VOLUME 5, NUMBER 28, JULY 11. 1994
1.  Advancing America's Enduring  Interests--Secretary
2.  Sources of Conflict and Tools for Stability:
Planning for the 21st Century--James B. Steinberg
3.  Haitian Refugee Processing--Brunson McKinley
4.  U.S. Revokes Non-Immigrant Visas to Haitian Nationals
5.  U.S. Objectives in Burma--Thomas C. Hubbard
6.  Treaty Actions
Advancing America's Enduring Interests
Secretary Christopher
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, DC, June 30, 1994
I wanted to come here today to review with you the
Clinton Administration's progress in advancing America's
vital interests in the world.
As you know, the President is about to embark on a trip
that will take him across Europe.  I will join him in
Riga, where we will pay tribute to the victory of the
Baltic peoples over tyranny and the reintegration of
their nations with the West.  We will go on to Poland,
where we will commemorate the approaching 50th
anniversary of the Warsaw uprising and discuss with
President Walesa our comprehensive approach to economic
and security cooperation in Europe.
From there, we go to the G-7 summit in Naples, where we
will build on the progress we made last year in
encouraging global growth, open trade, and Russian
reform.  In Germany, we will discuss with Chancellor Kohl
our shared goal of promoting security and economic
recovery in the East.  And we will pursue that goal at
the U.S.-EU summit in Berlin.  Later this month, I will
go on to the Middle East and Asia.
I thought it important to take this opportunity to
discuss our objectives for these trips and to offer a
broader view of the overall objectives of our foreign
I know that we will spend much of our time today
discussing immediate crises.  But in my statement, I will
focus on what I believe to be the most important
contribution I can make as Secretary of State:  that is
to help the President build and maintain long-term
relationships and lasting structures that will advance
America's enduring interests.
We must take advantage of a unique historical moment when
none of the great powers views any other as an immediate
military threat.  It requires managing effectively our
relations with Russia, Western Europe, Japan, and China.
And it requires strengthening, extending, and creating
the institutions that serve our overarching strategic
objectives.  These objectives remain:  ensuring our
security, reinforcing our prosperity, and expanding the
reach of democracy and free markets.
Since taking office, the Clinton Administration has made
steady and remarkable progress in advancing these
--Eighteen months ago, our budget deficits were out of
control and our international economic leadership was in
question.  With your help, we have put our economic house
in order.  And through NAFTA, GATT, and APEC, we are
building the foundations of a more open world trading
--Eighteen months ago, the Middle East peace talks were
stalled.  Today, we are helping to implement a historic
agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians.
Through our trilateral talks, we are promoting major new
progress between Israel and Jordan.  With our efforts on
the Israeli-Syrian and other negotiating tracks, we are
closer than many ever thought possible to building a
lasting structure of peace in the Middle East.
--Eighteen months ago, the United States was still
groping for a comprehensive security strategy toward
Today, we are putting a new strategy into place.  We are
transforming NATO to meet the challenges of the post-Cold
War world.  Through the Partnership for Peace and other
initiatives, we are helping new democracies in Central
and Eastern Europe become our stable partners in
diplomacy and trade.  We have forged a cooperative
relationship with Russia and helped keep that nation
moving toward reform.
The end of the Cold War has given us a unique opportunity
to build a more integrated world.  But the gains of
market democracy--in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and
around the world--will endure only if we have the
foresight to extend to new nations the institutions that
have long served us well.  If we are to lock into place
the gains of the Cold War's demise, we must now build the
economic and security architecture for the future.
American leadership is the essential condition for
constructing that architecture.
In my previous visits with this committee, I set out our
strategic priorities.  Today, I will focus on a few of
the most pressing issues we face in advancing these
This Administration is committed to building a secure,
democratic, and fully integrated Europe.  After the
Second World War, visionary leaders on both sides of the
Atlantic built the institutions that ensured the security
and economic strength of the United States and Western
Europe:  NATO and GATT, the OECD and its predecessor, and
ultimately the European Union.  These institutions helped
produce unparalleled peace and prosperity for half a
century--but only for half a continent.  For Eastern
Europe, the benefits of Western integration and of post-
war reconstruction were denied by the harsh confrontation
of the Cold War.
Earlier this month, I called on our partners at the OECD
and NATO to help extend to all of Europe the benefits,
and obligations, of the same liberal trading and
collective security order that have been pillars of
strength for the West.  We are actively working with our
EU partners to expand market access and investment
opportunities for Central and Eastern Europe.  Last week,
we welcomed Russia to the Partnership for Peace, the most
important strategic initiative NATO has undertaken since
its creation.  By widening NATO's reach, we are asserting
that Europe cannot be split into zones of stability and
After centuries of great power conflict in Europe, we are
building the first security partnership that can
encompass all the nations of the continent.  Twenty-one
countries have joined the Partnership for Peace.  In
September, Poland will host the first joint exercise on
the soil of a former Warsaw Pact state.
As the President said in Prague, the question now is not
whether, but when and how, NATO will admit new members.
We are committed to NATO expansion.  And that process
begins with developing deep cooperative relationships
through the Partnership for Peace.
The war in Bosnia, Mr. Chairman, remains a threat to
European security and integration.  We have a strategic
interest in seeing that the war does not spread.  And
certainly, we have a humanitarian interest in ending the
violence and in easing the plight of its victims.
In February, when I last came before this committee, two
wars were being fought on Bosnian territory.  In March,
we brokered an agreement between Bosnia's Muslims and
Croats to end one of those wars.  We helped end the
shelling of Sarajevo, and the exclusion zones NATO has
enforced around that city and around Gorazde have largely
held.  But violence continues, making it vital that the
parties agree to a political settlement.
We have been working with Russia and our other European
partners in the Contact Group on a proposal that can form
the basis for a negotiated settlement.  We are now
discussing the final contours of that proposal and the
consequences should any of the parties reject it.  In our
view, this must include a credible threat to increase
pressure on the Serbs if they say no.
This is a moment of opportunity on Bosnia.  Although we
may well reach the point where the international
community lifts the arms embargo, it would be a tragic
mistake to undermine the settlement process by
unilaterally lifting the embargo now.  That would break
the cohesion of the NATO Alliance.  It could lead to the
general collapse of UN sanctions as an effective
instrument in international affairs.  And it could
undermine our efforts in situations such as Iraq and
Mr. Chairman, with respect to Russia, this Administration
believes that supporting that nation's reforms and its
integration with the West is the best investment we can
make in our security.  That investment continues to yield
solid returns for America.  It has made our nation and
the world safer.  It has allowed us to dedicate more
resources to domestic renewal.
--In January, the United States, Russia, and Ukraine
signed a historic accord to eliminate nuclear weapons
from Ukraine's soil.
--In the last three weeks, in addition to joining the
Partnership for Peace, Russia signed an economic
partnership with the European Union and a cooperation
agreement with the OECD.
--Last week, we agreed to help Russia develop oil and gas
reserves in its far east.  And Russia agreed to close its
plutonium production reactors.
--At the Naples summit, President Yeltsin will join us
for the first time in the G-7 Plus One format.  In
September, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin will hold their
third summit.
Integration into Western institutions will bring benefits
to Russia, including expanded trade, greater investment,
and military cooperation with NATO.  It also will require
Russia to accept the obligations Western nations share:
to pursue sound economic policies, uphold democracy, and
respect the rights of other countries.  Integration will
serve the interests of the United States and of all the
nations of Europe, particularly those that so recently
won their freedom from communist rule.
The successful transformation of the Soviet empire into a
community of sovereign, democratic states is a matter of
fundamental importance to America and Europe.  In
particular, a prosperous, non-nuclear Ukraine is vital to
European stability. We are helping Ukraine try to reverse
the deterioration of its economy, which poses the most
immediate threat to its future.  This Administration also
has worked hard to achieve the full and timely withdrawal
of Russian troops from the Baltic states.
Let me be clear:  A rhetorical commitment to the
independence of new democracies will not suffice.  It
will require a determined effort, backed by resources.
It will require the steady support of this Congress.
