US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 5, NUMBER 21, MAY 23, 1994
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1. U.S. Taking New Steps To Respond to Crisis in Haiti--President
Clinton,
William Gray, White House Fact Sheet, Madeleine K. Albright, UNSC
Resolution
2. Pursuing the Restoration of Democracy in Haiti--Deputy Secretary
Talbott
3. U.S. Support for Reform in Central and Eastern Europe and the NIS--
Deputy
Secretary Talbott
4. U.S.-ASEAN Relations: Building on Shared Strength, Prosperity, and
Democratic Values--Acting Secretary Talbott, Joint Press Statement
5. Crisis in Rwanda--George E. Moose
6. Human Rights Abuses in Liberia
7. Cambodia: Recent Developments--Peter Tomsen
ARTICLE 1
U.S. Taking New Steps To Respond to Crisis in Haiti
President Clinton, William Gray, White House Fact Sheet, Madeleine K.
Albright, UNSC Resolution
President Clinton and William Gray
Opening statements at a White House news conference, Washington, DC, May
8,
1994.
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I want to speak for a few moments
about the crisis in Haiti, the challenge it poses to our national
interests, and the new steps I am taking to respond. Three and one-
half years ago, in free and fair elections, the people of Haiti chose
Jean-Bertrand Aristide as their President. Just nine months later,
their hopes were dashed when Haiti's military leaders overthrew
democracy by force. Since then, the military has murdered innocent
civilians, crushed political freedom, and plundered Haiti's economy.
From the start of this Administration, my goal has been to restore
democracy and President Aristide. Last year, we helped the parties
to negotiate the Governors Island Accord, a fair and balanced
agreement which laid out a road map for a peaceful resolution to the
crisis. But late last year, the Haitian military abrogated the
agreement, and since then they have rejected every effort to achieve
a political settlement. At the same time, the repression and
bloodshed in Haiti have reached alarming new proportions. Supporters
of President Aristide, and many other Haitians, are being killed and
mutilated. That is why, six weeks ago, I ordered a review of our
policy toward Haiti.
As a result of this review, we are taking several steps to increase
pressure on Haiti's military while addressing the suffering caused by
their brutal misrule. We are stepping up our diplomatic efforts, we
are intensifying sanctions, and we are adapting our migration
policy. Let me describe these steps. First, to bring new vigor to
our diplomacy, I am pleased to announce that Bill Gray, the President
of the United Negro College Fund and former House Majority Whip and
Chair of the House Budget Committee, has accepted my invitation to
serve as Special Adviser to me and to the Secretary of State on Haiti.
Bill is here with his wife, on his way to the inauguration of President
Mandela in South Africa, and I will ask him to speak in just a few
moments. But let me just say that he is a man of vision and
determination, of real strength and real creativity. I appreciate
his willingness to accept this difficult and challenging assignment.
He will be the point man in our diplomacy and a central figure in our
future policy deliberations. As part of our diplomatic efforts,
we will work with the United Nations to examine the changes in the
proposed UN military and police mission in Haiti. We want to ensure
that once Haiti's military leaders have left, this mission can do its
job effectively and safely.
Second, the U.S. is leading the international community in a drive to
impose tougher sanctions on Haiti. On Friday, the UN Security Council
unanimously adopted a resolution we had proposed to tighten sanctions
on everything but humanitarian supplies; to prevent Haiti's military
leaders and their civilian allies from leaving the country; to promote
a freeze of their assets worldwide; and to ban non-scheduled flights
in and out of Haiti. U.S. naval vessels will continue to enforce
these sanctions vigorously.
We are also working with the Dominican Republic to improve sanctions
enforcement
along that nation's border with Haiti. To shield the most vulnerable
Haitians
from the worst effects of the sanctions, we will increase both
humanitarian aid
and the number of UN and OAS human rights monitors in Haiti.
While these stronger sanctions will cause more hardships for innocent
Haitians,
we must be clear: The military leaders bear full responsibility for
this
action. They can stop the suffering of their people by giving up
power, as
they themselves agreed to do, and allowing the restoration of democracy
and the
return of President Aristide.
Third, I am announcing certain changes in our migration policy toward
Haiti.
Currently, Haitians seeking refugee status, including those interdicted
at sea,
are interviewed only in Haiti and not beyond its shores. Our
processing
centers, which have been dramatically expanded in this Administration,
are
doing a good job under bad circumstances.
In 1993, we processed and approved about 10 times the number of refugee
applicants as in 1992. In recent months, however, I have become
increasingly
concerned that Haiti's declining human rights situation may endanger
the safety
of those who have valid fears of political persecution, who flee by
boat, and
who are then returned to Haiti where they are met at the docks by
Haitian
authorities before they can be referred to in-country processing.
Therefore, I have decided to modify our procedures. We will continue to
interdict all Haitian migrants at sea, but we will determine aboard
ship, or in
other countries, which ones are bona fide political refugees. Those
who are
not will still be returned to Haiti, but those who are will be provided
refuge.
We will also approach other countries to seek their participation in
this
humanitarian endeavor.
The new procedures will begin once we have the necessary arrangements in
place.
This will take some weeks. Until then, the Haitians must understand
that we
will continue to return all boat migrants to Haiti. Even under the
new
procedures, there will be no advantage for Haitians with fears of
persecution
to risk their lives at sea if and when they can assert their claims
more safely
at processing centers in Haiti.
The ultimate solution to this crisis, however, is for the military
leaders to
keep their own commitment to leave, so that Haiti's people can build a
peaceful
and prosperous future in their own country.
I am committed to making these new international sanctions work. At the
same
time, I cannot and should not rule out other options. The United
States has
clear interests at stake in ending this crisis. We have an interest in
bolstering the cause of democracy in the Americas. We have an interest
in
ensuring the security of our citizens living and working in Haiti. We
have an
interest in stopping the gross human rights violations and abuses by
the
military and their accomplices. We clearly have a humanitarian
interest in
preventing a massive and dangerous exodus of Haitians by sea.
The steps I have announced today are designed to relieve suffering,
redouble
pressure, and restore democracy. Working with the Haitian people and
the world
community, we will try to advance our interests and give Haiti an
opportunity
to build a future of freedom and hope. They voted for it and they
deserve the
chance to have it.
William Gray. I am honored to accept this great and important
challenge. I am
glad for the opportunity to serve my country and to work on resolving
one of
the greatest challenges we face today. I share the President's
determination
to help end the suffering of the Haitian people at the hands of their
military
leaders. I will work toward that end with commitment and with
determination.
In accepting this assignment, I want to stress publicly, as I have
stressed to
you, Mr. President, that I am a private citizen and will remain a
private
citizen during this work. I have also insisted on serving without pay.
My
reason for taking on this work is straightforward and very simple. For
me, it
is an article of faith that when a person is asked by his President to
be of
service to the nation, he should do so. And today, I respond to that
request
from my President to serve.
In the months ahead, I look forward to working with you, Mr. President,
and your
national security team to carry out your policy, promote our nation's
interests, and restore freedom and democracy and, above all, hope to
the people
of Haiti.
White House Fact Sheet: Haiti
Fact sheet released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary,
Washington, DC, May 8, 1994.
Summary
At the conclusion of a comprehensive review of United States policy
toward
Haiti, the President announced on May 8 several new steps to bring
about the
restoration of democracy and return of Haiti's democratically elected
President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, while addressing humanitarian
concerns which
worsening repression in Haiti have intensified.
The major new steps the President announced were:
-- The appointment of William Gray, the distinguished President of the
United
Negro College Fund and former Chairman of the House Budget Committee,
as the
new Special Adviser to the President and Secretary of State on Haiti to
focus
and invigorate our diplomacy;
-- Changes in our procedures for returning boat migrants to Haiti to
ensure
that all who claim refugee status are given a hearing while still
discouraging
massive and dangerous departures by sea;
-- New emphasis on using comprehensive sanctions and improved
sanctions enforcement to make Haiti's military leaders relinquish power
(the UN Security Council approved on May 6 a new resolution
intensifying the sanctions);
-- Augmentation of humanitarian assistance for Haiti's poor and
support for the earliest arrival in Haiti of more UN and OAS human
rights monitors; and
-- Intensified consultations at the United Nations on preparing the UN
military and police mission for deployment to Haiti once the military
leaders have relinquished power.
Background
Resolving the crisis in Haiti has been a continuing policy priority of
the President and this Administration. Our objectives have been to
restore democracy and to make possible the return to Haiti of President
Aristide. The urgency of the situation has grown as the intransigence
and depredations of Haiti's military leaders have worsened.
The President is working to advance the several U.S. national interests
at stake.
-- Democracy--Haiti is one of only two countries in this hemisphere
where the people are deprived of their right to democracy. Democracy
underpins our efforts to build freedom and prosperity in this
hemisphere through such initiatives as NAFTA and the December Summit of
the Americas in Miami.
-- Human Rights and Humanitarian Concerns--The Haitian people are
suffering worsening privation and brutality at the hands of the
military. Unless halted soon, these abuses could drive large numbers
of Haitians to risk the perils of the sea to try to reach our shores.
The first step in giving Haitians hope in their own land is for the
military leaders to leave and democracy to be restored. This will
allow the international community to work with Haiti to address the
root causes of migration.
-- Protection of Americans Overseas--As many as 10,000 Americans live
and work in Haiti. Their safety is threatened by deepening military
abuses and the insecurity that creates.
The President and his senior advisers have reviewed our policy toward
Haiti during the last six weeks. This review was prompted by the
rejection by the Haitian military leadership of every initiative to
achieve a political settlement of the crisis and by their visibly
worsening human rights abuses. As a result of this review, the
President has directed important changes in our policy to increase the
pressure on Haiti's military leaders while addressing the humanitarian
repercussions of their misrule.
Vigorous Diplomacy.
The appointment of William Gray as the President's and Secretary of
State's Special Adviser on Haiti will inject new vision and
determination into our efforts. The President will rely on Mr. Gray as
a central figure in our Haiti policy. As Mr. Gray leads that effort,
Ambassador Albright will be working closely with the Secretary General
and her colleagues to ensure that the UN brings all its resources to
bear. Ambassador Babbitt will do likewise at the OAS, and Ambassador
Swing will direct our efforts within Haiti in support of the new
policy.
New Migrant Processing Procedures.
In the context of our broader Haitian policy review, we also reviewed
our migration policy. We currently process Haitians for refugee
claims only within Haiti, and we interdict and return all those who
seek to migrate by boat without processing. Haitians who are returned
by our interdiction effort are permitted to apply for refugee status
within Haiti. Those who claim political persecution on questionnaires
completed while they are being returned to Port-au-Prince are
encouraged to apply at our in- country refugee centers. Since the
inception of in-country refugee processing in 1992, we have accorded
refugee status to nearly 3,000 Haitians. We have increased the
refugee intake from Haiti through in-country processing tenfold
compared to the last Administration.
