US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 5, NUMBER 21, MAY 23, 1994
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
 
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
 
1.  U.S. Taking New Steps To Respond to Crisis in Haiti--President 
Clinton,
 William Gray, White House Fact Sheet, Madeleine K. Albright, UNSC 
Resolution
2.  Pursuing the Restoration of Democracy in Haiti--Deputy Secretary 
Talbott
3.  U.S. Support for Reform in Central and Eastern Europe and the NIS--
Deputy
 Secretary Talbott
4.  U.S.-ASEAN Relations:  Building on Shared Strength, Prosperity, and
 Democratic Values--Acting Secretary Talbott, Joint Press Statement
5.  Crisis in Rwanda--George E. Moose
6.  Human Rights Abuses in Liberia
7.  Cambodia:  Recent Developments--Peter Tomsen

      ARTICLE 1

U.S. Taking New Steps To Respond to Crisis in Haiti
President Clinton, William Gray, White House Fact Sheet, Madeleine K. 
Albright, UNSC Resolution
 
President Clinton and William Gray
Opening statements at a White House news conference, Washington, DC, May 
8,
 1994.
 
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.  I want to speak for a few moments 
about  the crisis in Haiti, the challenge it poses to our national 
interests, and the new steps I am taking to respond.    Three and one-
half years ago, in free and fair elections, the people of Haiti    chose 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide as their President.  Just nine months later, 
their    hopes were dashed when Haiti's military leaders overthrew 
democracy by force.    Since then, the military has murdered innocent 
civilians, crushed political    freedom, and plundered Haiti's economy.       
From the start of this Administration, my goal has been to restore 
democracy and    President Aristide.  Last year, we helped the parties 
to negotiate the    Governors Island Accord, a fair and balanced 
agreement which laid out a road    map for a peaceful resolution to the 
crisis.  But late last year, the Haitian    military abrogated the 
agreement, and since then they have rejected every    effort to achieve 
a political settlement.       At the same time, the repression and 
bloodshed in Haiti have reached alarming    new proportions.  Supporters 
of President Aristide, and many other Haitians,    are being killed and 
mutilated.  That is why, six weeks ago, I ordered a review    of our 
policy toward Haiti.    


As a result of this review, we are taking several steps to increase 
pressure on    Haiti's military while addressing the suffering caused by 
their brutal misrule.     We are stepping up our diplomatic efforts, we 
are intensifying  sanctions, and    we are adapting our migration 
policy.  Let me describe these steps.       First, to bring new vigor to 
our diplomacy, I am pleased to announce that Bill    Gray, the President 
of the United Negro College Fund and former House Majority    Whip and 
Chair of the House Budget Committee, has accepted my invitation to    
serve as Special Adviser to me and to the Secretary of State on Haiti.       
Bill is here with his wife, on his way to the inauguration of President 
Mandela    in South Africa, and I will ask him to speak in just a few 
moments.  But let me    just say that he is a man of vision and 
determination, of real strength and    real creativity.  I appreciate 
his willingness to accept this difficult and    challenging assignment.  
He will be the point man in our diplomacy and a    central figure in our 
future policy deliberations.       As part of our diplomatic efforts,  
we will work with the United Nations to    examine the changes in the 
proposed UN military and police mission in Haiti.    We want to ensure 
that once Haiti's military leaders have left, this mission    can do its 
job effectively and safely.

 
Second, the U.S. is leading the international community in a drive to 
impose   tougher sanctions on Haiti.  On Friday, the UN Security Council 
unanimously   adopted a resolution we had proposed to tighten sanctions 
on everything but   humanitarian supplies; to prevent Haiti's military 
leaders and their civilian   allies from leaving the country; to promote 
a freeze of their assets worldwide;   and to ban non-scheduled flights 
in and out of Haiti.  U.S. naval vessels will   continue to enforce 
these sanctions vigorously.


We are also working with the Dominican Republic to improve sanctions 
enforcement
 along that nation's border with Haiti.  To shield the most vulnerable 
Haitians
 from the worst effects of the sanctions, we will increase both 
humanitarian aid
 and the number of UN and OAS human rights monitors in Haiti.

While these stronger sanctions will cause more hardships for innocent 
Haitians,
 we must be clear:  The military leaders bear full responsibility for 
this
 action.  They can stop the suffering of their people by giving up 
power, as
 they themselves agreed to do, and allowing the restoration of democracy 
and the
 return of President Aristide.

Third, I am announcing certain changes in our migration policy toward 
Haiti.
 Currently, Haitians seeking refugee status, including those interdicted 
at sea,
 are interviewed only in Haiti and not beyond its shores.  Our 
processing
 centers, which have been dramatically expanded in this Administration, 
are
 doing a good job under bad circumstances.

In 1993, we processed and approved about 10 times the number of refugee
 applicants as in 1992.  In recent months, however, I have become 
increasingly
 concerned that Haiti's declining human rights situation may endanger 
the safety
 of those who have valid fears of political persecution, who flee by 
boat, and
 who are then returned to Haiti where they are met at the docks by 
Haitian
 authorities before they can be referred to in-country processing.

Therefore, I have decided to modify our procedures.  We will continue to
 interdict all Haitian migrants at sea, but we will determine aboard 
ship, or in
 other countries, which ones are bona fide political refugees.  Those 
who are
 not will still be returned to Haiti, but those who are will be provided 
refuge.
  We will also approach other countries to seek their participation in 
this
 humanitarian endeavor.

The new procedures will begin once we have the necessary arrangements in 
place.
 This will take some weeks.  Until then, the Haitians must understand 
that we
 will continue to return all boat migrants to Haiti.  Even under  the 
new
 procedures, there will be no advantage for Haitians with fears of 
persecution
 to risk their lives at sea if and when they can assert their claims 
more safely
 at processing centers in Haiti.

The ultimate solution to this crisis, however, is for the military 
leaders to
 keep their own commitment to leave, so that Haiti's people can build a 
peaceful
 and prosperous future in their own country.

I am committed to making these new international sanctions work.  At the 
same
 time, I cannot and should not rule out other options.  The United 
States has
 clear interests at stake in ending this crisis.  We have an interest in
 bolstering the cause of democracy in the Americas.  We have an interest 
in
 ensuring the security of our citizens living and working in Haiti.  We 
have an
 interest in stopping the gross human rights violations and abuses by 
the
 military and their accomplices.  We clearly have a humanitarian 
interest in
 preventing a massive and dangerous exodus of Haitians by sea.

The steps I have announced today are designed to relieve suffering, 
redouble
 pressure, and restore democracy.  Working with the Haitian people and 
the world
 community, we will try to advance our interests and give Haiti an 
opportunity
 to build a future of freedom and hope.  They voted for it and they 
deserve the
 chance to have it.

William Gray.  I am honored to accept this great and important 
challenge.  I am
 glad for the opportunity to serve my country and to work on resolving 
one of
 the greatest challenges we face today.  I share the President's 
determination
 to help end the suffering of the Haitian people at the hands of their 
military
 leaders.  I will work toward that end with commitment and with 
determination.

In accepting this assignment, I want to stress publicly, as I have 
stressed to
 you, Mr. President, that I am a private citizen and will remain a 
private
 citizen during this work.  I have also insisted on serving without pay.  
My
 reason for taking on this work is straightforward and very simple.  For 
me, it
 is an article of faith that when a person is asked by his President to 
be of
 service to the nation, he should do so.  And today, I respond to that 
request
 from my President to serve.

In the months ahead, I look forward to working with you, Mr. President, 
and your
 national security team to carry out your policy, promote our nation's
 interests, and restore freedom and democracy and, above all, hope to 
the people
 of Haiti.


White House Fact Sheet:  Haiti
Fact sheet released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary,
 Washington, DC, May 8, 1994.

Summary
At the conclusion of a comprehensive review of United States policy 
toward
 Haiti, the President announced on May 8 several new steps to bring 
about the
 restoration of democracy and return of Haiti's democratically elected
 President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, while addressing humanitarian 
concerns which
 worsening repression in Haiti have intensified.

The major new steps the President announced were:

--  The appointment of William Gray, the distinguished President of the 
United
 Negro College Fund and former Chairman of the House Budget Committee, 
as the
 new Special Adviser to the President and Secretary of State on Haiti to 
focus
 and invigorate our diplomacy;

--  Changes in our procedures for returning boat migrants to Haiti to 
ensure
 that all who claim refugee status are given a hearing while still 
discouraging
 massive and dangerous departures by sea;
  --  New emphasis on using comprehensive sanctions and improved  
sanctions  enforcement to make Haiti's military leaders relinquish power 
(the UN  Security  Council approved on May 6 a new resolution 
intensifying the sanctions); 

 --  Augmentation of humanitarian assistance for Haiti's poor and 
support   for the   earliest arrival in Haiti of more UN and OAS human 
rights monitors; and  

--  Intensified consultations at the United Nations on preparing the UN   
military   and police mission for deployment to Haiti once the military 
leaders  have  relinquished power.

Background
Resolving the crisis in Haiti has been a continuing policy priority of 
the  President and this Administration.  Our objectives have been to 
restore  democracy and to make possible the return to Haiti of President 
Aristide.  The  urgency of the situation has grown as the intransigence 
and  depredations of  Haiti's military leaders have worsened.

The President is working to advance the several U.S. national interests 
at  stake.

--  Democracy--Haiti is one of only two countries in this hemisphere 
where the  people are deprived of their right to democracy.  Democracy 
underpins  our  efforts to build freedom and prosperity in this 
hemisphere through such  initiatives as NAFTA and the December Summit of 
the Americas in Miami.

--  Human Rights and Humanitarian Concerns--The Haitian people are 
suffering  worsening privation and brutality at the hands of the 
military.  Unless  halted  soon, these abuses could drive large numbers 
of Haitians to risk the  perils of  the sea to try to reach our shores.  
The first step in giving Haitians  hope in  their own land is for the 
military leaders to leave and democracy to be  restored.  This will 
allow the international community to work with  Haiti to  address the 
root causes of migration.

--  Protection of Americans Overseas--As many as 10,000 Americans live 
and work  in Haiti.  Their safety is threatened by deepening military 
abuses and  the  insecurity that creates. 

The President and his senior advisers have reviewed our policy toward 
Haiti  during the last six weeks.  This review was prompted by the 
rejection  by the  Haitian military leadership of every initiative to 
achieve a political  settlement of the crisis and by their visibly 
worsening human rights  abuses.  As a result of this review, the 
President has directed important  changes in our  policy to increase the 
pressure on Haiti's military leaders while  addressing  the humanitarian 
repercussions of their misrule.

Vigorous Diplomacy. 
 The appointment of William Gray as the President's  and  Secretary of 
State's Special Adviser on Haiti will inject new vision  and  
determination into our efforts.  The President will rely on Mr. Gray as  
a  central figure in our Haiti policy.  As Mr. Gray leads that effort,  
Ambassador  Albright will be working closely with the Secretary General 
and her  colleagues  to ensure that the UN brings all its resources to 
bear.  Ambassador  Babbitt  will do likewise at the OAS, and Ambassador 
Swing will direct our  efforts  within Haiti in support of the new 
policy.

New Migrant Processing Procedures. 
 In the context of our broader  Haitian policy  review, we also reviewed 
our migration policy.  We currently process  Haitians  for refugee 
claims only within Haiti, and we interdict and return all  those who  
seek to migrate by boat without processing.  Haitians who are returned  
by our  interdiction effort are permitted to apply for refugee status 
within  Haiti.  Those who claim political persecution on questionnaires 
completed while  they  are being returned to Port-au-Prince are 
encouraged to apply at our in- country  refugee centers.  Since the 
inception of in-country refugee processing  in 1992,  we have accorded 
refugee status to nearly 3,000 Haitians.  We have  increased  the 
refugee intake from Haiti through in-country processing tenfold  
compared to  the last Administration.
 
