The State Department does not guarantee the
authenticity of documents on the Internet.  If for legal
or other reasons you require the original version of a
document in hard copy, please contact the Office of
Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs.
     Note that State Department information is not
copyrighted unless indicated and can be reproduced
without consent.  Citation of source is appreciated.
Permission to reproduce any copyrighted material
(including photos or graphics) must be obtained from the
original source.
VOLUME 5, NUMBER 33, AUGUST 15, 1994
1.  Foreign Ministers Contact Group Meeting on Bosnia-
Herzegovina -- Secretary Christopher, Communique
2.  Shared Resolve in Restoring Democracy in Haiti --
Madeleine K. Albright, UNSC Resolution
3.  Progress on Denuclearization in Ukraine -- Lynn E.
4.  U.S. Efforts To Combat International Terrorism --
Barbara A. Bodine
5.  What's in Print:  Foreign Relations of the United
Foreign Ministers Contact Group Meeting on Bosnia-
Secretary Christopher, Communique
Secretary Christopher
Opening remarks at a press conference, Geneva,
Switzerland, July 30, 1994.
We have just concluded a meeting to take action regarding
the conflict in Bosnia.  To begin, we reaffirmed our
unity of purpose in pressing for a negotiated settlement,
and we carried forward the step-by-step approach that we
have undertaken in prior meetings.  We made it clear that
the settlement must preserve Bosnia-Herzegovina as a
single union within internationally recognized borders.
In regard to our prior action, we welcomed the response
of the Bosnia Federation, which accepted the proposals of
the Contact Ministers and the Contact Group
unconditionally.  We concluded that the Bosnian Serb
response was tantamount to a rejection, and, against that
background, we reaffirmed to show our determination to
act together to carry out the agreements that we had
previously reached.
In light of the Serb rejection, we moved forward with the
implementation of the consequences we had defined at the
July 5 meeting.
First, we agreed that we would put forward to the
Security Council a new resolution that would extend
sanctions against Serbia and tighten the enforcement of
the existing sanctions.  We will put forward a resolution
at the UN within a week that would tighten sanctions and
extend the enforcement of the sanctions.  This is in
furtherance of the agreement we reached on July 5 as to
the first of the stated consequences.
Second, we also agreed that we would take steps to
strengthen the protection of the safe areas, and we would
go forward with a finalization of plans to permit
extension of the safe areas and strict enforcement of the
safe areas.  The planning will involve the essential step
of appropriate means to safeguard the safety and security
of the UNPROFOR troops as we move forward with this
process of stricter enforcement and extension of the safe
zones.  This is the second of the consequences we agreed
to on July 5.
We intend to move quickly on them as well, and we have
directed that the planning for that be done promptly--no
later than during the month of August.  We, I think,
recognize the need to move forward with this program, and
we expressed our common understanding that, if the
Bosnian Serbs continue to reject the proposed plan, a
decision in the Security Council to lift the arms embargo
may become unavoidable.  We agreed also to instruct the
Contact Group to work further with the front-line states
on sanctions enforcement.
Finally, if I could add a personal word for the United
States:  I stressed that, if this phased approach to the
increased pressure on the Serbs was not successful, the
United States would be under very strong, irresistible
pressure to lift the arms embargo, as we have said at
prior meetings.  We are not prepared to see this process
strung out indefinitely.  While, of course, a negotiated
settlement remains our firmest resolve, we cannot let the
current situation continue, a situation in which the
victim is penalized unfairly by the arms embargo and
denied the right to defend itself.
This is certainly not an easy course to take, but we
believe we will have no other choice if we are going to
achieve our common goal of bringing a durable peace to
Bosnia.  To sum the matter up, we have today taken action
to implement two of the consequences that were agreed on
at the July 5 meeting--a tightening and extending of the
sanctions against Serbia, and a stricter enforcement and
extension of the safe areas.  We have reiterated the fact
that, if the Serbs do not--the Bosnian Serbs do not
accept the plan--the lifting of the arms embargo may
become unavoidable or irresistible.
Text of the Communique of the Meeting of Foreign
Ministers in Geneva, 30 July, 1994.
The Foreign Ministers of Germany, Greece, and France and
the European Union Commissions for External Affairs
(representing the Troika of the European Union), the
Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, the Foreign
Secretary of the United Kingdom, and the U.S. Secretary
of State, together with the Co-Chairmen of the
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, met in
Geneva on 30 July.