Another distinctive imprint of the Administration's
foreign policy is the high priority we assign to economic
security.  In this respect, I have not hesitated to
challenge foreign policy orthodoxy.  It used to be said
that balance-of-power diplomacy and arms control were
"high politics" and economics was "low politics."  I
reject that distinction and not because times have
changed.  When our predecessors created the Bretton Woods
system 50 years ago this summer, when they launched the
Marshall Plan and established the GATT, they knew that
political and economic diplomacy are indivisible.
With support from this Congress, President Clinton is
advancing the most ambitious international economic
agenda of any President since Harry Truman.
With the Uruguay Round, we broke global gridlock to
complete the most comprehensive trade agreement in
history.  The Uruguay Round is an investment in a more
stable and integrated world in which open societies are
linked and invigorated by open markets.  Its approval by
Congress this year, so that it can take effect next
January, is a top priority for this Administration.
When Congress approved NAFTA, we built a platform for
greater American prosperity and a bridge to greater trade
and investment throughout the Americas.  We recognized
our overriding national interest in Mexico's stability,
prosperity, and democratic development.  Last year, I was
gratified to make the foreign policy case for passing
NAFTA.  As we seek fast track authority, I look forward
to making a similar case for liberalizing trade and
investment with other fast-growing markets, beginning
with Chile.
When the President hosted the successful meeting of APEC
leaders in Seattle, we deepened our economic integration
with the dynamic Asia-Pacific region.  Already, more than
40% of American trade is with Asia, supporting 2.5
million U.S. jobs.
Our commitment to promoting a secure, prosperous, and
democratic Asia requires that America remain a
stabilizing power in the Asia-Pacific.  Instability and
conflict in Asia would undermine global economic growth,
threaten democracies, and encourage proliferation.
This Administration has consistently identified North
Korea's nuclear program as a threat to America's vital
security interests.  North Korea's actions threaten peace
on the Korean Peninsula and endanger our treaty ally,
South Korea.  They threaten the strategic stability of
the entire region and could spur a nuclear arms race in
Asia.  And they threaten our global efforts to prevent
proliferation.  Left unchecked, rogue regimes or
terrorist groups could one day be a cargo ship away from
acquiring a nuclear capability.
We always have preferred to address this problem, and to
protect these interests, through negotiations.  We now
have a new opportunity to conduct on favorable terms a
third round of discussions between the United States and
North Korea.  But should North Korea use dialogue for the
purpose of delay, we are prepared to move the issue back
to the Security Council, pursue sanctions, and take
whatever steps are appropriate to resolve the issue.
We look forward to broad and thorough discussions with
the North  on a full range of security, political, and
economic issues.  And we welcome the upcoming meeting
between the Presidents of North and South Korea.  Our
objectives are the same:  a nuclear-free Korean
Peninsula, a secure Asia, and a strong non-proliferation
regime.  Our resolve to achieve these objectives is
Mr. Chairman, that same resolve underlies our policy
toward Haiti.  Our interests are clear:  maintaining the
stability of our hemisphere, protecting the historic tide
of democracy in our region, and a humane resolution of
the refugee problem.
Our objective is clear:  the restoration of democracy and
the return of President Aristide.  We have built a strong
coalition at the UN and at the OAS that reflects the
international community's determination to achieve this
The recent increase in the refugee flow from Haiti is a
result of the repressive policies of the illegitimate
military regime.  The longer the tragic situation
continues, the harder it will be for those who have
propped up the dictatorship.  In particular, the more
protracted the crisis, the more tenuous  is the future of
the military in Haiti.  When General Cedras and the other
leaders responsible go, as they must, we can begin the
process of reconciliation and the restoration of hope to
Mr. Chairman, we have accomplished a great deal in the
last 18 months.  But I am concentrating on our agenda for
the future.  We will be addressing a number of important
challenges, including:
--Ratification of the Uruguay Round and initiatives to
open new markets in Latin America and Asia;
--An expanded NATO that advances the integration and
security of a wider Europe;
--A comprehensive peace in the Middle East, with Israel
secure and fully integrated in the region's political and
economic life;
--A strong non-proliferation regime, including indefinite
extension of the NPT, a comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
and a ratified Chemical Weapons Convention;
--A United Nations better able to respond effectively and
rapidly to crises;
--An Africa in which an increasing number of democracies
cooperate to resolve conflicts and achieve sustainable
development; and
--International action on population and global climate
Since taking office, Mr. Chairman,  I have often spoken
about my deep respect for two of my most distinguished
predecessors, George Marshall and Dean Acheson.  We still
admire the way they managed the crises they faced.  But
most of all, we remember them for the enduring
institutions they left behind.  Their portraits hang
today in my office as a reminder of what determined
American leadership can accomplish.
Much has changed in the world since Truman, Marshall, and
Acheson forged America's post-war foreign policy.  But I
continue to be struck by the similarities.  They met the
challenge of reconstruction in post-war Western Europe.
We are meeting the challenge of reconstruction in post-
Cold War Eastern Europe.  They were present at the outset
of the Arab-Israeli conflict.  We are helping achieve its
resolution.  They faced a crisis in Korea.  We are
working to avert one.
We are the world's largest military and economic power.
Our nation and its founding principles still occupy a
special place in the imagination of people all over the
world.  And we still have the institutions the post-war
generation left us.  With the Cold War past, we now have
the power to expand the reach of these institutions and
to extend the security, prosperity, and democracy that
they helped preserve for us. (###)
Sources of Conflict and Tools for Stability:  Planning
for the 21st Century
James B. Steinberg, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Address at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island,
June 14, 1994
It is the job of policy planners to think about the
future, and how we can use today's policy decisions to
shape that future in a way that meets our national
interests.  But in order to know where we're going, it's
essential to have an idea of where we've come from.
Hence, I am following in my predecessor George Kennan's
footsteps.  In introducing his fourth lecture at the
University of Chicago in 1951, Kennan described his
approach to policy planning during his tenure as
     . . . an effort to look back from a present full of
uncertainty and controversy and unhappiness, to see
whether a study of the past will not help us to
understand some of our present predicament.
So if you'll indulge me, I'd like to spend a moment or
two on the forces that have created our current
international environment and to set the stage in the
second part of my talk for how we in the Clinton
Administration are trying to shape the future.
Major Changes in the Post-Cold War Era
All of us, if we are candid, will acknowledge a tendency
to see the era in which we live as "new" and "different."
This is especially true today, when so much is so new and
different.  The challenge, for me as Policy Planning
Director and indeed for all of us, is to have a sense for
how our times are a combination of both change and
continuity.  Let me begin with what has changed.
One of the most obvious changes is the transformation
from a world aligned along the bipolar lines of
antagonistic superpower-led blocs to one where none of
the world's major powers sees any of the others as an
immediate military threat.  We still have our disputes
with Russia and with China--and, for that matter, on
certain issues with Western Europe and Japan--but not one
of us considers any of the others an adversary.
There is, of course, no guarantee that relations among
the major powers will stay this way.  That is why we
continue to place such a high priority on resolving
differences and building cooperation in our developing
relationship with Russia, in a strategy of comprehensive
engagement with China, and in our effort to assure that
our relationships with Europe and Japan are strong over
all three vital dimensions--military, political, and
economic.  It is clear that many of our overall foreign
policy objectives--from the security of key regions to
non-proliferation to economic prosperity--can be greatly
facilitated by cooperation among the major powers.
The second element of change runs deeper under the
surface of international relations--a change that affects
the basic structure and organizing principles of the
international system which trace back not just to the
late 1940s but indeed over three centuries:  the system
of nation-states and the principles of territorial
integrity and self-determination.
As attentive students of international relations history
and theory, we all know that a dominant feature of the
modern period of international relations, going back to
the mid-17th-century peace of Westphalia, was the rise of
the state-system.  That system was built around the idea
of sovereign equality and non-interference by foreign
powers into a nation's internal affairs.  In the late
18th century, with the American and French Revolutions
and the rise of democracy, the state began its evolution
into the modern nation-state, characterized by the
growing reliance on the consent of the governed--the
principle of self-determination.  Taken together, these
two developments established the basic organizing
principles governing legitimate order within and among
These principles, although not a priori incompatible,
over time have often come into conflict.  For the most
part, the principle of territorial integrity has taken
precedence; self- determination was accepted as valid
only within pre-existing borders.  The priority for
territorial integrity stemmed from an overriding interest
in avoiding war between states and, of course, the vested
interests of the major powers who set the priorities, as
at the early 19th-century Congress of Vienna--which
sought to preserve the monarchical status quo in Europe--
and the late 19th-century Berlin Conference--at which the
European colonial powers further carved up the world map.
