U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 5, NUMBER 26, JUNE 27, 1994
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
 
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1. North Korea Nuclear Situation--President
Clinton, Robert L. Gallucci
2. Establishing the Basis for a Successful
Conclusion to the Crisis in Haiti--President
Clinton, William Gray
3. Additional Financial Sanctions Imposed on
Haiti
4. U.S. and Japan:  Common Ideals And New
Challenges--President Clinton, Emperor Akihito
5. Russia Joins the Partnership for Peace:  A
Historic Moment for NATO and Europe--Secretary
Christopher, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev
6. Realism and Idealism in American Foreign
Policy Today--Madeleine K. Albright
7. The Tragedy in Rwanda:  International
Cooperation To Find a Solution--Madeleine K.
Albright, UNSC Resolution
8. Dominican Republic Electoral Investigation
9. Combating International Narcotics
Trafficking--Robert S. Gelbard
 
 
ARTICLE 1:
 
North Korea Nuclear Situation
President Clinton, Robert L. Gallucci
 
President Clinton
June 22, 1994
Opening statement at a news conference,
Washington, DC.
 
Today, I want to announce an important step
forward in the situation in North Korea.  This
afternoon, we have received formal confirmation
from North Korea that it will freeze the major
elements of its nuclear program while a new
round of talks between our nations proceeds.
 
In response, we are informing the North Koreans
that we are ready to go forward with a new
round of talks in Geneva early next month.
North Korea has assured us that while we go
forward with these talks, it will not reload
its five-megawatt reactor with new fuel or
reprocess spent fuel.  We also have  been
assured that the IAEA will be allowed to keep
its inspectors and monitoring equipment in
place at the Yongbyon nuclear facility, thus
allowing verification of North Korea's
agreement.
 
We welcome this very positive development which
restores the basis for talks between North
Korea and the United States.
 
In addition to addressing the nuclear issue, we
are prepared to discuss the full range of
security, political, and economic issues that
affect North Korea's relationship with the
international community.  During these
discussions, we will suspend our efforts to
pursue a sanctions resolution in the United
Nations Security Council.  We also welcome the
agreement between South Korea and North Korea
to pursue a meeting between their Presidents.
 
I would like to thank President Carter for the
important role he played in helping to achieve
this step.  These developments mark not a
solution to the problem--but they do mark a new
opportunity to find a solution.  It is the
beginning of a new stage in our efforts to
pursue a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula.  We hope
this will lead to the resolution of all the
issues that divide Korea from the international
community.
 
In close consultation with our allies, we will
continue as we have over the past year and more
to pursue our interests and our goals with
steadiness, realism, and resolve.  This
approach is paying off, and we will continue
it.  This is good news.  Our task now is to
transform this news into a lasting agreement.
 
 
President Clinton
June 16, 1994
Opening statement at a news conference,
Washington, DC.
 
In recent weeks, we have been consulting with
our allies and friends on the imposition of
sanctions against North Korea because of its
refusal to permit full inspections of its
nuclear program.  Today there are reports that
the North Koreans--in discussions with
President Carter--may have offered new steps to
resolve the international community's concerns,
saying that International Atomic Energy Agency
inspectors and monitoring equipment would be
left in place and that North Korea desires to
replace its present nuclear program with a new
light-water reactor technology that is more
resistant to nuclear proliferation.
 
If North Korea means by this, also, that it is
willing to freeze its nuclear program while
talks take place, this could be a promising
development.  As we review these reports today
and in the days ahead, I want to take a moment
to explain the extent of our interests and the
steps we are taking to protect them.
 
Our nation clearly has vital interests on the
Korean Peninsula.  Four decades after the
conflict there that claimed hundreds of
thousands of South Korean and American lives,
South Korea continues to face a threat of 1
million troops, most of them massed near its
border.
 
America's commitment to South Korea--our treaty
ally, our trading partner, our fellow
democracy--is unshakable.  We have some 37,000
American troops in Korea to maintain that
commitment, and their safety is of vital
importance to us.
 
We also have an interest in preserving the
stability of the Asia-Pacific region.  And we
have a compelling interest in preserving the
integrity of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and
in preventing the spread of global nuclear
weapons and ballistic missiles.
 
Therefore, in response to North Korea's nuclear
activities, we have consistently pursued two
goals:  a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula and a
strong international non-proliferation regime.
We've made serious and extensive efforts to
resolve the North Korean issue through
negotiations and have given North Korea many
opportunities to return to compliance with its
own non-proliferation commitments made--first,
nine years ago--when North Korea signed the
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and--again, in
1991--when North Korea agreed with South Korea
to pursue a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula.
 
We've made clear that these negotiations could
continue--but only if North Korea cooperated
with the International Atomic Energy Agency and
did not deepen its violation of international
nuclear safeguards.  If today's developments
mean that North Korea is genuinely and
verifiably prepared to freeze its nuclear
program while talks go on--and we hope that is
the case--then we would be willing to resume
high-level talks.  In the meantime, we will
pursue our consultations on sanctions at the
United Nations.
 
In recent days, I've consulted with President
Kim of South Korea, Prime Minister Hata of
Japan, President Yeltsin of Russia, and others.
I will continue to consult closely with them on
this matter, with other international leaders,
and, of course, with Members of Congress of
both parties.
 
Through all appropriate means, I will keep
working to ensure the security of South Korea;
the safety of our troops; the stability of the
Asia-Pacific; and the protection of our nation,
our friends, and our allies from the spread of
nuclear weapons.
 
There is a great deal at stake.  We are
pursuing our interests with resolve and
steadiness.  We are hopeful that this
development today will be positive, and we are
awaiting further evidence.
 
 
Robert L. Gallucci
June 9, 1994
Statement by the Assistant Secretary for
Political-Military Affairs before the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC.
 
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to
testify on the North Korea nuclear issue.  We
have, once again, reached a critical juncture
in our efforts to resolve this issue through
diplomacy.  In spite of repeated warnings from
both us and the international community, North
Korea has unloaded spent fuel from its five-
megawatt reactor.  It has done so without
preserving the IAEA's ability to clarify the
operating history of the reactor and, in
particular, to verify North Korea's
declarations of the amount of fuel it
discharged from the reactor in the past.
 
As a result, we have informed the North that we
have no basis for holding a third round of
high-level talks.  Moreover, we will seek
further action in the UN Security Council.  We
have already begun consultations with our
allies and with the Security Council on
appropriate next steps, including sanctions.
Today, I would like to cover these topics:
 
(1)  An overview of our approach to the North
Korea nuclear issue;
(2)  A review of recent events leading to the
current situation; and
(3)  Next steps on this issue.
 
Background
As you know, the D.P.R.K. adhered to the
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985,
but it was not until April 1992 that an
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
safeguards agreement pursuant to the NPT
entered into force.  A so-called initial report
of nuclear material and installations was then
submitted to the agency in May 1992.
Subsequently, the IAEA found some
inconsistencies between the information
provided by the D.P.R.K. on plutonium
production and the IAEA's own findings on the
basis of analysis of samples taken during
inspections.  In addition, North Korea tried to
conceal two possible nuclear-waste sites at
Yongbyon which appear likely to contain
evidence of undeclared plutonium production.
 
Efforts to resolve these problems proved
unproductive, leading IAEA Director General
Hans Blix in January 1993 to call for special
inspections of the two suspect waste sites and
for additional information necessary to resolve
discrepancies in the D.P.R.K.'s plutonium
declaration.  Following North Korea's rejection
of this request and the adoption by the IAEA
Board of Governors (BOG) of a resolution
demanding that it comply with IAEA requirements
within one month, the D.P.R.K. responded in
March 1993 by giving notice that it intended to
withdraw from the NPT.  In April, the IAEA BOG
found North Korea in non-compliance with its
safeguards obligations under the NPT and
reported this non-compliance to the UN Security
Council.
 
North Korea's actions represent a dangerous
precedent.  They not only challenge the
international non-proliferation regime but also
threaten peace and security on the Korean
Peninsula and Asia.  Because of this danger,
the UN Security Council unanimously endorsed a
statement by the Council President in early
April calling on the D.P.R.K. to remain in the
NPT and to cooperate with the IAEA.  On May 11,
the Security Council passed a resolution along
similar lines which called on all member states
to "encourage" the D.P.R.K. to honor its non-
proliferation obligations.  That set the stage
for the beginning of our bilateral dialogue
with the North.
 
U.S. Policy
Our objectives in resolving the North Korean
nuclear issue have been a nuclear-free Korean
Peninsula and a strong non-proliferation
regime.  We must ensure that North Korea does
not possess nuclear weapons and will not build
them in the future.  That means North Korea
must agree to:
 
--Full membership in the NPT;
--Full cooperation with the IAEA in
implementing fullscope safeguards, including
special inspections and other measures to clear
up the discrepancies in the D.P.R.K.'s past
declaration; and,
--Full implementation of the South-North
Denuclearization Accord, which bans uranium
enrichment and reprocessing facilities and
provides for a bilateral inspection regime.
 
It has been a full year since we began our
bilateral effort to achieve our goals through
negotiations with North Korea.  It has been 11
months since we last met to negotiate formally.
For the past year, we have maintained our
position on the conditions necessary for
negotiations and have probed the North Korean
position.  Although it has stayed in the NPT--
albeit claiming a special status--and
maintained safeguards continuity, North Korea's
recent actions do not give us reason to believe
that it is yet serious about settling the
nuclear issue through negotiations.  We have
also made it clear to North Korea that we will
not continue discussions without tangible
progress toward resolution of the nuclear
issue.
 
In the course of our diplomatic effort, we have
created a firm international coalition in
support of our goals--a coalition which, I
might add, will be particularly important in
any effort to seek sanctions.  We have
consulted closely with Japan and the Republic
of Korea through normal diplomatic channels as
well as through regular trilateral meetings.
Both Japan and the Republic of Korea fully
support our policy.
 
At the same time, the U.S. and the Republic of
Korea have continued to take prudent measures
to ensure that our defenses remain strong.
Last year, we conducted a number of joint
exercises designed to enhance our capabilities
and readiness in case of hostilities.  We are
pursuing a force-modernization program for U.S.
forces in Korea begun in the late 1980s, and we
continue to provide technical assistance,
transfer technology, and participate in co-
production programs with South Korea to improve
its forces.  In reaction to increasing tensions
on the Korean Peninsula, we have taken steps to
enhance our military posture there, including
improvements to our intelligence and
surveillance capabilities.  In March 1994, at
the request of the UN commander of U.S. forces
in Korea, General Luck, a Patriot missile
battalion was deployed to the R.O.K.  This was
a defensive deployment in response to North
Korean missile capability.
 
Recent Diplomatic Efforts
Following North Korea's refusal to allow the
necessary IAEA inspections agreed to in its
February 15 agreement with the agency, the UNSC
issued a presidential statement on March 31
calling on the D.P.R.K. to comply with its
safeguards obligations and inviting IAEA
Director General Blix to report to the Council
in May on the status of IAEA inspections.
 
On the basis of the strong international
support demonstrated by the UNSC statement, and
in consultation with the R.O.K., our strategy
has been to:
 
--Stand firm on North Korea meeting its
international safeguards requirements and the
importance of implementing the South-North
Denuclearization Accord; and
 
--Demonstrate tactical flexibility,
particularly on the exact time, place, and
structure of meetings between North and South
Korea.  This flexibility was suggested and
fully supported by South Korea.  We made this
new approach clear to North Korea through our
working-level discussions and other parties
with a direct interest in our bilateral
dialogue.
 
Unfortunately, in early May, North Korea began
to unload spent fuel from its five-megawatt
reactor without making adequate arrangements
with the IAEA on actions required to preserve
the agency's ability to perform future
measurements of the discharged fuel.  The IAEA
has been allowed sufficient presence to ensure
that no fuel currently being unloaded from the
reactor has been diverted for non-peaceful
purposes.  However, there is an additional,
critical issue:  Measurements of specific fuel
rods unloaded from the reactor would have
helped to clarify its operating history and, in
particular, helped to verify North Korea's
declarations of the amount of fuel it
discharged from the reactor in the past.  This
is directly related to our goal of determining
whether the North has separated sufficient
plutonium to produce nuclear weapons.
 
Since the beginning of our negotiations with
the North Koreans last June, we have said that
satisfactory IAEA safeguards arrangements
during the refueling of the five-megawatt
reactor is one essential basis for continuing
our dialogue with North Korea, precisely
because of the importance of these fuel
measurements to determine the amount of
plutonium produced by North Korea.  We have
clearly and consistently told North Korea that
the nuclear issue cannot be resolved without
eventually accounting for its past plutonium
production.
 
In our recent exchanges with North Korea, we
offered to meet for a third round of high-level
talks in early June to discuss an overall
solution for the nuclear and other issues
within the broader context of movement toward
normalization of relations.  As a basis for
such an overall solution, we insisted that the
technical possibility of fuel measurement must
be preserved.  North Korea claimed it was ready
to permit measurement as part of a political
solution, but it refused to schedule a third
round of talks unless the U.S. dropped this
requirement.  Instead, North Korea began to
discharge fuel at a rapid rate, claiming a non-
existent "safety concern."  We warned North
Korea in the clearest terms that we would
return the issue to the UN Security Council if
North Korea proceeded to destroy evidence of
past  reactor operations.  As recently as May
30, the President of the UN Security Council
issued a warning urging North Korea not to
proceed with the discharge of fuel except in
accordance with IAEA requirements.
 
Unfortunately, North Korea ignored these
warnings from the international community.  It
rejected every method proposed by the IAEA for
preserving the technical possibility for
measurement of the fuel rods in the future and
proceeded to deliberately destroy evidence of
its past nuclear activities.  On June 2, IAEA
Director General Blix reported to the UNSC that
because of North Korea's actions, the IAEA has
lost the ability to accurately measure nuclear
fuel discharged from the five-megawatt,
experimental reactor in North Korea. The IAEA
reported that the loss of this technique means
that its overall ability to verify the amount
of plutonium previously produced by North Korea
has been "seriously eroded."
 
Accordingly, at present, we have no basis for
holding a third round of high-level talks with
North Korea, and we will seek further action in
the UN Security Council.  We have already begun
consultations with our allies and with the
Security Council on appropriate next steps in
response to North Korea's actions, including
sanctions.
 
