U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 5, NUMBER 25, JUNE 20, 1994
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
 
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1.  Toward a More Integrated World--Secretary
Christopher
2.  Transforming the NATO Alliance To Meet New
Security Needs--Secretary Christopher
3.  Fact Sheet:  Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development
4.  North Atlantic Council Final Communique
5.  Toward a Secure, Free, and Fully Integrated
Europe--Secretary Christopher
6.  North Atlantic Cooperation Council Communique
7.  NAC-NACC Ministerials
8.  Secretary and Russian Foreign Minister Meet--
Secretary Christopher, Foreign Minister Kozyrev
9.  Recent Events in the Middle East--Robert H.
Pelletreau
10.  U.S. Commitment to Conflict Resolution in
Africa--George E. Moose
11.  Current Trends in Global Terrorism--Patrick N.
Theros
 
 
 
ARTICLE 1:
 
Toward a More Integrated World
Secretary Christopher
Statement at the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) Ministerial
Meeting, Paris, France, June 8, 1994
 
It is a pleasure to be the first American Secretary
of State to attend an OECD ministerial in more than
a decade, and a pleasure to join Secretary Brown in
today's proceedings.  Let me take this opportunity
to express my government's appreciation for
Secretary General Paye's many contributions to the
OECD over the past decade.  He has earned our
gratitude.
 
I am especially pleased to be here today as the OECD
welcomes its first new member nation in more than 20
years.  By doing so, it reaffirms its scope as a
truly global organization.  I want to congratulate
my neighbor and friend, Foreign Minister Tello.
Mexico's commitment to economic reform and free
trade have earned it the respect of the world.  Now
it can assume new responsibilities as a contributor
to the OECD's important work.
 
Today, this organization is taking historic steps
almost unimaginable five years ago.  We have agreed
to start membership negotiations with four of the
new democracies to the East:  Poland, Hungary, the
Czech Republic, and Slovakia, and with South Korea
as well.  We hope that these five nations will
attain full membership as soon as possible.  And
today we also will sign a cooperation agreement with
the Russian Federation to extend the OECD's unique
expertise to the great task of building a market
economy in Russia.
 
With these actions, the OECD renews the purpose that
inspired Jean Monnet, George Marshall, and other
post-war leaders of long vision and strong will:  to
build a democratic and integrated Europe, and a more
peaceful and prosperous world.  Today, these goals
are within sight.
 
We are gathered this morning at a historic site.  It
was here, after the Second World War, that the
challenge of building peace and reconciliation was
addressed.  The United States and Western Europe
understood, as George Marshall expressed it, that a
"working economy" had to be revived "to permit the
emergence of political and social conditions in
which free institutions can exist."
 
The OECD evolved from that effort.  Its predecessor,
the Organization for European Economic Cooperation,
helped coordinate post-war reconstruction under the
Marshall Plan.  As the first European institution
dedicated to economic cooperation, the OEEC was a
catalyst for economic recovery and integration on
the western half of this continent.  In the words of
its first Secretary-General, Robert Marjolin, our
predecessors were "convinced that the different
European countries were indissolubly linked in their
destinies."
 
That we can meet today in a vibrant city, in a
prosperous Western Europe at peace, is a tribute to
the success of their work.  But to the east, the
scourges that George Marshall described almost 50
years ago, "hunger, poverty, despotism, and chaos,"
still are vivid in the memory of nations that never
had the chance to share our prosperity.  These
scourges are especially vivid in the former
Yugoslavia.  And they threaten the nations that
emerged from the former Soviet Union.
 
Marshall's vision, and Monnet's, encompassed all of
Europe, but the reality of their time could not.
The Eastern European nations were invited to join
the Marshall Plan, but Soviet leaders would not
allow it.  The benefits of Western European
reconstruction and integration were denied by the
absolute divisions of the Cold War.
 
With the end of the Cold War, we cannot allow new
divisions to arise.  Europe must not be split into
zones of prosperity and poverty, stability and
insecurity.  We must now extend to the East the
benefits--and obligations--of the same liberal
trading and security order that have been pillars of
strength for the West.
 
Tomorrow, many of us will meet in the North Atlantic
Council in Istanbul to review our progress in
renewing NATO, especially through the Partnership
for Peace.  In Istanbul, we will continue to develop
the important network of relationships with our new
partners to the East.
 
By widening the reach of NATO, and of organizations
like the OECD, we will strengthen the security and
prosperity of an undivided, democratic Europe.
 
I believe that the OECD, with its unique
capabilities, can be a model and an instrument of
wider integration in the post-Cold War world--just
as its predecessor was during the early Cold War
years in Western Europe.  The OECD can perform its
core function as a forum for policy analysis and
coordination at a time of accelerating economic
change.  And it can help complete the unfinished
business of post-war reconstruction, in a new era
and on a wider scale, by helping more countries
throughout the world enter the community of advanced
industrial nations.
 
Last January in Prague, President Clinton announced
that the United States supported early entry into
the OECD for the Visegrad countries, four nations
that, in his words, have "confounded skeptics and
surprised even the optimists."  By undertaking the
process leading to membership, they will push market
reform further and ultimately lift economic growth
and the living standards of their people.
 
The United States has strongly supported the OECD's
Center for Economies in Transition and its efforts
to forge closer links with other nations in Eastern
Europe and the New Independent States.  As we
learned in the years after the Second World War,
economic cooperation is the best way to promote
stability.
 
Five years ago, the countries of Eastern Europe won
their freedom and helped cement ours.  If we no
longer fear a Third World War, if we can envision a
Europe no longer riven by repression or conflict, we
owe it in part to the struggles of men and women in
Gdansk and Vilnius and Prague and Sofia.
 
The Visegrad states have the potential to form one
of the world's fastest-growing economic regions.
Poland, for example, already has one of the highest
growth rates in Europe, a budget deficit lower than
the European average, and declining inflation.
 
But expectations in the East have outpaced living
standards.  Market reforms have caused short-term
pain.  It continues to be in the interest of the
world's advanced industrial democracies to help
ensure that dislocation does not lead to
disillusionment with democratic institutions and
free markets.  That is why the United States has
provided more than $8 billion to support reform
efforts in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989.
 
But economic assistance is not enough.  We all must
urge these countries to build legal, tax, and
regulatory structures that will attract additional
private capital to the region.  These steps will
complement the difficult actions already taken to
privatize factories, reduce subsidies, and lower
tariffs.
 
If the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have
the courage to take these painful but necessary
steps, we must be prepared to do our part.  As
President Clinton has said, "it will make little
sense for us to applaud their market reforms on the
one hand while offering only selective access to our
markets on the other."  We must lower the remaining
trade barriers that limit their nations' exports and
potential for development.  Market access is not
just an economic issue.  At stake are the prospects
for democracy and stability across Europe.
 
There is no reason why our institutions or our
aspirations should stop at old frontiers of the Cold
War.  I believe that encouraging Russia's
integration with the West is the best investment we
can make in our security, and in the security of all
the peoples of Europe.  Integration will bring
benefits to Russia--not only expanded trade and
investment, but participation in military
arrangements with NATO and political discussions
with the G-7 nations.  Integration also will require
Russia to accept the obligations we all share:  to
pursue sound economic policies; to uphold democracy;
to respect the rights of other countries.
 
It is, of course, Russia's choice whether to take
the path of integration.  But we must do everything
we can to encourage it to choose that path.
Russia's recent agreement with the IMF is evidence
that its government, under the leadership of
President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin,
continues to make progress in stabilizing its
economy.  Substantial progress already has been made
in privatization and decentralization--the twin
reform objectives at the center of our assistance
efforts.  As a result, an increasing amount of
Russian economic life is no longer controlled by the
rigid hand of the state.
 
The agreement the OECD will conclude today with
Russia is a welcome step.  It will allow the OECD to
provide expertise on structural reform and to carry
out in-depth analyses of the Russian economy--just
as it does each year, with such integrity and
objectivity, for its members.
 
Our response to Russia's reforms, and to those of
its neighbors, should be based on a simple
proposition.  The community of market democracies is
not a closed club.  It is open to open societies. It
is open to open markets.  It is open to freedom
everywhere.
 
The OECD had its origins in Europe; its initial
membership was transatlantic.  But with Japan a
member for three decades and Australia and New
Zealand for more than two, and with Mexico joining
this year, the time has come for the OECD to evolve
further as a global organization.  It must create
new and flexible relationships with non-member
nations of growing economic importance.
 
An open, creative, and dynamic OECD can help enlarge
the community of free and prosperous nations
throughout the world.  The opportunity is there.
South Africa has emerged as a source of healing and
hope--and a potential catalyst for economic
development in Southern Africa.  In Asia, we have
seen dramatic growth, ranging from India to China to
South Korea.  In Latin America, liberalization is
opening markets, cutting tariffs, and creating jobs.
 
The United States welcomes the OECD's dialogue with
dynamic economies in Asia and Latin America.  We
hope that South Korea will follow Mexico as a full
member.  The OECD can also assume a new importance
in the architecture of the global economy, as a
bridge between Atlantic and Pacific industrial
economies.
 
Just as European integration began with economic
cooperation, so must the challenge of global
integration.  Implementation of the Uruguay Round is
a critical task for us all.  The world's advanced
industrial democracies share a responsibility to
sustain and strengthen the liberal world trading
system that has allowed our economies to grow and
our peoples to prosper.  Now we must meet that great
responsibility.
 
Cordell Hull, a distinguished predecessor of mine
who served Franklin D. Roosevelt as Secretary of
State, did more than any statesman of his time to
make America a champion of the liberal world trading
system.  He knew that open trade was good economics.
He also knew, as he put it, that "when goods move,
soldiers don't."
 
President Clinton is committed to passing
legislation to implement the Uruguay Round in this
calendar year.  The legislation will be submitted to
our Congress this summer, and I am confident that it
will be approved.  This agreement is in the
overriding interest of America and the world.  Each
of our nations must approve the Uruguay Round this
year to ensure that the most far-reaching trade
agreement in history takes effect by January 1,
1995.
 
By approving the Round, we will open markets, boost
confidence, spur growth, and create jobs.  We will
help new market democracies carry out difficult
economic reform.  We will help ensure that the post-
Cold War world is not divided into new blocs:  not
North against South; not rich against poor; not
North America against Europe or Asia.
 
We also must move ahead with a strong World Trade
Organization to set the stage for a new century of
prosperity.  The WTO can strengthen the multilateral
trading system through new rules and disciplines.
The OECD can help it address the next generation of
trade issues:  the intersection of trade with
investment, labor standards, and the environment.
 
New rules are also needed in other areas to make
trade more efficient and equitable.  Our nations
will not have open competition unless we have clean
competition.  Our ability to advance economic
development will be undermined as long as bribery
distorts the allocation of resources, saps
accountable government, and subverts the rule of
law.
 
The United States has long sought to build an
international consensus against the bribery of
foreign officials in international business
transactions.  Last October, I proposed on my
country's behalf an initiative to advance this vital
objective.  Now OECD member nations have committed
themselves to take "concrete and meaningful" steps
to stop illicit payments by their firms.  We must
mount a sustained campaign against bribery.  With
endorsement of the agreement at this ministerial
meeting today, we can move from the discussion phase
to the action phase of this campaign.
 
The campaign against illicit payments is a prime
example of the OECD's new, more activist role.  The
agreements we have reached with the Visegrad states
and with Russia show that the OECD is playing its
part in integrating Europe.  The accession of
Mexico, and the likelihood that South Korea will
join soon, demonstrate the OECD's global reach.
 
The United States sees a broader role for the OECD
but it also encourages its reform.  The OECD must
live within its means and streamline its operations
and decision-making.  It must focus its priorities
on areas where it has a comparative advantage, such
as structural analysis.  A recent example is the
seminal Growth and Employment Study that is helping
our nations tackle the central task of job creation.
 
That the OECD is changing and growing is a mark of
progress not only for the institution but for the
world.  It means that the sphere of advanced,
industrial democracies is growing.  It means that
economic cooperation is enlarging the circle of
prosperity.
 
As Jean Monnet once said, "Nothing is lasting
without institutions."  The gains of freedom will
endure only if we have the foresight to extend to
new nations the institutions that have served us so
well for so long.
 
Let us summon the confidence and the sense of common
purpose that guided us through the last half
century.  Let us gain inspiration from the vision of
Marshall and Monnet.  Now that we can, let us
strengthen our security by extending to others the
blessings our predecessors secured for us.  (###)
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 2:
 
Transforming the NATO Alliance To Meet New Security
Needs
Secretary Christopher
Intervention before the Ministerial Meeting of the
North Atlantic Council, Istanbul, Turkey, June 9,
1994
 
It is a pleasure to reconvene in the North Atlantic
Council.  I want to thank our Turkish hosts and
express our appreciation for this spectacular
meeting site on the banks of the Bosporus.  I also
want to thank our distinguished Deputy Secretary
General, Sergio Balanzino, who will lead our
discussion.
 
Our thoughts today also are with Secretary General
Woerner.  President Clinton and I offer our best
wishes for Manfred's full and rapid recovery.  His
strength, resilience, and courage inspire us all.
His contribution to the renewal of this alliance has
been remarkable.
 
Over the last week--in Italy, Britain, and France--
President Clinton made clear once again that
America's commitment to Europe is resolute.  Before
the French National Assembly on Tuesday [see
Dispatch V. 5, No. 24], President Clinton set forth
our shared strategic challenge in building a
stronger and more integrated Europe based on
security cooperation, market economies, and
democratic institutions.
 
The President will reaffirm his vision of a broader
Europe when he travels to Italy, Germany, and Poland
next month.  As the most hopeful chapter in European
history is being written, the United States will
continue to stand with the peoples of an undivided,
democratic continent.
 
This past week, President Clinton reiterated the
pledge he made at the Brussels summit to maintain
roughly 100,000 American troops in Europe.  He
reaffirmed that our political engagement will
continue to be reinforced by our military
deployment.  Our presence remains necessary to
safeguard America's vital interests as well as
Europe's.
 