The UN/OAS International Civilian Mission has documented a substantial
increase in killings and other brutal abuses in recent months. During
the month of April alone, it noted nearly 50 executions and suspicious
deaths, including 11 separate murders during April 23-24 alone. It
has reliably reported significant increases in kidnapings and forced
disappearances, rapes, attacks on children, and other abuses. In
Gonaives and other parts of Haiti, military sweeps have led to dozens
of deaths. Under these circumstances, the President has concluded
that it is inappropriate to return all Haitian boat migrants without
first affording them the opportunity to make claims to refugee status
and protection. While our in-country processing provides a crucial
route to refuge for many Haitians, it may no longer be adequate.
Therefore, the President has modified our procedures for processing
Haitian boat migrants. Our Coast Guard will continue to interdict all
Haitian migrants at sea, but we will no longer return them to Haiti
without first interviewing them to determine which are bona fide
political refugees. Processing will involve a standard refugee
interview similar to that currently performed by our three refugee
processing centers in Haiti. It will be carried out either in third
countries or aboard appropriate ships. Those who qualify as political
refugees will be resettled outside Haiti. Other countries will be
approached to join us in accepting Haitian political refugees. Those
not qualifying for refugee status will be returned promptly to Haiti.
The new procedures will not come into effect until after our new
processing facilities outside Haiti are in place. That will be some
weeks from now. Until that time, which will be announced publicly, we
will continue to return all interdicted boat migrants to Haiti without
processing. We will be unable to process boat migrants for possible
refugee status adequately and fairly before then, and we must
discourage departures in unseaworthy vessels with the attendant risk
of death at sea.
Intensified Sanctions. The UN Security Council on May 6 unanimously
approved a strong resolution intensifying sanctions. The resolution
immediately made effective worldwide the targeted entry ban and asset
freeze which we have been enforcing since last year against the
military and its allies. It also imposed an immediate ban on non-
scheduled flights to and from Haiti. Within the next two weeks, the
world community will bring into force comprehensive trade sanctions
against Haiti, excluding only the most essential humanitarian supplies.
On May 7, the President signed an executive order and proclamation
implementing the first two of those measures. A second executive order
will bring the comprehensive trade sanctions into effect in the next
several days.
Full Enforcement of Sanctions.
Our naval vessels around Haiti will continue to stop ships entering
and leaving Haitian waters and divert those carrying prohibited cargo.
The President has been in contact with President Balaguer of the
Dominican Republic to express his concern about sanctions leakage on
their long border with Haiti and our willingness to assist the
Dominicans in meeting their international obligation to enforce the
sanctions. We are working with the United Nations to facilitate
international cooperation with the Dominican Republic.
Humanitarian/Human Rights Measures.
Comprehensive new sanctions and strengthened enforcement will
increase the pressure on the Haitian people. To shield the most
vulnerable Haitians from the sanctions' worst impact, we will increase
as soon as possible our humanitarian feeding and health care programs
to reach 1.2 million beneficiaries. We are working to restore the full
complement of 250 UN/OAS civilian human rights observers to Haiti.
Reconfiguring the UN Mission in Haiti. We will be consulting
intensively with our partners in New York to prepare the planned UN
military and police mission for Haiti to be able to function
effectively and safely once the military leadership has relinquished
power. As those consultations proceed and the possibilities for our
own participation in the mission become clearer, we will consult
extensively with the Congress.
Madeleine K. Albright
Statement by the United States Permanent Representative to the United
Nations before the UN Security Council, New York City, May 6, 1994.
Mr. President, the situation in Haiti grows more desperate by the day.
A small group of military officers has usurped the sovereignty of an
independent people; these usurpers are devoid of honor or patriotism
and driven only by greed and mistaken self-interest. They have
violated their obligation to uphold Haiti's constitution, violated
their commitments to the international community, and violated the
most fundamental rights of their people.
Today, the Security Council speaks with one voice. We demand an end to
the assault on democracy in Haiti. By tightening the sanctions noose
around the Haitian military today, this Council is joining President
Clinton in his determination to protect the people of Haiti and to
promote their demand for democracy and dignity.
It is important to note that this resolution is the product of full
cooperation among the Latin American and Caribbean states, the members
of the Council, and the democratically elected Government of Haiti.
Mr. President, this is a step that we did not want to have to take and a
step we should never have had to even consider. We know that sanctions
are a blunt instrument. And we are acutely conscious of the suffering
of the Haitian people and of the potential of these sanctions to
aggravate that suffering. That is why the United States and the
international community are also undertaking humanitarian assistance
measures in Haiti on a massive scale.
We in the United States are particularly conscious of the plight of
Haitians who, for economic or political reasons, feel they have no
future in their homeland. It is our firm objective through this
Council and through other means to establish in Haiti once again the
conditions under which no Haitians need fear for their lives or
livelihoods and all Haitians will have an opportunity to build a future
for themselves and their families. Sanctions are one of the most potent
weapons the international community has. Our step imposes upon us a
significant moral obligation--to persevere and enforce these sanctions
fully so they achieve their objective in the shortest possible time.
We recognize that the burden of enforcement does not fall equally on
all states. We extend our thanks to the Government of the Dominican
Republic for the cooperation it has promised in enforcing these
measures. Together, all of us can and must make these sanctions work.
The price of failure would be too high for all of us. Thank you, Mr.
President.
Resolution 917 (May 6, 1994)
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolutions 841 (1993) of 16 June 1993, 861 (1993) of
27 August 1993, 862 (1993) of 31 August 1993, 867 (1993) of 23
September 1993, 873 (1993) of 13 October 1993, 875 (1993) of 16
October 1993 and 905 (1994) of 23 March 1994,
Recalling its Presidential statements of 11 October 1993 (S/26567), 25
October 1993 (S/26633), 30 October 1993 (S/26668), 15 November 1993
(S/26747) and 10 January 1994 (S/PRST/1994/2),
Noting resolutions MRE/RES.1/91, MRE/RES.2/91, MRE/RES.3/92,
MRE/RES.4/92, and MRE/RES.5/93, adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the
Organization of American States, and resolutions CP/RES.575 (885/92)
and CP/RES.594 (923/92) and declarations CP/Dec.8 (927/93), CP/Dec. 9
(931/93), CP/Dec.10 (934/93) and CP/Dec.15 (967/93), adopted by the
Permanent Council of the Organization of American States,
Noting in particular resolution CP/RES.610 (968/93) of 18 October 1993
of the Organization of American States,
Bearing in mind the statement of conclusions adopted at the Meeting of
the Four Friends of the Secretary-General on Haiti, held in Paris on 13
and 14 December 1993 (S/26881),
Having examined the reports of the Secretary-General of 19 January 1994
(S/1994/54) and 18 March 1994 (S/1994/311) regarding the United Nations
Mission in Haiti (UNMIH),
Commending the continuing efforts undertaken by the Special Envoy for
Haiti of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the
Organization of American States to bring about compliance with the
Governors Island Agreement and the full restoration of democracy in
Haiti,
Reaffirming that the goal of the international community remains the
restoration of democracy in Haiti and the prompt return of the
legitimately elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, under the
framework of the Governors Island Agreement,
Stressing in this context the importance of a proper and secure
environment for all legislative action agreed to in the Governors
Island Agreement and the New York Pact, as well as preparations for
free and fair legislative elections in Haiti, as called for in the
constitution, in the framework of the full restoration of democracy in
Haiti,
Concerned at the continued failure of the military authorities in Haiti,
including the police, to comply with their obligations under the
Governors Island Agreement, and at the violations of the related New
York Pact committed by political organizations party thereto in
relation to the disputed elections of 18 January 1993,
Strongly condemning the numerous instances of extra-judicial killings,
arbitrary arrests, illegal detentions, abductions, rape and enforced
disappearances, the continued denial of freedom of expression, and the
impunity with which armed civilians have been able to operate and
continue operating,
Recalling that in resolution 873 (1993) the Council confirmed its
readiness to consider the imposition of additional measures if the
military authorities in Haiti continued to impede the activities of
the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) or failed to comply in
full with its relevant resolutions and the provisions of the Governors
Island Agreement,
Reaffirming its determination that, in these unique and exceptional
circumstances, the situation created by the failure of the military
authorities in Haiti to fulfil their obligations under the Governors
Island Agreement and to comply with relevant Security Council
resolutions constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Calls upon the parties to the Governors Island Agreement and any
other authorities in Haiti to cooperate fully with the Special Envoy of
the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and Organization of
American States to bring about the full implementation of the
Governors Island Agreement and thus end the political crisis in Haiti;
2. Decides that all States shall without delay deny permission to any
aircraft to take off from, land in, or overfly their territory if it is
destined to land in, or has taken off from the territory of Haiti,
with the exception of regularly scheduled commercial passenger
flights, unless the particular flight has been approved, for
humanitarian purposes or for other purposes consistent with the
present resolution and other relevant resolutions, by the Committee
established by resolution 841 (1993);
3. Decides that all States shall without delay prevent the entry into
their territories:
(a) Of all officers of the Haitian military, including the police, and
their immediate families;
(b) Of the major participants in the coup d'etat of 1991 and in the
illegal governments since the coup d'etat, and their immediate
families;
(c) Of those employed by or acting on behalf of the Haitian military,
and their immediate families, unless their entry has been approved, for
purposes consistent with the present resolution and other relevant
resolutions, by the Committee established by resolution 841 (1993),
and requests the Committee to maintain an updated list, based on
information provided by States and regional organizations, of the
persons falling within this paragraph;
4. Strongly urges all States to freeze without delay the funds and
financial resources of persons falling within paragraph 3 above, to
ensure that neither these nor any other funds and financial resources
are made available, by their nationals or by any persons within their
territory, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of such
persons or of the Haitian military, including the police;
5. Decides that the provisions set forth in paragraphs 6 to 10 below,
which are consistent with the embargo recommended by the Organization
of American States, shall, to the extent that these measures are not
already in effect under its earlier relevant resolutions, take effect
no later than 2359 hours Eastern Standard Time on 21 May 1994 and
requests that the Secretary-General, having regard for the views of
the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, report
to the Council not later than 19 May 1994 on steps the military have
taken to comply with actions required of them by the Governors Island
Accord as specified in paragraph 18 below;
6. Decides that all States shall prevent:
(a) The import into their territories of all commodities and products
originating in Haiti and exported therefrom after the aforementioned
date;
(b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which
would promote the export or transshipment of any commodities or
products originating in Haiti, and any dealings by their nationals or
their flag vessels or air-craft or in their territories in any
commodities or products originating in Haiti and exported therefrom
after the aforementioned date;
7. Decides that all States shall prevent the sale or supply by their
nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or
aircraft of any commodities or products, whether or not originating in
their territories, to any person or body in Haiti or to any person or
body for the purpose of any business carried on in, or operated from,
Haiti, and any activities by their nationals or in their territories
which promote such sale or supply of such commodities or products,