What Next?
North Korea has deliberately and unnecessarily
destroyed important historical evidence that
has seriously eroded the IAEA's ability to
verify past plutonium production in North
Korea.  This act undercuts the basis of our
dialogue with the North.  We will not continue
that dialogue until a reasonable basis for it
can be established.
 
We hope that, as the Security Council addresses
this issue, North Korea will recognize that it
has overstepped the bounds and take steps
necessary to rectify the situation and make
resumption of our talks possible.  UNSC action
also will send a signal to other NPT parties
that the international community places great
emphasis on fulfilling fullscope safeguards
obligations.
 
We continue to work at building international
support for UNSC action.  On June 3-4, we held
bilateral and trilateral consultations with
Japan and South Korea in Washington on next
steps.  Those discussions were extremely useful
and productive in reaching a common position on
next steps.  As a result, at the close of our
meetings, we issued a joint statement calling
for UNSC consideration of sanctions.
Consultations at the UNSC on sanctions began on
June 6 with a Perm Five meeting.  We expect
that process to continue over the next few
weeks.
 
The IAEA has said that the destruction of the
evidence seriously erodes the ability of the
IAEA to verify past plutonium production in
North Korea but that the IAEA still might be
able to accomplish this objective if North
Korea fully cooperates in providing access to
locations and information required by the IAEA.
We hope that North Korea takes immediate steps
to seek new arrangements with the IAEA to begin
the process of resolving these discrepancies.
 
In conclusion, I would stress that any
possibility for resolving the nuclear issue
must be based on North Korea remaining in the
NPT, maintaining the continuity of safeguards,
halting any further plutonium separation, and
preserving the possibility of historical
analysis.  On May 30, the UNSC  requested that
the IAEA remain in North Korea to monitor
activities at the 5 MW reactor.  If North Korea
takes any further measures to undercut the
basis of a resolution of the nuclear issue, the
international community will have to respond
accordingly. (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 2:
 
Establishing the Basis for a Successful
Conclusion to the Crisis in Haiti
President Clinton, William Gray
 
New Steps on U.S.-Haiti Financial Transactions
and Commercial Air Service
 
Opening statements at a news conference by
President Clinton and William Gray, Special
Adviser to the President and the Secretary of
State on Haiti, Washington, DC, June 10, 1994.
 
President Clinton.  Today I want to have Bill
Gray, our special adviser on Haiti, announce
two new steps that are necessary to intensify
the pressure on that country's military
leaders:  a ban on commercial air traffic and
sanctions on financial transactions.
 
As Bill Gray will explain, these steps
represent an important, new stage in our
efforts to restore democracy and return
President Aristide to Haiti.  The message is
simple:  Democracy must be restored; the coup
must not endure.
 
In the past month, we have taken steps to
advance the interests of the Haitian people and
the United States.  Our national interests--to
help democracy thrive in this hemisphere and to
protect the lives of thousands of Americans who
live and work in Haiti--require us to
strengthen these efforts.
 
Under U.S. leadership, comprehensive United
Nations trade sanctions have gone into force.
To enforce these sanctions, we are moving to
assist the Dominican Republic in sealing its
shared border with Haiti.  The Dominican
Republic has agreed to welcome a multilateral
sanctions monitoring team to help the
Dominicans seal their border.  We've deployed
U.S. naval patrol boats to the area to stop
smugglers and have begun detaining ships
suspected of violating the sanctions.
 
We've also made important strides in dealing
with the difficult issue of Haitians who leave
that country by sea. A facility to interview
Haitians who have been interdicted will soon
open in Jamaica.  And one month from now, the
U.S. will open a second interview facility on
the Turks and Caicos Islands.  I want to thank
the governments of those countries and the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees for their
collaboration in this effort.
 
I want to be clear about this issue.  I
continue to urge all Haitians to avoid risking
their lives in treacherous boat voyages.
Anyone who fears persecution should apply for
refugee status at our facilities within Haiti.
Since our Administration began, those offices
have arranged resettlement for some 3,000
Haitian political refugees--far, far more than
was the case prior to that time.  They stand
ready to review further cases, and they
represent the safest and fastest way for
Haitians to seek refuge.
 
Now I'd like to ask Bill Gray, who stepped into
this very difficult role and has used great
skill to make real progress, to explain these
new steps which we're announcing today.
 
William Gray.  As the President has indicated,
we are announcing two new steps in our efforts
to restore democracy in Haiti.  First, the
President has signed an executive order banning
private financial transactions:
 
--Between Haiti and the United States; and
--Through the United States, between Haiti and
other countries.
 
Let me note that this ban does not apply to
humanitarian activities, including the
expanding programs to feed over a million
Haitians daily.  It also exempts remittances of
up to $50 per month to individual Haitians who
depend on such funds.
 
Second, the President has directed Secretary of
Transportation Pena to instruct all United
States and Haitian air carriers to cease
scheduled services between our two nations.  In
order to allow those Americans and others who
wish to leave Haiti to do so in an orderly
fashion, this measure will take effect as of
June 25.
 
The new measures we are announcing today have
been endorsed by the Organization of American
States, the Friends of Haiti, and President
Aristide.  Through these actions, the U.S. is
sending a strong message to Haiti's military
leaders that they cannot continue repressing
their people and defying world opinion with
impunity.  Working with our international and
Haitian partners, we will act to protect our
national interests and hasten the day when
Haitian democracy is restored and President
Aristide can return to the people who freely
elected him as their leader.
 
 
Progress on U.S. Policy Initiatives
Statement by William Gray, Special Adviser to
the President and the Secretary of State on
Haiti, before the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, Washington, DC, June 8, 1994.
 
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it
is good to be here.  As you will recall, Mr.
Chairman, I began my career in Congress on this
committee.  Then, as today, I was following my
mother's admonition to keep good company.
Thus, I welcome the opportunity to testify
before you today and to work with old
colleagues and new partners as we confront the
difficult issues facing us in Haiti.
 
Mr. Chairman, on May 8, President Clinton
announced a change in our policy on Haiti.
Like many of you, he felt the continued
intransigence of the military junta in Haiti
left us no choice but to step up our efforts to
bring down Haiti's dictators and to extend
every consideration to those fleeing their
oppressive rule.
 
Since the President's announcement, we have
achieved significant progress.  Our efforts
have been distinguished by three
characteristics:  They have multilateral
participation;  they are tough on the de facto
regime and its supporters; and they are
compassionate toward the regime's victims.  To
appreciate these characteristics, one need only
review what's been accomplished since May 8.
 
Progress in Implementing Sanctions
On May 21, as a consequence of U.S. leadership,
UN Security Council Resolution 917, imposing
stringent new sanctions on Haiti, went into
effect.
 
On May 26, the Special Representative of the
Secretaries General of the United Nations and
of the Organization of American States, Mr.
Dante Caputo, and I met with President Balaguer
and reached agreement on a plan to seal the
border between the Dominican Republic and Haiti
and to send 60 international technical advisers
to the Dominican Republic to help in that
effort.
 
On June 3, the representatives of the Friends
of the Secretary General of the United Nations
on Haiti--which include Argentina, Canada,
France, the United States, and Venezuela--
decided, among other things, to consider on a
national basis expanded sanctions that would
cut off commercial air flights to and from
Haiti and ban international financial
transactions with that country.  The Friends
also expressed their determination to promote
the full redeployment of a strengthened and
reconfigured United Nations Mission in Haiti.
 
Progress on Refugees
On May 19, the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees, Mrs. Ogata, and I were pleased to
announce agreement on a plan for cooperation
between the United Nations and the United
States in processing Haitian applicants for
refugee status and in locating countries for
resettlement for Haitian refugees.
 
On June 1, the Governments of Jamaica and of
the United States jointly announced a plan for
ship-board processing of Haitian migrants in
Jamaican ports.  On June 3, the Government of
the Turks and Caicos Islands agreed to the U.S.
proposals for a land-based processing center on
Grand Turk Island.
 
Progress on Multilateral Support
On June 6, Deputy Secretary Talbott and I
attended the meeting of foreign ministers of
the Organization of American States on Haiti in
Belem, Brazil.  A strong resolution was enacted
which includes a call to all member states to
assist in the resettlement of Haitian refugees,
to support measures by the United Nations to
strengthen the UN police and military mission
in Haiti, and to support and reinforce existing
and additional sanctions against the military
regime.
 
While much remains to be done, I believe we
have established the basis for a successful
conclusion to the Haitian crisis.  Allow me to
explain why these steps are important and how
they fit into the President's overall strategy.
 
U.S. Interests at Stake in Haiti
President Clinton is committed to the prompt
return of democracy and of President Aristide
to Haiti.  Why are we so committed to this
task?  Why does Haiti matter this much to the
United States?  How does Haiti differ from
other troubled countries around the globe?
President Clinton has recently explained our
interests quite clearly.
 
First, Haiti is a close neighbor.
 
Second, there are approximately 1 million
persons of Haitian descent resident in the
United States.
 
Third, several thousand American citizens live
in Haiti.
 
Fourth, we believe drugs are coming to the
United States from Haiti.
 
Fifth, we face the continuing possibility of a
massive outflow of Haitian migrants to the
United States because of conditions in Haiti.
 
Finally, Haiti and Cuba are the only two non-
democracies left in our hemisphere, and in
Haiti the results of a democratic election were
overturned by unconstitutional and anti-
democratic means.
 
These points bear discussion in greater depth.
Obviously, we have a moral stake in promoting
democracy and human rights throughout the
world.  At the same time, our capacity to
influence events varies.  We may not be able to
right every wrong everywhere, every time.  But
this is not a valid argument against taking
action in places where our interests are
heavily engaged and at times when we have the
ability to do so.  Indeed, there are times when
the ability to influence events in the right
direction gives us the responsibility to do so.
This is one of those times.
 
Haiti is a place where we have not only a moral
responsibility but a very practical interest in
human rights and democracy.  The corrupt and
brutal behavior of the Haitian military
leadership toward their own people and society
has caused Haitians to try to leave their
homeland to seek a decent life elsewhere:  some
because they are directly targeted by the
military; many more because of the economic,
educational, and social desolation that the
military's corruption and mismanagement has
inflicted on the country.
 
As a consequence of our geographical proximity
and cultural ties, the vast majority of those
seeking a new life attempt to enter the United
States.  As we learned more than a decade ago
with the Mariel boat lift from Cuba, the
consequences for our own society of a sudden,
mass influx of asylum seekers are devastating.
But neither can we accept that the burden of
corruption and brutality be borne indefinitely
by the people of Haiti and the United States
rather than by those who are responsible for
it.
 
Our other set of interests is less direct but
no less important.  The emergence of democracy
as the prevailing form of government in this
hemisphere is clearly and unmistakably in our
self-interest.  Democracies generate hope;
dictatorships produce refugees.  Democracies
work with each other to create mutually
beneficial trade; dictatorships engage in
corruption and then create conflicts to divert
the attention of their people.  Democracies
tend toward political stability since
democratic peoples can correct their mistakes
at the ballot box; dictatorships frequently
change course only at the point of a gun.
 
Protecting U.S. Interests--The Three-Part
Policy
 
Given our clear interests in ending the crisis
in Haiti, the President adopted last month a
three-part policy to achieve the goals he has
established to protect our interests.
 
First and foremost, our policy is designed to
bring about the prompt departure from power of
the current military leadership in Haiti.  They
alone have created the problem.  There can be
no solution until they depart.
 
Second, the President decided to provide
additional due process to asylum seekers,
pending resolution of the crisis.
 
Third, we have undertaken a series of actions
designed to mitigate human suffering to the
extent possible even as we work to bring a
definitive end to the situation that has
spawned it.
 
I would also note that in adopting this policy
the President made it clear that he is
determined that we should act on a multilateral
basis.  Each of these three elements of policy
are being pursued in full cooperation with the
international community.
 
Departure of the Haitian Military Leaders
 
Our recent policy review confirmed that the
real obstacle to progress is the intransigence
of a military leadership that has violated
Haiti's own constitution, violated its own
international commitments, and violated the
human rights of its own countrymen.  These coup
leaders had their chance to correct the error
of their past ways and to save themselves,
their institution, and their country.  Instead,
they have demonstrated that they have no
concern whatsoever for their fellow soldiers or
their fellow citizens.  They must go.
 
Accordingly, we have moved aggressively to
focus pressure on these coup leaders.  The
United States took the lead in the successful
effort to impose additional, comprehensive
sanctions on Haiti.  UN Resolution 917 directly
links the sanctions against Haiti to the
retirement of General Cedras and the departure
from Haiti of General Biamby and Lt. Colonel
Francois.  In addition to the worldwide embargo
of arms and petroleum products and the freezing
of the illegal regime's assets already in
place, UN Resolution 917 imposes a
comprehensive trade embargo exempting only food
and medicine; a cutoff of all but regularly
scheduled passenger air service;  and a
prohibition against travel worldwide of the
Haitian officer corps, members of the puppet
civilian regime, and others associated with the
military coup.  It also calls for a freezing of
the personal assets of such individuals.  The
resolution makes clear that all of these
sanctions will stay in place until these three
men go.  At the same time, the departure of
these three and the installation of a new
leadership committed to carrying out the
obligations of the military institution under
the Governors Island accord will begin the
process of lifting the sanctions.
 
The Dominican Republic:  Key to Sanctions
Enforcement
 
Sanctions are only as good as their
enforcement.  A worldwide fuel embargo was
reimposed by the UN last fall.  President
Clinton's leadership was crucial not only in
securing this prompt response to the military's
breach of its obligations under the Governors
Island agreement but in establishing a
multinational maritime enforcement effort to
ensure it is respected.  The United States has
maintained both naval and Coast Guard vessels
around Haiti to enforce the embargo, and we
have been joined by naval vessels from France,
Canada, Argentina, and the Netherlands.
 
These efforts have had a tremendous effect on
the Haitian economy:  We estimate that between
65% and 70% of Haiti's normal petroleum
requirements were not being met.  The price of
gasoline rose as high as $10 per gallon.
Electricity was available in the capital for
only a few hours a day.  Scores of businesses
have shut down or are operating at minimal
capacity.
 
But we are not satisfied with even this level
of effectiveness.  Every gallon of fuel that
leaks through the embargo allows the military
leadership to put off the decision they must
ultimately make and, thus, simply prolongs the
agony for the Haitian people.
 
