VOLUME 5, NUMBER 22, MAY 30, 1994
l.  U.S. Renews Most-Favored-Nation Trade Status for China -
- President Clinton, Summary of Secretary's Report
2.  America and the Asia-Pacific Future--Secretary
3.  Communique on Bosnia-Herzegovina
4.  UN Security Council Adopts Resolution 918 on Rwanda
5.  International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination -- Conrad K. Harper
6.  General Meeting on U.S.-Japan Common Agenda for
Cooperation in Global Perspective
7.  UN Convention on the Law of the Sea -- David A. Colson
8.  Fact Sheet:  U.S. Initiatives for Demining and Landmine
U.S. Renews Most-Favored-Nation Trade Status for China
President Clinton, Summary of Secretary's Report
President Clinton
Opening statement at a news conference, Washington, DC, May
26, 1994.
Today, I would like to announce a series of important
decisions regarding U.S. policy toward China.  Our
relationship with China is important to all Americans.  We
have significant interests in what happens there and what
happens between us.  China has an atomic arsenal and a vote
and a veto in the UN Security Council.  It is a major factor
in Asian and global security.  We share important interests,
such as in a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and in sustaining
the global environment.  China is also the world's fastest-
growing economy.  Over $8 billion of U.S. exports to China
last year supported over 150,000 American jobs.
I have received Secretary Christopher's letter recommending,
as required by last year's executive order, reporting to me
on the conditions in that executive order.  He has reached a
conclusion with which I agree:  The Chinese did not achieve
overall significant progress in all the areas outlined in
the executive order relating to human rights, even though,
clearly, there was progress made in important areas,
including the resolution of all emigration cases, the
establishment of a memorandum of understanding with regard
to how prison labor issues would be resolved, the adherence
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and other
issues.  Nevertheless, serious human rights abuses continue
in China, including the arrest and detention of those who
peacefully voice their opinions and the repression of
Tibet's religious and cultural traditions.
The question for us now is, given the fact that there has
been some progress but that not all the requirements of the
executive order were met, how can we best advance the cause
of human rights and the other profound interests the United
States has in its relationship with China.
I have decided that the United States should renew most-
favored-nation trading status toward China. This decision, I
believe, offers us the best opportunity to lay the basis for
long-term sustainable progress in human rights and for the
advancement of our other interests with China. Extending MFN
will avoid isolating China and, instead, will permit us to
engage the Chinese with not only economic contacts but with
cultural, educational, and other contacts, and with a
continuing aggressive effort in human rights--an approach
that I believe will make it more likely that China will play
a responsible role, both at home and abroad.
I am moving, therefore, to delink human rights from the
annual extension of most-favored-nation trading status for
China.  That linkage has been constructive during the past
year.  But I believe, based on our aggressive contacts with
the Chinese in the past several months, that we have reached
the end of the usefulness of that policy, and it is time to
take a new path toward the achievement of our constant
objectives.  We need to place our relationship into a larger
and more productive framework.
In view of the continuing human rights abuses, I am
extending the sanctions imposed by the United States as a
result of the events in Tiananmen Square, and I am also
banning the import of munitions, principally guns and
ammunition, from China.  I am also pursuing a new and
vigorous American program to support those in China working
to advance the cause of human rights and democracy.
This program will include increased broadcasts for Radio
Free Asia and the Voice of America, increased support for
non-governmental organizations working on human rights in
China, and the development with American business leaders of
a voluntary set of principles for business activity in
China.  I don 't want to be misunderstood about this:  China
continues to commit very serious human rights abuses.  Even
as we engage the Chinese on military, political, and
economic issues, we intend to stay engaged with those in
China who suffer from human rights abuses.  The United
States must remain a champion of their liberties.
I believe the question, therefore, is not whether we
continue to support human rights in China, but how we can
best support human rights in China and advance our other
very significant issues and interests.  I believe we can do
it by engaging the Chinese.  I believe the course I have
chosen gives us the best chance of success on all fronts.
We will have more contacts. We will have more trade.  We
will have more international cooperation.  We will have more
intense and constant dialogue on human rights issues.  We
will have that in an atmosphere which gives us the chance to
see China evolve as a responsible power, ever-growing not
only economically but growing in political maturity so that
human rights can be observed.
To those who argue that in view of China's human rights
abuses we should revoke MFN status, let me ask you the same
question that I have asked myself over and over these last
few weeks as I have studied this issue and consulted people
of both parties who have had experience with China over many
decades.   Will we do more to advance the cause of human
rights if China is isolated or if our nations are engaged in
a growing web of political and economic cooperation and
contacts?  I am persuaded that the best path for advancing
freedom in China is for the United States to intensify and
broaden its engagement with that nation.
I think we have to see our relations with China within the
broader context of our policies in the Asia-Pacific region,
a region that, after all, includes our own nation.  This
week, we've seen encouraging developments:  progress on
resolving trade frictions with the Japanese and possible
progress toward stopping North Korea's nuclear program.
I am determined to see that we maintain an active role in
this region, in both its dynamic economic growth and in its
security.  In three decades and three wars during this
century, Americans have fought and died in the Asia-Pacific
to advance our ideals and our security.  Our destiny demands
that we continue to play an active role in this region.  The
actions I have taken today to advance our security, to
advance our prosperity, to advance our ideals, I believe,
are the important and appropriate ones.  I believe, in other
words, this is in the strategic, economic, and political
interests of both the United States and China.  I am
confident that over the long run this decision will prove to
be the correct one.
Summary of Secretary's Report
Text of the summary of Secretary Christopher's report to the
President regarding the May 1993 executive order on most-
favored-nation (MFN) status for China, released by the White
House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, May
26, 1994.
China's Human Rights Performance and Executive Order 12850
We have reviewed China's human rights performance in light
of the conditions specified in Executive Order 12850 (May
28, 1993).  In making a recommendation with respect to
China's MFN status, we have also taken into account the full
range of our national objectives, responsibilities and
security interests including our determination to promote
human rights as a significant element of our foreign policy.
China's compliance with the Executive Order's two mandatory
conditions has been sufficient to permit a recommendation
that its MFN eligibility be renewed.  The Chinese have
resolved all pending emigration cases, including long-
standing ones, we have pressed upon them this year.  Jackson-
Vanik criteria as well as our specific goals were met, and
we believe that MFN extension will promote further
China is in compliance with terms of the 1992 bilateral
Memorandum of Understanding on prison labor exports called
for by EO 12850.  We are concerned at reports indicating
that some goods made by prison labor in China are still
being exported to the United States.  U.S. Customs is
looking closely at the evidence and will take appropriate
enforcement actions should such be warranted.
With respect to the five additional areas identified, China
has made gains in human rights but has not achieved the
"overall, significant progress" contemplated by the
Executive Order.  There was important, ongoing progress in
several areas:  China's public declaration of adherence to
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the release of
prominent Tiananmen era prisoners Wang Juntao and Chen
Ziming and several other prisoners of conscience;
substantive discussions with the ICRC concerning possible
future access to prisoners; the release of Tibetan
dissidents Gendun Rinchen and Lobsang Yonten; and the
Chinese decision to review VOA jamming with U.S. experts.
These positive developments cannot be said to meet the
expectations set forth in the EO.  Despite the several
significant prisoner releases, many more dissidents were
detained, tried, and sentenced during a nation-wide
crackdown on political and religious dissent.  New laws were
codified which, if enforced, would abridge the political and
religious rights of  individual Chinese.  Negotiations with
the ICRC have not yet resulted in any Chinese commitment to
permit access to prisons and prisoners.  Tibetans who
peacefully protest their support for political and religious
independence continue to be jailed.  The Chinese ignored
conciliatory public statements by the Dalai Lama and refused
to enter into a dialogue with him.  Some jamming of VOA
continues and the Chinese have strongly protested the
establishment of Radio Free Asia.
Extension of MFN Without Conditions
A determination that the Chinese human rights performance
fell short of the Executive Order's "overall, significant
progress" standard does not by itself require a
recommendation against extension of China's MFN eligibility.
We have kept centrally in mind the importance of fostering,
not stifling, progress in China toward universally-accepted
standards of human rights.  Our judgment is that revocation
of China's MFN status would serve neither the interest of
promoting human rights progress in China nor the interest
this nation has in maintaining mutually advantageous ties
with China.  Executive Order 12850 set an appropriate
agenda, and was an effective mechanism for pursuit of that
agenda.  However, we believe that our human rights
objectives may now be best pursued with China without
conditioning MFN eligibility, but rather through a broad
package of initiatives.  Extension of China's MFN
eligibility hereafter will be considered through an annual
report to the Congress concerning freedom of emigration, as
required by Jackson-Vanik provisions.
Continuation of Certain Sanctions
At the same time, owing to China's failure to achieve
"overall, significant progress" in the terms envisioned by
Executive Order 12850, certain sanctions imposed following
the 1989 Tiananmen Square tragedy will remain in force.  The
President will determine, in the course of ongoing review of
China's human rights performance, whether and when it might
be appropriate to lift these sanctions.  These sanctions
(1)  Suspension of weapons deliveries under both commercial
and government programs;
(2)  Denial of licenses for dual-use civilian technology
items for the Chinese police or military;
(3)  Suspension of consideration of licenses for U.S.
Munitions List items;
(4)  Ineligibility of China to participate in programs under
the Trade and Development Agency (TDA), Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC), and the U.S.-Asia Environment
Partnership Program; and
(5)  Withholding of U.S. support for World Bank and other
multilateral development bank lending to China except for
projects meeting basic human needs.