In evaluating the responses of the Bosnian parties to the
territorial proposal presented to them on 6 July by the
Contact Group, the Ministers underscored their firm
belief that the principles for a settlement set forth in
their communique of 13 May and the territorial proposal
reviewed by the Ministers at their 5 July meeting in
Geneva offer a reasonable and realistic basis for a
In this regard, the Ministers reaffirmed the importance
of achieving a settlement that preserves Bosnia and
Herzegovina as a union within its internationally
recognized borders, while providing for constitutional
arrangements that establish the relationship between the
Bosniac-Croat and Bosnian Serb entities.  They also
expressed their firm view that the settlement should
provide for refugees and displaced persons to have the
possibility to return freely to their homes of origin.
The Ministers welcomed the Bosniac-Croat delegation's
acceptance of the Contact Group proposal and urged the
Bosnia government to maintain its commitment to this
proposal and to a negotiated settlement to the conflict
in Bosnia.
The Ministers expressed their profound regret that the
Bosnian Serb delegation did not accept the Contact Group
proposal.  They called on the Bosnian Serb leadership to
urgently reconsider their response and to provide a clear
acceptance of the Contact Group proposal.
The Ministers emphasized that acceptance of the Contact
Group proposal is the essential first step for achieving
an equitable and balanced overall settlement covering all
relevant issues, and that they are determined to use
incentives and disincentives as agreed on 5 July to this
end.  In this regard, the Ministers reaffirmed that
acceptance of the Contact Group proposal will bring
important benefits for all parties.
Against this background, the Ministers:
1)  Agreed that proposals will be put to the Security
Council to extend sanctions against the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and tighten
enforcement of the existing sanctions regime.  They
agreed that a draft resolution to this effect should be
submitted to the Security Council as soon as possible for
early adoption.
2)  Decided that, simultaneously, as agreed 5 July, a
draft resolution concerning suspension of sanctions will
be prepared, to be submitted to the Security Council
immediately upon acceptance by the Bosnian Serbs of the
Contact Group map.
3)  Underlined the need for vigorous action to prevent
sanctions violations across borders, and agreed that
international cooperation with the neighboring states
should be developed to promote strict enforcement of the
sanctions regime.
4)  Called on all parties to respect the cease-fire,
demanded an immediate end to attacks and provocations
against UN personnel and the UN airlift operation,
condemned in strongest terms the taking of UN personnel
as hostages, and insisted that freedom of movement for
UNPROFOR be respected.
5)  Warned against any renewed effort to effect the
strangulation of Sarajevo.
6)  Expressed their commitment to strengthen the regime
of safe areas and requested finalization of planning to
permit strict enforcement and extension of exclusion
zones, including at each stage appropriate provision for
the safety of UNPROFOR troops.
The Ministers reiterated that in the event of continuing
rejection of the Contact Group proposal, as a last resort
a decision in the Security Council to lift the arms
embargo could become unavoidable.  They also agreed that
this would have consequences for the presence of
Noting the wider situation in the former Yugoslavia and
the importance of addressing the fundamental causes of
instability in the region, the Ministers urged mutual
recognition between all states of the former Yugoslavia.
They support the immediate resumption of talks between
the Croatian government and local Serb authorities in the
United Nations Protected Areas.
The Ministers will monitor the situation closely and
agreed to continue their common efforts to achieve a
political settlement and, meanwhile, to prevent the
conflict from spreading. (###)
Shared Resolve in Restoring Democracy in Haiti
Madeleine K. Albright, UNSC Resolution
Madeleine K. Albright
Statement by the U.S. Permanent Representative to the
United Nations before the UN Security Council, New York
City, July 31, 1994.
Mr. President, this historic resolution authorizes member
states to use all necessary means to restore legitimate,
constitutional authority to Haiti.  In so doing, it
brings to a climax this Council's effort to restore
democracy to the Haitian people, from whom it was stolen
34 long months ago.  The resolution builds on earlier
actions designed to relieve suffering in Haiti and
promote the rule of law.
This Council has pursued patiently a peaceful and just
end to the Haitian crisis.  The Organization of American
States has pursued a parallel effort.  Member states,
including my own, have taken steps independently to
encourage the illegitimate leaders to leave.  Together,
we--the international community--have tried condemnation,
persuasion, isolation, and negotiation.  At Governors
Island, we helped broker an agreement that the military's
leader signed but refused to implement.  We have imposed
sanctions, suspended them, reimposed them, and
strengthened them.  We have provided every opportunity
for the de facto leaders in Haiti to meet their
But patience is an exhaustible commodity.  The
democratically elected Government of Haiti was overthrown
almost three years ago.  The vast majority of the Haitian
people have suffered cruelly under the illegal regime.