A key to improving the enforcement of the
embargo is the Dominican Republic.  The
Dominican Government faces a significant task
in attempting to prevent smuggling over a 175-
mile land border and extensive coastal sea
routes.  The better the enforcement, the higher
the profit margin for smugglers and, hence, the
incentive to take risks.  So it is not an easy
job.
 
To reinvigorate our efforts to facilitate the
Dominican Republic's enforcement efforts, the
Special Representative of the Secretaries
General of the United Nations and of the
Organization of American States, Mr. Dante
Caputo, and I visited President Balaguer last
month.  President Balaguer described to us the
efforts his government was making and committed
himself personally to assuring that the border
is sealed.  He likewise undertook to implement
fully the recommendations of a United Nations
technical team that has completed its
assessment of sanctions enforcement measures.
 
A June 1 follow-up visit by Mr. Caputo
confirmed that President Balaguer and the
Dominican military are working to put into
practice the measures recommended.  It is in
our interest to assist them in doing so.
 
In sum, we found President Balaguer and his
government to be fully conscious of their
obligations and fully prepared to meet them.
We are already seeing encouraging results on
the border.
 
Let me take this occasion to deny categorically
the speculation in the press that the
cooperation of the Dominican Republic was
somehow linked to our position on the recent
elections in that nation.  President Balaguer
had initiated cooperation well in advance of
the elections--for example, in inviting the UN
team--and has never connected the two issues in
any of his talks with us, nor have we with him.
The U.S. position on these two matters is based
on the merits of each.  On the elections, we
have laid out our concerns publicly and
privately, and we will continue to support the
efforts of the international election
observers.  We will not pursue democracy in
Haiti at the expense of the democratic process
in the Dominican Republic.
 
Further Sanctions in the Offing
 
Even as the new sanctions and new enforcement
mechanisms we already have put into effect
begin to bite, we are developing new measures
to increase the pressure on the military
leadership.  At a high-level meeting of
representatives of the Friends of the UN
Secretary General on Haiti--the United States,
France, Canada, Venezuela, and Argentina--held
June 3, we took the initiative in proposing
consideration of a cutoff of commercial air
service and of financial transactions with
Haiti.  The Friends expressed their readiness
to consider such measures and encourage others
to do so.  The meeting of the foreign ministers
of the Organization of American States on Haiti
yesterday passed a resolution urging all states
to consider applying these additional
sanctions.  We are encouraged that others are
ready to join us in preparing to move toward
these additional measures.
 
Reconstituting the UN Mission in Haiti
 
A reconfigured UN peace-keeping mission for
Haiti will play an important role in assuring
the peaceful transition to democratic
government in Haiti.  We believe it is
important that the UN Security Council agree to
reconstitute and reconfigure the UN Mission in
Haiti--UNMIH.  A UNSC decision to reconstitute
UNMIH will send an important signal of
international determination to the military
regime in Port-au-Prince and an important
message of reassurance to the Haitian
population.
 
UNMIH should be ready to deploy once the
current military leadership in Haiti has
departed.  We envisage this as a permissive
operation.  The mission should have a mandate
and a composition, however, which will permit
it to deal with such challenges as it is likely
to encounter in the course of its deployment.
 
We believe that in addition to responsibility
for the training and professionalization of the
army and police, UNMIH also should be given the
mandate and the capability to support the
democratic government of Haiti in providing
security to the international presence, senior
Haitian government personnel, and key
installations and in helping assure basic civic
order.
 
We will encourage maximum multinational
participation.  The United States should be
prepared to participate in such a mission.  We
have received support for a UN Mission in Haiti
reconstituted and strengthened  along these
lines from the Friends of Haiti last Friday and
at the OAS ministerial this week.  At the
meeting in Brazil, President Aristide called
for such changes in UNMIH's composition and
mandate.  Yesterday, in their communique on
Haiti, the hemispheric ministers lent their
weight to this call.  In the coming days, we
will be working with the UN and interested
governments to secure a strengthened and
reconstituted mandate for UNMIH  and to
encourage broad, multinational participation in
it.
 
Radio Broadcasting to Haiti and the Role of
President Aristide
 
Finally, I would  note that President Aristide
has a role to play in bringing about the change
in the military leadership we all seek.  He has
told me that he does not consider the access he
now has to the Haitian media to be adequate to
allow him to carry his message of
reconciliation and progress to the Haitian
people.  We are considering ways in which we
can further assist him to bring his message of
peace and reconciliation directly to the
Haitian people.
 
Due Process for Haitian Asylum Seekers
 
An integral part of the Administration's review
of its policy toward Haiti was the treatment of
Haitian boat people.   The President announced
on May 8 that certain modifications to U.S.
refugee policy toward Haiti would be made.
Specifically, he stated that, while all Haitian
asylum seekers would continue to be interdicted
at sea, a determination of eligibility for
refugee status would be made for those
requesting asylum prior to any repatriation.
Those persons found to be refugees will be
provided refuge.  Those who are not found to be
refugees will be returned to Haiti.
 
International Cooperation in Processing
Refugees
 
We are now nearing the time when we will be in
a position to implement these changes.  Deputy
Secretary of State Strobe Talbott signed a
memorandum of understanding in Kingston,
Jamaica, on June 2 permitting the United States
to process Haitians aboard vessels in Jamaica's
territorial waters.  These vessels are
currently en route to Jamaica, and we
anticipate that refugee processing will be able
to commence soon.
 
We also have reached agreement with the
Government of the Turks and Caicos Islands to
use Grand Turk Island as an onshore processing
location.  We are pleased that the Haitian
refugee problem is being addressed in a
multilateral fashion, as it is an international
problem.
 
We also are extremely pleased with the support
and cooperation that we are receiving from the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees--
UNHCR.  UNHCR has agreed to actively
participate in the refugee processing operation
by counseling Haitian boat people prior to
their refugee interviews, providing guidance
and training to the interviewing officers, and
monitoring the overall process to ensure that
it meets the highest standards for refugee
determination.
 
Sharing the Refugee Burden Internationally
 
In addition to cooperation in processing, UNHCR
has indicated that it will assist the U.S. in
identifying countries willing to accept
approved Haitian refugees either for temporary
protection or permanent resettlement.   For our
part, we have approached states in the region
and requested that they accept approved Haitian
refugees either temporarily or permanently.  We
have received definitive, positive responses
from a few and encouraging ones from a number
of others.  We will continue our efforts to
convince countries to take their fair share.
The humanitarian crisis in Haiti is a serious
problem for the international community, and we
hope that it will actively participate in its
resolution.
 
Monitoring Returnees
 
While some Haitian boat people will be found to
be refugees, we would expect that the majority
will not be approved and will be returned to
Haiti.  Our experience thus far indicates that
repatriated boat people are not targeted by
Haitian authorities for retribution.  However,
as has been done for more than two years, our
embassy in Port-au-Prince will endeavor to
monitor the welfare of those who are
repatriated.
 
In-country Processing
 
As the President has emphasized, we believe our
in-country refugee processing program remains
the best and safest means for genuine refugees
to have their claims heard.  We have three in-
country processing centers that permit persons
with a well-founded fear of persecution to have
their claims adjudicated without having to take
a potentially dangerous sea journey in
unseaworthy vessels.  We wish to urge those who
are thinking about taking such a risk to
consider applying at one of the in-country
centers instead.
 
Since the in-country refugee processing program
began, over 2,500 persons have been admitted to
the United States as refugees.  The admission
of these recent refugees, combined with normal
immigration over the past 10 years, makes Haiti
one of the largest sources of new residents to
the United States in the world, despite its
relatively small population.
 
That being said, our goal in Haiti is to put
our refugee processing centers out of business
and decrease the pressures that cause the
refugee crisis by restoring and strengthening
democracy and rebuilding the Haitian economy.
Until these fundamental issues are addressed,
Haitian asylum seekers coming to the United
States will continue to confront us on a large
scale.
 
Alleviating Human Suffering
 
The third--but by no means last--component of
U.S. policy is that of alleviating human
suffering.  This element of our policy
resonates most fully in American hearts and is
most broadly supported in all corners of this
country.  President Clinton is determined that
the most vulnerable groups be protected as much
as possible from the tightened embargo.  For
that reason, we are not only continuing but
expanding our human rights and humanitarian
assistance support for the Haitian people.
 
Human Rights
 
We are working to rapidly return and augment
the staff of the joint United Nations and
Organization of American States International
Civilian Mission to monitor human rights abuses
in Haiti.  These courageous individuals have
been commended to us by our embassy as the only
practical deterrent to human rights abuses by
the military and their allies.  Our embassy has
recommended an all-out effort to build the
numbers back up to at least the level that
existed prior to their temporary withdrawal
last fall, and we fully share the embassy's
view.  At this point, 69 members have returned
to Haiti and are being deployed in key
locations.  The Organization of American States
is, meanwhile, recruiting more observers.
 
The United States actively supports the Inter-
American Human Rights Commission, which
recently returned from Haiti with a very
sobering report.  The United States fully
shares their views on the gravity and horror of
the abuses reported and will carefully consider
their conclusions and recommendations.
 
Humanitarian Assistance
 
The United States maintains a large
humanitarian assistance program in Haiti funded
by the Agency for International Development to
help alleviate the suffering that results from
the callous military authoritarianism and
economic mismanagement that have been
compounded by the international embargo.
 
The program is operated through well-known and
very effective United States private voluntary
organizations such as CARE, Catholic Relief
Services, ADRA, and the Pan-American
Development Foundation.  It consists of daily
feeding with PL-480 Title II foods for nearly a
million Haitian school children, pregnant and
lactating mothers, and elderly Haitians.  We
also provide access for nearly 2 million of the
most vulnerable Haitians to basic health care,
such as child immunizations, basic
pharmaceuticals, family planning,
epidemiological surveillance, and limited
curative care.  Finally, we provide, through
the Pan-American Development Foundation, 16,000
temporary jobs aimed at cleaning up garbage and
drainage canals, repairing key secondary roads
needed for the feeding programs, and rebuilding
irrigation canals.
 
As an integral part of the May 8 decision to
impose stronger sanctions, we committed
ourselves to expanding these humanitarian
programs as the effects of sanctions are felt.
We have increased actual feeding levels in the
past few weeks by 320,000 people.  We expect
the jobs program to put food-purchasing incomes
into the pockets of at least another 29,000
poor Haitians by the end of this year.  We will
soon contract with a logistics firm that can
assist our voluntary agencies in overcoming the
difficulties of transport and delivery in
Haiti.
 
Basic foods and medicines are not prohibited
under the UN commercial sanctions.  However,
with the recently strengthened commercial and
financial embargo, it may be necessary to
provide extraordinary humanitarian transport of
such items on a case-by-case basis.  I assure
you, Mr. Chairman, that the United States will
take the necessary measures to meet the basic
needs of the most vulnerable groups in Haiti.
 
Conclusion
 
Mr. Chairman, let me be as clear as I can be.
President Clinton has determined that our
interests require the restoration of the
democratic process in Haiti and the return of
President Aristide.  We are embarked on a new
path toward this goal.  Much has been achieved
since President Clinton's announcement on May
8.  Further steps will be taken in the coming
days and weeks.  No option is excluded.
Democracy in  Haiti will prevail.  Neither we
nor the Haitian people can long wait for this
event.(###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 3:
 
Additional Financial Sanctions Imposed on Haiti
Statement released by the White House, Office
of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, June
22, 1994.
 
As part of the Clinton Administration's
commitment to restore democracy to Haiti, the
President has imposed additional financial
sanctions to block assets of all Haitian
nationals residing in Haiti.  The order also
reconfirms prior blocking of assets of named
individuals who have participated in or
supported the illegal regime in Haiti and
extends to all Haitian family members of
already blocked individuals, wherever resident.
 
Blocked assets include assets in the U.S. or
subject to U.S. jurisdiction, such as deposits
in foreign branches of U.S. banks.  This new
executive order is effective immediately.  It
does not affect property of the United States
Government, the United Nations, the
Organization of American States, or the foreign
diplomatic missions in Haiti.  It is also not
applicable to non-governmental organizations
providing essential humanitarian assistance or
conducting refugee and migration operations in
Haiti.
 
This executive order is intended to target
propertied Haitians who have supported the de
facto regime and thus have prolonged the
suffering of the Haitian people.
 
We will continue to work closely with non-
governmental groups to minimize the impact of
the new sanctions on their operations in Haiti.
This executive order does not affect financing
for continued shipments of basic food stuffs
and medical supplies to Haiti, nor transactions
associated with such shipments, consistent with
previous executive orders and UN sanctions.
 
The new sanctions the President has imposed
will amplify our message to the Haitian
military leadership and those who have
supported them that we are determined to bring
about the return of democracy and President
Aristide to Haiti.  Coupled with previous
actions, the freeze executed today by President
Clinton will make it unmistakably clear to the
Haitian elite that it will not escape the
consequences of continued rule by the
illegitimate de facto regime.  We urge those
elites to recognize this now and to join in the
restoration of democracy in Haiti.(###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 4:
 
U.S. and Japan:  Common Ideals And New
Challenges
President Clinton, Emperor Akihito
Remarks upon arrival of Emperor Akihito and
Empress Michiko of Japan at the White House,
June 13, 1994
 
President Clinton.  Your Majesties,
distinguished guests:  On behalf of the people
of the United States, I am deeply honored to
welcome Your Majesties to Washington and our
nation for your first visit since you ascended
to the Chrysanthemum Throne.
 
When Hillary and I had the great pleasure of
visiting your beautiful county last year, we
were honored by your invitation to the
wonderful banquet at the Imperial Palace for
the G-7 leaders.  The people of Japan welcomed
us with open arms and left us deeply impressed
by their warmth and their society, which blends
the most ancient traditions with the most
modern technologies.
 
During the next two weeks as you make your way
across our land, the American people will have
the opportunity to return the hospitality that
you showed to us.  From the great cities of the
East to the peaks of the Rocky Mountains to the
ports of the West, we welcome you not as
visitors but as honored guests and old friends.
 
In the next two weeks, you will see much more
than vistas, landscapes, and monuments.  You
will also meet, as Your Majesty said on your
last visit here, as many people from as many
walks of life as possible.  Our people, after
all, are the essence of America.  I know they
look forward to welcoming you into their homes
and communities.  And I am certain you will be
impressed with them and that they will be
impressed with you and your great knowledge of
our nation, our culture, and our history.
 