The NATO alliance will remain the core of American
engagement in Europe and the heart of European
security.  Since the Athens ministerial last June,
we have renewed our efforts to reinforce the trans-
Atlantic bond that NATO embodies.  As we move ahead
with the landmark decisions taken at the summit, we
are transforming the alliance to meet the security
needs of the post-Cold War world.
 
The threat now is not invasion from the East but
instability in the East.  In Central Europe, new
market democracies are consolidating freedom and
showing promising signs of economic growth.  But
democracy remains vulnerable in many countries that
have emerged from the Soviet empire.  Demagogues
have played on ethnic divisions and economic
dislocation to fuel aggression.  Left unchecked,
such tensions will frustrate the region's progress
toward reform and ultimately threaten wider European
security.
 
As President Clinton said last January in Brussels:
"This period may decide whether the states of the
former Soviet bloc are woven into the fabric of
trans-Atlantic prosperity and security, or are
simply left hanging in isolation."  We must actively
embrace the opportunity to help new democracies
emerge as stable partners in security and trade.
 
At the Brussels summit, the alliance set two
central, mutually reinforcing goals.  The first was
to design more flexible command structures and to
address new security threats, such as weapons
proliferation.  The second and historic goal was to
deepen our ties with the emerging democracies to the
East.  We invited them to participate in a broad
range of political and military activities with
alliance members, thereby paving the way for
eventual expansion of the alliance.  We have made
progress toward both these goals.  Indeed, 1994 has
been a year of immense significance for the
alliance.
 
To achieve the first goal of increasing
effectiveness, NATO has taken important decisions to
support the efforts of allies to develop a more
capable European Security and Defense Identity.
That identity should maintain and build popular
support in Europe for meeting European commitments
and responsibilities and strengthen our collective
capacity to respond to future security needs.  It
should also reinforce the trans-Atlantic
relationship.  We continue to look to our allies for
a more balanced sharing of responsibilities.
 
Another important summit decision to achieve the
first goal was to create Combined Joint Task Forces.
We are making a promising start as we work to make
this innovative concept a reality.  Our objective
remains to renew the alliance and to strengthen the
Western European Union.  We hope efforts in NATO and
the WEU will enable us to take concrete decisions
about CJTF at the December ministerial.
 
As part of advancing the same goal of improving
alliance effectiveness, we are taking significant
steps to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and the means of delivering them.  NATO
must address this threat, both to complement other
international efforts and to meet our solemn
commitment to protect the security of alliance
members.
 
I am pleased by the early work of the senior
political-military and defense groups formed as a
result of this initiative.  We will affirm that
progress today by approving an alliance policy
framework on non-proliferation.  This framework lays
the political foundation for improving allied
capabilities to protect against the threat, or use,
of weapons of mass destruction.  The defense group
has agreed to examine threats, defense planning,
military doctrine and capabilities.
 
To achieve the second goal, the most significant
decision reached at the NATO summit was the creation
of the Partnership for Peace.  The Partnership,
proposed by President Clinton and adopted by the
alliance, reaches out to the East in order to
reassure new democracies and strengthen European
security.  In five short months, we can recognize a
remarkable achievement:  The Partnership has moved
from a bare concept to become a working reality, a
series of concrete relationships.  Twenty countries
have joined.  I want to highlight two among the many
steps we have taken thus far to make the Partnership
operational.
 
First, Partner states are actively engaged at NATO
Headquarters in Brussels, and will soon be present
at the Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons working
side by side with NATO military planners.  The
previously unimaginable is on the way to becoming
routine.
 
Second, we will fulfill the summit's call for
Partnership peacekeeping exercises to begin in 1994.
These exercises represent a remarkable
transformation.  Think of it:  Troops that for half
a century faced off against each other in the Cold
War will come together in joint military exercises.
 
This fall, the Netherlands will host a field
exercise, and Poland will host the first exercise on
the soil of a partner country.  SACLANT is
organizing a Partnership maritime exercise, which
will be held before the end of the year.  In
addition, the United States and other allies and
partners will use already scheduled exercises to
advance the Partnership's goals.  We expect at least
14 activities of this kind to occur before the end
of the year.  We are also developing a robust
schedule of exercises for 1995.
 
These exercises of NATO units with their former
adversaries will send a powerful message that the
old East-West division of Europe is dead.  These are
real, concrete steps toward the integrated and
strengthened Europe that President Clinton called
for at the summit and again this past week.
 
We will also involve partners in many NATO committee
and training activities.  Together, alliance members
and partners will develop practical means for
addressing new threats to regional security.  We
will enable non-NATO countries to develop the habits
of cooperation, such as defense planning, that are
the lifeblood of the alliance.
 
We are committed to NATO's expansion.  Effective
cooperation is a critical step in preparing partners
for NATO membership.  I want to underscore today
what the President told East European leaders in
Prague last January:  "The Partnership changes the
entire dialogue about enlarging NATO's membership.
Now the question is no longer whether NATO will take
on new members, but when and how we will do so."
 
Mr. Deputy Secretary General, as we consider NATO's
relationship with nations to the East, Russia will
figure prominently in our deliberations.  Russia is
undertaking a difficult transformation that will
have profound implications for the world.  Whatever
course its internal evolution may take, Russia is
and will remain a vital actor in European security
affairs.  It is in our interest--and Russia's--to
develop broad, constructive interaction between NATO
and Russia.  The Partnership for Peace is central to
that process.
 
We welcome Defense Minister Grachev's recent
statement that Russia will participate in the
Partnership for Peace without preconditions.  As
NATO has said, each partner will sign the same
framework document.  But each partner will design
its own presentation document and each will develop
its unique independent Partnership program.
Clearly, Russia has significant capabilities and
inherent strengths upon which it can draw in
developing a Partnership cooperation program that
will serve the Partnership's interests and enhance
European security.
 
At the same time, Russia's size, broad interests,
resources, and military capabilities provide the
basis for a productive relationship with NATO in
addition to the Partnership for Peace.  Properly
designed and conducted, this relationship can serve
the interests of all European countries.  We
recently welcomed Minister Grachev to NATO
Headquarters for an extremely valuable session.
Where Russia can and is prepared to make a
constructive contribution, periodic consultations
and practical cooperation outside the Partnership
would be natural and mutually beneficial.
 
For example, Russia's nuclear capabilities establish
an obvious basis for a dialogue on nuclear issues
such as safe and secure weapons dismantlement.
Cooperation between NATO and Russia to stem the
proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction would advance our shared interests.
 
Of course, other European states also may have
interests or capabilities that would warrant "16-
plus-one" consultations or cooperation with them
outside the Partnership as appropriate.  We should
welcome those possibilities.
 
Bilateral relationships between Russia and
individual allies complement Russia's relationship
with NATO.  The United States and other allies are
developing bilateral political and military
cooperation that will complement the work of the
alliance.
 
Let me turn briefly to two important matters that
have far-reaching implications for Russia's
relations with NATO and for the overall course of
European security.  First, European stability
depends on respecting the sovereignty, independence,
and territorial integrity of all the states that
emerged from the Soviet empire.  We recognize
Russia's legitimate concerns in this region, but we
have made it clear that no country has a right to
assert a role that is inconsistent with
international norms.
 
A second key feature of Europe's stability and
security is the Treaty on Conventional Forces in
Europe.  The United States is committed to
maintaining the integrity of the treaty over the
long term.  We welcome discussion of any
implementation questions among CFE signatories in
the forum created by the treaty--the Vienna Joint
Consultative Group.
 
An important area where Russia and members of the
alliance have cooperated productively is in working
to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia.  This
alliance--indeed, all nations concerned with the
future of Europe and standards of human decency--
remains deeply concerned about the continued
fighting in Bosnia.  That brutal and tragic
conflict, the most savage fighting in Europe since
1945, cries out for resolution.
 
We remain convinced that this conflict can be
resolved only through negotiations.  We know that
NATO cannot impose a solution.  Since our last
meeting, NATO has supported UN efforts to bring
peace to the former Yugoslavia.  Without question,
our efforts have decreased the level of violence and
destruction.  NATO's February 9 ultimatum ended the
shelling of Sarajevo.  We enforced the no-fly zone
over Bosnia.  NATO's April 22 decision ended the
brutal attacks on civilians in Gorazde.  We all
recognize the leadership of the Government of Italy
in providing bases for allied operations in these
vital endeavors.
 
These and previous NATO actions, including sanctions
enforcement, demonstrate our ability to make
difficult decisions as 16 allies.  NATO's firm
actions show, as President Clinton has said, that
the alliance "can still be a credible force for
peace in the post-Cold War era."  Those actions
continue to provide crucial support to the United
Nations and to save innocent lives.  NATO has
demonstrated in Bosnia that it is the only
international institution with that capability.
 
We are now at a critical point in our efforts to
find a negotiated solution.  Working together, the
EU, the UN, Russia, and the United States have made
good progress in putting together a territorial
proposal that we believe could serve as a reasonable
basis for a settlement.  Our hope is that this
proposal will be accepted by both sides, and that
yesterday's cease-fire agreement is a step toward a
nationwide cessation of hostilities.  If these
efforts succeed, we can turn our attention and
resources to the task of implementing a peace
agreement and helping reconstruct war-torn Bosnia.
We must expect, however, that the compromises
necessary for peace will not come easily.  The
alliance must stand ready as before to back up the
diplomatic process.  And NATO allies must remain
engaged in this effort.
 
The international community, and NATO in particular,
are powerful forces helping to resolve this
conflict.  We must stay at it until we get the job
done.  We can contain the conflict.  We can
facilitate talks.  We can help shape solutions.  We
can volunteer the military forces essential for
implementing a final agreement.  And I want clearly
to reaffirm the commitment of the United States to
participate in this vital task.
 
The war in Bosnia remains a grave threat to our goal
of an integrated Europe.  It threatens to draw other
fragile democracies into a wider war.  And violent
nationalism undermines the security of all European
nations.
 
The United States is committed to greater
integration among European democracies, East and
West.  We are determined to extend to the East the
benefits--and obligations--of the same liberal
trading and security order that have been pillars of
strength for the West.  That is the best way to
secure the gains of democracy in the East.  That is
the best way to ensure that a wider war never
engulfs Europe again.
 
Yesterday in Paris, many of us were present when the
OECD decided to start membership negotiations with
the Visegrad countries.  We decided to intensify
OECD activities in other Central and Eastern
European countries.  The OECD also signed a
cooperation agreement with Russia.
 
We have sought to extend economic institutions to
the East because we understand that the quest for
security in Europe cannot rely on security
institutions alone.  It also must rely on the
political and economic reconstruction of newly
democratic nations.  Our experience in Western
Europe after the Second World War taught us that
economic integration is essential to anchor
stability among rebuilding nations.  That is why we
must lower the remaining trade barriers that limit
the East's exports and its potential for lasting
growth.
 
With the Cold War past, the doors of the West must
be open to open societies and open markets to the
East.  By widening the reach of NATO and of
organizations like the OECD, the EU, and the GATT,
we will strengthen the prosperity of an undivided
Europe and bolster the security that this alliance
continues to preserve.  (###)
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 3:
 
Fact Sheet:  Organization for Cooperation and
Development
 
Background
The Paris-based OECD is an integral element in the
system of Western international institutions
developed after World War II.  It began as the
Organization for European Economic Cooperation,
created in 1948 to rebuild the economies of Europe
with the help of the U.S. Marshall Plan.  By 1961,
when it became the OECD, the organization's reach
had extended beyond Europe, and its mandate had
expanded to include coordinating assistance to
developing countries.
 
Over the intervening years, with the accession of
Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and most recently,
Mexico, the OECD has evolved into a global forum
where the industrial democracies meet to develop
policies on an expanding range of economic,
scientific, and social issues.  Its commitment to
the development of strong market economies and
democratic political systems has made it an
important complement to the security ties
established among many of its members.
 
The OECD's basic aims are to achieve the highest
sustainable economic growth and employment in member
countries, while maintaining financial stability; to
contribute to sound economic expansion in developing
countries; to assist in the transition of former
centrally planned economies into market-based ones;
and to contribute to the growth of world trade on a
multilateral, non-discriminatory basis.
 
Each member country has a representative on the OECD
Council, the organization's policy-making body.
Delegates from governments attend meetings of
committees that deal with specific issues.  Day-to-
day management is the responsibility of the OECD
Secretary General, who supervises a staff drawn from
all member countries.  The Secretariat is divided
into various directorates which support the work of
the committees.
 
Activities
The OECD plays an indispensable role in building
consensus among the industrial democracies on
critical economic, scientific, and social issues.
The spring ministerial meeting lays the substantive
groundwork for the annual economic summit of the
seven industrial democracies (G-7).  Its Growth and
Employment Study provided substantive background for
the G-7 jobs conference held in Detroit in March
1994.
 
The OECD was instrumental in the successful
conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) through its
innovative work on services, intellectual property
rights, and industrial and agricultural subsidies.
It will continue to play an activist role in the
post-Uruguay Round on such issues as trade and
labor, environment, and investment and competition.
The OECD's analysis of structural adjustment in
member economies has spurred efforts to promote
greater efficiency through tax reform, deregulation,
and privatization.  The OECD recently adopted a
recommendation against bribery of foreign officials
in international business transactions.
 
The OECD's Center for Cooperation with Economies in
Transition  provides policy advice and technical
assistance to countries in Central and Eastern
Europe, Russia, and the other New Independent
States.  The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and
Slovakia are members of the Partners in Transition
program, created in 1991, which provides them with
enhanced assistance toward the goal of eventual OECD
membership.  In June 1994, the OECD will sign a
cooperation agreement with Russia, signaling the
deepening of this important relationship.  It has an
ongoing dialogue with certain dynamic non-members,
including South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan,
Thailand, Malaysia, Argentina, Chile, and Brazil.
 