The UN/OAS International Civilian Mission has documented a substantial  
increase  in killings and other brutal abuses in recent months.  During 
the month  of  April alone, it noted nearly 50 executions and suspicious 
deaths,  including 11  separate murders during April 23-24 alone.  It 
has reliably reported  significant increases in kidnapings and forced 
disappearances, rapes,  attacks  on children, and other abuses.  In 
Gonaives and other parts of Haiti,  military  sweeps have led to dozens 
of deaths.  Under these circumstances, the  President  has concluded 
that it is inappropriate to return all Haitian boat  migrants  without 
first affording them the opportunity to make claims to refugee  status  
and protection.  While our in-country processing provides a crucial  
route to  refuge for many Haitians, it may no longer be adequate.

Therefore, the President has modified our procedures for processing  
Haitian boat  migrants.  Our Coast Guard will continue to interdict all 
Haitian  migrants at  sea, but we will no longer return them to Haiti 
without first  interviewing them  to determine which are bona fide 
political refugees.  Processing will  involve a  standard refugee 
interview similar to that currently performed by our  three  refugee 
processing centers in Haiti.  It will be carried out either in  third  
countries or aboard appropriate ships.  Those who qualify as political  
refugees  will be resettled outside Haiti.  Other countries will be 
approached to  join us  in accepting Haitian political refugees.  Those 
not qualifying for  refugee  status will be returned promptly to Haiti.

The new procedures will not come into effect until after our new 
processing  facilities outside Haiti are in place.  That will be some 
weeks from  now.  Until that time, which will be announced publicly, we 
will continue to  return  all interdicted boat migrants to Haiti without 
processing.  We will be  unable  to process boat migrants for possible 
refugee status adequately and  fairly  before then, and we must 
discourage departures in unseaworthy vessels  with the  attendant risk 
of death at sea.

Intensified Sanctions.  The UN Security Council on May 6 unanimously 
approved a  strong resolution intensifying sanctions.  The resolution 
immediately  made  effective worldwide the targeted entry ban and asset 
freeze which we  have been  enforcing since last year against the 
military and its allies.  It also  imposed  an immediate ban on non-
scheduled flights to and from Haiti.  Within  the next  two weeks, the 
world community will bring into force comprehensive  trade  sanctions 
against Haiti, excluding only the most essential humanitarian  supplies.

On May 7, the President signed an executive order and proclamation 
implementing  the first two of those measures.  A second executive order 
will bring  the  comprehensive trade sanctions into effect in the next 
several days.

Full Enforcement of Sanctions.
  Our naval vessels around Haiti will  continue to  stop ships entering 
and leaving Haitian waters and divert those  carrying  prohibited cargo.  
The President has been in contact with President  Balaguer of  the 
Dominican Republic to express his concern about sanctions leakage  on 
their  long border with Haiti and our willingness to assist the 
Dominicans in  meeting  their international obligation to enforce the 
sanctions.  We are  working with  the United Nations to facilitate 
international cooperation with the  Dominican  Republic.

Humanitarian/Human Rights Measures.
  Comprehensive new sanctions and  strengthened enforcement will 
increase the pressure on the Haitian  people.  To  shield the most 
vulnerable Haitians from the sanctions' worst impact,  we will  increase 
as soon as possible our humanitarian feeding and health care  programs  
to reach 1.2 million beneficiaries.  We are working to restore the full  
complement of 250 UN/OAS civilian human rights observers to Haiti.

Reconfiguring the UN Mission in Haiti.  We will be consulting  
intensively with  our partners in New York to prepare the planned UN 
military and police  mission  for Haiti to be able to function 
effectively and safely once the  military  leadership has relinquished 
power.  As those consultations proceed and  the  possibilities for our 
own participation in the mission become clearer,  we will  consult 
extensively with the Congress.


Madeleine K. Albright
Statement by the United States Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations  before the UN Security Council, New York City, May 6, 1994.

Mr. President, the situation in Haiti grows more desperate by the day.  
A small  group of military officers has usurped the sovereignty of an  
independent  people; these usurpers are devoid of honor or patriotism 
and driven  only by  greed and mistaken self-interest.  They have 
violated their obligation  to  uphold Haiti's constitution, violated 
their commitments to the  international  community, and violated the 
most fundamental rights of their people.

Today, the Security Council speaks with one voice.  We demand an end to 
the  assault on democracy in Haiti.  By tightening the sanctions noose 
around the Haitian military today,  this  Council is joining President 
Clinton in his determination to protect  the people  of Haiti and to 
promote their demand for democracy and dignity.

It is important to note that this resolution is the product of full 
cooperation  among the Latin American and Caribbean states, the members 
of the  Council, and  the democratically elected Government of Haiti.

Mr. President, this is a step that we did not want to have to take and a 
step we  should never have had to even consider.  We know that sanctions 
are a  blunt  instrument.  And we are acutely conscious of the suffering 
of the  Haitian  people and of the potential of these sanctions to 
aggravate that  suffering.  That is why the United States and the 
international community are also  undertaking humanitarian assistance 
measures in Haiti on a massive  scale.

We in the United States are particularly conscious of the plight of 
Haitians  who, for economic or political reasons, feel they have no 
future in  their  homeland.  It is our firm objective through this 
Council and through  other  means to establish in Haiti once again the 
conditions under which no  Haitians  need fear for their lives or 
livelihoods and all Haitians will have an  opportunity to build a future 
for themselves and their families.  Sanctions are one of the most potent 
weapons the international community  has.  Our step imposes upon us a 
significant moral obligation--to persevere  and  enforce these sanctions 
fully so they achieve their objective in the  shortest  possible time.  
We recognize that the burden of enforcement does not  fall  equally on 
all states.  We extend our thanks to the Government of the  Dominican  
Republic for the cooperation it has promised in enforcing these  
measures.  Together, all of us can and must make these sanctions work.  
The price  of  failure would be too high for all of us.  Thank you, Mr. 
President.


Resolution 917 (May 6, 1994)

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 841 (1993) of 16 June 1993,  861 (1993) of 
27 August  1993, 862 (1993) of 31 August 1993, 867 (1993) of 23 
September 1993,  873 (1993)  of 13 October 1993, 875 (1993) of 16 
October 1993 and 905 (1994) of 23  March  1994,

Recalling its Presidential statements of 11 October 1993 (S/26567), 25 
October  1993 (S/26633), 30 October 1993 (S/26668), 15 November 1993 
(S/26747)  and 10  January 1994 (S/PRST/1994/2),

Noting resolutions MRE/RES.1/91, MRE/RES.2/91, MRE/RES.3/92, 
MRE/RES.4/92, and  MRE/RES.5/93, adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the 
Organization of  American  States, and resolutions CP/RES.575 (885/92) 
and CP/RES.594 (923/92) and  declarations CP/Dec.8 (927/93), CP/Dec. 9 
(931/93), CP/Dec.10 (934/93)  and  CP/Dec.15 (967/93), adopted by the 
Permanent Council of the  Organization of  American States,

Noting in particular resolution CP/RES.610 (968/93) of 18 October 1993 
of the  Organization of American States,

Bearing in mind the statement of conclusions adopted at the Meeting of 
the Four  Friends of the Secretary-General on Haiti, held in Paris on 13 
and 14  December  1993 (S/26881),

Having examined the reports of the Secretary-General of 19 January 1994
 (S/1994/54) and 18 March 1994 (S/1994/311) regarding the United Nations 
Mission  in Haiti (UNMIH),

Commending the continuing efforts undertaken by the Special Envoy for 
Haiti of  the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the 
Organization  of  American  States to bring about compliance with the 
Governors Island Agreement  and the  full restoration of democracy in 
Haiti,

Reaffirming that the goal of the international community remains the 
restoration  of democracy in Haiti and the prompt return of the 
legitimately elected  President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, under the 
framework of the Governors  Island  Agreement,

Stressing in this context the importance of a proper and secure 
environment for  all legislative action agreed to in the Governors 
Island Agreement and  the New  York Pact, as well as preparations for 
free and fair legislative  elections in  Haiti, as called for in the 
constitution, in the framework of the full  restoration of democracy in 
Haiti,

Concerned at the continued failure of the military authorities in Haiti,  
including the police, to comply with their obligations under the  
Governors  Island Agreement, and at the violations of the related New 
York Pact  committed  by political organizations party thereto in 
relation to the disputed  elections  of 18 January 1993,

Strongly condemning the numerous instances of extra-judicial killings, 
arbitrary  arrests, illegal detentions, abductions, rape and enforced  
disappearances, the  continued denial of freedom of expression, and the 
impunity with which  armed  civilians have been able to operate and 
continue operating,

Recalling that in resolution 873 (1993) the Council confirmed its 
readiness to  consider the imposition of additional measures if the 
military  authorities in  Haiti continued to impede the activities of 
the United Nations Mission  in Haiti  (UNMIH) or failed to comply in 
full with its relevant resolutions and  the  provisions of the Governors 
Island Agreement,

Reaffirming its determination that, in these unique and exceptional  
circumstances, the situation created by the failure of the military  
authorities  in Haiti to fulfil their obligations under the Governors 
Island  Agreement and  to comply with relevant Security Council 
resolutions constitutes a  threat to  peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1.  Calls upon the parties to the Governors Island Agreement and any 
other  authorities in Haiti to cooperate fully with the Special Envoy of 
the  Secretaries-General of the United Nations and Organization of 
American  States  to bring about the full implementation of the 
Governors Island  Agreement and  thus end the political crisis in Haiti;

2.  Decides that all States shall without delay deny permission to any 
aircraft  to take off from, land in, or overfly their territory if it is 
destined  to land  in, or has taken off from the territory of Haiti, 
with the exception   of  regularly scheduled commercial passenger 
flights, unless the particular  flight  has been approved, for 
humanitarian purposes or for other purposes  consistent  with the 
present resolution and other relevant resolutions, by the  Committee
 established by resolution 841 (1993);

3.  Decides that all States shall without delay prevent the entry into 
their  territories:

(a)  Of all officers of the Haitian military, including the police, and 
their  immediate families;

(b)  Of the major participants in the coup d'etat of 1991 and in the 
illegal  governments since the coup d'etat, and their immediate 
families;

(c)  Of those employed by or acting on behalf of the Haitian military,  
and their  immediate families, unless their entry has been approved, for 
purposes  consistent with the present resolution and other relevant 
resolutions,  by the  Committee established by resolution 841 (1993), 
and requests the  Committee to  maintain an updated list, based on 
information provided by States and  regional  organizations, of the 
persons falling within this paragraph;

4.  Strongly urges all States to freeze without delay the funds and 
financial  resources of persons falling within paragraph 3 above, to 
ensure that  neither  these nor any other funds and financial resources 
are made available,  by their  nationals or by any persons within their 
territory, directly or  indirectly, to  or for the benefit of such 
persons or of the Haitian military,  including the  police;

5.  Decides that the provisions set forth in paragraphs 6 to 10 below, 
which are  consistent with the embargo recommended by the Organization 
of American  States,  shall, to the extent that these measures are not 
already in effect  under its  earlier relevant resolutions, take effect 
no later than 2359 hours  Eastern  Standard Time on 21 May 1994 and 
requests that the Secretary-General,  having  regard for the views of 
the Secretary-General of the Organization of  American  States, report 
to the Council not later than 19 May 1994 on steps the  military  have 
taken to comply with actions required of them by the Governors  Island  
Accord as specified in paragraph 18 below;

6.  Decides that all States shall prevent:

(a)  The import into their territories of all commodities and products
 originating in Haiti and exported therefrom after the aforementioned 
date;

(b)  Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which 
would  promote the export or transshipment of any commodities or 
products  originating  in Haiti, and any dealings by their nationals or 
their flag vessels or  air-craft or in their territories in any 
commodities or products  originating in  Haiti and exported therefrom 
after the aforementioned date;