At the end of World War I, President Woodrow Wilson
proposed to elevate the place of self-determination,
describing it in his Fourteen Principles and Fourteen
Points as "an imperative principle of action, which
statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril."
The post-war Kingdom of South Slavs, later to become
Yugoslavia, was one of the products of this creed.  Yet
even the founders of the League of Nations soon saw that,
taken to its extreme, granting self-determination to
groups within existing states could imperil the
international order.  The Covenant of the League of
Nations does not mention self-determination, and the
League itself was cautious in recognizing claims based on
The end of World War II saw a new impetus in favor of
self-determination, in part spurred on by the process of
decolonization.  The UN Charter explicitly recognizes the
right of self-determination as the "basis for friendly
relations among states," and it refers, somewhat
ambiguously, to self-determination of "peoples."  But the
Charter, like the Covenant, clearly placed self-
determination as second to the traditional principles of
the state system and largely limited its application to
existing territorial boundaries.  What is more, the
advent of the Cold War effectively rendered the
application of the principle a dead letter for countries
and peoples under the Soviet empire.  The structure of
the Security Council, with a veto in the hands of the
U.S.S.R., assured that there would be no recourse through
the international system short of war or uprising.
With the collapse of the Berlin Wall, history again
returned.  The initial euphoria was based on an
unexamined belief that, with the demise of Europe's last
empire--the Soviet internal and external empires--Europe
could now complete the work begun at the end of World War
I.  The new world order would reconcile the newly
liberated opportunity for self-determination with
international cooperation based on sovereign equality and
collective security.
Of course, it hasn't worked out so simply.  "Militant
nationalism," as President Clinton called it in his
speech last week to the French National Assembly, has
been on the rise.  Ancient ethnic hatreds are re-inflamed
not by Soviet fifth columns, but by local demagogues--
who, as President Clinton put it, are "transforming the
healthy pride of nations, tribes, religious, and ethnic
groups into cancerous prejudice."  Ideologies like
hypernationalism are home-grown, not taken from Marx's
treatises or Mao's "little red book"--but they are
proving to be deadly in their own right.
We have seen this all-too vividly and tragically in the
former Yugoslavia.  Not only does the quest for self-
determination by national, ethnic, and religious groups
tend to fragment and divide societies, it also tends to
fuel the forces of oppression against minorities and
vulnerable populations.  More-over, this is not simply a
problem of Yugoslavia, or of Northern Ireland, or of the
ethnically mixed republics of the former Soviet Union, or
of Rwanda alone.  Of 82 armed conflicts in the past three
years, only three were between states; the rest were
within states.
In my view, the central security challenge of this post-
Cold War era lies in the inadequacy of many of our
existing security structures and strategies to meet these
emerging forms of conflict and disorder--thus the need to
adapt old structures and strategies and design and devise
new ones.
Toward a Post-Cold War Security Strategy
I do not want to imply that we must abandon self-
determination or that we must regard ethnic and national
identity as something to be condemned.  To the contrary,
nationalism can be a cohesive force, binding together
disparate interests within a political community.  But
where nationalism spawns totalitarianism, it poses risks
not only for the citizens of that state but for its
neighbors and the rest of the international community.
Moreover, the danger is not only civil war but
international conflict, as neighboring states with ethnic
ties to the conflict can easily be drawn in or
destabilized by refugee flows.  Even when not directly
drawing neighbors in, these conflicts may still be
internationally destabilizing through possible
"contagion" and "demonstration" effects.  This means that
the international community has an interest--and
therefore must take an interest--in the rise of violent
nationalism, for strategic and not just moral reasons.
Therefore, the key question, posed by Bosnia, Rwanda,
Kashmir, and other ethnically based violence, is how far
does the international community's responsibility run
and, in particular, what is the role of the U.S.?
The most effective course, at least in theory, is
prevention.  In recent years, there has been growing
attention to preventive strategies.  Much of the focus
comes out of the work of the CSCE.  CSCE efforts today
build on the principles established by the 1975 Helsinki
Final Act governing individual rights and the legitimacy
of CSCE involvement in intra-state conflicts which
threaten regional security, as affirmed in the more
recent 1990 Paris Charter.  The CSCE not only prescribes
norms but helps limit the spread of and seeks to reduce
ethnic and national conflict.  The newly appointed High
Commissioner for National Minorities also has a
potentially important role to play. The UN deployment of
forces--including U.S. forces--to Macedonia is another
example of preventive action designed not only to stop
cross-border aggression from Serbia but also, indirectly,
to diminish the potential for conflict between Albanians
and Slavs with Macedonia.
But prevention too often fails and crisis management
becomes the order of the day.  It seems clear that a
rigid application of the concept of "non-interference in
internal affairs" is not enough.  The international
community has begun to exercise the right, recognized in
the UN Charter, to intervene in internal disputes when
they pose a threat to international peace and security.
And in practice, the international community is
stretching the concept of threat to internal peace and
security to a broad range of cases where the internal
conflict is serious, the humanitarian costs are large,
but the external dimension is limited, as in Somalia.
President Clinton has outlined steps to make UN peace-
keeping more selective and more effective, recognizing
that the UN cannot do everything everywhere, but that it
can be a useful tool to help resolve conflicts.  We have
proposed steps to streamline and improve UN operations.
PDD 25 establishes factors to be considered before we
decide to support or participate in a UN peace-keeping
operation--a guideline, in effect, to answering in each
case the question of how far the international
community's responsibility runs and what the U.S. role
should be.  The factors we consider include U.S.
interests, the threat to international peace and
security, clarity of objectives, the means available to
accomplish the mission, the consequences of inaction, and
realistic criteria for ending the operation.  When we are
considering whether to commit U.S. troops to a UN
operation, we weigh additional factors, including risks;
domestic and congressional support; command and control
arrangements; and, if the mission is likely to involve
combat, a plan to achieve clearly defined objectives
Another important policy option we have is to impose
economic sanctions.  It's fair to say that we have not
always made sanctions work as effectively as we would
like.  But in thinking about how best to use them in the
future, we need to remember that they are like any other
weapon in our arsenal.  It's not that they "never" or
"always" work, but rather how best to make them work.  We
need to be guided by a "sanctions realism" which
recognizes the importance of ensuring that we use this
tool effectively and not simply as a means of publicly
expressing disapproval.
I think we all agree that in the end, pluralism and
tolerance are more likely to produce stability than
quests for ethnically pure states.  Stability, as
Secretary Christopher has stated, "will be based on
common interests and shared values."  In the longer term,
integration coupled with decentralization, including
economic as well as political elements, can be a recipe
for allowing national identity and a sense of control
over destiny to triumph over the forces of hatred and
violence.  It is these forces of integration--security,
political and economic--that we are seeking to support,
sustain, and advance in every global region.
For example, in Europe, we are working through the full
range of regional organizations of which we are members--
NATO, NACC, and CSCE, as well as with the European Union.
We are particularly pleased with the progress being made
in the Partnership for Peace program.  Already all the
Central and Eastern European states have applied for PFP
membership, as have a number of former Soviet republics,
and Russia has indicated it soon will.  The cooperation
which NATO members have built over nearly half a century
is truly unique in the history of alliances.  One of the
most important goals of PFP is to develop the mechanism
for military cooperation that is crucial to the effective
integration of new members.
In Asia and the Pacific, we also are seeking and, despite
some of the problems we face, have made significant
progress toward deepening and broadening integration.
This is the essence of President Clinton's concept of a
"New Pacific Community," involving both a continued
American commitment to regional security--both on a
bilateral basis and through such regional organizations
as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Northeast Asia
Security Dialogue--and closer economic relations, a
process in which APEC will continue to play a key role.
In this hemisphere, NAFTA and the revitalization of the
OAS are but two examples of our efforts to foster
regional integration and cooperation.  In Africa, we are
working with the OAU on a number of problems of conflict
mismanagement, including the tragedy in Rwanda.