The usurpers now wielding power have brazenly murdered
political opponents, they have sown terror among the
poor, they have gone back on their word, they have
created a puppet show and called it a government, they
have expelled monitors sent by the UN and OAS to observe
human rights, and they have shunned the path of
reconciliation based on law.
The status quo in Haiti is neither tenable nor
acceptable.  Choices must be made.  And although the
situation in Haiti is complex, the choice is as simple as
the choice between right and wrong.  Today, the Council
has made the right choice--in favor of democracy, law,
dignity, and relief from suffering long endured and never
deserved.  The Council's message to General Cedras,
General Biamby, and Colonel Francois is a simple one:
You, too, have a choice.  You can depart voluntarily and
soon, or you can depart involuntarily and soon.  The sun
is setting on your ruthless ambition.  On the near
horizon, the light of a new dawn for Haiti can already be
There are those who argue that democracy is not possible
in Haiti and that the majority of the people there should
accept repression and grinding poverty as their fate.
These gloomy counselors urge us not to act, knowing that
if we accept their advice, we also will confirm their
prophecies.  For if we sit on the sidelines, we can be
certain that in Haiti the terror, the desperation, the
flight, the instability, the criminality, and the
injustice will go on and on.
My government has a more positive view.  We do not
underestimate Haiti's economic and social difficulties,
but we are not about to write off a whole society,
especially one so close to our shores.  Our generation
has seen freedom shatter the limits of past possibility
from Eastern Europe to Southeast Asia to Central America
to South Africa.  We know that free elections are
possible in Haiti, because the current president is a
product of one.  We know that Haitian freedom has heroes
and martyrs from Toussaint and Malary to the many
hundreds this year who have perished or been tortured or
raped simply for exercising basic rights.
We know that Haiti's culture is rich, its pride great,
its people imbued with energy and courage.  When the
military leaders have gone and the burden of sanctions
has been lifted, a new beginning will be made.  The
climate for political reconciliation will improve.  The
military will be trained to serve the people, not abuse
them.  We and others will provide a large influx of
economic and technical aid.  Old debts will be cleared.
New public and private investments will create jobs.  As
time passes, Haitians will once again be able to put food
on the table for their children and families.
Let us be clear.  Our purpose is not to impinge upon the
sovereignty of Haiti but to restore the power to exercise
that sovereignty to those who rightfully possess it.  Our
purpose is to enable Haiti, in the words of the UN
Charter, to pursue "social progress and better standards
of life in larger freedom."  Our choice is to allow Haiti
to build a future more free, more secure, and more
prosperous than its past.
The resolution we are adopting today authorizes a two-
phased approach.  In the first phase, a multinational
force, acting under Chapter 7 of the Charter, is
empowered to restore legitimate authority to Haiti.  The
United States is prepared to organize and lead such a
force.  We seek--and anticipate--that others will join.
We will begin to professionalize the police and military
and will perform tasks described in paragraphs 9 (a) and
(b) of the Secretary General's July 15 report.  We will
establish a stable and secure environment within which
democratic officials and institutions can operate.  We
hope that the current military leaders in Haiti will
depart voluntarily and that the multinational force will
not be opposed.  But this resolution authorizes action
whether or not our hopes are realized.
In the second phase, the UN Mission to Haiti will assume
the full range of its functions.  It will continue
professionalizing the Haitian armed forces and help build
a new, civilian police.  It will assume responsibility
for assisting the government in assuring basic public
order.  It will assist in establishing an environment
conducive to free and fair elections.  And it will strive
to complete its assigned tasks no later than February
The timing of the transition from phase one to phase two
will be determined by the Security Council after
appropriate consultation and after a stable and secure
environment has been established and the means for
fulfilling the UN mission are at hand.  The United States
is prepared to participate in the UN mission, and we are
encouraged by the willingness of others to participate as
The resolution before us meshes well with our policy--and
that of the Council--of subjecting proposed new peace
operations to rigorous review.  Phase one builds on the
precedents of Kuwait and Rwanda.  Phase two establishes a
UN mission of modest size, with a clear and achievable
mandate, operating in a relatively secure environment,
with the consent of the government, for a finite period
of time.