Environment.  The OECD aims to develop  harmonized
policies among members to promote sound
environmental management, protection, and
improvement.  The originator of the "polluter pays"
principle, the Environmental Committee now focuses
on the integration of economic and environmental
decision-making.
 
Energy.  The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, established
in 1957, promotes cooperation among member
governments in the development of nuclear power as a
safe, economic, and environmentally sound energy
source.  In addition, most OECD members participate
in the International Energy Agency (IEA),
established in 1974 in response to the oil price
shocks of that period.  The IEA's key objective is
to provide for energy security.  It also studies
options to reduce energy-related pollution and
encourages building up oil stocks, conservation, and
research and development of non-oil energy sources.
 
Development.  The OECD's Development Assistance
Committee works to expand resources made available
to developing countries and seeks to improve their
effectiveness.  Members periodically review both the
amount and nature of their contributions to aid
programs and consult about their assistance policies
and practices.
 
OECD Codes.  In 1961, OECD member countries adopted
the OECD Codes of Liberalization, governing capital
movements and trade in services.  Adherence to the
codes reflects a country's commitment to progressive
liberalization of financial flows and service
transactions across borders.  The codes complement
GATT disciplines on trade in goods and have
facilitated the growth of international trade and
capital flows and the globalization of the world
economy.  The related National Treatment Instrument
pledges member countries, on a best-efforts basis,
to extend to foreign enterprises from other OECD
countries treatment at least as favorable as that
given to domestic enterprises.
 
OECD Publications.  The OECD is probably best known
for its economic statistics and forecasts, which are
internationally comparable.  The biannual OECD
Economic Outlook provides an independent assessment
of economic trends and prospects in member
countries.  Periodic OECD Economic Surveys provide
in-depth coverage of individual member countries.
(For information, call OECD's Publications Center,
2001 "L" St., at 202-785-6323.)  (###)
 
Members:
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States,
European Union (observer).
(###)
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 4:
 
North Atlantic Council Final Communique
Final Communique issued following the Ministerial
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC),
Istanbul, Turkey, June 9, 1994.
 
1.  At their Summit meeting in Brussels on 10-11
January, our Heads of State and Government confirmed
the enduring validity and indispensability of the
North Atlantic Alliance and their commitment to a
strong transatlantic partnership between North
America and a Europe developing a Common Foreign and
Security Policy and taking on greater responsibility
on defence matters.  They also reaffirmed the
Alliance's enduring core functions. They gave their
full support to the development of a European
Security and Defence Identity.
 
2.  To enable the Alliance better to meet new
security challenges, they decided:
 
--  to adapt further the Alliance's political and
military structures to reflect both the full
spectrum of its roles and the development of the
emerging European Security and Defence Identity, and
to endorse the concept of Combined Joined Task
Forces;
 
--  to reiterate their strong commitment to the
transatlantic link, which is the bedrock of NATO;
 
--  to reaffirm the openness of the Alliance to
membership of other European countries;
 
--  to launch the Partnership for Peace initiative;
and
 
--  to intensify the Alliance's efforts against
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
their means of delivery.
 
3.  We have reviewed today in Istanbul the
implementation of these Summit decisions and
resolved to press forward with it.  We note with
satisfaction the progress already achieved in the
short time since the Summit.  We have given guidance
to the Council in Permanent Session on how to
proceed further, and look forward to its reports to
us at our next meeting in December.
 
4.  We are particularly pleased with the positive
reception of the Partnership for Peace initiative by
our Partners in the North Atlantic Cooperation
Council and by other CSCE countries. Twenty
countries have already joined with us in this
endeavour to forge new security relationships with
the Alliance, to expand political and military
cooperation throughout Europe, and to increase
stability and diminish threats to peace.  The
immediate response of Partner countries, and the
care they have put into their preparations for this
cooperation, demonstrate their commitment to working
alongside the Alliance for the preservation of peace
and security in the Euro-Atlantic area.
 
5.  The process of implementation of the Partnership
for Peace initiative is well underway.  Some Partner
countries' representatives have already moved into
dedicated office facilities at NATO Headquarters.
The first Individual Partnership Programme should be
agreed shortly.  The Partnership Coordination Cell
at Mons has been inaugurated and will under the
authority of the North Atlantic Council, carry out
the military planning necessary to implement the
Partnership Programmes.  The work of the
Coordination Cell will provide the basis for joint
training and exercises.  The first joint
peacekeeping field exercises will take place this
autumn in The Netherlands and in Poland, the latter
being the Partnership's first major activity in a
Partner country.  A joint maritime exercise
sponsored by SACLANT is also being planned for later
this year.  In addition, a number of nationally
sponsored peacekeeping exercises with Partners will
take place in 1994, also contributing to the goals
of the Partnership.
 
6.  We have tasked the Council in Permanent Session
to expedite work on a draft convention on the status
of Partners' missions and representatives to NATO.
We are grateful to Belgium for provisional
arrangements under which Liaison Officers of Partner
countries will be able to operate.
 
7.  We reiterate our conviction that stability and
security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved
only through fulfillment in good faith of
international obligations, cooperation and common
endeavour.  Partnership for Peace and our
intensifying cooperation in the framework of the
North Atlantic Cooperation Council are complementary
in pursuing this goal. We want to develop a strong
partnership with all Partner countries.  We are
pleased with the significantly expanded range of
practical cooperative activities being conducted
under the 1994 NACC Work Plan.
 
8.  Our Alliance's fundamental goal remains to
contribute to lasting peace, stability and well-
being in the whole of Europe. We are working for the
intensification of transparent relations between
NATO and its partners on an equal footing.  These
relations, while not replacing the network of
interdependent and mutually reinforcing European and
Euro-Atlantic institutions, help prevent new
divisions in Europe and contribute to strengthening
security.  We therefore look forward to further
deepening our dialogue and strengthening our
relationship with each of our partners. This will
not, of course, affect NATO's right to take its own
decisions on its own responsibility by consensus of
its members, including decisions on the enlargement
of the Alliance as envisaged in the January 1994
Brussels Summit Declaration.
 
9.  We reaffirm our strong support for political and
economic reform in Russia and recognize the
important contributions to European stability and
security that Russia can make on a wide range of
issues.  Accordingly, we wish to develop
constructive relations of mutual respect, benefit
and friendship between Russia and the Alliance, and
we welcome the progress already made.  We will
pursue the further development of this relationship
in a way that complements and reinforces our
relationship with all the new democratic states to
our east.  The Partnership for Peace is an important
new element in these relations, and we welcome
Russia's declaration of its intention to join it at
an early date by signing the Framework Document
which sets out the principles guiding the
participation of all Partners.  We hope and expect
that Russia will also join us in developing an
extensive and far-reaching Individual Partnership
Programme, corresponding to its size, importance,
capabilities, and willingness to contribute to the
pursuit of shared objectives.  As with all Partners,
our relationship with Russia, including in
appropriate areas outside the Partnership for Peace,
will be developed over time.  Good cooperative
relations between NATO and Russia will be the key
element for security and stability in Europe.  We
are, therefore, interested in a broad dialogue with
Russia in pursuit of common goals in areas where
Russia has a unique or particularly important
contribution to make.
 
10.  We believe that an independent, democratic,
stable and nuclear weapons-free Ukraine would
contribute to security and stability in Europe. We
therefore welcome Ukraine's adherence to the
Partnership for Peace and we look forward to further
developing our relationship with Ukraine.
 
11.  We have taken note of the preliminary work
undertaken on the further adaptation of the
Alliance's structures and procedures, in particular
on the development of the Combined Joint Task Forces
concept, including an initial assessment by NATO's
Military Authorities of the military aspects of the
implementation of this concept.  On the basis of
today's discussion, further political guidance is
being developed which will also take account of the
views of the WEU.  In this regard, we have taken
note of the views expressed by WEU Ministers in the
Kirchberg Declaration of 9 May 1994.  We look
forward to a further report by the Council in
Permanent Session at our next meeting in December.
We attach great importance to this work, which will
enhance the Alliance's ability to respond to crises
and provide separable but not separate military
capabilities that could be employed by NATO or the
WEU.  The Summit decisions have set the course for
cooperation, including the readiness of the Alliance
to make its collective assets available, on the
basis of consultations undertaken by the European
Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and
Security Policy.
 
12.  Following the decision at the Brussels Summit
to intensify and expand NATO's political and defence
efforts against proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and the means of delivery, we have today
adopted and made public an overall policy framework
setting out the basic principles of the Alliance's
role in this field.  We will continue to support and
seek to reinforce ongoing efforts in other
international fora and institutions to prevent
proliferation.  We will also give active
consideration in the Alliance on how to reduce the
proliferation threat or protect against it.  We have
tasked the Council in Permanent Session to report
back to us at our December meeting.
 
13.  We have discussed a number of regional issues
and sources of tension.
 
14.  The situation in Southern Caucasus continues to
be of special concern. We condemn the use of force
for territorial gains.  Respect for the territorial
integrity independence and sovereignty of Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia is essential to the
establishment of peace, stability and cooperation in
the region.  Peaceful and just solutions to ongoing
conflicts in the region can only be reached through
efforts under the aegis of the UN and the CSCE.
 
15.  We welcome the recent agreement to complete the
withdrawal of foreign troops from Latvia by 31
August 1994. We expect the early conclusion of the
on-going bilateral negotiations to achieve an
agreement on the withdrawal of the foreign troops
remaining in Estonia by the same date. We urge the
parties to resolve the remaining issues.
 
16.  We will consult in the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council tomorrow with our Cooperation
Partners on all these issues and on possible ways to
resolve them.
 
17.  We are deeply concerned that despite all
efforts of the international community, the conflict
in the Former Yugoslavia and, particular, in Bosnia
and Herzegovina continues.  We welcome the
contribution of the Contact Group and support the
conclusions reached at the 13 May Geneva meeting of
Foreign Ministers.
 
18.  We urge the parties concerned to:
 
--   conclude an immediate and comprehensive
cessation of hostilities and carry forward in
parallel without preconditions serious efforts to
reach a political settlement;
 
--  include in the agreement on cessation of
hostilities the separation of forces, the withdrawal
of heavy weapons and the interposition of UNPROFOR
troops;
 
--  reach a negotiated compromise that provides the
Bosniac-Croat Federation with viable, realistic and
reasonable territory; and
 
--  accept a settlement that preserves Bosnia and
Herzegovina as a single Union within its
internationally recognised borders, while providing
for constitutional arrangements that establish the
relationship between the Bosnia-Croat and Bosnian
Serb entities as they were referred to in the Vienna
and Washington agreements.
 
We welcome as a positive first step the agreement
reached in Geneva on 8 June not to engage in any
kind for a period of one month starting from 10 June
1994 at 1200 hours local time.
 
19.  The Alliance reiterates its determination to
carry out the necessary action under the authority
of the UN Secretary Council and, where appropriate
in close coordination with UNPROFOR, to enforce UN
Security Council resolutions dealing with embargoes
on the Former Yugoslavia, the No-Fly Zone over
Bosnia and Herzegovina established in accordance
with Security Council resolutions 824 and 836.  We
are united in our resolve to follow up the Alliance
decisions of 9 February and 22 April which
established military exclusion zones.  We reaffirm
our readiness to support the implementation of an
agreed peace settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
 
20.  We reaffirm the importance we attach to
enhanced relations with other institutions. Over the
past six months, the Alliance's relationship with
the UN has developed greatly.  The Alliance has
demonstrated its readiness and its capacity to
support on a case by case basis, peacekeeping and
other operations under the authority of the UN
Security Council.  We will work for further
improvement in the mutual understanding and the
close cooperation between NATO and the UN.
 
21.  Close cooperation and coordination between NATO
and WEU will continue to be developed in accordance
with the principles of complementary and
transparency.  The Summit decisions have set the
course for our cooperation, including the readiness
of the Alliance to make its collective assets
available, on the basis of consultations in the
North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations
undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of
their Common Foreign and Security Policy.
 
22.  We welcome the decisions taken in Luxembourg by
the WEU Council to create a status of association
with the Central European Consultation Partners of
the WEU. This important decision complements the
Alliance's efforts to promote security and stability
through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and
the Partnership for Peace, and contributes to the
growing network of security structures in Europe.
 
23.  We welcome the progress made in the preparation
of the Pact on Stability in Europe, and more
particularly the success of the Inaugural Conference
held in Paris on 26-27 May. We will continue fully
to support this initiative, which aims to promote
good neighbourly relations in Central and Eastern
Europe, including questions related to frontiers and
minorities, as well as regional cooperation and the
strengthening of democratic institutions.
 
24.  The CSCE remains central to European security.
We will work with other CSCE states to ensure that
the Budapest Review Conference and Budapest Summit
of Heads of State and Government will achieve
progress in all areas of the CSCE, particularly with
regard to early warning and conflict prevention, and
further strengthen its effectiveness.  We will
contribute to the means necessary for the CSCE to
carry out agreed missions and operations in a timely
and substantive way, and call upon other CSCE
participating states to do likewise.  We welcome
arrangements that allow NATO to participate in the
work of the CSCE and the CSCE to participate in
certain NATO activities, and, as decided at our
meetings in Athens last spring and at the CSCE
Council in Rome, look forward to further development
of the interaction and cooperation between the two
organisations.
 
25.  We noted with satisfaction the results thus far
in the CSCE's Forum for Security Cooperation.  We
look forward to further concrete results by the time
of the CSCE Summit in Budapest on the issues
identified in the Programme for Immediate Action,
particularly with regard to a code of conduct
committing all CSCE states to common rules of
politico-military behaviour, the harmonisation of
the obligations in the existing international
instruments on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe,
the development of the Vienna Document 1992 on
confidence-building measures, the global exchange of
military information and non-proliferation of
weapons and mass destruction.  This CSCE Summit will
provide an opportunity to take stock and give an
impetus to the security dialogue and the
negotiations conducted in the framework of the CSCE.
We expect the Summit to address the issues of
regional arms control, in particular with regard to
the former Yugoslavia.
 