Imposition of Import Ban on Weapons and Ammunition
Under legal authority granted by the Arms Export Control Act
to restrict arms imports on foreign policy grounds, there
will be an immediate import ban on munitions from China,
consisting primarily of arms and ammunition.
Our Future Policy Approach On Human Rights in China
We will pursue human rights concerns aggressively and
constructively with the Chinese in the framework of the
comprehensive engagement strategy approved by the President
last year.  Our broad objective will be to underscore our
undiminished commitment to keep human rights prominently on
the bilateral agenda, and to make plain that the quality of
the U.S.-China bilateral relationship will hinge
significantly upon continued Chinese human rights progress
in the areas we have pointed to previously.  We will plan to
use a variety of instruments to encourage human rights
progress in China:
--  Intensified dialogue with China on human rights.
--  Support for efforts underway in China to promote the
rule of law, in particular for efforts to achieve legal
reforms aimed at specific human rights abuses.
--  Stepped-up use of media (VOA, Radio Free Asia) to
broadcast, in both Chinese and Tibetan, information needed
by China's increasingly sophisticated audience to promote
domestic modernization and broader external contacts
including adherence to basic principles of human rights.
--  Closer cooperation with other nations, especially in the
U.N., the U.N. Human Rights Commission and other
international fora, to monitor, draw attention to, and press
our views on the Chinese human rights situation.  In that
regard, while recognizing Tibet as an integral part of
China, we will call for a substantially improved human
rights situation there and promote substantive discussions--
on an agreed agenda, at an early fixed date--between the
Dalai Lama and the Chinese government.
--  Consultation with the U.S. private sector in an effort
to establish a voluntary statement of principles for U.S.
business firms operating in China.
--  Increased support for those attempting to create an
active civil sector in China by working with human rights
groups, professional associations, academics, consumer
advocacy groups, and others who are promoting human rights
and legal reform. (###)
America and the Asia-Pacific Future
Secretary Christopher
Address to the Asia Society, New York City, May 27, 1994
It is a privilege to speak to America's pre-eminent
organization dedicated to forging links across the Pacific.
We are joined in a common endeavor:  to help build, with our
partners and friends, a New Pacific Community.  Our
engagement in Asia is essential to the security and well-
being of the American people, as well as our friends in the
Over the last 16 months, we have moved the Asia-Pacific
region to the center of America's foreign policy agenda.
And we have demonstrated to our Asian partners that the
United States will exercise its pivotal leadership role in
the Asia-Pacific region.
The President has articulated a broad vision and backed it
up with important initiatives:  hosting the APEC leaders
meeting last November in Seattle; promoting regional
security dialogues including Vietnam, Russia, and China for
the first time; launching a set of framework talks with
Japan to revitalize our economic relationship; and staunchly
supporting the emergence of a democratic Cambodia.  We have
also maintained our forward- deployed military presence--a
key to the region's strategic stability and a foundation for
its continued economic success.
This week's headlines dramatically illustrate our commitment
to comprehensive engagement in Asia and the building of a
New Pacific Community.  We have agreed with Japan to move
forward with negotiations on the Framework Agreement.  We
have proposed a third round of negotiations on the nuclear
issue with North Korea.  We agreed with Vietnam to establish
liaison offices in Hanoi and Washington, creating a stronger
foundation to pursue the fullest possible accounting for
Americans missing in action.  And yesterday, of course, the
President made a crucial decision concerning our policy
toward China.
Each of the week's developments is significant in its own
right, but they should not be viewed in isolation.  The
confluence of these major developments reflects the multiple
strands of our broad engagement in Asia.  Our approach is
attuned to the complexities of this dynamic region.
The stability of the Asia-Pacific region is a vital American
interest.  For 50 years, we have understood that the
emergence of a dominant hostile power in Asia would threaten
important U.S. allies and, ultimately, America itself.
Instability and conflict in Asia would undermine prospects
for global economic growth, threaten democracies, and
encourage proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
In the last half century, tens of thousands of Americans
have died in defense of our interests in Asia.  We have
built strong alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia,
the Philippines, and Thailand--a democratic core that
provides a firm basis for deterring aggression.  Thirty-
seven thousand U.S. troops bravely stand watch at Korea's
38th parallel--the world's most dangerous fault line.
America's long-standing security ties to the region are
matched by our exploding economic and cultural links.  Asia
has the world's fastest-growing economies.  More than 40% of
American trade is with Asia, supporting almost 2.5 million
U.S. jobs.  And millions of Asian-Americans retain a special
interest in their ancestral homelands.
All Americans also have a stake in supporting democracy and
human rights in Asia.  We do so because it is consistent
with our values as a people and our interests as a nation.
States that respect the rule of law at home are more likely
to observe the rule of international law abroad, and they
are less likely to practice terrorism or to push refugees
across borders.
Our commitment to democracy and human rights is neither
occidental nor accidental.  We are not imposing an American
model; we are supporting a universal impulse for freedom.
Last year, that impulse inspired the people of Cambodia,
where farmers, monks, and former soldiers risked violence to
vote.  These authentic voices of Asia are not embracing an
alien creed.  They are asserting their dignity as human
I believe that history is on the side of freedom.  There is
a powerful trend toward open markets and open societies.
Economic development depends upon the free flow of
information; computers are the new vehicles of political
expression.  The software of freedom will, ultimately,
prevail over the hardware of repression.
Asia, today, is in the midst of a remarkable transformation.
There is a growing network of constructive relations among
most of the region's key states; explosive economic growth;
expanding human freedom; and new efforts to foster
cooperation on economic and security issues.  These
achievements can be attributed to the skill, industry, and
determination of the peoples of the region.  But American
engagement can make an even brighter future possible.  Our
involvement is essential to regional peace, prosperity, and
the promotion of freedom.
Our forward-deployed military presence is crucial to a
stable regional balance of power.  Our lack of imperial
ambition makes us a trusted partner.  Our technology,
capital, and huge market make us a magnet for Asia's
economies.  And the universal values we embody--freedom,
democracy, and the rule of law--make us a beacon for all the
peoples of the region.
Virtually all Asian countries welcome and urge our active
involvement.  They understand that the failure of the United
States to remain engaged could threaten these bright
prospects, harming their interests and our own.
On three immediate issues, urgent engagement by the United
States is clearly central:  China's evolution, North Korea's
nuclear program, and improving our economic relations with
Japan.  How each question is resolved will directly affect
the security and prosperity of the United States.
As much as any other single factor, China's political,
economic, and social transformation will determine whether
Asia fulfills its great promise.  As you know, the President
announced yesterday that the United States will renew
China's most-favored-nation trading status while pursuing a
broad strategy to promote human rights in China.
The President's decision reflects a comprehensive U.S.
strategy of engagement and leadership in the Asia-Pacific.
It aims to integrate China into the global community, and
not to shut it out.  It encourages Chinese cooperation in
building a new regional and international order based upon
peace and security.  And it supports the peaceful
development of a more democratic and humane society.
Our relationship with China is important to all Americans.
China possesses the world's largest army, a nuclear arsenal,
and, not insignificantly, a veto in the UN Security Council.
The United States and China share a compelling interest in a
stable and secure Asia and a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.
China can contribute significantly and responsibly to global
issues such as environmental protection and drug
trafficking.  China has the world's fastest-growing and
third- largest economy.  More than 150,000 American jobs are
supported by U.S. exports to China, a figure that will grow
in the years ahead.
When President Clinton took office, the broad consensus on
our China policy that had prevailed for nearly two decades
no longer existed.  Last year, the President restored that
consensus with an executive order that enjoyed solid
bipartisan support.  Since then, we have placed human rights
firmly on the agenda with China, while working
constructively to address other shared concerns.
The executive order and our strategy of diplomatic
engagement have achieved positive results.  We have
established a genuine human rights dialogue with China.  And
China has fulfilled the mandatory conditions for MFN
renewal, namely those relating to emigration and prison
labor exports.
With respect to the executive order's five other criteria,
the gains China has made did not constitute the "overall
significant progress" contemplated by the order.  Months ago
I pledged that in making my recommendation to the President,
I would neither invent nor inflate China's performance.  I
have not.  Although there have been some gains, serious
human rights abuses continue in China.  These include the
arrest and detention of those who peacefully voice their
opinions, restrictions on religious freedom, and religious
and cultural repression in Tibet.
The President made the correct decision last year in issuing
the executive order.  A number of Chinese dissidents are
free today in part because of the pressure we have exerted.
But as the President said yesterday, linking human rights to
MFN has taken us as far as it can.  It is not likely to
yield more progress on human rights.
China is no longer an isolated nation.  Today, millions of
Chinese are exposed to Western radio and television.
Millions are engaged in trade with other nations in a
growing and dynamic private sector.  This is a trend that
must be encouraged.  Few believe that a complete revocation
of MFN would improve China's human rights record.  We must
intensify and broaden our engagement with China if we want
to promote change.
Let me make clear that we are not relying on the invisible
hand of economics alone to bring about human rights
progress.  Economic freedom may promote political freedom,
but it is not by itself sufficient.  That is why the
President announced a vigorous new program to advance human
rights and democracy in China.
We will work with U.S. business leaders to develop voluntary
principles to improve working conditions.  We will expand
international broadcasting to China through the Voice of
America and Radio Free Asia.  We will make it a practice to
meet with a broad spectrum of Chinese citizens, and to
support and work with emerging non-governmental
organizations.  We will engage other nations and the UN in
our efforts to advance human rights.  We will maintain the
economic sanctions we imposed after the Tiananmen massacre.