provided that the prohibitions contained in this paragraph shall not
apply to:
(a) Supplies intended strictly for medical purposes and foodstuffs;
(b) With the approval of the Committee established pursuant to
resolution 841 (1993), under the no-objection procedure, other
commodities and products for essential humanitarian needs;
(c) Petroleum or petroleum products, including propane gas for cooking,
authorized in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 841 (1993);
(d) Other commodities and products authorized in accordance with
paragraph 3 of resolution 873 (1993);
8. Decides that the prohibitions in paragraphs 6 and 7 above shall not
apply to trade in informational materials, including books and other
publications, needed for the free flow of information and further
decides that journalists may bring in and take out their equipment
subject to conditions and terms agreed by the Committee established
by resolution 841 (1993);
9. Decides to prohibit any and all traffic from entering or leaving the
territory or territorial sea of Haiti carrying commodities or products
the export of which from Haiti or the sale or supply of which to Haiti
would be prohibited under paragraphs 6 and 7 above, excepting regularly
scheduled maritime shipping lines calling in Haiti with goods permitted
under paragraph
7 and which are also carrying other commodities or products in transit
to other destinations, subject to formal monitoring arrangements
established with States cooperating with the legitimate Government of
Haiti as provided in paragraph 1 of resolution 875 (1993) and
paragraph 10 below;
10. Acting also under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United
Nations, calls upon Member States cooperating with the legitimate
Government of Haiti, acting nationally or through regional agencies or
arrangements, to use such measures commensurate with the specific
circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security
Council to ensure strict implementation of the provisions of the
present resolution and earlier relevant resolutions, and in particular
to halt outward as well as inward maritime shipping as necessary in
order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and also to
ensure that the Committee established pursuant to resolution 841 (1993)
is kept regularly informed;
11. Decides that all States, including the authorities in Haiti, shall
take the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the
instance of the authorities in Haiti, or of any person or body in
Haiti, or of any person claiming through or for the benefit of any
such person or body, in connection with the performance of a bond,
financial guarantee, indemnity or engagement, issued or granted in
connection with or related to the performance of any contract or
transaction, where the performance of that contract or transaction was
affected by the measures imposed by or pursuant to this resolution or
resolutions 841 (1993), 873 (1993) and 875 (1993);
12. Calls upon all States, including States not members of the United
Nations, and all international organizations, to act strictly in
accordance with the provisions of the present resolution and the
earlier relevant resolutions, notwithstanding the existence of any
rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international
agreement or any contract entered into or any licence or permit
granted prior to the effective date of the measures in this resolution
or earlier relevant resolutions;
13. Requests all States to report to the Secretary-General by 6 June
1994 on the measures they have instituted in implementation of the
measures contained in the present resolution and earlier relevant
resolutions;
14. Decides that the Committee established pursuant to resolution 841
(1993) shall undertake the following tasks in addition to those set out
in resolutions 841 (1993), 873 (1993) and in paragraph 3 above:
(a) To examine reports submitted pursuant to paragraph 13 above;
(b) To seek from all States, in particular neighbouring States, further
information regarding the action taken by them concerning the effective
implementation of the measures contained in the present resolution and
earlier relevant resolutions;
(c) To consider any information brought to its attention by States
concerning violations of the measures contained in the present
resolution and earlier relevant resolutions and, in that context, to
make recommendations to the Council on ways to increase their
effectiveness;
(d) To make recommendations in response to violations of the measures
contained in the present resolution and earlier relevant resolutions
and provide information on a regular basis to the Secretary-General for
general distribution to Member States;
(e) To consider and to decide upon expeditiously any application by
States for the approval of flights or entry in accordance with
paragraphs 2 and 3 above;
(f) To amend the guidelines referred to in paragraph 10 of resolution
841 (1993) to take into account the measures contained in the present
resolution;
(g) To examine possible requests for assistance under the provisions of
Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations and to make
recommendations to the President of the Security Council for
appropriate action;
15. Reaffirms its request to the Secretary-General to provide all
necessary assistance to the Committee and to make the necessary
arrangements in the Secretariat for this purpose;
16. Decides that, until the return of the democratically elected
President, it will keep under continuous review, at least on a monthly
basis, all the measures in the present resolution and earlier relevant
resolutions and requests the Secretary-General, having regard for the
views of the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States,
to report on the situation in Haiti, the implementation of the
Governors Island Agreement, legislative actions including preparations
for legislative elections, the full restoration of democracy in Haiti,
the humanitarian situation in that country, and the effectiveness of
the implementation of sanctions, with the first report not later than
30 June 1994;
17. Expresses its readiness to consider progressive suspension of the
measures contained in the present resolution and earlier relevant
resolutions, based on progress in the implementation of the Governors
Island Agreement and the restoration of democracy in Haiti;
18. Decides that, notwithstanding paragraph 16 above, measures in the
present resolution and earlier relevant resolutions will not be
completely lifted until:
(a) The retirement of the Commander-in-Chief of the Haitian Armed
Forces, and the resignation or departure from Haiti of the Chief of the
Metropolitan Zone of Port-au-Prince, commonly known as the Chief of
Police of Port-au-Prince, and the Chief of Staff of the Haitian Armed
Forces;
(b) Completion of the changes by retirement or departure from Haiti in
the leadership of the police and military high command called for in
the Governors Island Agreement;
(c) Adoption of the legislative actions called for in the Governors
Island Agreement, as well as the creation of a proper environment in
which free and fair legislative elections can be organized in the
framework of the full restoration of democracy in Haiti;
(d) The creation by authorities of the proper environment for the
deployment of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH);
(e) The return in the shortest time possible of the democratically
elected President and maintenance of constitutional order, these
conditions being necessary for the full implementation of the
Governors Island Agreement;
19. Condemns any attempt illegally to remove legal authority from the
legitimately elected President, declares that it would consider
illegitimate any purported government resulting from such an attempt,
and decides, in such an event, to consider reimposing any measures
suspended under paragraph 17 above;
20. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
VOTE: Unanimous (15-0). (###)
ARTICLE 2
Pursuing the Restoration Of Democracy in Haiti
Deputy Secretary Talbott
Statement before the Special Session of the Permanent Council of the
Organization of American States, Washington, DC, May 11, 1994
All of us in the room today recognize the growing importance of this
organization as a force for democracy in Latin America and the
Caribbean and throughout the world as a whole. After all, the OAS is
itself a democratic institution. Each member nation has an equal
voice no matter what the size of its population, its territory, or its
economy. We respect each other's sovereignty, we respect our
differences, and we work together to advance the values and interests
that we have in common.
The OAS has become increasingly effective as democracy has spread
throughout the region. Indeed, it has become more effective because
democracy has spread. Fifteen years ago, less than half of the
countries in Latin America had democratically elected governments.
Today, every one of us at the table represents a freely elected head
of state--including Ambassador Casimir.
Twenty years ago, in 1973, when the military extinguished freedom in
Chile, the OAS stood silent. By contrast, in 1993, when Guatemala's
elected government was threatened, this organization promptly and
effectively came to the defense of democracy. Under the steady
leadership of Secretary General Baena Soares, the OAS has also played
a key role in restoring a congress and a constitutional order in Peru,
and in demobilizing insurgent movements in Nicaragua and Suriname. The
OAS also took the lead in responding to the crisis in Haiti, and Haiti
continues to be an absolutely critical test for the OAS.
Why does Haiti matter so much to all of us?
If the international and hemispheric community allows thugs such as Raul
Cedras, Michel Francois, and Phillipe Biamby to continue to rob and
terrorize the people of Haiti, that country is likely to become a
haven and a breeding ground for the forces of instability and
criminality in the region. The human rights outrages perpetrated by
the Haitian regime violate all international standards. The regime is
presiding over a steadily worsening humanitarian catastrophe, raising
the spectre of a refugee crisis that impinges on the vital interests of
all countries in the region, especially Haiti's neighbors.
A few hours ago, we received news of the latest affront against
democracy in Haiti. Today, Supreme Court President Emile Jonassaint
was sworn in as president of Haiti, ostensibly under Article 149 of the
Haitian Constitution. This is a blatant attempt by an illegal faction
of the Haitian Senate, with the assistance of the military, to install
a bogus de facto government. This action will not divert the
international community from pursuing the restoration of democracy in
Haiti and the return of President Aristide.
As called for under the UN Security Council resolution, those persons
taking part in such an illegal government will have their personal
assets in the U.S. frozen, and they will be denied entry into all UN
member countries.
But let me return to the central importance of democracy itself. If
this military clique--having usurped democracy and repressed the
people-- remains in control of Haiti, it would contradict the trend
that we all applaud and from which we all benefit.
President Aristide, who won nearly 70% of the vote in an election in
which 90% of the people cast their ballots freely and fairly, is now
living in exile, 10 blocks from where we are meeting today. He is a
welcome guest here in Washington, but he should be in his own capital,
with his own people. He wants that. They want that. We want that.
As we discuss what further steps are needed, let us recognize that the
OAS and its allies have already come a long way together in dealing
with this issue. With the September 1991 coup, Haiti became the first
test of OASGA Resolution 1080, which calls for an immediate
hemispheric response to any interruption of the constitutional
democratic processes of a member state. The OAS lived up to its
responsibilities under that resolution, by recommending a trade embargo
against the coup leaders.
The international community has supported the OAS effort by providing an
increasingly wide safety net for those who might be unjustly affected
by those sanctions; the United States is trying to do its part in this
humanitarian effort.
The United States and other donors are currently feeding almost 1.2
million poor Haitians. In addition, we are providing nearly 2 million
Haitians-- nearly one-third of the population--with access to basic
health services, including medicines and immunizations.
The OAS has taken the lead by sending international human rights
monitors to Haiti, thus providing the basis for what has grown to be
the International Civilian Mission. The United States, along with
Canada, Venezuela, St. Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, Chile, Argentina,
and other member states, has enthusiastically supported this OAS
initiative. Today, the United States has decided to make $13 million
available to augment this monitoring effort.
Let me say a word or two about the all-important cooperation between the
OAS and the UN. That cooperation is personified by the UN/OAS Special
Envoy, Dante Caputo, with whom I met yesterday. Mr. Caputo has led
the efforts to arrive at a political settlement. Last Friday, the UN
Security Council reaffirmed its support for his mediation efforts,
unanimously adopting a resolution that makes mandatory, on a global
scale, the sanctions originally recommended by the OAS.
The time has now come to build upon these accomplishments. My President
sees four steps we must take.
First, we must enforce the sanctions that are now in place.
Second, we must continue to augment our humanitarian assistance
programs. Our moral authority in this struggle will be undercut unless
we clearly demonstrate that our sanctions are not directed at the
people of Haiti but at the regime.