Mr. President, the development of this resolution
reflects an interest in and concern about events in Haiti
that extend throughout the hemisphere and beyond.  The
friends of Haiti--Canada, France, Venezuela, Argentina,
and the United States--have worked closely with the
Secretary General and his special representative.  All
members of this Council have contributed.  All may be
characterized, in this sense, as "friends of Haiti."
Together, we have devised a resolution that does honor to
this great institution and which is fully consistent with
the views expressed by the Organization of American
States.  My government urges all governments to
contribute appropriately to the prompt and successful
implementation of this resolution.
Let us now go forward with one voice and shared resolve.
The need is great, the cause is just, the ability to make
a difference is real, the moment of decision is at hand.
Thank you very much.
Resolution 940
(July 31, 1994)
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolutions 841 (1993) of 16 June 1993,
861 (1993) of 27 August 1993, 862 (1993) of 31 August
1993, 867 (1993) of 23 September 1993, 873 (1993) of 13
October 1993, 875 (1993) of 16 October 1993, 905 (1994)
of 23 March 1994, 917 (1994) of 6 May 1994 and 933 (1994)
of 30 June 1994,
Recalling the terms of the Governors Island Agreement
(S/26063) and the related Pact of New York  (S/26297),
Condemning the continuing disregard of those agreements
by the illegal de facto regime, and the regime's refusal
to cooperate with efforts by the United Nations and the
Organization of American States (OAS) to bring about
their implementation,
Gravely concerned by the significant further
deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Haiti, in
particular the continuing escalation by the illegal de
facto regime of systematic violations of civil liberties,
the desperate plight of Haitian refugees and the recent
expulsion of the staff of the International Civilian
Mission (MICIVIH), which was condemned in its
Presidential statement of 12 July 1994 (S/PRST/1994/32),
Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General of
15 July 1994 (S/1994/828 and Add.1) and 26 July 1994
Taking note of the letter dated 29 July 1994 from the
legitimately elected President of Haiti (S/1994/905,
annex) and the letter dated 30 July 1994 from the
Permanent Representative of Haiti to the United Nations
Reiterating its commitment for the international
community to assist and support the economic, social and
institutional development of Haiti,
Reaffirming that the goal of the international community
remains the restoration of democracy in Haiti and the
prompt return of the legitimately elected President,
Jean-Bertrand Aristide, within the framework of the
Governors Island Agreement,
Recalling that in resolution 873 (1993) the Council
confirmed its readiness to consider the imposition of
additional measures if the military authorities in Haiti
continued to impede the activities of the United Nations
Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) or failed to comply in full with
its relevant resolutions and the provisions of the
Governors Island Agreement,
Determining that the situation in Haiti continues to
constitute a threat to peace and security in the region,
1.  Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of 15
July 1994 (S/1994/828) and takes note of his support for
action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations in order to assist the legitimate Government of
Haiti in the maintenance of public order;
2.  Recognizes the unique character of the present
situation in Haiti and its deteriorating, complex and
extraordinary nature, requiring an exceptional response;
3.  Determines that the illegal de facto regime in Haiti
has failed to comply with the Governors Island Agreement
and is in breach of its obligations under the relevant
resolutions of the Security Council;
4.  Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations, authorizes Member States to form a multinational
force under unified command and control and, in this
framework, to use all necessary means to facilitate the
departure from Haiti of the military leadership,
consistent with the Governors Island Agreement, the
prompt return of the legitimately elected President and
the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the
Government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a
secure and stable environment that will permit
implementation of the Governors Island Agreement, on the
understanding that the cost of implementing this
temporary operation will be borne by the participating
Member States;
5.  Approves the establishment, upon adoption of this
resolution, of an advance team of UNMIH of not more than
sixty personnel, including a group of observers, to
establish the appropriate means of coordination with the
multinational force, to carry out the monitoring of the
operations of the multinational force and other functions
described in paragraph 23 of the report of the Secretary-
General of 15 July 1994 (S/1994/828), and to assess
requirements and to prepare for the deployment of UNMIH
upon completion of the mission of the multinational
6.  Requests the Secretary-General to report on the
activities of the team within thirty days of the date of
deployment of the multinational force;
7.  Decides that the tasks of the advance team as defined
in paragraph 5 above will expire on the date of
termination of the mission of the multi- national force;
8.  Decides that the multinational force will terminate
its mission and UNMIH will assume the full range of its
functions described in paragraph 9 below when a secure