And we will ban import of munitions from China because of
the absence of "overall significant progress" on human
rights.  Almost a million cheap, semi-automatic rifles came
into the United States last year from China.  The
President's policy will keep them out.
We have focused a brighter spotlight on human rights
practices in China.  That scrutiny will continue, and our
human rights dialogue with China will intensify.
Repression is not a cure for instability.  In the long run,
political democracy--what Wei Jingsheng has referred to as
China's "Fifth Modernization"--must accompany economic
democracy if China's great experiment is to succeed.
I am convinced our strategy of comprehensive engagement
offers the best chance to influence China's development.  In
that way, we will advance our security, our prosperity, and
our values.
The Asia-Pacific's most urgent security problem--and one on
which we are working with the Chinese Government--is the
North Korean nuclear program.  Pyongyang's quest for nuclear
weapons poses multiple dangers:  It directly threatens the
security of key U.S. allies; it dramatically increases the
likelihood of a destabilizing nuclear arms race in Asia; and
it raises the specter of the spread of nuclear materials to
rogue regimes like Iran.
Working with the international community, our objective has
been to halt and reverse North Korea's nuclear program and
create the conditions for a stable North East Asia in the
years ahead.  Together with our South Korean and Japanese
allies, and with the support of China and other countries of
the region, we have proposed that North Korea join us in a
broad and thorough discussion of outstanding issues between
us.  These discussions would offer the prospect of resolving
the nuclear issue as part of a process of improving economic
and political contacts and moving us to a more normal
bilateral relationship.
We have developed a strong consensus behind our efforts to
achieve a peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue.  If
North Korea rejects these negotiations, our consensus-
building strategy will strengthen our ability to mobilize
the international community to take sterner measures if we
have to move down that road.  That path-- international
sanctions--condemns North Korea to continued isolation,
economic hardship, and pariah status.  That would prevent
the people of North Korea from reaping the benefits of the
dramatic economic progress underway in Asia.
Meanwhile, U.S. forces stand shoulder-to-shoulder with those
of our ally, South Korea, to deter and defeat any aggression
by the North.  Confrontation is emphatically not our
preferred path.  If North Korea renounces a nuclear future
and does not otherwise undermine peace in Northeast Asia, it
has nothing to fear from us or from South Korea.  Indeed, it
has much to gain from participation in the community of
Our efforts on North Korea underscore once again how
critical U.S.- Japan relations remain for ensuring stability
and security in the Asia-Pacific region.  Our partnership
formed the core of U.S. efforts to combat Soviet
expansionism in Asia during the Cold War.  Today, that
partnership also stands at the center of our efforts to
address the challenges and dangers of the post-Cold War era.
Our military alliance is stronger than ever.  We have worked
together to build democracy in Cambodia.  We are cooperating
to expand economic linkages across the region through APEC.
And we have reached bold new agreements on global issues
such as the environment and AIDS.
Our economic bonds with Japan must become just as strong as
the rest of our relationship.  Earlier this week we agreed
to resume negotiations under the U.S.-Japan Framework for
Economic Partnership.  We are again moving forward to
improve this relationship.
As the world's second-largest economy, Japan has a vital
role to play in promoting regional and global prosperity.
The Framework calls for Japan to widen access to its market
and take steps to increase its domestic growth.  In
committing to clear goals for agreements negotiated under
the Framework, the United States and Japan have unblocked
the road to progress.
Now we must move down this road by concluding solid
agreements on specific industrial sectors and issues.  I
gained respect for Prime Minister Hata when we served
together as Foreign Ministers.  My first meeting with
Foreign Minister Kakizawa indicated he is determined to take
a constructive approach to resolving our economic
differences.  Against the backdrop of our fundamentally
strong relationship, we look forward to working with Japan
to promote economic growth for our peoples and the world.
Today, developments in Beijing, Pyongyang, and Tokyo
dominate our headlines.  These events carry profound
consequences for America, the Asia-Pacific region, and,
indeed, the world.  In each of these areas, the Clinton
Administration is pursuing a multifaceted strategy of
engagement that will most effectively advance the full range
of U.S. interests.
At the same time, away from this week's headlines, we
continue to pursue a long-term agenda throughout the Pacific
region.  In July, I travel to Bangkok for the ASEAN Post-
Ministerial Conference, to further strengthen our ties with
Southeast Asia.  I will also participate in regional
security dialogues at the ASEAN Regional Forum, an important
exercise in preventive diplomacy.  And this fall, the
ministers and leaders of APEC will convene again, this time
in Indonesia, to chart the course for expanding economic
linkages across the Asia-Pacific region.
American leadership can help build a more hopeful future for
all the peoples of the Asia-Pacific.  It can help reduce the
prospect of war and the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
It can help ensure that America shares fully in the region's
prosperity, and that the people of Asia share fully in the
global movement to freedom.  (###)
Communique on Bosnia-Herzegovina
Text of communique released at a foreign ministers' meeting
held in Geneva, Switzerland, May 13, 1994.
The Foreign Ministers of Greece, Belgium and Germany and
European Commissioner Hans van den Broek, comprising the
Troika of the European Union, and the Foreign Ministers of
France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the
United States met in Geneva on 13 May.  Together with the Co-
Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, they reviewed the
serious situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and their common
efforts to date to end the conflict and achieve a political
The Ministers underscore their resolve and unity of purpose
in working for an early and durable settlement of the
Bosnian conflict.  They reaffirm that the conflict in Bosnia
and Herzegovina cannot be resolved by military means and
must be settled through negotiations.  Only a peaceful
settlement will command the support of the international
community and offer the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina
the prospect of a secure future.  They confirm their support
for a settlement that preserves Bosnia and Herzegovina as a
single Union within its internationally recognized borders,
while providing for constitutional arrangements that
establish the relationship between the Bosniac-Croat and the
Bosnian Serb entities.  The Ministers are committed to doing
their utmost to promote such a settlement.
They also affirm the readiness of their countries to
participate as appropriate in implementing an agreed
settlement, and in supporting the reconstruction of war-
ravaged Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Ministers express their strong concern that in the wake
of the recent Bosnian Serb attack on the UN-declared safe
area of Gorazde, the negotiating process has been set back.
They warn all the parties concerning the unacceptability and
risks of pursuing military solutions.  In this regard, they
support the determination of the international community to
take the necessary action to protect the safe areas within
Bosnia and Herzegovina established in accordance with
Security Council resolutions 824 and 836.  They demand that
the parties comply fully with the terms and conditions of
the relevant Security Council resolutions, the decisions
taken in reliance thereon, and all agreements the parties
have concluded.  They express their full support for strict
enforcement of these resolutions, decisions, and agreements.
The Ministers demand that all parties permit the unimpeded
delivery of humanitarian assistance in accordance with
existing agreements.  The Ministers insist on the release of
those members of humanitarian organizations in detention.
The Ministers note with concern the recent military action
related to Brcko and endorse efforts currently being made by
UNPROFOR and under way in the United Nations Security
Council to prevent offensive action in safe areas and
particularly in and around Brcko and to reduce tensions in
other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Ministers agreed on immediate steps aimed at an early
settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  They call on the
parties to conclude a comprehensive cessation of hostilities
and to resume in parallel without preconditions serious
efforts to reach a political settlement.
The agreement on cessation of hostilities must include the
separation of forces, the withdrawal of heavy weapons and
the interposition of UNPROFOR troops.  On the basis of
previous discussions with the parties, the Ministers believe
that the agreement should be for a period of four months,
with provision for extension.  Ministers underscored the
need for the United Nations and the parties to establish
necessary arrangements to insure compliance with this
agreement.  To complete its task in the safe areas and in
support of the cessation of hostilities, UNPROFOR will need
further reinforcement.
Previous negotiations have established the concept of a
territorial compromise based on 51 percent for the Bosniac-
Croat entity and 49 percent for the Bosnian Serb entity.
Ministers urge the parties to reach an agreement on this
The Ministers take note of the steps to establish the
Bosniac-Croat Federation.  They believe that the final
arrangement for the Federation must provide it with viable,
realistic, and reasonable territory consistent with the
concept described above.
The existing UN Security Council resolutions must be
strictly enforced and complied with, and the Ministers agree
that any attempt to make sanctions relief a precondition for
resuming talks is unacceptable.  Good faith implementation
of a peace settlement that includes provisions for
withdrawal to agreed territorial limits will lead to phased
suspension of the sanctions imposed by the United Nations.
With a view to achieving an early settlement within this
framework, the Ministers invite the parties to begin
substantive negotiations under the aegis of the Contact
Group within the next two weeks.  The Contact Group was
instructed to immediately commence all the necessary
substantive preparations aimed at facilitating an early
The Ministers will follow closely the course of these
negotiations and the actions of the parties on the ground.