Even in the Middle East, where regional cooperation and
integration for so long seemed contradictions in terms,
we are beginning to see profound and hopeful
developments.  The Israelis and Palestinians have begun
to implement their historic agreements signed in
Washington last September and in Cairo last month.
Israel and Jordan just last week signed a new set of
agreements; progress is slower but still occurring on the
Syrian track.  And while much less dramatic, the progress
being made on the multilateral tracks of the peace
process--particularly on arms control and regional
security (the ACRS Working Group) and regional economic
development--holds a great deal of promise over the long
term for integration, even in this region historically so
plagued by war.
The New Transnational Forces
Another challenge to the international nation-state
system comes from forces which transcend national
boundaries.  Weapons and weapons technology
proliferation, terrorism, population growth and
demographic change, drug trafficking and international
crime, and global environmental degradation are no longer
issues merely of quality of life, but in some societies
are threatening to undermine the very fabric of political
stability.  In recent weeks, we have heard dramatic
testimony on the impact of crime on the fragile
democratic experiment in Russia as well as the potential
for criminal elements to threaten international security
by gaining access to weapons of mass destruction.
Explosive population growth fuels social discontent in
the Maghreb, providing a fertile seed bed for anti-
Western fundamentalist movements that are not only
tearing apart their societies but threatening neighbors
as well.  Overpopulation was an important contributing
pressure in the horror that is Rwanda today.  "Narco-
trafficantes" represent perhaps the single greatest
threat to democracy in a number of Latin American
countries. And weapons proliferation is a growing
challenge to regional stability and global security.
Neither balances of power nor collective security
arrangements will be adequate to tackle these global
challenges unless we broaden our definition of collective
security arrangements to include the growing web of
cooperative international arrangements needed to protect
our citizens from these new threats.
Traditional Challenges Remain
This is not to say that the United States need no longer
be concerned about more traditional challenges to our
security.  It is all too clear that war has yet to become
"obsolescent," as one book of a few years ago put it, and
that aggression remains a fact of international life.
The end of the Cold War has not meant the end of leaders
and states that will resort to aggression in pursuit of
their interests.  Consequently, while the nature of
deterrence has changed, the need for it has not.  While
our preference always will be to integrate former
adversaries into common security structures, just as we
did with Germany and Japan after World War II, we also
must sustain the will and capabilities to meet aggression
and other threats.
The challenge posed by North Korea blends elements of
both the old and the new security dangers.  With an army
of 1 million, thousands of artillery tubes, and bellicose
leadership which rejects basic international norms of
behavior, North Korea poses a classic threat of
interstate aggression.  The prospect that North Korea
might possess or acquire a nuclear capability not only
increases the direct threat to our ally South Korea and
to the Northeast Asia region, but also poses a serious
threat of proliferation, both directly--through the
export of nuclear capability--and indirectly--by
undermining the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
This is why our strategy toward North Korea has two
dimensions.  We are meeting the threat to regional
stability through our military alliance with the Republic
of Korea, with Japan, and with our forward-deployed
military presence.  We are addressing the non-
proliferation threat by building a consensus in favor of
sanctions at the UN--a process that not only will provide
pressure for the North to return to compliance with its
obligations under the NPT, but also holds out the
prospect of further, tougher sanctions in the event that
North Korea moves forward with an unmonitored nuclear
program.  While we seek maximum support through a broad-
based international coalition of the UN, we are prepared
to act as necessary to protect our interests and those of
our allies in the region.
At the same time that we have been building international
support for pressuring North Korea, we also have made
clear to North Korea that we are prepared to pursue a
more cooperative relationship with them if they bring
their nuclear program back into compliance with their
obligations under the NPT, and are prepared to take a
more constructive approach to regional security,
including denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
The United States in an Uncertain Future
Historians may well look back at the end of the 20th
century and the beginning of the 21st century as the
opening chapter in a radically altered international
system, where instantaneous communications and the
globalization of trade and culture erase national
boundaries, building both new possibilities for
cooperation and new sources of conflict.  Alternatively,
the aspirations that many feel today for a new global
order may prove as misplaced as the 1920s belief that war
had been abolished.
If the world is to fulfill that more hopeful future, the
United States has a critical and irreplaceable part to
play, not only because we have unique and unchallenged
military, economic, and political assets but, equally
important, because collective action requires leadership.
In the world today, only the United States has the global
interests to galvanize action which benefits not only the
United States but all states, but which each, acting out
of its own narrow self-interest, is unlikely to
undertake.  It is not a question of the U.S. playing
global cop on the one hand, or ceding sovereignty and
responsibility to international institutions on the
other.  Rather, international institutions and mechanisms
can provide the fulcrum for leveraging our efforts--the
consensus-building structures and the burden-sharing
mechanisms that are necessary for effective collective
responses.  Our leadership is essential to kick these
mechanisms into gear.  We will act alone when we must,
but our leadership is most effective when we bring others
with us.
This, in a somewhat indirect way, brings me back to my
topic and my responsibility--planning.  Planners by
definition are condemned to grapple with uncertainty.
Some, such as my illustrious predecessor and the first
director of policy planning, George Kennan, appear to be
blessed with uncanny insight into the future.  For those
more mortal among us, we must develop strategies to guide
our decisions in the here and now to meet the challenges
of then and there.  The wisest among us may be tempted to
rely on our best guess.  But no matter how skilled that
guess may be, the risk of being wrong--catastrophically
wrong--is great.
Best-guess planning is for the bold and, in most cases,
reckless.  But there is an equal risk in timidity--worst-
case planning.  Worst-case planning not only has the
disadvantage of being frequently wrong; in some cases it
may be self-fulfilling.  If we conclude that Russia is
destined to be a hostile, imperial power and act
accordingly, we may unintentionally help bring that
result about.  If we decide that democracy cannot succeed
in Haiti, we will almost certainly consign its people to
brutal, venal dictators.  As policy planners, we are in
the business of trying to shape the international
environment, not simply prepare to react to it.
To my mind, the most important challenge for a planner is
not only to explore the range of possible outcomes but to
understand what factors will trigger different endpoints.
If we examine the assumptions underlying our forecasts,
we can not only understand better the limits of our
confidence in those forecasts but also make mid-course
corrections, as intermediate assumptions prove true or
false in the event.  This approach allows us to boldly
meet the challenges of an uncertain future, while
assuring that our fundamental national interests are
safeguarded. (###)
Haitian Refugee Processing
Brunson McKinley, Acting Director, Bureau of Population,
Refugees, and Migration
Statement before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere
and Peace Corps Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Washington, DC, June 28, 1994
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members:  I am pleased to
have this opportunity to discuss with you the work being
done by the Administration concerning the processing of
Haitian boat people.
As you know, an integral part of the Administration's
review of its policy toward Haitians was the treatment of
persons fleeing the island by boat.  The President
announced on May 8 that certain modifications to U.S.
refugee policy toward Haiti will be made.  Specifically,
he stated that while Haitian asylum seekers will continue
to be interdicted at sea, a determination of eligibility
for refugee status will be made for those requesting
asylum prior to any repatriation.  Those persons found to
be refugees are provided refuge.  Those found not to be
refugees are being returned to Haiti.
International Cooperation In Processing
On June 2, Deputy Secretary of State Talbott signed a
memorandum of understanding in Kingston, Jamaica,
permitting the United States to process Haitians aboard
vessels in Jamaica's territorial waters.  The USNS
Comfort is now at anchorage in Kingston.  A second
support ship and ancillary vessels are in place.  The
shipboard processing facility became operational June 15.
Now, nearly two weeks later, a total of 2,287 Haitians
have been interdicted.  Of these, 165 have been found to
be refugees, and 350 have been determined not to be
refugees.  Of the 1,772 remaining, 210 are aboard the
Comfort awaiting processing, and 1,562 are aboard Coast
Guard cutters en route to the Comfort.
We also reached agreement with the Government of the
Turks and Caicos Islands on June 18 to use a site on
Grand Turk Island as an on-shore processing location.
Department of Defense personnel are currently on the
ground working to construct the center.  We anticipate
that the processing facility will be operational in early
July.  Discussions on a number of issues relating to
Haiti are also underway with the Government of the
Bahamas, including refugee processing in the region.
Agreement With UNHCR
The United States is very pleased with the UNHCR's
cooperation and participation in the shipboard processing
of Haitian boat people within the territorial waters of
the Republic of Jamaica.
