US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 5, NUMBER 20, MAY 16, 1994
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1. Pursuing Peace in the Middle East and Bosnia
a. Palestinian Self-Rule Marks a Key Step Toward Lasting Peace --
Secretary
Christopher
b. Turning Principles Into New Realities in the Middle East --
Secretary
Christopher
c. Signing of Agreement To Implement Israel-Palestinian Declaration of
Principles -- President Clinton
d. Bosnia: U.S. and Russia Call for Meeting Of Contact Group Foreign
Ministers
e. Secretary Christopher's Consultations on Peace in the Middle East
and
Bosnia, April 25 to May 3, 1994
-- Secretary Christopher, Jordanian King Hussein, Russian Foreign
Minister
Kozyrev, Saudi Foreign
Minister Saud, Israeli Prime Minister Rabin
2. A New Consensus of the Americas -- Secretary Christopher
3. The Americas: New Priorities in a New Partnership -- Alexander F.
Watson
4. The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace
Operations -- Madeleine K. Albright, Anthony Lake, Lieutenant General
Clark, Executive Summary
5. Annual Terrorism Report Released
6. Treaty Actions
Inside back cover: Electronic Services
ARTICLE 1 (a-e):
Pursuing Peace in the Middle East and Bosnia
ARTICLE 1a:
Palestinian Self-Rule Marks A Key Step Toward Lasting Peace
Address by Secretary Christopher to the American Jewish Committee,
Washington, DC, May 5, 1994.
Before reporting to you on aspects of my recent trip, let me take a
moment to commend the AJC and the outstanding leadership of Al Moses.
Al, a long-time friend, exemplifies the best of a uniquely American
brand of public service: balancing responsibilities to his family and
profession with the demanding obligations of helping to lead his
community. You are indeed lucky to have him as your president.
The AJC has done pioneering and persistent work against bigotry. You
have spoken out against those who practice or preach anti-semitism and
you have condemned every other form of intolerance. Your support for
religious freedom is a gift for children of every faith. You know that
hatred cannot be quarantined; it must be confronted wherever it is
found.
Tragically, new evidence of prejudice abounds. Some nations have banned
the film "Schindler's List." As you learned yesterday during your time
with some of those saved by Schindler, that film's importance to the
collective conscience of humanity cannot be overstated and must not be
ignored.
Regrettably, in America, too, new signs of intolerance have appeared.
Recent eruptions of anti-Semitism and racism have degraded our
political dialogue and diminished our society.
What those in this room tonight know only too well is that bias and
prejudice do not disappear of their own accord. I learned that lesson
during my years at the Justice Department following the Watts riots. I
learned it again when I was involved in the independent commission that
recommended reforms in the Los Angeles Police Department after the
Rodney King beating.
Given our common vision of an America drawing strength from diversity,
it is no coincidence that the newly empowered L.A. Police Commission is
headed by a distinguished member of your organization, Rabbi Gary
Greenebaum.
The AJC has been an advocate of tolerance not only at home but a
compelling voice for human rights around the world. In the United
States, we are still working to form a "more perfect union." And yet I
would say that America's elevation of human dignity, in this country and
around the world, is unmistakable and really quite uncommon.
A Gift From Cairo
In view of the historic events of the last few days, I want to focus my
remarks tonight on developments in the Middle East peace process. It's
customary to bring a gift for your host whenever you're invited to
dinner. Well, tonight, I bring a precious gift from Cairo--a gift that
didn't come easily but clearly reflects the commitment Israel and the
Palestinians have made to creating a future of coexistence and a future
of reconciliation. Formally, it's known as the agreement on Palestinian
self-rule in Gaza and Jericho. But let me be a bit less opaque in
describing what it really is: an important step forward on the road to
a lasting and secure peace for Israel and the Middle East. This is,
indeed, an achievement to be cherished. We must use it to send a
simple message to a still-troubled world: Negotiations do work. Peace
between former enemies is possible. Starting today, the Palestinians and
the Israelis, joined by their friends in the United States, Egypt, and
the rest of the world, have rolled up their sleeves and joined the real
battle for peace. This is a battle that must be waged every day, on
the ground, in the hearts and minds of people on both sides of this
long and bloody conflict: a conflict that can only end when individual
Israelis and Palestinians see evidence in their lives that mistrust and
violence need not be a permanent state of affairs--that in fact they
can live together side by side in a relationship of mutual respect and
mutual benefit. Within a matter of weeks, the Israeli army will withdraw
from Gaza and Jericho.
For the first time in their history, almost a million Palestinians will
assume responsibility for the day-to-day decisions that shape
their lives. And in time, self-government will be extended to
Palestinians throughout the West Bank.For its part, Israel will be free
--free of what Prime Minister Rabin has called the bloody costs of
"ruling over another people who do not want our rule." What Israeli
soldier ever looked forward to serving inJericho?
What Israeli mother will not now rejoice knowing that her child will
never again be sent to patrol the back streets and alleyways of Gaza?
Israel's Courage: Taking Risks for Peace
To reap these benefits fully, both parties must continue to demonstrate
the courage and vision that brought them to yesterday's signing
ceremony. Israel, besieged by war and terror for four decades, must
transfer to yesterday's enemy, the PLO, sufficient authority so that
self-rule can succeed. Prime Minister Rabin intends to do precisely
that without compromising Israel's security.
The Prime Minister's determination to go the extra mile for peace has
been
evident at every stage of these
negotiations. In 1985, I had the pleasure of introducing then-Defense
Minister
Rabin at a function in Los
Angeles, never dreaming that a different day would come and that we
would have
the relationship we have
now. I emphasized the courage and leadership he had repeatedly
demonstrated in
times of war. Over the
last 15 months, as we've worked together to build a lasting peace, my
admiration
for him has only grown.
He has applied the courage and experience he acquired in war to the
difficult
task of making peace.
In those 1985 remarks, I also underscored Israel's tremendous courage as
a
country. Compelled by
circumstances to fight for its survival, Israel has never stopped
striving for
peace. In pursuit of that goal, it
repeatedly has shown itself ready to make painful choices and undertake
significant risks for peace. As it
does so yet again, Israel should know that America's bedrock commitment
to its
security remains
unshakable. As President Clinton has said, "it is the job of the United
States
to minimize Israel's risks."
Toward that end, we must continue to guarantee and enhance Israel's
qualitative
military edge.
Palestinian Courage: Ending Terror, Building Self-Rule
The Palestinians have much to gain from yesterday's events. In taking
on the
powers of self-rule, they also
have a great responsibility for ensuring that the process succeeds.
They can be
assured of the goodwill and
support of the United States and the world community. Last October, we
organized the Donors'
Conference to Support Middle East Peace, which raised more than $2
billion to
assist Palestinian economic
development. The United States alone pledged $500 million toward that
effort.
By embracing this historic opportunity, the Palestinians can build a
freer, more
prosperous society--a
society based on accountable, democratic institutions of self-
government, where
the rule of law and human
rights are upheld. That is the kind of self-government that
Palestinians want
and deserve. To achieve it,
however, they must first live up to all the solemn commitments their
leaders
have undertaken but that they
must now carry out. One stands out among all others: to root out
terrorism and
violence against Israel.
The peace process simply will not be sustained unless Israelis are
convinced
that it will bring them greater
security.
The U.S. Role
For our part, the Clinton Administration has been pushing the peace
process
forward since its first days in
office. Indeed, my first trip outside the United States as Secretary of
State
was to the Middle East. Since
then, we have maintained constant contact with the parties and have
played what
we hope will be a
significant role. There are four aspects to that:
First, through our co-sponsorship of the Madrid process, we have
provided the
parties a framework for
direct negotiations.
Second, we have defused several crises that threatened to derail the
talks--for
example, the crisis over
deportees in early 1993 and the Katyusha crisis in Lebanon last summer.
And
only a few weeks ago, when
negotiations were suspended following the Hebron massacre, we worked out
a
formula acceptable to Israel
that brought the Palestinians back to the peace table.
Third, when necessary, we have acted as an active intermediary to move
negotiations forward, particularly
on the Israeli-Syrian track.
Finally, we have mobilized the political and economic support of the
international community to ensure we
have the resources to help make peace a reality in that region.