They agreed to meet again as soon as necessary.  (###)
UN Security Council Adopts Resolution 918 on Rwanda
Resolution 918
(May 17, 1994)
The Security Council,
Reaffirming all its previous resolutions on the situation in
Rwanda, in particular its resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October
1993 by which it established the United Nations Assistance
Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), its resolution 909 (1994) of 5
April 1994 which extended the mandate of UNAMIR until 29
July 1994, and its resolution 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994 by
which it adjusted the mandate of UNAMIR,
Recalling the statements made by the President of the
Council on 7 April 1994 (S/PRST/1994/16) and 30 April 1994
Having considered the report of the Secretary-General dated
13 May 1994 (S/1994/565),
Reaffirming its resolution 868 (1993) of 29 September 1993
on the security of United Nations operations,
Strongly condemning the ongoing violence in Rwanda and
particularly condemning the very numerous killings of
civilians which have taken place in Rwanda and the impunity
with which armed individuals have been able to operate and
continue operating therein,
Stressing the importance of the Arusha Peace Agreement to
the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Rwanda and the
necessity for all parties to recommit themselves to its full
Commending the efforts of the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) and its organs, as well as the efforts of the
Tanzanian Facilitator, in providing diplomatic, political
and humanitarian support for the implementation of the
relevant resolutions of the Council,
Deeply concerned that the situation in Rwanda, which has
resulted in the death of many thousands of innocent
civilians, including women and children, the internal
displacement of a significant percentage of the Rwandan
population, and the massive exodus of refugees to
neighbouring countries, constitutes a humanitarian crisis of
enormous proportions,
Expressing once again its alarm at continuing reports of
systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of
international humanitarian law in Rwanda, as well as other
violations of the rights to life and property,
Recalling in this context that the killing of members of an
ethnic group with the intention of destroying such a group,
in whole or in part, constitutes a crime punishable under
international law,
Strongly urging all parties to cease forthwith any
incitement, especially through the mass media, to violence
or ethnic hatred,
Recalling also its request to the Secretary-General to
collect information on the responsibility for the tragic
incident that resulted in the death of the Presidents of
Rwanda and Burundi,
Recalling further that it had requested the Secretary-
General to make proposals for the investigation of reports
of serious violations of international humanitarian law
during the conflict,
Underlining the urgent need for coordinated international
action to alleviate the suffering of the Rwandan people and
to help restore peace in Rwanda, and in this connection
welcoming cooperation between the United Nations and the OAU
as well as with countries of the region, especially the
facilitator of the Arusha peace process,
Desiring in this context to expand the mandate of UNAMIR for
humanitarian purposes, and stressing the importance it
attaches to the support and cooperation of the parties for
the successful implementation of all aspects of that
Reaffirming its commitment to the unity and territorial
integrity of Rwanda,
Recognizing that the people of Rwanda bear ultimate
responsibility for national reconciliation and
reconstruction of their country,
Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering
caused by the conflict and concerned that the continuation
of the situation in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and
security in the region,
1.  Demands that all parties to the conflict immediately
cease hostilities, agree to a cease-fire, and bring an end
to the mindless violence and carnage engulfing Rwanda;
2.  Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General dated 13
May 1994 (S/1994/565);
3.  Decides to expand UNAMIR's mandate under resolution 912
(1994) to include the following additional responsibilities
within the limits of the resources available to it:
(a)  To contribute to the security and protection of
displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda,
including through the establishment and maintenance, where
feasible, of secure humanitarian areas;
(b)  To provide security and support for the distribution of
relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations;
4.  Recognizes that UNAMIR may be required to take action in
self defence against persons or groups who threaten
protected sites and populations, United Nations and other
humanitarian personnel or the means of delivery and
distribution of humanitarian relief;
5.  Authorizes in this context an expansion of the UNAMIR
force level up to 5,500 troops;
6.  Requests the Secretary-General, as recommended in his
report, and as a first phase, immediately to redeploy to
Rwanda the UNAMIR military observers currently in Nairobi
and to bring up to full strength the elements of the
mechanized infantry battalion currently in Rwanda;
7.  Further requests the Secretary-General to report as soon
as possible on the next phase of UNAMIR's deployment
including, inter alia, on the cooperation of the parties,
progress towards a cease-fire, availability of resources and
the proposed duration of the mandate for further review and
action, as required, by the Council;
8.  Encourages the Secretary-General to accelerate his
efforts, in conjunction with the Secretary-General of the
OAU, to obtain from Member States the necessary personnel to
enable deployment of the expanded UNAMIR to proceed
9.  Invites Member States to respond promptly to the
Secretary-General's request for the resources required,
including logistical support capability for rapid deployment
of the UNAMIR expanded force level and its support in the
10.  Strongly urges all parties in Rwanda to cooperate fully
with UNAMIR in the implementation of its mandate and in
particular in ensuring its freedom of movement and the
unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance, and further
calls upon them to treat Kigali airport as a neutral zone
under the control of UNAMIR;
11.  Demands that all parties in Rwanda strictly respect the
persons and premises of the United Nations and other
organizations serving in Rwanda, and refrain from any acts
of intimidation or violence against personnel engaged in
humanitarian and peace-keeping work;
12.  Commends the efforts of States, United Nations agencies
and non-governmental organizations which have provided
humanitarian and other assistance, encourages them to
continue and increase such assistance, and urges others to
provide such assistance;
Determining that the situation in Rwanda constitutes a
threat to peace and security in the region,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
13.  Decides that all States shall prevent the sale or
supply to Rwanda by their nationals or from their
territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft of arms
and related materiel of all types, including weapons and
ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary
police equipment and spare parts;
14.  Decides also to establish, in accordance with rule 28
of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security
Council, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of
all the members of the Council, to undertake the following
tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its
observations and recommendations:
(a)  To seek from all States information regarding the
action taken by them concerning the effective implementation
of the embargo imposed by paragraph 13 above;
(b)  To consider any information brought to its attention by
States concerning violations of the embargo, and in that
context to make recommendations to the Council on ways of
increasing the effectiveness of the embargo;
(c)  To recommend appropriate measures in response to
violations of the embargo imposed by paragraph 13 above and
provide information on a regular basis to the Secretary-
General for general distribution to Member States;
15.  Calls upon all States, including States not Members of
the United Nations, and international organizations to act
strictly in accordance with the provisions of the present
resolution, notwithstanding the existence of any rights or
obligations conferred or imposed by any international
agreement or any contract entered into or any licence or
permit granted prior to the date of the adoption of this
16.  Decides that the provisions set forth in paragraphs 13
and 15 above do not apply to activities related to UNAMIR
17.  Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary
assistance to the Committee and to make the necessary
arrangements in the Secretariat for this purpose;
18.  Requests the Secretary-General to present a report as
soon as possible on the investigation of serious violations
of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda during
the conflict;
19.  Invites the Secretary-General and his Special
Representative, in coordination with the OAU and countries
in the region, to continue their efforts to achieve a
political settlement in Rwanda within the framework of the
Arusha Peace Agreement;
20.  Decides to keep the situation in Rwanda under constant
review and requests the Secretary-General to report further,
including on the humanitarian situation, within five weeks
of the adoption of this resolution and again in good time
before the expiration of the current mandate of UNAMIR;
21.  Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
VOTE:  Unanimous (15-0).  (###)
International Convention on the Elimination Of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination
Conrad K. Harper, Legal Adviser
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, DC, May 11, 1994
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee:  I am pleased to
appear before you today to testify in support of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination.
The Clinton Administration is committed to eradicating race-
based discrimination in our society and ensuring equal
opportunity for all.  Respect for human rights and
individual dignity--regardless of racial or ethnic
background--is a fundamental tenet of a just and civilized
Over the past century, we have made significant advances in
the struggle for racial equality in this country.  Our
Constitution and laws establish important safeguards for
ensuring that individuals are not denied employment,
housing, education, or other rights or benefits because of
racial or ethnic animus.  The principle of anti-
discrimination is deeply embedded in our legal and social
But while we have made progress along the path to racial
equality, we have more distance to travel.  The Clinton
Administration intends to make every effort to ensure that
the goal of equal opportunity becomes ever.more a reality.
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination is an important expression of this
The convention was signed by the United States in 1966 and
transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to
ratification in 1978.  Apart from a hearing before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1979, no further
action has been taken.  On behalf of the President, we urge
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to report favorably
on this convention with a recommendation that the Senate
give its advice and consent to prompt ratification.
Ratification of this convention will send a clear signal of
our commitment to eradicate unlawful racial and ethnic
The convention--already ratified by more than 135 countries-
-creates an.important standard that members of.the
international community must strive to meet.  Although the
fundamental rights set forth in this treaty already are
recognized in U.S. laws, not.all countries have codified the
principle of equal protection in their legal systems or
permit effective redress for.acts of discrimination.  By
working collectively with other nations to eliminate
unlawful discrimination based on.race, color, descent, or
national or ethnic origin, we shall promote respect for.the
rule of law and human rights abroad.  This goal is
particularly important in light of the extraordinary
challenge to peace and security today resulting from racial
tension and ethnic conflict.
Ratification of this convention will.comport with our
domestic laws.  The substantive provisions of the convention
embody, with only a few exceptions, the requirements of the
Constitution and laws of the United States.  Where
necessary, we have proposed a reservation, understanding, or
declaration to make clear that the scope of U.S. obligations
under the convention is consonant with U.S. law.  Although
such qualifications are relatively few and do not undermine
in any.way the central purpose or object of the convention,
they clarify our legal.standards and ensure that our
acceptance of the convention is fully consistent with the
U.S. Constitution and laws.
A detailed legal analysis of the treaty's requirements and
their relationship to U.S. constitutional
over time by U.S. courts was previously submitted to
the.committee under separate cover on.April 26 by the Acting
Secretary of.State, Strobe Talbott.  For the convenience of
the committee, let me summarize the central provisions in
the.convention and then explain the relatively few
reservations, understandings, and declarations we have
Central Provisions
Article 1.  The convention is designed to forbid racial and
ethnic discrimination in all aspects of public life.