The United States and UNHCR recognize that shipboard
processing is an extraordinary measure which the United
States has undertaken as an alternative to interdiction
and return.  The goal of the United States and the UNHCR
remains the establishment of an appropriate land-based
processing center.  Until such time as one is fully
operational on Grand Turk, the United States and UNHCR
intend to make every effort to ensure that shipboard
processing provides protection and is procedurally fair
to all.  UNHCR has full access to the Haitians and their
case files in the operation underway in Jamaica.
We are also pleased that UNHCR has entered into an
agreement with prominent American voluntary agencies
which have long experience in refugee processing,
counseling, and resettlement.  The voluntary agencies--
acting through their coordinating body, InterAction--are
providing teams of professionals and interpreters which
are working directly with UNHCR to provide initial
counseling to the Haitians brought to the Comfort.
Involvement of organizations with specific experience
working with Haitian asylum seekers in the United States
are particularly valuable in these extraordinary
Under the terms of the agreement, UNHCR has the
opportunity to examine and review case files and to
discuss INS determination with quality assurance
officers.  When a negative determination has been made
and UNHCR believes that grounds for reconsideration
exist, UNHCR counsels applicants concerning their cases
and the possibility of reconsideration by INS.  UNHCR has
the opportunity to bring such cases--and the applIcant's
grounds for reconsideration--to the attention of the
Quality Assurance Officer.  The determination of refugee
status, including any requests for reconsideration, are
the responsibility of INS alone, but we welcome UNHCR
cooperation.  We are confident our procedures are fair
and will withstand scrutiny.
Refugee Processing Aboard Ship
Let me briefly describe for you how the process has been
working.  After interdiction, U.S. Coast Guard cutters
transport the Haitians to the Comfort.  The first
priority is rest, food, and emergency medical attention.
Any persons requiring special assistance--for example,
the disabled, young children--receive it.  Department of
Defense personnel use a special computerized
identification system to create individual identity and
family records.  They issue identifying documents to the
Haitians.  A Public Health Service doctor is on board the
vessel, and Department of Justice Community Relations
Service personnel assist with such social service issues
as unaccompanied minors and conflict resolution.
Once the Haitians' immediate medical and personal needs
have been attended to, UNHCR staff, and staff of non-
governmental organizations under contract to UNHCR,
counsel the Haitians about refugee status determination
and explain the purpose of the refugee program and the
processing steps involved.
Creole-speaking staff of the International Organization
for Migration prepare cases for INS adjudication.
Trained INS officers then conduct full refugee interviews
of all persons, using interpreters provided by IOM.  An
INS quality assurance officer reviews each decision
before it becomes final.
Those persons found ineligible for refugee status are
repatriated to Haiti by Coast Guard cutters.  Those
persons approved for refugee status are transferred to
Guantanamo Naval Base for further processing.  Refugees
who are to be resettled in the U.S. have their cases
expedited.  Refugees to be resettled or to be provided
asylum elsewhere are assisted by UNHCR and U.S.
Government personnel to go to their new homes.
Access to the Shipboard Processing Center
The agreement between the U.S. and Jamaica calls for
transparency in the operation.  We want to be fair and to
be seen to be fair.  Maximum access to the processing
center will be granted consistent with maintaining the
safety of the ship and its staff, and consistent also
with maintaining the confidentiality of status
determinations and the privacy of the Haitians.
Sharing the Refugee Burden
In addition to cooperating in processing, UNHCR has
indicated it will use its best endeavors to seek in third
countries temporary protection or resettlement for
persons determined to be refugees.  This complements our
efforts. We have approached states in the region and
elsewhere and requested that they accept approved Haitian
refugees either temporarily or permanently.  We have
received commitments and/or encouraging responses from a
number of countries.  We will continue our efforts to
convince other countries to take their fair share.  The
humanitarian crisis in Haiti is a serious problem for the
international community, and we hope that it will
actively participate in its resolution.
Monitoring Returnees
We have no way of knowing how many Haitian boat people
will be found to be refugees, but many certainly will be
returned to Haiti.  Our experience, thus far, indicates
that repatriated boat people are not targeted for
retribution by Haitian authorities for unauthorized
departure.  As has been done for over two years, however,
we will continue to monitor, through our embassy in Port-
au-Prince, the welfare of those who are repatriated.
In-Country Processing Will Continue
As the President has emphasized, we believe our in-
country refugee processing program remains the best and
safest means for genuine refugees to have their claims
heard.  I want to emphasize that we will continue in-
country processing.  Our three in-country processing
centers will continue to operate and to offer the best
means for Haitians with a well-founded fear of
persecution to have their claims adjudicated without
undertaking a perilous sea journey.  Even the suspension
of commercial air service to Haiti will not stop our
work.  Preparations are being made to ensure that
approved refugees can continue to leave Haiti as they are
granted status.
Commitment to Humane Action
The deployment of the Comfort to Jamaica and the
establishment of the land-based refugee processing center
in the Turks and Caicos are intended to be humane
responses to a desperate problem.  I don't pretend that
these measures alone will alleviate the widespread
suffering that is the lot of the Haitian people under the
illegal regime.  But it is our hope that for those who
are bona fide refugees, the new program will offer
protection. (###)
U.S. Revokes Non-Immigrant Visas to Haitian Nationals
Statement by White House Press Secretary Dee Dee Myers,
Washington, DC, June 29, 1994.
The U.S. Department of State has revoked all U.S. non-
immigrant visas issued before May 11, 1994 to Haitian
nationals by the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince or the
U.S. Consulate General in Curacao.  This revocation
became effective at 12:01 a.m. EDT June 29, 1994.
The stubborn refusal of Haiti's military leaders to
permit the restoration of democracy and the return of
President Aristide is the cause of this additional step.
We believe the revocation of these visas will
significantly increase pressure on the military, the
illegal Jonassaint regime, and their supporters.
This action complements the recent blocking of U.S.
assets of all Haitian nationals resident in Haiti, the
ban on financial transfers, and the ban on scheduled
commercial passenger flights.  It demonstrates in no
uncertain terms that there is a real cost to Haitians'
continued support for the military and its illegal
Air carriers and the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service have been notified that visas meeting the stated
criteria are no longer valid. (###)
U.S. Objectives in Burma
Thomas C. Hubbard, Deputy Assistant Secretary For East
Asian and Pacific Affairs
Statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific
Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
Washington, DC, June 29, 1994
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to join you today to discuss
our objectives and policy vision in Burma.  Our primary
objective in Burma is an end to the current regime's
pervasive human rights abuses and the establishment of a
democratic, representative government reflecting the will
of the Burmese people.  In view of Burma's role as the
predominant supplier of heroin to the U.S., our second
important objective is to bring an end to the production
and export of Burmese opium and heroin.  These objectives
are mutually reinforcing.
As you may know, Mr. Chairman, Burma was the subject of a
White House deputies-level meeting earlier this year.
The most important decision reached by the deputies was
endorsement of more vigorous U.S. Government efforts to
promote human rights and democratization in Burma.
In this respect, we have urged the regime in Rangoon to
begin a dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi and to release her
unconditionally.  We are also encouraging European and
Asian governments to press the regime on critical human
rights issues.  And we are urging more vigorous UN action
on Burma, including the establishment of a UN special
envoy to seek human rights improvements and
implementation of the results of the 1990 elections.
In addition to these and other diplomatic measures, we
are seeking to broaden our humanitarian assistance
efforts directed at displaced Burmese in the region.
USAID is now ready to begin implementation of its $1-
million earmark to provide assistance for displaced
Burmese in Thailand or Burma.  This will focus on health
care assistance in the Thai-Burma border and elsewhere in
Throughout this process, we have greatly valued the
contributions of the Foreign Affairs Committee staff, and
we look forward to continued cooperation with you on this
important issue.
Challenges in Burma
Lack of Democracy and Human Rights.  Three key events in
recent Burmese political history influence U.S. policy
toward Burma:
--The violent suppression of the Burmese democracy
movement in 1988 by the State Law and Order Restoration
Council, commonly referred to as the SLORC;
--The house arrest in July 1989 of Burmese democratic
activist and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi;
--The refusal of the SLORC to recognize the results of
the 1990 parliamentary elections in which Aung San Suu
Kyi's party, the National League for Democracy, won an
overwhelming majority.