Without the United States playing this kind of a leadership role, I
believe the
peace process simply will not
succeed. With it, yesterday's agreement can become the first step on
the road
to a lasting Middle East
peace.
Expanding the Peace
The successful implementation of the Gaza-Jericho accord must be
followed by the
expansion of self-rule
to the rest of the West Bank and then by negotiations on the difficult
issues of
final status.
But the Israeli-Palestinian breakthrough we saw finalized yesterday also
must be
accompanied by
accelerated progress in Israel's negotiations with its other neighbors--
Syria,
Jordan, and Lebanon. Only a
comprehensive Middle East peace will provide the strategic underpinning
for
long-term regional stability.
On my recent trip, I spent many intense and interesting hours with Prime
Minister Rabin and President
Asad of Syria, discussing their important set of negotiations. I
believe there
is a renewed seriousness of
purpose on both sides to engage comprehensively on all the issues that
must be
resolved across the broad
range of the relationship between the two countries. The gaps that
separate
them remain wide. But the
level of detail in their respective ideas is unprecedented and created a
much
stronger basis for negotiations.
A new, more substantive phase of these talks has been opened. The
United States
intends to remain deeply
engaged. I have agreed to travel again to Israel and Syria in the near
future.
Building Cooperation, Containing Extremism
Last week, I also traveled to Riyadh for talks with King Fahd of Saudi
Arabia
and the foreign ministers of
the Gulf Cooperation Council. I stressed the importance of expanding
the zone
of peace to the entire Arab
world. Here, the Gulf states' active participation in the multilateral
phase of
the peace process is essential.
The multilateral process doesn't get much attention. But quietly it
continues
to topple long-standing
taboos. Last month, for example, the water working group met in Muscat
and
approved an Israeli proposal
for rehabilitating water systems in the region. Think about that fact.
A group
including 13 Arab
delegations endorsed an Israeli proposal for addressing a common problem
affecting all the countries in the
region. The venue for the meeting--an Arab capital--is also a symbol of
falling
taboos. I talked to the
Israeli representative and was touched by the way he was received. The
process
continues this week in
Qatar, where the arms control group is meeting.
In Riyadh, I also urged the Gulf states to further demonstrate their
interest in
reconciliation with Israel, and
I told them that ending the Arab boycott is the place to start.
The boycott has always been detestable. Now, with the signing of the
Israeli-Palestinian economic
agreement a few days ago, it has become a dangerous anachronism that
hurts the
very people it is supposed
to help. Implementation of the Declaration of Principles will be
completed
soon. At that point, tangible
steps need to be taken to dismantle the boycott.
The second issue dominating my discussions in Riyadh was the need to
maintain
tight economic sanctions
against Iraq. If Saddam Hussein is allowed to escape his current
containment,
he would pose an immediate
threat to his neighbors as well as to Arab-Israeli peace. I am
gratified that I
found strong support for our
position among the Gulf countries for maintaining the sanctions. It is
essential that our other coalition
partners remain equally steadfast.
Creating a Middle East Community
I want to conclude by saying that yesterday's landmark agreement in
Cairo
represents another key building
block in America's long effort to help secure a more stable, peaceful
Middle
East. This represents a
sustained bipartisan effort by Democratic and Republican Administrations
alike.
The costs have been
substantial. But the returns are well worth the investment, not simply
because
it allows us to help
reconcile long-term adversaries but because it promises to advance
America's
vital interests in a critical
region of the world.
The potential strategic benefits of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict
are
difficult to exaggerate. Our aim is
nothing less than to create a new Middle East community of nations that
share a
common interest in
peaceful relations, stability, economic development, and the advancement
of the
region's peoples. Such a
community would not solve all the region's problems. But it would
provide a far
more solid foundation for
the well-being of Israel and our Arab friends. It would better secure
the
region's vast oil supplies. And it
would serve as a powerful bulwark against the growing threats of
political
extremism, weapons
proliferation, and the growing threats from renegade countries like
Iraq, Libya,
and Iran.
With the help and support of groups like the AJC, I am convinced that
America
can help Israel and her
neighbors achieve peace. Through patience, persistence, and strength,
we can
advance our interests in this
vital region. I assure you that the Clinton Administration remains
dedicated to
this vision of a more stable
and secure Middle East.
ARTICLE 1b:
Turning Principles Into New Realities in the Middle East
Remarks by Secretary Christopher at the signing of the "Agreement on the
Gaza
Strip and the Jericho
Area," Cairo, Egypt, May 4, 1994.
President Mubarak, Prime Minister Rabin, Chairman Arafat, Foreign
Minister
Peres, Foreign Minister
Kozyrev, Mr. Abbu Mazin, distinguished guests: Representing President
Clinton
and the United States, I
am privileged and honored to stand with you today in this wonderful
city, as we
witness the signing of this
remarkable agreement and pay tribute to those who made it possible.
Eight months ago, many of you stood with me in another great city to
witness
another historic handshake.
The signing of the Declaration of Principles last September in
Washington
committed long-time
adversaries to mutual reconciliation. It gave them a way out of the
bitter
conflict that has so long
entrapped them.
Now they stand on the verge of implementing that agreement. Though we
live in
an age of political
wonders, where old hatreds are giving way to new hopes, these
achievements
cannot be forgotten. Indeed,
we must use them to send this simple message to a world still beset by
conflict:
With vision, leadership,
and courage, peace between former enemies is possible.
The months between these two agreements have not been easy. They have
tested
our faith in the power of
reasoned compromise. Israelis and Palestinians have wrestled with the
complicated questions like transfer
of authority, economic integration, and security--and perhaps also with
their
own doubts about the
possibility of success. They searched for--and in the end, they found--
ways to
turn principles into new
realities.
To their eternal credit, Israelis and Palestinians pressed forward in
the face
of extremists who sought to kill
hope for the future by inflaming the hatreds of the past. We are here
today
because unspeakable acts of
violence could not still the voices of peace or weaken the resolve of
the
peacemakers. We are here to send
a message to all who would use terror to keep Arabs and Israelis mired
in the
politics of hatred and despair:
The children of the Middle East will not be condemned to a future of
perpetual
conflict. Negotiations
work; peace is possible.
For Palestinians, the challenge now is to build accountable, democratic
institutions of government; to
provide for the economic well-being of their people; to uphold the rule
of law;
and to guarantee respect for
human rights. That is the kind of self-government that Palestinians
want and
deserve. The international
community must stand ready to assist them. The challenge is not merely
to
secure the peace but to take full
advantage of it.
For Israelis, the immediate task will be to establish a new relationship
with
their Palestinian neighbors, to
forge bonds of cooperation that can bring benefits to both peoples--to
reach the
undiscovered promised
land of peace.
For Palestinians and Israelis alike, the challenge will be to create a
common
basis of respect and tolerance.
The challenge will be to help all the peoples of the Middle East
fulfill, in the
words of President Clinton,
the "great yearning for the quiet miracle of a normal life."
There is still important work to be done. We have not seen the end of
contention in the Middle East. But
we are changing the manner of contention. We are coming closer to the
day when
disputes once inflamed
by the argument of force will be settled by the force of argument.
The spirit of compromise we see today must not fade. Israelis and
Palestinians
have a fundamental stake in
this process. For the first time, Palestinians have the chance to
govern
themselves. For the first time,
Israelis have the chance to forge a truly constructive relationship with
Palestinians. I believe that together
they can--and must--succeed.
In the end, the goal we seek is not simply peace as the absence of war.
It is a
just and enduring and
comprehensive settlement based on genuine cooperation, mutual respect,
tolerance, and the normal
interaction of diplomacy and trade that binds nations together.
With the support and determination of the friends of peace, that goal
can be
reached. In this regard, I pay
special tribute to President Mubarak, whose efforts were so instrumental
in
helping us reach this moment.
Egypt has again demonstrated that it is an essential bridge, linking
Arabs and
Israelis in the pursuit of
peace. It is also fitting to honor the memory of the late Foreign
Minister of
Norway, Johan Holst, who
worked tirelessly in pursuit of this agreement, and who is, I am
certain, with
us in spirit.