26.  We remain committed to the full and timely
implementation of and the compliance with existing
arms control and disarmament agreements. We continue
to attach particular importance to:
 
--  the integrity of the CFE Treaty and full
compliance with all its provisions;
 
--  the indefinite and unconditional extension of
the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
and the work towards an enhanced verification
regime;
 
--  achieving a universal and verifiable
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at the Geneva
Conference on Disarmament;
 
--  the early coming into force of the Convention of
Chemical Weapons;
 
--  the early entry into force of the Treaty on Open
Skies;
 
--  the strengthening of the Biological Weapons
Convention.
 
27.  We welcome the assistance to the states
concerned in eliminating former Soviet weapons of
mass destruction.  We consult tomorrow with our
Cooperation Partners in the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council on these and other arms control
and disarmament issues.
 
28.  We condemn all acts of international terrorism.
They constitute flagrant violations of human dignity
and rights and are a threat to the conduct of normal
international relations.  In accordance with our
national legislation, we stress the need for the
most effective cooperation possible to prevent and
suppress this scourge.
 
29.  We carefully follow the political developments
around the Mediterranean.  We are concerned by the
risks to stability in this area.  We consider that
not only the security of the Alliance, but also that
of Europe in general is affected by security in the
Mediterranean.  We direct the Council in Permanent
Session to continue to review the overall situation
and to examine possible proposals by its members
with a view to contributing to the strengthening of
regional stability.
 
30.  We express our deep appreciation for the
gracious hospitality extended to us by the
Government of Turkey.  (###)
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 5:
 
Toward a Secure, Free, and Fully Integrated Europe
Secretary Christopher
Intervention at the Ministerial Meeting of the North
Atlantic Cooperation Council, Istanbul, Turkey, June
10, 1994
 
Mr. Acting Secretary General:  Four years ago, NATO
proposed to formalize its emerging security
cooperation with Europe's new democracies through
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.  This year,
NATO is building on the NACC to transform its
relationship with the East.  We have made clear that
neither our institutions nor our aspirations will
stop at the old frontiers of the Cold War.
 
The NACC remains a political forum where nations can
come to discuss issues that affect security
throughout the continent.  We share a common
commitment to deepen cooperation and widen
integration between East and West.
 
The Partnership for Peace, adopted at the NATO
summit in January, gives concrete expression to that
commitment.  The Partnership will make possible
joint operations to address common security
problems.  And it will pave the way for the eventual
expansion of the alliance.
 
Twenty countries, all represented here today, have
joined the Partnership.  In this respect, I am
pleased to welcome our colleagues from Finland,
Slovenia, and Sweden as partners.  We hope and
expect that other nations will join the Partnership
soon.
 
The Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons--the home
of SHAPE--was inaugurated on April 28.  For years,
NATO members met near that point to plan the defense
of allied territory.  Now we meet there with new
partners  for a new purpose:  to work together for
the peace and security of the entire continent.
Outside the building in Mons stands a section of the
Berlin Wall.  The symbol of Europe's old division is
there to remind us of the new integration we seek.
 
Yesterday, NATO ministers issued a communique that
reiterated two tenets at the core of the Partnership-
-equality of membership and flexibility of approach.
All members join as equal partners.  None enjoys
special status.  At the same time, each partner can
develop with NATO an individual program of
cooperation that reflects its interests and
capabilities.  Through the Partnership, we will not
only address common security concerns but
demonstrate the commitment and develop the habits of
cooperation that are the lifeblood of the alliance.
 
Let me take this opportunity to reaffirm that the
United States is committed to NATO's expansion.  And
let me reiterate what President Clinton told East
European leaders in Prague last January:  The
question is no longer whether NATO will take on new
members, but when and how we will do it.
 
The Partnership and the NACC were made possible by
the remarkable democratic transformation in Central
Europe and the former Soviet Union.  But the
Partnership and the NACC were made necessary by the
urgent security problems that remain.  In the
Balkans, we face the most destructive conflict in
Europe since the Second World War.  We have seen
violence int. Caucasus and in Central Asia.
Elsewhere, tensions persist that could lead to
conflict if they are not resolved.  Our discussions
today on regional security issues will thus be of
great value.
 
With respect to Bosnia, the U.S. believes that the
steps agreed at the Geneva ministerial meeting last
month offer the best chance for a resolution to that
horrible conflict.  We also must not lose sight of
the other disputes--and potential conflicts--in the
former Yugoslavia, especially in Krajina, Kosovo,
and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.  They
must be resolved to avoid a wider conflict in the
region.
 
In the former Soviet Union, the United States has
worked with all the parties to keep disagreements
from erupting into violence.  Where fighting has
broken out, we have vigorously supported UN- and
CSCE-brokered mediation efforts.  We will work with
the international community to ensure that any peace-
keeping forces are impartial, limited in their aims,
and act in ways that are compatible with UN and CSCE
principles.
 
European stability depends on all countries
respecting the sovereignty, independence, and
territorial integrity of all the states that emerged
from the Soviet empire.  No country should assert a
role that is inconsistent with international norms.
In a democratic, undivided Europe, there should be
no more lines of division and no more spheres of
influence.
 
We must hold all participating states accountable
for compliance with CSCE principles.  These
principles are the foundation for a peaceful,
prosperous, and democratic Europe.  At the same
time, we must strengthen the CSCE's capabilities in
preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution.
 
NACC consultations will continue to complement CSCE
and UN efforts by building confidence and
understanding among member nations.  The NACC ad hoc
group on peace-keeping--soon to be merged into the
Partnership for Peace--has intensified practical
cooperation in communications, logistics, planning,
and training.  The NACC has increased cooperation in
environmental, technical, and economic areas over
the past year.  At the same time, new cooperative
efforts are underway in air defense, civil emergency
planning, and humanitarian assistance.
 
The NACC will maintain a distinct and complementary
role in developing and sustaining security
cooperation among its member nations.  And it will
remain the forum for political consultations among
the nations participating in the Partnership for
Peace.
 
We still face many difficult problems.  But the Cold
War, with its 40-year struggle between freedom and
tyranny, is over.  The routine character of some of
the tasks in which we are now engaged--scheduling
joint exercises and consultations and allocating
office space and drafting documents--is a sign of
just how far we have come.
 
We have a long way to go before institutions like
the NACC and the Partnership for Peace help us
achieve our goal of a secure, free, and fully
integrated Europe linked by open societies and open
markets.  But I am confident we have made an
excellent beginning.  (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 6:
 
North Atlantic Cooperation Council Communique
Statement issued following the Ministerial Meeting
of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC),
Istanbul, Turkey, June 10, 1994.
 
1.  We, the Foreign Ministers and Representatives of
the member countries of the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council (NACC), have met today in
Istanbul for our seventh meeting since the
inauguration of our Council on 20 December 1991.  We
continued our consultations on regional conflicts
and tensions affecting security in our area.  We
reviewed the implementation of the Partnership for
Peace initiative, launched by NATO Heads of State
and Government at their meeting in Brussels on 10
January of this year, and our broadening
cooperation.  Through increasingly close cooperation
and joint efforts we will be able to strengthen
security and stability throughout our area.
 
2.  Finland, Slovenia, and Sweden, having joined the
Partnership for Peace, participated in the
deliberations on PfP issues and attended the rest of
the meeting as observers.
 
3.  We are pleased by the progress made in the
implementation of our NACC Work Plan for Dialogue,
Partnership and Cooperation for 1994, which we
agreed at our meeting last December.  Our
cooperation in many areas is already firmly
established and has developed its own momentum.  We
will continue with the broad agenda of our NACC
activities.  Cooperation on political and security
related issues will remain a key activity.  We shall
intensify our regular political consultations and
continue our practical cooperation activities, using
the mechanisms established in the framework of the
NACC.
 
4.  We welcome the establishment of the Partnership
for Peace and fully support the principles on which
it is founded.  This important and far-reaching
partnership initiative signifies the extension of
our cooperation in this Council, taking into account
the interests and capacities of the individual
partner countries.  Twenty countries have already
joined the Partnership for Peace.  We look forward
to others joining, including other CSCE states which
are not members of the NACC and which are able and
willing to contribute to this programme.
 
5.  The objective of the Partnership is to enhance
security and stability in the whole of Europe.  The
Partnership will transform the relations between
NATO and participating states and adapt them further
to the new conditions in Europe.  Cooperation will
include the necessary transparency and not be
directed against any other country.  Partnership for
Peace is based on the commitment to democratic
principles and human rights, to the preservation of
democratic societies, their freedom from coercion
and intimidation and the maintenance of the
principles of international law.  Central
obligations of the Partnership for Peace, already
undertaken in the UN Charter, include respect for
sovereignty and existing borders, settlement of
disputes by peaceful means and refraining from the
threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state.
 
6.  Important practical steps for the implementation
of Partnership for Peace have already been taken:  a
Political Military Steering Committee has been set
up and a separate Partnership Coordination Cell at
Mons, Belgium, has been established.  Partner
representatives now have offices at NATO
Headquarters in Brussels to facilitate liaison and
closer cooperation.  The first Individual
Partnership Programmes should be agreed shortly.
 
7.  We seek a robust programme of exercises,
beginning this year.  In this connection, we welcome
the holding of the first joint peacekeeping field
exercises this autumn in The Netherlands and in
Poland.  We also welcome a number of nationally-
sponsored peacekeeping exercises planned for 1994,
which we believe will contribute to our joint effort
to foster practical cooperation in the field of
peacekeeping within the NACC/PfP framework.  Since
joint practical planning, training and exercises in
the field of peacekeeping operations will form an
important part of Partnership for Peace activities,
we decided on the merger of the NACC Ad Hoc Group
with the Political-Military Steering Committee on
Partnership for Peace with provision to maintain
participation by all who have taken part in the work
of the Ad Hoc Group.
 
8.  We welcome the progress achieved in the NACC Ad
Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping towards
improving the ability of participating states to
cooperate effectively in support of peacekeeping
operations, including their humanitarian aspects,
under the authority of the UN Security Council or
the responsibility of the CSCE.  We have published
today the third progress report submitted to us by
the Group.  Participation by representatives of the
UN and the CSCE has facilitated liaison and
transparency with both.
 
9.  The Partnership for Peace programme builds on
the valuable cooperation underway in the NACC
framework in the fields of peacekeeping and defence-
related cooperation and military contacts.
Partnership for Peace activities will have greater
depth and be tailored to the needs of individual
Partners, in particular on the basis of Individual
Partnership Programmes.
 
10.  We take note of the adoption of a status of
Association with WEU for the countries of Central
Europe which have been partners in the Forum of
Consultation.  This initiative, for those who
participate, is designed to contribute to security
and stability in the whole of Europe, and as such is
fully complementary to the cooperation within the
framework of the Alliance, particularly the
Partnership for Peace.
 
11.  The CSCE remains essential in promoting
security and human rights in our area.  We consider
important the role of the CSCE in support of new
democracies.  We support the full range of its
activities.  We welcome the decisions of the CSCE
Council in Rome to make the role of the CSCE in
conflict prevention and crisis management more
operational.  We reaffirm our commitment to further
strengthening the role of the CSCE and its
contribution to European security, including its
early warning capabilities.  We endorse the work in
the CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation and are
committed to seek rapid further progress,
particularly with regard to the code of conduct,
harmonisation, regional arms control, including in
the Balkans, non-proliferation and the global
exchange of military information.  We will work for
concrete results in all these areas by the time of
the Budapest CSCE Review Conference and the CSCE
Summit in December.
 
12.  We welcome the progress made in the preparation
of the Pact on Stability in Europe, and more
particularly the success of the Inaugural Conference
held in Paris on 26-27 May.  We will continue to
support this initiative, which aims to promote good
neighbourly relations in Central and Eastern Europe,
including questions related to frontiers and
minorities, as well as regional cooperation and the
strengthening of democratic institutions.
 
13.  As at our previous meetings, we discussed the
regional conflicts and regional security issues
which undermine stability and security in our area
and endanger the process of democratic transition in
Europe.  Our consultations contribute to fostering a
better common understanding and reaffirming our
commitment to reduce tensions and search for
solutions.  We are united in the conviction that
only negotiated, peaceful settlements acceptable to
the parties involved will produce lasting solutions
to such conflicts.
 
14.  While international efforts have helped to
reduce the violence in some areas of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, fighting still continues.
We urge the parties concerned to conclude and
implement a comprehensive cessation of hostilities
and to negotiate an early and durable settlement of
the conflict, based on the framework agreed in
previous negotiations and recently reaffirmed by the
Geneva ministerial meeting on 13 May.  Only a
peaceful settlement will command the support of the
international community and offer the peoples of
Bosnia-Herzegovina the prospect of a secure future.
We welcome all latest efforts by the international
community, including those of the Contact Group, to
bring about such a settlement.  We welcome progress
in establishing a federation between the Bosniacs
and the Bosnian Croats in the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina as a step towards a global settlement.
We call on the parties and all others concerned to
comply fully with all relevant UNSC resolutions.  We
recognise the economic burdens being borne by
states, particularly those in the region, in
implementing those resolutions.  We call on all
parties to the conflict to respect safe areas
established in accordance with Security Council
Resolutions 824 and 836, and to refrain from
interference with humanitarian relief operations or
actions against UNPROFOR or other forces engaged in
implementing UNSC resolutions.  We note NATO's
decisions in response to requests from the UN
Secretary General, to provide its air power in
support of the relevant UN Security Council
resolutions.
 
We affirm our support of the International
Conference on Former Yugoslavia-sponsored mediation
with respect to the Krajina.  We remain deeply
concerned about tensions and the potential for
conflict in Vojvodina, Sandjak, Kosovo, as well as
in parts of the Republic of Croatia, and other
areas.  We call for full respect for human and
democratic rights.  We support UN efforts in this
regard and call for the return of CSCE long-term
missions.
 
