US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 5, NUMBER 20, MAY 16, 1994
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
 
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1.  Pursuing Peace in the Middle East and Bosnia
a.  Palestinian Self-Rule Marks a Key Step Toward Lasting Peace -- 
Secretary
 Christopher
b.  Turning Principles Into New Realities in the Middle East -- 
Secretary
 Christopher
c.  Signing of Agreement To Implement Israel-Palestinian Declaration of
 Principles -- President Clinton
d.  Bosnia:  U.S. and Russia Call for Meeting Of Contact Group Foreign 
Ministers
e.  Secretary Christopher's Consultations on Peace in the Middle East 
and
 Bosnia, April 25 to May 3, 1994
-- Secretary Christopher, Jordanian King Hussein, Russian Foreign 
Minister
 Kozyrev, Saudi Foreign
Minister Saud, Israeli Prime Minister Rabin
2.  A New Consensus of the Americas -- Secretary Christopher
3.  The Americas:  New Priorities in a New Partnership -- Alexander F. 
Watson
4.  The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace
 Operations -- Madeleine K. Albright, Anthony Lake, Lieutenant General 
Clark, Executive Summary
5.  Annual Terrorism Report Released
6.  Treaty Actions
Inside back cover:  Electronic Services
 
 
ARTICLE 1 (a-e):
 
Pursuing Peace in the Middle East and Bosnia
 
ARTICLE 1a:
 
Palestinian Self-Rule Marks A Key Step Toward Lasting Peace
Address by Secretary Christopher to the American Jewish Committee, 
Washington, DC, May 5, 1994.
 
Before reporting to you on aspects of my recent trip, let me take a 
moment to  commend the AJC and the outstanding leadership of Al Moses.  
Al, a long-time friend, exemplifies the  best of a uniquely American 
brand of public service:  balancing responsibilities to his family and  
profession with the demanding obligations of helping to lead his 
community.  You are indeed lucky to have him  as your president.
 
The AJC has done pioneering and persistent work against bigotry.  You 
have  spoken out against those who practice or preach anti-semitism and 
you have condemned every other form of  intolerance.  Your support for 
religious freedom is a gift for children of every faith.  You know that  
hatred cannot be quarantined; it must be confronted wherever it is 
found.
 
Tragically, new evidence of prejudice abounds.  Some nations have banned 
the  film "Schindler's List."  As you learned yesterday during your time 
with some of those saved by Schindler,  that film's importance to the 
collective conscience of humanity cannot be overstated and must not be  
ignored.
 
Regrettably, in America, too, new signs of intolerance have appeared.  
Recent  eruptions of anti-Semitism and racism have degraded our 
political dialogue and diminished our society.
 
What those in this room tonight know only too well is that bias and 
prejudice do  not disappear of their own accord.  I learned that lesson 
during my years at the Justice Department  following the Watts riots.  I 
learned it again when I was involved in the independent commission that 
recommended  reforms in the Los Angeles Police Department after the 
Rodney King beating.
 
Given our common vision of an America drawing strength from diversity, 
it is no  coincidence that the newly empowered L.A. Police Commission is 
headed by a distinguished member of  your organization, Rabbi Gary 
Greenebaum.
 
The AJC has been an advocate of tolerance not only at home but a 
compelling  voice for human rights around the world.  In the United 
States, we are still working to form a "more  perfect union."  And yet I 
would say that America's elevation of human dignity, in this country and 
around  the world, is unmistakable and really quite uncommon.
 
A Gift From Cairo
 
In view of the historic events of the last few days, I want to focus my 
remarks  tonight on developments in the Middle East peace process.  It's 
customary to bring a gift for your host  whenever you're invited to 
dinner.  Well, tonight, I bring a precious gift from Cairo--a gift that 
didn't  come easily but clearly reflects the commitment Israel and the 
Palestinians have made to creating a future of  coexistence and a future 
of reconciliation.  Formally, it's known as the agreement on Palestinian 
self-rule  in Gaza and Jericho.  But let me be a bit less opaque in 
describing what it really is:  an important step  forward on the road to 
a lasting and secure peace for Israel and the Middle East. This is, 
indeed, an achievement to be cherished.  We must use it to send a  
simple message to a still-troubled world:  Negotiations do work.  Peace 
between former enemies is possible. Starting today, the Palestinians and 
the Israelis, joined by their friends in  the United States, Egypt, and 
the rest of the world, have rolled up their sleeves and joined the real 
battle for  peace.  This is a battle that must be waged every day, on 
the ground, in the hearts and minds of people on both  sides of this 
long and bloody conflict:  a conflict that can only end when individual 
Israelis and  Palestinians see evidence in their lives that mistrust and 
violence need not be a permanent state of affairs--that in  fact they 
can live together side by side in a relationship of mutual respect and 
mutual benefit. Within a matter of weeks, the Israeli army will withdraw 
from Gaza and Jericho.

For the first time in their history, almost a million Palestinians will 
assume responsibility for the  day-to-day decisions that shape
their lives.   And in time, self-government will be extended to 
Palestinians throughout the West Bank.For its part, Israel will be free
--free of what Prime Minister Rabin has called the bloody costs of 
"ruling over another people who do not want our rule."  What Israeli 
soldier ever looked  forward to serving inJericho?  

What Israeli mother will not now rejoice knowing that her child will
 never again be sent to patrol the back streets and alleyways of Gaza?

Israel's Courage:  Taking Risks for Peace

To reap these benefits fully, both parties must continue to demonstrate 
the courage and vision that brought   them to yesterday's signing 
ceremony.  Israel, besieged by war and terror for  four decades, must 
transfer to yesterday's enemy, the PLO, sufficient authority so that 
self-rule can succeed.  Prime Minister Rabin intends to do precisely 
that without compromising Israel's security.
The Prime Minister's determination to go the extra mile for peace has 
been
 evident at every stage of these
negotiations.  In 1985, I had the pleasure of introducing then-Defense 
Minister
 Rabin at a function in Los
Angeles, never dreaming that a different day would come and that we 
would have
 the relationship we have
now.  I emphasized the courage and leadership he had repeatedly 
demonstrated in
 times of war.  Over the
last 15 months, as we've worked together to build a lasting peace, my 
admiration
 for him has only grown.
He has applied the courage and experience he acquired in war to the 
difficult
 task of making peace.
 
In those 1985 remarks, I also underscored Israel's tremendous courage as 
a
 country.  Compelled by
circumstances to fight for its survival, Israel has never stopped 
striving for
 peace.  In pursuit of that goal, it
repeatedly has shown itself ready to make painful choices and undertake
 significant risks for peace.  As it
does so yet again, Israel should know that America's bedrock commitment 
to its
 security remains
unshakable.  As President Clinton has said, "it is the job of the United 
States
 to minimize Israel's risks."
Toward that end, we must continue to guarantee and enhance Israel's 
qualitative
 military edge.
 
Palestinian Courage:  Ending Terror, Building Self-Rule
 
The Palestinians have much to gain from yesterday's events.  In taking 
on the
 powers of self-rule, they also
have a great responsibility for ensuring that the process succeeds.  
They can be
 assured of the goodwill and
support of the United States and the world community.  Last October, we
 organized the Donors'
Conference to Support Middle East Peace, which raised more than $2 
billion to
 assist Palestinian economic
development.  The United States alone pledged $500 million toward that 
effort.
 
By embracing this historic opportunity, the Palestinians can build a 
freer, more
 prosperous society--a
society based on accountable, democratic institutions of self-
government, where
 the rule of law and human
rights are upheld.  That is the kind of self-government that 
Palestinians want
 and deserve.  To achieve it,
however, they must first live up to all the solemn commitments their 
leaders
 have undertaken but that they
must now carry out.  One stands out among all others:  to root out 
terrorism and
 violence against Israel.
The peace process simply will not be sustained unless Israelis are 
convinced
 that it will bring them greater
security.
 
The U.S. Role
 
For our part, the Clinton Administration has been pushing the peace 
process
 forward since its first days in
office.  Indeed, my first trip outside the United States as Secretary of 
State
 was to the Middle East.  Since
then, we have maintained constant contact with the parties and have 
played what
 we hope will be a
significant role.  There are four aspects to that:
 
First, through our co-sponsorship of the Madrid process, we have 
provided the
 parties a framework for
direct negotiations.
 
Second, we have defused several crises that threatened to derail the 
talks--for
 example, the crisis over
deportees in early 1993 and the Katyusha crisis in Lebanon last summer.  
And
 only a few weeks ago, when
negotiations were suspended following the Hebron massacre, we worked out 
a
 formula acceptable to Israel
that brought the Palestinians back to the peace table.
 
Third, when necessary, we have acted as an active intermediary to move
 negotiations forward, particularly
on the Israeli-Syrian track.
 
Finally, we have mobilized the political and economic support of the
 international community to ensure we
have the resources to help make peace a reality in that region.
 
Without the United States playing this kind of a leadership role, I 
believe the
 peace process simply will not
succeed.  With it, yesterday's agreement can become the first step on 
the road
 to a lasting Middle East
peace.
 
Expanding the Peace
 
The successful implementation of the Gaza-Jericho accord must be 
followed by the
 expansion of self-rule
to the rest of the West Bank and then by negotiations on the difficult 
issues of
 final status.
 
But the Israeli-Palestinian breakthrough we saw finalized yesterday also 
must be
 accompanied by
accelerated progress in Israel's negotiations with its other neighbors--
Syria,
 Jordan, and Lebanon.  Only a
comprehensive Middle East peace will provide the strategic underpinning 
for
 long-term regional stability.
 
On my recent trip, I spent many intense and interesting hours with Prime
 Minister Rabin and President
Asad of Syria, discussing their important set of negotiations.  I 
believe there
 is a renewed seriousness of
purpose on both sides to engage comprehensively on all the issues that 
must be
 resolved across the broad
range of the relationship between the two countries.  The gaps that 
separate
 them remain wide.  But the
level of detail in their respective ideas is unprecedented and created a 
much
 stronger basis for negotiations.
A new, more substantive phase of these talks has been opened.  The 
United States
 intends to remain deeply
engaged.  I have agreed to travel again to Israel and Syria in the near 
future.
 
Building Cooperation, Containing Extremism
 
Last week, I also traveled to Riyadh for talks with King Fahd of Saudi 
Arabia
 and the foreign ministers of
the Gulf Cooperation Council.  I stressed the importance of expanding 
the zone
 of peace to the entire Arab
world.  Here, the Gulf states' active participation in the multilateral 
phase of
 the peace process is essential.
 
The multilateral process doesn't get much attention.  But quietly it 
continues
 to topple long-standing
taboos.  Last month, for example, the water working group met in Muscat 
and
 approved an Israeli proposal
for rehabilitating water systems in the region.  Think about that fact.  
A group
 including 13 Arab
delegations endorsed an Israeli proposal for addressing a common problem
 affecting all the countries in the
region.  The venue for the meeting--an Arab capital--is also a symbol of 
falling
 taboos.  I talked to the
Israeli representative and was touched by the way he was received.  The 
process
 continues this week in
Qatar, where the arms control group is meeting.
 
In Riyadh, I also urged the Gulf states to further demonstrate their 
interest in
 reconciliation with Israel, and
I told them that ending the Arab boycott is the place to start.
 
The boycott has always been detestable.  Now, with the signing of the
 Israeli-Palestinian economic
agreement a few days ago, it has become a dangerous anachronism that 
hurts the
 very people it is supposed
to help.  Implementation of the Declaration of Principles will be 
completed
 soon.  At that point, tangible
steps need to be taken to dismantle the boycott.
 
The second issue dominating my discussions in Riyadh was the need to 
maintain
 tight economic sanctions
against Iraq.  If Saddam Hussein is allowed to escape his current 
containment,
 he would pose an immediate
threat to his neighbors as well as to Arab-Israeli peace.  I am 
gratified that I
 found strong support for our
position among the Gulf countries for maintaining the sanctions.  It is
 essential that our other coalition
partners remain equally steadfast.
 
Creating a Middle East Community
 
I want to conclude by saying that yesterday's landmark agreement in 
Cairo
 represents another key building
block in America's long effort to help secure a more stable, peaceful 
Middle
 East.  This represents a
sustained bipartisan effort by Democratic and Republican Administrations 
alike.
 The costs have been
substantial.  But the returns are well worth the investment,  not simply 
because
 it allows us to help
reconcile long-term adversaries but because it promises to advance 
America's
 vital interests in a critical
region of the world.
 
The potential strategic benefits of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict 
are
 difficult to exaggerate.  Our aim is
nothing less than to create a new Middle East community of nations that 
share a
 common interest in
peaceful relations, stability, economic development, and the advancement 
of the
 region's peoples.  Such a
community would not solve all the region's problems.  But it would 
provide a far
 more solid foundation for
the well-being of Israel and our Arab friends.  It would better secure 
the
 region's vast oil supplies.  And it
would serve as a powerful bulwark against the growing threats of 
political
 extremism, weapons
proliferation, and the growing threats from renegade countries like 
Iraq, Libya,
 and Iran.
 
With the help and support of groups like the AJC, I am convinced that 
America
 can help Israel and her
neighbors achieve peace.  Through patience, persistence, and strength, 
we can
 advance our interests in this
vital region.  I assure you that the Clinton Administration remains 
dedicated to
 this vision of a more stable
and secure Middle East.
 
ARTICLE 1b:
 
Turning Principles Into New Realities in the Middle East
Remarks by Secretary Christopher at the signing of the "Agreement on the 
Gaza
 Strip and the Jericho
Area," Cairo, Egypt, May 4, 1994.
 
President Mubarak, Prime Minister Rabin, Chairman Arafat, Foreign 
Minister
 Peres, Foreign Minister
Kozyrev, Mr. Abbu Mazin, distinguished guests:  Representing President 
Clinton
 and the United States, I
am privileged and honored to stand with you today in this wonderful 
city, as we
 witness the signing of this
remarkable agreement and pay tribute to those who made it possible.
 
Eight months ago, many of you stood with me in another great city to 
witness
 another historic handshake.
The signing of the Declaration of Principles last September in 
Washington
 committed long-time
adversaries to mutual reconciliation.  It gave them a way out of the 
bitter
 conflict that has so long
entrapped them.
 
Now they stand on the verge of implementing that agreement.  Though we 
live in
 an age of political
wonders, where old hatreds are giving way to new hopes, these 
achievements
 cannot be forgotten.  Indeed,
we must use them to send this simple message to a world still beset by 
conflict:
  With vision, leadership,
and courage, peace between former enemies is possible.
 
The months between these two agreements have not been easy.  They have 
tested
 our faith in the power of
reasoned compromise.  Israelis and Palestinians have wrestled with the
 complicated questions like transfer
of authority, economic integration, and security--and perhaps also with 
their
 own doubts about the
possibility of success.  They searched for--and in the end, they found--
ways to
 turn principles into new
realities.
 
To their eternal credit, Israelis and Palestinians pressed forward in 
the face
 of extremists who sought to kill
hope for the future by inflaming the hatreds of the past.  We are here 
today
 because unspeakable acts of
violence could not still the voices of peace or weaken the resolve of 
the
 peacemakers.  We are here to send
a message to all who would use terror to keep Arabs and Israelis mired 
in the
 politics of hatred and despair:
The children of the Middle East will not be condemned to a future of 
perpetual
 conflict.  Negotiations
work; peace is possible.
 