Article 1(1) defines "racial discrimination" as:
Any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based
on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which
has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political,
economic, social, cultural or any other field of public
Although this definition is relatively broad, Article 1(2)
and Article 1(3) impose certain limits.  For instance, the
convention does not apply to distinctions, exclusions,
restrictions, or preferences made between citizens and non-
citizens; nor does it affect legal provisions concerning
acquisition of nationality and citizenship or
naturalization, provided that such provisions do not
discriminate against any particular nationality.  Moreover,
Article 1(4) explicitly exempts "special measures" taken for
the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain
racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such
protection.  As a result, the convention leaves undisturbed
existing U.S. law regarding affirmative action programs.
Article 2 requires states parties to take a series of
specified steps or measures to eliminate racial
discrimination, including:
(a)  Ensuring that all public authorities and institutions
act in conformity with that basic obligation;
(b)  Not sponsoring, defending, or supporting racial
discrimination by any persons or organizations;
(c)  Reviewing governmental policies and amending,
rescinding, or nullifying discriminatory laws and
regulations at all levels of political organization;
(d)  Bringing to an end, by all appropriate means, racial
discrimination by "any persons, group or organization;" and
(e)  Encouraging, where appropriate, integrationalist
multiracial organizations and movements.
Under Article 3, states parties condemn racial segregation
and apartheid and agree to prevent, prohibit, and eradicate
all such practices in territories under their jurisdiction.
Article 4 requires states parties to condemn propaganda and
organizations based on racial hatred or superiority.
Under Article 5, states parties undertake to guarantee the
right of everyone, without distinction as to race, color, or
national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law in the
enjoyment of the rights--among others--to equal treatment
before the courts and security of the person and protection
against violence and bodily harm; political rights,
including universal and equal suffrage, freedom of movement
and residence, peaceful assembly and association, thought,
conscience, religion, opinion, and expression; the rights to
nationality, to marriage, to own and inherit property, to
work, to form and join unions, and to housing, medical care,
education, cultural activities, and access to public
Article 6 requires states parties to.ensure everyone within
their jurisdiction effective protection and remedies against
acts of discrimination contrary to this convention, which
violate human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the
right to seek just and adequate reparation or satisfaction
for any damage suffered as a result of such discrimination.
Finally, under Article 7, states parties undertake to
institute measures to combat prejudice and promote tolerance
in the fields of teaching, education, culture, and training.
Articles 8 through 16.  As an oversight mechanism,
the.convention establishes in Articles 8 through 16 a
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination--an
autonomous body of 18 experts of high moral standing and
acknowledged impartiality who are elected by states parties
to four-year terms.  This committee considers detailed
reports from states parties on the legislative, judicial,
administrative, or other measures they have adopted or which
give effect to the provisions of.the convention.  The first
such report is due within one year of entry of the
convention into force for the state concerned; supplementary
reports are due thereafter every two years.  The committee
also submits an annual report to the UN General Assembly.
The committee generally meets twice a year, usually in New
York or Geneva.  Although it is not a court, it.may hear
complaints by one state party against another concerning non-
compliance with convention requirements.  Such disputes, if
not settled by mutual agreement, may be.resolved by the
committee or, at its discretion, referred to a non-binding
conciliation commission.  To date, no such disputes have
been brought.
States parties may, by declaration--on an optional basis--
also recognize the competence of the committee to consider
communications from individuals or groups claiming to be
victims of a violation by that state of any of the rights
set forth in the convention.  The United States has not
availed itself of this option.  A state that makes such a
declaration also may establish a national body to receive
and consider such petitions from individuals within its
jurisdiction on an initial basis; petitioners who fail to
receive satisfaction from such a body within six months may
communicate directly with the committee.
Both mechanisms--the individual and the state-to-state--are
non-binding.  The convention contains no provision for the
referral of either state-to-state complaints or individual
petitions from the committee to the International Court of
Justice (ICJ).  Article 22 of the convention does provide,
however, that disputes between two or more parties with
respect to the interpretation or application of the
convention which are not settled by negotiation or other
methods may be submitted to the ICJ at the request of either
Reservations, Understandings, And Declarations
As a general matter, the substantive provisions of the
convention reflect the.anti-discrimination principles
inherent in our constitutional scheme.  They require the
United States to do what it.already is legally obligated to
do--eradicate unlawful racial or ethnic discrimination.
Ratification of this convention will constitute an important
expression of U.S. commitment to fulfill its legal
obligation to ensure equality under law.
Nonetheless, while the convention generally comports with
U.S. laws, certain provisions appear either to be
inconsistent with current law or sufficiently ambiguous as
to warrant additional clarification.  As a result, we have
proposed several reservations, declarations, and
understandings to clarify the nature and scope of the
obligations we shall undertake.
The most important of these is required by the First
Amendment to our Constitution.  Specifically, we have
proposed a reservation regarding Article 4 of the
convention, which, as noted above, requires states parties
to condemn propaganda and organizations based on racial
hatred or superiority.  Article 4 requires states parties
(a)  Make criminal the dissemination of ideas based on
racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial
discrimination, and acts of violence or incitement to such
acts against any race or group of persons of another color
or ethnic origin;
(b)  Prohibit organizations and propaganda which promote and
incite racial discrimination; and
(c)  Forbid public authorities or institutions, national or
local, from promoting or inciting racial discrimination.
As a matter of national policy, the.U.S. Government has long
condemned racial discrimination and has engaged in many
activities designed to combat prejudices leading to racial
discrimination and to promote tolerance and understanding
among racial and ethnic groups.  Such programs include those
under the authority of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the Bilingual Education Act, the Mutual Educational
and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, the International
Education Act, and the National Foundation on the Arts and
Humanities Act of 1965.
Nonetheless, because the rights to free expression and
association are fundamental values in our constitutional
structure, any governmental restrictions on expressive
activity must be viewed with suspicion and must survive the
most stringent scrutiny.  Although speech likely to cause
imminent violence and certain forms of bias-related criminal
conduct may be proscribed consistent with the First
Amendment, the government generally may not impose
regulations aimed at the content of expression.  However
objectionable certain opinions or ideas may be, the
Constitution requires that such expression be
constitutionally protected.  As the Supreme Court
consistently has recognized:
The constitutional right of free expression is intended to
remove governmental restraints from the arena of public
discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be
voiced largely into the hands of each of us in the belief
that no other approach would comport with the premise of
individual dignity and choice upon which our political
system rests.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
Because Article 4 mandates the suppression and
criminalization of certain expression because of its content
and also implicates the freedom of association, we believe
it is inconsistent with existing First Amendment principles.
We thus have proposed a reservation indicating that the
United States will not accept any obligation to restrict
rights to free expression and association protected by the
U.S. Constitution and laws.  The text of this reservation is
set forth at page 12 of the detailed legal analysis to which
I referred earlier.  Such a reservation will make clear that
U.S. ratification of the convention is informed by and
contingent upon existing constitutional norms.
The second reservation we have proposed pertains to private
conduct.  We are concerned that certain provisions in the
convention might be interpreted as prohibiting conduct
beyond the proper scope of governmental regulation under
existing U.S. law.  Our concerns are derived from the
breadth of the definition of "racial discrimination" under
Article 1(1); the obligation imposed on states parties in
Article 2(1)(d) to bring an end to all racial discrimination
"by any persons, group or organization;" and the specific
requirements of paragraphs 2(1)(c) and (d), Articles 3 and
As explained in greater detail in our legal analysis, the
Constitution and laws of the United States establish
extensive protection against discrimination, including
certain conduct by private actors.  The "state action"
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment recognizes that in
certain cases conduct by private individuals is actionable
if such conduct is "fairly attributable" to the state.
(Lugar v. Edmonson, 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)).  Likewise,
the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. $ 1983, reaches
conduct by individuals acting "under color of" state law.
(See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988)).  In addition, the
Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition against slavery and
involuntary servitude encompasses private as well as
governmental action.  Congress may regulate private conduct
not only through the Thirteenth Amendment but also through
its Article I commerce and spending powers, as it did in
passing Title II and Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
which, respectively, prohibit private entities from
discriminating in public accommodations and employment.
Further discussion of U.S. law regarding private conduct is
included in our legal analysis at pp. 12-15.
The government's ability to proscribe certain private
conduct is, however, not unlimited.  Our constitutional
framework recognizes that individual freedom and protection
from governmental interference are vital to a free and
democratic society.  For this reason, some private conduct
is not actionable--even if discriminatory--provided no nexus
exists between individual and governmental action.
Exactly how far the drafters of the convention intended to
sweep in regulating discriminatory conduct remains unclear.
On the one hand, it could be argued that the reference to
"public life" in the definition of "racial discrimination"
in Article I limits the reach of the convention to conduct
involving some measure of governmental involvement or "state
action."  On the other hand, the negotiating history of the
convention is ambiguous on this point.  Moreover, the
committee appears to have adopted an expansive view of the
convention, interpreting it to reach racial discrimination
perpetuated by any person or group against another.  We
cannot be sure, therefore, that the term "public life"
carries with it the same limits on governmental regulation
as is contemplated under U.S. law.  Some forms of private
individual or organizational conduct that currently are
outside the permissible scope of governmental regulation in
this country could well become actionable under the
convention, thereby offending existing constitutional norms.