and stable environment has been established and UNMIH has
adequate force capability and structure to assume the
full range of its functions; the determination will be
made by the Security Council, taking into account
recommendations from the Member States of the
multinational force, which are based on the assessment of
the commander of the multi- national force, and from the
9.  Decides to revise and extend the mandate of the
United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) for a period of
six months to assist the democratic Government of Haiti
in fulfilling its responsibilities in connection with:
(a)  sustaining the secure and stable environment
established during the multinational phase and protecting
international personnel and key installations; and
(b)  the professionalization of the Haitian armed forces
and the creation of a separate police force;
10.  Requests also that UNMIH assist the legitimate
constitutional authorities of Haiti in establishing an
environment conducive to the organization of free and
fair legislative elections to be called by those
authorities and, when requested by them, monitored by the
United Nations, in cooperation with the Organization of
American States (OAS);
11.  Decides to increase the troop level of UNMIH to
6,000 and establishes the objective of completing UNMIH's
mission, in cooperation with the constitutional
Government of Haiti, not later than February 1996;
12.  Invites all States, in particular those in the
region, to provide appropriate support for the actions
undertaken by the United Nations and by Member States
pursuant to this and other relevant Security Council
13.  Requests the Member States acting in accordance with
paragraph 4 above to report to the Council at regular
intervals, the first such report to be made not later
than seven days following the deployment of the
multinational force;
14.  Requests the Secretary-General to report on the
implementation of this resolution at sixty-day intervals
starting from the date of deployment of the multinational
15.  Demands strict respect for the persons and premises
of the United Nations, the Organization of American
States, other international and humanitarian
organizations and diplomatic missions in Haiti, and that
no acts of intimidation or violence be directed against
personnel engaged in humanitarian or peace-keeping work;
16.  Emphasizes the necessity that, inter alia:
(a) All appropriate steps be taken to ensure the security
and safety of the operations and personnel engaged in
such operations; and
(b) The security and safety arrangements undertaken
extend to all persons engaged in the operations;
17.  Affirms that the Council will review the measures
imposed pursuant to resolutions 841 (1993), 873 (1993)
and 917 (1994), with a view to lifting them in their
entirety, immediately following the return to Haiti of
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide;
18.  Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
VOTE:  12-0-2 (Brazil and China abstaining).  (###)
Progress on Denuclearization in Ukraine
Lynn E. Davis, Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security Affairs
Opening remarks at a State Department press briefing,
Washington DC, August 3, 1994
I think most of you know that Vice President Gore stopped
over in Kiev yesterday and sought to begin to build a
relationship with the new leaders of Ukraine and, at the
end of that visit yesterday, announced that President
Kuchma will be coming to the United States at the end of
November to visit the President and all of us.
So it was an important step to once again show our
determination to help Ukraine make the transition to a
market economy as well as to carry out the full range of
non-proliferation goals, which I'd like to bring you up
to date on.  So let me just begin by saying that we are
very pleased that President Kuchma has stated that
Ukraine will honor its international commitments,
including the Trilateral Statement in which Ukraine
agreed to transfer all nuclear weapons on its territory
to Russia for dismantling.
As of today, about 300 warheads already have been
transferred from Ukraine to Russia for dismantling--we
already have passed the goal of 200 warheads by November
which was established in the Trilateral Statement, and
more than half of the SS-24 ICBMs located on the
territory of Ukraine have been deactivated.  In the
Trilateral Statement, Russia agreed to provide reactor
fuel to Ukraine as compensation for the value of the
highly enriched uranium, and two shipments have already
been delivered by Russia to Ukraine.
For our part, the United States has provided $60 million
as an advance payment on the U.S.-Russia highly enriched
uranium contract to help finance these initial deliveries
of reactor fuel to Ukraine.  This advance payment on the
part of the United States will be repaid through
deliveries of low-enriched uranium to the U.S. under that
HEU contract.
In addition, the U.S. has committed $350 million in Nunn-
Lugar assistance for dismantling strategic forces and
other non-proliferation related projects.  We also are
pursuing a broader international effort involving 13
other countries, all of which have announced their
intention to provide Ukraine with dismantlement and
related non-proliferation assistance.
I think, as you know--and it's been reported in the
press--that we face some difficulties in getting the
Nunn-Lugar assistance up and running.  We have outlined
our goals and obligations for these projects.  We are
taking steps to fix the problems, and we will be sending
a team out to Kiev next week in order to get on with the
promises made in terms of this assistance.