Third, we must find ways to assure that those with a legitimate claim to
asylum get a fair hearing. Here, too, we must make it clear to the
people of Haiti that we are on their side. President Clinton offered
a new approach to this problem last Sunday. Since the Haitian refugee
situation affects a number of us here today, I hope that OAS members
will join us in working together on this very difficult dimension of
the problem.
Fourth, and finally, as the new sanctions take effect, we must agree on
the transitional measures that will be required when Cedras resigns,
and Francois and Biamby leave the island--as they must.
This relates to the question of UNMIH, the United Nations Mission in
Haiti, which has been envisioned, and authored, by earlier UN
resolutions as a key part of the political solution. The United
States stands ready to be a part of such a mission. The task for
UNMIH is to help ensure a safe and effective transition back to
democracy.
The task now--and that means starting today--is to define the mission
with precision, realism, and credibility, and to configure the
collective effort that will be necessary to make it successful.
In the days immediately ahead, we will be consulting closely with your
governments--and, of course, with the United Nations--on the definition
and configuration of UNMIH.
As I hope is apparent from everything I have said, the United States is
strongly committed to supporting the OAS and the United Nations in
bringing democracy back to Haiti. Last Sunday, President Clinton
demonstrated his commitment by appointing William Gray, the respected
former majority whip of the House of Representatives, to be Special
Adviser to the President and the Secretary of State. When he announced
Mr. Gray's appointment, President Clinton reiterated that--and I
quote--"the ultimate solution to this crisis is for the military
leaders to keep their own commitment,"--that is to permit the
restoration of democracy--"so that Haiti's people can build a peaceful
and prosperous future in their own country." As an amplification of
that statement, I will conclude with what Secretary of State
Christopher said in Mexico City the day before yesterday: If Haiti's
military leaders refuse to resign or leave Haiti, they will find that
the international community has both the will and the means to make
them pay the price for their illegitimate actions, and to restore the
legitimately elected authorities. We are the international community.
Let us use this meeting, and its immediate aftermath, to galvanize the
will and assemble the means to prevail on behalf of our common
interests.
(###)
ARTICLE 3
U.S. Support for Reform in Central And Eastern Europe and the NIS Deputy
Secretary Talbott
Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export
Financing and Related Programs of the House Appropriations Committee,
Washington, DC, May 10,
1994
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the chance to testify today in support of the
Administration's program to assist the 26 nations that are emerging
from communism in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union. Our policy toward that vast region of the world and the more
than 370 million people that live there has been based on three basic
premises.
1. Reform in Central and Eastern Europe and the New Independent States
of the former Soviet Union is in the most basic interests of the United
States.
To the extent that the reformers succeed in their efforts, the community
of market democracies and the boundaries of freedom and prosperity will
be enlarged. The potential payoffs for America are immense: a reduced
threat of war, lower defense budgets, and vast new markets that can
fuel global prosperity and create jobs for Americans.
As Vice President Gore said in Milwaukee in January, the great
transformation underway in the post-communist world is "the story of
the century--our century." We also have a part in that story. Through
our programs to support reform, we have an opportunity--indeed, an
obligation--to do everything we can to increase the chances that the
story ends well; that is, that in place of the old Warsaw Pact and the
old Soviet Union will emerge a community of nations at peace with
themselves and each other, fully integrated into the larger community
of nations to which we belong and of which we are, in many ways, the
leader.
2. Reformers are locked in a struggle with opponents of reform, and the
struggle will go on for a long time.
Thanks in large measure to five years of support from the Support for
East European Democracy (SEED) program and other U.S. assistance
programs, most of the nations of Central and Eastern Europe are moving
steadily toward full integration into the community of market
democracies. There are bound to be delays and setbacks along the way,
but the sooner these nations consolidate their gains, the sooner we
will be able to benefit from their emergence as stable, secure
democracies and as reliable trading partners.
Reformers in the former U.S.S.R. are fighting a hard, uphill battle to
replace the Soviet system with political and economic institutions that
will permit those countries to prosper. Even those NIS leaders who
have been most tenacious in their pursuit of reform are going to have
to overcome many obstacles.
3. We have already made a difference for the better--and must keep
doing so. Each of the nations of Central and Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union must choose its course: The decisions as to how
and to what extent they will join the community of market democracies
are theirs, not ours. However, the events of the past five years have
clearly demonstrated that in many cases our assistance can spur
progress.
It is with these premises in mind, Mr. Chairman, that the Administration
comes before you to request continued funding for the SEED and FREEDOM
Support Act programs. Our FY 1995 SEED request of $380 million is in
keeping with what we expect to be a general downward trend in SEED
funding levels. This trend is largely because of the success of the
program in its first five years. SEED began in three countries--
Hungary, Poland, and the former Czechoslovakia--and has grown to cover
4. Beginning in FY 1995, however, we will begin closing out SEED
programs in countries that no longer need this kind of support. The
Czech Republic, now well on its way toward full integration with the
market democracies of Europe, will be the first country to "graduate";
Estonia and Slovenia may follow soon thereafter.
Our FY 1995 FREEDOM Support Act request of $900 million also takes into
account the considerable progress now being made in Russia and
throughout the former Soviet Union. The large amount of funds
Congress provided for NIS programs in FY 1994 will enable us to
continue--in cooperation with other international donors--to provide
much of the assistance needed for the major steps toward transition,
especially in Russia. In FY 1995 and subsequent years, we will
request smaller levels of resources, and our initiatives will focus
more on encouraging private sector trade and investment in the region.
In light of the substantial progress being made in Russia, our FY 1995
FREEDOM Support Act request also assumes that more than half of these
funds will directly benefit the other states of the NIS--roughly a
third of FY 1993 supplemental and FY 1994 FREEDOM Support Act funds
were for programs in these states.
As in previous years, we are requesting SEED and FREEDOM Support Act
funds for use in three general areas:
-- Support for democratic institutions;
-- Support for transitions to market economies; and
-- Quality of life and humanitarian assistance.
What I would like to do now is spend a few minutes focusing on our goals
and achievements in each area, then make some more general points about
each of these.
Creating the Building Blocks Of Democratic Society
With the help of SEED and FREEDOM Support Act programs, most of the
countries in CEE and the NIS have been successful in creating the
fundamental building blocks of democracy-- national constitutions,
political parties, and systems of fair and free elections. Now that
these structures are for the most part in place, new sorts of
assistance are called for--programs that strengthen non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), local governments, and legal institutions,
including courts.
In January, President Clinton announced a major new initiative called
the "Democracy Network" to bolster emerging civil societies in Central
and Eastern Europe. The timing is right. As democratic institutions
develop, public participation must also advance, assisted in part by
NGOs involved in advocacy and watchdog work. The "network" will allow
American NGOs to support their counterparts, thereby enlarging what
one Hungarian philosopher has called "small circles of freedom"
capable of overcoming the communist past.
In a similar program already operating in the NIS, we are providing
support for already existing indigenous NGOs, as well as assisting in
the formation of new ones. Four years ago, such organizations were
all but unknown in the former Soviet Union. Today, there are over
12,000 NGOs in the region. We are also providing assistance that
supports the development of a free and independent media. One example
is our support for the International Media Fund, which has trained
hundreds of writers and broadcasters and provided the technical
assistance and hardware that make a critical difference to the
survival of fledgling journalistic enterprises.
Another is our support for Inter- news, a U.S. NGO that has helped
independent Russian TV stations to produce local news programs that
have a combined viewership of more than 70 million people. In Ukraine,
Internews has helped create a network of independent TV stations that
has a wider viewership than Ukrainian state television.
Since direct exposure to democracy is often the best teacher, we also
are working to increase the size of our exchange programs. More than
8,000 leaders, business people, and students came from CEE and the NIS
on such programs in 1993. We plan to fund another 20,000 to 30,000 of
these visitors to our country over the next two years.
In our efforts to help decentralize the governments of the region, we
are supporting programs such as the one run by the International City
Managers' Association, which provides technical assistance and training
to local municipal government associations in Poland, the Czech
Republic, and Slovakia. One of the most successful of our public-
private democracy programs is the American University in Bulgaria
(AUBG), which we opened in 11 months, from the first informal
discussion to the selection of students and the opening of classes.
AUBG brings together students from 14 countries and presents them with
an American curriculum taught, in English, primarily by professors from
the U.S. and other Western countries. The entering students have an
average SAT score of 1220, an amazing feat considering that they all
take the test in English.
U.S. Assistance in the Transition To Market Economies
With our help, the nations of Central and Eastern Europe and the NIS
have already achieved a great deal in the way of economic reform.
State-run enterprises are being privatized at a rapid pace; equally
important, new businesses, especially small businesses, are also
appearing in large numbers.
Privatization has been, and will continue to be, the necessary first
step for economic reform in the region. Our assistance goals here are
ambitious but finite: to help dismantle the edifice of state-owned
enterprises that survives as one of the principal legacies of
communism and replace it with the institutions of market democracy.
After five years of SEED support, this goal is well within reach in many
of the nations of Central and Eastern Europe. In Poland, American
advisers are helping to structure the $4-billion Mass Privatization
Program of over 400 former state-owned enterprises. This effort is
expected to enable 25 million Poles to purchase shares in new private
businesses.
In the Czech Republic, our advisers helped the Ministry of Privatization
to establish a fair and transparent process that has gained the
confidence of foreign investors. Our team of accountants and bankers
has helped complete 84 deals to date, representing investments of up
to $2.4 billion in foreign investment. American investments are 40%
of this total. Given the speed at which the programs in the Czech
Republic are proceeding, we expect that FY 1995 will be the last year
that it will be necessary to fund them.
The tide of privatization is moving eastward as well. In Russia, our
intensive assistance programs have made a difference. Two-thirds of
all small shops--some 70,000-100,000 businesses--have been privatized;
over 50% of large and medium firms--some 9,000--have been auctioned,
and 40% of Russia's industrial labor force is now working in the
private sector. Some 55 million Russians have become shareholders.
Russian privatization officials have told Administration officials--
and visiting congressional delegations--that U.S. support has been the
most responsive and effective of any international donor.
Our next great privatization challenge is Ukraine, where the government
has indicated a new readiness to move toward wholesale privatization.
When that government begins to make the tough decisions, we want to
make sure that we have support ready at hand. Indeed, it is our hope
that our FY 1995 aid package, when combined with the assistance that
we were not able to allocate in FY 1994 due to the lack of reform,
will itself provide a strong incentive for the Ukrainian Government to
take courageous steps.
In that regard, I should mention that the President's Special Assistant
for the former Soviet Union, Nick Burns, and an inter-agency delegation
just returned from Kiev, where they had meetings with President
Kravchuk and Ukrainian economic leaders. This was the third round,
since November, of high-level talks designed to hasten economic reform
in Ukraine and to improve the effectiveness of our assistance programs
there.
We are, throughout the region, working to help create small- and medium-
sized businesses. Enterprise Funds have been among the most successful
of all our assistance programs in Central and Eastern Europe. These
funds have been unique in their approach and unusual in their speed.