15.  We remain convinced that the plan for a CSCE
Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh in Minsk offers the
appropriate means to find a just and lasting
solution to that conflict, the continuation of which
remains a source of deep concern.  We reaffirm that
the conflict cannot be resolved by military means
but only through a negotiated settlement, based on
respect for CSCE principles and the UN Charter, and
the establishment of good neighbourly relations
between Armenia and Azerbaijan and all countries in
the region.  We strongly support the work of the
CSCE Minsk Group.  We welcome all mediation efforts
undertaken in cooperation with the CSCE to help
achieve these ends.  We agree that implementation of
an effective ceasefire and constructive negotiations
in a spirit of compromise are essential to create
the conditions necessary for a step by step peace
process leading to a permanent solution, including
the de-escalation of the conflict and the withdrawal
of forces from areas occupied by force and the
return of displaced persons to their homes in
accordance with the relevant UN Security Council
resolutions.  We support the deployment of CSCE
monitors to facilitate a permanent settlement of
this enduring conflict.
 
16.  We welcome the progress towards a lasting
solution to the conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia, that
has been achieved in negotiations between the
parties concerned.  We support the efforts of the UN
and the CSCE to bring about a permanent settlement.
We take note of the measures, undertaken in the CIS
framework in order to assist in maintaining an
effective ceasefire, creating conditions for full
scale and secure return of refugees and displaced
civilians to their homes.  We reiterate our support
for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the
Republic of Georgia.
 
17.  We also call upon the conflicting parties to
work towards a peaceful solution of the problems in
Tajikistan and to abandon armed confrontation at the
Tajik-Afghan border.  We welcome the process of
inter-Tajik negotiations and support the efforts of
the UN and CSCE in furthering the dialogue towards
reaching a lasting political settlement of the
conflict, which will restore peace in Tajikistan and
make it possible for displaced persons to return to
places of their residence, thereby making it
possible for the country to focus upon her
democratic development and economic progress in the
interests of all her citizens.  We welcome the first
round of UN-sponsored peace talks that took place in
Moscow in April, and we urge further progress in the
next round scheduled for June.
 
18.  We welcome the recent agreement to complete the
withdrawal of foreign troops from Latvia by 31
August 1994.  We expect the early conclusion of the
on-going bilateral negotiations to achieve an
agreement on the withdrawal of the foreign troops
remaining in Estonia.  The orderly and expeditious
completion of the withdrawal from Latvia and Estonia
will be a positive contribution to regional and
European security.  It will help lay the basis for
constructive neighbourly relations in the region,
which are in the interest not only of the countries
in the Baltic region but of us all.  We urge the
parties to resolve the remaining issues.
 
19.  We are pleased that progress has been made
towards a permanent, peaceful solution of the
dispute regarding the Transdniestria area of
Moldova.  We welcome the recent signature of a
declaration on the principles of a settlement by the
parties concerned, which should serve as an
important step towards national reconciliation
within the context of respect for the territorial
integrity of Moldova.  We support the expeditious
conclusion of negotiations between the parties
concerned to lead to an early, complete and orderly
withdrawal of the 14th Russian Army from Moldova
without linkage to other issues.  We support the
efforts of the CSCE Mission in Moldova and the
facilitation of its work.
 
20.  We express great concern at the recent
developments around the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea within Ukraine, which may lead to further
escalation of tension in the region, and reiterate
that the solution of this problem should be found by
all parties concerned, fully respecting the
Constitution and territorial integrity of Ukraine,
and by peaceful means only, in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations and the principles of
the CSCE Final Act.
 
21.  We reaffirm the importance of full
implementation of and compliance with all existing
arms control and disarmament agreements.  This
means:
 
--  continuing support for the CFE Treaty as a
cornerstone of European security and stability;
 
--  the indefinite and unconditional extension of
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT), and work towards an enhanced
verification regime;
 
--  the early entry into force of the Convention on
Chemical Weapons, and its early ratification by
those states that have not yet done so;
 
--  the full implementation of the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention and new measures to
strengthen it;
 
--  the early entry into force of the Treaty on Open
Skies;
 
--  increased transparency on conventional arms
transfers and the full provision of relevant data by
all states to the UN Register of Conventional Arms;
 
--  the early conclusion of a universal and
effectively verifiable Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty.
 
22.  In the nuclear field, we welcome the Trilateral
Statement signed by Presidents Clinton, Kravchuk and
Yeltsin in Moscow on 14 January, on the transfer of
all nuclear warheads in Ukraine to Russia for
dismantlement and Russian compensation to Ukraine
for the value of highly-enriched uranium in those
weapons.  We welcome Ukraine's initiation in March
of the transfer to Russia of nuclear warheads from
strategic systems as a significant step towards
fulfillment of Ukraine's commitments under the
Lisbon Protocol and the Trilateral Statement.
 
23.  We look forward to Ukraine's accession to the
NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state at the earliest
opportunity and welcome the readiness of the three
co-depository states of the NPT to provide the
security assurances to Ukraine specified in the
Trilateral Statement once Ukraine becomes a non-
nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.
 
24.  We further welcome the Memorandum of
Understanding signed on 13 May 1994 between the
United States and Ukraine on missile non-
proliferation in accordance with the Missile
Technology Control Regime guidelines on export
controls.
 
25.  We welcome the Republic of Kazakhstan's
accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state
and highly appreciate the positive role of
Kazakhstan in the process of dismantling the nuclear
weapons of the former Soviet Union in accordance
with the terms of the Lisbon Protocol.
 
26.  We strongly urge the Government of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea to affirm
unequivocally its commitment to the NPT and to
comply with its International Atomic Energy Agency
Safeguards Agreement.
 
27.  We look forward to the next meeting of the
North Atlantic Cooperation Council in Brussels in
December 1994.
 
28.  We extend our deep appreciation for the
gracious hospitality extended to us by the
Government of Turkey.  (###)
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 7:
 
NAC-NACC Ministerials
 
NAC
The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is the principal
forum for consultation and cooperation between NATO
member governments on all issues affecting their
common security.  Its decisions are made by
consensus, with each member having an equal right to
express its views.  The NATO Secretary General is
Chairman of the NAC. The NAC meets at least twice a
year in ministerial session; its last meeting was in
December 1993 in Brussels.  It also meets weekly at
NATO Headquarters at the level of Permanent
Representatives, who hold ambassadorial rank.
 
The principal focus of the June 9 NAC ministerial
will be to review progress on implementation of the
major initiatives agreed to at the January 10-11
NATO summit and to give direction and impetus to
remaining work.  The major summit initiatives were
the Partnership for Peace, NATO support for
"separable but not separate" European forces to
promote a better U.S.-European balance of
responsibilities and support European integration,
and development of a NATO non-proliferation
strategy.
 
There are 16 members of the NATO alliance:  Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States.
 
NACC
Based on a U.S.-German initiative, the North
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was created at
the November 1991 NATO summit in Rome.  NACC aims to
conduct NATO's outreach program to the states of the
former Warsaw Pact and to help heal the divisions of
the Cold War.  It meets in ministerial session at
least once a year and met last at that level in
Brussels in December 1993.  The Partnership for
Peace was established within the NACC framework.
The NACC ministerial meeting on June 10, 1994,
discussed implementation of the Partnership and
regional issues and reviewed progress made on the
1994 NACC Work Plan and the Work Program of the NACC
Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peace-keeping.
 
In the 2 1/2 years since its founding, NACC
cooperation activities have expanded dramatically.
Through a variety of projects, seminars, and
exchanges, NACC member states address such topics as
peace-keeping, defense planning and budgeting, civil-
military relations, command and control, defense
conversion, airspace management, civil emergency
planning, and environmental consequences of military
activities.
 
Current NACC membership stands at 38:  the 16 NATO
allies, seven Central and East European states
(Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Romania, and Slovakia), the 12 former Soviet
republics, and the three Baltic states.  Finland,
Slovenia, and Sweden attended the NACC ministerial
as observers.  (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 8:
 
Secretary and Russian Foreign Minister Meet
Secretary Christopher, Foreign Minister Kozyrev
Opening statements at a news conference following a
meeting, Istanbul, Turkey, June 10, 1994
 
Secretary Christopher.  I've been meeting with the
Foreign Minister for 2 1/2 hours.  We, fortunately,
had lunch next to each other today, came back, and
have been upstairs in my suite.  So we've had a good
opportunity to talk.  As you might imagine, we went
over a number of issues.  We've discussed, as we
usually do, the state of U.S.-Russian relations, and
I would describe them as being excellent.  We are
working on a number of matters in a cooperative way,
exchanging views, and working our way through the
problems.  We talked about our leaders being
together at the G-7 in Naples and the opportunity
that that will give them to have an exchange of
views.  We talked about some of the issues relating
to Naples.
 
We talked about North Korea.  As you perhaps know,
our two Presidents discussed that subject on the
telephone.  We are proceeding to work together on a
sanctions resolution that will contain both
reference to sanctions as well as to, at some point
in the process, an international conference.
 
We discussed the way we are working together on
Bosnia, stemming from the May 13 meeting in Geneva.
The Contact Group is actively working on a proposal
which, hopefully, will get the agreement of both
parties.  As we said in Geneva, the ministers will
meet again whenever it would be desirable.  I think
that this is another example of our working in
cooperation to try to resolve an exceedingly
difficult problem.
 
We actually spent a good deal of time talking about
the Partnership for Peace.  We are looking forward
to an early adherence to the Partnership by Russia,
but I think it's most appropriate for me to let the
Foreign Minister describe how that will take place.
We've had a very positive set of exchanges on that,
and, of course, today the NACC was another
indication of the close relationship we have working
on that problem.
 
Let me not mislead you in any way. Sometimes when we
have slightly different views about matters, the
essence of the relationship that we have in this new
era is that we discuss them fully and almost always
find some way to reach a resolution.
 
I think I will now turn to Foreign Minister Kozyrev.
I know you are extremely interested in their
reaction with respect to the Partnership for Peace.
 
Foreign Minister Kozyrev (interpreted from Russian).
I believe that that was a very businesslike and
fruitful summary and discussion.  I would say that
special good will was displayed during the lunch.
This was because we sat close together, but we also
sat close by Prime Minister Ciller.
 
I won't touch upon the questions that have already
been covered by the Secretary of State.  I would
only say that we instructed our Working Group
experts to continue to intensify their work on
matters such as COCOM and some regional matters as
well.
 
As to the Partnership for Peace, we consider it to
be one of the avenues to the development of European
cooperation, and I hope to visit Brussels in the
near future in order to put into action--to launch--
the important Partnership for Peace and the
framework of cooperation with Russia.  This program
should be substantial:  one containing no mutual
vetoes and no surprises.  (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 9:
 
Recent Events in the Middle East
Robert H. Pelletreau, Assistant Secretary For Near
Eastern Affairs
Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the
Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
Washington, DC, June 14, 1994
 
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the
subcommittee:  I am pleased to appear before you
again to review recent developments in the Middle
East.
 
In the two months that have passed since I last
testified before you, the region has taken a
historic step toward peace with the conclusion of
the May 4 accord between Israel and the PLO and the
transfer of authority in the Jericho area and the
Gaza Strip from Israel to the Palestinian Authority.
Jordan and Israel also have made significant
progress:  They have agreed to hold negotiations in
Jordan and Israel this July.  It is our hope that
these dramatic achievements will encourage
governments in the region to move forward in other
areas of activity in the peace process.  While the
process remains fraught with difficulties and
dangers, there are, indeed, encouraging signs that
the momentum toward peace is building.
 
Mr. Chairman, my statement today will cover the
peace process, Yemen, Gulf security, and our
democratization and commercial policies in the
region.  Let me begin by reviewing the various
tracks of the peace process.
 
Update on the Peace Process:  Bilateral Negotiations
 
Over the past six weeks, the peace process has taken
several large steps forward.  And the United States
has been actively involved.  On the bilateral track,
Israelis and Palestinians signed two important
agreements.  In Paris, on April 29, the two sides
concluded an economic agreement that will have far-
reaching implications for their relations in the
period ahead.
 
Five days later, on May 4, at a dramatic ceremony in
Cairo, Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and PLO Chairman
Arafat signed an agreement to implement the first
part of the Declaration of Principles relating to
Gaza and Jericho.  Secretary Christopher, who had
been in the region for more than a week to advance
the peace process, was on hand to witness the
signing.
 
By the middle of May, authority had been transferred
to the Palestinians in Gaza and Jericho.  On a
second trip to the region--following the Cairo
ceremony--the Secretary visited Jericho to see first-
hand the situation on the ground.  He was able to
witness the implementation process moving forward
amidst great enthusiasm by the local Palestinians.
 
With Palestinians now assuming self-government
responsibilities in Gaza and Jericho, it is
important that we expedite the aid promised at the
Conference to Support Middle East Peace.  Secretary
Christopher has been urging other donors to join us
in reallocating pledges to meet the start-up needs
of the Palestinian Authority.  Donors have responded
positively.  At the June 9-10 meeting of the Ad Hoc
Liaison Committee (AHLC) keydonors pledged to
reallocate $42 million to meet Palestinian cash-flow
needs this summer.  We are pleased that most of
these resources will be steered through the Holst
Peace Fund.  Administered by the World Bank, this
fund was specifically set up to deliver cash quickly
and accountably.  The United States has helped lead
this process by reallocating an additional $10
million for the Holst Fund in 1994.  This meets the
AHLC target of allocating 25% of total 1994 pledges
for start-up costs.
 
Total pledges for start-up costs now exceed $130
million and should rise further at the mid-July
meeting of the Consultative Group.  The donor
response is extraordinary, but it must also be
temporary.  Palestinian self-help efforts--
collecting taxes and tapping the resources of the
Palestinian diaspora--as well as cooperation between
the PLO and Israel in implementing the economic
aspects of the Cairo protocol are critical for
economic progress.
 