Forty-five years ago, on the island of Rhodes, the great American
peacemaker
Ralph Bunche mediated the
first armistice between Arabs and Israelis. His words then capture our
spirit
now. He said:
"I have a bias against war; a bias for peace. . . . I have a bias in
favor of
both Arabs and Jews in the sense
that I believe that both are good, honorable and essentially peace-
loving
peoples, and are therefore as
capable of making peace as of waging war."
The same motivations that brought Arabs and Israelis to Madrid, to Oslo,
to
Washington, and here today to
Cairo will carry this region forward to lasting peace. Prime Minister
Rabin,
Chairman Arafat, we salute
you today for taking an extraordinary step toward this noble goal.
ARTICLE 1c:
Signing of Agreement To Implement Israel-Palestinian Declaration of
Principles
Statement by President Clinton released by the White House, Office of
the Press
Secretary, Washington,
DC, May 4, 1994.
The signing today in Cairo of the agreement to implement the Israel-
Palestinian
Declaration of Principles
marks another milestone in progress toward a lasting peace in the Middle
East.
On behalf of all
Americans, I have called Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat to
congratulate them for this
accomplishment. I expressed my high regard for Prime Minister Rabin's
courageous leadership and
stressed to Chairman Arafat the importance of moving without hesitation
to make
this agreement a reality.
I also telephoned yesterday, and again today, President Mubarak to
underscore
our gratitude and
appreciation for the key role he played in making this historic step
forward
possible.
Now the focus must be on implementing the Declaration of Principles in
as rapid
and successful a manner
as possible. The process of transforming the situation on the ground
for the
better must begin. The
promise of a new future of hope for Israelis and Palestinians alike must
now be
realized. I assured Prime
Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat that the United States would do
everything
possible to make this
happen.
Building on the progress achieved today and our ongoing discussions with
parties
in the region, I am
hopeful that this can be the year of breakthrough to a lasting and
comprehensive
peace for all the peoples
of the Middle East.
ARTICLE 1d:
Bosnia: U.S. and Russia Call for Meeting Of Contact Group Foreign
Ministers
Statement by Department Spokesman Michael D. McCurry, released by the
Office of
the Spokesman,
Washington, DC, May 3, 1994.
United States Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Foreign Minister
of the
Russian Federation
Andrei V. Kozyrev met today in Cairo, Egypt, to discuss a number of
issues.
Most importantly, the
Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister expressed serious concern
over the
continuing instability of the
situation in Bosnia, which could spark another dangerous point of
conflict.
They called on all the parties for:
-- Immediate and full compliance concerning the withdrawal of forces
from
proscribed areas around
Gorazde;
-- Immediate steps to reduce tension and prevent offensive military
action in
the Brcko area;
-- Agreement on an urgent basis to a complete cessation of hostilities
throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, to
include separation of military forces, withdrawal of heavy weapons, and
interposition of UN forces; and
-- Immediate resumption of negotiations without precondition for
conclusion of
an overall settlement.
Secretary Christopher and Minister Kozyrev are convinced that a new,
powerful
political impetus is
required for a Bosnia settlement process. They believe that a meeting
involving
the foreign ministers of
the participants in the Contact Group should be convened as soon as
possible.
Based on discussions with
their colleagues, they believe such a meeting could probably take place
on May
13 in Geneva.
ARTICLE 1e:
Secretary Christopher's Consultations on Peace in the Middle East and
Bosnia,
April 25 to May 3, 1994
Ascot, United Kingdom, April 25, 1994
Opening statements at a news conference by Jordanian King Hussein and
Secretary
Christopher.
King Hussein. Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to express before you
once
again my joy at having the
opportunity to meet a very dear and old friend, Secretary Christopher,
here.
We have had some very, very
fruitful, open, frank discussions on a number of issues that are of
mutual
interest to us but also to all of
you. I am very happy indeed to have had this chance. I am sure you
have
questions, which you should
address to the Secretary and myself, and we would be more than happy to
respond
to them.
Secretary Christopher. I just had the honor of meeting with King
Hussein again,
here at his residence in
[Ascot], and I am glad to say that we have had a very constructive
discussion of
a number of issues.
We, of course, discussed the peace process and the importance of pushing
for
progress on all four of the
tracks, looking toward and understanding the great importance of a
comprehensive
peace. We talked about
resumption on the four bilateral tracks in Washington, DC, rather soon
after I
complete this visit to the
Middle East. We particularly agreed on the importance of moving forward
to
rapid implementation of the
Declaration of Principles between the Israelis and the Palestinians
after they
conclude their agreement,
which we hope will be in the very near future.
On another matter of importance, I informed His Majesty that, subject to
some
fine tuning, the United
States Government will support establishment of a land-based regime for
verifying enforcement of
sanctions against Iraq. The inspections will be carried out by a
private,
independent, not-for-profit
company of international stature and integrity, Lloyds Register of the
United
Kingdom, which will operate
at the Port of Aqaba.
The United States is convinced this new inspection regime will be as
effective
as the MIF--Multinational
Interception Force--effective in guaranteeing that no Iraqi trade will
transit
Aqaba other than transactions
which have been specifically permitted by the United Nations. Indeed,
we
believe that in some respects
land-based inspections will be an improvement in our ability to enforce
sanctions against Iraq. I want to
emphasize that the King and I discussed these matters today, and the
United
States, Jordan, and our MIF
partners are all fully and definitely committed to the enforcement of
these
sanctions.
After careful study, I am glad to say, we became convinced that this
proposal
for a new inspection regime
not only takes into account--in response to legitimate concerns that His
Majesty
has indicated to me on a
prior occasion--but will also make it easier to sustain and enhance the
sanctions against Iraq. The King and
I have agreed that Jordan and the United States will cooperate closely
together
with the UN Sanctions
Committee and other interested parties to effectuate and establish this
new
on-shore enforcement regime to
make it work efficiently and expeditiously.
The Government of Iraq continues to thwart the will of the international
community by its refusal to
comply with United Nations resolutions. It certainly continues to
inflict great
damage on the people of
Iraq. The King was very eloquent today in pointing out to me the harm
that the
people of Iraq are suffering
at the hands of the Government of Iraq. Last week, we saw another
example of
Iraq's promotion of
terrorism when its agents assassinated an Iraqi opposition leader in
Beirut. In
the face of this kind of
behavior, we believe that we have no alternative but to continue with
the
enforcement of the sanctions
regime.
Geneva, Switzerland, April 26, 1994
Opening statements at a news conference by Secretary Christopher and
Russian
Foreign Minister Kozyrev.
Secretary Christopher. Good afternoon. I will start with a brief
opening
statement, and then Foreign
Minister Kozyrev will make a brief statement in Russian, which will be
translated. And then we'll be glad
to try to respond to your questions.
We've just had a very productive meeting which covered several important
international issues. The chief
subject, of course, was Bosnia. Throughout this crisis in Bosnia over
the
Gorazde issue, the United States
and Russia have retained and had very close consultations at every
stage. We
have a common objective in
Bosnia. I believe we have a common view as to events on the ground.
Russia's
support for the steps taken
in Gorazde--and with respect to the other safe areas--by NATO has been
very
important and highly
desirable.
We discussed here this afternoon the importance of finding a diplomatic
solution, for it is clear that there
can be no military solution to this long-standing conflict. We have
recognized
the importance of the
Contact Group--which was formally recognized yesterday--which will, of
course,
combine the efforts of
Russia, the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations.
I think
the task of that Contact
Group, of course, is to try to bring the parties back to the table and
into
serious negotiations. To that end,
the first task will be to achieve a genuine cessation of hostilities
between the
parties. At the same time, the
Contact Group will be working to bring the parties into serious
discussion of a
final settlement. We are
already at work, I think, on both of these urgent goals; and as you
know, the
members of the Contact
Group are preparing to go to Sarajevo to meet with both of the parties
commencing on Thursday and
Friday of this week.
We had a good discussion--changing the subject--on the Middle East
peace
process and our concerns
about making progress there. Foreign Minister Kozyrev gave me an
account of his
important meetings
today with Prime Minister Rabin, who had been in Moscow, and I told him
of my
plans over the next
several days to try to move the peace process along. We discussed North
Korea
and the proliferation
problems there. That's a problem on which our two countries have common
goals
and common interests,
and we will work closely together on that problem.