They have provided a source--in some cases, the only source--of debt or
equity capital available to small- and medium-sized firms employing
thousands of workers, and they have attracted investments from the
multilateral banks, private institutions, and pension funds.
The funds also tap into the experience of financial and business
professionals to help develop banking and financial skills and
institutions in the host country. They have attracted top-flight
American business professionals who volunteer their time to serve on
fund boards.
The Enterprise Funds in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Czech and
Slovak Republics are nearing full capitalization. Thus, we expect that
the bulk of FY 1995 SEED money for Enterprise Funds will be used to
help establish new programs in Albania, Romania, and the Baltics.
As they gain experience, the funds are branching out into new and
innovative ventures. In 1993, the Polish Enterprise Fund began making
very small loans--in the range of $400-$7,500--available to new
businesses owned by women in rural areas. In this way, the funds will
support market economies at the smallest level as well as the largest.
Similar micro-lending ventures are now being planned by Hungary and
Bulgaria, and we are working to expand this highly promising method
throughout the region.
In the past year, we have started up Enterprise Funds in the NIS as
well. In February, the Russian-American Enterprise Fund opened; next
month, it will make its first loans and investments. FY 1995 FREEDOM
Support Act money will also be directed toward new funds in Central
Asia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus.
For private enterprise to prosper--and for it to attract Western trade
and investment--there must be a financial and legal infrastructure.
Here, too, we are helping. Our assistance programs are facilitating
the privatization of state-owned banks, and the creation of new
private ones, by providing training to local bankers in both Central
and Eastern Europe and the NIS. Recently, 255 senior bankers from
Russia trained for eight weeks in the United States and returned to
their country to apply new approaches to their own banks. USAID is
also playing a key role in the regulatory development and expansion of
East European capital markets, especially helping with emerging
exchanges that allow citizens to trade their vouchers and to engage in
share-issuance programs that can finance new businesses when bank
loans are unavailable or too expensive.
Further, in both CEE and the NIS states, we are assisting in the
drafting of laws that establish anti-trust and competition procedures,
permitting market forces to work better. Bankruptcy laws are also
being developed, which will permit the restructuring of many
industries.
In these programs, in particular, the public-private partnerships we
have crafted have greatly enhanced the reach of our programs. By
supporting U.S. volunteer organizations such as the Financial Services
Volunteer Corps and the International Executive Service Corps, we have
been able to leverage the use of some of the world's great experts in
the realms of law and finance.
We're also helping to put in place social service systems. Our FY 1995
SEED and FREEDOM Support Act requests place greater emphasis than in
previous years on providing technical assistance to help CEE and NIS
countries restructure their social services to the needs of a market
economy.
Our first challenge here is to help the governments of the region
determine what services they can no longer afford and to find ways for
the private sector to deliver some of those services.
Our second task is to help governments find new ways to finance those
social services that they do plan to continue to provide.Housing and
health care loom as two of the biggest social service challenges in
both CEE and the NIS. With respect to housing, our programs are
providing technical assistance to help governments phase out rent
subsidies, while targeting allowances for vulnerable groups. With
respect to health care, we are providing training and advice that will
improve the efficiency and quality of delivery in the private sector.
Mr. Chairman, let me emphasize a key feature of our program. For the
most part, the U.S Government provides technical assistance, not cash,
to the nations of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union. It is trade, not aid, which will provide the bulk of the hard-
currency capital that the region so badly needs.
Through our assistance programs, and through high-level political
discussions, we are helping the nations of CEE and the former Soviet
Union to establish a legal, regulatory, and institutional environment
that is more conducive to American trade and investment.
The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission has been particularly successful in
engaging the Russians in finding where the problems for Western
investment are and in trying to work to remove them. Secretary Brown,
the Chair of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Business Development Committee,
recently lead a mission to Russia; it included 29 CEOs from Fortune
100 and leading smaller companies, as well as high-level
representatives from the White House and our principal trade and
investment-related agencies. One of the main goals of the mission was
to communicate to the Russian Government that a stable, low-tax, low-
tariff business climate will be necessary to attract the level of
investment and trade that is needed for economic recovery and reform.
In addition, our Eximbank and OPIC programs are increasing their efforts
to facilitate American trade and investment in the region. Eximbank
has been particularly active in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic for several years now, and it is now stepping up its
financing for projects in the Baltic states. In Russia and the other
NIS, OPIC will provide up to $2.5 billion in finance and insurance in
1994--a seven-fold increase over last year's levels. OPIC also has
recently quadrupled its finance project limit and doubled its per-
project insurance--both to $200 million--in order to facilitate larger
projects.
American businesses are not going to invest in the region for altruistic
reasons. But as the basic mechanisms of the free market are
established, the natural, industrial, and human resources of the region
will make it an increasingly attractive market for investment and
export. The markets that our assistance efforts are nurturing will
create profits and jobs at home as well. American firms already have
invested more than $3 billion in Hungary and $2.5 billion in Poland.
This gives us a 43% share of total foreign direct investment in the
former and a 40% share in the latter, making the United States the
number one foreign investor in both countries.
In the next decade, the nations of the former Soviet Union--particularly
those in Central Asia--also will provide attractive investment
opportunity for American firms. Last week, I participated in an
extraordinary conference--financed by FREEDOM Support Act funds and
sponsored by the Commerce Department--that brought representatives of
the five Central Asian NIS together with representatives of nearly 400
American companies that are doing business there or are interested in
doing so. Those companies are motivated by facts and opportunities.
Consider, for instance, that the mineral deposits in Uzbekistan alone
are estimated to have a market value of $3 trillion. Already, U.S.
firms such as Chevron and Philip Morris have concluded or are actively
negotiating contracts in Central Asia that could result in the flow of
$3 billion in investment over the next few years.
Quality-of-Life and Humanitarian Programs
Mr. Chairman, while we are interested in promoting economic development
in CEE and the NIS, we also share the concern of the peoples of the
region that that development be sustainable. Thus, FY 1995 SEED and
FREEDOM Support Act programs will also focus on problems such as energy
conservation and efficiency, water resources management, and nuclear
safety. In particular, we plan to increase the funding for our
growing multilateral collaboration on regional environmental problems.
USAID advisers have and will continue to support the efforts of the
Group of 7 (G-7) Nuclear Safety Account--efforts which have lead to
agreements to close high-risk nuclear reactors in Bulgaria and
Lithuania over the next four years. The G-7 is now hard at work
trying to reach a similar agreement with Ukraine, in order to shut
down that country's notorious Chernobyl reactor.
In addition, we have made good progress in fleshing out U.S.-Japanese
cooperation on the environmental initiative for the region announced by
the President and the Japanese Prime Minister on February 11. As part
of this initiative, the Japanese will contribute up to $1 billion in
untied loans.
SEED funding for humanitarian assistance increased in FY 1994, with a
focus on the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We expect
this focus and level of spending to continue in FY 1995, with some
funds set aside for rehabilitation of public utilities and services, to
help that nation recover from the devastating war there.
Ethnic and regional conflict has, unfortunately, been all too much a
consequence of the collapse of communism in the NIS as well. That is
why we are requesting FY 1995 funds to help stave off starvation and
reduce human suffering in war-torn areas of the former Soviet Union,
including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Tajikistan. In addition
to meeting immediate humanitarian needs, our humanitarian programs
often serve to buy time, to cushion the immediate shock of transition,
and to give peace-making and political reform processes the
opportunity to establish themselves.
Mr. Chairman, we are constantly putting our programs to the hard test of
reality. We have in place a rigorous and comprehensive system of
auditing. More than 35 external audits of our programs in Central and
Eastern Europe have been completed or are in the process of being
completed by the USAID Inspector General and the General Accounting
Office. None of these audit reports contained any serious programmatic
criticisms. At the same time, however, some of our programs have not
lived up to our expectations. Just as the leaders and citizens of the
CEE and NIS states are pioneering--just as they are engaged in a great
experiment--so are we. There is, and will continue to be, an element
of trial and error to their efforts--and to ours. When we make
mistakes, we learn from them.
For example, we also have reduced our use of consultants who "fly in and
out." Short-term advisers absorbed a significant portion of the
assistance budget when the CEE program was first launched. We built
on this lesson to reduce reliance on short-term consultants in the NIS
and to focus them on specific tasks that require special expertise.
Both SEED and FREEDOM Support Act programs now utilize long-term
advisers, eschew the "seminar approach," and are more concerned with
building indigenous capacity. We started, for example, with one
Russian for every foreign adviser on the Russian privatization program.
The ratio is now 4 to 1.
In addition, we are revamping our contracting system to encourage
broader competition and get the best skills for taxpayer dollars. We
are also concerned about our rate of expenditures, which are still not
as high as we would like for either SEED or FREEDOM Support Act
programs.
In part, our rate of expenditure is low by design or for unavoidable
reasons. Some programs are designed to last several years, and the
expenditures will cover the same period. As I mentioned, we are now
directing more of our resources toward long-term advisers, who tend to
be more effective than short-term ones.
In some cases, our expenditures are dependent on the pace of reform.
For instance, the funds that have been targeted for assistance to
Ukraine can only be spent as that government takes concrete actions to
advance economic reform. Simply put, we can't support privatization
efforts until there are efforts to fund.
Other delays, however, are being corrected. While there is an
inevitable trade-off between AID regulatory oversight and our ability
to respond quickly in the region, we are confident that the
experiences of the past year have taught us much of what we need to
know in order to speed things along. For instance, last year we
realized that, despite good intentions, the G-24 was not playing an
effective coordinating role. We therefore seized the initiative and
pushed the coordinating function out into the field, especially in the
realm of democracy building. U.S. embassies in Prague and Warsaw are
now coordinating G-24 democracy-building programs. For Russia, we have
shifted key coordination issues to a more manageable G-7 forum.
Changes such as these have enabled us to respond more flexibly to the
expressed desires and needs of each of the recipient countries. There
are a number of indications that we have, in fact, speeded up the
response time of our assistance programs, particularly in the former
Soviet Union. We are now getting privatization advisers on the ground
throughout the NIS within 30 days of our receiving assistance
requests. We expect the FREEDOM Support Act expenditure rate to rise
from the current level of $438 million to more than $750 million or
$800 million by the end of the fiscal year; this will represent an
increase to 25% of appropriations.
I should say also, Mr. Chairman, that we are concerned about the impact
of crime and corruption both on our assistance programs as well as on
the economic and political development of the nations of the region.
As we work to improve the delivery of our assistance programs, we know
that we must be alert to the growing potential for crime to undermine
these efforts. Through careful program monitoring and selection of
reliable implementors, we believe we have minimized the potential for
corruption. Moreover, since most of our assistance is in the form of
technical expertise, rather than cash, opportunities for abuse are
considerably reduced.
However, the problem of more widespread crime and corruption in the
region will be much tougher to fix. The growth of organized crime in
CEE and the NIS is undermining many of the structures of civil society
that reformers have worked so hard to nurture.