Because we wish to make clear that the obligations
undertaken by the U.S. are limited by U.S. constitutional
and statutory provisions, we have proposed a reservation
indicating that:
To the extent that the Convention calls for a broader
regulation of private conduct, the United States does not
accept any obligation . . . to enact legislation or take
other measures under paragraph (1) of Article 2,
subparagraphs (1)(c) and (d) of.Article 2, Article 3 and
Article 5 with respect to private conduct except as mandated
by the Constitution and laws of the United States.
The text of the reservation is included at pp. 14-15 in our
legal analysis submitted to the committee.  We believe such
a measure is prudent and will ensure that the U.S. does not
embrace any obligation it cannot appropriately assume.
The third reservation we have submitted concerns submission
to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.
Such a reservation parallels those taken to the Genocide and
Torture Conventions.  Although this Administration strongly
supports the use of international dispute-resolution
mechanisms in appropriate cases, we believe it is prudent
for the U.S. Government to retain the ability to decline to
become involved in a case that may be brought by another
country for frivolous or political reasons.  In any case,
the ICJ has played no practical role under this treaty.
Indeed, to date, no case has been brought to the ICJ under
this convention.
The primary mechanism for reviewing implementation of the
convention is through consideration of reports submitted by
states parties to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination.  The committee also provides a mechanism for
resolution of state-to-state complaints.  The United States
plans to submit to both mechanisms.  Finally, there is ample
opportunity in the United States to seek redress of alleged
acts of discrimination.
In addition to these three reservations, we have proposed an
under- standing which expresses our view that with respect
to implementation of the convention, the federal government
will have responsibility over matters under its jurisdiction
and that, otherwise, implementation shall be the
responsibility of state and local governments.  This is to
make clear that ratification does not preempt state and
local anti-discrimination initiatives.  The understanding
also makes clear that where states and localities have
jurisdiction over such measures, the federal government will
ensure compliance.  We adopted a similar provision in
ratifying the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1992
and believe such an understanding is appropriate here.
Finally, we have submitted a proposed declaration indicating
that the convention's provisions are not self-executing.
Under Article VI, Clause 2 of the Constitution, duly
ratified treaties become the supreme law of the land,
equivalent to a federal statute.  By making clear that this
convention is not self-executing, we ensure that it does not
create a new or independently enforceable private cause of
action in U.S. courts.  We have proposed and the.Senate has
concurred in the same approach to previous human rights
treaties, such as the UN Convention Against Torture and
other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(1990) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (1992).
As was the case with the earlier treaties, existing U.S. law
provides extensive protection and remedies against racial
discrimination sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the
present convention.  In addition, federal, state, and local
laws already provide a comprehensive basis for challenging
discriminatory statutes, regulations, and other governmental
actions in court, as well as certain forms of discriminatory
conduct by private actors.  There is thus no need for the
establishment of additional causes of action to enforce the
requirements of the convention.  By adopting these proposed
reservations, declarations, and understandings, we signify
the seriousness with which the United States accepts the
obligations the convention imposes.  By being forthright
about the legal constraints under which we operate and
specific about our obligations as we interpret them, we make
clear that we shall meet the obligations we assume in a
manner fully consistent with the Constitution and laws of
the United States.  Since the major thrust of the convention
comports with U.S. law, the qualifications on U.S.
ratification are few and do not undermine the central tenets
or purposes of the convention.
Other Issues
I wish also to point out that in our extensive analysis of
the convention's potential impact on our domestic law, we
have identified other issues about which the Senate should
be aware but which do not warrant inclusion in the Senate's
resolution of advice or consent or in the instrument of
ratification as specific reservations, understandings, or
reservations.  These issues relate to convention provisions
regarding ethnic origin and descent; special measures, known
as "affirmative action;" implementing legislation;
provisions relating to discriminatory purpose and effect;
territorial application; state-to-state complaints;
individual petitions; and financial implications of
ratification.  Our analysis of each is set forth in the
detailed legal memorandum which we hope will become part of
the committee's report on the convention so that it will be
readily accessible to interested parties.
Of these, perhaps the most noteworthy is Article 2(1)(c) of
the convention, which requires states parties to:
Take effective measures to review governmental, national and
local policies which have the effect of creating or
perpetuating racial discrimination.
The provision also requires states parties to "amend,
rescind or nullify any laws and regulations" that have such
The negotiating history of the convention leaves unclear the
precise scope of a state party's obligation under Article
2(1)(c).  We believe, however, that the provision does not
require the invalidation of every race-neutral law,
regulation, or practice that causes some degree of adverse
impact on racial groups.  This conclusion is confirmed by
the committee's recently adopted General Recommendation XIV
which states that:
In seeking to determine whether an action has an effect
contrary to the convention, it will look to see whether that
action has an unjustifiable disparate impact upon a group
distinguished by race, colour, descent, or national origin.
The committee's use of the term "unjustifiable disparate
impact" indicates its view that the convention reaches only
those race-neutral practices that both create statistically
significant racial disparities and that are unnecessary.
This view is consistent with the standards for proving
disparate impact under Title VII, the Title VI implementing
regulations, and the Fair Housing Act, as well as with the
requirements for proving a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause or of the federal civil rights statutes.
In sum, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination embodies the anti-discrimination
principles animating U.S. law.  U.S. ratification of.this
convention--long awaited by other countries--will be an
important expression of our commitment to eradicate unlawful
racial and ethnic discrimination and to ensure equal
opportunity for all.  By demonstrating our resolve to
eliminate discrimination at home, we shall encourage respect
for human rights and the rule of law abroad and, in so
doing, join with other nations in building a fairer, more
pluralistic, and, ultimately, more just environment for
everyone.  (###)
General Meeting on U.S.-Japan Common Agenda for Cooperation
In Global Perspective
Text of a joint press statement released following the
General Meeting on U.S.-Japan Common Agenda for Cooperation
in Global Perspective, Washington, DC, May 24, 1994.
This morning, at the Department of State, Under Secretary of
State for Global Affairs, Timothy E. Wirth, Deputy Foreign
Minister for Economic Affairs Sadayuki Hayashi, and Vice
Minister of International Trade and Industry Sozaburo
Okamatsu led discussion at the 3rd General Meeting on the
U.S.-Japan Common Agenda for Cooperation in Global
The Common Agenda was established by President Clinton and
Prime Minister Miyazawa on July 10, 1993 in Tokyo, as part
of the Joint Statement on the United States-Japan Framework
for a New Economic Partnership.  The other two elements of
the Framework are discussions on macroeconomic issues, and
trade negotiations addressing sectoral and structural
economic problems.  As outlined in the Framework, the Common
Agenda calls for cooperation on fifteen separate programs
aimed at addressing critical global issues in five fields:
environmental degradation, technology development, human
resource development, population, and the prevention of
AIDS.  The interim results of the Common Agenda were
announced and endorsed by President Clinton and Prime
Minister Hosokawa on February 11, 1994 at the White House.
In today's review, the two delegations expressed the shared
view that the Common Agenda is a significant and successful
cooperative program, which has served to enhance the U.S.-
Japan global partnership.
The two delegations decided today that the scope of the
Common Agenda should be expanded to encompass four new
--  Child health, including the global eradication of
poliomyelitis and cooperation on the Children's Vaccine
Initiative (CVI), a program which encompasses research and
development, production, quality control, and distribution
of children's vaccines suitable for use in developing
--  Cooperation in assisting developing countries to find
alternatives to the production of narcotics;
--  Coordinated efforts on the protection of coral reefs;
--  Information exchanges and other cooperation related to
building linkages between the Asia-Pacific Network (a
network to promote global change research in the Asia-
Pacific region) and the Inter-American Institute for Global
Change Research.
Today's meeting also focussed on implementing existing
Common Agenda initiatives, and negotiating areas not yet
concluded.  Some of the specific results:
Population and HIV/AIDS
As a part of their coordinated assistance program on
population and HIV/AIDS in developing countries, the two
sides decided upon six priority countries--Kenya, Egypt, the
Philippines, Indonesia, Ghana, and India--for joint
activities through the U.S. Agency for International
Development and Japanese donor agencies.  As decided at the
February Clinton-Hosokawa summit meeting, contributions by
the U.S. and Japan to population and HIV/AIDS programs--
using a comprehensive approach that includes fields such as
basic health care, primary education, and improvement of the
status of women in addition to family planning services and
commodities--are expected to reach $12 billion by the year
The U.S. and Japan intend to co-fund a biodiversity training
center at Subic Bay, Philippines; this center will help in
protecting 25,000 acres of pristine lowland rain forest.
They also plan to co-fund a community resource conservation
and development program in Papua New Guinea, empowering
tribal clans to preserve endangered forests by promoting
income alternatives.  They are also considering other
initiatives for coordinated action in the sustainable use of
U.S. and Japanese officials are consulting closely on means
to prevent the dumping of nuclear wastes by Russia in the
Pacific and Arctic Oceans.
Yesterday, U.S. and Japanese officials met at the Regional
Environment Center in Budapest to discuss implementation of
the U.S.-Japan Initiative to Improve the Environment in
Central and Eastern Europe.  The officials established
procedures for a Joint Committee, which will review and
evaluate environmental assistance projects focussing on
priority health concerns.
On Friday, May 27, U.S. and Japanese officials will meet to
discuss essential factors for a system to efficiently link
databases of global observation data.
