987 and
1991 to 200 in 1992 and roughly 70 in the first nine months of 1993.
However, in spite of the real progress, some practices--such as the use
of torture--continue, and there is inadequate prosecution and punishment
of human rights violators. We have had a frank and productive dialogue
with the Sri Lankan Government on these issues.
The Sri Lankan economy is enjoying a 6% growth rate, despite the
continued drain of the war. We wish to see Sri Lanka continue its
progress on economic reform and we look for increased opportunities for
U.S. trade and investment. A number of U.S. companies have bid on
infrastructure development projects. Our embassy sponsored an American
trade fair last year as well as other trade promotion events. In the
past few years, we have signed a bilateral investment treaty, an
intellectual property rights agreement, and have established a U.S.
chamber of commerce. Both major political parties have declared support
for economic reform.
ARTICLE 6:
Treaty Actions
Multilateral
Finance
Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, formulated at the Bretton Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944.
Opened for signature at Washington Dec. 27, 1945; entered into force
Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1502; 60 Stat. 1440.
Acceptance: Eritrea, July 6, 1994.
Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund, formulated at
the Bretton Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944. Opened for signature at
Washington Dec. 27, 1945; entered into force Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1501;
60 Stat. 1401.
Acceptance: Eritrea, July 6, 1994.
Labor
Instrument for the amendment of the constitution of the International
Labor Organization. Done at Montreal Oct. 9, 1946. Entered into force
Apr. 20, 1948. TIAS 1868; 62 Stat. 3485.
Acceptance: South Africa, May 26, 1994.
Patents International convention for the protection of new varieties of
plants of Dec. 2, 1961, as revised. Done at Geneva Oct. 23, 1978.
Entered into force Nov. 8, 1981. TIAS 10199; 33 UST 2703.
Accession: Austria, June 14, 1994.
Racial Discrimination International convention on the elimination of all
forms of racial discrimination. Done at New York Dec. 21, 1965.
Entered into force Jan. 4, 19691. Senate advice and consent to
ratification: June 24, 19942.
World Heritage Convention concerning the protection of the world
cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered
into force Dec. 17, 1975. TIAS 8226; 27 UST 37.
Acceptance: Burma, Apr. 29, 1994.
Bilateral
Croatia
Agreement concerning economic, technical, and related assistance.
Signed at Zagreb May 6, 1994. Entered into force provisionally, May 6,
1994; definitively, on the first day of the first month after Parties
exchange notes confirming that they have completed their respective
internal requirements.
France
Agreement for the continuous processing of composite propellants, with
annexes. Signed at Paris and Washington Apr. 5 and May 16, 1994.
Entered into force May 16, 1994.
Germany
Agreement amending and extending the memorandum of understanding of Apr.
14, 1989, for cooperative projects of research and development in the
field of high energy laser technology. Signed at Washington and Bonn
Apr. 7 and May 26, 1994. Entered into force May 26, 1994.
Kenya
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts
owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and
its agency, with annexes. Signed at Nairobi July 1, 1994. Enters into
force following signature and receipt by Kenya of written notice from
the U.S. that all necessary domestic legal requirements have been
fulfilled.
Norway
Agreement for cooperation on environmental protection in defense
matters. Signed at Baltimore May 19, 1994. Entered into force May 19,
1994. Russian Federation Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in
geoscience, with annexes. Signed at Washington June 23, 1994. Entered
into force June 23, 1994.
Memorandum of understanding on basic scientific research cooperation,
with annexes. Signed at Washington June 23, 1994. Entered into force
June 23, 1994.
Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in transportation, science,
and technology, with annex. Signed at Washington June 23, 1994.
Entered into force June 23, 1994.
Saudi Arabia
Agreement extending the technical cooperation agreement of Feb. 13,
1975, as amended and extended. Signed at Washington Apr. 27, 1994.
Entered into force Apr. 27, 1994; effective Feb. 13, 1995.
Spain
Agreement on scientific and technological cooperation, with annex.
Signed at Madrid June 10, 1994. Entered into force provisionally June
10, 1994; definitively, upon an exchange of notes in which the parties
have notified each other that they have completed their internal
processes.
Ukraine
Memorandum of understanding on scientific and technical cooperation in
the fields of standards and metrology. Signed at Gaithersburg and Kiev
May 20 and 28, 1994. Entered into force May 28, 1994.
_______________
1 Not in force for the U.S.
2 With reservations, understanding, declaration, and a proviso.
(###)
[END OF DISPATCH VOLUME 5, NUMBER 35]
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