You also will witness the tremendous
contributions that Japanese Americans have made
to our society and the growing influence of
Japanese cultural heritage in America.  The
list is long.  It includes distinguished
artists and musicians.  It includes athletes.
It includes business leaders and eminent
leaders of our political system.
 
In your travels, you will find that almost
every American city boasts buildings inspired
by the fluid and elegant lines of Japanese
architects.  In millions of American homes, you
will see the works of Japanese printmakers and
gardens that might well fit in Kyoto.  And in
our elementary schools and colleges, you will
meet thousands of Americans struggling to learn
and to master your wonderful Japanese language.
These studies, in fact, are among the fastest-
growing courses in our schools today.
 
Think how different the world was when Your
Majesty first came to America more than 40
years ago.  Nations were rebuilding from the
devastation of war, and vivid memories of that
conflict divided our two people.
Misunderstanding and even ignorance divided us,
and more than borders blocked the sharing of
ideas.
 
When you visited New York in 1953, you were
shown a demonstration of a brand new
technology.  Your eager American hosts called
it "color television."  Today, as we gather
here, millions and millions of Japanese
citizens are watching us as we speak because
their households are linked by TV sets to us
through the miracle of satellite technology.
 
Today's ceremony is but one symbol of what the
combined talents and ingenuity of our two
people can produce.  Surely we have come far
since the days when one of our great teachers
on Japan--your friend and our ambassador, Edwin
O. Reischauer--observed that our two countries
were using the same set of binoculars but
looking through opposite ends.  Today, we share
a common vision.
 
It is a vision of democracy and prosperity, of
a world where we trade freely in ideas and
goods; a vision of a world that protects and
secures the rights and freedoms of all human
beings; a vision of a world at peace.  You have
called the era of your reign Heisei--
"fulfilling peace."  And nothing could be more
important to our nation than working with you
to achieve that goal.
 
Your Majesties visit us at a moment when it is
clear that the destinies of our two peoples are
inextricably linked, a moment in history when
every day yields new challenges.  But those
challenges bring with them the opportunity for
us to carve new paths together.
 
Let us listen to the elegant words left to us
by the Japanese poet Tachibana Akemi:  "It is a
pleasure when, rising in the morning, I go
outside and find a flower that has bloomed that
was not there yesterday."  That verse is more
than a century old, but its message is
timeless.  Every day brings with it the promise
of a new blossom, the prospect of progress and
growing friendship between our two peoples.
 
Your Majesties, our commitment to common ideals
is firm.  Our determination to work with you is
strong.  Our welcome to you today is sincere
and heartfelt.  We are privileged to receive
you in the United States.  Thank you very much.
 
 
Emperor Akihito.  Mr. President, Mrs. Clinton,
ladies and gentlemen:  I would like to express
my heartfelt gratitude for your gracious words
of welcome.  I would also like to thank you for
your cordial invitation for this visit.
 
It has been 140 years since the first treaty
was concluded between your country and mine.
When Japan ended its period of national
seclusion and embarked on a course of
development while maintaining its independence,
the knowledge and technologies it learned from
the United States and other countries were
indeed of great importance.
 
One example of the depth of interest Japan had
in your country at that time is the fact that
the Empress Dowager Shoken, the Empress of my
great grandfather, Emperor Meiji, composed 12
waka poems on the theme of Benjamin Franklin's
virtues.  I recall with deep emotion that this
was only 20-odd years after Japan established
diplomatic relations with your country.
 
Today, our two countries have overcome the
deplorable rupture brought about by war and
have forged a close and cooperative
relationship by dint of the wisdom and
unremitting endeavors of our two peoples.
This, I believe, owes much to the broad range
of exchanges long fostered between our two
countries despite differences in historical and
cultural backgrounds.
 
The Japanese people will not forget the
generosity of the support which the United
States extended to my country after World War
II in providing material support, as well as in
caring for next generations of Japanese by
accepting exchange students and by other means;
nor will they forget the indispensable role
played by the United States in ensuring Japan's
security and world peace for the past half-
century.
 
The American people have succeeded in building
their nation based on the tradition of
independence and the tolerance ensured by
democracy buttressed by the underlying spirit
to defend individual freedom.  In the
international community, your country
surmounted the numerous difficulties and put an
end to the Cold War.  And today, your country
assumes the role of leading a new age of great
change.
 
Long exposed to foreign cultures via the sea
from ancient times, Japan has assimilated them
into its own culture and has reached where it
is today through its history of tradition and
change.
 
After World War II, democracy firmly took root
in Japan amid its people's strong aspiration
for peace.  As greater stability was achieved,
its national vigor increased.
 
Japan and the United States are facing major
tasks for the future to build on the
achievements of the past half-century and
consolidate their relations further by drawing
on their respective histories and
characteristics to meet in partnership the new
needs of the post-Cold War era and to
contribute together to the peace and prosperity
of Asia and the Pacific.
 
At the end of the last century, Dr. Inazo
Nitobe, who was later to become Under Secretary
General of the League of Nations, crossed the
ocean and came to your land to fulfill his
youthful dream of becoming a bridge over the
Pacific.
 
I am told that about a century later, Dr. Edwin
Reischauer--former United States Ambassador to
Japan, who had spent his formative years in
Japan and rendered great service as a bridge
between our two countries--was constantly
gazing at the Pacific from his hospital window
in La Jolla, where he lived his final years.
 
Many great individual efforts such as these
sustained and strengthened the ties that bind
our two countries together.  It is my earnest
hope that peaceful interchange will continue to
flourish for many more years to come and that
the Pacific will become a true ocean of peace.
 
More than 40 years have passed since I first
visited the White House to call on President
Eisenhower.  Since then, the Empress and I have
visited the United States several times.  We
are full of warm and pleasant memories of these
trips in which we always came into contact with
the goodwill of the American people.
 
During this visit, the Empress and I will tour
various parts of your country, including places
which we will visit for the first time.  We
will try to meet many people and deepen our
understanding of the path which your country
has chosen and where it stands today.  I
sincerely hope that this visit will further
contribute to the promotion of friendship
between our two peoples.
 
Finally, I would like to express my best wishes
for the greater prosperity of the United States
and the happiness of the American people and
wish to conclude my remarks by expressing my
heartfelt gratitude.(###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 5
 
Russia Joins the Partnership for Peace:  A
Historic Moment for NATO and Europe
Secretary Christopher, Russian Foreign Minister
Kozyrev
 
Secretary Christopher
June 21, 1994
Opening statement from a press briefing en
route from Andrews Air Force Base to Brussels,
Belgium.
 
I thought that it might be useful if I gave you
a little preview of the day tomorrow--some of
the background of it.  The day will begin, for
me, with a rather early morning bilateral
meeting with Foreign Minister Kozyrev.  This is
one of a series of regular consultations that I
have with him on a wide range of subjects.  Of
course, the occasion for his coming to Brussels
is to sign the framework document on the
Partnership for Peace.
 
After our bilateral, Mr. Kozyrev will go to
NATO, where he will meet briefly with Acting
Secretary General Balanzino.  Then he will come
into the NATO Room, where he will sign the
Partnership document--the same document that
all the other members of the Partnership for
Peace have signed.
 
Then, after the signature, there will be a
general discussion between ministers.  After
that, there will be a press conference attended
by Mr. Balanzino and Mr. Kozyrev.  There will
be a brief summary of the entry of Russia into
the Partnership for Peace.  You will see that
the language has been drawn from the NATO
communique.
 
This is, I think it is fair to say, a historic
moment for NATO and for Europe.  It is, in
fact, a development that the United States has
been working on and that I, personally, have
been working on for some time.
 
As you know, last summer we began to analyze
the various possibilities for a renewal of
NATO.  We decided to go forward with the
Partnership for Peace.  In October, I visited
Moscow and consulted with President Yeltsin on
the Partnership for Peace.  I think they felt
that the signing would be the culmination of a
long series of events which brings Russia into
the Partnership for Peace and which, I think,
confirms the viability and validity of that
concept.
 
For Russia, I think, it means a definite
decision which was taken after serious
consideration in that country.  Obviously, it
was a firm decision by President Yeltsin that
he would enter the Partnership for Peace on
this basis--the same basis as the other
nations.  Subsequently, of course, there will
be a presentation document put forward by the
Russians as their contribution to their
participation in the Partnership for Peace, but
that will not be presented tomorrow.  That will
result in a development thereafter of something
called the Individual Partnership Program,
which will basically work out the relationships
between NATO and Russia relating to the
Partnership for Peace.
 
I think you should see this event in a much
broader context of integrating Russia into the
institutions that were formed after World War
II.  These are institutions through which the
West--including Western Europe--has moved to
prosperity and peace over the last four
decades, but they are also institutions which
it was not appropriate for Russia to be part of
because of the tensions of the Cold War.  Now
with those tensions behind us, we are able to
move to a substantially new period.
 
A couple of weeks ago, when I was in Europe,
Russia entered into an agreement with the OECD,
which was an important step forward.  In a few
days, the Russians will be entering into a
somewhat comparable document with the European
Union which affects the trading relationships
between the European Union and Russia.  In two
weeks, in early July, President Yeltsin will be
attending the political aspect of the G-7
summit.  So, if you look at these as a whole,
you will see the integration of Russia into the
institutions of the West.  As I say, this is a
historic series of events:  the Partnership for
Peace being the NATO aspect; appropriate
agreements with the OECD and the European
Union; and, then, attendance at the G-7 summit.
 
I think President Clinton had a fundamental
vision about this, for which I think he has not
gotten sufficient credit.  He saw the
possibility of two alternatives in this post-
Cold War period.  We could try to deal at arm's
length with Russia, pushing them to the East
and not incorporating them into the Western
instruments that were formed after World War
II.  He chose the other path.  It was a path
integrating Russia into the West.  The firm
decision of President Yeltsin--after a lot of
discussion within Russia and, apparently, some
controversy--was to take this important step.
I believe tomorrow will be seen, as we look
back on this period, as a very important day.
I wanted to be there because it's important for
the United States as the most prominent member
of NATO and because it's something that I've
worked on for a long time.
 
The Partnership for Peace has been criticized
by some.  But I think that, as a concept, it
has been far more successful than possibly
could have been envisioned when the President
announced it in January.  Twenty-one have now
signed up, and you know the other things that
are happening--joint planning, joint exercises.
. . (inaudible) Partnership for Peace tomorrow
at NATO Headquarters.  So, I would say that the
Partnership for Peace discussions will be a
central portion of the trip.
 
As far as the bilateral discussion is
concerned, one of the important things that I
will be doing is to bring Foreign Minister
Kozyrev up to date on the situation in North
Korea--our relationship with North Korea.  I
might just diverge for a moment and tell you
where that stands now.
 
As you know, last Thursday, when we heard from
President Carter--the early descriptions of the
message that he would be carrying back from
North Korea--he said that it seemed promising,
but he could not be certain of the meeting.  At
that time, it was basically a decision that was
taken, last Thursday, to meet at the highest
levels.  We said that if the North's
willingness to freeze the critical elements of
their nuclear program meant that:
 
--First, they could not reprocess the fuel;
 
--Second, they would not refuel the reactor;
and
 
--Third, they would permit the IAEA inspectors
to remain and permit the agency to maintain
continuity of safeguards,
 
then we would regard it as a sound basis to
resume talks and go into the third round in
Geneva.
 
We also said after last Thursday's meeting that
we would meet with President Carter when he
returned, for a firsthand opportunity to get an
account of his trip.  Then we would follow up
through diplomatic channels and attempt to
confirm the understanding.  Bob Gallucci and
Tony Lake met with President Carter at length
last Sunday.  President Clinton spoke with him
on the telephone; following that, a message was
constructed.  Last night, we sent a message to
North Korea through diplomatic channels to
confirm the understandings.  As I mentioned,
the three key elements of the freeze of their
nuclear program and confirmation would pave the
way for a third round.
 
I will be talking with Foreign Minister Kozyrev
about that to make sure that he understands
where we stand on that.  We will also be
discussing the progress toward sanctions in the
United Nations if that becomes necessary.  We
are continuing the consultations on sanctions
in order to have a sanctions resolution or, at
least, a sanctions program ready if we should
not be able to confirm the understanding that I
outlined here.
 
So, we'll be talking about North Korea in the
broadest framework and bringing him up to date
as far as our consultations are concerned.
 
Another subject that is very much alive and
important at present is Bosnia.  We will be
talking about that.  As you know, the Contact
Group has been working effectively to put
together a proposal that will be agreed on by
all members of the Contact Group and that will
then be presented to the parties.  We are
making good progress on that.  We are very
close to an agreement in the Contact Group.  We
will also discuss in that Contact Group the
consequences . . . if one of the parties to the
conflict agrees to the proposal and if the
other party doesn't and various hypotheticals
on that.  I will be discussing that with the
Foreign Minister tomorrow as well.
 
I suppose we will take up some other bilateral
topics, as we usually do.  But those three
things, I would say, are the high points of the
meeting I intend to have with him--the
Partnership for Peace, North Korea, and Bosnia.
 
 
Secretary Christopher
June 22, 1994
Address to the North Atlantic Council,
Brussels, Belgium.
 
Mr. Deputy Secretary General, it is a great
pleasure to join our NATO colleagues and
Foreign Minister Kozyrev to mark this historic
occasion and to welcome Russia as the newest
member of the Partnership for Peace.
 
Our meeting today is a powerful expression of
Europe's remarkable transformation.  Who could
have imagined even a few short years ago that
after 40 years of bitter confrontation across
the Iron Curtain, a newly democratic Russia and
this alliance would join in a partnership of
cooperation.  Within our grasp lies the
historic opportunity to build an undivided,
peaceful, and democratic Europe.  That is the
dream that has animated this alliance and my
country for more than four decades.  That is
the vision that President Clinton set forth
when he proposed the Partnership for Peace.
That is the goal that the United Stares remains
fully committed to achieving.
 
Today, as Russia joins the Partnership, we take
a major step toward building the bonds of
cooperation that can secure the peace of a
broader Europe.  As an alliance, we are
reaching out to Russia's Government and its
military to establish a new, more constructive
relationship.  But no less important--as the
alliance has done with other European
neighbors--we are extending a hand of
friendship to the Russian people.
 