In Russia, we are assisting with the creation of a new civil code, which
includes a new criminal code. Further, James Collins is now chairing an
inter-agency task force to review the current legal, judicial, and
enforcement programs that assist CEE and NIS governments in combating
the spread of crime, and we expect that this task force will provide us
with recommendations as to how these programs can best be adjusted,
strengthened, and enlarged.
However, we know that the problems of crime and corruption do not lend
themselves to quick solutions. The growth in crime is a result of the
breakup of the old authoritarian system and will only be controlled when
new laws, enforcement structures, and judicial systems are in place. I
come before you today with no magic wand: Creating these new structures
will take time.
As a general proposition, Mr. Chairman, let me assure you that we will
continue to subject ourselves to rigorous self-criticism, and we are
receptive to criticism and advice we get from others, particularly, I
might add, from Members of Congress. Secretary Christopher, USAID
Administrator Brian Atwood, NIS Assistance Coordinator Tom Simons,
Senior Coordinator Jim Collins, and I spent a very useful hour last
month on the Hill with the Gephardt delegation, which had just returned
from a fact-finding mission to Russia. The delegation made a number
of thoughtful suggestions concerning our assistance programs, on issues
ranging from crime to small- business creation to tax reform, and we are
currently working hard on concrete responses to those suggestions. For
instance, we are now focusing more attention on Russia's regions and
issues of federalism. Our assistance projects will concentrate on 5-10
key regions in Russia, where U.S. interests and reform potential are the
greatest.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me make this point: From the
beginning, our assistance efforts have assumed that advice and training,
rather than cash transfers, are the most effective ways for us to
support the whole spectrum of reform in the region. As the saying goes:
"Give a man a fish, he'll eat for a day; teach him how to fish, and
he'll eat forever."
One of America's greatest strengths lies in its human resources, and the
strength of our assistance program lies in the skills of its
participants--our bankers, lawyers, environmental experts, and labor
specialists. Generally, the people we engage are the same experts that
American businesses employ when they need advice. Furthermore, many of
these advisers work for us at reduced rates, or even pro bono.
Our programs are by no means flawless, but our achievements to date have
demonstrated that American technical expertise can impart knowledge and
help reformers arrive at creative solutions to the seemingly intractable
problems they face. And above and beyond the transfer of knowledge and
expertise, there are the intangible but still very real long-term
benefits created by face-to-face inter- action between Americans and the
people of Central and Eastern Europe and the NIS.
For one thing, the American professionals now working on behalf of our
assistance programs are building the contacts and relationships that
will lead to strong private sector opportunities in the future. For
another, there is no better way to expand the culture of democracy than
by these face-to-face contacts. Thus, SEED and FREEDOM Support Act
programs are building links between economies and people, rather than
simply between governments.A few minutes ago, I mentioned how
enthusiastically American firms have been investing in countries such as
Hungary and Kazakhstan. These companies are not in Central and Eastern
Europe and the NIS for reasons of altruism; they're doing it because it
makes good business sense.
By the same token, our Administration is investing in the region because
it makes good economic sense--and good national security sense; we are
investing for reasons that go to the heart of what we see as America's
vital national interests. As the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe
and the NIS take a greater role in the political decisions of their
communities and their nations; as they consolidate their independence,
stabilize their economies, and trade with other countries; the world--
and the United States--will become safer and more prosperous.
(###)
ARTICLE 4
U.S.-ASEAN Relations: Building On Shared Strength, Prosperity, And
Democratic Values
Acting Secretary Talbott, Joint Press Statement
Remarks at opening of the 12th U.S.-ASEAN Dialogue, Washington, DC, May
9, 1994.
Secretary Christopher sends you his warm greetings. He regrets that he
could not be here to welcome you himself; he is out of the country
today. He looks forward to meeting again with his ASEAN colleagues
later this year in Thailand and Indonesia.
This year, we have taken another important step in the evolution of the
dialogue by combining it with our TICC discussions, and inviting
representatives of the private sector to participate. So let me extend
a special welcome to the business leaders who are here today.
President Clinton's first overseas trip after being elected was to Asia,
and he hosted a historic first meeting of Asian-Pacific leaders last
November in Seattle. He has committed himself to helping create what he
calls a New Pacific Community, built on shared strength, shared
prosperity, and a shared commitment to democratic values. To that end,
he, and all of us, will be relying heavily on two organizations, APEC
and ASEAN. There is obviously an important connection between the two.
Indonesia will host both the first APEC Trade Ministers conference and,
of course, the second APEC leaders summit. It is appropriate that an
ASEAN state is helping to lead the way for APEC, since ASEAN itself has
been leading the way on a broad range of Pacific community issues for
more than two decades. We attach special importance to the new ASEAN
Regional Forum to be launched this year in Thailand. This will include
China, Russia, Vietnam, and other states in the region. We feel this is
the right setting for the region's first broadly inclusive security
dialogue.
I am struck that your agenda this week has a similarly broad focus. It
includes so-called "out-of-area" issues such as the Middle East and
Bosnia. Thus, this group obviously recognizes, and represents, the
overarching fact of life in today's world, which is interdependence.
That means the interdependence of whole areas as well as the
interdependence of individual countries. We see interdependence as
basically a favorable phenomenon.
The Pacific region in general, and ASEAN in particular, offer enormous
opportunities for American enterprise. U.S. trade with Asia is now 40%,
and Asia is likely to account for half the growth in world trade between
now and the year 2000. As currently constituted, ASEAN is already the
United States' fourth-largest overseas market. By the year 2000, it
could become a trillion dollar economic area, encompassing up to a dozen
countries. We believe that just as free trade enhances our prosperity,
so the free movement of people, information, and ideas enhances other
aspects of our lives, including our security in an interdependent world.
Communication and transportation technologies are bringing the world
closer together in time and space, enabling us to forge new links among
people and joint approaches to shared problems. Moreover, the
communications revolution also encourages a global consciousness--and
global conscience. Ethnic groups have been slaughtering each other in
Africa and the Balkans for millenia. But now the whole world sees real-
time coverage of these massacres. That is an inducement to
international response to these terrible affronts to humanity and these
threats to regional stability.
At the same time, interdependence also has a dimension of danger. There
is a host of perils that refuse to respect state boundaries: AIDS, arms
proliferation, terrorism, drug trafficking, and environmental
degradation. Just as good ideas--democracy and market economics--are
contagious, so are bad ideas--particularly various forms of extremism,
and particularly in those places where poverty and overpopulation make
people desperate.
ASEAN and the ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue can play a leading role in magnifying
the positive features of our growing interdependence. It also can play
a leading role in combating the negative ones. My colleagues, I know,
look forward to a frank discussion of our bilateral, regional, and
global trading priorities, including any differences we may have. We
also hope that the dialogue produces constructive plans for dealing with
troubles and threats in the region.
ASEAN already has established an impressive track record in nurturing
peace and democracy in Cambodia. That country still serves as an
example of international peace-making at its most promising. Political
violence in Cambodia continues. But the people there can nevertheless
celebrate the first anniversary of an election in which 90% of the
registered voters participated. It was last May, a year ago now, that
Cambodian farmers and monks and former soldiers crossed mine fields and
defied election-day death threats, all in order to vote. They
demonstrated that the yearning for freedom is a universal impulse.
Since then, ASEAN and the UN have, together, maintained a steady,
intelligent commitment to peace, prosperity, and democracy there.
With respect to another troubled country in the region--Burma--the
United States has its differences with the ASEAN states. But this
disagreement is primarily tactical; we and ASEAN share the same
objective, which is the establishment of democracy. Indeed, we share
the same objectives throughout the region. Our common purposes clearly
outweigh periodic strains that inevitably arise from different
histories, cultures, and stages of development. Far more important--and
far more powerful--than any differences among us are the interests and
values that bind us together.
I will conclude by saying how pleased we are that you have all gathered
here--many of you traveling from the other side of the globe--for three
days of meetings. While the revolutions in communications technology
are, as I said, bringing us closer and closer, there will never be a
substitute for face-to-face gatherings like this one. They give us a
chance to look each other in the eye and listen to each other
attentively, respectfully, critically, and constructively. I appreciate
your listening to me--and now, for a few minutes at least, I will have a
chance to listen to you--and to sample the excellent program you have
ahead of you.
Joint Press Statement
Text of a joint press statement released following the Meeting of the
Twelfth U.S.-ASEAN Dialogue, Washington, DC, May 10, 1994.
1. The Twelfth U.S.-ASEAN Dialogue was held at the U.S. Department
of State in Washington, D.C. on May 9-10, 1994.
2. Delegations from the governments of the United States and members of
the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) participated in the
meeting, which was co-chaired by Ambassador Winston Lord, Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, leader of the
United States Delegation, and His Excellency Dato Lim Jock Seng,
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, leader of the Brunei
Darussalam delegation. His Excellency Dato Ajit Singh, Secretary
General of ASEAN, was also present.
3. The private sectors of the United States and ASEAN also participated
and were represented by the United States and ASEAN Sections of the
U.S.-ASEAN Business Council. To underscore the central importance both
sides accord to the private sector and the United States' and ASEAN
desire to integrate the private sector more extensively in the Dialogue,
the private sector participated fully in the entire economic agenda of
the Dialogue.
4. Acting Secretary of State Strobe Talbott welcomed the ASEAN
participants and observed that the dialogue provides an opportunity to
discuss a broad range of economic and political issues, including issues
outside the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. attaches special importance
to the new ASEAN Regional forum. Communications and transportation
technologies are bringing the world closer together in time and space,
enabling us to forge new links among peoples and joint approaches to
shared problems. The communications revolution also encourages a global
consciousness, and a global conscience. ASEAN, and the U.S.-ASEAN
Dialogue, can play a leading role in magnifying the positive features of
our growing interdependence and in controlling the negative ones. Far
more important than any differences among us are the interests and
values that bind us together. The Acting Secretary noted the value in
having the Trade and Investment Coordination Committee (TICC)
deliberations within the framework of the Dialogue process, thereby
engaging the private sector in all aspects of the economic agenda. He
extended a special welcome to the business leaders participating in the
dialogue.
5. ASEAN Secretary General Dato Ajit Singh emphasized in his opening
remarks the importance of the now 17 year old ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue
process, noting our substantial trade and investment ties and our shared
political and security interests. He described the Dialogue process as
a dynamic one, pointing to the role of the private sector, the
Dialogue's elevation to the senior officials level, and the inclusion of
political and security issues. The Secretary General stressed ASEAN's
commitment to free trade and the opportunities for U.S. joint ventures
with ASEAN counterparts. He said ASEAN looks to enhanced regional
security consultations to foster trust and confidence so matters can be
peacefully resolved. The Secretary General concluded that ASEAN
considers the United States an important partner in the region.