Burma remains one of the world's worst violators of human
rights.  The SLORC military junta maintains its grip by
suppressing political freedoms, rigorously controlling
the press, and harassing and imprisoning democratic
leaders.  Aung San Suu Kyi and other leading political
prisoners remain under detention.  The Burmese people's
basic political and civil liberties are either
nonexistent or sharply curtailed.
The Burmese army continues to employ forced labor under
inhumane conditions in its campaigns against ethnic
minorities.  Over 70,000 refugees remain in camps on the
Thai-Burma border, and nearly 200,000 Rohingya Muslims
who fled Arakan state are still in Bangladesh.
Meanwhile, the Burmese military continues its
unprecedented expansion and has nearly doubled the number
of its combat units in recent years.
The SLORC regime has consolidated control over the
country and is in a confident frame of mind.  The
economy, although troubled by persistent inflation, is
growing and attracting new foreign investment and
increased numbers of tourists.  The SLORC has effectively
silenced the democratic opposition and is successfully
negotiating separate cease-fire accords with many of the
ethnic insurgent groups, some of which have been in
almost continual revolt against the Burmese central
government since the end of the Second World War.  The
SLORC shows no intention of implementing the results of
the 1990 elections.
Motivated in part by a desire to regain some
international stature, the SLORC has taken some steps in
the past two years to ease the harshness of martial law.
Measures include the reported release of over 2,000
political prisoners, the lifting of a nationwide curfew,
the reopening of the universities, and the signing of a
memorandum of understanding with UNHCR which provides for
its official presence in Burma to ensure that the
Rohingya Muslim refugees remaining in Bangladesh are
repatriated voluntarily in safety and dignity.
The SLORC has also permitted Aung San Suu Kyi family
visits and allowed Congressman Bill Richardson to meet
with her in February.  However, there has been no
fundamental change in the government's repressive rule,
and there has been no movement toward a dialogue between
the SLORC and Aung San Suu Kyi since her February meeting
with Congressman Richardson.
In January 1993, the SLORC convened a hand-picked
National Convention to draft guidelines for a new
constitution.  The National Convention has as its
principal objective the consolidation and legitimization
of the military's role in Burma's future political
institutions.  Several chapters of the constitution have
reportedly been completed, but it could be months or even
years before it is finished.  The constitution may
eventually be submitted to a referendum, perhaps followed
by regime-controlled elections.  Most observers contend
that the SLORC will not soon relinquish its grip or its
vested interest in retaining power.
With its leadership in detention or exile, the democratic
opposition within Burma is in very difficult straits.
The Burmese population remains intimidated by the regime
and focused on the routines of daily life, while some
enjoy the new business opportunities stemming from the
SLORC's limited economic reforms.  At the same time,
politically aware Burmese remain deeply alienated from
the regime and rightly cynical about its attempt to
institute merely cosmetic political change.  As a result,
many educated Burmese have fled the country.
Strains between the primarily Burman--or ethnic-majority-
-democratic opposition and their ethnic-minority allies
have been exacerbated by the SLORC's attempts to reach
separate cease-fires with ethnic insurgents.  Thailand--
in pursuit of better relations with Burma and serving its
own perceived national security interests--has clamped
down on the activities of Burmese exiles and is taking an
increasing role in SLORC's efforts to bring the ethnic
groups into cease-fire agreements.  We have encouraged
the Thai Government to maintain policies that are
sympathetic to the humanitarian needs of displaced
While the SLORC is in its strongest position ever, it
remains wary of Aung San Suu Kyi and the potential threat
she represents to their continued rule.  In spite of
nearly five years of detention, Aung San Suu Kyi remains
as determined as ever to pursue the struggle for
democracy in Burma and still commands great moral
authority.  She has renounced personal political
ambitions and categorically rejects the regime's offer
for her to leave the country.  She maintains that a
genuine dialogue with the regime is the only way to end
the country's political impasse.
The U.S. has repeatedly urged, publicly and privately,
that the Burmese military regime immediately lift Aung
San Suu Kyi's house arrest and release all political
prisoners.  Since taking office, President Clinton has
made three separate statements on Burma making clear our
support for the democratic struggle in Burma and the
unconditional release of Aung San Suu Kyi and all other
remaining political prisoners.
Narcotics Production and Export.  Not only does Burma
have an abysmal human rights record within its own
borders, but--as the world's largest producer of opium
and heroin--it has contributed to addiction and the
spread of drug-related crime everywhere.  Since 1988, the
military regime has sharply reduced its already limited
counter-narcotics program, with the result that opium
production reached an estimated level of 2,575 metric
tons in 1993.
The SLORC undertakes few narcotics-related law
enforcement measures and has reached political
accommodations with certain ethnic insurgent groups in
the Shan state, permitting them to continue opium
production and trafficking in return for ceasing
hostilities against the central government.  At the same
time, however, the Burmese army is currently pursuing a
military campaign directed against the Shan United Army,
which is headed by heroin warlord--and indicted U.S.
fugitive--Khun Sa.
U.S. Actions
Democracy and Human Rights.  While our influence on
Burma's closed society is limited, we continue to push
for democratic reform and basic human rights bilaterally
and multilaterally.  Following the brutal suppression of
the democracy movement in 1988, the U.S. suspended all
bilateral assistance programs and--along with the EU,
Australia, and Japan--implemented a voluntary arms
embargo.  We also revoked generalized system of
preferences (GSP) privileges and suspended eligibility
for Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
We have lobbied for successively stronger resolutions--
for the past three years at the UNGA and for five at the
UNHRC--condemning the junta for its human rights
violations and urging transition to democratic rule.  As
a direct result, the latest UNGA and UNHRC resolutions
request the assistance of the UN Secretary General in
addressing the situation in Burma.  In fact, we would
have preferred an even stronger resolution than that
adopted by last year's UNGA, and it was for this reason
that we chose not to co-sponsor the resolution that was
ultimately adopted.
Most recently, our delegation to the International Labor
Organization conference held in Geneva in June 1994
worked vigorously to increase international pressure on
the SLORC to end forced labor and permit freedom of
association for workers.
Narcotics.  In 1989, the U.S. ceased certifying Burma as
a cooperating country on counter-narcotics efforts.  As a
result, the U.S. is required by law to vote against
development bank lending and other international
financial institution (IFI) loans to Burma, except for
projects which meet basic human needs.  It should be
noted that even in the absence of decertification, the
U.S. would still oppose loans to Burma because of its
major human rights violations.
The United States has a significant interest in ending
the flow of heroin from Burma, the world's largest
producer of this narcotic.  We maintain narcotics
cooperation with Burma under constant review as one
option to ameliorate the deadly impact of Burmese heroin
on the United States, but it is unlikely that the heroin
trade can be curtailed without fundamental political
change in Burma.  That is why the recent interagency
policy review concluded that a higher level of
cooperation is not a reasonable prospect at this time and
that the promoting of democracy in Burma is, ultimately,
the best way to achieve our counter-narcotics objectives
as well.
Heroin from Burma is a threat not only to the U.S. but
also to Burma's neighbors--including China, India,
Thailand, and Malaysia.  U.S. officials, therefore, are
consulting with those governments to develop more
effective approaches directed against the production and
trafficking of heroin from Burma, including efforts to
stem the supply of arms and essential chemicals that
sustain the Burma-based trafficking groups such as Khun
Sa's Shan United Army.
We are also pursuing a variety of counter-narcotics
measures, including regional diplomatic initiatives,
support for UNDCP crop-substitution projects, and
dialogue with the Burmese regime calling for serious and
sustained efforts to comply with the 1988 UN Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs.  We are also
exploring possibilities for other programs that might
assist impoverished farmers without directly benefiting
the SLORC regime.
Arms.  In order to stem the flow of arms to Burma, the
U.S. has made over 40 demarches to almost 20 countries
urging them to desist from arms sales to Rangoon.
Regrettably, countries such as Poland, Portugal,
Singapore, and South Korea continue to tolerate the sale
and transshipment of military items to Burma.  China
alone has sold an estimated $1 billion of arms to the
SLORC since 1989.  We will continue  to press other
countries to desist from supplying the SLORC with arms
and military equipment.