We also discussed the issue of Russian troop withdrawals from Latvia and
Estonia. We, I think, share the
hope that there can be a signature, in the next few days really, of the
troop
withdrawal agreement between
Russia and Latvia. We also hope that the talks between Russia and
Estonia,
which will take place in the
early part of May, will be successfully concluded as well.
Finally, we discussed Russia's interest in joining the Partnership for
Peace;
and the partnership, of course,
is moving forward with, I think, 14 countries now having indicated
interest in
joining. And, of course,
NATO will welcome Russia's participation at the time when they are ready
to
enter into those discussions.
Foreign Minister Kozyrev. Well, I think that this is an objective
description
of the subjects we discussed.
The only thing I would like to add is one question that we discussed
regarding
the new COCOM and the
participation of Russia in the practical work in the development of this
regime
along the lines as we agreed
in Vladivostok.
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, April 27, 1994
Opening statements at a news conference by Saudi Foreign Minister Saud
and
Secretary Christopher.
Foreign Minister Saud. I'd like to say that the Secretary has had a
very
wide-ranging, thorough, extensive,
fruitful discussion with the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, and the
Secretary will give you a briefing
on these discussions.
I would like to concentrate my comments on the discussions that were
held
between the Secretary and the
Gulf Cooperation Council countries; and, in this regard, I would like to
say
that we were pleased to have
hosted the meeting today with Secretary of State Christopher and the
ministers
of the Gulf Cooperation
Council.
The GCC and the United States have a long history of close relations
marked by
advances in regional peace
and security to the benefit of all states in the region. In our
discussions, we
reviewed with Secretary
Christopher our common stance with regard to the effect which Iraq
continues to
pose to regional security.
We agreed on a common resolve to stand vigilant and determined to ensure
full
compliance with United
Nations sanctions in accordance with Security Council resolutions--
especially
Resolution 833, pertaining to
the demarcation of borders between Kuwait and Iraq.
The Secretary, on behalf of the President of the United States,
reiterated the
commitment of the United
States to the defense of the Gulf--a commitment that is appreciated by
the Gulf
Cooperation Council
countries.
The Secretary also briefed the GCC ministers on the state of progress in
the
peace process and the
objectives of his current trip to the region. The GCC reiterated its
full
support for a negotiated peace
settlement; and, in this regard, the GCC ministers recognized the
progress being
made in the PLO-Israel
agreement and reiterated the need for a speedy implementation of that
agreement.
The ministers also pledged to continue to do what they can to support
negotiations and agreements reached
on the other tracks as well. They will also continue their active
engagement
and participation in the
multilateral negotiations. One meeting of the multilaterals has already
taken
place in the Gulf area; another
one is about to convene.
The GCC ministers believe all sides should do what they can to advance
the
prospects of peace. They
condemn terrorism everywhere in the world and abhor extremism that
threatens the
peace process. The
ministers appreciate the President's and the Secretary's efforts to
promote
Arab-Israeli peace and
reconciliation. And the ministers look forward to the day when a new
page is
turned in the Middle East
and a just and comprehensive peace is achieved for all the peoples in
the
region.
As regards the problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the GCC ministers
expressed their
deep appreciation for
the firm stand taken by the United States and hoped this position will
continue
until a peaceful resolution is
achieved.
The two sides expressed their appreciation for the efforts exerted by
the United
Arab Emirates aiming at
reaching an agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the
issue of
the three islands--Greater
Tumbs, Lesser Tumbs, and Abu Musa--which belong to the UAE.
They called upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to start serious
negotiations with
the UAE in order to arrive
at a peaceful solution to this problem.
Secretary Christopher. First, let me express my appreciation to Prince
Saud,
the Foreign Minister, as well
as to all the officials of the Saudi Arabian Government for the warm
hospitality
that we've had here and for
the pleasant time that they've provided for us.
Of course, I am especially grateful to His Majesty, the King, for
receiving me.
We met for about an hour
and 15 or 20 minutes today. We discussed a very wide variety of world
problems.
The King expressed his
concern about the situation in Iraq and expressed his support for the
maintenance of the United Nations
resolutions and the sanctions. He expressed his concern for the
situation in
Iran. He expressed his firm
support for the Middle East peace process and urged the United States to
continue its efforts to produce
peace in the area.
We discussed European matters--including Bosnia and the path of reform
in
Russia--and the King
discussed a great many of the world's problems and had acute
observations and
deep insights as to many of
these problems. I am sure that we will benefit from the comments that
he made.
I would say and emphasize that my presence in the region today is a
manifestation of President Clinton's
Administration's commitment--which is an ironclad commitment--to the
defense of
the countries in the
Gulf. Our resolve to defend against aggression in this region is no
less strong
than it was at the time of the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. We will remain determined and vigilant in
this
region, constantly aware that
there are threats to peace and security in the area.
The regime in Baghdad, in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions,
continues
the suppression of its
own citizens: the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the south. Its
refusal
also--three years after the
liberation of Kuwait--to recognize Kuwait's independence and its borders
is
obviously a troubling
phenomenon. Its resort to terrorism, as illustrated by its attempt to
assassinate President Bush last year and
its assassination of an Iraqi dissident in Beirut last week, shows that
they
remain in clear violation of
United Nations resolutions.
I am pleased to say that we join with our GCC partners in unanimously
and
strongly expressing our resolve
to maintain sanctions on Iraq until they fully comply. I want to send a
message
to the people of Iraq that,
certainly, we have no interest in prolonging their suffering. We would
like to
see a united and democratic
Iraq, a country that might then resume its rightful place in the
community of
nations. The problem and the
reason for the delay lie with the regime that is in power in Iraq.
I would say to the people of Iraq: Ask your rulers why there are
shortages of
medicine and food. The
United Nations resolution specifically exempts food and medicine from
the
sanctions. I would say to the
people of Iraq that your suffering today has one cause, and that is
Saddam
Hussein's refusal to comply with
the UN Security Council resolutions--his regime's rejection of the
resolutions
that would allow oil to be
exported in exchange for food and medicine and his harassment of UN
officials
engaged in humanitarian
efforts in Iraq.
We are using today's meeting not only to address our common concerns
with
respect to Iraq but also to
review with the ministers here our efforts to help to achieve a peaceful
settlement of the various
controversies in the Middle East. We agreed on the great importance of
the
early implementation of the
Declaration of Principles. We are pledged, I think, to provide not only
moral
support but tangible support
to the implementation of this important Declaration of Principles.
We agreed on the value of the multilateral talks, which can generate
broader
regional development and
show the people of the region what peace can mean.
We note the success of the water working group of the multilaterals last
week in
Muscat, and we are
looking forward to the meeting in Doha next week on arms control and
regional
security matters.
Finally, I'd like to indicate that we greatly appreciate the support of
Saudi
Arabia and the other Gulf
countries in the efforts to pursue peace in the region. As you know,
I'm going
from here to Cairo, where
I'll meet with President Mubarak, Chairman Arafat, and Israeli Foreign
Minister
Peres as they draw close to
reaching an agreement on the implementation of the Declaration of
Principles.
Thereafter, I'll be traveling to Israel and Syria, all to try to advance
the
cause of comprehensive peace in
the Middle East. This area has suffered too long from bloody conflict
and
oppressive rule. For the first
time, I believe that this region has an excellent opportunity to turn a
new
page, to put aside war and to
choose peace instead, to end the Arab boycott of Israel, and to lay the
foundation for permanent and lasting
peace. Our nation, the United States, looks forward to continued close
consultation with our close friends
here in Saudi Arabia as well as the other countries of the Gulf.
Tel Aviv, Israel, April 29, 1994
Opening statements at a news conference by Israeli Prime Minister Rabin
and
Secretary Christopher.
Prime Minister Rabin. Mr. Secretary, we welcome you to Israel and more
than
appreciate your efforts in
advancing and assisting the negotiations for peace between us and the
Palestinians, between us and the
three neighboring Arab countries. We appreciate the efforts that you
have put
forth since you became
Secretary of State in bringing about a solution to the Arab-Israeli
conflict.
You have spent some days now
in Cairo with President Mubarak, Chairman Arafat, and our Foreign
Minister Peres
and helped to bring
about the beginning of the end of the negotiations about "Gaza-Jericho
first."