For Palestinians, the challenge now is to build accountable, democratic
 institutions of government; to
provide for the economic well-being of their people; to uphold the rule 
of law;
 and to guarantee respect for
human rights.  That is the kind of self-government that Palestinians 
want and
 deserve. The international
community must stand ready to assist them.  The challenge is not merely 
to
 secure the peace but to take full
advantage of it.
 
For Israelis, the immediate task will be to establish a new relationship 
with
 their Palestinian neighbors, to
forge bonds of cooperation that can bring benefits to both peoples--to 
reach the
 undiscovered promised
land of peace.
 
For Palestinians and Israelis alike, the challenge will be to create a 
common
 basis of respect and tolerance.
The challenge will be to help all the peoples of the Middle East 
fulfill, in the
 words of President Clinton,
the "great yearning for the quiet miracle of a normal life."
 
There is still important work to be done.  We have not seen the end of
 contention in the Middle East.  But
we are changing the manner of contention.  We are coming closer to the 
day when
 disputes once inflamed
by the argument of force will be settled by the force of argument.
 
The spirit of compromise we see today must not fade.  Israelis and 
Palestinians
 have a fundamental stake in
this process.  For the first time, Palestinians have the chance to 
govern
 themselves.  For the first time,
Israelis have the chance to forge a truly constructive relationship with
 Palestinians.  I believe that together
they can--and must--succeed.
 
In the end, the goal we seek is not simply peace as the absence of war.  
It is a
 just and enduring and
comprehensive settlement based on genuine cooperation, mutual respect,
 tolerance, and the normal
interaction of diplomacy and trade that binds nations together.
 
With the support and determination of the friends of peace, that goal 
can be
 reached.  In this regard, I pay
special tribute to President Mubarak, whose efforts were so instrumental 
in
 helping us reach this moment.
Egypt has again demonstrated that it is an essential bridge, linking 
Arabs and
 Israelis in the pursuit of
peace.  It is also fitting to honor the memory of the late Foreign 
Minister of
 Norway, Johan Holst, who
worked tirelessly in pursuit of this agreement, and who is, I am 
certain, with
 us in spirit.
 
Forty-five years ago, on the island of Rhodes, the great American 
peacemaker
 Ralph Bunche mediated the
first armistice between Arabs and Israelis.  His words then capture our 
spirit
 now.  He said:
 
"I have a bias against war; a bias for peace. . . .  I have a bias in 
favor of
 both Arabs and Jews in the sense
that I believe that both are good, honorable and essentially peace-
loving
 peoples, and are therefore as
capable of making peace as of waging war."
 
The same motivations that brought Arabs and Israelis to Madrid, to Oslo, 
to
 Washington, and here today to
Cairo will carry this region forward to lasting peace.  Prime Minister 
Rabin,
 Chairman Arafat, we salute
you today for taking an extraordinary step toward this noble goal.
 
ARTICLE 1c:
 
Signing of Agreement To Implement Israel-Palestinian Declaration of 
Principles
Statement by President Clinton released by the White House, Office of 
the Press
 Secretary, Washington,
DC, May 4, 1994.
 
The signing today in Cairo of the agreement to implement the Israel-
Palestinian
 Declaration of Principles
marks another milestone in progress toward a lasting peace in the Middle 
East.
 On behalf of all
Americans, I have called Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat to
 congratulate them for this
accomplishment.  I expressed my high regard for Prime Minister Rabin's
 courageous leadership and
stressed to Chairman Arafat the importance of moving without hesitation 
to make
 this agreement a reality.
I also telephoned yesterday, and again today, President Mubarak to 
underscore
 our gratitude and
appreciation for the key role he played in making this historic step 
forward
 possible.
 
Now the focus must be on implementing the Declaration of Principles in 
as rapid
 and successful a manner
as possible.  The process of transforming the situation on the ground 
for the
 better must begin.  The
promise of a new future of hope for Israelis and Palestinians alike must 
now be
 realized.  I assured Prime
Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat that the United States would do 
everything
 possible to make this
happen.
 
Building on the progress achieved today and our ongoing discussions with 
parties
 in the region, I am
hopeful that this can be the year of breakthrough to a lasting and 
comprehensive
 peace for all the peoples
of the Middle East.
 
ARTICLE 1d:
 
Bosnia:  U.S. and Russia Call for Meeting Of Contact Group Foreign 
Ministers
Statement by Department Spokesman Michael D. McCurry, released by the 
Office of
 the Spokesman,
Washington, DC, May 3, 1994.
 
United States Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Foreign Minister 
of the
 Russian Federation
Andrei V. Kozyrev met today in Cairo, Egypt, to discuss a number of 
issues.
 Most importantly, the
Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister expressed serious concern 
over the
 continuing instability of the
situation in Bosnia, which could spark another dangerous point of 
conflict.
 
They called on all the parties for:
 
--  Immediate and full compliance concerning the withdrawal of forces 
from
 proscribed areas around
Gorazde;
 
--  Immediate steps to reduce tension and prevent offensive military 
action in
 the Brcko area;
 
--  Agreement on an urgent basis to a complete cessation of hostilities
 throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, to
include separation of military forces, withdrawal of heavy weapons, and
 interposition of UN forces; and
 
--  Immediate resumption of negotiations without precondition for 
conclusion of
 an overall settlement.
 
Secretary Christopher and Minister Kozyrev are convinced that a new, 
powerful
 political impetus is
required for a Bosnia settlement process.  They believe that a meeting 
involving
 the foreign ministers of
the participants in the Contact Group should be convened as soon as 
possible.
 Based on discussions with
their colleagues, they believe such a meeting could probably take place 
on May
 13 in Geneva.
 
ARTICLE 1e:
 
Secretary Christopher's Consultations on Peace in the Middle East and 
Bosnia,
 April 25 to May 3, 1994
 
Ascot, United Kingdom, April 25, 1994
Opening statements at a news conference by Jordanian King Hussein and 
Secretary
 Christopher.
 
King Hussein.  Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to express before you 
once
 again my joy at having the
opportunity to meet a very dear and old friend,  Secretary Christopher, 
here.
 We have had some very, very
fruitful, open, frank discussions on a number of issues that are of 
mutual
 interest to us but also to all of
you.  I am very happy indeed to have had this chance.  I am sure you 
have
 questions, which you should
address to the Secretary and myself, and we would be more than happy to 
respond
 to them.
 
Secretary Christopher.  I just had the honor of meeting with King 
Hussein again,
 here at his residence in
[Ascot], and I am glad to say that we have had a very constructive 
discussion of
 a number of issues.
 
We, of course, discussed the peace process and the importance of pushing 
for
 progress on all four of the
tracks, looking toward and understanding the great importance of a 
comprehensive
 peace.  We talked about
resumption on the four bilateral tracks in Washington, DC, rather soon 
after I
 complete this visit to the
Middle East.  We particularly agreed on the importance of moving forward 
to
 rapid implementation of the
Declaration of Principles between the Israelis and the Palestinians 
after they
 conclude their agreement,
which we hope will be in the very near future.
 
On another matter of importance, I informed His Majesty that, subject to 
some
 fine tuning, the United
States Government will support establishment of a land-based regime for
 verifying enforcement of
sanctions against Iraq.  The inspections will be carried out by a 
private,
 independent, not-for-profit
company of international stature and integrity, Lloyds Register of the 
United
 Kingdom, which will operate
at the Port of Aqaba.
 
The United States is convinced this new inspection regime will be as 
effective
 as the MIF--Multinational
Interception Force--effective in guaranteeing that no Iraqi trade will 
transit
 Aqaba other than transactions
which have been specifically permitted by the United Nations.  Indeed, 
we
 believe that in some respects
land-based inspections will be an improvement in our ability to enforce
 sanctions against Iraq.  I want to
emphasize that the King and I discussed these matters today, and the 
United
 States, Jordan, and our MIF
partners are all fully and definitely committed to the enforcement of 
these
 sanctions.
 
After careful study, I am glad to say, we became convinced that this 
proposal
 for a new inspection regime
not only takes into account--in response to legitimate concerns that His 
Majesty
 has indicated to me on a
prior occasion--but will also make it easier to sustain and enhance the
 sanctions against Iraq.  The King and
I have agreed that Jordan and the United States will cooperate closely 
together
 with the UN Sanctions
Committee and other interested parties to effectuate and establish this 
new
 on-shore enforcement regime to
make it work efficiently and expeditiously.
 
The Government of Iraq continues to thwart the will of the international
 community by its refusal to
comply with United Nations resolutions.  It certainly continues to 
inflict great
 damage on the people of
Iraq.  The King was very eloquent today in pointing out to me the harm 
that the
 people of Iraq are suffering
at the hands of the Government of Iraq.  Last week, we saw another 
example of
 Iraq's promotion of
terrorism when its agents assassinated an Iraqi opposition leader in 
Beirut.  In
 the face of this kind of
behavior, we believe that we have no alternative but to continue with 
the
 enforcement of the sanctions
regime.
 
 
Geneva, Switzerland, April 26, 1994
Opening statements at a news conference by Secretary Christopher and 
Russian
 Foreign Minister Kozyrev.
 
Secretary Christopher.  Good afternoon.  I will start with a brief 
opening
 statement, and then Foreign
Minister Kozyrev will make a brief statement in Russian, which will be
 translated.  And then we'll be glad
to try to respond to your questions.
 
We've just had a very productive meeting which covered several important
 international issues.  The chief
subject, of course, was Bosnia. Throughout this crisis in Bosnia over 
the
 Gorazde issue, the United States
and Russia have retained and had very close consultations at every 
stage.  We
 have a common objective in
Bosnia.  I believe we have a common view as to events on the ground.  
Russia's
 support for the steps taken
in Gorazde--and with respect to the other safe areas--by NATO has been 
very
 important and highly
desirable.
 
We discussed here this afternoon the importance of finding a diplomatic
 solution, for it is clear that there
can be no military solution to this long-standing conflict.  We have 
recognized
 the importance of the
Contact Group--which was formally recognized yesterday--which will, of 
course,
 combine the efforts of
Russia, the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations.  
I think
 the task of that Contact
Group, of course, is to try to bring the parties back to the table and 
into
 serious negotiations.  To that end,
the first task will be to achieve a genuine cessation of hostilities 
between the
 parties.  At the same time, the
Contact Group will be working to bring the parties into serious 
discussion of a
 final settlement.  We are
already at work, I think, on both of these urgent goals; and as you 
know, the
 members of the Contact
Group are preparing to go to Sarajevo to meet with both of the parties
 commencing on Thursday and
Friday of this week.
 
We had a good discussion--changing the subject--on the Middle East  
peace
 process and our concerns
about making progress there.  Foreign Minister Kozyrev gave me an 
account of his
 important meetings
today with Prime Minister Rabin, who had been in Moscow, and I told him 
of my
 plans over the next
several days to try to move the peace process along.  We discussed North 
Korea
 and the proliferation
problems there.  That's a problem on which our two countries have common 
goals
 and common interests,
and we will work closely together on that problem.
 
We also discussed the issue of Russian troop withdrawals from Latvia and
 Estonia.  We, I think, share the
hope that there can be a signature, in the next few days really, of the 
troop
 withdrawal agreement between
Russia and Latvia.  We also hope that the talks between Russia and 
Estonia,
 which will take place in the
early part of May, will be successfully concluded as well.
 
Finally, we discussed Russia's interest in joining the Partnership for 
Peace;
 and the partnership, of course,
is moving forward with, I think, 14 countries now having indicated 
interest in
 joining.  And, of course,
NATO will welcome Russia's participation at the time when they are ready 
to
 enter into those discussions.
 
 
Foreign Minister Kozyrev.  Well, I think that this is an objective 
description
 of the subjects we discussed.
The only thing I would like to add is one question that we discussed 
regarding
 the new COCOM and the
participation of Russia in the practical work in the development of this 
regime
 along the lines as we agreed
in Vladivostok.
 
 
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, April 27, 1994
Opening statements at a news conference by Saudi Foreign Minister Saud 
and
 Secretary Christopher.
 
Foreign Minister Saud.  I'd like to say that the Secretary has had a 
very
 wide-ranging, thorough, extensive,
fruitful discussion with the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, and the
 Secretary will give you a briefing
on these discussions.
 
I would like to concentrate my comments on the discussions that were 
held
 between the Secretary and the
Gulf Cooperation Council countries; and, in this regard, I would like to 
say
 that we were pleased to have
hosted the meeting today with Secretary of State Christopher and the 
ministers
 of the Gulf Cooperation
Council.
 
The GCC and the United States have a long history of close relations 
marked by
 advances in regional peace
and security to the benefit of all states in the region.  In our 
discussions, we
 reviewed with Secretary
Christopher our common stance with regard to the effect which Iraq 
continues to
 pose to regional security.
We agreed on a common resolve to stand vigilant and determined to ensure 
full
 compliance with United
Nations sanctions in accordance with Security Council resolutions--
especially
 Resolution 833, pertaining to
the demarcation of borders between Kuwait and Iraq.
 
The Secretary, on behalf of the President of the United States, 
reiterated the
 commitment of the United
States to the defense of the Gulf--a commitment that is appreciated by 
the Gulf
 Cooperation Council
countries.
 
The Secretary also briefed the GCC ministers on the state of progress in 
the
 peace process and the
objectives of his current trip to the region.  The GCC reiterated its 
full
 support for a negotiated peace
settlement; and, in this regard, the GCC ministers recognized the 
progress being
 made in the PLO-Israel
agreement and reiterated the need for a speedy implementation of that 
agreement.
 
The ministers also pledged to continue to do what they can to support
 negotiations and agreements reached
on the other tracks as well.  They will also continue their active 
engagement
 and participation in the
multilateral negotiations.  One meeting of the multilaterals has already 
taken
 place in the Gulf area; another
one is about to convene.
 
The GCC ministers believe all sides should do what they can to advance 
the
 prospects of peace.  They
condemn terrorism everywhere in the world and abhor extremism that 
threatens the
 peace process.  The
ministers appreciate the President's and the Secretary's efforts to 
promote
 Arab-Israeli peace and
reconciliation.  And the ministers look forward to the day when a new 
page is
 turned in the Middle East
and a just and comprehensive peace is achieved for all the peoples in 
the
 region.
 
As regards the problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the GCC ministers 
expressed their
 deep appreciation for
the firm stand taken by the United States and hoped this position will 
continue
 until a peaceful resolution is
achieved.
 
The two sides expressed their appreciation for the efforts exerted by 
the United
 Arab Emirates aiming at
reaching an agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the 
issue of
 the three islands--Greater
Tumbs, Lesser Tumbs, and Abu Musa--which belong to the UAE.
 
They called upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to start serious 
negotiations with
 the UAE in order to arrive
at a peaceful solution to this problem.
 
 
Secretary Christopher.  First, let me express my appreciation to Prince 
Saud,
 the Foreign Minister, as well
as to all the officials of the Saudi Arabian Government for the warm 
hospitality
 that we've had here and for
the pleasant time that they've provided for us.
 