To be frank, the U.S. has found it difficult to build
broader international support for a more effective arms
embargo.  Our efforts last year to nudge the UN General
Assembly toward voluntary arms restraints were not
successful, largely on the procedural grounds that the
Third Committee could only address human rights issues;
among Asian nations there was no support at all for our
initiative.  While we would even support a mandatory
embargo, obtaining such an embargo would be a major
challenge.  This is because it would require UN Security
Council approval, for which strong regional support--
including from China--would be essential.  Nevertheless,
we will continue to explore and encourage support for
multilateral endorsement of such an embargo.
Political Opposition.  In the wake of Congressman Bill
Richardson's unprecedented February meetings with Aung
San Suu Kyi and SLORC strongman Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt, we
have urged the international community to encourage the
SLORC to begin a dialogue with her as the best way to end
the political impasse in the country.  While we had hoped
for more immediate signs of progress, the SLORC has not
ruled out the possibility of high-level dialogue with
Aung San Suu Kyi.  More political prisoners, including
the well-known Zargana, have been released.  Negotiations
between the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) and the SLORC for access to political prisoners
are underway and making headway.  Nevertheless, the
situation in Burma remains grim.
U.S. Approach
Representation.  The United States has not had an
ambassador in Burma for the last four years.  Following
the departure of our last ambassador in 1990, we
originally supported the appointment of a new ambassador.
Given the length of time since we have had an ambassador
in Burma, we now believe that such an appointment must be
evaluated with great caution lest it be interpreted by
the SLORC as a sign of U.S. approval.
Retaining U.S. diplomatic representation at the charg
level has allowed the United States to express its
displeasure with the human rights record of the SLORC in
readily understood diplomatic parlance.  In addition,
given the SLORC's growing interest in international
contacts, we believe that the decision of whether and
when to appoint an ambassador to Burma provides us with a
useful incentive to use with the Burmese leadership to
encourage improved human rights practices.
We have no current plans to appoint an ambassador to
Burma but would be prepared to reconsider this position
in light of significant movement toward respect for human
rights and democracy.
Trade Restrictions.  The question is often asked whether
the U.S. should seek to limit trade and investment with
Burma.  As you know, although detained Burmese opposition
leader Aung San Suu Kyi advocates restricting foreign
investment until there are significant human rights
improvements, the prevailing view among most governments
in the region favors more, not less, trade.
While we are exploring whether multilateral or bilateral
sanctions are both feasible and effective, there are
obstacles in this area.  The economic impact of
multilateral sanctions on Burma would be limited by
several factors.
--The Burmese economy is agricultural and largely self-
sustaining; it proved surprisingly resilient even during
the years of self-imposed isolation under long-time
dictator Ne Win.
--Burma's extensive borders with India, China, and
Thailand are porous; black market trade cannot be
stopped, making enforcement of sanctions extremely
The SLORC wants closer political and economic ties with
the West--including the U.S.--so the political impact of
wide-ranging trade restrictions in Burma might be more
significant than their economic effects.
In this respect, multilateral sanctions would clearly be
preferable, but Japan and ASEAN oppose trade and
investment embargoes, and the European countries have no
enthusiasm for them either.  Singapore, Japan, South
Korea, Australia, France, and the U.K. are actively
pursuing business interests in Burma, and Singapore may
soon rival the U.S. as the largest investor in Burma.
Nevertheless, we continue to work closely with the
international community to explore ways to promote
positive change.
Regional Considerations.  While the U.S. and ASEAN share
the long-term goal of a more open, progressive, and
stable Burma, our respective tactical approaches differ.
For example, in 1993, ASEAN conducted an internal debate
about the possibility of including Burma as an observer.
As a result, Thailand, as the ASEAN Standing Committee
Chairman, invited Burma to attend the opening ceremonies
of the ASEAN annual gathering this July in Bangkok as the
Thai Government's guest.  The U.S. has repeatedly stated
that while it is up to ASEAN members themselves to decide
which countries will participate, we believe it is
premature--absent significant political reform and an
improvement in the country's human rights record--to
extend observer status or membership to the Burmese.
Like the U.S. and ASEAN, the U.S. and Japan share similar
goals on human rights and democratization but disagree on
how to achieve them, with the U.S. preferring the
isolation of Burma and Japan favoring engagement.
Despite our differences in approach, however, Japan froze
new foreign assistance to express displeasure following
the events of 1988-89.  Diplomatic exchanges have also
been reduced.  Japan maintains its freeze on new economic
assistance but will renew small-scale technical
assistance projects.
Finally, China's shift toward a decentralized market-
oriented economy has stimulated growing cross-border
trade with its neighbors, including Burma.  A growing
number of Chinese-financed infrastructure projects
underscores China's role as the dominant economic
influence in Burma.  These growing commercial ties are
another reason why China would resist further efforts to
isolate Rangoon.
Despite differences in approach, we will continue to
stress more vigorous efforts to bring pressure to bear
upon the regime in Rangoon.  Burma continues to present
one of the most frustrating yet compelling problems in
our international relations.  Political freedom remains
nonexistent, and the regime has yet to show a real
willingness to grapple with narcotics issues.
The SLORC calculates that foreign aid will flow if it is
able to quell the insurgencies, show a nominal effort to
neutralize the drug lords, and open up the economy--even
in the absence of recognizing the results of the 1990
elections, releasing the most important political
prisoners, or making any real improvement in human
No government which does not express the political will
of the people can endure indefinitely, and the voice of
Burma's democratic forces will be heard again.  Our
attempts to promote true democracy and human rights will
continue unabated, as will our unflagging support for
Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners.  (###)
Treaty Actions
Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards.  Done at New York June 10, 1958.
Entered into force June 7, 1959; for the U.S. Dec. 29,
1970.  TIAS 6997; 21 UST 2517.
Accession:  Georgia, June 2, 1994.
Successions:  Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sept. 1, 1993,
effective Mar. 6, 19921; Macedonia, Mar. 10, 1994.
Biological Weapons
Convention on the prohibition of the development,
production, and stockpiling of bacteriological
(biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction.
Done at Washington, London, and Moscow Apr. 10, 1972.
Entered into force Mar. 26, 1975. TIAS 8062; 26 UST 583.
Accession:  Armenia, June 7, 1994.
Chemical Weapons
Convention on the prohibition of the development,
production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and
on their destruction, with annexes.  Done at Paris Jan.
13, 19931.  [Senate] Treaty Doc. 103-21.
Signature:  Tanzania, Feb. 25, 1994.
Ratification:  Albania, May 11, 1994.
Convention on protection of children and cooperation in
respect of intercountry adoption.  Done at The Hague May
29, 19932.
Signatures:  Ecuador, May 3, 1994; Sri Lanka, May 24,
Universal copyright convention.  Done at Geneva Sept. 6,
1952.  Entered into force Sept. 16, 1955.  TIAS 3324; 6
UST 2731.
Succession:  Belarus, Mar. 29, 1994.
Universal copyright convention, as revised.  Done at
Paris July 24, 1971.  Entered into force July 10, 1974.
TIAS 7868; 25 UST 1341.
Accession:  Saudi Arabia, Apr. 13, 1994.
Agreement establishing the International Fund for
Agricultural Development.  Done at Rome June 13, 1976.
Entered into force Nov. 30, 1977.  TIAS 8765; 28 UST
Accessions:  Azerbaijan, Apr. 11, 1994; Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Mar. 18, 1994.
Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime
of genocide.  Adopted by UN General Assembly at Paris
Dec. 9, 1948.  Entered into force Jan. 12, 1951; for the
U.S. Feb. 23, 1989.
Succession:  Macedonia, Jan. 18, 1994.
Human Rights
International covenant on civil and political rights.
Adopted by the UN General Assembly Dec. 16, 1966.
Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976; for the U.S. Sept. 8,
Succession:  Macedonia, Jan. 18, 1994.
International covenant on economic, social, and cultural
rights.  Adopted by the UN General Assembly Dec. 16,
1966.  Entered into force Jan. 3, 19763.
Succession:  Macedonia, Jan. 18, 1994.