7.  Decides that all States shall prevent the sale or supply by their 
nationals  or from their territories or using their flag vessels or 
aircraft of  any  commodities or products, whether or not originating in 
their  territories, to  any person or body in Haiti or to any person or 
body for the purpose of  any  business carried on in, or operated from, 
Haiti, and any activities by  their  nationals or in their territories 
which promote such sale or supply of  such  commodities or products, 
provided that the prohibitions contained in  this  paragraph shall not 
apply to:

(a)  Supplies intended strictly for medical purposes and foodstuffs;

(b)  With the approval of the Committee  established pursuant to 
resolution 841  (1993), under the no-objection procedure, other 
commodities and  products for  essential humanitarian needs;

(c)  Petroleum or petroleum products, including propane gas for cooking,
 authorized in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 841 (1993);

(d)  Other commodities and products authorized in accordance with 
paragraph 3 of  resolution 873 (1993);

8.  Decides that the prohibitions in paragraphs 6 and 7 above shall not 
apply to  trade in informational materials, including books and other  
publications,  needed for the free flow of information and further 
decides that  journalists  may bring in and take out their equipment 
subject to conditions and   terms  agreed by the Committee established 
by resolution 841 (1993);

9.  Decides to prohibit any and all traffic from entering or leaving the
 territory or territorial sea of Haiti carrying commodities or products 
the  export of which from Haiti or the sale or supply of which to Haiti  
would be  prohibited under paragraphs 6 and 7 above, excepting regularly  
scheduled  maritime shipping lines calling in Haiti with goods permitted 
under  paragraph

 7 and which are also carrying other commodities or products in transit 
to other  destinations, subject to formal monitoring arrangements 
established  with States  cooperating with the legitimate Government of 
Haiti as provided in  paragraph 1  of resolution 875 (1993) and 
paragraph 10 below;

10.  Acting also under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United  
Nations, calls  upon Member States cooperating with the legitimate 
Government of Haiti,  acting  nationally or through regional agencies or 
arrangements, to use such  measures  commensurate with the specific 
circumstances as may be necessary under  the  authority of the Security 
Council to ensure strict implementation of  the  provisions of the 
present resolution and earlier relevant resolutions,  and in  particular 
to halt outward as well as inward maritime shipping as  necessary in  
order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and also to  
ensure  that the Committee established pursuant to resolution 841 (1993) 
is  kept  regularly informed;

11.  Decides that all States, including the authorities in Haiti, shall 
take the  necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the 
instance of  the  authorities in Haiti, or of any person or body in 
Haiti, or of any  person  claiming through or for the benefit of any 
such person or body, in  connection  with the performance of a bond, 
financial guarantee, indemnity or  engagement,  issued or granted in 
connection with or related to the performance of  any  contract or 
transaction, where the performance of that contract or  transaction  was 
affected by the measures imposed by or pursuant to this resolution  or  
resolutions 841 (1993), 873 (1993) and 875 (1993);

12.  Calls upon all States, including States not members of the United 
Nations,  and all international organizations, to act strictly in 
accordance with  the  provisions of the present resolution and the 
earlier relevant  resolutions,  notwithstanding the existence of any 
rights or obligations conferred or  imposed  by any international 
agreement or any contract entered into or any  licence or  permit 
granted prior to the effective date of the measures in this  resolution  
or earlier relevant resolutions;

13.  Requests all States to report to the Secretary-General by 6 June 
1994 on  the measures they have instituted in implementation of the 
measures  contained  in the present resolution and earlier relevant 
resolutions;

14.  Decides that the Committee established pursuant to resolution 841  
(1993)  shall undertake the following tasks in addition to those set out 
in  resolutions  841 (1993), 873 (1993) and in paragraph 3 above:

(a)  To examine reports submitted pursuant to paragraph 13 above;

(b)  To seek from all States, in particular neighbouring States, further  
information regarding the action taken by them concerning the effective  
implementation of the measures contained in the present resolution and  
earlier  relevant resolutions;

(c)  To consider any information brought to its attention by States 
concerning  violations of the measures contained in the present 
resolution and  earlier  relevant resolutions and, in that context, to 
make recommendations to  the  Council on ways to increase their 
effectiveness;

(d)  To make recommendations in response to violations of the measures 
contained  in the present resolution and earlier relevant resolutions 
and provide  information on a regular basis to the Secretary-General for 
general  distribution to Member States;

(e)  To consider and to decide upon expeditiously any application by 
States for  the approval of flights or entry in accordance with 
paragraphs 2 and 3  above;

(f)  To amend the guidelines referred to in paragraph 10 of resolution  
841  (1993) to take into account the measures contained in the present  
resolution;

(g)  To examine possible requests for assistance under the provisions of  
Article  50 of the Charter of the United Nations and to make 
recommendations to  the  President of the Security Council for 
appropriate action;

15.  Reaffirms its request to the Secretary-General to provide all  
necessary  assistance to the Committee and to make the necessary 
arrangements in  the  Secretariat for this purpose;

16.  Decides that, until the return of the democratically elected  
President, it  will keep under continuous review, at least on a monthly 
basis, all the  measures in the present resolution and earlier relevant 
resolutions and  requests the Secretary-General, having regard for the 
views of the  Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, 
to report on  the  situation in Haiti, the implementation of the 
Governors Island  Agreement,  legislative actions including preparations 
for legislative elections,  the full  restoration of democracy in Haiti, 
the humanitarian situation in that  country,  and the effectiveness of 
the implementation of sanctions, with the  first report  not later than 
30 June 1994;

17.  Expresses its readiness to consider progressive suspension of the 
measures  contained in the present resolution and earlier relevant 
resolutions,  based on  progress in the implementation of the Governors 
Island Agreement and  the  restoration of democracy in Haiti;

18.  Decides that, notwithstanding paragraph 16 above, measures in the  
present  resolution and earlier relevant resolutions will not be 
completely  lifted  until:

(a)  The retirement of the Commander-in-Chief of the Haitian Armed  
Forces, and  the resignation or departure from Haiti of the Chief of the  
Metropolitan Zone  of Port-au-Prince, commonly known as the Chief of 
Police of Port-au-Prince, and  the Chief of Staff of the Haitian Armed 
Forces;

(b)  Completion of the changes by retirement or departure from Haiti in 
the  leadership of the police and military high command called for in 
the  Governors  Island Agreement;

(c)  Adoption of the legislative actions called for in the Governors 
Island  Agreement, as well as the creation of a proper environment in 
which  free and  fair legislative elections can be organized in the 
framework of the  full  restoration of democracy in Haiti;

(d)  The creation by authorities of the proper environment for the 
deployment of  the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH); 

(e)  The return in the shortest time possible of the democratically 
elected  President and maintenance of constitutional order, these 
conditions  being  necessary for the full implementation of the 
Governors Island  Agreement;

19.  Condemns any attempt illegally to remove legal authority from the
 legitimately elected President, declares that it would consider 
illegitimate  any purported government resulting from such an attempt, 
and decides,  in such  an event, to consider reimposing any measures 
suspended under paragraph  17  above;

20.  Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

VOTE:  Unanimous (15-0). (###)



ARTICLE 2

Pursuing the Restoration Of Democracy in Haiti
Deputy Secretary Talbott

Statement before the Special Session of the Permanent Council of the
 Organization of American States, Washington, DC, May 11, 1994

All of us in the room today recognize the growing importance of this  
organization as a force for democracy in Latin America and the  
Caribbean and  throughout the world as a whole.  After all, the OAS is 
itself a  democratic  institution.  Each member nation has an equal 
voice no matter what the  size of  its population, its territory, or its 
economy.  We respect each other's  sovereignty, we respect our 
differences, and we work together to  advance the  values and interests 
that we have in common.

The OAS has become increasingly effective as democracy has spread  
throughout the  region.  Indeed, it has become more effective because 
democracy has  spread.  Fifteen years ago, less than half of the 
countries in Latin America had  democratically elected governments.  
Today, every one of us at the  table  represents a freely elected head 
of state--including Ambassador  Casimir.

Twenty years ago, in 1973, when the military extinguished freedom in  
Chile, the  OAS stood silent.  By contrast, in 1993, when Guatemala's 
elected  government  was threatened, this organization promptly and 
effectively came to the  defense  of democracy.  Under the steady 
leadership of Secretary General Baena  Soares,  the OAS has also played 
a key role in restoring a congress and a  constitutional  order in Peru, 
and in demobilizing insurgent movements in Nicaragua and  Suriname.  The 
OAS also took the lead in responding to the crisis in  Haiti, and  Haiti 
continues to be an absolutely critical test for the OAS.

Why does Haiti matter so much to all of us?

If the international and hemispheric community allows thugs such as Raul 
Cedras,  Michel Francois, and Phillipe Biamby to continue to rob and 
terrorize  the  people of Haiti, that country is likely to become a 
haven and a  breeding ground  for the forces of instability and 
criminality in the region.  The human  rights  outrages perpetrated by 
the Haitian regime violate all international  standards.   The regime is 
presiding over a steadily worsening humanitarian  catastrophe,  raising 
the spectre of a refugee crisis that impinges on the vital  interests of  
all countries in the region, especially Haiti's neighbors.

A few hours ago, we received news of the latest affront against  
democracy in  Haiti.  Today, Supreme Court President Emile Jonassaint 
was sworn in as  president of Haiti, ostensibly under Article 149 of the 
Haitian  Constitution.  This is a blatant attempt by an illegal faction 
of the Haitian Senate,  with the  assistance of the military, to install 
a bogus de facto government.   This  action will not divert the 
international community from pursuing the  restoration of democracy in 
Haiti and the return of President Aristide.

As called for under the UN Security Council resolution, those persons 
taking  part in such an illegal government will have their personal 
assets in  the U.S.  frozen, and they will be denied entry into all UN 
member countries.

But let me return to the central importance of democracy itself.  If  
this  military clique--having usurped democracy and repressed the 
people-- remains in  control of Haiti, it would contradict the trend 
that we all applaud and  from  which we all benefit.

President Aristide, who won nearly 70% of the vote in an election in 
which 90%  of the people cast their ballots freely and fairly, is now 
living in  exile, 10  blocks from where we are meeting today.  He is a 
welcome guest here in  Washington, but he should be in his own capital, 
with his own people.   He wants  that.  They want that.  We want that.

As we discuss what further steps are needed, let us recognize that the 
OAS and  its allies have already come a long way together in dealing 
with this  issue.  With the September 1991 coup, Haiti became the first 
test of OASGA  Resolution  1080, which calls for an immediate 
hemispheric response to any  interruption of  the constitutional 
democratic processes of a member state.  The OAS  lived up to  its 
responsibilities under that resolution, by recommending a trade  embargo  
against the coup leaders.

The international community has supported the OAS effort by providing an  
increasingly wide safety net for those who might be unjustly affected  
by those  sanctions; the United States is trying to do its part in this  
humanitarian  effort.

The United States and other donors are currently feeding almost 1.2  
million poor  Haitians.  In addition, we are providing nearly 2 million 
Haitians-- nearly  one-third of the population--with access to basic 
health services,  including  medicines and immunizations.

The OAS has taken the lead by sending international human rights 
monitors to  Haiti, thus providing the basis for what has grown to be 
the  International  Civilian Mission.  The United States, along with 
Canada, Venezuela, St.  Lucia,  Trinidad and Tobago, Chile, Argentina, 
and other member states, has  enthusiastically supported this OAS 
initiative.  Today, the United  States has  decided to make $13 million 
available to augment this monitoring  effort.

Let me say a word or two about the all-important cooperation between the  
OAS and  the UN.  That cooperation is personified by the UN/OAS Special 
Envoy,  Dante  Caputo, with whom I met yesterday.  Mr. Caputo has led 
the efforts to  arrive at  a political settlement.  Last Friday, the UN 
Security Council  reaffirmed its  support for his mediation efforts, 
unanimously adopting a resolution  that makes  mandatory, on a global 
scale, the sanctions originally recommended by  the OAS.