Of course, I am especially grateful to His Majesty, the King, for 
receiving me.
 We met for about an hour
and 15 or 20 minutes today.  We discussed a very wide variety of world 
problems.
  The King expressed his
concern about the situation in Iraq and expressed his support for the
 maintenance of the United Nations
resolutions and the sanctions.  He expressed his concern for the 
situation in
 Iran.  He expressed his firm
support for the Middle East peace process and urged the United States to
 continue its efforts to produce
peace in the area.
 
We discussed European matters--including Bosnia and the path of reform 
in
 Russia--and the King
discussed a great many of the world's problems and had acute 
observations and
 deep insights as to many of
these problems.  I am sure that we will benefit from the comments that 
he made.
 
I would say and emphasize that my presence in the region today is a
 manifestation of President Clinton's
Administration's commitment--which is an ironclad commitment--to the 
defense of
 the countries in the
Gulf.  Our resolve to defend against aggression in this region is no 
less strong
 than it was at the time of the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.  We will remain determined and vigilant in 
this
 region, constantly aware that
there are threats to peace and security in the area.
 
The regime in Baghdad, in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions, 
continues
 the suppression of its
own citizens:  the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the south.  Its 
refusal
 also--three years after the
liberation of Kuwait--to recognize Kuwait's independence and its borders 
is
 obviously a troubling
phenomenon.  Its resort to terrorism, as illustrated by its attempt to
 assassinate President Bush last year and
its assassination of an Iraqi dissident in Beirut last week, shows that 
they
 remain in clear violation of
United Nations resolutions.
 
I am pleased to say that we join with our GCC partners in unanimously 
and
 strongly expressing our resolve
to maintain sanctions on Iraq until they fully comply.  I want to send a 
message
 to the people of Iraq that,
certainly, we have no interest in prolonging their suffering.  We would 
like to
 see a united and democratic
Iraq, a country that might then resume its rightful place in the 
community of
 nations.  The problem and the
reason for the delay lie with the regime that is in power in Iraq.
 
I would say to the people of Iraq:  Ask your rulers why there are 
shortages of
 medicine and food.  The
United Nations resolution specifically exempts food and medicine from 
the
 sanctions.  I would say to the
people of Iraq that your suffering today has one cause, and that is 
Saddam
 Hussein's refusal to comply with
the UN Security Council resolutions--his regime's rejection of the 
resolutions
 that would allow oil to be
exported in exchange for food and medicine and his harassment of UN 
officials
 engaged in humanitarian
efforts in Iraq.
 
We are using today's meeting not only to address our common concerns 
with
 respect to Iraq but also to
review with the ministers here our efforts to help to achieve a peaceful
 settlement of the various
controversies in the Middle East.  We agreed on the great importance of 
the
 early implementation of the
Declaration of Principles.  We are pledged, I think, to provide not only 
moral
 support but tangible support
to the implementation of this important Declaration of Principles.
 
We agreed on the value of the multilateral talks, which can generate 
broader
 regional development and
show the people of the region what peace can mean.
 
We note the success of the water working group of the multilaterals last 
week in
 Muscat, and we are
looking forward to the meeting in Doha next week on arms control and 
regional
 security matters.
 
Finally, I'd like to indicate that we greatly appreciate the support of 
Saudi
 Arabia and the other Gulf
countries in the efforts to pursue peace in the region.  As you know, 
I'm going
 from here to Cairo, where
I'll meet with President Mubarak, Chairman Arafat, and Israeli Foreign 
Minister
 Peres as they draw close to
reaching an agreement on the implementation of the Declaration of 
Principles.
 
Thereafter, I'll be traveling to Israel and Syria, all to try to advance 
the
 cause of comprehensive peace in
the Middle East.  This area has suffered too long from bloody conflict 
and
 oppressive rule.  For the first
time, I believe that this region has an excellent opportunity to turn a 
new
 page, to put aside war and to
choose peace instead, to end the Arab boycott of Israel, and to lay the
 foundation for permanent and lasting
peace.  Our nation, the United States, looks forward to continued close
 consultation with our close friends
here in Saudi Arabia as well as the other countries of the Gulf.
 
 
Tel Aviv, Israel, April 29, 1994
Opening statements at a news conference by Israeli Prime Minister Rabin 
and
 Secretary Christopher.
 
Prime Minister Rabin.  Mr. Secretary, we welcome you to Israel and more 
than
 appreciate your efforts in
advancing and assisting the negotiations for peace between us and the
 Palestinians, between us and the
three neighboring Arab countries.  We appreciate the efforts that you 
have put
 forth since you became
Secretary of State in bringing about a solution to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict.
 You have spent some days now
in Cairo with President Mubarak, Chairman Arafat, and our Foreign 
Minister Peres
 and helped to bring
about the beginning of the end of the negotiations about "Gaza-Jericho 
first."
 
I know that a date was set for the signing of the agreement, but there 
are still
 some issues to be negotiated,
formulated, and brought into the context of the agreement which we will 
sign.
 
I know that now you will go to other countries, especially to Syria, in 
an
 effort to revive the peace
negotiations between Israel and Syria.  Israel is interested in 
achieving peace
 treaties with the three
neighboring Arab countries beyond the peace with Egypt.  We appreciate 
your
 efforts in bringing the
Syrian and the Israeli positions closer, and I wish you all the success 
on your
 road to Damascus.
 
 
Secretary Christopher.   As you know, I've just completed a full day of 
talks
 with the Prime Minister and
Foreign Minister Peres, and I must say it was wonderful to be back in 
the
 company of such good friends
and allies.  My visit here comes at a time of great hope for peace.  We 
devoted
 our sessions today to ways
in which we might improve our effort to achieve peace.
 
As the Prime Minister said, we had an opportunity to review the few 
remaining
 steps necessary to come to
closure on the Gaza-Jericho agreement.  These negotiations have been 
long and
 hard, but with the signing
ceremony in Cairo next Wednesday, it's clear that Israel and the 
Palestinians
 will be embarking on a new
road--a new venture together.
 
This will transform their relations from conflict into peaceful co-
existence.
 To address the point that the
Prime Minister raised with me today, we both feel that entering into 
this
 agreement and implementing it is
the best answer to the terrorists who have inflicted so much pain on all 
the
 parties who have been
negotiating.
 
My presence here is a reflection of our continued engagement with the 
parties.
 But it's only really one
aspect of our commitment to peace and to the people of Israel.  We've 
been on
 your side--at your side--
during time of war.  We'll be at your side in this new era filled with 
the hopes
 and the fears and the
challenges that come with the difficult task of making peace.
 
As you said, Mr. Prime Minister, my goal on this trip is to facilitate, 
as well,
 the progress on the other three
tracks.  Our goal is a comprehensive peace.  The completion of the Gaza-
Jericho
 agreement to be signed on
Wednesday will be only one step--but an important step--to facilitate 
progress
 in the other negotiations
which are necessary to achieve a comprehensive peace.  We now need to 
make
 progress on the Syrian
track, as the Prime Minister said, as well.  We spent a good deal of 
time today
 discussing various aspects of
the negotiations between Israel and Syria.
 
I'm afraid I am going to have to disappoint you:  I think you'll 
understand that
 I'm not able to go into any of
the details of our discussion.  What I will say is that the Prime 
Minister and
 the Government of Israel and
the Foreign Minister are absolutely serious about this matter, and they 
have
 urged me to attend to it with
the utmost seriousness and determination.
 
I would want to say also in the presence of the Prime Minister that in 
Yitzhak
 Rabin the people of Israel
have a steadfast and resolute leader who is very determined to protect 
the
 security of Israel.  He is the kind
of wise and courageous leader that Israel needs at this kind of a moment 
in its
 history.
 
Tomorrow, as the Prime Minister said, I'll travel to Damascus.  I expect 
the
 conversations there to be as
serious and substantive as the conversations here.  We've got a lot of 
hard work
 ahead of us, but as we enter
this very difficult stage, I want to say to you, Mr. Prime Minister, 
that it's a
 great honor to have an
opportunity to join in this noble pursuit with you.
 
 
Damascus, Syria, May 1, 1994
Opening statement at a news conference by Secretary Christopher.
 
As you know, I met twice in Jerusalem with Prime Minister Rabin and his
 colleagues.  They gave me some
ideas, which I presented at some length yesterday to President Asad.  
Today, I
 met again and I have
received some ideas from President Asad, which I will be taking back and
 presenting to Prime Minister
Rabin tomorrow.  Let me characterize the discussions I have had as being 
very
 serious and substantive.  I
think, from my standpoint--my own evaluation--we have entered a new, 
more
 substantive phase in the
negotiations.  But it is clear that there is a good deal of work to be 
done--a
 lot of work to be done ahead.
 
I would indicate to you that the United States is going to play the most
 effective and determined role that
we can to try to aid the parties in coming to some resolution of the 
situation.
 But I am afraid that I can't go
much further than what I have said.  I do believe we have entered a new, 
more
 substantive phase, based
upon the discussions that I have had with the leaders of the two 
countries over
 the last three days.
 
 
En route Jerusalem to Cairo, May 3, 1994
Press briefing by Secretary Christopher.
 
I haven't seen as much of you as I would like to have done or normally 
would do.
  There are two reasons
for that.  As you know, I have been working pretty well around the 
clock.
 Second, the role of the mediator
is such that you have to be very careful not to disclose the parties' 
positions,
 or you become quite useless to
them.
 
I thought I might come back and just say a few words on two subjects.  
In
 connection with the Israeli-
Syrian track--to repeat what I think you all know--I have spent a lot of 
time
 with the two parties over the
last three or four days.  Last Friday, I had two extensive meetings with 
Prime
 Minister Rabin, Foreign
Minister Peres, and his group.  Then on Saturday, I went to Damascus, 
where I
 had a long session with
President Asad where I basically passed on the views of Prime Minister 
Rabin.
 As I have said before, I did
most of the talking in that meeting, which is not the usual way in those
 meetings.
 
The following day, because the President asked me to stay over and to 
give them
 an opportunity to insert
their views and to react to the views of the Israelis, we had a long 
meeting
 again on Sunday night--I am
sorry for such a late arrival on Monday morning.  Yesterday I had, once 
again, a
 very extensive session
with the Israelis:  first in the morning with the Prime Minister and in 
a larger
 group; and then, last night,
another session with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister and 
General
 Barak and other Israeli
officials.
 
I find in this situation a sense that there is a willingness on the part 
of all
 the parties to examine the
positions across a wide range of issues.  One of the things that strikes 
me
 about this is that for the first time,
you are able to compare comprehensive proposals with other comprehensive
 proposals.  I don't want to say
that the architecture is the same on both sides, but, nevertheless, 
there are
 proposals that can be examined.
 
We are in what I would describe as an exploratory stage.  Each party is 
serious
 about having to explore the
views of the other parties to see if there is some way to bridge the 
very
 considerable gaps that exist.  I don't
want to in any way mislead you into thinking that the parties are close
 together.  There is a long road to
travel.  But I think that there is a seriousness about the exploration I 
have
 not seen before.
 
Both parties are probing for new approaches to bridge gaps.  My own 
feeling is
 that I ought to be available
to help keep the momentum up, and so I have told both parties that I 
would try
 to return mid-month.  I wish
I could be more precise about that.  Several factors are involved.  
First,
 I'm--as you probably know--going
to Mexico next Sunday and Monday.  I also have a trip to meet with the 
foreign
 ministers of Europe and
elsewhere on Bosnia, and the date of that has not been set.  Also, as 
you
 probably all know, there are
important holidays for both parties sometime in mid-month.  So, we'll 
have to
 work around all of that; but
what I want to do is make myself available for a meeting approximately 
in the
 middle of the month, or
whenever the parties can be available, to try to keep up the momentum 
that's
 been achieved--not because
the parties are so close together but because they are both dealing in
 comprehensive approaches.
 
Now, just a few words about today's situation.  The timing of my visit 
and my
 meeting in Cairo, I think,
served an important purpose.  We were able to help the parties identify 
the
 remaining open issues and,
together with a good deal of leadership from President Mubarak, to 
persuade them
 to set the signing date
for tomorrow.  The Egyptians asked us to summarize the results of the 
meeting in
 which the issues were
defined, and we did that and presented a U.S. summary to both parties 
which I
 think has helped them to
sharpen the issues.  I feel quite confident, although there are some 
issues that
 remain to be decided, that
there will be a signing ceremony tomorrow.
 
So, what is my role for the remainder of the day?  I think the best way 
to state
 it is that I'll be available to
try to help the parties--I'll be there to help keep the parties on 
track, to
 help them to identify the open
issues.  Of course, this is for the parties to resolve on their own, and 
I do
 want to emphasize the great
importance of Egyptian leadership and the debt that is owed to the 
leadership of
 President Mubarak, which
I witnessed firsthand.  It's very impressive leadership, together with 
Foreign
 Minister Moussa. (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 2:
 
A New Consensus of the Americas
Secretary Christopher
Address before the Matias Romero Institute for Diplomatic Studies at the 
Mexican
 Foreign Ministry,
Mexico City, May 9, 1994
 
I am delighted to be in this vast metropolis, the cradle of the New 
World and
 now the largest city on earth.
As a Californian and a Los Angeleno, I am particularly proud to be with 
you in
 this vital center of modern
Hispanic culture in the Americas.  This afternoon, I will visit one of 
Mexico's
 national treasures, the
anthropology museum in Chapultepec Park.  There, I will have a chance to 
reflect
 upon the richness of the
pre-Columbian cultures that are part of the heritage of this nation.
 
An involvement with history comes with my job.  When it is being made, I 
often
 can see it and feel it and
lend my hand.  I had that privilege last Wednesday in another city of 
ancient
 greatness, Cairo.  There, Israel
and the Palestinians agreed to implement the Declaration of Principles 
that, we
 hope, will transform the
war-torn Middle East.  Thankfully, our task today is not a matter of war 
and
 peace.  But I think that history
will remember well the importance of the work we are undertaking here.
 
Earlier this morning, I joined members of President Salinas' cabinet, 
along with
 several of my Cabinet
colleagues, in opening the first Binational Commission meeting since 
NAFTA went
 into effect.  Only with
Mexico does the United States convene every year on such a basis.  In 
that
 setting and in others, I have
found that the quality of Mexico's leadership--its technical expertise 
and its
 political vision--is a match for
that of any other nation in the world.
 
I am confident in saying today that relations between our nations have 
never
 been better, stronger, or more
important.
 
We recognize that NAFTA is not just a turning point for free trade but a
 transforming event in the history
of our relations.  It is a platform for prosperity and a bridge to 
greater trade
 and investment throughout the
Americas.  For the United States, Mexico, and Canada, NAFTA represents a
 monumental decision to
strengthen cooperation, widen integration in our hemisphere, and deepen 
our
 engagement in the global
economy.
 
NAFTA reflects and reinforces the new reality in the Americas.  The 
historic
 movement over the last
decade toward democracy and economic liberalization has resulted in an
 unprecedented convergence of
values and interests among Latin nations--and between them and the 
United
 States.
 