Experts meetings are taking place to implement two bilateral
cooperative agreements:  the Implementing Arrangement on
Cooperation in Transportation Science and Technology, signed
February 10 by Secretary of Transportation Federico Pena and
Minister of Transport Shigeru Ito; and the Implementing
Arrangement on Research and Development Related to
Environmental Technologies signed February 11 by EPA
Administrator Carol Browner and Minister of International
Trade and Industry Hiroshi Kumagai.
The U.S. Geological Survey accepted a proposal to cooperate
with the Geological Survey Institute of Japan on global
The Department of Commerce and Ministry of International
Trade and Industry are discussing a set of documents to
facilitate bilateral cooperation in the development of civil
industrial technologies.  Under Secretary Mary Lowe Good
will travel to Japan June 6-10 for discussions with Japanese
These two agencies are also reviewing the success of the
first year of the Manufacturing Technology Fellowship
Program, and are discussing strengthening the Program.
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
David A. Colson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans
Statement before the Subcommittee on Oceanography of the
House Merchant.Marine and Fisheries Committee, Washington,
DC, April 26, 1994
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee:  Thank you for
the opportunity to testify today on the Law of the Sea
Convention on behalf of the Administration.  As you know,
there have been efforts recently to address the objections
of the United States--and many other developed countries--to
the convention's provisions on deep seabed mining which are
found in Part XI of the convention and related annexes.  I
am accompanied by Mr. Wes Scholz of the Department of
State's Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, who has led
our efforts in these discussions.  He will assist me in
answering your questions regarding that effort.
On November 16 of this year, the 1982 UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea will enter into force.  This event presents
the United States with both an opportunity and a challenge.
The opportunity is to try to achieve a long-standing, yet
elusive, U.S. objective of a widely ratified, comprehensive
law of the sea treaty protecting and promoting the wide
range of U.S. ocean interests.  The challenge is to try to
avoid the establishment of a regime for managing the
development of mineral resources beyond national
jurisdiction that is inimical to U.S. economic and
commercial interests.
I can report to you today that we are closer than ever
before to achieving the objective of a comprehensive, widely
ratified treaty that we can support and that not only do we
stand on the threshold of meeting the challenge and avoiding
the entry into force of an unsatisfactory deep seabed mining
regime, but that the discussions in which Mr. Scholz and
others have participated have resolved a thorny set of
issues in a satisfactory way.  Let me take a moment to set
the context.
Since the 1960s, a central tenet of U.S. oceans policy has
been to achieve a comprehensive treaty on the law of the
sea.  The first UN conference on the law of the sea, in the
1950s, resulted in four conventions which the U.S.
supported.  But those results, in many ways, became outdated
quickly by the emergence of new nations in the post-colonial
era who had some ideas of their own and by the failure of
the second UN conference in 1960 to resolve the question of
the breadth of the territorial sea.  The continuing growth
of human activities in the oceans, the desire by many states
to control those activities off their coast, and the
advancement of new technologies--be they to enable humankind
to catch fish more effectively, to conduct marine science,
or to move quietly through the oceans aboard a nuclear
submarine--presented a challenge to U.S. interests.
Interest in protecting and managing fishery resources,
controlling continental shelf oil and gas development, and
protecting the marine environment led the United States and
other nations to extend jurisdiction to increasingly large
areas of ocean space.  While such extensions of jurisdiction
served important national interests in protecting areas off
the coast, such extensions by other nations were not always
limited to matters of resource use.  They often represented
a potential threat to U.S. interests as a major maritime
nation--in freedom of commercial and military navigation and
overflight--on, over, and under the seas.  It is for this
reason that the United States, during the Nixon
Administration, became a prime mover  supporting the
convening of the third UN conference on the law of the sea.
The U.S. objective was to establish and preserve a balance
between our interests as a major maritime power and our
interests in preserving, protecting, and reaping the
benefits of the resources in adjacent offshore areas and in
protecting the marine environment.  The U.S. wanted to
establish that balance globally.  In the late 1960s, as
these thoughts were being developed, a new factor emerged--
the prospect of mining hard minerals from the sea floor
beyond national jurisdiction.
The third UN conference on the law of the sea began in the
early 1970s.  The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention which
resulted from that 10-year negotiating effort has been
recognized by each succeeding U.S. administration as the
cornerstone of U.S. oceans policy.  The merit of the
convention is not that it provides the answer to all law-of-
the-sea issues that have arisen since then or that may arise
in the future, but that it provides a basic framework for
nations within which to work out solutions to the
increasingly complex problems of the use of ocean space--
solutions which respect the essential balance between our
interests as a coastal and maritime nation.  Notwithstanding
the support for virtually all of the convention by
successive Republican and Democratic administrations,
support for the convention as a whole was not possible
because of its regime for managing the future development of
deep seabed mineral resources beyond national jurisdiction.
Benefits of the Convention
Before turning to the seabed mining question, I would like
to review briefly what we believe are the primary benefits
of the convention to the United States in other specific
areas.  It stabilizes the breadth of the territorial sea at
12 miles and establishes important navigation regimes of
innocent passage in the territorial sea, transit passage in
straits used for international navigation, and archipelagic
sea lanes passage in archipelagoes.  It also respects the
traditional freedoms of navigation and overflight in the
exclusive economic zone and the high seas beyond.  These
navigation regimes are consistent with U.S. coastal
interests in the waters off our coasts, but they also
preserve the right of the U.S. military to use the world's
oceans to meet our national security requirements and of
commercial vessels to carry sea-going cargoes.  It
establishes the 200-mile exclusive economic zone, and it
makes provision for a wider continental shelf.  These
regimes are fully supportive of U.S. interests in developing
our fisheries and oil and gas resources.  Indeed, the
convention's provisions in these areas are fully consistent
with our current oil and gas leasing practices and our
international fisheries policies and agreements--including
the agreement reached recently concerning fishing in the
Donut Hole in the Bering Sea, the UN resolution providing
for a moratorium on driftnet fishing, and regional tuna
agreements--while leaving to our domestic management bodies
the responsibility of managing our coastal fishery
resources.  The convention also is a far-reaching
environmental accord addressing vessel-source pollution,
ocean dumping, and land-based sources of marine pollution.
There is more, but space is too limited here to recount the
many other aspects of this convention that we have always
Objections to Deep Seabed Mining Provisions
Notwithstanding these benefits, the United States decided
not to sign the convention in 1982 because of fundamental
problems with the regime it would establish for managing
mineral resource development beyond national jurisdiction.
It has been the consistent view among successive U.S.
administrations that the deep seabed regime of Part XI is
inadequate and is in need of fundamental reform if the U.S.
is ever to consider ratification of the convention as a
In this regard, I want to recall an important point.  Most
of this convention was negotiated during the Carter
Administration, and that Administration's negotiator,
Ambassador Eliot Richardson, at the end of his assignment,
testified to the inadequacies of the deep seabed text then
under review; the Reagan Administration made clear the U.S.
objections to that text.  Yet this treaty part--Part XI--was
not fixed in the subsequent negotiations.  Ultimately, the
negotiations were brought to a close in 1982 with this
flawed text in place, and the convention was adopted over
the formal objection of the United States.
I recount this to emphasize our consistent support for the
non-seabeds parts of the convention and our opposition to
Part XI as it emerged from the negotiations.  Throughout, we
have supported strongly the negotiated compromises in the
other parts of the convention but have stood firm against
Part XI, which appears in the text of the 1982 convention
over our objection.
The basic flaws of that deep seabed mining regime are
manifold.  But stated simply, it failed to provide the
United States and other states with major economic interests
a voice commensurate with those interests in decision making
relating to the management of deep seabed resources-- and it
was based on a highly interventionist, central economic
planning model that was overly bureaucratic and would have
preempted private investment in deep seabed mineral resource
development, thus preventing the development of those
resources when economic conditions warrant.
In 1982, the Reagan Administration, in its ocean policy
statement, reaffirmed support for the rest of the convention
while identifying the specific U.S. objections concerning
deep seabed mining.  They fell into two broad categories--
institutional issues and economic and commercial issues.  On
the institutional front, we objected to the fact that the
U.S was not guaranteed a seat on the executive council of
the International Seabed Authority--the organization that
would administer the deep seabed regime--and we objected
that developing countries would dominate the organization
based on the rules for decision making and the relationship
between the executive council and the plenary assembly.  In
addition, we objected to the fact that the convention's
provisions on seabed mining could be amended in the future
and bind the U.S. without our consent, and we objected to
the possibility that future revenues from deep seabed mining
might be distributed to national liberation movements, over
our objections.
On the economic and commercial front, we objected to the
requirement that commercial enterprises, as a condition to
the awarding of mining rights, must undertake to transfer
their mining technology to a competing operating arm of the
regime known as "the enterprise" or, possibly, to developing
countries.  We also objected to "the enterprise" benefiting
from discriminatory and competitive advantages over
commercial enterprises, such as through funding of its
initial operations by state parties via loans and loan
guarantees and by a 10-year holiday from paying royalties.
We also objected to the regime's production control
arrangements that limited the level of production from the
seabed so as to protect land-based producers of deep seabed
minerals.  We also objected to the regime's onerous system
of financial payments that would have to be made by
commercial miners, in particular a U.S. $1-million annual
fee payable beginning with the exploration stage.
These features made the regime non-viable and led the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Germany to not sign the
convention.  Other major industrialized countries that
signed the convention did not move to ratify for these same
reasons.  Indeed, today, no major industrialized country has
ratified the convention.