Judicial Procedure
Convention on the civil aspects of international child
abduction.  Done at The Hague Oct. 25, 1980.  Entered
into force Dec. 1, 1983; for the U.S. July 1, 1988.  TIAS
Signature and acceptance:  Finland, May 25, 19941.
Convention abolishing the requirement of legalization for
foreign public documents, with annex.  Done at the Hague
Oct. 5, 1961.  Entered into force Jan. 24, 1965; for the
U.S. Oct. 15, 1981.  TIAS 10072; 33 UST 883.
Accessions:  Republic of San Marino, May 26, 1994; Saint
Kitts and Nevis, Feb. 26, 1994.
Convention on the service abroad of judicial and
extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters.
Done at The Hague Nov. 15, 1965.  Entered into force Feb.
10, 1969.  TIAS 6638; 20 UST 361.
Ratification:  Ireland, Apr. 5, 19941.
Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961.  Done at New
York Mar. 30, 1961.  Entered into force Dec. 13, 1964;
for the U.S. June 24, 1967.  TIAS 6298; 18 UST 1407.
Accessions:  Saint Kitts and Nevis, May 9, 1994; Sierra
Leone, June 6, 1994.
Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic
drugs, 1961.  Done at Geneva Mar. 25, 1972.  Entered into
force Aug. 8, 1975.  TIAS 8118; 26 UST 1439.
Accessions:  Saint Kitts and Nevis, May 9, 1994; Sierra
Leone, June 6, 1994.
Convention on psychotropic substances.  Done at Vienna
Feb. 21, 1971.  Entered into force Aug. 16, 1976; for the
U.S. July 15, 1980.  TIAS 9725; 32 UST 543.
Accessions:  Saint Kitts and Nevis, May 9, 1994; Sierra
Leone, June 6, 1994.
United Nations convention against illicit traffic in
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, with annex
and final act.  Done at Vienna Dec. 20, 1988.  Entered
into force Nov. 11, 1990.  [Senate] Treaty Doc. 101-4.
Accessions:  Sierra Leone, June 6, 1994; St. Vincent and
the Grenadines, May 17, 1994.
Ratification:  Colombia, June 10, 1994.
Patent cooperation treaty with regulations.  Done at
Washington June 19, 1970.  Entered into force Jan. 24,
1978.  TIAS 8733; 28 UST 7645.
Accessions:  Estonia, May 24, 1994; Liberia, May 27,
Succession:  Armenia, May 17, 1994.
Prisoner Transfer
Convention on the transfer of sentenced persons.  Done at
Strasbourg Mar. 21, 1983.  Entered into force July 1,
1985.  TIAS 10824.
Accession:  Trinidad and Tobago, Mar. 22, 1994.
Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial
property of Mar. 20, 1883, as revised.  Done at Stockholm
July 14, 1967.  Entered into force May 19, 1970; for the
U.S. Aug. 25, 1973.  TIAS 6923, 7727; 24 UST 2140.
Accessions:  Estonia, May 24, 1994; Liberia, May 27,
Succession:  Armenia, May 17, 1994.
Racial Discrimination
International convention on the elimination of all forms
of racial discrimination.  Adopted by the UN General
Assembly Dec. 21, 1965.  Entered into force Jan. 4,
Accession:  Albania, May 11, 1994.
Succession:  Macedonia, Jan. 18, 1994.
Convention relating to the status of refugees, with
schedule and annex.  Signed at Geneva July 28, 1951.
Entered into force Apr. 22, 19543.  TIAS 6577.
Succession:  Macedonia, Jan. 18, 1994.
Protocol relating to the status of refugees.  Done at New
York Jan. 31, 1967.  Entered into force Oct. 4, 1967; for
the U.S. Nov. 1, 1968.  TIAS 6577; 19 UST 6223.
Succession:  Macedonia, Jan. 18, 1994.
Slave Trade
Convention to suppress the slave trade and slavery.
Concluded at Geneva Sept. 25, 1926.  Entered into force
Mar. 9, 1927; for the U.S. Mar. 21, 1929.  TS 778; 46
Stat. 2183.
Successions:  Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sept. 1, 1993,
effective Mar. 6, 1992; Macedonia, Jan. 18, 1994.
Protocol amending the slavery convention signed at Geneva
on Sept. 25, 1926, and annex.  Done at New York Dec. 7,
1953.  Entered into force Dec. 7, 1953 for the protocol;
July 7, 1955 for annex to protocol; for the U.S. Mar. 7,
1956.  TIAS 3532; 7 UST 479.
Succession:  Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sept. 1, 1993, effective
Mar. 6, 1992.
Supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery, the
slave trade, and institutions and practices similar to
slavery.  Done at Geneva Sept. 7, 1956.  Entered into
force Apr. 30, 1957; for the U.S. Dec. 6, 1967.  TIAS
6418; 18 UST 3201.
Successions:  Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sept. 1, 1993,
effective Mar. 6, 1992; Macedonia, Jan. 18, 1994.
Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes
against internationally protected persons, including
diplomatic agents.  Adopted by the UN General Assembly
Dec. 14, 1973.  Entered into force Feb. 20, 1977.  TIAS
8532; 28 UST 1975.
Accession:  Armenia, May 18, 1994.
International convention against the taking of hostages.
Adopted by the UN General Assembly Dec. 17, 1979.
Entered into force June 3, 1983; for the U.S. Jan. 6,
Succession:  Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sept. 1, 1993, effective
Mar. 6, 1992.
Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment.  Adopted by the UN
General Assembly Dec. 10, 1984.  Entered into force June
26, 19873.  [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-20.
Accessions:  Albania, May 11, 1994; Sri Lanka, Jan. 3,
Vienna convention on the law of treaties between states
and international organizations or between international
organizations, with annex.  Done at Vienna Mar. 21,
Succession:  Bosnia-Herzegovina, Jan. 12, 1994.
Constitution of the United Nations Industrial Development
Organization.  Done at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.  Entered into
force June 21, 1985.
Accession:  Uzbekistan, Apr. 26, 1994.
Convention providing a uniform law on the form of an
international will, with annex.  Done at Washington Oct.
26, 1973.  Entered into force Feb. 9, 19783.
Ratification:  France, June 1, 1994.
Convention on the political rights of women.  Done at New
York Mar. 31, 1953.  Entered into force July 7, 1954; for
the U.S. July 7, 1976.  TIAS 8289; 27 UST 1909.
Succession:  Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sept. 1, 1993; effective
Mar. 6, 1992.
Convention on the elimination of all forms of
discrimination against women.  Adopted by the UN General
Assembly Dec. 18, 1979.  Entered into force Sept. 3,
Accession:  Albania, May 11, 1994.
Succession:  Macedonia, Jan. 18, 1994.
Agreement regarding grants under the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, as amended, and the furnishing of defense
articles, related training, and other defense services
from the United States to Guyana.  Effected by exchange
of notes at Georgetown Mar. 31 and Apr. 28, 1994.
Entered into force Apr. 28, 1994.
Memorandum of understanding concerning scientific and
technical cooperation in the earth and mapping sciences,
with annexes.  Signed at Mexico May 9, 1994.  Entered
into force May 9, 1994.
Agreement supplementing the investment incentive and
financial agreement of Dec. 16, 1992, relating to the
Export-Import Bank.  Signed at Washington May 20, 1994.
Entered into force May 20, 1994.
Russian Federation
Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the field
of basic biomedical research.  Signed at Washington June
23, 1994.  Entered into force June 23, 1994.
Memorandum of understanding concerning scientific and
technical cooperation in the earth sciences, with
annexes.  Signed at Reston and Stockholm Apr. 22 and June
1, 1994.  Entered into force June 1, 1994.
Agreement concerning mutual logistic support, with
annexes.  Signed at Tunis and Stuttgart-Vaihingen Mar. 29
and Apr. 29, 1994.  Entered into force Apr. 29, 1994.
Agreement relating to scientific and technological
cooperation, with annexes.  Signed at Ankara June 14,
1994.  Entered into force June 14, 1994.
United Nations
Agreement concerning the provision of assistance on a
reimbursable basis in support of the operations of the
United Nations in the former Yugoslavia.  Signed at New
York Mar. 14, 1994.  Entered into force Mar. 14, 1994.
1  With declaration(s).
2  Not in force.
3  Not in force for the U.S.  (###)

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