When I visited Latin America in 1977 as Deputy Secretary of State, most 
Latin
 countries were stagnating
under military rule.  Now, virtually every nation in the Americas is a
 democracy--and proud of it.  Not
coincidentally, economies have expanded, and trade has multiplied.  This
 progress is gaining irreversible
momentum.  And, not surprisingly, it has set important precedents for 
political
 and economic change
around the world.
 
Today, a new consensus of the Americas has formed.  Open markets work.
 Democratic governments are
just.  And together they offer the best hope for lifting people's lives.
 
This morning, I will focus on the progress we have made and the work 
that
 remains to be done to build on
this new consensus of the Americas.
 
Let me begin with economic reform.  Latin America is capturing the 
imagination,
 and attracting the trade
and investment, of the United States and the world.  Exports to the 
region have
 more than doubled within
the last six years alone, and Mexico has become our third-largest 
trading
 partner and our fastest-growing
major export market.
 
Liberalization is opening markets, lowering barriers, cutting tariffs, 
and
 creating jobs.  Inefficient state
enterprises are giving way to privatized companies that enhance 
productivity.
 Debt crises are passing.
Latin America is growing faster, on average, than the advanced 
industrial
 nations of the OECD.  Latin
"jaguars" are in hot pursuit of Asian "tigers."
 
The modernizing economic reforms of the Salinas administration have made 
Mexico
 a pacesetter for the
region and for the world.  By becoming a member of the Asia-Pacific 
Economic
 Cooperation forum,
Mexico is extending its dynamism and its destiny to the west.  And by 
becoming
 the first Latin member of
the OECD, Mexico is gaining new responsibilities as a leader of the 
global
 economy.
 
President Clinton has reaffirmed our intention to negotiate free trade
 agreements with other market
democracies in the hemisphere.  We are committed to begin with Chile, 
another
 country on the cutting
edge of reform.  We are consulting with Congress on broad, fast-track 
authority
 for these negotiations.
 
As we expand trade, we must also build a new architecture for regional
 integration and investment.
Regional development banks are vital if we are to enlarge the circle of
 prospering democracies.  Last
month in Guadalajara, we took an important step with the landmark 
replenishment
 of the Inter-American
Development Bank.  Together, we provided $40 billion in new capital that 
will
 allow the IDB to advance
several new priorities:  investing in education and human resources, 
protecting
 the environment, and
supporting the private sector.
 
For the full promise of open markets and trade to be realized, the vital
 arteries of a liberal market economy-
-from banking to transportation to communications--must carry commerce 
more
 efficiently.  The reforms
of the last decade must be sustained.  Inflation must continue to be 
curbed,
 public debt contained,
corruption combated.
 
We understand, as did Mexico's great 19th-century president, Benito 
Juarez, that
 even if reform requires
"immense sacrifice," it is essential to freedom and modernization.  In 
the
 spirit of Juarez, reform must also
benefit every segment of society and narrow the gap between rich and 
poor.  All
 our governments,
including mine, have a responsibility to help those who are left behind:  
those
 who have lost their jobs and
those who never had them.
 
Democracy is the single most effective link between prosperity and 
equity.
 Strengthening that link not
only will empower our nations, it will enrich them.
 
The movement to democracy in Latin America is a great epic of the late 
20th
 century.  It is not captured in
any single image as indelible as the fall of the Berlin Wall or the 
sight of
 South Africans marking their
ballots and claiming their freedom.  But democracy's victories in this
 hemisphere--from Argentina, Brazil,
and Chile to Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala--are just as vital to 
the
 cause of liberty.
 
In El Salvador, political movements no longer field armies; now they 
field
 candidates for public office.  In
many other countries, civic groups that once conducted their work 
underground
 now work openly to
monitor human rights and to advocate the needs of women, minorities, and 
the
 poor.  They are advancing
democracy's agenda for the 1990s:  They are building strong civil 
societies that
 countervail the power of
strong states; they are making governments more accountable to their 
people.
 
Here in Mexico, the government led Latin America by reforming the 
economy,
 opening markets, and
negotiating NAFTA.  Now Mexico, with its proud revolutionary heritage, 
is in the
 process of revitalizing
its democratic institutions.
 
In response to events in Chiapas, the Mexican Government has fostered 
political
 dialogue and paved the
way for national reconciliation.   In announcing a cease-fire, in 
issuing a
 unilateral amnesty, and in openly
acknowledging the legitimacy of grievances, the government has shown 
sensitivity
 and responsibility.
 
In the period since the tragic assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio, 
Mexicans
 have come together to
uphold democracy and oppose violence.  The death of such a promising 
leader
 would be a terrible loss for
any nation.  But Mexico is revealing its strength and courage.  I 
believe that
 out of this tragedy will come
renewal.
 
This August's elections will demonstrate the vitality of Mexico's 
democracy.  We
 applaud the far-reaching
electoral reforms that Mexico has adopted over the last several years, 
including
 the agreement of January
27 of this year.  We trust that these reforms, combined with your new 
election
 technology, will produce a
free and fair election that will give all Mexicans confidence in its 
outcome.
 
We have a strong and productive relationship with President Salinas and 
his
 administration.  I am confident
that we will have an equally strong and productive relationship with the
 government that Mexican voters
choose in the August election.
 
Democracy and human rights are cardinal principles of the Americas.
 Unfortunately, Haiti and Cuba
remain outside the orbit of democracy.
 
President Clinton is committed to the restoration of democracy and the 
return of
 President Aristide to Haiti.
The hemisphere is united in opposition to the unconscionable usurpation 
of power
 by the coup leaders.
The Haitian people have suffered gravely under their repressive rule.
 
This is why, last Friday, the UN Security Council adopted tough, new,
 comprehensive sanctions, including
immediate measures targeted at the coup leaders and their supporters.  
If
 Haiti's military leaders refuse to
give up power, they will find that the international community has both 
the will
 and the means to make
them pay the price for their illegal actions.  At the same time, the
 international community will step up its
efforts to ensure that those who need humanitarian assistance receive 
it.
 President Clinton announced
yesterday that for its part, the United States will increase its 
humanitarian
 feeding and health programs in
Haiti to reach 1.2 million beneficiaries.
 
All the nations of the Americas have an interest in preventing a return 
to the
 rule of dictators.  The United
States is committed to working with the nations of this hemisphere to 
meet this
 shared objective.  We are
working with the Dominican Republic to tighten sanctions along the
 Haitian-Dominican border.  We will
seek to increase the number of UN and OAS human rights monitors in 
Haiti.  And
 we will seek the
participation of other countries in the region in an effort to assist 
Haitian
 political refugees.  Working
together, we can restore democracy and hope to the people of Haiti.
 
The people of Cuba, like all other citizens of the Americas, deserve the 
right
 to choose their leaders and to
take command of their destiny.  Instead, their nation is caught in a 
downward
 economic spiral.  Cuba can
escape its plight only by joining the hemispheric tide of open societies 
and
 open markets.
 
As we acknowledge this hopeful tide, we recognize that more must be done 
to
 fulfill the promise of
democracy in the Americas.  We must build on the progress that Latin 
militaries
 have made in accepting
the primacy of civilian authority.  We must also encourage the 
development of
 fully independent
judiciaries.  They are essential to guarantee that the rule of law 
prevails for
 all.
 
Public institutions must become more efficient and accountable.  
Unresponsive
 bureaucracy undermines
productivity and saps trust in democracy.  That is why in the United 
States Vice
 President Gore is leading
an ambitious effort to "reinvent government."
 
To sustain trust in democracy, governments must attack the scourges of
 corruption and drug trafficking.
Government cannot be held accountable if its power can be bought.  
Authority
 will not be respected if the
rule of law can be defied with impunity.
 
Drug production and trafficking remains a vicious enemy.  Drugs destroy 
lives
 and fuel violence.  The drug
trade breeds official corruption and distorts economies by diverting 
private
 resources to criminal empires.
 
Under President Clinton's leadership, the United States is taking 
responsibility
 for its share of the problem.
Blaming other countries for our drug problems will not help addicts in 
Los
 Angeles or New York get off
drugs.  Our first line of defense is to reduce demand at home.  
President
 Clinton's drug strategy and crime
bill will allow us to step up street-level drug enforcement, expand drug 
abuse
 prevention, and provide
treatment to hard-core drug abusers in prisons.
 
We recognize that many nations in the hemisphere have taken grave risks 
and
 demonstrated remarkable
resilience in the fight against drugs.  Cooperation between the United 
States
 and Mexico against narcotics
is at its highest level ever, although much remains to be done.
 
We must help strengthen democratic institutions so that they can resist
 intimidation.  We will back
sustainable development programs to strengthen the economies of drug-
producing
 and -transit countries.
We will enlist, for the first time, the international financial 
institutions in
 this effort.  And we will reinforce
global law enforcement against drug cartels.  The virtual "state of 
siege" they
 impose on cities and even
nations must be lifted--forever.
 
Like drugs, environmental pollution respects no borders; it cannot be 
contained
 by customs officials.  It
must be fought domestically, regionally, and globally.  Two years ago in 
Rio,
 leaders of 120 countries met
at the Earth Summit.  It was right that the summit was held in the 
Americas, for
 we face urgent
environmental problems.  But we have the chance to lead the world toward
 sustainable development that
balances the environment, population pressures, and economic growth.
 
By undertaking the commitments made in the NAFTA side agreement on the
 environment, Mexico, the
United States, and Canada joined in an unprecedented international 
effort to
 curb pollution.  In 1994,
Mexico will spend more than 1% of its GDP on environmental programs--a
 significant increase.  Nowhere
are these efforts more important than here in Mexico City.
 
President Clinton has returned the United States to the mainstream of 
global
 efforts to curb too-rapid
population growth.  Ten years ago in Mexico City, we watched the major
 population conference from the
sidelines.  This year, in Cairo, we will help forge a global action plan 
on
 population growth.  We will draw
on the experiences that have enabled Latin America to cut its rate of 
population
 growth in half over the last
20 years.  And we will seek to expand health care and empower women.
 
We can gain confidence from the close political and diplomatic 
cooperation that
 is building from Central
America to the Southern Cone.  With the advance of democracy and 
integration,
 the chance that Latin
neighbors will go to war has dramatically receded.  Once, Brazil and 
Argentina
 decided to design bridges
on their border so they would collapse in case tanks ever crossed over.
 Argentinians, Chileans, and
Peruvians once mined their border roads.  Today, bridges and roads carry 
trade,
 not tanks.  Engineers dig
tunnels and pipelines through the Andes.  And military spending is down.
 
Soon, we expect Brazil to join Argentina and Chile in renouncing a 
nuclear arms
 race in Latin America by
ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco, a landmark agreement made possible 
by
 Mexico's leadership.  Argentina
has also recently joined the Missile Technology Control Regime.  At a 
time when
 the nuclear ambitions of
rogue states like North Korea pose a threat to peace, the nations of 
this
 hemisphere have set a different
precedent:  Nuclear and missile proliferation can be reversed.
 
The Summit of the Americas will be a catalyst for even greater 
cooperation in
 the hemisphere this year.
The United States is already engaged in intensive pre-summit 
consultations with
 the nations of Latin
America and the Caribbean.  We will develop initiatives to encourage 
effective
 democratic government,
strengthen the collective defense of democracy, fight the drug trade, 
liberalize
 trade and investment, and
promote sustainable development.
 
Looking ahead to the summit, President Clinton has said:
 
"We have a unique opportunity to build a community of free nations, 
diverse in
 culture and history but
bound together by a commitment to responsive and free government, 
vibrant civil
 societies, open
economies, and rising living standards."
 
This generation's task is to defend and develop the powerful movement to 
market
 democracy.  We must
accept the responsibility to ensure that this great, transforming change 
becomes
 truly irreversible.
 
People from the United States like to come to Mexico and quote Octavio 
Paz.
 Being a young man, I tried
to resist this venerable practice.  But I couldn't.  That great poet, 
essayist,
 Nobel laureate, and, I should add,
diplomat, wrote this of our hemisphere:  "America is not so much a 
tradition to
 be carried on as it is a
future to be realized."
 
Octavio Paz was right.  The task still lies before us.  (###)
 
Binational Commission Meeting Material
Material from the Secretary's trip to Mexico and Binational Commission 
meeting
 will be printed in
Dispatch Supplement Vol. 5, No. 3.  (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 3:
 
The Americas:  New Priorities in A New Partnership
Alexander F. Watson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
Address to the Council of the Americas, Washington, DC, May 2, 1994
 
It is a truly great pleasure to be here this morning with so many 
friends in the
 Council of the Americas.  I
have enjoyed a very close association with the Council and the Americas 
Society
 for many years--but most
intensely during my 3-1/2 years as the Deputy U.S. Representative to the 
United
 Nations in New York
immediately before I assumed my current position.  I am pleased to be 
able to
 continue that association
now.
 
Today, we do not really have time for me to present a full overview of   
the
 Clinton Administration's
policies toward Latin America and the Caribbean.  So I will focus on 
some of the
 broader trends I believe
will be of particular interest to the Council.  I will be glad to 
discuss other
 issues--including the
Administration's energetic new efforts to restore democratic governance 
to
 Haiti--during the discussion
period following my remarks.
 
From Consensus to Partnership
 
The theme for this, the Council's 24th Washington conference--After 
NAFTA:  The
 Road to Hemispheric
Growth--is very well chosen.  I believe we have entered a period in 
which the
 countries of our hemisphere
have within their grasp the ability to generate long-term, broad-based,
 sustainable economic growth and
development.  Of course, all of our countries face very difficult 
problems in
 this regard.  We always have,
and we always will.  But we are better positioned to overcome these 
problems
 than before.  In fact, I
submit that prospects for our countries and, more importantly, for our 
people
 generally are brighter than at
almost any of your previous 23 Washington conferences.
 
It is a very exciting moment in our hemisphere for political as well as 
economic
 reasons.  Reflect for a
moment, if you will, on political developments over the past year.  How 
many
 free, fair, legitimate
elections have there been since your last conference?  Look at the 
quality of
 the chiefs of state and heads of
government that those elections have produced in Bolivia, Paraguay, 
Belize,
 Venezuela, Honduras, Costa
Rica, El Salvador, and Chile--to name a few.  And there will be more 
elections
 this year.  There is a strong
commitment throughout the hemisphere that elections must be fair--that 
victory
 in an unfair contest is not
really a victory and that the resulting regime will suffer severe 
problems of
 legitimacy at home and
internationally, to the serious disadvantage of the country concerned.
 
This consensus that only freely and fairly elected, democratic 
governments are
 legitimate is profoundly
important in facilitating relationships of confidence and trust between 
our
 countries, in laying the basis for
broad cooperation between governments and societies, and in enhancing
 possibilities for hemispheric
integration.
 
Similarly, economic reform has proceeded apace.  Governments, by and 
large, have
 put their
macroeconomic houses in order, and, in many cases, this has not been 
easy.
 
The fiscal and monetary discipline which is at the base of these reforms 
is
 being reinforced with
fundamental tax reforms, restructuring of financial markets, 
privatization, and
 establishment of
independent central banks.
 
These efforts are bearing fruit, however, as tariffs and inflation rates 
tumble
 into the low teens in most
countries.  Latin America is experiencing its third year of solid growth 
with
 capital flows that continue to
be high despite some setbacks.
 