6. His Excellency Dato Lim Jock Seng, in his opening remarks, stated
that the Dialogue is a relationship between friends who feel confident
enough to talk frankly, and that we have made progress in the Dialogue
relationship. He emphasized the need for mutual understanding and
sensitivity in conducting relations. He pointed to the importance of a
balance within the Dialogue relationship to ensure that all aspects of
our joint efforts--political, economic, cultural, and development
cooperation--are given equal consideration.
7. The Meeting reviewed the U.S.-ASEAN Dialogue relations since the
last U.S.-ASEAN Dialogue in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam on
May 15-16, 1993. Both sides emphasized the importance of the Dialogue
process as a key element in our relations, recognizing the breadth of
United States and ASEAN links and the areas where the United States and
ASEAN can work in partnership, and emphasizing the role of the Dialogue
in reviewing shared economic and political issues.
8. The representatives of the U.S. and ASEAN private sectors called on
governments to nurture a healthy and strong economic and commercial
relationship. The U.S.-ASEAN Dialogue and the Trade and Investment
Coordination Committee should be used not only to identify and solve
problems, but also to enhance cooperation for mutual growth.
Governments should continue bilateral and regional efforts to lower
barriers to trade in goods and services, to reduce subsidies, protect
intellectual property rights, facilitate economically sound investment,
and to avoid taking unilateral actions and linking non-trade issues to
trade matters. Such measures are consistent with, and complementary to,
the recently completed Uruguay Round. Both private and public sector
representatives welcomed private sector participation in the Dialogue.
9. The Meeting exchanged views on international economic issues and the
United States and ASEAN economic outlooks. The United States indicated
that the U.S. economy is in the best shape in a generation. GDP growth
in 1994 is expected to be three percent or higher; the U.S. is
experiencing an investment boom; personal consumption remains moderate;
and inflation figures are at the lowest level in more than 20 years.
The ASEAN region, whose two-way trade with the world and with the United
States in 1993 was, respectively, $372 billion and $70.6 billion, is
characterized by high growth, rapid economic integration, significant
investment and growth from foreign capital, a central private sector
role in growth and integration, and sound government policies. The
meeting welcomed the improved economic outlook and hoped that this would
engender greater trade and investment flows.
10. The U.S. and ASEAN were pleased that negotiations for an
International Tropical Timber Agreement were successfully concluded and
was hopeful that negotiations for a Third International Natural Rubber
Agreement could be completed this year.
11. The Meeting agreed to pursue the Alliance for Mutual Growth (AMG)
to improve trade and investment through mutual cooperation. The TICC
meeting on May 11 will look at the six areas being emphasized under the
AMG: human resources, infrastructure, small and medium sized
enterprises, standards, technology, and trade promotion.
12. The U.S. and ASEAN discussed the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) forum, the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), and the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). They agreed that APEC would contribute
positively to regional economic cooperation. They recognized that the
successful APEC Leaders and Ministerial meetings in Seattle last
November moved APEC to a new level of maturity and provided strong
momentum for further development in 1994 under Indonesia's chair. ASEAN
and the United States briefed each other on the AFTA and the NAFTA, and
encouraged each other to take advantage of the new trade and investment
opportunities offered by these agreements. The ASEAN Secretary General
also briefed on developments on the EAEC.
13. Both sides remain committed to the multilateral trading system, the
importance of the recently concluded Uruguay Round, and the significance
of the World Trade Organization. The United States noted the
President's commitment to seek bipartisan support for passage this year
of the Uruguay Round implementing legislation. ASEAN confirmed that
they are also preparing for early ratification of the Uruguay Round
agreement. The United States, ASEAN, and the private sector all
stressed the need to fully implement the Uruguay Round.
14. The Meeting recognized the ASEAN Private Investment Trade
Opportunities (PITO) program's important role in promoting investment
and trade activities in the Asia-Pacific region. The Meeting also
discussed funding by the United States Agency for International
Development through PITO and the ASEAN Environment Improvement Program
(EIP). The private sector underlined the possible role PITO could play
in implementing AMG.
15. The United States looks forward to participating in the first
meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Bangkok in July 1994 to further
regional security dialogue in Asia. The Bangkok meeting will include
ASEAN foreign ministers, foreign ministers from ASEAN Dialogue Partners,
including Secretary Christopher, and observers and guests. The U.S.
affirmed that it will remain engaged in the region and that U.S.
security policy will continue to be based on U.S. alliances and other
bilateral defense ties, supplemented by active participation in the
ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference and the ASEAN Regional Forum. ASEAN
expressed appreciation for the constructive role which the United States
plays in the region.
16. Participants also exchanged views on current international and
regional issues of mutual interest, including Korea, Myanmar, Cambodia,
Vietnam, the Middle East, Bosnia-Herzegovina, narcotics, and non-
proliferation.
17. It was agreed that the 13th U.S.-ASEAN Dialogue would be held in
Indonesia on a date to be mutually agreed upon.
18. The ASEAN delegations expressed appreciation to the Government of
the United States for the warm hospitality accorded to them and the
excellent arrangements made for the meeting.
19. The Meeting was held in the spirit of United States-ASEAN
cooperation and cordiality. (###)
ARTICLE 5
Crisis in Rwanda
George E. Moose, Assistant Secretary For African AffairsStatement before
the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
Washington, DC, May 4, 1994
Mr. Chairman, members of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on
Africa: On April 6, the private plane of Rwandan President Juvenal
Habyarimana crashed outside Kigali under suspicious circumstances,
killing President Habyarimana and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of
Burundi. This tragic event sparked massive violence on two levels.
First, elements of the Hutu-dominated Rwandan military, hard-line party
militias, and Hutu extremist gangs began killing Hutu opposition
politicians (including Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana) and Tutsi
opposition leaders and civilians. The killings began in Kigali but
eventually spread throughout the country.
Second, fighting quickly broke out between Rwandan Government forces and
the Tutsi-dominated rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), effectively
resuming the civil war that began in October 1990 and was to have ended
on August 4, 1993, with the signing of the Arusha Peace Accord. Both
the fighting and the violence continue. The RPF has pushed government
forces to the south and west and controls much of the capital of Kigali.
The violence has left at least 100,000 dead and displaced hundreds of
thousands of Rwandans. Over 300,000 Rwandans have fled to neighboring
countries, most to Tanzania. On May 3, the Rwandan Government and the
RPF sent delegations to attend talks in Arusha, Tanzania, but direct
negotiations between the two sides have not yet begun.
U.S. Response to the Crisis
Since the crisis began, the U.S. has pursued an active strategy with
five main
goals:
-- Stop the killings;
-- Achieve a durable cease-fire;
-- Return the parties to the negotiating table;
-- Contain the conflict; and
-- Address humanitarian relief needs.
We have taken several actions designed to achieve these goals.First, we
have put diplomatic pressure on the parties themselves. I and other U.S.
officials have spoken directly to Rwandan Government officials, the
Rwandan military, and the RPF in Washington, via diplomatic channels in
other locations, and by telephone to Rwanda. Our message has been
simple and direct: We want an immediate end to the killings, a cease-
fire in place, the resumption of peace talks, and complete cooperation
with relief efforts. We have reinforced these private contacts with
high-level public appeals and statements by the President and the State
Department.Second, we have worked to mobilize the international
community. We encouraged the efforts of the Tanzanian Government, as
facilitator of the Arusha process, to reconvene peace talks and are
supporting those efforts. As in the past, the United States will be
represented at any substantive talks. We have encouraged the
Organization of African Unity (OAU), other regional states, and our
European allies to join us in urging the Rwandans to agree to a cease-
fire and resume talks.
Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
John Shattuck and our Ambassador to Rwanda, David Rawson, have been sent
to the region to continue these efforts. They are being accompanied by
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Refugee Programs Brunson McKinley. Our
diplomatic contacts confirm that all major players agree with and
support our goals and strategy.
Third, we have been pursuing an active policy in the UN Security
Council. We pushed for approval of a strong Security Council
presidential statement, issued April 30, which demands that the interim
government of Rwanda and the RPF take effective measures to prevent
attacks on civilians. The statement condemns the breaches of
international humanitarian law that have occurred and calls on all
states to cease shipments of arms to Rwanda.
Fourth, we have undertaken contingency planning to provide humanitarian
relief and have identified several million dollars from various sources
that we intend to tap for the crisis. The U.S. Government has already
contributed approximately $28 million in food, relief items, and
earmarked funds to organizations assisting Burundi refugees and persons
displaced following last October's coup attempt and subsequent
widespread violence. In response to the Rwanda crisis, the
Administration just approved $15 million in additional funding for new
relief efforts in the area.
Fifth, we are continuing to monitor the situation in Burundi very
closely. We have sent high-level visitors to the country to show our
support for Burundi's fragile nascent democracy and are continuing
humanitarian relief efforts. We have also provided support to the 47-
member monitoring force that the OAU is in the process of deploying in
Burundi.
The efforts outlined above are a continuation of the long-standing U.S.
support for the Rwandan peace process. We were active observers
throughout the year-long Arusha peace talks and provided $1 million in
assistance to support the talks and help the OAU field cease-fire
monitors. The United States supported deployment of UN peace-keepers
once a peace accord was reached.
In the end, only the Rwandans can bring peace to their country, and no
outside effort can succeed without a commitment to peace by the
combatants themselves. The influence of the international community in
an internal conflict of this type is limited, but we will use what
influence we have in an effort to achieve our goals.
Future Policy Options
At the same time that we are pursuing the policies outlined above, we
are examining further measures to ratchet up the pressure. First among
these is a formal UN arms embargo against Rwanda, which we intend to
pursue this week. We also encourage increased involvement by the UN
Human Rights Commissioner, who could launch an investigation into human
rights abuses and perhaps become involved in mediation efforts. In
addition, we are exploring the possibility, if necessary, of having the
UN or OAU establish protected areas for refugees and displaced persons
around border areas.
Assessment of the UN Mission
From the start, the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was a
peace-keeping, not a peace-making, operation. It was deployed only
after a cease-fire was in place and both sides had signed a peace
accord. The force had the limited mandate of monitoring and
facilitating implementation of the accord, as the parties had requested.
Circumstances have changed drastically since the April 6 plane crash.
Heavy fighting and widespread violence have resumed, UNAMIR troops were
attacked and at least 10 UN peace-keepers were killed, and there was
serious doubt in the early stages whether the lightly armed UNAMIR
troops had the capability to defend themselves in such circumstances.
As a result, the U.S. supported withdrawal of the bulk of the force for
its safety, provided satisfactory arrangements were made to ensure the
safety of Rwandans under direct UNAMIR protection.
It appears now that a portion of the force has been able to remain
safely in Rwanda. Under such circumstances we strongly support the
Security Council decision to maintain a small force to help broker a new
cease-fire, facilitate humanitarian relief efforts, and help ensure the
safety of those Rwandans already under UNAMIR's direct protection.
(###)
ARTICLE 6
Human Rights Abuses in Liberia
Statement by Acting Department Spokesman Christine Shelly, Washington,
DC, May 9, 1994.