The time has now come to build upon these accomplishments.  My President  
sees  four steps we must take.

First, we must enforce the sanctions that are now in place.

Second, we must continue to augment our humanitarian assistance 
programs.  Our  moral authority in this struggle will be undercut unless 
we clearly  demonstrate  that our sanctions are not directed at the 
people of Haiti but at the  regime.

Third, we must find ways to assure that those with a legitimate claim to 
asylum  get a fair hearing.   Here, too, we must make it clear to the 
people of  Haiti  that we are on their side.  President Clinton offered 
a new approach to  this  problem last Sunday.  Since the Haitian refugee 
situation affects a  number of  us here today, I hope that OAS members 
will join us in working together  on this  very difficult dimension of 
the problem.

Fourth, and finally, as the new sanctions take effect, we must agree on 
the  transitional measures that will be required when Cedras resigns, 
and  Francois  and Biamby leave the island--as they must.

This relates to the question of UNMIH, the United Nations Mission in 
Haiti,  which has been envisioned, and authored, by earlier UN 
resolutions as a  key  part of the political solution.  The United 
States stands ready to be a  part of  such a mission.  The task for 
UNMIH is to help ensure a safe and  effective  transition back to 
democracy.

The task now--and that means starting today--is to define the mission 
with  precision, realism, and credibility, and to configure the 
collective  effort  that will be necessary to make it successful.

In the days immediately ahead, we will be consulting closely with your  
governments--and, of course, with the United Nations--on the definition  
and  configuration of UNMIH.

As I hope is apparent from everything I have said, the United States is 
strongly  committed to supporting the OAS and the United Nations in 
bringing  democracy  back to Haiti.  Last Sunday, President Clinton 
demonstrated his commitment by appointing  William  Gray, the respected 
former majority whip of the House of  Representatives, to be  Special 
Adviser to the President and the Secretary of State.  When he announced 
Mr. Gray's appointment, President Clinton reiterated  that--and  I 
quote--"the ultimate solution to this crisis is for the military  
leaders to  keep their own commitment,"--that is to permit the 
restoration of  democracy--"so that Haiti's people can build a peaceful 
and prosperous  future  in their own country."  As an amplification of 
that statement, I will conclude with what  Secretary of  State 
Christopher said in Mexico City the day before yesterday:  If Haiti's 
military leaders refuse to resign or leave Haiti, they will  find that  
the international community has both the will and the means to make  
them pay  the price for their illegitimate actions, and to restore the  
legitimately  elected authorities.  We are the international community.  
Let us use this meeting, and its  immediate  aftermath, to galvanize the 
will and assemble the means to prevail on  behalf of  our common 
interests.  


(###)    


ARTICLE 3 

U.S. Support for Reform in Central And Eastern Europe and the NIS Deputy 
Secretary Talbott 

Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export  
Financing and  Related Programs of the House Appropriations Committee, 
Washington, DC,  May 10,
 1994


Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the chance to testify today in support of the  
Administration's program to assist the 26 nations that are emerging  
from  communism in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union.   Our  policy toward that vast region of the world and the more 
than 370  million  people that live there has been based on three basic 
premises.

1.  Reform in Central and Eastern Europe and the New Independent States 
of the  former Soviet Union is in the most basic interests of the United  
States.

To the extent that the reformers succeed in their efforts, the community 
of  market democracies and the boundaries of freedom and prosperity will 
be  enlarged.  The potential payoffs for America are immense:  a reduced  
threat of  war, lower defense budgets, and vast new markets that can 
fuel global  prosperity and create jobs for Americans.

As Vice President Gore said in Milwaukee in January, the great 
transformation  underway in the post-communist world is "the story of 
the century--our  century."  We also have a part in that story.  Through 
our programs to  support  reform, we have an opportunity--indeed, an 
obligation--to do everything  we can  to increase the chances that the 
story ends well; that is, that in  place of the  old Warsaw Pact and the 
old Soviet Union will emerge a community of  nations at  peace with 
themselves and each other, fully integrated into the larger  community 
of nations to which we belong and of which we are, in many  ways, the  
leader.

2.  Reformers are locked in a struggle with opponents of reform, and the  
struggle will go on for a long time.

Thanks in large measure to five years of support from the Support for  
East  European Democracy (SEED) program and other U.S. assistance 
programs,  most of  the nations of Central and Eastern Europe are moving 
steadily toward  full  integration into the community of market 
democracies.  There are bound  to be  delays and setbacks along the way, 
but the sooner these nations  consolidate  their gains, the sooner we 
will be able to benefit from their emergence  as  stable, secure 
democracies and as reliable trading partners.

Reformers in the former U.S.S.R. are fighting a hard, uphill battle to 
replace  the Soviet system with political and economic institutions that 
will  permit  those countries to prosper.  Even those NIS leaders who 
have been most  tenacious in their pursuit of reform are going to have 
to overcome many  obstacles.

3.  We have already made a difference for the better--and must keep  
doing so.  Each of the nations of Central and Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet  Union  must choose its course:  The decisions as to how 
and to what extent  they will  join the community of market democracies 
are theirs, not ours.   However, the  events of the past five years have 
clearly demonstrated that in many  cases our  assistance can spur 
progress.

It is with these premises in mind, Mr. Chairman, that the Administration 
comes  before you to request continued funding for the SEED and FREEDOM  
Support Act  programs.  Our FY 1995 SEED request of $380 million is in 
keeping with  what we  expect to be a general downward trend in SEED 
funding levels.  This trend is largely because of the success of the 
program in its first  five  years.  SEED began in three countries--
Hungary, Poland, and the former  Czechoslovakia--and has grown to cover 

4.  Beginning in FY 1995, however, we  will begin closing out SEED 
programs in countries that no longer need  this kind  of support.  The 
Czech Republic, now well on its way toward full  integration  with the 
market democracies of Europe, will be the first country to  "graduate";  
Estonia and Slovenia may follow soon thereafter.

Our FY 1995 FREEDOM Support Act request of $900 million also takes into 
account  the considerable progress now being made in Russia and 
throughout the  former  Soviet Union.  The large amount of funds 
Congress provided for NIS  programs in  FY 1994 will enable us to 
continue--in cooperation with other  international  donors--to provide 
much of the assistance needed for the major steps  toward  transition, 
especially in Russia.  In FY 1995 and subsequent years, we  will  
request smaller levels of resources, and our initiatives will focus  
more on  encouraging private sector trade and investment in the region.  
In light of the substantial progress being made in Russia, our FY 1995  
FREEDOM  Support Act request also assumes that more than half of these 
funds  will  directly benefit the other states of the NIS--roughly a 
third of FY  1993  supplemental and FY 1994 FREEDOM Support Act funds 
were for programs in  these  states.

As in previous years, we are requesting SEED and FREEDOM Support Act 
funds for  use in three general areas:

--  Support for democratic institutions;

--  Support for transitions to market economies; and

--  Quality of life and humanitarian assistance.

What I would like to do now is spend a few minutes focusing on our goals 
and  achievements in each area, then make some more general points about  
each of  these.

Creating the Building Blocks Of Democratic Society

With the help of SEED and FREEDOM Support Act programs, most of the 
countries in  CEE and the NIS have been successful in creating the 
fundamental  building  blocks of democracy-- national constitutions, 
political parties, and  systems of  fair and free elections. Now that 
these structures are for the most  part in  place, new sorts of 
assistance are called for--programs that strengthen  non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), local governments, and legal  institutions, 
including courts.

In January, President Clinton announced a major new initiative called 
the  "Democracy Network" to bolster emerging civil societies in Central 
and  Eastern  Europe.  The timing is right.  As democratic institutions 
develop,  public  participation must also advance, assisted in part by 
NGOs involved in  advocacy  and watchdog work.  The "network" will allow 
American NGOs to support  their  counterparts, thereby enlarging what 
one Hungarian philosopher has  called  "small circles of freedom" 
capable of overcoming the communist past.

In a similar program already operating in the NIS, we are providing 
support for  already existing indigenous NGOs, as well as assisting in 
the formation  of new  ones.  Four years ago, such organizations were 
all but unknown in the  former  Soviet Union.  Today, there are over 
12,000 NGOs in the region.  We are also providing assistance that 
supports the development of a free  and  independent media.  One example 
is our support for the International  Media  Fund, which has trained 
hundreds of writers and broadcasters and  provided the  technical 
assistance and hardware that make a critical difference to  the  
survival of fledgling journalistic enterprises.

Another is our support for Inter- news, a U.S. NGO that has helped 
independent  Russian TV stations to produce local news programs that 
have a combined  viewership of more than 70 million people.  In Ukraine, 
Internews has  helped  create a network of independent TV stations that 
has a wider viewership  than  Ukrainian state television.

Since direct exposure to democracy is often the best teacher, we also 
are  working to increase the size of our exchange programs.  More than 
8,000  leaders, business people, and students came from CEE and the NIS 
on  such  programs in 1993.  We plan to fund another 20,000 to 30,000 of 
these  visitors  to our country over the next two years.

In our efforts to help decentralize the governments of the region, we 
are  supporting programs such as the one run by the International City  
Managers'  Association, which provides technical assistance and training 
to local  municipal government associations in Poland, the Czech 
Republic, and  Slovakia.  One of the most successful of our public-
private democracy programs is  the  American University in Bulgaria 
(AUBG), which we opened in 11 months,  from the  first informal 
discussion to the selection of students and the opening  of  classes.  
AUBG brings together students from 14 countries and presents  them  with 
an American curriculum taught, in English, primarily by professors  from  
the U.S. and other Western countries.  The entering students have an  
average  SAT score of 1220, an amazing feat considering that they all 
take the  test in  English.

U.S. Assistance in the Transition To Market Economies

With our help, the nations of Central and Eastern Europe and the NIS 
have  already achieved a great deal in the way of economic reform.  
State-run  enterprises are being privatized at a rapid pace; equally 
important,  new  businesses, especially small businesses, are also 
appearing in large  numbers.

Privatization has been, and will continue to be, the necessary first 
step for  economic reform in the region.  Our assistance goals here are 
ambitious  but  finite:  to help dismantle the edifice of state-owned 
enterprises that  survives  as one of the principal legacies of 
communism and replace it with the  institutions of market democracy.

After five years of SEED support, this goal is well within reach in many 
of the  nations of Central and Eastern Europe.  In Poland, American 
advisers  are  helping to structure the $4-billion Mass Privatization 
Program of over  400  former state-owned enterprises.  This effort is 
expected to enable 25  million  Poles to purchase shares in new private 
businesses.

In the Czech Republic, our advisers helped the Ministry of Privatization 
to  establish a fair and transparent process that has gained the 
confidence  of  foreign investors.  Our team of accountants and bankers 
has helped  complete 84  deals to date, representing investments of up 
to $2.4 billion in  foreign  investment.  American investments are 40% 
of this total.  Given the  speed at  which the programs in the Czech 
Republic are proceeding, we expect that  FY 1995  will be the last year 
that it will be necessary to fund them.

The tide of privatization is moving eastward as well.  In Russia, our  
intensive  assistance programs have made a difference.  Two-thirds of 
all small  shops--some 70,000-100,000 businesses--have been privatized; 
over 50%  of large  and medium firms--some 9,000--have been auctioned, 
and 40% of Russia's  industrial labor force is now working in the 
private sector.  Some   55  million  Russians have become shareholders.  
Russian privatization officials  have told  Administration officials--
and visiting congressional delegations--that  U.S.  support has been the 
most responsive and effective of any international  donor.