Russia is and will remain a country of immense
importance to the rest of Europe and the world.
Its efforts to build democratic institutions
and a market economy have profound implications
for European security.  A broad and
constructive NATO-Russia relationship will
serve the interests of this alliance.  It will
serve Russia's interests.  It will serve the
interests of all the nations of Europe--
particularly those that so recently won their
freedom from communist rule.
 
The Partnership for Peace is central to NATO's
relationship with Russia.  We also look forward
to constructive dialogue and cooperation to
supplement the Partnership in areas where
Russia has unique and important contributions
to make.  At the same time, President Clinton
will continue to work closely with President
Yeltsin to build a strong and cooperative U.S.-
Russian bilateral relationship in the interests
of both our peoples and the world.
 
Other European states may also have interests
or capabilities that would warrant "16-plus-
one" consultations outside the Partnership.  We
should welcome these possibilities.  As NATO
promotes security and stability in Central and
Eastern Europe, that too will benefit all
European nations--including Russia.
 
Russia's accession to the Partnership for Peace
is a reflection of the policy of extending to
the East the institutions that have allowed the
West to achieve unparalleled security and
prosperity.  Two weeks ago in Paris, Russia
signed a cooperation agreement with the OECD.
In two days in Corfu, President Yeltsin will
sign an agreement with the EU that will open
European markets to many Russian products.
Next month in Naples, the G-7 will welcome
President Yeltsin for broad political
consultations.
 
By widening the reach of the great postwar
security and economic institutions, we can help
ensure that war, poverty, and oppression never
again engulf this continent.  We are committed
to working for an integrated Europe where
sovereign and independent states need not fear
their neighbors.
 
Today, we are taking another decisive step
toward banishing Europe's historic divisions.
We are building a security partnership that has
the potential to encompass all the nations of
the continent.  With Russia's action, 21
countries have now joined the Partnership for
Peace.  Several have already entered into close
consultations with NATO to develop Individual
Partnership Programs tailored to their unique
capabilities and interests.  By this fall,
joint exercises will commence, with Poland
hosting the first exercise on the soil of a
partner country.  In this  way, the Partnership
will build the habits of cooperation that are
the lifeblood of the alliance.  It can thus
pave the way for NATO's eventual expansion.
 
We cannot build the Europe we seek without a
strong NATO alliance.  We cannot build it
without a democratic Russia.  We cannot build
it without the nations of Central and Eastern
Europe.  The "best possible future for Europe,"
which President Clinton invoked at the January
summit, depends on all our nations working
together in pursuit of common security
interests and democratic ideals.  That is the
purpose of the Partnership, and it is the
spirit in which we welcome Russia as a partner
today.
 
 
Foreign Minister Kozyrev,
Secretary Christopher
June 22, 1994
Opening statements from a news conference,
Brussels, Belgium.
 
Foreign Minister Kozyrev (through an
interpreter).  Ladies and gentlemen, today, as
usual, in the Russian embassy, we have had a
frank and substantive discussion with the
Secretary of State.  We have discussed, today,
a number of urgent issues:
 
--First of all, as regards the official visit
by President Yeltsin to the United States at
the end of September;
 
--Secondly, the meeting of President Yeltsin
and President Clinton in Naples, which will be
a major milestone in the Russian-U.S.
partnership;
 
--Also, on the instruction of our two
Presidents, we have discussed the joint
initiative as given in the text of the draft
resolution regarding nuclear issues connected
with North Korea.  I must say that our
positions have become closer and almost
coincide on the majority of all the aspects,
and I think that our representatives in New
York should be ready to reach agreement on that
very soon;
 
--Of course, we also discussed the settlement
in Bosnia, and I think that, in this respect,
the work of the Contact Group can rely on the
understanding that is between us;
 
--Finally, we discussed the issue of the Baltic
states.  In particular, I expressed concern
regarding the adoption bilaterally of
legislation which withstands any criticism--not
only on the part of Russian human rights
organizations but also of the Council of Europe
and the CSCE.  We also discussed the question
of living up to the agreements on the
withdrawal of troops from Estonia; and I think
that, given the goodwill on the part of our
colleagues, there may be rapid progress in this
area soon.  We also discussed some other
problems.
 
 
Secretary Christopher.  It's always a pleasure
to be with my good friend, Andrei Kozyrev.
We've been seeing a good deal of each other
recently, and I am sure that will continue.  It
reflects the intensified consultations between
the United States and Russia, giving us an
opportunity to harmonize our policies and to
make sure we are on the same track.
 
The United States especially welcomed the
accession by Russia to the Partnership for
Peace, which, of course, we've just seen taking
place in the ceremony at NATO Headquarters.
This reflects the transformation of Europe in
the direction that President Clinton had in
mind when, last January, he called for the
Partnership for Peace as a possible way--as the
best way, indeed--to achieve a peaceful,
democratic, undivided Europe.
 
We also, as Minister Kozyrev said, discussed a
number of matters of common interest.  We are
very pleased that President Yeltsin has
accepted President Clinton's invitation to
visit the United States in September, which
will follow on their bilateral meeting during
the time of the G-7.
 
We discussed a number of issues of importance
to both countries.  I briefed the Foreign
Minister on the results of President Carter's
trip to North Korea.  I explained to him that
we are going back through official diplomatic
channels now to seek confirmation of
indications that President Carter perceived
that North Korea is prepared to freeze its
nuclear program.  We need to have more
specificity on that, and I indicated to the
Foreign Minister the precise areas in which we
are seeking specificity.
 
Of course, both of us hope that North Korea
will take steps to come into compliance with
its international obligations, but until that
has been confirmed, we believe that
consultations should go forward on the
sanctions resolution at the United Nations.  As
the Foreign Minister indicated, we have
developed a common approach toward such a
sanctions resolution, which will integrate the
concept of the international conference--
possible international conference--as well.
But I want to emphasize that both of those
aspects would be looking toward ensuring
compliance by North Korea with its
international obligations.
 
Finally, a word about Bosnia:  We discussed and
commended the work of the Contact Group,
looking toward the achievement of a common
proposal as well as a proposal with respect to
incentives and consequences--sometimes called,
I think, the carrots and sticks.
 
The Contact Group will meet again next week,
probably on June 28.  If they are able to come
into concurrence on these various aspects, I
think the Foreign Minister and I would welcome
another ministerial meeting to press forward on
this front, and--here as in various other
matters--I think we have made good progress in
developing a common approach.(###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 6:
 
Realism and Idealism in American Foreign Policy
Today
Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Permanent
Representative to the United Nations
Commencement address at Harvard University's
Kennedy School of Government, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, June 8, 1994
 
It is wonderful to be here among so many
friends at what is without doubt one of
America's most prestigious and accomplished
graduate schools.
 
This afternoon, we come together to mark the
end of another academic year.  It is a day to
celebrate.  After all, graduation is one of the
five great milestones of life--the others being
birth, marriage, death, and the day you finally
pay off your student loan.
 
As a former professor, I have attended many
ceremonies such as this.  Only one thing can
mar them--and that's the commencement speech.
A commencement speaker is like the body at an
Irish wake.  Everyone says nice things about
you, but you're neither expected nor encouraged
to say very much.
 
So I promise not to bore you--at least not
intentionally.  And I will try to control the
habit, developed while a professor, of speaking
in sound bites 50 minutes long.  But because I
am a former professor, I cannot resist talking
about the future in light of the past;
especially this week when we are surrounded by
reminders of World War II.
 
I will begin, therefore, by citing remarks made
here at Harvard by Walter Lippman in the summer
of 1940.  Europe--though not yet America--had
been plunged into war.  And Lippman, speaking
to a reunion of his class, faulted his own
generation for failing the test of history.
 
He said that after World War I, his generation
had refused to organize the peace because that
would have been too much trouble.  When it saw
great evil arise in Europe and Asia, it had
disapproved but had not resisted because
disapproval was easy and resistance was hard.
When it saw savage crimes committed, it assured
itself that the criminal impulse would not last
nor cross the ocean.  And when it was
confronted by the possibility of war, it
responded with confusion and complacency and
thereby assured the reality of war.  This
generation, said Lippman, suffered "a disaster
of character," "renounced indispensable
virtues" and "dissipated . . . the inheritance
of freedom."
 
The cost of the failure of which Lippman spoke
is measured in the thousands of white crosses
and Stars of David now freshly adorned with
flowers in cemeteries along the coast of
Normandy.  There lie the remains of young men
and women who, when called upon, demonstrated
precisely the indispensable virtues of which
Lippman spoke.  It is fitting, on this day of
celebration, to recall their bravery and mourn
their unfulfilled dreams.
 
It is also imperative that we ponder the
relevance of Lippman's stark words to our own
character and time.  For we, too, have a
responsibility in the aftermath of a great
struggle to organize the peace.  We, too, face
the risks of confusion and the temptation of
complacency.  We, too, must find and affirm
indispensable virtues.
 
Defining U.S. Interests and Tailoring U.S
Responses
 
To be sustainable, American foreign policy must
be guided by American interests.  But in the
wake of the Cold War, a whole category of
conflicts has arisen in which the American
stake resists precise calculation.  Certainly,
the dangers are less clear and present than
Soviet missiles targeted on our homes.  But
there is ample precedent within this century
for conflicts in remote regions coming home to
America.
 
Few believed in 1914 that an assassin's bullet
in Sarajevo would cause thousands of American
soldiers to cross the Atlantic, many never to
return.  Few understood that invasion of
Manchuria in 1931, Ethiopia in 1935, and
Czechoslovakia in 1939 would end not with peace
in our time but in world war.
 
The globe is far smaller now than it was then.
Weapons cost less but can destroy more at
further range.  Borders provide little
protection from deadly drugs or death-dealing
terrorists.  Economies are interdependent.
Populations--including our own--are highly
mobile.  And images of heroism and horror are
transmitted instantly and constantly to and
from every corner of the earth.
 
In such a world, there is no perfect scale or
formula for categorizing what is important to
our people.  Obviously, there remains an inner
circle of vital interests related to the
defense of our people, territory, allies, and
economic well-being.  Here, unilateral action,
if required, is warranted and would likely have
full support from Congress and the American
people.
 
Increasingly, we also recognize an outer circle
of important interests that we share with
others.  Global issues--such as the health of
the atmosphere, stabilizing population growth,
controlling international crime, and curbing
AIDS--fall within this circle.  Here,
multilateral action is essential because
national action alone is not sufficient.
 
But between and sometimes overlapping these two
is a middle circle--a gray area of regional
conflicts and potential conflicts that does not
fit neatly into any national security framework
but which, if left unattended, could erode the
foundation of freedom and threaten world peace.
Here, the destructive legacy of the Cold War is
most evident and the challenge of organizing
the peace most complex.  Here, regional
organizations and regional powers have an
important role.  Here, the American stake may
shift dramatically with changing circumstance
and must be evaluated case by case, day by day.
 
These regional problems do not affect us
equally or in the same way.  Some--such as
Somalia or Rwanda--are of primarily
humanitarian concern.  But this afternoon, I
will discuss four situations which, if not
well-managed, could pose threats to the
innermost circle of American concerns.  Here,
our interests are especially compelling and the
risks especially high.  In each case, our goal
is to shape events so that our most vital
interests are secure.  In each, we are using a
range of foreign policy tools.  In each,
multilateral institutions are involved.  And in
each, American leadership--and the support and
engagement of the American people--is required.
 
North Korea
This week at the United Nations, the United
States is asking other nations to support
economic sanctions.  We will not acquiesce in
North Korea's failure to meet its obligations
under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  A
nuclear North Korea would threaten regional
security in Northeast Asia and undermine the
international non-proliferation regime.  In so
doing, it would affect alliances and interests
that bear on the security of our own people.
Our firm objective, which we are pursuing
deliberately and consistently, is a non-nuclear
Korean Peninsula.
 
Experience informs us that sanctions alone
rarely cause even isolated regimes to reverse
course.  But sanctions are needed now to
demonstrate international seriousness and
resolve.  And they are needed to provide an
incentive for corrective action and a
disincentive for further backsliding.
 
North Korea should know that the capacity to
threaten use of nuclear weapons will not
enhance its own security but, rather, weaken
it; not ease its economic hardship but, rather,
worsen it; not end its isolation but, rather,
deepen it.  The diplomatic option remains open
and is the best course for all sides.  If North
Korea will acknowledge and abide by its
obligations, it will open the door to resumed
discussions and to a more normal and rewarding
relationship with the world.  The sanctions now
under discussion are intended to promote, not
derail, prospects for a peaceful resolution.
 
But North Korea also should know that America
will stand by its allies, and that we will be
steadfast in assisting South Korea in the
protection of its territory and its people.
 
Haiti
Haiti is another country where we have turned
to the tool of economic sanctions.  Here again,
our preference is to resolve a difficult
situation peacefully.  Our goal is to pressure
General Cedras and other military leaders to
leave so that democracy may return.  Both the
UN and the OAS have authorized tougher
sanctions and improved enforcement.  The
Dominican Republic has moved in recent days to
seal its border with Haiti.  And we will soon
take steps to tighten the economic noose even
further.
 
In Haiti, as in Korea, we cannot assume that
sanctions alone will work.  To further isolate
the military and prepare for what may happen in
the future, we will seek approval of a UN
peace-keeping force to provide training and to
promote calm once the military leaders have
left.
 
Clearly, the status quo in Haiti is not
tenable.  The longer the current impasse
continues, the greater the potential for
violence, the more severe the suffering of
Haiti's poor majority, and the more
irreversible the environmental degradation
caused by scavenging for fuel.  Haitians should
not be asked to survive indefinitely on
humanitarian relief.  The hemisphere should not
be asked to put up indefinitely with a criminal
regime.  And the legal and moral dilemma posed
by those fleeing Haiti can only truly be
resolved by addressing the problem at its
source.  Haitians must be able to live freely
and securely at home.
 
There are some who say we should simply let
events in Haiti run their course--that we
should ignore the theft of democracy and
knuckle under to the thugs now in charge.  They
say that Haiti does not have a strong
democratic tradition.  But our goal in Haiti is
not to create a democratic government; it is to
restore a democratic government elected with
70% of the vote.
 
It is a goal of this Administration, as it has
been of previous ones, to help emerging
democracies.  We are doing so in cooperation
with others in every corner of the world--from
Mozambique to Cambodia to South Africa to
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
Obviously, we cannot insulate every new
democracy from the plots of usurpers.  But
Haiti is in our own backyard.  The Haitian
people deserve to live in freedom, and we are
determined to see that they do.
 