I know that a date was set for the signing of the agreement, but there
are still
some issues to be negotiated,
formulated, and brought into the context of the agreement which we will
sign.
I know that now you will go to other countries, especially to Syria, in
an
effort to revive the peace
negotiations between Israel and Syria. Israel is interested in
achieving peace
treaties with the three
neighboring Arab countries beyond the peace with Egypt. We appreciate
your
efforts in bringing the
Syrian and the Israeli positions closer, and I wish you all the success
on your
road to Damascus.
Secretary Christopher. As you know, I've just completed a full day of
talks
with the Prime Minister and
Foreign Minister Peres, and I must say it was wonderful to be back in
the
company of such good friends
and allies. My visit here comes at a time of great hope for peace. We
devoted
our sessions today to ways
in which we might improve our effort to achieve peace.
As the Prime Minister said, we had an opportunity to review the few
remaining
steps necessary to come to
closure on the Gaza-Jericho agreement. These negotiations have been
long and
hard, but with the signing
ceremony in Cairo next Wednesday, it's clear that Israel and the
Palestinians
will be embarking on a new
road--a new venture together.
This will transform their relations from conflict into peaceful co-
existence.
To address the point that the
Prime Minister raised with me today, we both feel that entering into
this
agreement and implementing it is
the best answer to the terrorists who have inflicted so much pain on all
the
parties who have been
negotiating.
My presence here is a reflection of our continued engagement with the
parties.
But it's only really one
aspect of our commitment to peace and to the people of Israel. We've
been on
your side--at your side--
during time of war. We'll be at your side in this new era filled with
the hopes
and the fears and the
challenges that come with the difficult task of making peace.
As you said, Mr. Prime Minister, my goal on this trip is to facilitate,
as well,
the progress on the other three
tracks. Our goal is a comprehensive peace. The completion of the Gaza-
Jericho
agreement to be signed on
Wednesday will be only one step--but an important step--to facilitate
progress
in the other negotiations
which are necessary to achieve a comprehensive peace. We now need to
make
progress on the Syrian
track, as the Prime Minister said, as well. We spent a good deal of
time today
discussing various aspects of
the negotiations between Israel and Syria.
I'm afraid I am going to have to disappoint you: I think you'll
understand that
I'm not able to go into any of
the details of our discussion. What I will say is that the Prime
Minister and
the Government of Israel and
the Foreign Minister are absolutely serious about this matter, and they
have
urged me to attend to it with
the utmost seriousness and determination.
I would want to say also in the presence of the Prime Minister that in
Yitzhak
Rabin the people of Israel
have a steadfast and resolute leader who is very determined to protect
the
security of Israel. He is the kind
of wise and courageous leader that Israel needs at this kind of a moment
in its
history.
Tomorrow, as the Prime Minister said, I'll travel to Damascus. I expect
the
conversations there to be as
serious and substantive as the conversations here. We've got a lot of
hard work
ahead of us, but as we enter
this very difficult stage, I want to say to you, Mr. Prime Minister,
that it's a
great honor to have an
opportunity to join in this noble pursuit with you.
Damascus, Syria, May 1, 1994
Opening statement at a news conference by Secretary Christopher.
As you know, I met twice in Jerusalem with Prime Minister Rabin and his
colleagues. They gave me some
ideas, which I presented at some length yesterday to President Asad.
Today, I
met again and I have
received some ideas from President Asad, which I will be taking back and
presenting to Prime Minister
Rabin tomorrow. Let me characterize the discussions I have had as being
very
serious and substantive. I
think, from my standpoint--my own evaluation--we have entered a new,
more
substantive phase in the
negotiations. But it is clear that there is a good deal of work to be
done--a
lot of work to be done ahead.
I would indicate to you that the United States is going to play the most
effective and determined role that
we can to try to aid the parties in coming to some resolution of the
situation.
But I am afraid that I can't go
much further than what I have said. I do believe we have entered a new,
more
substantive phase, based
upon the discussions that I have had with the leaders of the two
countries over
the last three days.
En route Jerusalem to Cairo, May 3, 1994
Press briefing by Secretary Christopher.
I haven't seen as much of you as I would like to have done or normally
would do.
There are two reasons
for that. As you know, I have been working pretty well around the
clock.
Second, the role of the mediator
is such that you have to be very careful not to disclose the parties'
positions,
or you become quite useless to
them.
I thought I might come back and just say a few words on two subjects.
In
connection with the Israeli-
Syrian track--to repeat what I think you all know--I have spent a lot of
time
with the two parties over the
last three or four days. Last Friday, I had two extensive meetings with
Prime
Minister Rabin, Foreign
Minister Peres, and his group. Then on Saturday, I went to Damascus,
where I
had a long session with
President Asad where I basically passed on the views of Prime Minister
Rabin.
As I have said before, I did
most of the talking in that meeting, which is not the usual way in those
meetings.
The following day, because the President asked me to stay over and to
give them
an opportunity to insert
their views and to react to the views of the Israelis, we had a long
meeting
again on Sunday night--I am
sorry for such a late arrival on Monday morning. Yesterday I had, once
again, a
very extensive session
with the Israelis: first in the morning with the Prime Minister and in
a larger
group; and then, last night,
another session with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister and
General
Barak and other Israeli
officials.
I find in this situation a sense that there is a willingness on the part
of all
the parties to examine the
positions across a wide range of issues. One of the things that strikes
me
about this is that for the first time,
you are able to compare comprehensive proposals with other comprehensive
proposals. I don't want to say
that the architecture is the same on both sides, but, nevertheless,
there are
proposals that can be examined.
We are in what I would describe as an exploratory stage. Each party is
serious
about having to explore the
views of the other parties to see if there is some way to bridge the
very
considerable gaps that exist. I don't
want to in any way mislead you into thinking that the parties are close
together. There is a long road to
travel. But I think that there is a seriousness about the exploration I
have
not seen before.
Both parties are probing for new approaches to bridge gaps. My own
feeling is
that I ought to be available
to help keep the momentum up, and so I have told both parties that I
would try
to return mid-month. I wish
I could be more precise about that. Several factors are involved.
First,
I'm--as you probably know--going
to Mexico next Sunday and Monday. I also have a trip to meet with the
foreign
ministers of Europe and
elsewhere on Bosnia, and the date of that has not been set. Also, as
you
probably all know, there are
important holidays for both parties sometime in mid-month. So, we'll
have to
work around all of that; but
what I want to do is make myself available for a meeting approximately
in the
middle of the month, or
whenever the parties can be available, to try to keep up the momentum
that's
been achieved--not because
the parties are so close together but because they are both dealing in
comprehensive approaches.
Now, just a few words about today's situation. The timing of my visit
and my
meeting in Cairo, I think,
served an important purpose. We were able to help the parties identify
the
remaining open issues and,
together with a good deal of leadership from President Mubarak, to
persuade them
to set the signing date
for tomorrow. The Egyptians asked us to summarize the results of the
meeting in
which the issues were
defined, and we did that and presented a U.S. summary to both parties
which I
think has helped them to
sharpen the issues. I feel quite confident, although there are some
issues that
remain to be decided, that
there will be a signing ceremony tomorrow.
So, what is my role for the remainder of the day? I think the best way
to state
it is that I'll be available to
try to help the parties--I'll be there to help keep the parties on
track, to
help them to identify the open
issues. Of course, this is for the parties to resolve on their own, and
I do
want to emphasize the great
importance of Egyptian leadership and the debt that is owed to the
leadership of
President Mubarak, which
I witnessed firsthand. It's very impressive leadership, together with
Foreign
Minister Moussa. (###)
ARTICLE 2:
A New Consensus of the Americas
Secretary Christopher
Address before the Matias Romero Institute for Diplomatic Studies at the
Mexican
Foreign Ministry,
Mexico City, May 9, 1994
I am delighted to be in this vast metropolis, the cradle of the New
World and
now the largest city on earth.
As a Californian and a Los Angeleno, I am particularly proud to be with
you in
this vital center of modern
Hispanic culture in the Americas. This afternoon, I will visit one of
Mexico's
national treasures, the
anthropology museum in Chapultepec Park. There, I will have a chance to
reflect
upon the richness of the
pre-Columbian cultures that are part of the heritage of this nation.