Last week's meeting of the U.S.-Jordanian-Israeli
Trilateral Economic Committee in Washington moved
the Jordan-Israel track forward in substantial ways.
The parties initialed bilateral agreements--on
water, energy, the environment, borders, and
security--which will constitute parts of an eventual
peace treaty.  They also agreed to establish a
commission on these issues which will meet openly in
their two countries beginning next month.  For the
first time since Camp David, representatives of
Israel and an Arab state are planning to meet
publicly on each other's territory as a
demonstration of their commitment to peace.
 
On trilateral issues, the parties agreed to a number
of new ventures, including:
 
--  A road link between Jordan and Israel near their
respective Red Sea ports;
 
--  Tourism coordination and development of a
transboundary cultural heritage park;
 
--  Discussion of civil aviation matters;
 
--  Comprehensive development planning for the
Jordan Rift Valley; and,
 
--  To supplement the road project, the two parties
agreed to form a commission to examine border
demarcation in the immediate vicinity next month.
 
These are clear signs of tangible progress since
Jordan and Israel signed the Common Agenda last
September.  They demonstrate that the parties are
serious about finding common ground on which to base
future relations.
 
The U.S. also has been seeking opportunities to move
forward the Syria-Israel negotiations.  During his
two recent trips to the region, Secretary
Christopher had extensive discussions on this
subject in Syria and Israel.  It is clear from the
Secretary's exchanges--and our subsequent follow-up-
-that these negotiations have entered a new, more
substantive phase.  Instead of focusing on only one
or two key elements, the parties are looking at a
more comprehensive, package approach.  This allows
each side to present its ideas not only on the
nature of peace and withdrawal but on issues such as
timing, phasing, and security arrangements.
 
At the same time, significant gaps remain both on
substance and procedure.  There is still a great
deal of work to be done.  The U.S. is committed to
doing everything possible to advance the Syria-
Israel track in 1994.  Lebanon and Israel are also
continuing their effort to reach agreement on a
political frame of reference dealing with the key
issues of land and peace.
 
Multilateral Negotiations
 
The multilateral peace process also has broken new
ground in important ways.  We are, currently, in
round six of the plenary working group meetings.  In
this round, the five working groups have increased
their emphasis on concrete projects designed to
bring the benefits of peace home to the people of
the region.  The groups have approved, and in a few
cases implemented, small-scale projects on the
ground.  For example, the Arms Control and Regional
Security--ACRS--Group is establishing a
communications network, patterned after CSCE, among
regional participants.  In April, the Water Group
approved an Israeli proposal for rehabilitating
water systems in small communities--the first time
an Israeli proposal was endorsed in the
multilaterals.
 
The multilaterals also are beginning to sketch a
picture of what the region might look like--and how
the countries of the area might cooperate--once a
comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace is achieved.  Both
the Steering Group and the Arms Control and Regional
Security Group are actively considering draft
declarations of principles or guidelines for
conducting relations in the future.
 
In the current multilateral round, four of the five
working groups and the Steering Group have met or
will meet in Arab states.  Hosts thus far include
Qatar, for the ACRS Group; Oman, water; and Egypt,
refugees.  The Regional Economic and Development
Group--REDWG--is meeting this week in Morocco.  The
Steering Group will convene in Tunisia next month.
Israeli participation in the meetings in Qatar and
Oman created major news events in Israel--and is a
sign of a changing Middle East.
 
Yemen
 
The current situation in the Republic of Yemen, Mr.
Chairman, reminds us that even as the region
inclines toward peace, the international community
must remain vigilant to prevent, to the extent
possible, local rivalries from flaring into
violence.
 
Yemen's progress since the unity agreement of 1990
toward democracy and economic reform broke down with
the outbreak of fighting in early May.  Both before
and since this test of arms began, the U.S. has been
encouraging the parties to seek a resolution of
their differences through political dialogue and
negotiation.  We continue to believe that
reconciliation is not beyond reach.
 
The situation on the ground remains unclear.
Northern forces achieved the upper hand early in the
fighting and now occupy positions within artillery
range of Aden.  They also have advanced in the east
toward the town of al-Mukalla, a key port and the
interim capital of the south since former Vice
President Ali Salim al-Bidh declared the south's
independence on May 20.  Despite the announcement of
a cease-fire and the presence of a special envoy of
the UN Secretary General in the region, fighting
appears to be continuing along these fronts with an
increasing prospect for large-scale civilian
casualties in Aden and elsewhere, an outflow of
refugees to neighboring areas, and a requirement for
humanitarian relief.
 
The U.S. shares the special concerns of Yemen's
neighbors over the adverse consequences for the
stability of the Arabian Peninsula of continued
fighting.  The U.S. is opposed to the imposition of
unity by force, just as we are opposed to an act of
secession in the midst of war.  That is why we
supported the passage of Security Council Resolution
924, with its clear call for:
 
--  An immediate cease-fire;
 
--  A resumption of political dialogue; and
--  A halt to the supply of arms to the parties from
the outside.
 
Unfortunately, that call has not been heeded by the
parties.  The continued fighting is now threatening
serious humanitarian consequences.  If the fighting
does not end immediately, we are concerned that
interested parties will feel it necessary to take
actions which will undo the prospects for a cease-
fire and a return to the negotiating table.
 
UN Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi has been in Yemen
and the Gulf over the weekend talking to both sides.
We have been vigorously urging our interlocutors in
Yemen to give his mission a chance.  There needs to
be an immediate cease-fire.  This should be followed
by the establishment of a joint military committee,
comprising elements from the north and south, which
can oversee and monitor the cease-fire.  The work of
the joint military committee can be supplemented by
an international presence.  We do not believe that
this is an appropriate task for UN forces, which are
already stretched thin.  If UN envoy Brahimi feels
that an international presence is necessary, we
would support the concept of this being handled in
an Arab or Islamic context.
 
Mr. Chairman, the situation in Yemen calls for
maximum restraint on all sides.  Those who choose
now to continue the fighting risk losing the support
of the international community and plunging Yemen
into a prolonged crisis that will not serve the
interests of anyone who genuinely seeks a better
future for Yemen.
 
 
Gulf Security
 
Let me now turn to our broader security concerns in
the Gulf region.  My visit to the Gulf, May 4-13,
provided an excellent opportunity to engage with our
friends and partners in the region on the critical
issues we confront there.  The scene had been set by
the Secretary's very productive meeting with the
Gulf Cooperation Council foreign ministers in late
April and his clear reiteration of U.S. policy to
"remain determined and vigilant in this region,
constantly aware that there are threats to peace and
security in the area."
 
I found that, without exception, the ties which were
forged by our common effort to liberate Kuwait
remain strong and healthy.  There is continued,
broad agreement on the nature of the threat we face
in the region.
 
We will continue to work closely with the Gulf
Cooperation Council to contain the threats to
regional stability posed by Iran and Iraq.  But
containment alone is insufficient and represents
only one side of the picture.  We need to work with
our friends to develop a strong regional deterrent
to those who would threaten its security or
stability.  Our recent reassessment of U.S. defense
strategy reaffirmed the importance of the Gulf to
American interests and committed major U.S. defense
assets to a continuing mission in the region.  Our
goal is to complement, not replace, the Gulf states'
own collective security efforts.
 
I must report, however, that the United States is
disappointed with the slow progress of the Gulf
Cooperation Council's efforts to promote its
members' collective security.  The council leaders
did announce some steps to improve cooperation at
their summit meeting last December, and we have been
encouraged by an increase in the number of intra-
council exercises.  Nevertheless, our assessment is
that internal differences within the council over
long-standing issues, such as border disputes,
continue to obstruct more meaningful cooperation.
 
I stressed throughout my discussions in the region
that the council states must find a means for
addressing and resolving these differences and that,
in the meantime, they should not allow disputes
among friends to delay their response to real
dangers from regional foes.  Advancing this
perspective will remain a high priority for the U.S.
in our continuing dialogue on security issues with
our friends in the region.
 
 
Iraq
 
The primary threats to Gulf security today come from
two sources--Iran and Iraq.  In my March 1 statement
to the subcommittee, I detailed our many concerns
about Iranian behavior.  I will not repeat those
here except to say that Iran's hegemonic ambitions
toward the Gulf and aggressive posture in support of
militant Islamic movements and in opposition to the
peace process are continuing unabated.
 
I would, however, like to review briefly
developments in U.S. policy toward Iraq.  The
Security Council met in May for its regular 60-day
review of Iraq sanctions.  The council agreed
unanimously that Iraq has not complied with the
relevant Security Council resolutions and that
sanctions must remain in place.
 
UN Resolution 687 ended the war and established the
terms of the cease-fire.  It was designed to ensure
that Iraq did not again threaten the peace.  Indeed,
its preamble reaffirms "the need to be assured of
Iraq's peaceful intentions."  That is still the
right standard.  Clearly, Iraq is not meeting it.
Baghdad has not taken the legal steps necessary to
reverse its 1990 incorporation of Kuwait; it has not
accepted the UN's delineation of the border.  It has
never accounted for hundreds of Kuwaiti MIAs, as
required by Resolution 687.
 
Baghdad continues active repression of Shi'a in the
south and Kurds in the north, creating dangerous
areas of instability on Iraq's borders.  UN Security
Council Resolution 688 requires an end to this
repression.  Baghdad likewise continues to use
terror in violation of Resolutions 687 and 688, as
we saw in the recent assassination of an Iraqi
dissident in Beirut.
 
The conclusion is inescapable:  Nothing fundamental
has changed in Baghdad; the nature of the current
regime is the same as it was in August 1990 and in
April 1991, when Resolution 687 was passed.  Iraq's
modus operandi differs only as a function of the
intrusiveness of current UN activities.  What
cooperation we have seen on weapons of mass
destruction issues has been based solely on the
tactical calculation that this approach looks like
the shortest path to ending oil export sanctions.
That clearly is not an adequate basis for giving up
the principal lever the international community has
over Iraq's long-term behavior.
 
With sanctions still in place--and likely to remain
so--the U.S. continues to seek ways to relieve the
suffering of the Iraqi people.  The U.S. and other
members of the Security Council have put in place a
way for Iraq to sell limited quantities of oil to
purchase needed humanitarian supplies.  Saddam
Hussein refuses to do so.  He prefers the suffering
of his people to the loss of police-state control
which might occur if the UN were to monitor who gets
humanitarian supplies.
 
To offset Baghdad's efforts, the U.S. continues to
support international relief.  Our commitment to
provide protection and humanitarian assistance to
the people of northern Iraq and to support the
continuation of Operation Provide Comfort remains
absolutely firm, as President Clinton made clear in
his remarks after the tragic shoot-down of two
American helicopters over northern Iraq on April 14.
 
It should be clear that we have no quarrel with the
people of Iraq.   Indeed, a government in Baghdad
that lived in peace with its people and respected
Security Council resolutions would find us ready to
move quickly to lighten the burdens of the Iraqi
people.
 
 
Democratization and Human Rights Issues
 
I would like to add here a note on democratization.
While there has not been as much progress as we
would like, there have been some recent, notable
steps.
 
Jordan is among the countries in the Middle East
that have made measurable progress toward democracy.
Its emerging democratic system took a further step
forward last November when multi-party elections
were held for 80 seats of its lower house of
parliament.  The elections were conducted in a fair
manner, and they demonstrated that the Jordanian
people are taking an active interest.
 
Since the end of the Gulf war, several Gulf
Cooperation Council states have inaugurated or
expanded efforts to promote popular participation in
government and more open societies.  Saudi Arabia,
the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain now have
operating advisory councils which provide citizens
institutionalized access to government.  During my
recent visit to the Gulf, I found developments in
Oman and Kuwait of particular interest.  Sultan
Qaboos of Oman made clear his interest in building
institutions to enhance the role of the Omani people
in their government within the framework of his
country's political culture and traditions.
 
In Kuwait, the National Assembly is a vibrant,
growing part of government and society and is
clearly enjoying greater authority than at any time
in its history.  I had the memorable experience of
being the first foreign official to appear before a
committee of the National Assembly when I met with
the foreign affairs committee for a good and
spirited exchange.  This was followed quickly by a
visit to the U.S. by a Kuwaiti parliamentary
delegation which was very productive and which
hopefully will contribute to the further development
of that institution in Kuwait.
 
 
Egypt
 
Moving west, I would also like to mention to the
committee some noteworthy developments in Egypt.
The Egyptian Government has achieved some important
successes recently in its battle against terrorism.
A number of key terrorist operatives have been
apprehended since the beginning of the year.
Although it is still too soon to draw firm
conclusions, there has been a marked drop in the
level of terrorist violence in the past four months.
 
As we applaud the government's successes, we are
concerned that democratic values and respect for
human rights not become casualties of the war
against terrorism--in Egypt and elsewhere.  We have
raised with the Government of Egypt the death in
custody of a lawyer, Mr. Abdel Harith Madani, as
well as other human rights concerns.  In addition,
we will be watching with keen interest the progress
of the National Dialogue, which got underway this
month, involving the government and opposition
political parties, professional syndicates, and
other national institutions.
 
Egypt also has made progress on its economic reform
program, selling off several public enterprises.
However, we believe that Egypt must accelerate its
efforts to establish the basis for a market economy
by pursuing deregulation, privatization, and
macroeconomic reforms more aggressively.  Doing so
would provide a solid foundation for the economic
growth necessary to prevent unemployment from rising
further.
 
U.S. Commercial Interests
 
We support economic liberalization in Egypt and
throughout the region because that is a prerequisite
for prosperity and stability.  Prosperity also means
more opportunities for U.S. trade with and
investment in the Middle East.
 
Under the direction of President Clinton and
Secretary Christopher, our ambassadors in the Middle
East view promotion of trade and investment as a key
part of their work.  Successes this year include
decisions by Saudi Arabia to purchase $6 billion
worth of McDonnell Douglas and Boeing airframes and
engines to replace their civilian airfleet and an
AT&T communication system worth approximately $4
billion.  These sales demonstrate how our
partnership with U.S. firms can translate into large
orders for goods produced by American workers.
 