Another important part of our efforts with respect to
Ukraine is assistance to facilitate the closure of the
Chernobyl nuclear power station.  The G-7 countries in
Naples committed $200 million in grants to Ukraine to
launch a program to address both nuclear safety and
energy supplies into the next century.  The G-7 team will
present our plan to the Ukrainians in early September.
We also are working with Ukraine on the overall non-
proliferation agenda of the Clinton Administration.  The
next key step is for Ukraine to accede to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty.  Once that happens, we can bring
into force the START I Treaty, and their accession will
also open the way for Ukraine to participate in all the
other non-proliferation regimes in which they have begun
to become interested, carrying out the steps necessary to
become partners.
In May, we were able to sign a Memorandum of
Understanding with Ukraine by which they committed to
respect the guidelines of the MTCR.  This opens the way
for space cooperation between the United States and
Ukraine.  We also look to Ukraine, once it has joined the
NPT, to become a partner in the regime that succeeds
So looking back to January, when Russia, Ukraine, and the
United States agreed to the steps to remove nuclear
weapons from Ukraine and to provide compensation to
Ukraine for those nuclear weapons, we launched a process
to achieve this very important non-proliferation goal.
Since January, we've made significant progress toward
that goal--in implementing the Trilateral Statement--and
we're counting on the new Ukrainian administration to
take the next important step and that is to adhere to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty.  We hope that that important
step will be taken in the coming months leading up to the
time in which President Kuchma will visit the United
States.  That's a fairly quick rendition of where we are
and where we wish to be.  (###)
U.S. Efforts to Combat International Terrorism
Barbara Bodine, Coordinator for Counterterrorism
Statement before the Subcommittee on International
Security, International Organization, and Human Rights of
the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC,
August 1, 1994
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee:  Thank you for
inviting the State Department to testify this morning.
We deeply appreciate your continuing interest--as
demonstrated through this hearing--in U.S. Government
efforts to counter the threat posed by international
Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this opportunity to
extend on behalf of the Secretary of State and the entire
Department our deepest sympathies to all the victims of
the recent terrorist attacks in Buenos Aires, London, and
Panama, as well as the attacks, albeit unrelated, in
Madrid and Northern Ireland last Friday.
It is particularly tragic and ironic that the attacks in
Buenos Aires, Panama, and London occurred just as
prospects for peace in the Middle East are brighter than
they have ever been this century.  Let me assure you that
the forces opposed to a comprehensive peace in the Middle
East will not meet their objective by attacks on
civilians literally thousands of miles away.  In this
regard, we are deeply heartened by the recent massive
demonstration by 150,000 Argentines that took place in
Buenos Aires to repudiate the bombing and to express
solidarity with the families of the victims.
Mr. Chairman, just a few days ago, you held hearings to
examine again the response of the U.S. Government to the
Pan Am 103 bombing; in many respects, what happened at
the Argentine Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) is a
tragic parallel to that terrible night over Lockerbie.
Just as Pan Am 103 demonstrated the callousness and
savagery of international terrorism, so too did AMIA.
More importantly, the Pan Am 103 bombing--and similar
acts of terrorism in the 1980s--invigorated many states
to combat terrorism through the application of the rule
of law and by bringing pressure to bear on those few
states that support terrorism.  I trust that the AMIA
bombing--and the incidents that have followed it--will
produce the same consequences for those who undertake
such attacks and those governments that help make such
attacks happen.
As you requested, I would like to explain what the U.S.
Government has done in the aftermath of both the AMIA
bombing and a similar attack in 1992 on the Israeli
embassy in Buenos Aires to assist the Government of
Argentina in its efforts to investigate and to bring to
justice those responsible for this outrage and to deter
future acts of terrorism.
In 1992, and again after the AMIA bombing, the U.S. sent
investigative and forensic personnel to Buenos Aires to
provide on-the-scene assistance to their Argentine
colleagues.  The most recent team included
representatives of the State Department's Bureau of
Diplomatic Security, the FBI, and the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms.  Included on that team, in view of
his special expertise, was one of the key bomb-site
technicians from the World Trade Center investigation.
That team has now completed its crime scene work and has
returned to the U.S.  As requested by Argentina, evidence
collected by the team will be analyzed in FBI and ATF
laboratories.  An Argentine forensic specialist came back
with the team to participate in these forensic studies.