Our next great privatization challenge is Ukraine, where the government 
has  indicated a new readiness to move toward wholesale privatization.  
When  that  government begins to make the tough decisions, we want to 
make sure  that we  have support ready at hand.  Indeed, it is our hope 
that our FY 1995  aid  package, when combined with the assistance that 
we were not able to  allocate in  FY 1994 due to the lack of reform, 
will itself provide a strong  incentive for  the Ukrainian Government to 
take courageous steps.

In that regard, I should mention that the President's Special Assistant 
for the  former Soviet Union, Nick Burns, and an inter-agency delegation 
just  returned  from Kiev, where they had meetings with President 
Kravchuk and  Ukrainian  economic leaders.  This was the third round, 
since November, of high-level  talks designed to hasten economic reform 
in Ukraine and to improve the  effectiveness of our assistance programs 
there.

We are, throughout the region, working to help create small- and medium- 
sized  businesses.  Enterprise Funds have been among the most successful 
of  all our  assistance programs in Central and Eastern Europe.  These 
funds have  been  unique in their approach and unusual in their speed.

They have provided a source--in some cases, the only source--of debt or 
equity  capital available to small- and medium-sized firms employing 
thousands  of  workers, and they have attracted investments from the 
multilateral  banks,  private institutions, and pension funds.

The funds also tap into the experience of financial and business 
professionals  to help develop banking and financial skills and 
institutions in the  host  country.  They have attracted top-flight 
American business  professionals who  volunteer their time to serve on 
fund boards.

The Enterprise Funds in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Czech and 
Slovak  Republics are nearing full capitalization.  Thus, we expect that 
the  bulk of FY  1995 SEED money for Enterprise Funds will be used to 
help establish new  programs in Albania, Romania, and the Baltics.

As they gain experience, the funds are branching out into new and  
innovative  ventures.  In 1993, the Polish Enterprise Fund began making 
very small  loans--in the range of $400-$7,500--available to new 
businesses owned  by women  in rural areas.  In this way, the funds will 
support market economies  at the  smallest level as well as the largest.  
Similar micro-lending ventures  are now  being planned by Hungary and 
Bulgaria, and we are working to expand  this highly  promising method 
throughout the region.

In the past year, we have started up Enterprise Funds in the NIS as 
well.  In  February, the Russian-American Enterprise Fund opened; next 
month, it  will make  its first loans and investments.  FY 1995 FREEDOM 
Support Act money  will also  be directed toward new funds in Central 
Asia, Ukraine, Moldova, and  Belarus.

For private enterprise to prosper--and for it to attract Western trade 
and  investment--there must be a financial and legal infrastructure.  
Here,  too, we  are helping.  Our assistance programs are facilitating 
the  privatization of  state-owned banks, and the creation of new 
private ones, by providing  training  to local bankers in both Central 
and Eastern Europe and the NIS.   Recently, 255  senior bankers from 
Russia trained for eight weeks in the United States  and  returned to 
their country to apply new approaches to their own banks.   USAID is  
also playing a key role in the regulatory development and expansion of  
East  European capital markets, especially helping with emerging 
exchanges  that allow  citizens to trade their vouchers and to engage in 
share-issuance  programs that  can finance new businesses when bank 
loans are unavailable or too  expensive.

Further, in both CEE and the NIS states, we are assisting in the 
drafting of  laws that establish anti-trust and competition procedures, 
permitting  market  forces to work better.  Bankruptcy laws are also 
being developed, which  will  permit the restructuring of many 
industries.

In these programs, in particular, the public-private partnerships we 
have  crafted have greatly enhanced the reach of our programs.  By 
supporting  U.S.  volunteer organizations such as the Financial Services 
Volunteer Corps  and the  International Executive Service Corps, we have 
been able to leverage  the use of  some of the world's great experts in 
the realms of law and finance.

We're also helping to put in place social service systems.  Our FY 1995 
SEED and  FREEDOM Support Act requests place greater emphasis than in 
previous  years on  providing technical assistance to help CEE and NIS 
countries  restructure their  social services to the needs of a market 
economy.

Our first challenge here is to help the governments of the region  
determine what  services they can no longer afford and to find ways for 
the private  sector to  deliver some of those services.

Our second task is to help governments find new ways to finance those 
social  services that they do plan to continue to provide.Housing and 
health  care loom  as two of the biggest social service challenges in 
both CEE and the  NIS.  With  respect to housing, our programs are 
providing technical assistance to  help  governments phase out rent 
subsidies, while targeting allowances for  vulnerable  groups.  With 
respect to health care, we are providing training and  advice that  will 
improve the efficiency and quality of delivery in the private  sector.

Mr. Chairman, let me emphasize a key feature of our program.  For the  
most part,  the U.S Government provides technical assistance, not cash, 
to the  nations of  Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union.  It is trade,  not aid,  which will provide the bulk of the hard-
currency capital that the  region so  badly needs.

Through our assistance programs, and through high-level political  
discussions,  we are helping the nations of CEE and the former Soviet 
Union to  establish a  legal, regulatory, and institutional environment 
that is more conducive  to  American trade and investment.

The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission has been particularly successful in  
engaging  the Russians in finding where the problems for Western 
investment are  and in  trying to work to remove them.  Secretary Brown, 
the Chair of the  Gore-Chernomyrdin Business Development Committee, 
recently lead a  mission to  Russia; it included 29 CEOs from Fortune 
100 and leading smaller  companies, as  well as high-level 
representatives from the White House and our  principal trade  and 
investment-related agencies.  One of the main goals of the mission  was 
to  communicate to the Russian Government that a stable, low-tax, low- 
tariff  business climate will be necessary to attract the level of 
investment  and trade  that is needed for economic recovery and reform.

In addition, our Eximbank and OPIC programs are increasing their efforts  
to  facilitate American trade and investment in the region.  Eximbank 
has  been  particularly active in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic for  several  years now, and it is now stepping up its 
financing for projects in the  Baltic  states.  In Russia and the other 
NIS, OPIC will provide up to $2.5  billion in  finance and insurance in 
1994--a seven-fold increase over last year's  levels.  OPIC also has 
recently quadrupled its finance project limit and doubled  its  per-
project insurance--both to $200 million--in order to facilitate  larger  
projects.

American businesses are not going to invest in the region for altruistic  
reasons.  But as the basic mechanisms of the free market are  
established, the  natural, industrial, and human resources of the region 
will make it an  increasingly attractive market for investment and 
export.  The markets  that our  assistance efforts are nurturing will 
create profits and jobs at home  as well.  American firms already have 
invested more than $3 billion in Hungary and  $2.5  billion in Poland.  
This gives us a 43% share of total foreign direct  investment in the 
former and a 40% share in the latter, making the  United  States the 
number one foreign investor in both countries.

In the next decade, the nations of the former Soviet Union--particularly 
those  in Central Asia--also will provide attractive investment 
opportunity  for  American firms.  Last week, I participated in an 
extraordinary  conference--financed by FREEDOM Support Act funds and 
sponsored by the  Commerce  Department--that brought representatives of 
the five Central Asian NIS  together  with representatives of nearly 400 
American companies that are doing  business  there or are interested in 
doing so.  Those companies are motivated by  facts  and opportunities.  
Consider, for instance, that the mineral deposits  in  Uzbekistan alone 
are estimated to have a market value of $3 trillion.   Already,  U.S. 
firms such as Chevron and Philip Morris have concluded or are  actively  
negotiating contracts in Central Asia that could result in the flow of  
$3  billion in investment over the next few years.

Quality-of-Life and Humanitarian Programs

Mr. Chairman, while we are interested in promoting economic development  
in CEE  and the NIS, we also share the concern of the peoples of the 
region  that that  development be sustainable.  Thus, FY 1995 SEED and 
FREEDOM Support Act  programs will also focus on problems such as energy 
conservation and  efficiency, water resources management, and nuclear 
safety.  In  particular, we  plan to increase the funding for our 
growing multilateral collaboration  on  regional environmental problems.

USAID advisers have and will continue to support the efforts of the 
Group of 7 (G-7) Nuclear Safety Account--efforts which have lead to  
agreements  to close high-risk nuclear reactors in Bulgaria and 
Lithuania over the  next  four years.  The G-7 is now hard at work 
trying to reach a similar  agreement  with Ukraine, in order to shut 
down that country's notorious Chernobyl  reactor.

In addition, we have made good progress in fleshing out U.S.-Japanese  
cooperation on the environmental initiative for the region announced by  
the  President and the Japanese Prime Minister on February 11.  As part 
of  this  initiative, the Japanese will contribute up to $1 billion in 
untied  loans.

SEED funding for humanitarian assistance increased in FY 1994, with a  
focus on  the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  We expect 
this  focus and  level of spending to continue in FY 1995, with some 
funds set aside for  rehabilitation of public utilities and services, to 
help that nation  recover  from the devastating war there.

Ethnic and regional conflict has, unfortunately, been all too much a  
consequence  of the collapse of communism in the NIS as well.  That is 
why we are  requesting  FY 1995 funds to help stave off starvation and 
reduce human suffering  in  war-torn areas of the former Soviet Union, 
including Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  Georgia, and Tajikistan.  In addition 
to meeting immediate humanitarian  needs,  our humanitarian programs 
often serve to buy time, to cushion the  immediate  shock of transition, 
and to give peace-making and political reform  processes  the 
opportunity to establish themselves.

Mr. Chairman, we are constantly putting our programs to the hard test of  
reality.  We have in place a rigorous and comprehensive system of  
auditing.  More than 35 external audits of our programs in Central and 
Eastern  Europe have  been completed or are in the process of being 
completed by the USAID  Inspector  General and the General Accounting 
Office.  None of these audit reports  contained any serious programmatic 
criticisms.  At the same time, however, some of our programs have not 
lived up to our  expectations.  Just as the leaders and citizens of the 
CEE and NIS  states are  pioneering--just as they are engaged in a great 
experiment--so are we.   There  is, and will continue to be, an element 
of trial and error to their  efforts--and to ours.  When we make 
mistakes, we learn from them. 

For example, we also have reduced our use of consultants who "fly in and  
out."  Short-term advisers absorbed a significant portion of the 
assistance  budget  when the CEE program was first launched.  We built 
on this lesson to  reduce  reliance on short-term consultants in the NIS 
and to focus them on  specific  tasks that require special expertise.  
Both SEED and FREEDOM Support  Act  programs now utilize long-term 
advisers, eschew the "seminar approach,"  and are  more concerned with 
building indigenous capacity.  We started, for  example,  with one 
Russian for every foreign adviser on the Russian privatization  program.  
The ratio is now 4 to 1.

In addition, we are revamping our contracting system to encourage  
broader  competition and get the best skills for taxpayer dollars.  We 
are also  concerned about our rate of expenditures, which are still not 
as high  as we  would like for either SEED or FREEDOM Support Act 
programs.

In part, our rate of expenditure is low by design or for unavoidable  
reasons.  Some programs are designed to last several years, and the 
expenditures  will  cover the same period.  As I mentioned, we are now 
directing more of  our  resources toward long-term advisers, who tend to 
be more effective than  short-term ones.

In some cases, our expenditures are dependent on the pace of reform.   
For  instance, the funds that have been targeted for assistance to 
Ukraine  can only  be spent as that government takes concrete actions to 
advance economic  reform.  Simply put, we can't support privatization 
efforts until there are  efforts to  fund.

Other delays, however, are being corrected.  While there is an  
inevitable  trade-off between AID regulatory oversight and our ability 
to respond  quickly  in the region, we are confident that the 
experiences of the past year  have  taught us much of what we need to 
know in order to speed things along.  For instance, last year we 
realized that, despite good intentions, the  G-24 was  not playing an 
effective coordinating role.  We therefore seized the  initiative  and 
pushed the coordinating function out into the field, especially in  the  
realm of democracy building.  U.S. embassies in Prague and Warsaw are  
now  coordinating G-24 democracy-building programs.  For Russia, we have  
shifted key  coordination issues to a more manageable G-7 forum.