Most important of all is the synergy among these political and economic 
reforms.
  They give our
governments the political incentive and economic capacity to address 
more
 effectively the social needs our
people face.  President Clinton is endeavoring to address those needs in 
his
 powerful initiatives on health
care, welfare reform, and crime, to mention only a few.  Leaders 
throughout the
 hemisphere are making
similar efforts.
 
Addressing these social needs and providing greater social equity and 
more
 responsive, honest, and
effective government generates greater popular support for democratic
 government, increasing social
stability and broadening the base for economic growth.  These, in turn, 
reassure
 investors and encourage
flows of capital and technology and trade which produce growth.
 
Some have described this next phase as the "second generation" of 
reforms.  The
 first generation of
reforms aimed at taking government out of the things that it didn't do 
well and
 probably shouldn't do at all
and at empowering markets to be the main decision-makers for the 
economy.
 
The second generation of reforms aims at giving government the capacity 
to do
 well what only
governments can do and what markets cannot do or do only imperfectly.  
The idea
 here is shared growth to
benefit all elements of society and to benefit future as well as present
 generations.
 
In a broad sense, we are all facing similarly daunting new challenges, 
within
 the U.S. as well as in Latin
America and the Caribbean:
 
--  Redefining our communities so that growth and job opportunities 
reach all
 parts of our society;
 
--  Reforming our social systems so that health, educational, and 
welfare
 services are delivered efficiently,
free of abuses, and responsive to the needs of all our people; and
 
--  Restructuring incentives so as to protect our countries' resources 
for
 sustainable, environmentally sound
use.
 
There is considerable work already underway.  A couple of examples 
follow.
 
--  The recent historic capital replenishment of the Inter-American 
Development
 Bank--which increased the
IDB's capital from $60 billion to $100 billion and added almost another 
billion
 dollars to its fund for
special operations--also marked agreement on reorienting IDB lending to
 investment in health and
education, to protection of the environment, and to harnessing the 
energy of the
 private sector.  As Under
Secretary of the Treasury Summers said at the IDB annual meeting last 
month,
 "growth must be inclusive
if it is to be enduring."
 
--  Another innovative example is Bolivia's "capitalization" program, 
which will
 simultaneously privatize a
large part of its state enterprises while giving every Bolivian over age 
21
 assets to use toward his or her
retirement.
 
In addition to the essentially domestic political and economic reforms I 
have
 mentioned, one of the most
significant trends in the hemisphere is that of regional integration.  
For those
 of us in North America,
certainly, the most dramatic manifestation of this trend was approval of 
the
 North American Free Trade
Agreement.  NAFTA was a historic watershed, the full effects of which we 
will
 only realize years from
now.  It is already making a profound difference in the nature and 
intensity of
 relations among the three
partners.  In speaking to the Council of the Americas, which played such 
an
 important role in the genesis
and approval of NAFTA, I need not dwell on its virtues and significance,
 although I will return to some
aspects of NAFTA later in my remarks.
 
But I would like to note here that many other manifestations of 
integration have
 taken place.  For example,
bilateral and multilateral trade liberalization arrangements are 
burgeoning.  At
 last count, there were 23
bilateral and multilateral subregional trade arrangements.
 
One noteworthy example is the Andean Pact that, next year,  is expected 
to
 become a single market with
free internal trade and a common external tariff no higher than 20%.  To 
give
 you a notion of the size of
this integrated market, at that point, the five members of the pact will 
become
 one of the top 12 markets for
the U.S., accounting for more than $10 billion in U.S. exports.  We sell 
more to
 the Andean Pact's 95
million people than to China's 1.2 billion.
 
Economic reforms and trade liberalization have caused trade within the 
region to
 boom.  Intraregional trade
is outpacing growth in both regional GDP and overall world trade 
expansion.
 During the past five years,
world imports as a whole increased 19%.  Latin American imports from the 
world
 increased 79%.  I
believe we are at a defining moment in hemispheric relations.  You have 
heard
 this Administration's
emphasis on the convergence of values and interests that has emerged 
among us.
 The challenge we face is
to transform this broad, although far from perfect, consensus into a new
 partnership for action to address
our common problems and approach our common goals.  We must consolidate 
and
 institutionalize our
domestic gains in mutually reinforcing fashion and shape a new web of
 relationships which define our
hemisphere's future.  That's what the Summit of the Americas is all 
about.
 
The Summit of the Americas
 
In describing his vision of the Americas, President Clinton said:
 
"We have a unique opportunity to build a community of free nations, 
diverse in
 culture and history but
bound together by a commitment to responsive and free government, 
vibrant civil
 societies, open
economies, and rising living standards."
 
Our effort to realize this vision will be one of history's exciting 
endeavors.
 We believe the Summit of the
Americas, which will take place in Miami on December 9-10, will be an
 unparalleled opportunity to
consolidate our achievements and chart our future course.
 
We envision that the summit will produce a declaration of principles 
that will
 guide relationships among
our nations and an action plan of specific initiatives.  We have found 
support
 and enthusiasm for a summit
built on the themes of democracy and effective governance on the 
political side
 and trade expansion,
investment, and sustainable development on the economic front.  We are
 developing many specific ideas to
present to our partners in an intense process of consultations during 
which we
 expect to hear many other
proposals.
 
We have met with our Mexican neighbors and will continue our discussions 
next
 week during our
Binational Commission meeting in Mexico.  The U.S. delegation will be 
led by
 Secretary of State
Christopher and will include other Cabinet secretaries.
 
We hope to complete the first round of consultations on the summit this 
month,
 meeting with
representatives of CARICOM, Central America, the Rio Group, and Canada.  
Of
 course, we will continue
discussions at the OAS General Assembly in Belem next month and follow 
up with
 many other meetings
throughout the year to make the Summit of the Americas as substantive 
and
 significant an event as
possible.
 
We also look forward to receiving input on the summit agenda and 
specific
 initiatives from a wide variety
of sources--certainly the Council of the Americas, as well as other 
private
 sector and non-governmental
groups.  We eagerly invite your views.  We hope that the summit will 
provide
 impetus and direction on
issues such as the consolidation and defense of democracy; government
 accountability, efficiency, and
transparency; empowerment of civil society; and the rule of law, 
including steps
 to combat the dangerous
narcotics cartels.  We will offer ideas for harmonizing financial, 
legal,
 fiscal, and other regimes to facilitate
hemispheric integration.  We may examine innovative ideas for developing 
health,
 labor, environmental,
and educational standards.  We will seek ways to enhance hemispheric 
cooperation
 on security issues in the
post-Cold War era.
 
Trade expansion will be a major focus of the summit.  There is 
overwhelming
 regional interest in this
subject.  The President remains fully committed to his desire to expand 
NAFTA to
 include other market-
oriented democracies in Latin America and the Caribbean.  While I know 
you are
 eager to know what
future steps on trade the Administration has in mind, I will defer to 
U.S. Trade
 Representative Mickey
Kantor, who will speak to us at lunch today.
 
I will say here, however, that our concept of free trade expansion 
includes
 underlying components such as
investment agreements and understandings concerning intellectual 
property
 rights, the environment, and
labor.  As Vice President Gore said in Marrakesh on April 14:
 
"The relationship between trade and the creation of wealth is manifest. 
. . .
 However, economic growth
cannot be pursued without vision or compassion for the way it may affect 
working
 men and women and
without regard for its environmental consequences."
 
For expanded free trade to reach its potential, these underpinnings are
 essential.
 
Similarly, free trade means not just new opportunities for exports but 
also
 stronger linkages among our
societies.  More open economies, based on competition rather than access 
and
 privilege, provide more
opportunities for economic and social mobility; stronger economic growth 
and
 broader markets; and
greater flows of capital, goods, ideas, and technology.  The promise of 
a
 hemisphere united by open
markets is a powerful tool in the hands of reformers throughout our 
hemisphere.
 
The Impact on American Business
 
This congeries of developments and trends in our hemisphere has profound
 implications for American
business.  The Western Hemisphere is the United States' largest trading 
partner.
  President Clinton is
committed to reaching out to the other market-oriented democracies of 
Latin
 America to join what he
called "this great American pact."  This will be good for American 
exports and
 American jobs.  Some facts
follow.
 
--  37% of U.S. exports go to Western Hemisphere nations.
 
--  The U.S. sells as much to Brazil as to China, more to Venezuela than 
to
 Russia, and more to Ecuador
than to Poland and Hungary combined.
 
--  The value of U.S. exports to Latin America and the Caribbean has 
increased
 144% since 1986, while
our exports to the rest of the world rose 90%.
 
--  Latin America is the largest developing country destination for U.S. 
private
 investment, accounting for
$5.1 billion in 1990-92, or almost 70% of all our investment in 
developing
 countries.
 
--  The IMF predicts that "upper-middle-income markets" in Brazil, 
Mexico,
 Colombia, Venezuela, and
Argentina are among those likely to grow fastest.
 
--  Proximity, investment patterns, and established cultural ties all 
help to
 give American products
important advantages in these markets, which have a high propensity to 
purchase
 our products.
 
--  The countries of the region are moving rapidly beyond traditional 
Third
 World status.  Mexico has just
joined the OECD as its first Latin American representative, and Brazil 
and
 Argentina have been admitted to
the OECD's development center.  The U.S. strongly supported--in fact, 
proudly
 led--these initiatives in the
OECD.
 
--  The major components of U.S. policy toward Latin America and the
 Caribbean--promoting democracy
and human rights, strengthening U.S. economic security, and building 
cooperation
 on global issues--are at
the heart of the Administration's overall foreign policy agenda.  This 
endows
 our efforts in the hemisphere
with consistency and sustainability.
 
Thus, our interest in the region is clear.  Our engagement is firm.  Our 
vision
 is powerful.
 
The rapid evolution of our hemisphere is a complex phenomenon involving 
many
 intertwining strands.
Far-sighted American business leaders understand this and are among the
 strongest proponents of market-
driven change throughout the region.  It is strongly in your interest, I
 believe, to support Latin American
and Caribbean leaders who undertake the second generation of reforms I 
mentioned
 earlier--those aimed at
making growth inclusive and at giving a stake to all parts of society in 
the
 market-based  democracies.
 
Structural reforms bring some costs, as all change inevitably does.  We 
are
 aware that elements of the
business community, as well as other groups, opposed and still oppose 
the
 dismantling of special privileges
and protection.  But it is a credit to the vision of many business 
leaders that
 they see beyond the temporary
costs of transition and change and recognize the immense benefits to 
themselves
 and to all in their societies
which come from greater competition and democracy.  Your vision, energy, 
and
 talents are urgently
needed in making sure that the ideals of political and economic 
democracy become
 a reality for all.
 
Conclusion
 
Let me conclude by observing that what we are pursuing in our hemisphere 
is more
 than expanded free
trade.  We seek a community of nations committed to democracy and human 
rights,
 bound together by
open markets and rising standards of living, and dedicated to the 
peaceful
 resolution of disputes.  Such a
community implies a new kind of relationship between the United States 
and our
 neighbors:  a more
mature partnership, based on mutual respect and cooperation and on the
 convergence of our values,
interests, and objectives.
 
President Cesar Gaviria of Colombia, whom we are proud to have supported 
in his
 successful candidacy
for Secretary General of the Organization of American States, expressed 
this
 idea eloquently a month ago:
 
"From the Americas of the past with its arms extended and crying out for 
its
 proper destiny, we will see
born a new hemisphere that calls for solidarity and cooperation to 
develop
 economic and trade relations
based on parity and dignity."
 
We look forward to working together with him and with all of you to 
realize this
 vision.  (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 4:
 
The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace 
Operations
Madeleine K. Albright, Anthony Lake, Lieutenant General Clark, Executive 
Summary
 
Madeleine K. Albright
Statement by the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations 
before the
 Subcommittee on
Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs of the House
 Appropriations Committee,
Washington, DC, May 5, 1994.
 
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am pleased 
to be
 here this morning, along
with my colleague, Assistant Secretary of State Doug Bennet, to discuss 
U.S.
 policy toward the UN and the
Administration's budget request for fiscal year 1995.
 
For purposes of time, I will confine my remarks to an issue of central
 importance to the Administration and
of demonstrated interest to the Congress:  the future of UN peace-
keeping.
 Although this is an issue which
appears to be constantly in the news, it raises fundamental questions 
that are
 anything but new.
 
Today, we can look back at centuries of international efforts to deter 
conflict
 through a combination of
force and law.  Before the UN, there was the League of Nations; before 
that, the
 Congress of Vienna;
before that, the Treaty of Westphalia; before that, medieval 
nonaggression
 pacts; and before that, the
Athenian League.
 
Obviously, no magic formula has been found.  Today, some Americans see 
UN
 peace-keeping as a
dangerous illusion.  Others consider it the linchpin of world peace.  
The
 Clinton Administration has a more
balanced view.  We see UN peace-keeping as a contributor to, not the 
centerpiece
 of, our national security
strategy.  We see it as a way to defuse crises and prevent breaches of 
peace
 from turning into larger
disasters.  It lends global legitimacy to efforts to mediate disputes,
 demobilize armed factions, arrange
cease-fires, and provide emergency relief.  It reduces the likelihood of
 unwelcome interventions by
regional powers.  And it ensures a sharing of the costs and risks of 
maintaining
 world order.
 
But for reasons that may be inherent in the institution, the UN has not 
yet
 demonstrated the ability to
respond effectively when the risk of combat is high and the level of 
local
 cooperation is low.  The UN's
impartiality can be a key to diplomatic credibility, but it is of less 
help when
 military credibility is what is
required.  And the UN's resources have been stretched perilously thin by 
the
 dramatic increase in peace-
keeping requests it has received.
 
So UN peace-keeping is not, in our view, a substitute for vigorous 
alliances and
 a strong national defense.
When threats arise to us or to others, we will choose the course of 
action that
 best serves our interests.  We
may act through the UN, we may act through NATO, we may act through a 
coalition,
 we may sometimes
mix these tools, or we may act alone.  But we will do whatever is 
necessary to
 defend the vital interests of
the United States.
 
As you know, Mr. Chairman, the Administration has just completed a 
comprehensive
 review of peace-
keeping policy.  The one-sentence summary of our policy is that it is 
not
 intended to expand UN peace-
keeping but to help fix it.  We have already taken the first step by 
insisting
 that the Security Council
overhaul its process for deciding when a peace-keeping operation should 
be
 initiated or extended.
 
More Rigorous Decision-making
 
Last year, soon after I arrived in New York, I began to ask:  What 
criteria have
 we been using to decide
whether or not to support a peace mission?  What criteria did the 
previous
 Administration use, for example,
when it voted to support new operations in the former Yugoslavia, 
Somalia,
 Angola, El Salvador,
Cambodia, the Western Sahara, Mozambique, and Kuwait?  What criteria 
were other
 members of the
Security Council using?  There was no clear answer.
 
We have changed that.  We believe that the value of UN peace-keeping 
does not
 depend on how many
missions are attempted but on how well each mission is conducted.  So we 
are
 insisting that the key
questions be asked before, not after, new peace-keeping obligations are
 undertaken.  These questions
include the following.
 
--  Will UN involvement advance U.S. interests?
 
--  Is there a real threat to international peace and security?
 