A central element in the effective international effort
to prevent and to counter terrorism or to bring to
justice those responsible for such attacks is the
effective exchange of intelligence.  I wish to assure you
that the U.S. intelligence community is cooperating
closely and effectively with other services as part of
the international effort to identify those responsible
for this recent outrage.
To help prevent such terrorist horrors, the United States
also has  provided extensive training to Argentina
through the Anti-terrorism Training Assistance Program
between 1992 and now.  Among the courses offered have
been Post-Blast Investigation, Explosive Incident
Counter- measures, and a terrorist interdiction seminar.
Many other courses also have been offered or are
scheduled, Mr. Chairman, and I would ask that the list I
have prepared be made part of the committee's record.
The United States has also been deeply concerned over the
development in Latin America of a Hezbollah presence.
Just this spring, we approached governments throughout
the region expressing our concern over the growing
Hezbollah presence.  Unfortunately, the responses to date
have proven inadequate. We will, of course, be
undertaking additional initiatives concerning this issue,
as Secretary Christopher discussed last Thursday.
Mr. Chairman, you also asked me to address the issue of
what group or groups might have undertaken this attack.
Let me begin by reviewing what we know about the 1992
attack on the Israeli embassy.  That attack was clearly
the work of Hezbollah, the terrorist group created by
Iran and which has undertaken some of the world's most
repulsive acts of terrorism, particularly hostage-taking
and murder in Lebanon during the 1980s.  Hezbollah
publicly claimed responsibility for bombing the embassy
and, when this claim was questioned by the Lebanese
Government, the group released a video of the embassy
taken during a surveillance operation in order to
authenticate its claim.
The investigation into this most recent bombing
continues, and we have not yet determined which group or
groups were responsible for this attack.  What we can
say, however, is that this bombing demonstrates both the
unfortunate global reach of terrorists and their
willingness to attack "soft" targets, chosen only because
of their symbolic value.  While Hezbollah has denied that
it bombed AMIA, this bombing certainly has the hallmarks
of a Hezbollah operation, and a statement about the
attack has been made by a group using the name Ansar
al'Allah;  this appears to be an offshoot of Hezbollah.
Mr. Chairman, while this hearing has been called to
address the recent AMIA incident, it is also important
that I discuss briefly the apparent bombing of a commuter
plane outside of Colon, Panama.  This apparent act of
aviation sabotage killed 21 people, including three
Americans.  It is too early to conclude definitively if
the objective of this attack was political in nature or
perhaps just a type of personal vendetta by a drug
cartel.  It is worth noting, moreover, that the Ansar
al'Allah, when it issued its statement regarding the AMIA
bombing, also included a reference to the bombing of an
aircraft in Panama.  This statement was made well before
aviation experts determined that the plane had, in fact,
been bombed.
Just as in the case of Argentina, the United States is
cooperating closely with Panamanian authorities.  Shortly
after the plane crashed, the U.S. sent a team of
investigators from the National Transportation Safety
Board and the FAA to Panama.  In addition to experts on
aviation safety, the U.S.--through the FBI--is providing
forensic assistance.  Lastly, since this case resulted in
the death of three Americans, this bombing is being
aggressively investigated by the FBI pursuant to U.S.
"long arm" statutes.
Mr. Chairman, I would also like to comment upon one
additional incident in Latin America which--while not
terrorism--is certainly instructive of the lengths to
which Iran will go in its efforts to silence dissent.  In
June of this year, Manoucher Moatamer and his family fled
Iran.  He is a former government official in Tehran.  He
and his family fled to Turkey and then managed to obtain
visas for Cuba.  After they arrived there, Iranian
embassy personnel forced them onto a flight to Caracas.
When they arrived there, they were met by other Iranian
official personnel who essentially kidnaped the family in
apparent preparation for forcible repatriation to Iran.
Mr. Moatamer managed to escape and notify the UNHCR of
his predicament.  He and his family are now, thankfully,
safe.  The Government of Venezuela, I am pleased to
state, has declared all of the Iranian officials
involved, as well as the ambassador, persona non grata.
Furthermore, the Government of Argentina is investigating
carefully information provided by Mr. Moatamer concerning
the AMIA bombing.
Last week also saw two additional acts of international
terrorism in London.  One target was the Israeli
consulate, the other an office of a Jewish social
services agency.  Remarkably, no one was killed in either
of these incidents, but there was extensive property
damage and some 20 people were injured in these attacks.