Changes such as these have enabled us to respond more flexibly to the  
expressed  desires and needs of each of the recipient countries.  There 
are a  number of  indications that we have, in fact, speeded up the 
response time of our  assistance programs, particularly in the former 
Soviet Union.  We are now getting privatization advisers on the ground 
throughout the  NIS  within 30 days of our receiving assistance 
requests.  We expect the  FREEDOM  Support Act expenditure rate to rise 
from the current level of $438  million to  more than $750 million or 
$800 million by the end of the fiscal year;  this will  represent an 
increase to 25% of appropriations.

I should say also, Mr. Chairman, that we are concerned about the impact  
of crime  and corruption both on our assistance programs as well as on 
the  economic and  political development of the nations of the region.  
As we work to  improve the  delivery of our assistance programs, we know 
that we must be alert to  the  growing potential for crime to undermine 
these efforts.  Through  careful program monitoring and selection of 
reliable implementors, we believe we have minimized the potential for 
corruption.  Moreover, since most of our assistance is in the form of 
technical expertise, rather than cash, opportunities for abuse are 
considerably reduced.

However, the problem of more widespread crime and corruption in the 
region will be much tougher to fix.  The growth of organized crime in 
CEE and the NIS is undermining many of the structures of civil society 
that reformers have worked so hard to nurture.

In Russia, we are assisting with the creation of a new civil code, which 
includes a new criminal code.  Further, James Collins is now chairing an 
inter-agency task force to review the current legal, judicial, and 
enforcement programs that assist CEE and NIS governments in combating 
the spread of crime, and we expect that this task force will provide us 
with recommendations as to how these programs can best be adjusted, 
strengthened, and enlarged.

However, we know that the problems of crime and corruption do not lend 
themselves to quick solutions.  The growth in crime is a result of the 
breakup of the old authoritarian system and will only be controlled when 
new laws, enforcement structures, and judicial systems are in place.  I 
come before you today with no magic wand: Creating these new structures 
will take time.

As a general proposition, Mr. Chairman, let me assure you that we will 
continue to subject ourselves to rigorous self-criticism, and we are 
receptive to criticism and advice we get from others, particularly, I 
might add, from Members of Congress.  Secretary Christopher, USAID 
Administrator Brian Atwood, NIS Assistance Coordinator Tom Simons, 
Senior Coordinator Jim Collins, and I spent a very useful hour last 
month on the Hill with the Gephardt delegation, which had just returned 
from a fact-finding mission   to Russia.   The delegation made a number 
of thoughtful suggestions concerning our assistance programs, on issues 
ranging from crime to small- business creation to tax reform, and we are 
currently working hard on concrete responses to those suggestions.  For 
instance, we are now focusing more attention on Russia's regions and 
issues of federalism.  Our assistance projects will concentrate on 5-10 
key regions in Russia, where U.S. interests and reform potential are the 
greatest.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me make this point:  From the 
beginning, our assistance efforts have assumed that advice and training, 
rather than cash transfers, are the most effective ways for us to 
support the whole spectrum of reform in the region.  As the saying goes:  
"Give a man a fish, he'll eat for a day; teach him how to fish, and 
he'll eat forever."

One of America's greatest strengths lies in its human resources, and the 
strength of our assistance program lies in the skills of its 
participants--our bankers, lawyers, environmental experts, and labor 
specialists.  Generally, the people we engage are the same experts that 
American businesses employ when they need advice.  Furthermore, many of 
these advisers work for us at reduced rates, or even pro bono.

Our programs are by no means flawless, but our achievements to date have 
demonstrated that American technical expertise can impart knowledge and 
help reformers arrive at creative solutions to the seemingly intractable 
problems they face.  And above and beyond the transfer of knowledge and 
expertise, there are the intangible but still very real long-term 
benefits created by face-to-face inter- action between Americans and the 
people of Central and Eastern Europe and the NIS.

For one thing, the American professionals now working on behalf of our 
assistance programs are building the contacts and relationships that 
will lead to strong private sector opportunities in the future.  For 
another, there is no better way to expand the culture of democracy than 
by these face-to-face contacts.  Thus, SEED and FREEDOM Support Act 
programs are building links between economies and people, rather than 
simply between governments.A few minutes ago, I mentioned how 
enthusiastically American firms have been investing in countries such as 
Hungary and Kazakhstan.   These companies are not in Central and Eastern 
Europe and the NIS for reasons of altruism; they're doing it because it 
makes good business sense.

By the same token, our Administration is investing in the region because 
it makes good economic sense--and good national security sense; we are 
investing for reasons that go to the heart of what we see as America's   
vital national interests.  As the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe 
and  the NIS take a greater role in the political decisions of their 
communities and their nations; as they consolidate their independence, 
stabilize their economies, and trade with other countries; the world--
and the United States--will become safer and more prosperous.

   (###)



ARTICLE  4

U.S.-ASEAN Relations:  Building On Shared Strength, Prosperity, And 
Democratic Values
Acting Secretary Talbott, Joint Press Statement 
Remarks at opening of the 12th U.S.-ASEAN Dialogue, Washington, DC, May 
9, 1994.

Secretary Christopher sends you his warm greetings.  He regrets that he 
could not be here to welcome you himself; he is out of the country 
today.  He looks forward to meeting again with his ASEAN colleagues 
later this year in Thailand and Indonesia.

This year, we have taken another important step in the evolution of the 
dialogue by combining it with our TICC discussions, and inviting 
representatives of the private sector to participate.  So let me extend 
a special welcome to the business leaders who are here today.

President Clinton's first overseas trip after being elected was to Asia, 
and he hosted a historic first meeting of Asian-Pacific leaders last 
November in Seattle.  He has committed himself to helping create what he 
calls a New Pacific Community, built on shared strength, shared 
prosperity, and a shared commitment to democratic values.  To that end, 
he, and all of us, will be relying heavily on two organizations, APEC 
and ASEAN.  There is obviously an important connection between the two.

Indonesia will host both the first APEC Trade Ministers conference and, 
of course, the second APEC leaders summit.  It is appropriate that an 
ASEAN state is helping to lead the way for APEC, since ASEAN itself has 
been leading the way on a broad range of Pacific community issues for 
more than two decades.  We attach special importance to the new ASEAN 
Regional Forum to be launched this year in Thailand.  This will include 
China, Russia, Vietnam, and other states in the region.  We feel this is 
the right setting for the region's first broadly inclusive security 
dialogue.

I am struck that your agenda this week has a similarly broad focus.  It 
includes so-called "out-of-area" issues such as the Middle East and 
Bosnia.  Thus, this group obviously recognizes, and represents, the 
overarching fact   of life in today's world, which is interdependence.  
That means the interdependence of whole areas as well as the 
interdependence of individual countries.  We see interdependence as 
basically a favorable phenomenon.

The Pacific region in general, and ASEAN in particular, offer enormous 
opportunities for American enterprise.  U.S. trade with Asia is now 40%, 
and Asia is likely to account for half the growth in world trade between 
now and the year 2000.  As currently constituted, ASEAN is already the 
United States' fourth-largest overseas market.  By the year 2000, it 
could become a trillion dollar economic area, encompassing up to a dozen 
countries.  We believe that just as free trade enhances our prosperity, 
so the free movement of people, information, and ideas enhances other 
aspects of our lives, including our security in an interdependent world.

Communication and transportation technologies are bringing the world 
closer together in time and space, enabling us to forge new links among 
people and joint approaches to shared problems.  Moreover, the 
communications revolution also encourages a global consciousness--and 
global conscience.  Ethnic groups have been slaughtering each other in 
Africa and the Balkans for millenia.  But now the whole world sees real-
time coverage of these massacres.  That is an inducement to 
international response to these terrible affronts to humanity and these 
threats to regional stability.

At the same time, interdependence also has a dimension of danger.  There 
is a host of perils that refuse to respect state boundaries:  AIDS, arms 
proliferation, terrorism, drug trafficking, and environmental 
degradation. Just as good ideas--democracy and market economics--are 
contagious, so are bad ideas--particularly various forms of extremism, 
and particularly in those places where poverty and overpopulation make 
people desperate.

ASEAN and the ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue can play a leading role in magnifying 
the positive features of our growing interdependence.  It also can play 
a leading role in combating the negative ones.  My colleagues, I know, 
look forward to a frank discussion of our bilateral, regional, and 
global trading priorities, including any differences we may have.  We 
also hope that the dialogue produces constructive plans for dealing with 
troubles and threats in the region.

ASEAN already has established an impressive track record in nurturing 
peace and democracy in Cambodia.  That country still serves as an 
example of international peace-making at its most promising.  Political 
violence in Cambodia continues.  But the people there can nevertheless 
celebrate the first anniversary of an election in which 90% of the 
registered voters participated. It was last May, a year ago now, that 
Cambodian farmers and monks and former soldiers crossed mine fields and 
defied election-day death threats, all in order to vote.  They 
demonstrated that the yearning for freedom is a universal impulse.  
Since then, ASEAN and the UN have, together, maintained a steady, 
intelligent commitment to peace, prosperity, and democracy there.

With respect to another troubled country in the region--Burma--the 
United States has its differences with the ASEAN states.  But this 
disagreement is primarily tactical; we and ASEAN share the same 
objective, which is the establishment of democracy.  Indeed, we share 
the same objectives throughout the region.  Our common purposes clearly 
outweigh periodic strains that inevitably arise from different 
histories, cultures, and stages of development.  Far more important--and 
far more powerful--than any differences among us are the interests and 
values that bind us together.

I will conclude by saying how pleased we are that you have all gathered 
here--many of you traveling from the other side of the globe--for three 
days of meetings.  While the revolutions in communications technology 
are, as I said, bringing us closer and closer, there will never be a 
substitute for face-to-face gatherings like this one.  They give us a 
chance to look each other in the eye and listen to each other 
attentively, respectfully, critically, and constructively.  I appreciate 
your listening to me--and now, for a few minutes at least, I will have a 
chance to listen to you--and to sample the excellent program you have 
ahead of you.


Joint Press Statement
Text of a joint press statement released following the Meeting of the 
Twelfth U.S.-ASEAN Dialogue, Washington, DC, May 10, 1994.

1.  The Twelfth U.S.-ASEAN Dialogue was held at the U.S. Department
of State in Washington, D.C. on May 9-10, 1994.

2.  Delegations from the governments of the United States and members of 
the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) participated in the 
meeting, which was co-chaired by Ambassador Winston Lord, Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, leader of the 
United States Delegation, and His Excellency Dato Lim Jock Seng, 
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, leader of the Brunei 
Darussalam delegation.  His Excellency Dato Ajit Singh, Secretary 
General of ASEAN, was also present.

3.  The private sectors of the United States and ASEAN also participated 
and were represented by the United States and ASEAN Sections of the 
U.S.-ASEAN Business Council.  To underscore the central importance both 
sides accord to the private sector and the United States' and ASEAN 
desire to integrate the private sector more extensively in the Dialogue, 
the private sector participated fully in the entire economic agenda of 
the Dialogue.

4.  Acting Secretary of State Strobe Talbott welcomed the ASEAN 
participants and observed that the dialogue provides an opportunity to 
discuss a broad range of economic and political issues, including issues 
outside the Asia-Pacific region.  The U.S. attaches special importance 
to the new ASEAN Regional forum. Communications and transportation 
technologies are bringing the world closer together in time and space, 
enabling us to forge new links among peoples and joint approaches to 
shared problems.  The communications revolution also encourages a global 
consciousness, and a global conscience.  ASEAN, and the U.S.-ASEAN 
Dialogue, can play a leading role in magnifying the positive features of 
our growing interdependence and in controlling the negative ones. Far 
more important than any differences among us are the interests and 
values that bind us together.  The Acting Secretary noted the value in 
having the Trade and Investment Coordination Committee (TICC) 
deliberations within the framework of the Dialogue process, thereby 
engaging the private sector in all aspects of the economic agenda.  He 
extended a special welcome to the business leaders participating in the 
dialogue.