The Balkans
In the Balkans, we see another challenge that
engages our interests and where current tragedy
could grow still worse.  The conflict there
knows no natural boundaries.  The fuse of
potential violence lies like a coiled snake
across the region.
 
A wider conflagration could threaten us
strategically by undermining new democracies in
Eastern Europe, dividing our NATO allies, and
straining our relationship with Russia.  We
have a humanitarian interest in opposing the
brutal violence--including acts of genocide--
that has outraged the conscience and uprooted
hundreds of thousands from their homes.  And we
have a political interest in opposing Serbia's
efforts to use its Bosnian surrogates to
undermine a sovereign state.
 
We have responded to this most complex of
international crises on a variety of fronts.
To discourage aggression, we have supported
tough enforcement of economic sanctions and
sent peacekeepers to The Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia.  We have used NATO air
power to restore a semblance of normal life in
Sarajevo, to lend belated credibility to the
concept of safe havens, and to maintain a
humanitarian lifeline that has kept hundreds of
thousands alive despite the bitter fighting.
 
In the name of justice, we are backing the war
crimes tribunal for former Yugoslavia.  True
reconciliation will not be possible in that
region until collective guilt for past
atrocities is expunged and individual
responsibility is assigned.
 
And to promote peace, we have increased our
diplomatic engagement.  We helped broker an
agreement between government and Bosnian Croat
factions that has stopped the fighting in
central Bosnia and improved prospects for
Bosnia's survival as a multi-ethnic state.
Americans have an important stake in the
viability of that state, for we derive our own
identity from the conviction that those of
different races, creeds, and ethnic origins can
live together productively, freely, and in
peace.
 
The New Independent States
A fourth example of the challenges we face in
this new era and another place where multi-
ethnic states are being tested is the former
Soviet Union.  It is no surprise that none of
the New Independent States, including Russia,
were fully prepared when independence arrived.
It is far easier to redraw lines on a map than
to remake the political habits of a lifetime.
 
Today, the former Soviet Union is riddled with
open and potential conflict.  Causes include
hard economic conditions, personal rivalries,
and ethnic groups dissatisfied with communist-
imposed borders.  Relations among the new
republics remain unsettled.  And while the
infrastructure of empire is unraveling, the
infrastructure of democracy is not yet fully
built.
 
We are concerned, as are Russian and other
responsible leaders throughout the former
Soviet Union, that if current conflicts spread,
other regional powers could be drawn in,
economic development will slow, democratic
reforms will be curtailed, and a new flood of
refugees will crowd the international relief
system.
 
U.S. policy is to buttress the sovereignty and
independence of the new states, while promoting
constructive relations among them and with
Russia.  We are using active diplomacy--
economic and humanitarian aid that will amount
to almost $2.5 billion this year--and a frank
and open dialogue with the leaders of Russia
and the other republics.
 
Russia has the resources and leadership
required to help resolve regional problems.
But, for obvious historical reasons, its role
is sensitive.  Recent electoral gains made by
extreme nationalists have aggravated the
situation.  Vladimir Zhirinovskiy has accused
the government of pursuing policies of
accommodation that will lead to the "slow
murder of the Russian nation."  Meanwhile,
officials in Moscow have been defining and
promoting Russia's national interests
vigorously, including the protection of
millions of ethnic Russians who live in the
Russian "near abroad."
 
Although Russia desires stability, there have
been troubling aspects to its policy toward the
new republics.  Russian military units
stationed in Georgia and Moldova have
exacerbated local conflicts.  Instead of
cooperating fully with international bodies,
Russia has often pursued a "go-it-alone"
strategy toward negotiations in Nagorno-
Karabakh.  And Russia has occasionally used its
economic clout, especially in the energy
sector, to pressure its neighbors.
 
We have been frank with Russia.  We believe
that requests for UN peace-keeping missions in
the former Soviet Union should be subject to
the same guidelines as operations elsewhere.
That means that tough questions must be asked--
in advance--about mission, scope, duration,
cost, and risk.
 
In Georgia, a fundamental test of peace-keeping
in the former Soviet Union is imminent.
Violence there has displaced hundreds of
thousands of people, severed vital
transportation lines, and made economic and
social progress impossible.  With Russia's
support, Georgia asked the UN to deploy a
multilateral peace-keeping force.  But a UN
force would not be viable in the absence of
substantial progress toward a political
agreement and a common understanding by the
parties as to where such a force would be
deployed and what it would do.  So far, this
has not occurred.
 
The parties have now asked for a Russian-led
CIS peace-keeping operation.  We would prefer
that they work, instead, to establish the
conditions necessary for a UN force to deploy.
But if a CIS force does go in, it should be
impartial.  It should operate in agreement with
the parties; it should respect Georgia's
territorial integrity; and it should conduct
itself in accordance with the UN Charter and
the principles of the CSCE.
 
Elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, the U.S.
is focusing on preventive diplomacy.  President
Clinton has worked in partnership with
President Yeltsin to reduce the number of
Russian troops in the Baltics from more than
120,000 two years ago to less than 10,000
today.  And the President's intervention helped
seal the trilateral accord with Russia and
Ukraine, affirming Ukraine's territorial
integrity and establishing a road map for the
removal of nuclear weapons from Ukrainian soil.
 
The day may come when we will not think of the
former Soviet Union in terms of regional
problems but, rather, regional strengths.  The
day may come when we see a region characterized
by peaceful and independent democracies, each
with its own personality, and a Russia whose
greatness has been reconfirmed and yet
redefined in terms appropriate to the present
and future.  The day may come when we see a
Europe fully liberated from spheres of
influence and artificial division and linked by
open societies, open markets, common interests,
and common values.
 
The fulfillment of that vision will not come
without setbacks, without great patience, or
without faith.  The people of the New
Independent States will bear--as they know they
must--the primary burden.  Our task is to work
with them, not impose upon them--to help them
to build their own societies and to establish
relationships based on shared recognition and
respect.  In so doing, we validate our own
values, preserve our own interests, and secure
the gains of freedom for which so many--in the
West and East--sacrificed so much.
 
U.S. Engagement:  The Need and the Means
In each of the areas I have cited today--Korea,
Haiti, Bosnia, and the former Soviet Union--the
UN Security Council has a key part to play.
The end of the superpower rivalry has made
cooperation possible.  So peace-keeping and
sanctions--little-used previously--have moved
to center stage.  Each entered to high
expectations; each has since received mixed
reviews.  The Administration's strategy has
been to use these tools assertively to
supplement diplomatic, political, and military
initiatives we have taken on our own.  We have
sought, at the same time, to hone these tools--
to make sanctions a more precise instrument of
policy and to make UN peace-keeping more
disciplined and more effective.
 
Although our effort to reform UN peace-keeping
has bipartisan support, there are some in
Congress who either would pull the plug
altogether or so restrict funding as to make
the management of peace-keeping impossible.
Last month, an amendment was offered in the
House of Representatives that--in the words of
Defense Secretary Perry--would have brought
about the virtual collapse of UN peace-keeping.
It would have jeopardized current peace-keeping
operations in Cyprus, sanctions enforcement in
Iraq, and the separation of hostile forces in
the tinderbox of the Middle East.  And it would
have made new UN peace-keeping operations
anywhere in the world untenable, regardless of
whether they would serve American interests.
 
It is sobering that an amendment so contrary to
American interests and traditions could have
been offered and only narrowly defeated.  Our
ability to manage the problems I have discussed
today in Haiti, Bosnia, and the former Soviet
Union would be seriously undermined if UN
peace-keeping were no longer an option.  And
the chances of gaining support from other
countries for our policy toward North Korea
would also diminish.
 
This is the kind of thinking--the kind of
retreat from responsibility--that Lippman
warned his generation about more than a half-
century ago.  And it is contrary to the kind of
bipartisan foreign policy that responsible
leaders from both parties wish to create.
 
If we are going to meet the challenges of this
new era, we will need to use every tool
available--a strong defense, strong alliances,
vigorous diplomacy, better UN peace-keeping,
more effective multilateral sanctions, and firm
support for the requirements of international
law.  We need to understand--as the late
Senator Henry Jackson once said--that
international peace and security depend not on
a parity of power but on a preponderance of
power that favors the peacekeepers over the
"peace-upsetters."
 
The reassuring lesson of D-Day is that a free
people, when fully aroused in the face of great
danger, can respond with boundless courage and
nobility.  The cautionary lesson is that any
people, in the absence of a perceived clear and
present danger, can fall into complacency.
 
Last Monday afternoon, at a U.S. military
cemetery in France, President Clinton paid his
respects to those who gave their lives on the
beaches of Normandy a half-century ago.  These
were, he said, "the fathers we never knew, the
uncles we never met, the friends who never
returned, the heroes we can never repay."
 
It may be that we can never be fully worthy of
their sacrifice, but it is certain that to be
worthy at all, we cannot turn inward or stand
still.  To do so would be to dissipate the
heritage of freedom and renounce indispensable
virtues.
 
President Clinton referred at the very end of
his remarks to the "pathfinders"--to the
paratroopers who were the first to land at
Normandy where, deep in the darkness, they lit
beacons for the airborne assault that would
follow.  Addressing the veterans directly, the
President then said that:
 
Now, near the dawn of a new century, the job of
lighting those beacons falls to our hands.  To
you who brought us here, I promise we will be
the new pathfinders, for we are the children of
your sacrifice.
 
There are those who suggest that America's
challenges at home justify turning away from
responsibilities abroad.  But as the tears shed
at Normandy suggest, there is no more local an
issue than whether our young men and women will
once again be forced to fight big wars because
we failed to prevent small ones.  There are few
more salient economic issues than whether we
will have to resume a military buildup because
of setbacks in Moscow or because nuclear
weapons have fallen into the wrong hands.  And
there are few questions more vital for our
children than whether we will bequeath to them
a world that is relatively stable or one that
is brutal, anarchic, and violent.
 
We have a responsibility in our time, as others
had in theirs, to be pathfinders; not to be
imprisoned by history but to shape it; to build
a world not without conflict but in which
conflict is effectively contained; a world, not
without repression but in which the sway of
freedom is enlarged; a world not without
lawless behavior but in which the law-abiding
are progressively more secure.
 
That is our mission as we enter this new era.
That is your assignment as you enter your new
life.(###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 7:
 
The Tragedy in Rwanda:  International
Cooperation To Find a Solution
Madeleine K. Albright, UNSC Resolution
Statement by the U.S. Permanent Representative
to the United Nations before the UN Security
Council, New York City, June 22, 1994.
 
Mr. President, so much has been said about the
tragedy in Rwanda--in this room, in the press,
in our capitals.  It is not necessary to
catalogue once again the horrors of what has
been taking place there. The tales of butchery-
-of slain orphans, nuns, mothers, hospital
patients, innocent victims--become almost mind-
numbing.  But we cannot afford to become numb
to this tragedy, for it is still unfolding
before our eyes.  Despite the demands that the
killings stop, despite the expressions of
outrage, reports of continuing atrocities still
reach our ears.  Mr. President, I need not
remind you of the hours upon hours the Council
has spent deliberating on how to best handle
this crisis of appalling proportions.  Our
decisions have been difficult ones, made in the
face of a difficult and fluid situation.  We
stand behind those decisions, and believe that
the UN and UNAMIR have a vital role to play.
But the enormity of the tragedy causes us also
to welcome the bold French initiative.
 
In supporting this resolution, the United
States wishes to emphasize our strong support
for the French initiative and the effort the
cooperating force will undertake to guarantee
the security and protection of displaced
persons, refugees, and civilians in Rwanda.
The grave humanitarian crisis in that country
demands a swift response from the international
community, and we commend the French for acting
to address this need.
 
We wish to underline as well the mandate the
cooperating force has received to play a truly
impartial role in Rwanda.  We recognize that
skepticism remains in some quarters about the
role of the cooperating force.  We want to
point out that the scope of the resolution has
been narrowed to address exactly that concern,
and that the mandate of the force is limited to
addressing humanitarian needs as called for in
resolution 925, sub-paragraphs 4(a) and (b).
 
In light of this situation, we encourage the
force upon its arrival and through its actions
to demonstrate its impartiality and even-
handedness in dealing with the parties in
Rwanda.  This will clarify for all that the
force has a humanitarian mandate, designed to
protect innocent civilians and not to intervene
in the conflict between the parties.
 
In a similar manner, we wish to call upon the
parties in Rwanda to recognize the humanitarian
role the cooperating force has been called upon
to play.  We further call upon the parties to
assist the force in facilitating the provision
of humanitarian assistance to those who so
desperately require it.
 
The French decision to send troops to Rwanda
reflects the continued need to strengthen the
United Nations' own peace-keeping capabilities
and the need for cooperative action by member
states who are willing and able to supplement
UN peace operations in particular situations.
Examples of such action in the recent past
include allied coalitions that responded to
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and to the
humanitarian crisis in Somalia, the efforts of
ECOWAS in Liberia, and NATO action to enforce
Security Council resolutions in Bosnia.
 
The point here is that if we are to respond
effectively to the variety of conflicts we see
in the world today, we must be flexible enough
to accept imperfect solutions when no perfect
solutions are available to us.  We must
continually make judgements, on a case-by-case
basis, of what is appropriate, what is
consistent with principle, and what will work.
 
In closing, we once again commend the
Government of France, which has made a noble
offer to lead the world community in dealing
with the tragedy in Rwanda.  This effort
demands the cooperation of all.
 