The British have extensive experience in investigating
bombings and have not sought U.S. technical assistance.
We are, however, following closely all developments
regarding these incidents.  We will be coordinating
closely with the British Government regarding a common
response to these apparent acts of state-sponsored
terrorism.  The two attacks in London have now been
claimed in Beirut by a group calling itself "Movement of
the Oppressed."  The name used in the statement, as well
as the means used to make the claim, suggest that the
statement is both authentic and made on behalf of
Mr. Chairman, the events of the last two weeks
demonstrate all too clearly that international terrorism
remains a threat to democratic states and their people
throughout the world.  At the same time, I believe we are
making progress in limiting both the number of states
willing to sponsor terrorism and the support they provide
to terrorists.  And we will be doing more in this regard,
as Secretary Christopher described in his testimony
before this committee just last Thursday.  Efforts such
as those described by the Secretary and the long-standing
policy objectives we pursue to counter terrorism are the
best way to reduce further the perils posed by terrorism.
The task will be neither quick nor always successful, but
I want to assure you and this committee of the commitment
of the State Department to do all that it can to meet
this goal.
Thank you for this opportunity to appear before your
committee.  (###)
What's in Print
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-63,Volume
XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962-63
This volume presents the comprehensive record of major
policy decisions and actions by the Kennedy White House,
the Department of State, and other agencies relating to
the Berlin crisis from March 1962 to the end of 1963.
This crisis was the most threatening East-West political-
military confrontation in Europe since World  War II.
Difficult and generally unsuccessful negotiations to
resolve the crisis were conducted throughout 1962 in
Washington, Moscow, and Geneva.  President Kennedy and
Secretary of State Dean Rusk took the lead in formulating
policy demarches aimed at defusing the crisis while
preserving essential Western rights in and access to
The Cuban missile crisis brought the United States and
the Soviet Union to the brink of war, and there was
concern that the Soviets might react to the blockade of
Cuba by a counter-blockade of West Berlin.  This,
however, failed to materialize.  U.S. determination to
confront Soviet threats during the Cuban crisis led to a
reduction of Soviet aggressiveness over Berlin and a de-
escalation of East-West military tensions in Germany.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-63, Volume
XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey
This volume focuses on a new strategy--economic
diplomacy--in the Cold War in Eastern Europe during the
Kennedy Administration.  Of particular significance was
President Kennedy's inclination to explore policies that
would play upon the emerging nationalist sentiments in
the Soviet Union's Eastern European satellites and thus
weaken Soviet domination if not remove it altogether.
Economic issues, especially the cautious use of increased
U.S. aid and trade to the Soviet bloc regimes, dominated
the limited relationship between the Kennedy
Administration and Eastern European states.
U.S. relations with Tito's independent communist
Yugoslavia benefited from the presence of George F.
Kennan as the head of the mission in Belgrade.  His
analyses of Yugoslavian foreign and domestic politics and
Tito's attitude toward the Soviet Union were read at the
highest levels of the U.S.Government and provoked a
lively debate on policy toward this neutral but communist
Relations between the United States and Austria, Finland,
and two NATO allies--Greece and Turkey--are also
documented.  The U.S. policy toward Cyprus during this
period is also described.
These volumes are part of 25 print volumes and 6
microfiche supplements documenting the foreign policy of
the Kennedy Administration.  Volume XV, Berlin Crisis,
1962-1963 (GPO Stock No. 044-000-02375-0) is available at
a cost of $32 ($40 foreign).  Volume XVI, Eastern Europe;
Cyprus; Greece; Turkey (GPO Stock No. 044-000-02378-4) is
available at a cost of $36 ($45 foreign).  These volumes
can be purchased from:
Superintendent of Documents
Government Printing Office
P.O. Box 371954
Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954
To fax orders, dial (202) 512-2250.  Checks payable to
the Superintendent of Documents are accepted, as are VISA
and MasterCard.  For more information, contact Glenn W.
LaFantasie, General Editor, Foreign Relations series, by
telephone at (202) 663-1133 or by fax at (202) 663-1289.

To the top of this page

Index of Dispatch Magazine Archives 1994 Issues|| Index of Dispatch Magazine Archives|| Index of "Briefings and Statements"
Index of Electronic Research Collections ERC Reference Desk || Alphabetic Index || Sitemap || ERC Homepage
Last modified: Jun. 3, 1999
Designed by: Lin Dou