In the late 1980s, a number of developments created
circumstances that caused the Secretary General of the
United Nations to undertake consultations with a view to
seeing if solutions could be found to the outstanding
objections to the convention now clearly expressed by many
major countries.  The changing political environment
following the waning of the Cold War and the explosion of
interest in free market reforms in developing countries in
Asia, Latin America, and within Eastern Europe and the
states of the former Soviet Union were important factors
leading to a change in attitude.  Another important factor
was the decline in commercial interest in deep seabed mining
reflecting a 10-year period of relatively low metals prices.
Against this backdrop, developing country spokesmen began to
speak out on the need for an accommodation.
Progress in Resolving Deep Seabed Mining Issues
The Secretary General's consultations, which began in 1990,
were devoted to resolving the objections that had caused the
United States and others to reject the deep seabed mining
regime.  However, the declining near-term prospect for deep
seabed mining also highlighted the need for a more
fundamental reevaluation of the regime from the standpoint
1.  Reducing the size and costs of the regime's
institutions; and
2.  Introducing flexibility into the regime that would allow
it to evolve in keeping with the actual level of interest in
seabed activity at the appropriate time.
These consultations began during the Bush Administration,
and a fair amount of progress was achieved in the
consultations in identifying conceptual approaches to
solving our problems with the seabed mining provisions.
Early in the Clinton Administration, an interagency review
concluded that overall U.S. interests in the convention
would be best served by taking a more active role to exploit
this opportunity to seek changes and to make the regime
acceptable to us.
Progress has been made swiftly.  The most recent round of
consultations, earlier this month, nearly completed work on
an agreement that will fundamentally change the seabed
mining regime of the convention.  It is important to
recognize at the outset that  while much of the
institutional structure of Part XI has been kept, it has
been reduced in size and substantially revised.  The new
regime will:
--  Provide the U.S. and other industrialized countries
influence in the regime commensurate with their interests;
--  Ensure that market-oriented approaches are taken to the
administration of the resources of the deep seabed;
--  At the outset, recognize the seabed-mine site claims
established on.the basis of the exploration work already
conducted by U.S. and other companies; and
--  Study the potential environmental impacts of deep seabed
Rather than seeking to establish a detailed regime
anticipating all phases of mining activity, the agreement
establishes general principles in those areas which relate
to the objections we have raised on commercial and economic
grounds.  These principles will be the basis for rules and
regulations establishing a management regime for commercial
mining when interest in commercial mining emerges.
To summarize briefly, in response to our specific
objections, the agreement would:
--  Increase the influence of the U.S. and other
industrialized countries to a level commensurate with their
interests by:
1.  Guaranteeing a U.S. seat in the council;
2.  Allowing the U.S. and a few other industrialized nations
acting in concert to block decisions in the council;
3.  Requiring that the assembly cannot act independently of
council recommendations; and
4.  Establishing a finance committee controlled by the five
largest contributors to the organization's budget and which
would make decisions by consensus.  This committee, like our
congressional committees here, will have a strong voice in
the management of the regime;
--  Ensure that future amendments to the regime could not be
adopted over U.S. objections;
--  Eliminate provisions compelling the transfer of seabed
mining technology;
--  Eliminate the power of the organization to limit
production from the seabed to protect land-based mining and,
in its place, establish restrictions on subsidization of
seabed mining based on GATT;
--  "Grandfather in" seabed-mine site claims by three U.S.-
led multinational consortia on terms no "less favorable
than" the best granted to Japanese, French, Russian, Indian,
or Chinese claims which have already been registered.
--  Eliminate large annual fees miners would have to pay
prior to commercial production; and
--  Remodel "the enterprise" by:
1.  Requiring a future decision by the executive council to
make it operational;
2.  Subjecting it to the same requirements as other
commercial enterprises;
3.  Eliminating the requirement that parties to the
convention fund its mining activities;
4.  Providing that it operate through joint ventures with
other commercial enterprises; and
5.  Eliminating provisions that would compel other
commercial enterprises to provide it with technology.
Mr. Chairman, this is quite an advance.  The negotiations
are not quite finished, but they may be concluded by this
summer.  If so, the final text of the agreement to amend
Part XI will need to be evaluated before a formal decision
is made to sign.  However, our preliminary evaluation of the
text is favorable.  We believe it satisfies our primary
objections to Part XI and establishes an international
mining regime for the seabed that meets our basic concerns.
If the Administration decides to sign the agreement
modifying Part XI, it would be submitted along with the
convention to the Senate for advice and consent to
Implementing Legislation
Finally, I would like to briefly address the question of
implementing legislation for the seabed mining agreement and
the remainder of the convention.  With regard to the seabed
mining agreement, the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources
Act does anticipate the possibility of the entry into force
of a comprehensive law of the sea treaty for the United
States.  It provides, in Section 202, for existing
regulations under the act to continue to the extent not
inconsistent with the treaty and expresses the intent that
the Department of State work with the Department of Commerce
to ensure--to the maximum extent practicable--that U.S.-
licensed activities continue uninterrupted.
A question arises whether sufficient domestic legal
authority exists currently to allow the U.S. to perform all
the obligations it would undertake under the agreement
modifying Part XI.  This and related questions will require
further study.  The same is true concerning a number of
issues found in the remainder of the convention.  We will
begin a serious review of the question of the need for
implementing legislation now that we can see some light at
the end of the tunnel.  I believe we would all be surprised
if some changes in U.S. domestic law would not be required
in the context of becoming party to the Law of the Sea
Convention, as amended.  (###)
Fact Sheet:  U.S. Initiatives for Demining and Landmine
Anti-personnel landmines are the weapon of choice for many
government and insurgent groups.  They are cheap, easy to
manufacture and use, difficult to detect, and expensive and
dangerous to remove.  Usually, landmines are not removed
after armed conflict ends. They are left for populations
and, more recently, peace-keepers to deal with. While the
U.S. military employs landmines responsibly and in
accordance with international law, others often use them in
unconventional and indiscriminate ways against civilian
populations to generate fear, inhibit refugee repatriation,
disrupt economic reconstruction, and generally create chaos
in fragile governments.
Addressing the horrible toll in innocent civilian casualties
caused by the irresponsible and indiscriminate use of anti-
personnel landmines is a high priority of the
Administration.  Given the immediacy and the complexity of
the problem, the U.S. has developed a comprehensive, four-
track strategy.
Demining Initiatives.  The U.S. currently assists demining
programs in Cambodia, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and
Mozambique.  These follow five steps:  landmine assessment,
training in mine awareness, education and training in mine
clearance, transition of responsibility for the program to
the host government or other designated entity (e.g., an
international organization or a private non-governmental
organization), and follow-on assistance.  Using this general
plan, the Administration is initiating this year support of
demining efforts in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Honduras, and Costa
Rica.  There are significant landmine problems in Angola,
Somalia, Rwanda, and Liberia as well, but unrest in those
countries has prevented the implementation of U.S.
assistance.  By the end of 1994, the U.S. aims to have
programs in at least nine countries where landmines are a
serious problem.  The Administration hopes to expand the
program to other countries; it has requested additional
funding for FY 1995, particularly for research and
development of technologies to assist affected nations to
detect and clear landmines.
Efforts To Strengthen the Convention on Conventional Weapons
(particularly Protocol II which governs the use of
landmines).  The convention has been transmitted to the
Senate for advice and consent to ratification.  The U.S. is
pressing for substantial improvements to the landmine
protocol, such as making it applicable to internal
conflicts, requiring all mines to have a substantial
metallic content, requiring certain mines to be self-
deactivating, and establishing verification procedures.
Moratoria on Landmine Transfers.  In October 1992, the U.S.
adopted a unilateral export moratorium on anti-personnel
landmines.  This moratorium was extended in 1993 for three
years.  In 1993, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted
a U.S. resolution calling for moratoria on exports of
landmines that pose a grave risk to civilians.  The U.S. is
strongly urging key countries to adhere to moratoria.  To
date, eight other countries formally have declared moratoria
of their own; several have export controls in place.
Establishment of a More Permanent International Control
Mechanism.  The export moratoria are only temporary
measures.  The U.S. is engaged in a fast-track policy review
to develop a proposal for a more permanent multilateral anti-
personnel landmine control regime.  It is taking a rigorous,
systematic look at a broad range of options.  The
Administration is dedicated to building the international
consensus necessary to bring about an effective control
regime in the shortest possible time.
For further information see Hidden Killers:  The Global
Problem With Uncleared Landmines, U.S. Department of State,
July 1993, available from the Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs, tel. 202-647-6968.
Anti-Personnel Landmine Facts
--  There are more than 85 million uncleared landmines in 62
countries around the world.  More than 65 million mines were
laid in the last 15 years.
--  Landmines cause more than 150 deaths or injuries
worldwide each week. Most of these are innocent civilian
--  The United Nations estimates that there are 9-10 million
landmines in Afghanistan, 9 million in Angola, 4-7 million
in Cambodia, 5-10 million in Iraq, 5-7 million in Kuwait,
and 2-4 million in the former Yugoslavia.
--  It costs between $150 and $1,000 to remove one landmine.
--  The U.S. allocated more than $9 million to demining
projects in FY 1993; more than $12 million will be spent in
FY 1994.
--  There are more than 30,000 amputees in Cambodia and more
than 20,000 in Angola, according to International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) estimates. Most are victims of
--  In 1991, the ICRC made almost 8,000 artificial limbs and
11,000 orthopedic appliances for mine victims in 14
countries.  (###)

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