 
Resolution 929 (June 22, 1994)
 
The Security Council,
 
Reaffirming all its previous resolutions on the
situation in Rwanda, in particular its
resolutions 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994, 918
(1994) of 17 May 1994 and 925 (1994) of 8 June
1994, which set out the mandate and force level
of the United Nations Assistance Mission for
Rwanda (UNAMIR),
 
Determined to contribute to the resumption of
the process of political settlement under the
Arusha Peace Agreement and encouraging the
Secretary-General and his Special
Representative for Rwanda to continue and
redouble their efforts at the national,
regional and international levels to promote
these objectives,
 
Stressing the importance of the cooperation of
all parties for the fulfilment of the
objectives of the United Nations in Rwanda,
 
Having considered the letter of the Secretary-
General of 19 June 1994 (S/1994/728),
 
Taking into account the time needed to gather
the necessary resources for the effective
deployment of UNAMIR, as expanded in
resolutions 918 (1994) and 925 (1994),
 
Noting the offer by Member States to cooperate
with the Secretary-General towards the
fulfilment of the objectives of the United
Nations in Rwanda (S/1994/734), and stressing
the strictly humanitarian character of this
operation which shall be conducted in an
impartial and neutral fashion, and shall not
constitute an interposition force between the
parties,
 
Welcoming the cooperation between the United
Nations, the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) and neighbouring States to bring peace to
Rwanda,
 
Deeply concerned by the continuation of
systematic and widespread killings of the
civilian population in Rwanda,
 
Recognizing that the current situation in
Rwanda constitutes a unique case which demands
an urgent response by the international
community,
 
Determining that the magnitude of the
humanitarian crisis in Rwanda constitutes a
threat to peace and security in the region,
 
1.  Welcomes the Secretary-General's letter
dated 19 June 1994 (S/1994/728) and agrees that
a multinational operation may be set up for
humanitarian purposes in Rwanda until UNAMIR is
brought up to the necessary strength;
 
2.  Welcomes also the offer by Member States
(S/1994/734) to cooperate with the Secretary-
General in order to achieve the objectives of
the United Nations in Rwanda through the
establishment of a temporary operation under
national command and control aimed at
contributing, in an impartial way, to the
security and protection of displaced persons,
refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, on
the understanding that the costs of
implementing the offer will be borne by the
Member States concerned;
 
3.  Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of
the United Nations, authorizes the Member
States cooperating with the Secretary-General
to conduct the operation referred to in
paragraph 2 above using all necessary means to
achieve the humanitarian objectives set out in
sub-paragraphs 4(a) and (b) of resolution 925
(1994);
 
4.  Decides that the mission of Member States
cooperating with the Secretary-General will be
limited to a period of two months following the
adoption of the present resolution, unless the
Secretary-General determines at an earlier date
that the expanded UNAMIR is able to carry out
its mandate;
 
5.  Commends the offers already made by Member
States of troops for the expanded UNAMIR;
 
6.  Calls upon all Member States to respond
urgently to the Secretary-General's request for
resources, including logistical support, in
order to enable expanded UNAMIR to fulfil its
mandate effectively as soon as possible and
requests the Secretary-General to identify and
coordinate the supply of the essential
equipment required by troops committed to the
expanded UNAMIR;
 
7.  Welcomes, in this respect, the offers
already made by Member States of equipment for
troop contributors to UNAMIR and calls on other
Members to offer such support, including the
possibility of comprehensive provision of
equipment to specific troop contributors, to
speed UNAMIR's expanded force deployment;
 
8.  Requests Member States cooperating with the
Secretary-General to coordinate closely with
UNAMIR and also requests the Secretary-General
to set up appropriate mechanisms to this end;
 
9.  Demands that all parties to the conflict
and others concerned immediately bring to an
end all killings of civilian populations in
areas under their control and allow Member
States cooperating with the Secretary-General
to implement fully the mission set forth in
paragraph 3 above;
 
10.  Requests the States concerned and the
Secretary-General, as appropriate, to report to
the Council on a regular basis, the first such
report to be made no later than fifteen days
after the adoption of this resolution, on the
implementation of this operation and the
progress made towards the fulfilment of the
objectives referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3
above.
 
11.  Also requests the Secretary-General to
report on the progress made towards completing
the deployment of the expanded UNAMIR within
the framework of the report due no later than 9
August 1994 under paragraph 17 of resolution
925 (1994), as well as on progress towards the
resumption of the process of political
settlement under the Arusha Peace Agreement;
 
12.  Decides to remain actively seized of the
matter.
 
VOTE:  10-0-5 (Brazil, China, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, and Pakistan abstaining).(###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 8:
 
Dominican Republic Electoral Investigation
Statement by Department Spokesman Michael
McCurry, Washington, DC, June 15, 1994.
 
On May 16, voters in the Dominican Republic
went to the polls to elect a new government.
OAS and other international observer
delegations issued reports in the days
following the election that serious
irregularities had occurred.  These included
questions about the disenfranchisement of a
large number of voters whose names did not
appear on the voting lists when they presented
themselves to vote.
 
The United States has joined the observer
groups in calling upon Dominican authorities to
investigate fully all the irregularities and to
take the necessary steps to ensure that the
results of the election are determined in a
free, fair, and transparent manner.
 
The United States strongly urges that the
actual voting lists used at the polling
stations on election day be made public.  Such
a step would help clarify a key factor that is
in dispute by making it possible to compare the
lists actually used at the polls with the lists
of eligible voters issued to the parties on May
12.
 
We understand that the Central Electoral Board
of the Dominican Republic has constituted a
commission to investigate and address these
concerns.  We hope its investigation will be
carried out in a manner acceptable to all
parties, and that the lists will be released as
soon as possible.
 
While international observer election experts
have provided valuable assistance during the
investigation to date, in the final analysis
constitutional responsibility rests with the
Central Electoral Board to ensure that the
investigation is free, fair, and thorough.
 
President Balaguer has stated publicly that he
would be open to new elections where the
electoral boards determine that there have been
serious irregularities.  We commend his
statement.  Such action would open the way to
resolving disputed results.
 
The U.S. remains steadfast in its commitment to
democracy throughout the Western Hemisphere.
By supporting the democratic process in the
Dominican Republic, we are supporting the
foundation for a mature relationship between
partners on equal footing.(###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 9:
 
Combating International Narcotics Trafficking
Robert S. Gelbard, Assistant Secretary for
International Narcotics Matters
Statement before the House Foreign Affairs
Committee,Washington, DC, June 22, 1994
 
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee:  I
appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you
today the Department of State's response to the
Latin American narcotics threat, including our
1994 International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report (INCSR) and the President's
certification decisions that were based on it.
As you have requested, I will also discuss the
President's counter-narcotics strategy for the
Western Hemisphere--including efforts to
safeguard human rights--and our FY 1995 budget
request.  The 1994 INCSR is this
Administration's first full public assessment
of the global drug threat, and the President's
April 1 certification underscores this
Administration's response to that threat.  The
message is clear.  President Clinton's approach
to international drug control can be capsulized
in five words:  no more business as usual.
 
Mr. Chairman, let there be no doubts:  The
Administration takes the problems of drug abuse
and trafficking seriously.  We are reminded
daily by stories from Colombia, Mexico, Russia,
and virtually every American community that the
global narcotics trade is an insidious threat
to America's domestic and foreign interests.
It is an increasingly dangerous threat to
democracy and sustainable development abroad,
undermining the cornerstones of our policies to
make America more secure and competitive in
today's world.  The effects on American society
if we fail to address the narcotics problem
abroad will be direct and unambiguous:  more
addiction, crime, violence, disease, and
poverty.
 
Assessment of the Illegal Narcotics Trade:
Volatile But Vulnerable
 
My first task after confirmation as the
Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics
Matters (INM) in November 1993 was to take a
fresh look at the dimensions and implications
of the foreign narcotics threat.  President
Clinton had just issued his counter-narcotics
directive instructing us to support those
countries that demonstrate the political will
and commitment to attack the drug problem.  He
also instructed the Department of State to
apply stringent standards in the
congressionally mandated certification process-
-a process that can result in the denial of
assistance to countries that do not cooperate
fully with the United States in counter-
narcotics or take adequate steps on their own.
I have since traveled to Latin America, Asia,
and Europe to talk with my counterparts, assess
their efforts, and see our programs at work.
 
My assessment is that the international
narcotics trade is extremely volatile and
continues to pose a grave danger to our foreign
and domestic interests.  The major
international drug syndicates continue to
target the U.S. market despite our intensified
enforcement efforts in recent years.  They are
diversifying into other drugs and criminal
activities and are expanding their operations
and markets to regions where political control
is weak.  We need greater international
cooperation to overcome this threat.  There are
opportunities for advancing this objective, but
current levels of cooperation and commitment
are uneven at best.
 
Focusing on Latin America, let me comment first
on the cocaine situation.  We made important
gains last year, but they could be short-lived
without stronger action by Colombia, Bolivia,
and Peru.  The good news:  Coca leaf production
fell by 20%--the first decline that we have
ever recorded.  Virtually all of the reduction,
however, occurred in Peru's Huallaga Valley as
a consequence of a major fungus epidemic,
declining soil fertility, and counter-narcotics
pressure on trafficker operations.  Producers
are already moving to restore supplies.  Coca
cultivation increased in Colombia and Bolivia,
and Peruvian growers are responding to the
disease by shifting cultivation to new areas.
 
Latin American governments made important
breakthroughs in attacking the cartels.  Pablo
Escobar--the last of Colombia's Medellin
kingpins--is dead.  His demise occurred not
only because of outstanding work by the
Colombian security forces but also because, in
the end, he had nowhere to flee--international
concern had made him a virtual prisoner in his
own country.  "Vaticano," Peru's most notorious
kingpin, was arrested in Colombia, expelled to
Peru, and is now serving a lengthy sentence.
 
Colombia's Cali cartel is meanwhile working
hard to implement a legal and political
strategy to thwart prosecutions by U.S. and
Colombian authorities.  They are seeking
lenient plea-bargain arrangements with
Colombia's independent prosecutor and, even
worse, trying to manipulate ambiguities in the
revised Colombian criminal procedures to avoid
punishment for serious drug crimes.  We have
sent a strong message to Colombia's President-
elect, Ernesto Samper, that the crackdown on
the Cali cartel must not falter if Colombia
wants to sustain close relations with the
United States.
 
As pressure mounts on kingpins elsewhere, I
predict that they will shift tactics to follow
the pattern set by the Colombian cartel.  That
is, they will move from simply trying to bribe
or intimidate key officials to a more
comprehensive strategy aimed at permanently
crippling the counter-narcotics capabilities of
the judicial and enforcement institutions.
There is one sure way to thwart this tactic--
build stronger democratic counter-narcotics
institutions in key Latin American drug-
producing and -transit countries.
 
Latin America also poses an expanding heroin
threat to the United States.  There is good
news in Mexico and Guatemala.  Mexican
production, the traditional threat, is being
held in check through eradication and related
enforcement programs.  The Government of Mexico
is accomplishing this on its own, having
assumed in 1993 full responsibility for funding
and managing the $20-million-a-year narcotics
control program that the State Department
formerly administered there.  INM's eradication
program also has virtually eliminated poppy
cultivation in Guatemala.  Colombia's
burgeoning heroin trade, however, offsets these
accomplishments and presents us with one of our
most dangerous drug control challenges.
Seeking to diversify operations, Colombia's
cocaine traffickers have moved rapidly into
opium and heroin production.  The Government of
Colombia, with our help, is responding with a
crop eradication program, but it still faces an
uphill struggle.
 
It is more important than ever that we
integrate our narcotics control policies with
other foreign policy objectives in Latin
America.  This need comes at a time of
unprecedented movement toward democracy and
economic reform in the region:  Military
control has given way to civilian rule in
country after country; participatory democracy
is flourishing; corruption is under attack; and
trade, investment, and economic growth are
moving forward.
 
But all of this is jeopardized if the narcotics
trade is not controlled.  Trafficker corruption
and intimidation can turn legislatures,
judiciaries, police, the media, and other
democratic institutions into mere facades that
provide cover for drug operations.  The ability
of traffickers to push Colombia to the brink of
political chaos prior to its 1990 presidential
elections and the virtually unobstructed
influence they had at the highest levels of
Panama's Government before Operation Just Cause
underscore the magnitude of this threat.  Such
situations are not only disastrous for host
nations--they make it impossible for us to
pursue important security, trade, commercial,
and other regional and bilateral relations.
 
New opportunities for counter-narcotics
progress are emerging in Latin America.  Thanks
to our leadership, governments are increasingly
aware of the political, economic, and social
threat drug trafficking poses to their
societies.  Democratic, market-oriented
governments will be especially responsive.
They are more likely to recognize the adverse
effects of the drug trade and to have the
political will and commitment to respond.  Too
many governments, however, continue to
underestimate the risks and, consequently, are
not taking sufficient steps on their own to
address them.  Through a combination of sticks,
carrots, and new initiatives, our strategy is
designed to encourage and help them take these
steps.
 
Mr. Chairman, this was the global context on
which we based our certification
recommendations to the President--and on which
he made the final decisions, developed our
Western Hemisphere strategy, and drafted our
budget.  These actions underscore the promise I
made when I accepted this job:  There would be
no more business as usual on international
narcotics policy.  I meant it.  In fact, I
would not be in this position today if I did
not believe it.  We will be holding countries
that receive our anti-drug assistance
increasingly accountable for their counter-
narcotics performance.
 
Certification:  No More Business as Usual
One area where the President's new policy has
had a strong impact is certification.  The
Foreign Assistance Act requires that each year
the President identify the major drug-producing
and drug-transit countries and determine
whether they have fully cooperated with the
United States or taken adequate steps on their
own toward narcotics control.  The United
States must cut off most foreign assistance to
those countries that are not certified and vote
against their requests for loans from
multilateral development banks.  For countries
found not fully cooperating or taking adequate
steps on their own, the President may grant a
national interest certification if vital
interests of the United States require
continued provision of foreign assistance.
 
On April 1, in accordance with the requirements
of the Foreign Assistance Act, the President
issued his 1994 certification determination.
This year's certifications are the toughest
ever.  Ten of 26 countries were either not
certified or granted only a vital national
interest certification.  More countries than
ever have been placed in these categories.
This is double the number so categorized every
year since 1990.  Among these are not just
"pariah" nations but also countries with which
we have strong bilateral interests.
 
--Three countries--Nigeria, Bolivia, and Peru--
had never received anything less than full
certification.  Nigeria was denied
certification for failing to take satisfactory
action to curb blatant corruption and
trafficking.  Bolivia and Peru did not meet the
requirements for "full" certification primarily
because their efforts to attack coca
cultivation were insufficient, but they were
granted vital national interest certifications.
 
--Two countries--Panama and Laos, each of which
had been denied certification before but had
been fully certified in recent years--received
vital national interest certifications.  Panama
has failed to address squarely its role in
international money laundering, the most
critical drug control problem in that country.
Laos has not moved actively to establish its
special police counter-narcotics unit, nor did
it sustain pressure--after successive years of
decline--to reduce opium poppy cultivation in
1993.
 