U.S. embassies have been active elsewhere in the
Gulf helping American businesses to secure, for
instance, more than 500 construction contracts in
Kuwait worth approximately $5 billion and a $98-
million contract to dredge a channel in Doha.  We
will continue to be active in seeking commercial
opportunities for U.S. business.
 
One of the impediments to economic expansion in the
region is the Arab boycott of Israel.  In light of
the latest advances in the peace process, the
boycott simply does not make sense.  In the wake of
an Israeli-PLO economic agreement, the boycott is
not merely an anachronism; it is an economic
dinosaur.  The boycott stultifies the region's
economic growth at a time when promoting trade and
economic development is critical to the area's
stability.  U.S. policy is clear:  The time has come
to end the boycott.  (###)
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 10:
 
U.S. Commitment to Conflict Resolution in Africa
George E. Moose, Assistant Secretary for African
Affairs
Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC,
June 8, 1994
 
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee:  I
welcome this opportunity to address the committee on
the subject of conflict resolution in Africa.  It is
a central issue for those of us involved in African
policy and one that warrants ongoing attention.
 
I would like to commend this committee for its
consistent and steady leadership on this issue.
Your proposed 1994 legislative initiative, in
particular, could prove to be helpful in
strengthening our approach to conflict resolution
and military downsizing in Africa.
 
As the poorest region of the world, Africa is also
the region most heavily burdened with conflict-
generated problems.  The costs to the continent of
war-related tragedies are easily measured in
enormous flows of refugees and displaced persons as
non-combatants seek to flee the violence. But the
economic, environmental, and, most subtly,
psychological impact of conflict has taken an
immeasurable toll on the lives of the African
people. Conflict prevention and resolution, peace-
making, and peace-keeping are ongoing requirements
for a continent whose future sways in unpredictable
balance.
 
This Administration has put a premium on conflict
resolution issues, making them one of the priorities
of President Clinton's foreign policy agenda.  Given
the growing burden of conflict resolution around the
world today, we have also recognized that it has
become necessary to look to the utility of regional
organizations to handle these very difficult
problems. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) is
in a unique position to defuse conflicts before they
start or conduct early intervention in African
conflicts, thereby reducing the magnitude of human
suffering and the level of destruction.
 
We are helping the OAU--as the region's principal
political organization--develop a credible
capability to plan, coordinate, and supervise
efforts in conflict resolution.  In FY 1994, the
U.S. is providing the OAU with $3.5 million, which
consists of $2 million in non-assessed peace-keeping
funding to strengthen the OAU's capacity to conduct
peace-keeping operations, and $1.5 million in
Economic Support Funding (ESF) to assist the OAU in
the development of conflict prevention and mediation
measures.  Our assistance complements $3 million
that the UN Development Program is providing in
support of OAU conflict resolution.
 
Following receipt of the OAU's concept paper
outlining the organization and operation of the
conflict resolution mechanism, the Africa bureau
recently signed a memorandum of understanding with
USAID for the $1.5 million in ESF money to assist
the OAU in the establishment and operation of a
civilian conflict resolution/mediation center at the
OAU headquarters in Addis Ababa.  Disbursal of these
funds to the OAU is anticipated in the near future.
This money will be used to purchase communications
and computer equipment, train civilian staff, and
create procedures and software to enhance the OAU's
ability to track crisis situations and communicate
with OAU representatives in the field.
 
Funds from the FY 1994 voluntary peace-keeping
account will provide equipment and training for OAU
observer and peace-keeping missions undertaken as
directed by the OAU's conflict resolution mechanism
activity.  Portions of these funds have been
expended to support OAU mediation efforts in Burundi
and Somalia.  The OAU's commitment to this
significant mandate expansion is less than a year
old, and the organization is not yet capable of
handling a crisis on the scale of the horrors in
Rwanda.  We believe, however, that active
involvement by the OAU member nations and the
current Secretary General, Salim Salim, to increase
the competence of African states and their regional
organization to handle African problems is an effort
worthy of continued funding.
 
Continued Funding for the OAU Mechanism
 
Building on the conflict resolution initiative
contained in last year's House authorization bill,
the Administration has proposed providing an
additional $5 million to the OAU in FY 1995.  This
figure would provide an additional $1.5 million in
support of conflict prevention and mediation.  An
additional $3.5 million would enhance the
organization's peace-keeping capabilities.  This
funding would be used primarily for the further
acquisition of communications and protective
equipment, vehicles, tents, and field rations.
 
In addition to the proposed support to strengthen
the OAU's capabilities, the Administration has also
proposed an additional $10 million in FY 1995
regional peace-keeping funding that would provide
materiel and training assistance on a bilateral
basis to selected African countries to enhance their
capabilities to participate in international and
regional peace-keeping endeavors.  This support will
assist the development of credible, well-trained
African units capable of participating in conflict
resolution and peace-making and peace-keeping
efforts.
 
Sub-Regional Organizations
 
While we recognize the real and potential
contributions of regional organizations, we also
have explored the possible contributions of sub-
regional organizations--such as ECOWAS, IGADD, and
SADC--to conflict resolution, especially in the
field of preventive mediation. ECOMOG's peace-
keeping effort in Liberia, for example, was
undertaken prior to the OAU's accepting
responsibility to undertake conflict resolution and
has helped restore peace to that country.  The
ECOMOG effort was, subsequently, endorsed by the
OAU, and the OAU has contributed much to that
effort.
 
We would like to retain the option of channeling our
support to the sub-regional organizations.  We do
not wish to encourage them to become inadvertent
competitors with the OAU for scarce conflict
resolution resources. Rather, we would like to
ensure that regional mediation and conflict
resolution efforts are undertaken in a closely
coordinated way.
 
Demobilization
 
Military downsizing has become a key issue in Africa
not only for the U.S. Government but for a number of
other donor governments and for the World Bank.  In
several cases, African states are demobilizing
forces following the resolution of armed conflicts.
Another major reason is to reduce the economic
burdens that an oversized military places on the
resources of a state or to rationalize the force
structure in accordance with a realistic threat
assessment.
 
Military downsizing directly supports efforts to
enhance democratization in Africa:  Politicized
militaries are often the greatest threat to
democracy within African states.  In most African
countries, for reasons of legitimate security
requirements and as a mark of sovereign authority,
the military will remain an important national
actor.  But downsizing and professional orientation
can reduce opportunities for the military to engage
in political manipulation.  Finally, downsizing with
reintegration can be an important contribution to
the overall economic development of a nation.
 
Military downsizing in Africa should be viewed as a
multi-step process targeted toward family units and
communities, rather than as a single event--
demobilization--affecting individual soldiers.  The
downsizing process includes:
 
--  Restructuring the military--often to include a
change in the professional culture surrounding the
military in question, to include civil-military
relations;
 
--  Survey of the retraining/reintegration needs of
the personnel to be demobilized;
 
--  Study of the specific local economy;
 
--  Demobilization of selected military personnel;
and
 
--  Reintegration of demobilized personnel into the
civilian society.
 
Downsizing and restructuring of the military,
coupled with demobilization and successful
reintegration of demobilized military personnel into
the civilian society, is an arduous undertaking
which includes vocational training, pensions and/or
discharge payments, transportation/relocation
assistance, literacy training, possibly housing
construction assistance, and, possibly, credits to
enable veterans to establish-a business or go into
agriculture. Further, community-level health care
and educational systems may need to be strengthened
to permit these systems to support the increased
demands placed on them by demobilized veterans and
their families.
 
For the planning and implementation of downsizing
programs, we should coordinate with international
donors and development banks to share the burden.
Within our own government, we should take advantage
of the unique skills the Department of Defense (DoD)
can provide.
 
Ideally, we would like to be able to provide funding
to support plans for military restructuring and
downsizing efforts.  We should look to and work with
USAID and the World Bank for studies of the national
economy of the state in question, community-level
infrastructure enhancement requirements, and the
needs assessment survey of those to be demobilized.
We are committed to assisting African countries
downsize and reintegrate their militaries, and we
will continue to support demobilization efforts.
 
Conflict Resolution Training
 
Education and training in conflict resolution and
peace-keeping for personnel of countries of Sub-
Saharan Africa are extremely important.  DoD is the
organization most capable of designing and
presenting such a course of instruction.  We will
undertake to work with our colleagues at Defense to
create a conflict resolution and peacekeeping
education and training program that can be offered
to Africans and other foreign personnel.
 
Support for Non-Governmental Organizations
 
There are informal conflict prevention networks in
Africa, such as the proposed joint "Africa
Reconciliation" effort between the OAU and the
Global Coalition for Africa, that could provide a
framework for this issue.  That program successfully
links senior African and international statesmen
with non-governmental organizations to provide
experts on mediation for conflict prevention and
resolution.  Such a network could coordinate its
activities with the OAU Secretary General and
provide early warning and active mediation of
conflict in Africa.  Africa already has an
established tradition of informal mediation of
conflict by eminent figures; providing funding
assistance to such efforts could build on that
successful tradition.  It is an area we will
continue to investigate as we study the whole range
of conflict resolution and prevention issues.
 
Conflict Resolution and Peace-keeping Lessons
Learned
 
The crises in Angola, Liberia, Somalia, and Rwanda
demonstrate that international peace-keeping is a
critical instrument for both the maintenance of
international security and the aversion of
humanitarian disasters.  Our challenge is to make it
a more effective one.
 
I believe that the broad outlines of this bill
contain some helpful ideas for conflict resolution
in Africa.  I can promise you that the
Administration will carefully consider this and any
proposed legislation on conflict resolution in
Africa.  I look forward to working with the
committee to make our commitment to conflict
resolution stronger and more effective.  (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 11:
 
Current Trends in Global Terrorism
Patrick N. Theros, Director for Regional Counter-
Terrorism Affairs
Address to the American Society for Industrial
Security, Arlington, Virginia, June 7, 1994
 
Good morning.  In the late 1980s, when terrorist
hijackings were commonplace and Beirut was in utter
chaos, public opinion polls showed that the American
people were more concerned about terrorism than any
other foreign policy issue, including nuclear arms.
Terrorist activity is at a more manageable level
now, but it still plagues the world scene.  Dramatic
and deadly attacks occur regularly, causing entire
populations to feel terrorized.  We saw this
recently with the multiple, deadly bombings in South
Africa intended to disrupt the historic elections
there.
 
I appreciate your giving me the opportunity to talk
about the problem of international terrorism today.
I would like to begin by outlining the nature of the
threat we are facing and the major elements of our
counter-terrorism strategy.  Given the interests of
your group, I will highlight some of these areas of
our policy and programs specifically of interest to
corporations like the ones you represent.
 
Activity in 1993
 
It may help to start with an update about worldwide
terrorist activity, which continued unabated in
1993.  In fact, the number of attacks last year
increased to 427, up from 361 the previous year.
 
This increase is mainly due to two terrorist
rampages by the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK,
against Turkish targets throughout Western Europe.
These occurred on two separate days, in June and
November, with about 75 attacks each day.  These
very well-coordinated attacks across an entire
continent bring a new level of sophistication to
terrorism.  Were it not for these two campaigns, the
level of terrorism actually would have fallen in
1993, continuing the trend of the past few years.
 
The number of anti-American attacks decreased in
1993 to 88, down from 142 the previous year.  The
reason for this drop is that there were fewer
bombings by the National Liberation Army in Colombia
and by the Lautaro Youth Movement in Chile and fewer
armed attacks against Americans by Dev Sol in
Turkey.
 
There was, of course, one terrorist "spectacular"
last year:  the bombing of the World Trade Center.
The attack killed six Americans and wounded more
than 1,000--the highest casualty total for a single
terrorist attack ever recorded.
 
The WTC bombing was not the first international
terrorist attack in the United States, as some have
alleged.  Certainly, foreign terrorism perpetrated
by various ethnic groups is not new to our shores,
and the FBI regularly warns of the vulnerability of
the United States to such attacks.  But the drama
and high casualty figures from the WTC bombing made
a strong impression in this country.  It made some
Americans fearful; it made most Americans indignant.
The satisfying aftermath of that indignation was the
swift arrest, trial, and conviction of the four
suspects, as well as the excellent FBI work that
preempted another planned massive terrorist bombing
in New York City by members of the same extremist
sect.  We await their trial on conspiracy charges,
as well as the eventual trial of two suspects in the
WTC bombing, who are now at large and believed to be
in the Middle East.
 
U.S. Policy
 
The citizens of the United States expect their
government to protect them, and American interests
abroad, against terrorist attack to the maximum
extent possible.  They also expect us to mitigate
the damage done by terrorists when protection is not
possible.
 
Accordingly, the U.S. Government has adopted a
counter-terrorism policy that seeks to meet these
high expectations.  It is a three-part policy, in
force for over a decade, and we believe it is a
sound one:
 
--  Make no concessions to terrorists;
--  Put pressure on states that sponsor terrorism;
and
--  Bring terrorists to justice.
 
No Deals
 
The first element can be summarized as no deals.  It
was this policy that was violated when arms were
sold to Iran to gain the release of American
hostages in Lebanon, with disastrous results.
 
That episode proved the truth of the policy.  The no-
deals policy works.  All U.S. hostages were finally
released from captivity in Lebanon at the end of
1991, when the kidnappers realized there would be no
benefit in continuing to hold the captives.  No
ransom was paid, no terrorists were released from
prison, and no concessions of any sort were made.
The United States regained its credibility, and
terrorists understand that no benefits will accrue
if they attempt to blackmail us.
 
State Sponsorship
 
The second part of our policy concerns the
sponsorship of terrorism by sovereign nations, and
1993 saw a classic example of how state-sponsored
terrorism works--the planned car-bombing
assassination of former President Bush during his
visit to Kuwait last year.  When evidence clearly
implicated the Government of Iraq in the plot, the
Clinton Administration responded forcefully with a
military strike against Iraqi intelligence
headquarters.  As President Clinton explained, the
strike was:
 
A firm and commensurate response . . . essential to
protect our sovereignty, to send a message to those
who engage in state-sponsored terrorism, to deter
further violence against our people, and to affirm
the expectation of civilized behavior among nations.
 