--  Does the proposed peace-keeping mission have clear objectives, and 
can its
 scope be clearly defined?
 
--  If the operation is a peace-keeping--as opposed to peace
 enforcement--mission, is a cease-fire in place,
and have the parties to the conflict agreed to a UN presence?
 
--  Are the financial and personnel resources needed to accomplish the 
mission
 available?
 
--  Can an end point to UN participation be identified?
 
--  What happens if we do not act?
 
These questions are intended to serve as an aid to decision-making, not 
as a
 substitute for it.  Decisions
have been and will be based on the cumulative weight of the factors with 
no
 single factor being an absolute
determinant.
 
Already, our new policy is making a difference.  For example, we have 
made our
 support for potential
expansion of missions in Angola and Liberia contingent on sustained 
progress in
 peace negotiations.  We
supported an increased UN police presence in Mozambique--but on the 
condition
 that the additional costs
be offset by reductions in the military presence.  We are insisting that
 "sunset" clauses be inserted in
resolutions authorizing or extending peace-keeping missions so that the 
burden
 of proof rests on those who
favor extension rather than termination.  We have established what we 
hope will
 be a precedent by
encouraging Cyprus--with help from Greece--and Kuwait to pay a 
significant
 portion of the costs of peace-
keeping operations on their territory.  We are relying on regional 
organizations
 such as ECOWAS and the
CSCE wherever appropriate.  And we review regularly the status of each 
UN
 operation to determine
whether its objectives are being achieved or can be achieved.
 
I also must observe that no new UN peace operation has yet been proposed
 formally for Burundi, Sudan,
Nagorno-Karabakh, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, or Sierra Leone despite the 
terrible
 violence that has occurred
in each.  This reflects not callousness on the part of the international
 community but rather a recognition of
the limits of what UN peace operations can achieve in the absence of a
 demonstrated will on the part of
contending factions to choose negotiations over force of arms.
 
Enhancing Capabilities
 
We also are working to make UN operations more efficient and effective 
once they
 are approved.
Currently, the UN does not have the ability to manage peace-keeping as 
an
 integrated whole.  Instead, each
mission is financed and run separately by an understaffed Department of
 Peacekeeping Operations.  As a
result, support to the field suffers, economies of scale are lost, work 
is
 duplicated, and missions are
delayed.  The UN is left to scrape together the money, troops, and 
logistical
 support necessary for each
operation essentially from scratch.  To remedy these and other problems, 
the
 Administration is proposing
or supporting:
 
--  A unified budget for peace-keeping to replace the current ad hoc 
system;
 
--  Reforms in procurement that will ensure competitiveness and provide
 economies of scale;
 
--  The development of a computerized data base and a modular budget 
template
 that would allow for
standardization of costs, enable quick and accurate budget estimates, 
and
 prevent over-assessments;
 
--  A rapidly deployable headquarters unit with logistics support so 
that the UN
 can respond to emergencies
in a timely way; and
 
--  Improvements in planning, training, communications, intelligence, 
and
 logistics.
 
Our purpose in all of this is not to create some sort of global high 
command but
 rather to raise the level of
performance to the point where UN peace-keeping is credible, cost-
effective, and
 professional.
 
The Value of Peace-keeping
 
Of course, none of this would matter if carefully defined and well-
executed UN
 peace operations did not
serve the best interests of our people.  This Administration, like prior
 Administrations, believes that they
do; we think that most Americans agree.
 
First--to put things in perspective--the world spends about $900 billion 
each
 year for military forces.  The
UN spends about one-third of 1% as much on peace-keeping.  Here in the 
United
 States, we allocate
roughly $250-$300 for defense for every $1 we allocate to peace-keeping.  
The
 recent increase in peace-
keeping costs brought about in part by the end of the Cold War remains 
far less
 than the savings that have
been made possible by the relaxation of East-West tensions.
 
Second, the United States is one of five countries with the power to 
veto any UN
 peace-keeping operation.
I can assure you that we will use our influence--and if necessary our 
veto--to
 block operations that would
harm our interests.  I can also assure you that our continued right to 
the veto
 is not negotiable.
 
Third, a narrow but not insignificant point:  In 1993, UN Headquarters 
purchased
 more than $250 million
worth of goods and services from American sources--36% of the total 
value of UN
 Headquarters'
procurement for peace-keeping.
 
Fourth, well-planned and well-implemented UN peace operations do 
contribute to
 goals of direct interest to
us.
 
In Cambodia, the UN was asked to run elections, clear mines, repatriate
 refugees, disarm the Khmer
Rouge, and help administer the country.  The result was less than some 
hoped but
 far more than skeptics
predicted.  The Cambodian people responded overwhelmingly to the promise 
of
 peace and to the
opportunity to vote.  The result was an election with more than 90%
 participation, a constitutional
government taking power, the repatriation of hundreds of thousands of 
refugees,
 and further discrediting of
the Khmer Rouge.
 
In El Salvador, the UN helped end a 12-year conflict that took 70,000 
lives.
 Observers from all sides agree
that only the UN had the credibility to oversee demobilization, monitor 
human
 rights, assign responsibility
for past atrocities, verify implementation of the peace agreement, and 
pave the
 way for elections which--
despite significant problems--were the freest and most peaceful in the 
nation's
 history.
 
In Cyprus, the UN has prevented the outbreak of war between two NATO 
allies.
 Through its presence on
the Golan Heights, it has helped to preserve peace between Israel and 
Syria for
 more than two decades.  In
Namibia, it helped to create an outpost of democracy and stability in a
 strategic part of Africa.  In
Mozambique, it is arranging elections this fall and demobilizing 
factions that
 had waged a bloody civil
war.  UN sanctions against Iraq, combined with a UN presence on the 
Kuwait
 border, are helping to keep
Saddam Hussein's ambitions in check.
 
A few weeks ago, I traveled to South Africa, where UN observers worked 
hard to
 make last week's
elections a success--to drive the final nail into the coffin of 
apartheid and
 make possible a government that
is truly responsive to the people.  There is an abundance of bad news in 
the
 world today; there remain
enormous obstacles for South Africa, but the miracle of a democratic 
transition
 in that country should
inspire us all.  President F.W. de Klerk and President-elect Nelson 
Mandela
 found a useful ally in the UN.
 
In Croatia and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, UN forces are 
helping
 prevent a wider
Balkan war.  And in Bosnia, the UN has worked in a sometimes uneasy 
partnership
 with NATO to restore a
semblance of normal life to Sarajevo, to open the airport in Tuzla, to 
end the
 violence between government
and Bosnian Croat factions, to lend belated credibility to the safe-
haven
 concept, and to maintain a
humanitarian lifeline to those in desperate need.
 
Last weekend, for the fourth time, the U.S., NATO, and the UN acted in 
tandem to
 implement Security
Council directives aimed at ending the violence and encouraging peace.  
The
 first time was in February,
when a NATO ultimatum resulted in the removal or control of heavy 
weapons in and
 around Sarajevo.
The second was in late February with the shootdown of Serb planes 
violating the
 no-fly zone.  The third
was three weeks ago, when limited air strikes were ordered in response 
to the
 initial Bosnian Serb attacks
against Gorazde.  The fourth was the NATO ultimatum demanding a 
withdrawal of
 Serb forces and heavy
weapons from around that same town.
 
The purpose of these actions is to see that the will of the Security 
Council is
 respected and that the parties
are encouraged to negotiate seriously for peace.  The Bosnian Serbs must
 understand that continued
aggression will be met by internationally sanctioned military force.
 
We Americans support these operations because they contribute to a world 
that is
 less violent, more stable,
and more democratic than it otherwise would be.  History teaches us that
 democracies rarely commit
aggression.  And experience warns us that when small powers fight, 
larger powers
 are often drawn in and
that aggression, when unchecked, only leads to more aggression.  It is 
far more
 effective and far less risky
to treat the symptoms of global disorder when they appear than to wait 
until the
 consequences of conflict
arrive at our door.
 
In summary, we should not ask the UN to take on jobs that we have not 
equipped
 it to do.  And we should
equip the UN to do the jobs we would like it to do.  The United States 
will be
 better off if the United
Nations is better able to prevent and contain international conflict.
 
Paying for Peace-keeping:  The U.S. Share
 
Despite the burden-sharing aspects of UN peace-keeping, the United 
States
 remains by far the largest
single financial contributor to the UN, and no one should forget that.  
This
 reflects our position as a
permanent member of the Security Council and as the world's leading 
economic and
 military power.
 
The system for assessing peace-keeping costs was created in 1973 with 
U.S.
 support.  For a variety of
reasons, the share of peace-keeping costs we are assessed has risen in 
recent
 years from about 28% to more
than 30%.  In December 1992, the breakup of the Soviet Union and the 
resultant
 decrease in contributions
from that source caused the UN to raise our assessment even further--to 
31.7%.
 We made it clear that we
did not accept this most recent change, however, and continue to 
acknowledge an
 assessment rate of
30.4%, upon which our budget calculations are based.  The Administration
 believes that the 30.4% rate is
still too high, and we are seeking support at the UN for a reduction to 
the 25%
 rate recently mandated by
Congress beginning in 1996.
 
We have informed the Secretary General of our determination--and of 
yours--to
 see that the U.S.
assessment is reduced.  He shares our concern and has sent emissaries to 
conduct
 consultations in key
foreign capitals.  We are conducting our own consultations both in New 
York and
 abroad.  We note that the
General Assembly will be reviewing requests for alterations in the 
current
 assessment scale this spring and
fall.  I can assure you that we will keep you informed of developments 
as they
 occur.
 
The Administration's Budget
 
Successful UN peace-keeping operations serve our interests.  But they 
will more
 likely succeed if we have
met fully our obligation to help pay for them and if we encourage other 
member
 states who have fallen
behind in their payments to do the same.
 
The funds appropriated by Congress last year for peace-keeping in FY 
1994 had to
 be used to meet prior-
year commitments.  Thus, our entire assessed share of UN peace-keeping 
costs in
 the current fiscal year--
an amount we expect will exceed $1 billion--is currently unmet.  We will 
need
 your help to find a way to
provide that money.  We also face the possibility of additional costs 
associated
 with new or expanded
peace operations, both this year and next.  As President Clinton made 
clear
 during his recent meeting with
congressional leaders, funding for our peace-keeping obligations is a 
high
 priority, and we are prepared to
work closely with you on this matter.
 
Our specific requests include $670 million in FY 1994 supplemental funds 
and
 $533 million in FY 1995,
including funds for additional payments on our estimated FY 1994 
requirements.
 We are also requesting
from your subcommittee $75 million in voluntary contributions for 
multilateral
 peace-keeping in FY 1995.
 
Because we believe that the Departments of State and Defense should have 
shared
 responsibility for peace-
keeping, the Administration is requesting, in addition, an appropriation 
of $300
 million for a new
Department of Defense peace-keeping account.  Under the "shared 
responsibility"
 concept, the Defense
Department will have lead management responsibility within the U.S. 
Government
 for those UN peace
operations involving the likelihood of combat or the presence of U.S. 
combat
 units.  This approach will
ensure that military expertise is brought to bear on those peace 
operations that
 have a significant military
component.
 
The State Department will continue to have lead management and funding
 responsibility for traditional
peace-keeping operations that do not involve U.S. combat units.  In all 
cases,
 the State Department will
retain its traditional diplomatic responsibilities with respect to all
 peace-keeping operations and activities.
 
In urging favorable consideration by Congress of our peace-keeping 
budget
 requests, I stress three points.
 
First, UN peace-keeping will not be fixed unless it is supported 
financially by
 UN members.  The current
funding shortfall complicates efforts to plan efficiently, to implement 
reforms,
 and to make the investments
that will save money in the long run.  Already, the UN has fallen well 
behind in
 reimbursing troop
contributors.  We know that some nations have informed the UN that they 
will not
 contribute troops to
future operations until past bills are reimbursed.  This makes it harder 
to find
 additional troops for places
like Bosnia and to maintain troops at adequate levels in places like 
Somalia.
 This, in turn, jeopardizes the
success of such operations and puts the peace-keepers who are deployed 
at
 greater risk.
 
Second, we are already facing situations--and we can foresee others--in 
which we
 must choose between
rejecting an operation we believe is very important to our interests or 
voting
 for an operation for which
funds are not assured.  This past week, for example, the Security 
Council
 voted--with U.S. support--to
expand the authorized strength of UNPROFOR.  This expansion is essential 
if our
 policy of extending real
protection to designated safe areas such as Gorazde is to succeed.  But 
expanded
 capabilities do not come
without increased financial obligations.
 
We also have a strong interest in seeing that conflicts in the former 
Soviet
 Union are resolved in ways that
maintain the integrity of the New Independent States.  UN involvement is 
one way
 to advance that goal.
But if we can't support an operation due to lack of funds or if UN 
members won't
 contribute troops because
they fear they will not be reimbursed, the option disappears.  This, in 
my
 personal judgment, is how grave
historical errors come to be made.
 
Third, my ability to push our reform agenda at the UN would be enhanced 
greatly
 if I were able to say with
confidence that we are going to pay our bills fully and promptly.  This 
is true
 both with respect to the
inspector general issue--which Mr. Bennet will discuss--and gaining a 
reduction
 in the U.S. share of peace-
keeping costs.
 
An Appropriate Role for Congress
 
America cannot lead in international organizations by executive action 
alone.
 Congress must play an
important role because Congress, like the President, is accountable to 
the
 people.  I can assure you, Mr.
Chairman, that with respect to both funding and policy, we want to work 
with you
 and with your
subcommittee.  We have initiated and we will maintain close and regular
 consultations concerning all
aspects of our peace-keeping policy.
 
In that connection, I will end by citing the conclusion of an excellent 
recent
 study on peace-keeping that
was prepared under the auspices of the Stimson Center with the 
participation of
 Members of the House and
Senate from both parties.  That conclusion is also a pretty good summary 
of the
 Administration's own
approach to peace-keeping policy.
 
"The US can be as tough on approving new UN operations as it wants to 
be, and as
 selective in deciding
whether or not US forces should participate as it wishes to be.  But if 
the UN's
 capacity for peace
operations is improved successfully, it would provide a new security 
option to
 the United States, to be used
at the US Government's discretion, permitting us to avoid the necessity 
of
 choosing between unilateral
action and standing by helplessly when international conflict and 
atrocities
 occur."
 
 
Anthony Lake, Lt. Gen. Wesley Clark
Opening statements at a press briefing on the peace operations 
presidential
 decision directive (PDD) by
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 
and Lt.
 Gen. Wesley Clark,
Director for Strategic Plans and Policy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
 Washington, DC, May 5, 1994.
 
Anthony Lake.  This week, President Clinton signed the first 
comprehensive U.S.
 policy on multilateral
peace operations suited to the post-Cold War era.  This policy has the 
full
 support of the entire
Administration.  It benefited very greatly from the work that had been 
done in
 the previous Administration
on this issue and from very detailed consultations in the Congress with 
dozens
 of key legislators.  In fact, in
drafting the final policy, we incorporated many very useful 
contributions by
 Members of Congress.
 