-- Of the remaining five countries, we gave a
vital national interest certification to
Lebanon--because it is in our vital interest
that Lebanon continue to receive assistance
aimed at promoting economic and political
stability--and to Afghanistan.  To deny
certification to Afghanistan would undermine
progress toward political stability, which is
essential for counter-narcotics efforts.  We
continued to deny certification to Burma, Iran,
and Syria.
 
These were difficult decisions.  They took into
account a number of important U.S. foreign
policy interests.  Judging from their public
reactions, some countries were clearly
surprised.  They apparently thought that
performing at the previous year's levels would
be sufficient.  This is not what the law
requires and they know it.  Some may have
thought they could impress us by stepping up
efforts against less critical targets.  Not so.
We will not accept progress by a country
against marginal targets as a substitute for
neglecting the key drug issue.  If a country is
a money laundering center, we will expect
progress against this problem; increased
arrests of low-level couriers will not be
sufficient.
 
Countries that were fully certified should not
relax.  It is no more in their interests to
relax their counter-narcotics efforts than it
is ours.  Fully certified countries must
continue to strengthen and improve their drug
control programs.  The goal of our "no more
business as usual" approach is progress, not
status quo.  In making our recommendations to
the President, we intend to continue strictly
applying the statutory standards for
certification.
 
The fact that the President decided not to
grant full certification to so many countries--
several for the first time--sends powerful
narcotics control messages to foreign and
domestic audiences alike.
 
--International narcotics control is a key
foreign policy concern that the U.S. will put
ahead of other bilateral interests if
necessary.
 
--We will no longer accept weak excuses for
inaction; countries know what we expect.
 
--We expect concrete results.  After years of
supplying assistance and building institutions,
we now expect key countries to be more
responsible for their own anti-drug programs.
 
--We are going to cut waste from global drug
control programs.  If assistance is not being
used effectively, it will be shifted elsewhere.
 
--Many countries where we have important
narcotics bilateral interests will be electing
new governments soon; these new governments
should realize that narcotics control is at the
top of our agenda.
 
We do not seek to embarrass governments.  We do
not want to force them to adopt our standards.
But we want certification to be an effective
tool for securing greater international
narcotics control and cooperation.  I believe
it will be.  In fact, I have a simple message
for the governments of the world, the American
people, and the Congress:  Narcotics
certification is an honest process.
 
We obviously would prefer to make substantive
progress through cooperative relationships
rather than to impose sanctions owing to a lack
of cooperation.  Nevertheless, this
certification decision has given our
international counter-narcotics policy greater
credibility.  It is important to sustain this
momentum.  I have begun exploring, in
Washington and at U.S. posts abroad, improved
ways of keeping the attention of key drug
countries focused on achieving concrete
narcotics control goals.  We are in the process
of making demarches to these countries
highlighting critical areas of performance
during the current certification cycle.  I
welcome a dialogue with this committee on how
the legislative and executive branches can make
the certification process more effective.
 
A final point concerning certification
legislation:  As you are aware, if Congress
does not act by September 1994, important
provisions of the International Narcotics
Control Act of 1992 will expire, eliminating
several important improvements that have helped
make certification a more effective counter-
narcotics tool.  These improvements, codified
in Sections 489 and 490 of the Foreign
Assistance Act, have greatly improved the
scope, objectivity, and efficiency of the drug
reporting and certification processes.  Before
the deadline, we would like to see Congress
retain these sections with only a few minor
language changes we hope to provide soon to the
committee.
 
Improved Strategy:  Sharper Focus, Better
Tactics
 
The Administration is making new use of these
instruments because it has a new international
narcotics control strategy and policy.  Both
were developed to find a better and more cost-
effective, long-term solution to our drug
problem and to ensure that our foreign counter-
narcotics objectives are integrated with our
broader foreign policy goals of promoting
democracy, sustainable development, and
security around the world.  Allow me to
highlight the key elements of that strategy.
 
First, we will support the development of
stronger democratic counter-narcotics
institutions in countries that demonstrate a
commitment to narcotics control.  This is
critical for convincing host governments to
shoulder more of the drug control burden.
Strong and accountable institutions are the
foundation for an effective policy; they are
essential for successful operations.  The
stronger the institutions, and the more
responsive they are to public concerns and
respectful of the rule of law, the less likely
they are to succumb to the corrosive influence
of narco-corruption and intimidation.  We will
put more emphasis on the cocaine source
countries where the political and economic
stakes are potentially higher and the trade is
potentially more vulnerable.
 
Strengthening the institutional base starts
with enacting good drug control laws and then
building the judicial, enforcement, and penal
organizations to enforce them.  This must
include building respect for the rule of law
and human rights.  Administration of justice
programs that serve both our broader democracy-
building and our drug control objectives will
be a major part of this effort.  So, too, will
be training and, in some countries, support to
the military--with emphasis in both cases on
human rights.  Other important elements include
public awareness and demand-reduction programs
to alleviate the adverse social effects of the
drug trade and to build public support for
anti-drug programs.
 
Second, we will integrate our anti-drug efforts
with sustainable development programs, focusing
on both macro and micro objectives.
Strengthening the economies of key drug-
producing and -transit countries creates
economic alternatives to narcotics production
and trafficking and increases the resources
host nations can devote to narcotics control.
Macro objectives are aimed at broad-based
growth that expands income and employment
alternatives throughout the economy and include
such measures as balance-of-payments supports
and other programs to generate foreign trade
and investment.  Micro objectives--targeted in
and outside drug-producing areas--are important
for ensuring that small producers have viable
alternatives to narcotics crops.  Such projects
also help facilitate eradication and other
enforcement efforts by extending government
authority and presence into drug-producing
areas.
 
Third, we will seek to involve multilateral and
regional organizations in our counter-narcotics
programs and objectives.  Multilateral
organizations can complement our institution-
building and sustainable development
initiatives, operate where our access is
limited, and attract additional international
donors to the anti-drug effort.  We will
increase support to our traditional UN partner-
-the United Nations Drug Control Program
(UNDCP)--and will continue to urge greater
involvement by other UN agencies such as UNICEF
and UNDP.  We have recently undertaken the
first-ever initiatives to engage international
financial institutions and multilateral
development banks in the counter-narcotics
effort.  INM and AID have already held many
meetings with the leadership of the World Bank
and the Inter-American Development Bank to
discuss how their programs can contribute to
eliminating illicit coca cultivation in Bolivia
and Peru.  We will be coordinating with them
more closely to ensure that their programs
complement our counter-narcotics and
sustainable development objectives in host
nations.
 
Our fourth objective is to achieve more
effective law enforcement operations against
the kingpins and their organizations--a goal
supported by institution-building and
sustainable development initiatives which
enhance the political will and ability of host
nations to move in this direction.  Although we
have yet to see appropriately aggressive
prosecution of significant kingpins in
Colombia, recent enforcement operations in
Colombia and other countries convince us that
the kingpins and their organizations are now
vulnerable to increased and enhanced host
nation enforcement efforts.  The institutional
building blocks and U.S. Government support and
commitment are already in place to be more
aggressive on this front.  We intend to
encourage greater regional and international
cooperation; tougher action on chemical and
money controls;  and adoption and
implementation of aggressive and comprehensive
asset forfeiture legislation, extraditions, and
other measures to weaken the major
organizations and to apprehend, convict, and
incarcerate--for appropriately severe terms of
imprisonment--their leaders.  Targeting the
leadership of the cartels and their vast ill-
gotten fortunes disrupts their entire
organization, makes narcotics trafficking less
profitable, and blunts the effects of
corruption and intimidation--the most dangerous
drug-related threats to democratic political
systems.
 
Success will depend on securing the commitment
of foreign governments to set their drug
enforcement sights on the kingpins.  It will be
achieved through good intelligence and police
work and not necessarily through the constant
application of high-cost technology, as has
been the case with interdiction.
 
Human Rights
I am aware of how the human rights issue is
connected to the narcotics control assistance
we provide to foreign police and military
units.  Fortunately, we rarely have found human
rights abuses in our counter-narcotics
programs, but we remain concerned.  As I
already have emphasized, a major thrust of our
institution-building initiatives is to
strengthen respect for human rights.
Accordingly, we have established several
mechanisms to minimize the potential for
violations and to identify them and take
corrective actions quickly when they occur.
 
In Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, U.S. embassies
screen individuals for counter-narcotics
training, target assistance specifically for
anti-drug units, and monitor ongoing operations
for possible abuses.  We are in the process of
establishing mechanisms to screen units prior
to delivering counter-narcotics assistance.
Meanwhile, I work closely with the Department's
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor to
monitor and respond to allegations of human
rights abuses by government forces that may
receive funding, training, or other support
from U.S. Government counter-narcotics
programs.  Assistant Secretary Shattuck and I
co-chair an interagency working group to
address these problems and recently agreed to
instruct our military group in Colombia to add
more aggressive human rights monitoring to its
end-use monitoring mission for equipment and
assistance provided to the Colombian military.
INM recently discussed our Colombia initiatives
with Amnesty International representatives.
Our embassies in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru
have human rights working groups that mirror
our efforts in Washington to identify and
resolve human rights abuses.  In addition, AID
programs that advance drug control objectives,
such as justice-system reform in Colombia and
Bolivia, also include mechanisms to protect
human rights.
 
The bottom line is that our counter-narcotics
assistance can be a powerful force in
advancing, rather than retarding, human rights
objectives in the hemisphere.  Our training and
oversight help instill respect for human rights
and professionalism among police and military
commanders in the host countries, a fact
underscored by the virtual absence of confirmed
human rights violations by counter-narcotics
forces.  Moreover, it is through the provision
of assistance that we can conduct end-use
monitoring and, in that way, keep an eye on the
human rights performance of these forces.
Indeed, in many ways, the narcotics kingpins,
whom these commanders and their forces are
trying to subdue, pose a far more fundamental
threat to human rights.  This is evident from
the way narco-traffickers have terrorized the
press, corrupted local police forces, and
paralyzed the judiciary.  We will remain
vigilant, but I believe that a withdrawal of
our counter-narcotics support could be a
setback for human rights.
 
Budget Support
Mr. Chairman, the President's counter-narcotics
strategy recognizes that we must operate within
tight budgets.  This is why it stresses the
need to concentrate resources and pursue
operations more efficiently and effectively
than in the past.  INM, with its program focus
on institution-building and its long experience
in source countries, developed its FY 1995
counter-narcotics budget request for $232
million with these principles in mind.
 
Let me assure you that we have used fiscal
restraint in planning our programs.  Our FY
1995 request reflects a new, consolidated
budget that includes for the first time the
traditional INM account ($152 million) as well
as funds that were formerly provided through
counter-narcotics economic (ESF) and military
(FMF) security assistance and International
Military Education and Training (IMET)
accounts.  Of the $232 million total,
approximately $205 million is for Latin
American and Caribbean programs.  The $232
million is less than what we had requested in
FY 1994 and over $100 million less than what we
received in FY 1993.
 
The House recently voted out an appropriations
bill that, frankly, jeopardizes our programs
and policy.  The traditional INM account was
broken out and cut to $115 million, marginally
more than last year.  The Senate Appropriations
Committee reported out last week an INM budget
of only $100 million.  Cuts in our overall
request for economic and military assistance
are likely to force us to reduce further our
counter-narcotics assistance.  We are surviving
on our drastically reduced FY 1994 budget by
drawing on the prior-year pipeline, deferring
upgrades and improvements, and seeking
augmentations from UNDCP and the Department of
Defense.  We have cut most overseas programs to
the core.  A continuation at the $115-million
level will have serious consequences:
 
--Scaling back source country programs--INM
will be faced with reducing its plans for
sustainable development initiatives in Bolivia
and Peru, weakening our efforts to strengthen
the political and economic underpinnings for
their counter-narcotics commitment and
performance.  We would curb aviation support in
the Andes, causing large cutbacks in police
operations.
 
--Closing programs--We would make deep cuts in
transit country programs, possibly closing some
operations completely.  Judicial enhancement,
intelligence collection and sharing, and
interdiction operations would suffer.
 
--Stopping eradication initiatives--At $115
million, we will not be able to sustain the
recent momentum that has overcome major hurdles
in winning greater host nation commitment to
eradication.  Colombia will not be able to keep
pace with poppy production and will have to
delay its new coca-eradication efforts.
Setbacks in Colombia will cause recent progress
to strengthen the political will of the
Governments of Bolivia and Peru to falter.
 
--Gutting aviation support--We are abiding by
Congress's wishes that we get out of the air
force business.  We have already reduced our
air wing from 62 to 48 aircraft.  The budget
cuts, however, would force us to make deeper
reductions than planned, forcing us to either
mothball aircraft or turn them over to host
countries before they are fully capable of
receiving or maintaining them.
 
--Diverting funds from other priorities--To
save what we can of the Andean programs, we
would have to divert funding from other
priority programs such as international heroin
control and our new initiatives to address the
organized crime threats from the former Soviet
Union and elsewhere.
 
I do not mean to sound alarmist, but I do mean
to inform the committee that a $115-million
budget will have practical consequences for
U.S. international counter-narcotics efforts.
 
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, I do not pretend that there is an
easy solution to the global narcotics problem.
I am here to say, however, that the stakes in
terms of America's security and welfare are too
high for us to abandon or disengage from the
international narcotics control effort.  The
President has altered our approach.  The
increasingly dangerous nature of the threat,
new opportunities, and current funding
realities require it.  Our new approach does
more than sustain pressure; it attacks the
criminal, economic, and political heart of the
trade and raises the stakes against those who
oppose or obstruct our efforts.  We have built
this strategy on lessons learned.  We have
enough evidence to know that it can work if
given time and support and that the
consequences are dire if it is allowed to fail.
 
I look forward to working closely with the
members of this committee on our counter-
narcotics objectives and seek your support in
ensuring that we have adequate funds to meet
these objectives.  We must avoid making cuts
that will starve the President's strategy to
death in its first year and leave the United
States without a coherent, supportable
international narcotics control strategy.
 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
 
Copies of the 1994 International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report  can be purchased from
the U.S. Government Printing Office.  The
report also is available electronically through
GPO's Federal Bulletin Board Service (BBS).
 
For more information on using BBS please call
202-512-1530, or to obtain an order form for
paper copies, please call 202-512-0822.(###)
 
 
[END OF DISPATCH VOL 5, NO 26]

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