An involvement with history comes with my job. When it is being made, I
often
can see it and feel it and
lend my hand. I had that privilege last Wednesday in another city of
ancient
greatness, Cairo. There, Israel
and the Palestinians agreed to implement the Declaration of Principles
that, we
hope, will transform the
war-torn Middle East. Thankfully, our task today is not a matter of war
and
peace. But I think that history
will remember well the importance of the work we are undertaking here.
Earlier this morning, I joined members of President Salinas' cabinet,
along with
several of my Cabinet
colleagues, in opening the first Binational Commission meeting since
NAFTA went
into effect. Only with
Mexico does the United States convene every year on such a basis. In
that
setting and in others, I have
found that the quality of Mexico's leadership--its technical expertise
and its
political vision--is a match for
that of any other nation in the world.
I am confident in saying today that relations between our nations have
never
been better, stronger, or more
important.
We recognize that NAFTA is not just a turning point for free trade but a
transforming event in the history
of our relations. It is a platform for prosperity and a bridge to
greater trade
and investment throughout the
Americas. For the United States, Mexico, and Canada, NAFTA represents a
monumental decision to
strengthen cooperation, widen integration in our hemisphere, and deepen
our
engagement in the global
economy.
NAFTA reflects and reinforces the new reality in the Americas. The
historic
movement over the last
decade toward democracy and economic liberalization has resulted in an
unprecedented convergence of
values and interests among Latin nations--and between them and the
United
States.
When I visited Latin America in 1977 as Deputy Secretary of State, most
Latin
countries were stagnating
under military rule. Now, virtually every nation in the Americas is a
democracy--and proud of it. Not
coincidentally, economies have expanded, and trade has multiplied. This
progress is gaining irreversible
momentum. And, not surprisingly, it has set important precedents for
political
and economic change
around the world.
Today, a new consensus of the Americas has formed. Open markets work.
Democratic governments are
just. And together they offer the best hope for lifting people's lives.
This morning, I will focus on the progress we have made and the work
that
remains to be done to build on
this new consensus of the Americas.
Let me begin with economic reform. Latin America is capturing the
imagination,
and attracting the trade
and investment, of the United States and the world. Exports to the
region have
more than doubled within
the last six years alone, and Mexico has become our third-largest
trading
partner and our fastest-growing
major export market.
Liberalization is opening markets, lowering barriers, cutting tariffs,
and
creating jobs. Inefficient state
enterprises are giving way to privatized companies that enhance
productivity.
Debt crises are passing.
Latin America is growing faster, on average, than the advanced
industrial
nations of the OECD. Latin
"jaguars" are in hot pursuit of Asian "tigers."
The modernizing economic reforms of the Salinas administration have made
Mexico
a pacesetter for the
region and for the world. By becoming a member of the Asia-Pacific
Economic
Cooperation forum,
Mexico is extending its dynamism and its destiny to the west. And by
becoming
the first Latin member of
the OECD, Mexico is gaining new responsibilities as a leader of the
global
economy.
President Clinton has reaffirmed our intention to negotiate free trade
agreements with other market
democracies in the hemisphere. We are committed to begin with Chile,
another
country on the cutting
edge of reform. We are consulting with Congress on broad, fast-track
authority
for these negotiations.
As we expand trade, we must also build a new architecture for regional
integration and investment.
Regional development banks are vital if we are to enlarge the circle of
prospering democracies. Last
month in Guadalajara, we took an important step with the landmark
replenishment
of the Inter-American
Development Bank. Together, we provided $40 billion in new capital that
will
allow the IDB to advance
several new priorities: investing in education and human resources,
protecting
the environment, and
supporting the private sector.
For the full promise of open markets and trade to be realized, the vital
arteries of a liberal market economy-
-from banking to transportation to communications--must carry commerce
more
efficiently. The reforms
of the last decade must be sustained. Inflation must continue to be
curbed,
public debt contained,
corruption combated.
We understand, as did Mexico's great 19th-century president, Benito
Juarez, that
even if reform requires
"immense sacrifice," it is essential to freedom and modernization. In
the
spirit of Juarez, reform must also
benefit every segment of society and narrow the gap between rich and
poor. All
our governments,
including mine, have a responsibility to help those who are left behind:
those
who have lost their jobs and
those who never had them.
Democracy is the single most effective link between prosperity and
equity.
Strengthening that link not
only will empower our nations, it will enrich them.
The movement to democracy in Latin America is a great epic of the late
20th
century. It is not captured in
any single image as indelible as the fall of the Berlin Wall or the
sight of
South Africans marking their
ballots and claiming their freedom. But democracy's victories in this
hemisphere--from Argentina, Brazil,
and Chile to Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala--are just as vital to
the
cause of liberty.
In El Salvador, political movements no longer field armies; now they
field
candidates for public office. In
many other countries, civic groups that once conducted their work
underground
now work openly to
monitor human rights and to advocate the needs of women, minorities, and
the
poor. They are advancing
democracy's agenda for the 1990s: They are building strong civil
societies that
countervail the power of
strong states; they are making governments more accountable to their
people.
Here in Mexico, the government led Latin America by reforming the
economy,
opening markets, and
negotiating NAFTA. Now Mexico, with its proud revolutionary heritage,
is in the
process of revitalizing
its democratic institutions.
In response to events in Chiapas, the Mexican Government has fostered
political
dialogue and paved the
way for national reconciliation. In announcing a cease-fire, in
issuing a
unilateral amnesty, and in openly
acknowledging the legitimacy of grievances, the government has shown
sensitivity
and responsibility.
In the period since the tragic assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio,
Mexicans
have come together to
uphold democracy and oppose violence. The death of such a promising
leader
would be a terrible loss for
any nation. But Mexico is revealing its strength and courage. I
believe that
out of this tragedy will come
renewal.
This August's elections will demonstrate the vitality of Mexico's
democracy. We
applaud the far-reaching
electoral reforms that Mexico has adopted over the last several years,
including
the agreement of January
27 of this year. We trust that these reforms, combined with your new
election
technology, will produce a
free and fair election that will give all Mexicans confidence in its
outcome.
We have a strong and productive relationship with President Salinas and
his
administration. I am confident
that we will have an equally strong and productive relationship with the
government that Mexican voters
choose in the August election.
Democracy and human rights are cardinal principles of the Americas.
Unfortunately, Haiti and Cuba
remain outside the orbit of democracy.
President Clinton is committed to the restoration of democracy and the
return of
President Aristide to Haiti.
The hemisphere is united in opposition to the unconscionable usurpation
of power
by the coup leaders.
The Haitian people have suffered gravely under their repressive rule.
This is why, last Friday, the UN Security Council adopted tough, new,
comprehensive sanctions, including
immediate measures targeted at the coup leaders and their supporters.
If
Haiti's military leaders refuse to
give up power, they will find that the international community has both
the will
and the means to make
them pay the price for their illegal actions. At the same time, the
international community will step up its
efforts to ensure that those who need humanitarian assistance receive
it.
President Clinton announced
yesterday that for its part, the United States will increase its
humanitarian
feeding and health programs in
Haiti to reach 1.2 million beneficiaries.
All the nations of the Americas have an interest in preventing a return
to the
rule of dictators. The United
States is committed to working with the nations of this hemisphere to
meet this
shared objective. We are
working with the Dominican Republic to tighten sanctions along the
Haitian-Dominican border. We will
seek to increase the number of UN and OAS human rights monitors in
Haiti. And
we will seek the
participation of other countries in the region in an effort to assist
Haitian
political refugees. Working
together, we can restore democracy and hope to the people of Haiti.
The people of Cuba, like all other citizens of the Americas, deserve the
right
to choose their leaders and to
take command of their destiny. Instead, their nation is caught in a
downward
economic spiral. Cuba can
escape its plight only by joining the hemispheric tide of open societies
and
open markets.
As we acknowledge this hopeful tide, we recognize that more must be done
to
fulfill the promise of
democracy in the Americas. We must build on the progress that Latin
militaries
have made in accepting
the primacy of civilian authority. We must also encourage the
development of
fully independent
judiciaries. They are essential to guarantee that the rule of law
prevails for
all.
Public institutions must become more efficient and accountable.
Unresponsive
bureaucracy undermines
productivity and saps trust in democracy. That is why in the United
States Vice
President Gore is leading
an ambitious effort to "reinvent government."