The central conclusion of the Administration's study is that, when  
properly
 conceived and well-executed,
peace-keeping can be a very important and useful tool of American 
foreign
 policy.  Our purpose is to use
peace-keeping selectively and more effectively than has been done in the 
past.
 
The post-Cold War era is, as we see every day, a very dangerous time.  
Its
 defining characteristic is that
conflicts in this era take place more within nations than among them.  
And this
 makes it a particularly
difficult time, both conceptually and practically, for us in the 
international
 community to come to grips
with questions of when and how and where we will use force.
 
Some of these internal conflicts challenge our interests, and some of 
them do
 not.  But the cumulative
effect of all of these internal conflicts around the world is 
significant.  We
 have all, over the last year--you
and I and the others in the Administration--spent a great deal of time 
working
 on various conflicts of this
kind, whether in Somalia, or Rwanda, or Haiti, or Bosnia, or elsewhere.
 
The further problem here is that these kinds of conflicts are 
particularly hard
 to come to grips with and to
have an effect on from outside because, basically, of course, their 
origins are
 in political turmoil within
these nations.  And that political turmoil may not be susceptible to the 
efforts
 of the international
community.  So neither we nor the international community have the 
mandate to,
 the resources for, or the
possibility of resolving every conflict of this kind.
 
When I wake up every morning and look at the headlines and the stories 
and the
 images on television of
these conflicts, I want to work to end every conflict.  I want to work 
to save
 every child out there.  I know
the President does, and I know the American people do.
 
But neither we nor the international community have the resources or the 
mandate
 to do so.  So we have to
make distinctions.  We have to ask hard questions about where and when 
we can
 intervene.  And the reality
is that we often cannot solve other people's problems--and we can never 
build
 their nations for them.
 
So the policy review is intended to help us make those hard choices 
about where
 and when the
international community can get involved; where and when we can take 
part with
 the international
community in getting involved; and, thus, where and when we can make a 
positive
 difference.
 
Let me emphasize again that, even when we do take action, the primary
 responsibility for peace rests with
the people and the parties to the conflict.  What the international 
community
 can do is to offer a kind of a
breathing space for the people involved to make and preserve their own 
peace.
 
That's the principle, for example, that we have employed in recent 
months in
 Somalia.  We continue to
urge the Somali people to take advantage of the breathing space that we 
helped
 provide for them and to
seize this opportunity to resolve their differences peacefully.  While 
we are
 hopeful--and there are hopeful
signs--that they can do so, there are also disturbing signs in Somalia 
in recent
 weeks, and we do not know
what the outcome will be.  But we did our job, we believe, in providing 
that
 breathing space, and we
believe that the more than 15,000 UN personnel there are doing theirs 
today.
 
So we must be selective, as I have just said, and we must also be more
 effective.  The U.S. is committed to
strengthening UN peace-keeping capabilities, because effective peace-
keeping
 serves both America's and
the world's collective interests.  It can produce conflict resolution 
and
 prevention, as on the Golan or in El
Salvador; it can promote democracy as it has in Namibia and in Cambodia 
and,
 again, in El Salvador; and
it can serve our economic interests as well, as, for example, in the 
Persian
 Gulf.
 
And peace-keeping is burden-sharing, which is certainly in our 
interests.  We
 pay less than one-third of the
costs of the UN troops and UN operations--and less than 1% of UN troops 
in the
 field are, in fact,
American.
 
While there are limits to peace-keeping--and even setbacks, as we have 
seen in
 Rwanda in recent days--we
have to be careful never to overlook the impressive successes and the 
personal
 courage that have been
shown and are being shown today by UN peace-keepers around the world.
 
Since 1948, over 650,000 men and women from all over the world have 
served in UN
 missions, and over
1,000 have given their lives--for example, some 200 in southern Lebanon, 
over 70
 in Bosnia, 100 in
Somalia, more than 150 in Cyprus.  In Cambodia, Bulgarians and Japanese 
and
 Chinese and Bangladeshis
and others were victims of the Khmer Rouge, who attacked UN peace-
keepers trying
 to oversee the
elections there and make them possible.  There were stories that I'm 
sure some
 of you recall of villagers
stuffing messages into the ballot boxes in Cambodia thanking the UN
 peace-keepers for what they were
doing and imploring them to stay on.
 
In the Bosnian town of Bakovici, some of you may remember that there 
were 100
 patients in a mental
hospital who were trapped there without heat or electricity over the 
winter, and
 UN peace-keepers were
going in, back and forth, bringing in supplies to the mental hospital 
across the
 lines and getting fired at
from both sides.
 
My point is that it is easy for all of us, when there is a setback, to 
dismiss
 the UN and the peace-keepers as
a whole.  We must not do that, because it does a disservice to the 
courage that
 they are showing today and
to the sacrifices they have made in the past.  Even so, because the 
needs for
 peace-keeping have outrun the
resources for peace-keeping, it's important that we ask the tough 
questions
 about when and where we will
support or participate in such operations.  We are the first government 
that
 has--and this is the first time in
the history of the U.S. Government that we have--cared and dared enough 
to do so
 and to ask those
questions.
 
Peace-keeping is a part of our national security policy, but it is not 
the
 centerpiece.  The primary purpose
of our military forces is to fight and win wars--as specified in our 
bottom-up
 review, to fight and win two
major regional contingencies nearly simultaneously and to do so 
unilaterally
 when necessary.
 
If peace-keeping operations ever conflicted with our ability to carry 
out those
 operations, we would pull
out of the peace operations to serve our primary military purposes.  But 
we
 will, as the President has said
many times, seek collective rather than unilateral solutions to regional 
and
 intrastate conflicts that don't
touch our core national interests.  And we'll choose between unilateral 
and
 collective approaches, between
the UN and other coalitions depending on what works best and what best 
serves
 American interests.
 
The policy review addresses six major issues.  First, ensuring that we 
support
 the right operations; second,
that we reduce the cost of peace-keeping operations; third, that we 
improve UN
 peace-keeping capabilities;
fourth, that we ensure effective command and control of American forces; 
fifth,
 that we improve the way
the American Government manages the issue of peace-keeping; and, sixth, 
to
 enhance the cooperation
between the Congress and the executive branch.  Let me say just a word 
about
 each.
 
First--ensuring that we support or participate only in the right types 
of
 peace-keeping operations.  Not all
such operations, obviously, make sense.  We are, as I said, I believe 
the first
 nation to ask the tough
questions at the UN before committing to costly new peace-keeping 
operations.
 The President said that we
would do so in his General Assembly speech last fall, and we are, 
indeed, doing
 just that.
 
We've developed two sets of questions in the study to determine, first, 
when the
 United States should vote
for such operations and, second, when the U.S. should participate in 
them.  In
 the unclassified document
we've handed out--"The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming 
Multilateral
 Peace Operations,"
which summarizes the PDD--we have a complete list of those questions.  
They
 include such questions as:
 
--  Does the mission advance American interests?
--  Is there a threat to international peace and security?
--  Does it have a very clear mandate?
--  Does it have clear objectives?
--  Are the forces and the funds actually available for such an 
operation?
 
Second, we believe that we have to reduce the peace-keeping costs to the 
United
 States and to the United
Nations.  Peace-keeping simply costs too much right now.  It can be a 
very good
 investment for us, but it
would be an even better investment if it were less costly.  So, first, 
we are
 working to reduce American
costs.  As the President has said, we are committed to reducing our
 peace-keeping assessment to 25% by
January 1996, and we believe that other newly rich countries should pay 
their
 fair share.  And, second, we
all save when the costs of UN peace-keeping operations are reduced 
generally.
 In the study, we propose--
have proposed already in a number of cases--numerous financial and
 budget-management reforms to make
UN peace-keeping operations more efficient and cost effective.  For 
example, we
 would like to see a
unified UN peace-keeping budget; we would like to see better procurement
 procedures; and, as a top
priority and something we are working on right now, we would like to see 
a
 wholly independent office of
an inspector general with oversight for peace-keeping.
 
Third, we think we have to improve the UN's peace-keeping capabilities, 
and we
 are committed to doing
this.  So we're going to work with the UN and member states on steps to 
improve
 the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations and its field missions--for example, enhancing 
planning,
 logistics, procurement,
command and control, public affairs, intelligence, and civilian police
 capabilities.  And we will lead an
effort in the UN to try to redeploy resources within the UN system to 
fund these
 reforms.
 
Fourth--and this is tremendously important--we have to ensure that there 
is
 effective command and control
of American forces when they are engaged in peace-keeping operations.  I 
will
 ask Lt. Gen. Wes Clark to
address this for a moment.
 
 
Lieutenant General Clark.  There has been a great deal of discussion on 
the
 issue of command and control,
so let me begin by laying out the definitions that are relevant here.  
First of
 all, by command, what we're
speaking of is the constitutional authority to establish and deploy 
forces:  to
 issue orders, separate and
move units, resupply, provide medical support, enforce discipline.  The
 President will never relinquish
command of U.S. forces; that is inviolable.
 
Operational control is a subset of command.  Operational control can be 
given
 for a specific time frame--
for a specific mission in a particular location.  Operational control 
may be the
 assignment of tasks to
already-deployed forces led by U.S. officers.  We may place the U.S. 
forces
 under the operational control
of foreign commanders.  That's the distinction that's in this peace 
operations
 document.
 
Now the involvement with foreign commanders, I would tell you, is 
nothing new.
 In fact, that's the news
of this document--that from the perspective of command and control, 
there is
 nothing new.  In World War I
and World War II, throughout our experience with NATO, and in Operation 
Desert
 Storm, we've always
had the ability to task, organize, and place some U.S. units under 
foreign
 operational control, if it was
advantageous to do so.
 
This PDD policy preserves our option to do that.  We will be able to 
place U.S.
 forces under foreign
operational  control when it's prudent or tactically advantageous.  I 
would tell
 you that, as we look at it, the
greater the U.S. military role and the more likely the operations 
involved
 entail combat, the less likely we
are to place those forces under foreign operational control.
 
Even were we to do so, fundamental elements would still apply.  The 
chain of
 command will be inviolate.
All our commanders will have the capability of reporting to higher U.S.
 authority.  They'll report illegal
orders--or orders outside the mandate that they've been authorized to
 perform--to higher U.S. authority if
they can't work those out with the foreign commander on the ground.
 
Of course, the President retains the authority to terminate 
participation at any
 time to protect our forces.
There's no intent in this language to subvert an operational chain of 
command.
 What we're trying to do is
achieve the best balance between cohesive, trained, well-established 
U.S. chains
 of command and unity of
command in an operation involving foreign forces in a coalition or some 
other
 grouping.
 
So that's the intent behind this.  And, as I say, it is no change from 
the way
 we've operated in the past.  I
would also tell you that our military has played a major role in 
defining the
 command and control aspects
of this PDD.  It's been thoroughly vetted in the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
system.
 It's been reviewed and
approved by the Chiefs of Staff of our services and by the commanders in 
chief
 of our forces overseas.
 
 
Anthony Lake.  Also--fifth--we think it is important that we improve the
 American Government's
management of peace-keeping.  We think so because peace-keeping, as we 
have
 seen, is important and
complex and dangerous--and, thus, the perspective of our military and 
defense
 leaders should be brought
more to bear in it.  So we concluded that the Department of Defense 
should join
 the State Department in
assuming both policy and financial responsibility for appropriate peace
 operations--what we call shared
responsibility.  You will not be surprised to know that each was more 
anxious
 for the policy responsibility
than the financial responsibility, but it has been worked out, we think, 
very
 well.
 
The State Department will both manage and pay for traditional, non-
combat
 peace-keeping operations--i.e.,
under Chapter VI of the Charter--when there are not American combat 
units
 involved.  This represents, by
far, the greatest number of such operations.  The Defense Department 
will manage
 and pay for all peace
enforcement operations under Chapter VII of the Charter--for example, in
 Somalia, the former Yugoslavia,
and Kuwait now--and those traditional peace-keeping operations under 
Chapter VI
 in which there are
American combat units.
 
We believe that this shared responsibility will not only mean better 
management
 but will help us solve the
long-term funding problem that we face in peace-keeping.  We still have 
an
 immediate arrears problem in
our peace-keeping debts, and without new funding, the American arrearage 
will be
 over $1 billion by the
end of this fiscal year--the end of September.  The President is very 
committed
 to paying off this debt, and
he and we are working very closely with the Congress now to devise the 
means to
 do so.
 
Finally, in the study, we have worked to recognize the need to improve 
the
 relationships and consultations
between the executive branch and the Congress on peace-keeping 
operations.  And
 we're going to take a
number of steps to improve the information flow between the 
Administration and
 the Congress on these
issues.
 
In short, the policy is designed to impose more discipline on the UN and 
on
 ourselves so that peace-
keeping will be a more effective collective security tool for American 
foreign
 policy.  This is a new era; we
are all learning how to come to grips with the new problems that it 
presents to
 us.  But there is no doubt in
my mind that peace-keeping offers a very important way of making sure 
that
 today's problems don't
become tomorrow's crises--because those crises will cost us a lot more 
in the
 long run than peace-keeping
does right now.
 
This is an important--not the most important but an important--part of 
our
 national security policy.  It is
very, very important that we and the United Nations get it right, and 
that's
 what this study is about.
 
 
Executive Summary
Text of the executive summary from "The Clinton Administration's Policy 
on
 Reforming Multilateral
Peace Operations" released by the White House, May 5, 1994.
 
Last year, President Clinton ordered an inter-agency review of our 
nation's
 peacekeeping policies and
programs in order to develop a comprehensive policy framework suited to 
the
 realities of the post-Cold
War period.  This policy review has resulted in a Presidential Decision
 Directive (PDD).  The President
signed this directive, following the completion of extensive 
consultations with
 Members of Congress. This
paper ["The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral 
Peace
 Operations"] summarizes the
key elements of that directive.
 
As specified in the "Bottom-Up Review," the primary mission of the U.S. 
Armed
 Forces remains to be
prepared to fight and win two simultaneous regional conflicts.  In this 
context,
 peacekeeping can be one
useful tool to help prevent and resolve such conflicts before they pose 
direct
 threats to our national
security.  Peacekeeping can also serve U.S. interests by promoting 
democracy,
 regional security, and
economic growth.
 
The policy directive (PDD) addresses six major issues of reform and 
improvement:
 
1.  Making disciplined and coherent choices about which peace operations 
to
 support--both when we vote
in the Security Council for UN peace operations and when we participate 
in such
 operations with U.S.
troops.
 
To achieve this goal, the policy directive sets forth three increasingly
 rigorous standards of review for U.S.
support for or participation in peace operations, with the most 
stringent
 applying to U.S. participation in
missions that may involve combat.  The policy directive affirms that
 peacekeeping can be a useful tool for
advancing U.S. national security interests in some circumstances, but 
both U.S.
 and UN involvement in
peacekeeping must be selective and more effective.
 
2.  Reducing U.S. costs for UN peace operations, both the percentage our 
nation
 pays for each operation
and the cost of the operations themselves.
 
To achieve this goal, the policy directive orders that we work to reduce 
our
 peacekeeping assessment
percentage from the current 31.7% to 25% by January 1, 1996, and 
proposes a
 number of specific steps to
reduce the cost of UN peace operations.
 