5.  ASEAN Secretary General Dato Ajit Singh emphasized in his opening 
remarks the importance of the now 17 year old ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue 
process, noting our substantial trade and investment ties and our shared 
political and security interests.  He described the Dialogue process as 
a dynamic one, pointing to the role of the private sector, the 
Dialogue's elevation to the senior officials level, and the inclusion of 
political and security issues.  The Secretary General stressed ASEAN's 
commitment to free trade and the opportunities for U.S. joint ventures 
with ASEAN counterparts.  He said ASEAN looks to enhanced regional 
security consultations to foster trust and confidence so matters can be 
peacefully resolved.  The Secretary General concluded that ASEAN 
considers the United States an important partner in the region.

6.  His Excellency Dato Lim Jock Seng, in his opening remarks, stated 
that the Dialogue is a relationship between friends who feel confident 
enough to talk frankly, and that we have made progress in the Dialogue 
relationship.  He emphasized the need for mutual understanding and 
sensitivity in conducting relations.  He pointed to the importance of a 
balance within the Dialogue relationship to ensure that all aspects of 
our joint efforts--political, economic, cultural, and development 
cooperation--are given equal consideration.

7.  The Meeting reviewed the U.S.-ASEAN Dialogue relations since the 
last U.S.-ASEAN Dialogue in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam on 
May 15-16, 1993.  Both sides emphasized the importance of the Dialogue 
process as a key element in our relations, recognizing the breadth of 
United States and ASEAN links and the areas where the United States and 
ASEAN can work in partnership, and emphasizing the role of the Dialogue 
in reviewing shared economic and political issues.

8.  The representatives of the U.S. and ASEAN private sectors called on 
governments to nurture a healthy and strong economic and commercial 
relationship.  The U.S.-ASEAN Dialogue and the Trade and Investment 
Coordination Committee should be used not only to identify and solve 
problems, but also to enhance cooperation for mutual growth.  
Governments should continue bilateral and regional efforts to lower 
barriers to trade in goods and services, to reduce subsidies, protect 
intellectual property rights, facilitate economically sound investment, 
and to avoid taking unilateral actions and linking non-trade issues to 
trade matters.  Such measures are consistent with, and complementary to, 
the recently completed Uruguay Round.  Both private and public sector 
representatives welcomed private sector participation in the Dialogue.

9.  The Meeting exchanged views on international economic issues and the 
United States and ASEAN economic outlooks.  The United States indicated 
that the U.S. economy is in the best shape in a generation.  GDP growth 
in 1994 is expected to be three percent or higher; the U.S. is 
experiencing an investment boom; personal consumption remains moderate; 
and inflation figures are at the lowest level in more than 20 years.  
The ASEAN region, whose two-way trade with the world and with the United 
States in 1993 was, respectively, $372 billion and $70.6 billion, is 
characterized by high growth, rapid economic integration, significant 
investment and growth from foreign capital, a central private sector 
role in growth and integration, and sound government policies.  The 
meeting welcomed the improved economic outlook and hoped that this would 
engender greater trade and investment flows.

10.  The U.S. and ASEAN were pleased that negotiations for an 
International Tropical Timber Agreement were successfully concluded and 
was hopeful that negotiations for a Third International Natural Rubber 
Agreement could be completed this year.

11.  The Meeting agreed to pursue the Alliance for Mutual Growth (AMG) 
to improve trade and investment through mutual cooperation.  The TICC 
meeting on May 11 will look at the six areas being emphasized under the 
AMG:  human resources, infrastructure, small and medium sized 
enterprises, standards, technology, and trade promotion.

12.  The U.S. and ASEAN discussed the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) forum, the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), and the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  They agreed that APEC would contribute 
positively to regional economic cooperation.  They recognized that the 
successful APEC Leaders and Ministerial meetings in Seattle last 
November moved APEC to a new level of maturity and provided strong 
momentum for further development in 1994 under Indonesia's chair.  ASEAN 
and the United States briefed each other on the AFTA and the NAFTA, and 
encouraged each other to take advantage of the new trade and investment 
opportunities offered by these agreements.  The ASEAN Secretary General 
also briefed on developments on the EAEC.

13.  Both sides remain committed to the multilateral trading system, the 
importance of the recently concluded Uruguay Round, and the significance 
of the World Trade Organization.  The United States noted the 
President's commitment to seek bipartisan support for passage this year 
of the Uruguay Round implementing legislation.  ASEAN confirmed that 
they are also preparing for early ratification of the Uruguay Round 
agreement.  The United States, ASEAN, and the private sector all 
stressed the need to fully implement the Uruguay Round.

14.  The Meeting recognized the ASEAN Private Investment Trade 
Opportunities (PITO) program's important role in promoting investment 
and trade activities in the Asia-Pacific region.  The Meeting also 
discussed funding by the United States Agency for International 
Development through PITO and the ASEAN Environment Improvement Program 
(EIP).  The private sector underlined the possible role PITO could play 
in implementing AMG.

15.  The United States looks forward to participating in the first 
meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Bangkok in July 1994 to further 
regional security dialogue in Asia.  The Bangkok meeting will include 
ASEAN foreign ministers, foreign ministers from ASEAN Dialogue Partners, 
including Secretary Christopher, and observers and guests.  The U.S. 
affirmed that it will remain engaged in the region and that U.S. 
security policy will continue to be based on U.S. alliances and other 
bilateral defense ties, supplemented by active participation in the 
ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference and the ASEAN Regional Forum.  ASEAN 
expressed appreciation for the constructive role which the United States 
plays in the region.

16.  Participants also exchanged views on current international and 
regional issues of mutual interest, including Korea, Myanmar, Cambodia, 
Vietnam, the Middle East, Bosnia-Herzegovina, narcotics, and non-
proliferation.

17.  It was agreed that the 13th U.S.-ASEAN Dialogue would be held in 
Indonesia on a date to be mutually agreed upon.

18.  The ASEAN delegations expressed appreciation to the Government of 
the United States for the warm hospitality accorded to them and the 
excellent arrangements made for the meeting.

19.  The Meeting was held in the spirit of United States-ASEAN 
cooperation and cordiality.  (###)




ARTICLE 5

Crisis in Rwanda
George E. Moose, Assistant Secretary For African AffairsStatement before 
the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
Washington, DC, May 4, 1994

Mr. Chairman, members of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on 
Africa:  On April 6, the private plane of Rwandan President Juvenal 
Habyarimana crashed outside Kigali under suspicious circumstances, 
killing President Habyarimana and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of 
Burundi.  This tragic event sparked massive violence on two levels.

First, elements of the Hutu-dominated Rwandan military, hard-line party 
militias, and Hutu extremist gangs began killing Hutu opposition 
politicians (including Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana) and Tutsi 
opposition leaders and civilians.  The killings began in Kigali but 
eventually spread throughout the country.

Second, fighting quickly broke out between Rwandan Government forces and 
the Tutsi-dominated rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), effectively 
resuming the civil war that began in October 1990 and was to have ended 
on August 4, 1993, with the signing of the Arusha Peace Accord.  Both 
the fighting and the violence continue.  The RPF has pushed government 
forces to the south and west and controls much of the capital of Kigali.  
The violence has left at least 100,000 dead and displaced hundreds of 
thousands of Rwandans.  Over 300,000 Rwandans have fled to neighboring 
countries, most to Tanzania.  On May 3, the Rwandan Government and the 
RPF sent delegations to attend talks in Arusha, Tanzania, but direct 
negotiations between the two sides have not yet begun.

U.S. Response to the Crisis

Since the crisis began, the U.S. has pursued an active strategy with 
five main
 goals:

--  Stop the killings;
--  Achieve a durable cease-fire;
--  Return the parties to the negotiating table;
--  Contain the conflict; and
--  Address humanitarian relief needs.

We have taken several actions designed to achieve these goals.First, we 
have put diplomatic pressure on the parties themselves. I and other U.S. 
officials have spoken directly to Rwandan Government officials, the 
Rwandan military, and the RPF in Washington, via diplomatic channels in 
other locations, and by telephone to Rwanda.  Our message has been 
simple and direct:  We want an immediate end to the killings, a cease-
fire in place, the resumption of peace talks, and complete cooperation 
with relief efforts.  We have reinforced these private contacts with 
high-level public appeals and statements by the President and the State 
Department.Second, we have worked to mobilize the international 
community.  We encouraged the efforts of the Tanzanian Government, as 
facilitator of the Arusha process, to reconvene peace talks and are 
supporting those efforts.  As in the past, the United States will be 
represented at any substantive talks.  We have encouraged the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU), other regional states, and our 
European allies to join us in urging the Rwandans to agree to a cease-
fire and resume talks.

Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs 
John Shattuck and our Ambassador to Rwanda, David Rawson, have been sent 
to the region to continue these efforts.  They are being accompanied by 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Refugee Programs Brunson McKinley.  Our 
diplomatic contacts confirm that all major players agree with and 
support our goals and strategy.

Third, we have been pursuing an active policy in the UN Security 
Council.  We pushed for approval of a strong Security Council 
presidential statement, issued April 30, which demands that the interim 
government of Rwanda and the RPF take effective measures to prevent 
attacks on civilians.  The statement condemns the breaches of 
international humanitarian law that have occurred and calls on all 
states to cease shipments of arms to Rwanda.

Fourth, we have undertaken contingency planning to provide humanitarian 
relief and have identified several million dollars from various sources 
that we intend to tap for the crisis.  The U.S. Government has already 
contributed approximately $28 million in food, relief items, and 
earmarked funds to organizations assisting Burundi refugees and persons 
displaced following last October's coup attempt and subsequent 
widespread violence.  In response to the Rwanda crisis, the 
Administration just approved $15 million in additional funding for new 
relief efforts in the area.

Fifth, we are continuing to monitor the situation in Burundi very 
closely. We have sent high-level visitors to the country to show our 
support for Burundi's fragile nascent democracy and are continuing 
humanitarian relief efforts.  We have also provided support to the 47-
member monitoring force that the OAU is in the process of deploying in 
Burundi.

The efforts outlined above are a continuation of the long-standing U.S. 
support for the Rwandan peace process.  We were active observers 
throughout the year-long Arusha peace talks and provided $1 million in 
assistance to support the talks and help the OAU field cease-fire 
monitors.  The United States supported deployment of UN peace-keepers 
once a peace accord was reached.

In the end, only the Rwandans can bring peace to their country, and no 
outside effort can succeed without a commitment to peace by the 
combatants themselves. The influence of the international community in 
an internal conflict of this type is limited, but we will use what 
influence we have in an effort to achieve our goals.

Future Policy Options

At the same time that we are pursuing the policies outlined above, we 
are examining further measures to ratchet up the pressure.  First among 
these is a formal UN arms embargo against Rwanda, which we intend to 
pursue this week.  We also encourage increased involvement by the UN 
Human Rights Commissioner, who could launch an investigation into human 
rights abuses and perhaps become involved in mediation efforts. In 
addition, we are exploring the possibility, if necessary, of having the 
UN or OAU establish protected areas for refugees and displaced persons 
around border areas.

Assessment of the UN Mission

From the start, the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was a 
peace-keeping, not a peace-making, operation.  It was deployed only 
after a cease-fire was in place and both sides had signed a peace 
accord.  The force had the limited mandate of monitoring and 
facilitating implementation of the accord, as the parties had requested.

Circumstances have changed drastically since the April 6 plane crash.  
Heavy fighting and widespread violence have resumed, UNAMIR troops were 
attacked and at least 10 UN peace-keepers were killed, and there was 
serious doubt in the early stages whether the lightly armed UNAMIR 
troops had the capability to defend themselves in such circumstances.  
As a result, the U.S. supported withdrawal of the bulk of the force for 
its safety, provided satisfactory arrangements were made to ensure the 
safety of Rwandans under direct UNAMIR protection.