To sustain trust in democracy, governments must attack the scourges of
corruption and drug trafficking.
Government cannot be held accountable if its power can be bought.
Authority
will not be respected if the
rule of law can be defied with impunity.
Drug production and trafficking remains a vicious enemy. Drugs destroy
lives
and fuel violence. The drug
trade breeds official corruption and distorts economies by diverting
private
resources to criminal empires.
Under President Clinton's leadership, the United States is taking
responsibility
for its share of the problem.
Blaming other countries for our drug problems will not help addicts in
Los
Angeles or New York get off
drugs. Our first line of defense is to reduce demand at home.
President
Clinton's drug strategy and crime
bill will allow us to step up street-level drug enforcement, expand drug
abuse
prevention, and provide
treatment to hard-core drug abusers in prisons.
We recognize that many nations in the hemisphere have taken grave risks
and
demonstrated remarkable
resilience in the fight against drugs. Cooperation between the United
States
and Mexico against narcotics
is at its highest level ever, although much remains to be done.
We must help strengthen democratic institutions so that they can resist
intimidation. We will back
sustainable development programs to strengthen the economies of drug-
producing
and -transit countries.
We will enlist, for the first time, the international financial
institutions in
this effort. And we will reinforce
global law enforcement against drug cartels. The virtual "state of
siege" they
impose on cities and even
nations must be lifted--forever.
Like drugs, environmental pollution respects no borders; it cannot be
contained
by customs officials. It
must be fought domestically, regionally, and globally. Two years ago in
Rio,
leaders of 120 countries met
at the Earth Summit. It was right that the summit was held in the
Americas, for
we face urgent
environmental problems. But we have the chance to lead the world toward
sustainable development that
balances the environment, population pressures, and economic growth.
By undertaking the commitments made in the NAFTA side agreement on the
environment, Mexico, the
United States, and Canada joined in an unprecedented international
effort to
curb pollution. In 1994,
Mexico will spend more than 1% of its GDP on environmental programs--a
significant increase. Nowhere
are these efforts more important than here in Mexico City.
President Clinton has returned the United States to the mainstream of
global
efforts to curb too-rapid
population growth. Ten years ago in Mexico City, we watched the major
population conference from the
sidelines. This year, in Cairo, we will help forge a global action plan
on
population growth. We will draw
on the experiences that have enabled Latin America to cut its rate of
population
growth in half over the last
20 years. And we will seek to expand health care and empower women.
We can gain confidence from the close political and diplomatic
cooperation that
is building from Central
America to the Southern Cone. With the advance of democracy and
integration,
the chance that Latin
neighbors will go to war has dramatically receded. Once, Brazil and
Argentina
decided to design bridges
on their border so they would collapse in case tanks ever crossed over.
Argentinians, Chileans, and
Peruvians once mined their border roads. Today, bridges and roads carry
trade,
not tanks. Engineers dig
tunnels and pipelines through the Andes. And military spending is down.
Soon, we expect Brazil to join Argentina and Chile in renouncing a
nuclear arms
race in Latin America by
ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco, a landmark agreement made possible
by
Mexico's leadership. Argentina
has also recently joined the Missile Technology Control Regime. At a
time when
the nuclear ambitions of
rogue states like North Korea pose a threat to peace, the nations of
this
hemisphere have set a different
precedent: Nuclear and missile proliferation can be reversed.
The Summit of the Americas will be a catalyst for even greater
cooperation in
the hemisphere this year.
The United States is already engaged in intensive pre-summit
consultations with
the nations of Latin
America and the Caribbean. We will develop initiatives to encourage
effective
democratic government,
strengthen the collective defense of democracy, fight the drug trade,
liberalize
trade and investment, and
promote sustainable development.
Looking ahead to the summit, President Clinton has said:
"We have a unique opportunity to build a community of free nations,
diverse in
culture and history but
bound together by a commitment to responsive and free government,
vibrant civil
societies, open
economies, and rising living standards."
This generation's task is to defend and develop the powerful movement to
market
democracy. We must
accept the responsibility to ensure that this great, transforming change
becomes
truly irreversible.
People from the United States like to come to Mexico and quote Octavio
Paz.
Being a young man, I tried
to resist this venerable practice. But I couldn't. That great poet,
essayist,
Nobel laureate, and, I should add,
diplomat, wrote this of our hemisphere: "America is not so much a
tradition to
be carried on as it is a
future to be realized."
Octavio Paz was right. The task still lies before us. (###)
Binational Commission Meeting Material
Material from the Secretary's trip to Mexico and Binational Commission
meeting
will be printed in
Dispatch Supplement Vol. 5, No. 3. (###)
ARTICLE 3:
The Americas: New Priorities in A New Partnership
Alexander F. Watson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
Address to the Council of the Americas, Washington, DC, May 2, 1994
It is a truly great pleasure to be here this morning with so many
friends in the
Council of the Americas. I
have enjoyed a very close association with the Council and the Americas
Society
for many years--but most
intensely during my 3-1/2 years as the Deputy U.S. Representative to the
United
Nations in New York
immediately before I assumed my current position. I am pleased to be
able to
continue that association
now.
Today, we do not really have time for me to present a full overview of
the
Clinton Administration's
policies toward Latin America and the Caribbean. So I will focus on
some of the
broader trends I believe
will be of particular interest to the Council. I will be glad to
discuss other
issues--including the
Administration's energetic new efforts to restore democratic governance
to
Haiti--during the discussion
period following my remarks.
From Consensus to Partnership
The theme for this, the Council's 24th Washington conference--After
NAFTA: The
Road to Hemispheric
Growth--is very well chosen. I believe we have entered a period in
which the
countries of our hemisphere
have within their grasp the ability to generate long-term, broad-based,
sustainable economic growth and
development. Of course, all of our countries face very difficult
problems in
this regard. We always have,
and we always will. But we are better positioned to overcome these
problems
than before. In fact, I
submit that prospects for our countries and, more importantly, for our
people
generally are brighter than at
almost any of your previous 23 Washington conferences.
It is a very exciting moment in our hemisphere for political as well as
economic
reasons. Reflect for a
moment, if you will, on political developments over the past year. How
many
free, fair, legitimate
elections have there been since your last conference? Look at the
quality of
the chiefs of state and heads of
government that those elections have produced in Bolivia, Paraguay,
Belize,
Venezuela, Honduras, Costa
Rica, El Salvador, and Chile--to name a few. And there will be more
elections
this year. There is a strong
commitment throughout the hemisphere that elections must be fair--that
victory
in an unfair contest is not
really a victory and that the resulting regime will suffer severe
problems of
legitimacy at home and
internationally, to the serious disadvantage of the country concerned.
This consensus that only freely and fairly elected, democratic
governments are
legitimate is profoundly
important in facilitating relationships of confidence and trust between
our
countries, in laying the basis for
broad cooperation between governments and societies, and in enhancing
possibilities for hemispheric
integration.
Similarly, economic reform has proceeded apace. Governments, by and
large, have
put their
macroeconomic houses in order, and, in many cases, this has not been
easy.
The fiscal and monetary discipline which is at the base of these reforms
is
being reinforced with
fundamental tax reforms, restructuring of financial markets,
privatization, and
establishment of
independent central banks.
These efforts are bearing fruit, however, as tariffs and inflation rates
tumble
into the low teens in most
countries. Latin America is experiencing its third year of solid growth
with
capital flows that continue to
be high despite some setbacks.
Most important of all is the synergy among these political and economic
reforms.
They give our
governments the political incentive and economic capacity to address
more
effectively the social needs our
people face. President Clinton is endeavoring to address those needs in
his
powerful initiatives on health
care, welfare reform, and crime, to mention only a few. Leaders
throughout the
hemisphere are making
similar efforts.
Addressing these social needs and providing greater social equity and
more
responsive, honest, and
effective government generates greater popular support for democratic
government, increasing social
stability and broadening the base for economic growth. These, in turn,
reassure
investors and encourage
flows of capital and technology and trade which produce growth.
Some have described this next phase as the "second generation" of
reforms. The
first generation of
reforms aimed at taking government out of the things that it didn't do
well and
probably shouldn't do at all
and at empowering markets to be the main decision-makers for the
economy.