3.  Defining clearly our policy regarding the command and control of 
American
 military forces in UN
peace operations.
 
The policy directive underscores the fact that the President will never
 relinquish command of U.S. forces.
However, as Commander-in-Chief, the President has the authority to place 
U.S.
 forces under the
operational control of a foreign commander when doing so serves American
 security interests, just as
American leaders have done numerous times since the Revolutionary War, 
including
 in Operation Desert
Storm.
 
The greater the anticipated U.S. military role, the less likely it will 
be that
 the U.S. will agree to have a UN
commander exercise overall operational control over U.S. forces.  Any 
large
 scale participation of U.S.
forces in a major peace enforcement operation that is likely to involve 
combat
 should ordinarily be
conducted under U.S. command and operational control or through 
competent
 regional organizations such
as NATO or ad hoc coalitions.
 
4.  Reforming and improving the UN's capability to manage peace 
operations.
 
The policy recommends 11 steps to strengthen UN management of peace 
operations
 and directs U.S.
support for strengthening the UN's planning, logistics, information and 
command
 and control capabilities.
 
5.  Improving the way the U.S. Government manages and funds peace 
operations.
 
The policy directive creates a new "shared responsibility" approach to 
managing
 and funding UN peace
operations within the U.S. Government.  Under this approach, the 
Department of
 Defense will take lead
management and funding responsibility for those UN operations that 
involve U.S.
 combat units and those
that are likely to involve combat, whether or not U.S. troops are 
involved.
 This approach will ensure that
military expertise is brought to bear on those operations that have a
 significant military component.
 
The State Department will retain lead management and funding 
responsibility for
 traditional peacekeeping
operations that do not involve U.S. combat units.  In all cases, the 
State
 Department remains responsible
for the conduct of diplomacy and instructions to embassies and our UN 
Mission in
 New York.
 
6.  Creating better forms of cooperation between the Executive, the 
Congress and
 the American public on
peace operations.
 
The policy directive sets out seven proposals for increasing and 
regularizing
 the flow of information and
consultation between the executive branch and Congress; the President 
believes
 U.S. support for and
participation in UN peace operations can only succeed over the long term 
with
 the bipartisan support of
Congress and the American people.  (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 5:
 
Annual Terrorism Report Released
Statement by Acting Department Spokesman Christine Shelly, Washington, 
DC, May
 9, 1994.
 
Available in the Press Office are copies of Patterns of Global 
Terrorism:  1993.
  The report describes the
dimension of the international terrorist threat during calendar year 
1993,
 during which we recorded 427
international terrorist attacks.  This is an increase from the 361 
incidents
 recorded the previous year.  The
main reason for the increase was an accelerated terror campaign 
perpetrated by
 the Kurdistan Workers
Party (PKK) against Turkish interests.  Most of the group's 150 attacks 
took
 place on only two days--24
June and 4 November--and were staged throughout Western Europe.  Had it 
not been
 for these two days of
coordinated attacks, the level of terrorism would have continued the 
downward
 trend of recent years.
 
The list of states that sponsor terrorism grew by one last year.  We 
added Sudan
 to the list in August 1993.
The other nations that remain on the list are Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, 
North
 Korea, and Syria.  All seven are
discussed in the report.
 
The bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City and the ensuing 
fire and
 smoke caused six
deaths and 1,000 injuries.  It was the only terrorist incident in 1993 
that
 claimed American lives.  Through
the hard work of U.S. law enforcement agencies, the Administration 
successfully
 tracked down and
brought to justice perpetrators of the World Trade Center bombing.  The 
World
 Trade Center bombing and
the FBI's discovery of the plot to blow up selected targets in New York 
City,
 including the United Nations
and the Holland and Lincoln Tunnels, show that because American targets 
are
 vulnerable to terrorist
threats, we cannot let down our guard.
 
The report also describes how the United States is countering the 
threat. We
 have been resolute in
demanding justice for the families of the victims of the Pan Am 103 
bombing, and
 we remain determined
to ensure that Libya surrender the two suspects for trial in Scotland or 
the
 United States. We fought for and
obtained tighter sanctions against Libya and are vigorously enforcing 
them.
 President Clinton sent Saddam
Hussein a strong and unequivocal message once evidence was uncovered 
that his
 government was
responsible for the plot to assassinate former President Bush.  We took 
military
 action against the Iraqi
intelligence headquarters that planned the attack last June, an 
important and
 appropriate response.  This
Administration is committed to maintaining an effective international
 counter-terrorism policy.
 
How To Get the 1993 Terrorism Report
 
The full report is available electronically through the U.S. Government 
Printing
 Office's Federal Bulletin
Board Service (BBS); the price is $15.00.  The report can be found in 
the
 Department of State Global
Issues Library under Terrorism.  For information on how to access the 
BBS, see
 the inside back cover of
this issue.
 
[Editor's Note:  Access to the BBS information is noted as last article 
in this
 Dispatch issue.]
 
Paper copies of the report may be obtained from:
 
The Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism
U.S. Department of State
Washington, DC  20520
(FAX:  202-647-0221).  (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 6:
 
Treaty Actions
 
Multilateral
 
Finance
Agreement establishing the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development.
 Done at Rome June 13,
1976.  Entered into force Nov. 30, 1977.  TIAS 8765; 28 UST 8435.
Accession:  Eritrea, Mar. 31, 1994.
 
Genocide
Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide.  
Adopted
 by UN General
Assembly at Paris Dec. 9, 1948.  Entered into force Jan. 12, 1951; for 
the U.S.
 Feb. 23, 1989.
Accession:  Liechtenstein, Mar. 24, 1994.
Succession:  Slovakia, May 28, 1993.
 
Human Rights
International covenant on civil and political rights.  Adopted by the UN 
General
 Assembly Dec. 16, 1966.
Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976; for the U.S. Sept. 8, 1992.
Accession:  Dominica, June 17, 1993.
Succession:  Slovakia, May 28, 1993.
 
International covenant on economic, social, and cultural rights.  
Adopted by the
 UN General Assembly
Dec. 16, 1966.  Entered into force Jan. 3, 1976 (1).
Accession:  Dominica, June 17, 1993.
Succession:  Slovakia, May 28, 1993.
 
Judicial Procedure
Convention abolishing the requirement of legalization for foreign public
 documents, with annex.  Done at
The Hague Oct. 5, 1961.  Entered into force Jan. 24, 1965; for the U.S. 
Oct. 15,
 1981.  TIAS 10072; 33
UST 883.
Succession:  Macedonia, Sept. 30, 1993.
 
Convention on the service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents 
in
 civil or commercial matters.
Done at The Hague Nov. 15, 1965.  Entered into force Feb. 10, 1969.  
TIAS 6638;
 20 UST 361.
Territorial application:  United States extended to the Commonwealth of 
the
 Northern Mariana Islands,
Mar. 31, 1994.
 
Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction.  Done 
at The
 Hague Oct. 25, 1980.
Entered into force Dec. 1, 1983; for the U.S. July 1, 1988.  TIAS 11670.
Accession:  Chile, Feb. 23, 1994 (3).
 
Labor
Instrument for the amendment of the constitution of the International 
Labor
 Organization.  Done at
Montreal Oct. 9, 1946.  Entered into force Apr. 20, 1948; reentered into 
force
 for the U.S. Feb. 18, 1980.
TIAS 1868; 62 Stat. 3485.
Acceptance:  Oman, Jan. 31, 1994.
 
Narcotics
Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961.  Done at New York Mar. 30, 
1961.
 Entered into force Dec. 13,
1964; for the U.S. June 24, 1967.  TIAS 6298; 18 UST 1407.
Succession:  Slovakia, May 28, 1993.
 
Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961.  Done 
at Geneva
 Mar. 25, 1972.
Entered into force Aug. 8, 1975.  TIAS 8118; 26 UST 1439.
Succession:  Slovakia, May 28, 1993.
 
Convention on psychotropic substances.  Done at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971.  
Entered
 into force Aug. 16, 1976;
for the U.S.  July 15, 1980.  TIAS 9725; 32 UST 543.
Accession:  Sudan, July 26, 1993; Zimbabwe, July 30, 1993.
Succession:  Slovakia, May 28, 1993; Croatia, July 26, 1993.
Territorial Application:  Extended to Anguilla, Bermuda, the British 
Antarctic
 Territory, the Cayman
Islands, the Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Montserrat, South Georgia and 
the
 South Sandwich Islands, and
the Turks and Caicos Islands, June 3, 1993.
 
United Nations convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and
 psychotropic substances, with annex
and final act.  Done at Vienna Dec. 20, 1988.  Entered into force Nov. 
11, 1990.
  [Senate] Treaty Doc. 101-
4.
Accession:  Zimbabwe, July 30, 1993; Latvia, Feb. 24, 1994.
Acceptance:  Netherlands, Sept. 8, 19932; Finland, Feb. 15, 1994.
Succession:  Croatia, July 26, 1993.
Ratification:  Panama, Jan. 13, 1994 (2).
Territorial application:   Extended to the Isle of Man, subject to 
reservations
 and notifications, Dec. 2,
1993.
 
Patents
Patent cooperation treaty with regulations.  Done at Washington June 19, 
1970.
 Entered into force Jan. 24,
1978.  TIAS 8733; 28 UST 7645.
Accession:  Lithuania, Apr. 5, 1994.
 
Property
Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of Mar. 
20, 1883,
 as revised.  Done at
Stockholm July 14, 1967.  Entered into force May 19, 1970; for the U.S. 
Aug. 25,
 1973.  TIAS 6923, 7727;
24 UST 2140.
Accession:  Paraguay, Feb. 25, 1994.
 
Racial Discrimination
International convention on the elimination of all forms of racial
 discrimination.  Adopted by the UN
General Assembly Dec. 21, 1965.  Entered into force Jan. 4, 1969 (1).
Successions:  Bosnia-Herzegovina, July 16, 1993; Slovakia, May 28, 1993.
 
Torture
Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or
 punishment.  Adopted by
the General Assembly of the United Nations Dec. 10, 1984.  Entered into 
force
 June 26, 1987 (1).  [Senate]
Treaty Doc. 100-20.
Accession:  Ethiopia, Mar. 14, 1994.
Succession:  Slovakia, May 28, 1993.
 
Women
Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against 
women.
 Adopted by the UN General
Assembly Dec. 18, 1979.  Entered into force Sept. 3, 1981 (1).
Signature:  South Africa, Jan. 29, 1993.
Succession:  Slovakia, May 28, 1993.
 
Bilateral
 
Belgium
Basic exchange and cooperative agreement concerning mapping, charting, 
and geodesy cooperation.  Signed at Fairfax Mar. 1, 1994.  Entered into 
force Mar. 1, 1994.
 
Bolivia
Agreement amending the agreement of Oct. 13, 1992, regarding the 
consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of certain debts owed to, 
guaranteed by, or insured by the U.S. Government and its agencies. 
Effected by exchange of notes at La Paz Mar. 2 and Apr. 13, 1994.  
Entered into force Apr. 13, 1994.
 
Brazil
Agreement amending and extending the agreement of Feb. 6, 1984, as 
extended, relating to cooperation in science and technology.  Signed at 
Brasilia Mar. 21, 1994.  Enters into force on the date that both 
governments have notified each other that their respective requirements 
have been fulfilled.
 
Guyana
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of 
certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the U.S. Government 
and its agencies, with annexes.  Signed at Washington Apr. 5, 1994.  
Enters into force following signature and receipt by Guyana of written 
notice from the United States that all necessary domestic legal 
requirements have been fulfilled.
 
Jamaica
Agreement concerning the protection and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights.  Signed at Kingston Mar. 17, 1994.  Enters into force 
upon an exchange of notes indicating all legislation and regulations 
necessary to give full effect to obligations undertaken therein have 
come into force.
 
Kyrgyzstan
Agreement concerning the provision of training related to defense 
articles under the United States International Military Education and 
Training (IMET) Program.  Effected by exchange of notes at Bishkek Feb. 
7 and 25, 1994.  Entered into force Feb. 25, 1994.
 
Mali
Postal money order agreement.  Signed at Bamako and Washington Feb. 10 
and Apr. 7, 1994.  Entered into force May 1, 1994.
 
Moldova
Agreement regarding cooperation to facilitate the provision of 
assistance. Signed at Chisinau Mar. 21,1994.  Entered into force Mar. 
21, 1994.
 
Nauru
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations.  Signed 
at Washington and Nauru Oct. 8,1993 and Jan. 17, 1994.  Entered into 
force Apr. 4, 1994.
 
Russia
Agreement to establish a joint commission for agribusiness and rural 
development, with annexes.  Signed at Moscow Mar. 11, 1994.  Entered 
into force Mar. 11, 1994.
 
Uruguay
Treaty on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters.  Signed at 
Montevideo May 6, 1991.  [Senate] Treaty 
Doc. 102-19.  Entered into force Apr. 15, 1994.
 
Uzbekistan
Agreement regarding cooperation to facilitate the provision of 
assistance. Signed at Tashkent Mar. 1,1994.  Entered into force Mar. 1, 
1994.
 
1  Not in force for the U.S.
2  With reservation(s).
3  With declaration(s).  (###)
 
 
Inside Back Cover:
 
Electronic Services
 
Federal Bulletin Board
 
The U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO) provides the public with 
immediate, self-service, and cost-effective access to federal electronic 
information through its Federal Bulletin Board Service (BBS).  The State 
Department's Bureau of Public Affairs provides Dispatch, country 
Background Notes, daily press briefings, and special publications on the 
BBS.
 
Users can immediately access free services on the bulletin board with a 
personal computer, modem (settings: 8 bit, no parity, 1 stop bit, speeds 
300-9600 baud), telecommunications software, and telephone line by 
dialing (202) 512-1387.
 
To access BBS through the Internet, Telnet to FEDERAL.BBS.GPO.GOV 3001 
(where 3001 is the port number).
 
There is no charge for browsing the list of files, downloading copies of
 instructional and product description files or publication schedules, 
or using electronic mail to order files on personal computer diskettes 
or as hard copy.  To download files, prices are reasonable:  the minimum 
charge per file is $2 (upto 50 kilobytes); a full megabyte file costs 
$15.  For BBS purchases, you may pay by Visa, MasterCard, or GPO Deposit 
Account.  To pay be credit card, GPO requires 24 hourse to validate the 
information from the time you register on the BBS as a new user.  A GPO 
Deposit Account can be opened by calling (202) 512-0822 (FAX:  (202) 
512-1262).  For additional information about GPO's service, call the 
Office of Electronic Information Dissemination Services at (202) 512-
1530.
 
Consular Affairs Bulletin Board
 
The Department of State's Bureau of Consular Affairs provides Consular
 Information Sheets, Travel Warnings, and helpful tips to travelers on 
the Consular Affairs Bulletin Board (CABB).  Access is free of charge to 
anyone with a personal computer, modem, telecommunications software, and 
telephone line. Dial (202) 647-9225 and follow the screen prompts to 
retrieve and download data.  For further informationon the CABB and 
materials provided, write to:  Department of State, Bureau of Consular 
Affairs, Office of
Public Affairs, Room 5807, Washington, DC 20520; or telephone (202) 647-
1488.
 (###)
 
END OF DISPATCH VOL 5, NO 20.

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