It appears now that a portion of the force has been able to remain 
safely in Rwanda.  Under such circumstances we strongly support the 
Security Council decision to maintain a small force to help broker a new 
cease-fire, facilitate humanitarian relief efforts, and help ensure the 
safety of those Rwandans already under UNAMIR's direct protection.  
(###)



ARTICLE 6

Human Rights Abuses in Liberia
Statement by Acting Department Spokesman Christine Shelly, Washington, 
DC, May 9, 1994.

The United States is increasingly concerned by the widespread and 
growing pattern of human rights abuses being committed by the various 
armed factions in Liberia. These abuses, accompanied by continued 
violence among and within the factions, have curtailed the delivery of 
much-needed humanitarian assistance and threaten to derail Liberia's 
fragile peace process.

We are particularly concerned about the actions of an organization 
calling itself the Liberian Peace Council (LPC)--an armed militant group 
operating in southeastern Liberia. We have received numerous credible 
reports of gross human rights violations--including murder, rape, 
mutilation, and torture--committed by the LPC against unarmed civilians. 
The LPC's aggressive military activities have displaced tens of 
thousands of Liberians and threaten to plunge the country back into 
full-scale civil war.

We are also concerned about human rights abuses stemming from the 
fighting which continues between rival groups within the United 
Liberation Movement for Democracy (ULIMO), including summary executions 
of civilians based on their ethnic background.  In central and northern 
Liberia, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) has harassed 
relief workers and UN personnel, recently compelling UN observers to 
withdraw temporarily from northern Nimba County. These activities have 
disrupted humanitarian relief operations in large areas of the country 
and frustrated the implementation of the Cotonou Peace Accords.

The United States calls on the leadership and partisans of the Liberian 
factions to cease immediately their military activities and obstruction 
of relief shipments.  The United States strongly supports the efforts of 
the African peace-keeping force (ECOMOG) and the UN to engineer 
disengagement of LPC and NPFL forces and urges the prompt and complete 
cooperation of all Liberian factions in the disarmament process mandated 
by the Cotonou Accords.  
(###)



ARTICLE 7

Cambodia:  Recent Developments
Peter Tomsen, Deputy Assistant Secretary For East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs

Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, May 11, 1994

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I welcome this opportunity 
to testify today on Cambodia.

As we approach the first anniversary of the dramatically successful UN-
organized elections in Cambodia--held May 23-28, 1993--the events of 
recent weeks have demonstrated that the future of democracy in Cambodia 
cannot be taken for granted.  The recapture of Pailin by the Khmer Rouge 
(KR) and their success in reestablishing illegal control over certain 
areas in western Cambodia have been setbacks to the Royal Cambodian 
Government (RCG).  While this does not threaten the viability of the 
RCG, it underscores the danger the Khmer Rouge still poses to Cambodia's 
emerging democracy.

Accomplishments

Despite persistent Khmer Rouge threats, democracy in Cambodia has shown 
impressive staying power over the past year.  Cambodian accomplishments 
in this area would not have been possible without the contribution of 
the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).  UNTAC was a stunning 
peace-keeping success.  The UN organized the May 1993 elections in which 
approximately 4 million Cambodians--90% of registered voters--
participated.  These elections, internationally recognized as free and 
fair, succeeded despite the fact that the Khmer Rouge--also known as the 
Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK)--refused to participate, denied the 
UN access to areas under KR control, and threatened and intimidated 
potential voters.

Cambodia's constitution, promulgated September 24, 1993, established a 
multiparty liberal democracy within the framework of a constitutional 
monarchy, with the former Prince Sihanouk elevated to King.  The 
FUNCINPEC Party and the Cambodian People's Party (CPP)--the election's 
top vote recipients--share power in the Royal Cambodian Government, with 
which the United States has full diplomatic relations.  FUNCINPEC's 
Prince Ranariddh and the CPP's Hun Sen are First Prime Minister and 
Second Prime Minister, respectively.  The Khmer Rouge, which boycotted 
the elections, is excluded from the government.The Royal Cambodian 
Government has been working to develop governmental institutions and has 
made significant strides in advancing respect for human rights and 
implementing market-oriented economic reforms.  Cooperation between 
FUNCINPEC and the CPP has surpassed earlier predictions, although there 
are still tensions within the ruling coalition as these former 
adversaries work out the dynamics of sharing power.

Cambodia continues to consolidate the impressive gains it has made in 
the area of human rights.  A wide range of internationally recognized 
human rights is provided for in Cambodia's constitution.  Membership in 
indigenous human rights organizations has grown rapidly.  The newly 
independent local media have expanded to include radio and television 
stations operated by political parties, as well as numerous print 
publications.  For the first time in decades, there are no political 
prisoners in Cambodia except persons detained in Khmer Rouge-controlled 
areas.  Racial violence against ethnic Vietnamese, however, remains a 
serious human rights problem.

Recent events suggest that as long as the Khmer Rouge insurgency remains 
active, Cambodia will continue to have periodic problems with regard to 
displaced persons.  This should not, however, obscure the fact that it 
was a major milestone in international refugee affairs when just over a 
year ago--in April 1993--the last of the 370,000 Cambodian refugees in 
Thailand were able to return to their home country as part of the 
international effort to bring peace to Cambodia.  The UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees has recently surveyed the returnee population 
with respect to their degree of reintegration.  Some 80% are doing well 
in the sense that they are no worse--or better--off than other 
Cambodians.  The disruption in their lives even with their return to 
Cambodia must not be minimized; the process of recovery is not a short 
one.

In the economic area, Cambodia has made important strides, including 
steps to liberalize trade, improve revenue collection, create macro-
economic stability, reduce inflation, and stabilize exchange rates.  
Cambodia's well-received national rehabilitation and development program 
outlines sound priorities, including reforming administrative and 
judicial institutions, promoting economic stabilization and growth, 
ensuring structural adjustment and sectoral reform, providing direct 
support for sustained development, and optimizing sustainable 
utilization of the natural resource base.

Cambodia is cooperating closely with international financial 
institutions.  On May 6, the International Monetary Fund Executive Board 
approved an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility arrangement that 
should provide approximately $120 million in balance-of-payments 
supports to Cambodia from 1994 to 1996. The World Bank intends to extend 
new structural adjustment lending of approximately $60 million, provided 
agreement is reached with the RCG on a medium-term reform policy.  The 
Asian Development Bank operational program envisages $266 million in 
medium-term--1994-97--lending to Cambodia.

Challenges

Despite its successes, Cambodia still faces enormous development, 
humanitarian, and security challenges.  Cambodia is one of the world's 
least developed countries, with a per capita annual GDP of only about 
$200.  Its infrastructure has been devastated--the result of more than 
20 years of war and KR atrocities.  Cambodia lacks the institutions and 
adequate numbers of trained personnel needed for a mature democracy.  
Under these challenging circumstances, it is vital that we in the 
international community join the Royal Cambodian Government and the 
Cambodian people in doing all we can to ensure the success of Cambodian 
democracy.

The Cambodians will not be able to address their problems without 
sustained assistance from the international community.  The March 1994 
Tokyo meeting of the International Committee on the Reconstruction of 
Cambodia (ICORC) produced total pledges of nearly $500 million in aid 
for Cambodia this year.  Secretary Christopher, heading the U.S. 
delegation, reaffirmed our commitment to Cambodia, its democratic 
government, and its nascent market economy.  The U.S. ICORC pledge was 
for over $33 million in assistance for Cambodia in 1994 and an 
additional $40 million in 1995, subject to Congressional action.  This 
assistance will be used to promote political stability and democratic 
pluralism, support sustainable economic growth, and meet humanitarian 
needs.

At the June 1992 Tokyo conference on international assistance to 
Cambodia, international donors had pledged a total of $880 million for 
the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Cambodia, far in excess of the 
Secretary General's appeal.  By the end of 1993, the United States alone 
had provided more than $135 million in humanitarian and development 
assistance for Cambodia, meeting our 1992 pledge.  This was in addition 
to the approximately $517 million we had contributed through the United 
Nations to support the Cambodian peace process.

Our assistance reflects our commitment to demining.  The Cambodia Mine 
Action Center (CMAC) estimates that there are 8-10 million landmines 
still in place in Cambodia, roughly one for each Cambodian.  Cambodia--
along with Afghanistan and Angola--has the highest proportion in the 
world of amputees relative to population, largely because of landmines.  
CMAC and nongovernmental organizations have been very active in the 
demining effort, and the United States has strongly supported demining 
in Cambodia.  We have already provided $6 million for demining and, at 
the March 1994 ICORC conference, the United States pledged an additional 
$6 million for demining in FY 1994.  A total of $15 million for demining 
was pledged at ICORC by various governments and organizations.

Another way in which we are supporting the RCG is by assisting the 
Cambodians in their efforts to integrate their country into the global 
market economy.  We recently sent the RCG a revised draft of a proposed 
bilateral trade agreement. If the text proves acceptable to the RCG, we 
should be able to move forward quickly on concluding an agreement.  This 
would be an important step toward restoring MFN for Cambodia, a matter 
on which we are working closely with Congress.  Talks are continuing 
with the RCG on the unblocking of frozen Cambodian assets in connection 
with the settlement of outstanding claims involving the two countries.

The question of the hour following the KR recapture of Pailin is what we 
should be doing to help the RCG deal with the KR threat.  Certain steps 
are already underway.  In January, we concluded a Foreign Assistance Act 
Section 505 agreement with the RCG on end-use, security, and retransfer 
assurances.  This is a prerequisite for any security assistance.  The 
agreement includes an RCG commitment that U.S. assistance to Cambodia 
will not be allowed to benefit the Khmer Rouge.

We have provided humanitarian assistance donations to the RCG to help 
reintegrate defectors from the Khmer Rouge into Cambodian society.  
Eight 40-foot containers of humanitarian assistance excess property were 
delivered to Cambodia on April 4, 1994.  This was the second delivery in 
FY 1994.  Since February, the Department of Defense has delivered 
approximately $900,000 of medical supplies and equipment, hand-tools, 
sleeping mats, and mosquito nets. We are planning one additional FY 1994 
delivery which will include medical supplies and engineering equipment.  
Two deliveries are projected for FY 1995.

We have started an International Military Education and Training (IMET) 
program for Cambodia.  The initial focus is on English-language 
programs--a prerequisite for effective communication between the U.S. 
military and the RCAF.  The $90,000 in IMET funding will be used to 
purchase an English-language laboratory for Cambodia, train two 
Cambodians as English-language instructors, and send one Cambodian flag 
officer to the Senior International Defense Resources Management course.  
Cambodia also has been approved for Title 10 funding to attend a wide 
range of U.S-sponsored multinational seminars and conferences.  
Additional steps in response to Cambodian requests are under 
consideration.

Conclusion

The RCG and the Cambodian people are striving to consolidate the gains 
Cambodia has made in building a democratic political system and 
establishing a market economy.  They are doing so under extremely 
difficult circumstances, particularly in view of the ongoing security 
danger posed by the Khmer Rouge. The United States has an interest in 
helping Cambodia emerge as a prosperous and secure trading partner.  
Each nation in Southeast Asia has an interest in helping Cambodia 
finally put an end to the violence and instability that have stunted its 
development.  As the first anniversary of Cambodia's rebirth as a 
democratic nation draws near, it is more important than ever that the 
U.S. and other countries remain engaged to ensure that the progress the 
Cambodians and the international community have worked so hard to 
achieve is sustained.

With their courage and determination, the Cambodian people have moved a 
long distance from the killing fields of only a few years ago.  They 
have shown that the yearning for freedom is a universal impulse, not a 
Western export.  No other people have suffered more or earned our 
admiration more.  The international community--and America--must not let 
them down.  (###)

[END OF DISPATCH VOL 5, NO. 21]

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