Because it is the root of the problem, state
sponsorship is a focus of our counter-terrorism
policy.  With state terrorism, a country can strike
at its enemies short of all-out war, and it offers
terrorists numerous advantages.  State support comes
in many forms:
 
--  Money--terrorists spend time on operations, not
robbing banks or trafficking in drugs;
 
--  Equipment--states provide terrorists with
weapons, explosives, documents, and other critical
logistical support; and
 
--  Refuge, an important support--safe houses and
sanctuary allow terrorists a respite between
operations as well as time and a place to plan
future actions without fear of arrest, punishment,
or compromise.
 
Our counter-terrorism policy seeks to apply pressure
to such states to stop providing these and other
forms of support and to make them pay the cost if
they persist.  We do this by publicly identifying
state sponsors and by imposing economic, diplomatic,
and sometimes military sanctions.  Seven nations are
currently designated as states that sponsor
international terrorism:  Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria,
Sudan, Cuba, and North Korea.
 
Iran remains the most dangerous sponsor and the
greatest source of concern.  Last month, the U.K.
publicly accused the Iranian Government of stepping
up its links with the PIRA.  Secretary Christopher
used the occasion to underscore his "deep anger at
the continued terrorism projected by Iran, not only
in the Middle East but also in other parts of the
world."  A number of murders in Germany, Turkey,
Switzerland, and Italy can be laid at Iran's door.
Iran's surrogate, Hezbollah, was responsible for the
bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in
early 1992.  Iran opposes the Middle East peace
process and arms and funds rejectionist groups who
espouse violence.  Last year, President Clinton met
with Salman Rushdie, whose murder the Iranian
Government still advocates.
 
We conduct an active dialogue with our principal
allies, seeking to raise the cost to Tehran of its
support for terrorism.  I must report that,
unfortunately, we have not been as successful as we
would like.  We protested Germany's invitation to
Iran's Minister of Intelligence for bilateral talks,
and we are outraged over France's release of two
Iranians sought for murder in Switzerland.
 
International sanctions have hampered but have not
eliminated Iraq's ability to conduct international
terrorism.  The Government of Lebanon broke
relations with Iraq last month and arrested two
Iraqi diplomats for murdering an Iraqi dissident in
Beirut.  Last year, an Iraqi scientist was murdered
in Amman, and Iraqi agents have sabotaged trucks
carrying relief supplies to the Kurdish area of
northern Iraq, killing innocent aid workers.  I have
already mentioned our military strike against Iraq,
which we believe was a necessary response to the
continuing threat against the United States posed by
Iraq.
 
Libya's ties with terrorists are ongoing.  In late
March, Qadhafi invited all Palestinian rejectionist
groups to Tripoli, and Abu Nidal continues to reside
there and control his organization from there.
Despite new inter- national sanctions, Libya has not
complied with UN Security Council demands that it
surrender the suspects in the bombing of Pan Am
flight 103 and cooperate with the French in
investigating the bombing of UTA flight 772.  The
past year has seen continued maneuvering by Libya,
which refuses to hear our consistent message:  There
is no compromise on the issue of justice.  UN
Security Council Resolution 883, which took effect
in December, froze selected Libyan assets and banned
the sale of many categories of oil industry
equipment.  However, if Libya continues to defy the
United Nations, we will seek new sanctions.
 
Syria continues to support groups that carry out
terrorist attacks against its neighbors, Israel and
Turkey.  President Clinton raised the subject of
terrorism with President Asad at their January
meeting in Geneva, and Secretary Christopher raised
it again when he met Asad a month ago.  It will
continue to be on our agenda with Damascus.
 
Last year, we added Sudan to the terrorism list
because of the safehaven given to a number of
international terrorist groups, not least the Abu
Nidal organization.  Although we have no conclusive
evidence that Sudan has itself participated in or
sponsored terrorist actions, we believe that Sudan-
based organizations have perpetrated acts of
terrorism in Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria.
 
Cuba and North Korea have not been tied directly to
acts of international terrorism for some years.  In
Cuba's case, that appears to be more a factor of its
disastrous economic situation and loss of Soviet
support.  However, the island continues to serve as
a safehaven for members of some regional and
international terrorist organizations.  Our current
bilateral problems with North Korea are related to
its pursuit of nuclear weapons, not terrorism, but
Pyongyang has demonstrated both a capability and
willingness to engage in large-scale terrorism
whenever it chooses.
 
Rule of Law
 
The third part of our counter-terrorism policy is
bringing terrorists to justice.  This is an area
that is intrinsic in a free society but anathema to
terrorists:  the rule of law.  Terrorists frequently
attack the rule of law in general  and legal
institutions specifically.  They attempt to subvert
justice in demanding the release of convicted
prisoners.  They threaten jurors and judges in
trials of terrorists.
 
One of the deadliest attacks against the rule of law
occurred in November 1985, when guerrillas belonging
to the M-19 Movement seized the Palace of Justice in
Bogota, Colombia, and held it for more than 27
hours.  By the time the incident came to an end
after government troops stormed the building, some
90 people were dead, including 12 Supreme Court
judges and more than 50 guerrillas.  The targets of
this attack were the judges who were rendering
verdicts for extradition of drug traffickers.  That
was the "root cause" of the attack.
 
In spite of attacks like this, it is, in the end,
the rule of law that is the most effective tool to
use against terrorists.  Democratic nations are
increasingly tracking down terrorists, putting them
on trial, and putting them in jail.
 
The United States has spearheaded this cooperation.
Aside from the capture, trial, and conviction of the
World Trade Center bombers, we have pursued other
terrorists abroad.  In 1989, we caught a Palestinian
terrorist in international waters and brought him to
Washington, DC.  A court convicted Fawaz Younis of
the 1985 hijacking of a Royal Jordanian Airlines
flight and of taking hostages, including American
citizens.  Younis was sentenced to 30 years
imprisonment.
 
Last year, with the assistance of several nations,
U.S. law enforcement officials arrested Mohammed Ali
Rezaq.  He is now in Washington awaiting trial for
air piracy.  Rezaq hijacked an Egypt Air flight in
1985 in which 60 people were killed, including an
American citizen, and another 35 injured.  He was
found guilty of murder in Malta, sentenced to 25
years in prison, but released after serving only
seven years.  Rezaq was put on a plane in Malta
bound for Sudan, but a well-planned chain reaction
put him into our hands and back under arrest.
 
Terrorists everywhere should recognize that the U.S.
is committed to tracking down and punishing
terrorists.  We shall not relent in our efforts to
bring them to justice.
 
Businesses as Targets
 
You may be aware of a very disturbing terrorism
trend that has emerged during the past 10 years.
Business has been targeted more frequently than
diplomatic, government, or military facilities.  In
1993, 70% of all international terrorist attacks
were against business targets.  That is nearly 300
attacks, the highest number of attacks in that
category since we began compiling terrorism
statistics 25 years ago.  Sixty of those attacks
were against American business targets.
 
In an age of shrinking budgets, I know from
experience that the cost of maintaining a nation's
diplomatic establishments is high, and this is
having a real effect on our ability to represent our
interests abroad.  But I also know that it is even
more difficult for private businesses in countries
with a high incidence of terrorism.  Let me cite a
few examples.
 
Private security guards can be very expensive, and
terrorism-related insurance premiums can be
prohibitive.  The climate of fear created by
terrorism dries up capital.  Terrorist attacks on
electrical grids interrupt the power source for
computers or refrigerated goods.  When the threat
against senior executives--especially foreign
executives--becomes too high, some companies decide
not to risk their people and simply withdraw them,
closing down that avenue to export promotion.
 
All businesses suffer, but the transportation
industry is especially vulnerable.  Bus companies
and railroads have been targeted by terrorists, and
airlines in particular face sharply increased costs
because of the terrorist threat.  Pan Am folded
shortly after the bombing of flight 103 in 1988.  In
the wake of the Achille Lauro hijacking of 1985 and
the attack on the Greek ferry City of Poros the
following year, cruise lines are very vulnerable to
terrorism.
 
When terrorism drives away tourist and business
travelers, airlines are forced to fly empty seats or
cut prices to fill them.  Entire routes are
eliminated, or flights along those routes are
reduced.  As traffic and revenues fall, orders for
new aircraft decline as well.
 
Salaries for security personnel and equipment run
into millions annually for an airport of any size at
all.  These costs, when passed along to the
traveler, further reduce the desirability and
frequency of travel.  In countries with a high
incidence of terrorism, these costs are frequently
accompanied by a decline in tax revenues as the
costs of terrorism eat into business and personal
income.
 
Revenues from tourism can suffer dramatically.
Following the 1985 hijacking of TWA 847 enroute to
Athens, the Greek Government estimated that the drop
in tourism there cost them $100 million.  In Egypt,
Islamic fundamentalists have been waging a terrorist
campaign for the past year-and-a-half against
foreign tourists.  Cruise ships, tour buses, and
public places have been targeted.  It is estimated
that earnings from Egypt's tourism industry may be
down by as much as 50% since the start of the
campaign.  The Kurdistan Workers Party in Turkey
last year began to target the tourism industry by
bombing restaurants, hotels, and tourist sites and
by planting grenades on Mediterranean beaches.  The
Shining Path in Peru has a long, bloody history of
singling out tourists for attack.
 
Property damage caused by today's professional
terrorist bombers can be staggering.  The most
active and lethal terrorist group in Western Europe
is the PIRA.  Part of the strategy it is pursuing is
to make war on the economic center of the U.K.  In
1992, it detonated a van bomb in the middle of the
City of London, killing three persons and wounding
more than 90 others.  The amount of property damage
caused by this single attack is estimated to have
been $1.5 billion.  Last year, the PIRA exploded its
largest bomb ever in the same section of London and
caused a similar amount of damage.
 
The recent series of PIRA mortar attacks against
Heathrow Airport caused a tremendous loss of
revenue.  The terminal was closed, flight schedules
disrupted, and traffic redirected at the world's
busiest airport.  Following the third volley of
mortar shells at Heathrow, a telephone threat
containing the correct code word was made to
Gatwick, and both airports were ordered closed.  The
economic costs were measured in the millions of
dollars.
 
Clearly, terrorism has extensive economic
consequences.  But fighting terrorism must mean more
than armed guards, x-ray machines, and high walls.
We must not allow ourselves to sit and wait to be
attacked.  We must have an active counter-terrorism
policy to complement our defensive measures.
 
Outlook
 
I have outlined what we are doing to fight
terrorism, and some recent trends are encouraging.
 
--  State-sponsored terrorism dropped slightly in
1993.
--  There were 38% fewer anti-U.S. attacks last year
than the previous year.
--  Attacks against American diplomatic facilities
fell sharply.
--  Although attacks on international business
targets rose in 1993, there were fewer attacks on
American businesses--61 as compared with 75 the year
before.
 
Practical Measures
 
In an effort to curb future terrorism overseas, we
have been actively engaged in a coordinated effort
to share the fruits of our counter-terrorism
experience with allies.  My office runs a program to
train local law enforcement officials in such areas
as airport security, bomb detention, maritime
security, VIP protection, hostage rescue, and crisis
management.  Since the program began 10 years ago,
we have trained over 15,000 civilian law enforcement
personnel from more than 80 countries.
 
My office also spearheads an effort to bring
coordinated, interagency research and development to
bear on the counter-terrorism issue.  Our national
counter-terrorism R&D program is jointly funded by
the Pentagon and State Department.  Three million
dollars is earmarked for international projects
involving NATO and major non-NATO allies.  My office
chairs, with members from 25 federal agencies, a
group that identifies projects relating to explosive
detection, collection, and surveillance; chemical,
biological, and nuclear counter-terrorism; and
personal protection.  Many devices developed through
this extremely successful program are now in the
inventories of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Secret Service.
 
The Department is fighting terrorism on another
front, using a tried and true law enforcement tool.
We now pay rewards of up to $2 million to any person
who furnishes information that leads to the
prevention, frustration, or favorable resolution of
a terrorist act against U.S. persons or property.
This program has already resulted in the prevention
of terrorist attacks and has thus saved lives.  It
has also helped bring a number of terrorists to
justice.
 
In 1990, the State Department forged a unique public-
private partnership with the Air Transport
Association of America and the Air Lines Pilots
Association, in which each organization pledged up
to $1 million to match funds paid by the U.S.
Government.  The resulting offer is a reward of up
to $4 million for information that prevents a
terrorist act outside the United States against a
U.S. air carrier or leads to the arrest and
conviction of any person who has committed such an
act.  This feature of the rewards program is a
positive legacy of the Pan Am 103 bombing.  Last
year, in the wake of the World Trade Center attack,
we expanded the program to include international
aspects of domestic terrorism.
 
Terrorism is an international problem, one without
borders that demands an international solution.  In
addition to our unilateral programs, we have a very
active multilateral diplomatic effort underway.  The
United States regularly exchanges intelligence and
law enforcement information with like-minded nations
to help preempt or investigate terrorist attacks.  A
recent example of international cooperation was the
absence of terrorism at the Lillehammer Olympics and
during the 1992 Summer Olympics in Barcelona.  This
was a reflection of worldwide resolve to prevent
terrorism at international sporting events.
 
Terrorism undermines America's goals for the
expansion of democracy, since terrorism relies on
force and will always be an enemy of democracy.
Terrorism is also an enemy of the free and open
markets that are a cornerstone of our society.  It
carries a very high cost, both in human and economic
terms.  I can assure you that the United States will
continue to pursue a vigorous counter-terrorism
strategy to improve the climate for Americans to
conduct business safely overseas.  (###)
 
[END OF DISPATCH VOL 5, NO. 25]

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