The United States is increasingly concerned by the widespread and
growing pattern of human rights abuses being committed by the various
armed factions in Liberia. These abuses, accompanied by continued
violence among and within the factions, have curtailed the delivery of
much-needed humanitarian assistance and threaten to derail Liberia's
fragile peace process.
We are particularly concerned about the actions of an organization
calling itself the Liberian Peace Council (LPC)--an armed militant group
operating in southeastern Liberia. We have received numerous credible
reports of gross human rights violations--including murder, rape,
mutilation, and torture--committed by the LPC against unarmed civilians.
The LPC's aggressive military activities have displaced tens of
thousands of Liberians and threaten to plunge the country back into
full-scale civil war.
We are also concerned about human rights abuses stemming from the
fighting which continues between rival groups within the United
Liberation Movement for Democracy (ULIMO), including summary executions
of civilians based on their ethnic background. In central and northern
Liberia, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) has harassed
relief workers and UN personnel, recently compelling UN observers to
withdraw temporarily from northern Nimba County. These activities have
disrupted humanitarian relief operations in large areas of the country
and frustrated the implementation of the Cotonou Peace Accords.
The United States calls on the leadership and partisans of the Liberian
factions to cease immediately their military activities and obstruction
of relief shipments. The United States strongly supports the efforts of
the African peace-keeping force (ECOMOG) and the UN to engineer
disengagement of LPC and NPFL forces and urges the prompt and complete
cooperation of all Liberian factions in the disarmament process mandated
by the Cotonou Accords.
(###)
ARTICLE 7
Cambodia: Recent Developments
Peter Tomsen, Deputy Assistant Secretary For East Asian and Pacific
Affairs
Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, May 11, 1994
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I welcome this opportunity
to testify today on Cambodia.
As we approach the first anniversary of the dramatically successful UN-
organized elections in Cambodia--held May 23-28, 1993--the events of
recent weeks have demonstrated that the future of democracy in Cambodia
cannot be taken for granted. The recapture of Pailin by the Khmer Rouge
(KR) and their success in reestablishing illegal control over certain
areas in western Cambodia have been setbacks to the Royal Cambodian
Government (RCG). While this does not threaten the viability of the
RCG, it underscores the danger the Khmer Rouge still poses to Cambodia's
emerging democracy.
Accomplishments
Despite persistent Khmer Rouge threats, democracy in Cambodia has shown
impressive staying power over the past year. Cambodian accomplishments
in this area would not have been possible without the contribution of
the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). UNTAC was a stunning
peace-keeping success. The UN organized the May 1993 elections in which
approximately 4 million Cambodians--90% of registered voters--
participated. These elections, internationally recognized as free and
fair, succeeded despite the fact that the Khmer Rouge--also known as the
Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK)--refused to participate, denied the
UN access to areas under KR control, and threatened and intimidated
potential voters.
Cambodia's constitution, promulgated September 24, 1993, established a
multiparty liberal democracy within the framework of a constitutional
monarchy, with the former Prince Sihanouk elevated to King. The
FUNCINPEC Party and the Cambodian People's Party (CPP)--the election's
top vote recipients--share power in the Royal Cambodian Government, with
which the United States has full diplomatic relations. FUNCINPEC's
Prince Ranariddh and the CPP's Hun Sen are First Prime Minister and
Second Prime Minister, respectively. The Khmer Rouge, which boycotted
the elections, is excluded from the government.The Royal Cambodian
Government has been working to develop governmental institutions and has
made significant strides in advancing respect for human rights and
implementing market-oriented economic reforms. Cooperation between
FUNCINPEC and the CPP has surpassed earlier predictions, although there
are still tensions within the ruling coalition as these former
adversaries work out the dynamics of sharing power.
Cambodia continues to consolidate the impressive gains it has made in
the area of human rights. A wide range of internationally recognized
human rights is provided for in Cambodia's constitution. Membership in
indigenous human rights organizations has grown rapidly. The newly
independent local media have expanded to include radio and television
stations operated by political parties, as well as numerous print
publications. For the first time in decades, there are no political
prisoners in Cambodia except persons detained in Khmer Rouge-controlled
areas. Racial violence against ethnic Vietnamese, however, remains a
serious human rights problem.
Recent events suggest that as long as the Khmer Rouge insurgency remains
active, Cambodia will continue to have periodic problems with regard to
displaced persons. This should not, however, obscure the fact that it
was a major milestone in international refugee affairs when just over a
year ago--in April 1993--the last of the 370,000 Cambodian refugees in
Thailand were able to return to their home country as part of the
international effort to bring peace to Cambodia. The UN High
Commissioner for Refugees has recently surveyed the returnee population
with respect to their degree of reintegration. Some 80% are doing well
in the sense that they are no worse--or better--off than other
Cambodians. The disruption in their lives even with their return to
Cambodia must not be minimized; the process of recovery is not a short
one.
In the economic area, Cambodia has made important strides, including
steps to liberalize trade, improve revenue collection, create macro-
economic stability, reduce inflation, and stabilize exchange rates.
Cambodia's well-received national rehabilitation and development program
outlines sound priorities, including reforming administrative and
judicial institutions, promoting economic stabilization and growth,
ensuring structural adjustment and sectoral reform, providing direct
support for sustained development, and optimizing sustainable
utilization of the natural resource base.
Cambodia is cooperating closely with international financial
institutions. On May 6, the International Monetary Fund Executive Board
approved an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility arrangement that
should provide approximately $120 million in balance-of-payments
supports to Cambodia from 1994 to 1996. The World Bank intends to extend
new structural adjustment lending of approximately $60 million, provided
agreement is reached with the RCG on a medium-term reform policy. The
Asian Development Bank operational program envisages $266 million in
medium-term--1994-97--lending to Cambodia.
Challenges
Despite its successes, Cambodia still faces enormous development,
humanitarian, and security challenges. Cambodia is one of the world's
least developed countries, with a per capita annual GDP of only about
$200. Its infrastructure has been devastated--the result of more than
20 years of war and KR atrocities. Cambodia lacks the institutions and
adequate numbers of trained personnel needed for a mature democracy.
Under these challenging circumstances, it is vital that we in the
international community join the Royal Cambodian Government and the
Cambodian people in doing all we can to ensure the success of Cambodian
democracy.
The Cambodians will not be able to address their problems without
sustained assistance from the international community. The March 1994
Tokyo meeting of the International Committee on the Reconstruction of
Cambodia (ICORC) produced total pledges of nearly $500 million in aid
for Cambodia this year. Secretary Christopher, heading the U.S.
delegation, reaffirmed our commitment to Cambodia, its democratic
government, and its nascent market economy. The U.S. ICORC pledge was
for over $33 million in assistance for Cambodia in 1994 and an
additional $40 million in 1995, subject to Congressional action. This
assistance will be used to promote political stability and democratic
pluralism, support sustainable economic growth, and meet humanitarian
needs.
At the June 1992 Tokyo conference on international assistance to
Cambodia, international donors had pledged a total of $880 million for
the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Cambodia, far in excess of the
Secretary General's appeal. By the end of 1993, the United States alone
had provided more than $135 million in humanitarian and development
assistance for Cambodia, meeting our 1992 pledge. This was in addition
to the approximately $517 million we had contributed through the United
Nations to support the Cambodian peace process.
Our assistance reflects our commitment to demining. The Cambodia Mine
Action Center (CMAC) estimates that there are 8-10 million landmines
still in place in Cambodia, roughly one for each Cambodian. Cambodia--
along with Afghanistan and Angola--has the highest proportion in the
world of amputees relative to population, largely because of landmines.
CMAC and nongovernmental organizations have been very active in the
demining effort, and the United States has strongly supported demining
in Cambodia. We have already provided $6 million for demining and, at
the March 1994 ICORC conference, the United States pledged an additional
$6 million for demining in FY 1994. A total of $15 million for demining
was pledged at ICORC by various governments and organizations.
Another way in which we are supporting the RCG is by assisting the
Cambodians in their efforts to integrate their country into the global
market economy. We recently sent the RCG a revised draft of a proposed
bilateral trade agreement. If the text proves acceptable to the RCG, we
should be able to move forward quickly on concluding an agreement. This
would be an important step toward restoring MFN for Cambodia, a matter
on which we are working closely with Congress. Talks are continuing
with the RCG on the unblocking of frozen Cambodian assets in connection
with the settlement of outstanding claims involving the two countries.
The question of the hour following the KR recapture of Pailin is what we
should be doing to help the RCG deal with the KR threat. Certain steps
are already underway. In January, we concluded a Foreign Assistance Act
Section 505 agreement with the RCG on end-use, security, and retransfer
assurances. This is a prerequisite for any security assistance. The
agreement includes an RCG commitment that U.S. assistance to Cambodia
will not be allowed to benefit the Khmer Rouge.
We have provided humanitarian assistance donations to the RCG to help
reintegrate defectors from the Khmer Rouge into Cambodian society.
Eight 40-foot containers of humanitarian assistance excess property were
delivered to Cambodia on April 4, 1994. This was the second delivery in
FY 1994. Since February, the Department of Defense has delivered
approximately $900,000 of medical supplies and equipment, hand-tools,
sleeping mats, and mosquito nets. We are planning one additional FY 1994
delivery which will include medical supplies and engineering equipment.
Two deliveries are projected for FY 1995.
We have started an International Military Education and Training (IMET)
program for Cambodia. The initial focus is on English-language
programs--a prerequisite for effective communication between the U.S.
military and the RCAF. The $90,000 in IMET funding will be used to
purchase an English-language laboratory for Cambodia, train two
Cambodians as English-language instructors, and send one Cambodian flag
officer to the Senior International Defense Resources Management course.
Cambodia also has been approved for Title 10 funding to attend a wide
range of U.S-sponsored multinational seminars and conferences.
Additional steps in response to Cambodian requests are under
consideration.
Conclusion
The RCG and the Cambodian people are striving to consolidate the gains
Cambodia has made in building a democratic political system and
establishing a market economy. They are doing so under extremely
difficult circumstances, particularly in view of the ongoing security
danger posed by the Khmer Rouge. The United States has an interest in
helping Cambodia emerge as a prosperous and secure trading partner.
Each nation in Southeast Asia has an interest in helping Cambodia
finally put an end to the violence and instability that have stunted its
development. As the first anniversary of Cambodia's rebirth as a
democratic nation draws near, it is more important than ever that the
U.S. and other countries remain engaged to ensure that the progress the
Cambodians and the international community have worked so hard to
achieve is sustained.
With their courage and determination, the Cambodian people have moved a
long distance from the killing fields of only a few years ago. They
have shown that the yearning for freedom is a universal impulse, not a
Western export. No other people have suffered more or earned our
admiration more. The international community--and America--must not let
them down. (###)
[END OF DISPATCH VOL 5, NO. 21]
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