The second generation of reforms aims at giving government the capacity
to do
well what only
governments can do and what markets cannot do or do only imperfectly.
The idea
here is shared growth to
benefit all elements of society and to benefit future as well as present
generations.
In a broad sense, we are all facing similarly daunting new challenges,
within
the U.S. as well as in Latin
America and the Caribbean:
-- Redefining our communities so that growth and job opportunities
reach all
parts of our society;
-- Reforming our social systems so that health, educational, and
welfare
services are delivered efficiently,
free of abuses, and responsive to the needs of all our people; and
-- Restructuring incentives so as to protect our countries' resources
for
sustainable, environmentally sound
use.
There is considerable work already underway. A couple of examples
follow.
-- The recent historic capital replenishment of the Inter-American
Development
Bank--which increased the
IDB's capital from $60 billion to $100 billion and added almost another
billion
dollars to its fund for
special operations--also marked agreement on reorienting IDB lending to
investment in health and
education, to protection of the environment, and to harnessing the
energy of the
private sector. As Under
Secretary of the Treasury Summers said at the IDB annual meeting last
month,
"growth must be inclusive
if it is to be enduring."
-- Another innovative example is Bolivia's "capitalization" program,
which will
simultaneously privatize a
large part of its state enterprises while giving every Bolivian over age
21
assets to use toward his or her
retirement.
In addition to the essentially domestic political and economic reforms I
have
mentioned, one of the most
significant trends in the hemisphere is that of regional integration.
For those
of us in North America,
certainly, the most dramatic manifestation of this trend was approval of
the
North American Free Trade
Agreement. NAFTA was a historic watershed, the full effects of which we
will
only realize years from
now. It is already making a profound difference in the nature and
intensity of
relations among the three
partners. In speaking to the Council of the Americas, which played such
an
important role in the genesis
and approval of NAFTA, I need not dwell on its virtues and significance,
although I will return to some
aspects of NAFTA later in my remarks.
But I would like to note here that many other manifestations of
integration have
taken place. For example,
bilateral and multilateral trade liberalization arrangements are
burgeoning. At
last count, there were 23
bilateral and multilateral subregional trade arrangements.
One noteworthy example is the Andean Pact that, next year, is expected
to
become a single market with
free internal trade and a common external tariff no higher than 20%. To
give
you a notion of the size of
this integrated market, at that point, the five members of the pact will
become
one of the top 12 markets for
the U.S., accounting for more than $10 billion in U.S. exports. We sell
more to
the Andean Pact's 95
million people than to China's 1.2 billion.
Economic reforms and trade liberalization have caused trade within the
region to
boom. Intraregional trade
is outpacing growth in both regional GDP and overall world trade
expansion.
During the past five years,
world imports as a whole increased 19%. Latin American imports from the
world
increased 79%. I
believe we are at a defining moment in hemispheric relations. You have
heard
this Administration's
emphasis on the convergence of values and interests that has emerged
among us.
The challenge we face is
to transform this broad, although far from perfect, consensus into a new
partnership for action to address
our common problems and approach our common goals. We must consolidate
and
institutionalize our
domestic gains in mutually reinforcing fashion and shape a new web of
relationships which define our
hemisphere's future. That's what the Summit of the Americas is all
about.
The Summit of the Americas
In describing his vision of the Americas, President Clinton said:
"We have a unique opportunity to build a community of free nations,
diverse in
culture and history but
bound together by a commitment to responsive and free government,
vibrant civil
societies, open
economies, and rising living standards."
Our effort to realize this vision will be one of history's exciting
endeavors.
We believe the Summit of the
Americas, which will take place in Miami on December 9-10, will be an
unparalleled opportunity to
consolidate our achievements and chart our future course.
We envision that the summit will produce a declaration of principles
that will
guide relationships among
our nations and an action plan of specific initiatives. We have found
support
and enthusiasm for a summit
built on the themes of democracy and effective governance on the
political side
and trade expansion,
investment, and sustainable development on the economic front. We are
developing many specific ideas to
present to our partners in an intense process of consultations during
which we
expect to hear many other
proposals.
We have met with our Mexican neighbors and will continue our discussions
next
week during our
Binational Commission meeting in Mexico. The U.S. delegation will be
led by
Secretary of State
Christopher and will include other Cabinet secretaries.
We hope to complete the first round of consultations on the summit this
month,
meeting with
representatives of CARICOM, Central America, the Rio Group, and Canada.
Of
course, we will continue
discussions at the OAS General Assembly in Belem next month and follow
up with
many other meetings
throughout the year to make the Summit of the Americas as substantive
and
significant an event as
possible.
We also look forward to receiving input on the summit agenda and
specific
initiatives from a wide variety
of sources--certainly the Council of the Americas, as well as other
private
sector and non-governmental
groups. We eagerly invite your views. We hope that the summit will
provide
impetus and direction on
issues such as the consolidation and defense of democracy; government
accountability, efficiency, and
transparency; empowerment of civil society; and the rule of law,
including steps
to combat the dangerous
narcotics cartels. We will offer ideas for harmonizing financial,
legal,
fiscal, and other regimes to facilitate
hemispheric integration. We may examine innovative ideas for developing
health,
labor, environmental,
and educational standards. We will seek ways to enhance hemispheric
cooperation
on security issues in the
post-Cold War era.
Trade expansion will be a major focus of the summit. There is
overwhelming
regional interest in this
subject. The President remains fully committed to his desire to expand
NAFTA to
include other market-
oriented democracies in Latin America and the Caribbean. While I know
you are
eager to know what
future steps on trade the Administration has in mind, I will defer to
U.S. Trade
Representative Mickey
Kantor, who will speak to us at lunch today.
I will say here, however, that our concept of free trade expansion
includes
underlying components such as
investment agreements and understandings concerning intellectual
property
rights, the environment, and
labor. As Vice President Gore said in Marrakesh on April 14:
"The relationship between trade and the creation of wealth is manifest.
. . .
However, economic growth
cannot be pursued without vision or compassion for the way it may affect
working
men and women and
without regard for its environmental consequences."
For expanded free trade to reach its potential, these underpinnings are
essential.
Similarly, free trade means not just new opportunities for exports but
also
stronger linkages among our
societies. More open economies, based on competition rather than access
and
privilege, provide more
opportunities for economic and social mobility; stronger economic growth
and
broader markets; and
greater flows of capital, goods, ideas, and technology. The promise of
a
hemisphere united by open
markets is a powerful tool in the hands of reformers throughout our
hemisphere.
The Impact on American Business
This congeries of developments and trends in our hemisphere has profound
implications for American
business. The Western Hemisphere is the United States' largest trading
partner.
President Clinton is
committed to reaching out to the other market-oriented democracies of
Latin
America to join what he
called "this great American pact." This will be good for American
exports and
American jobs. Some facts
follow.
-- 37% of U.S. exports go to Western Hemisphere nations.
-- The U.S. sells as much to Brazil as to China, more to Venezuela than
to
Russia, and more to Ecuador
than to Poland and Hungary combined.
-- The value of U.S. exports to Latin America and the Caribbean has
increased
144% since 1986, while
our exports to the rest of the world rose 90%.
-- Latin America is the largest developing country destination for U.S.
private
investment, accounting for
$5.1 billion in 1990-92, or almost 70% of all our investment in
developing
countries.
-- The IMF predicts that "upper-middle-income markets" in Brazil,
Mexico,
Colombia, Venezuela, and
Argentina are among those likely to grow fastest.
-- Proximity, investment patterns, and established cultural ties all
help to
give American products
important advantages in these markets, which have a high propensity to
purchase
our products.
-- The countries of the region are moving rapidly beyond traditional
Third
World status. Mexico has just
joined the OECD as its first Latin American representative, and Brazil
and
Argentina have been admitted to
the OECD's development center. The U.S. strongly supported--in fact,
proudly
led--these initiatives in the
OECD.
-- The major components of U.S. policy toward Latin America and the
Caribbean--promoting democracy
and human rights, strengthening U.S. economic security, and building
cooperation
on global issues--are at
the heart of the Administration's overall foreign policy agenda. This
endows
our efforts in the hemisphere
with consistency and sustainability.
Thus, our interest in the region is clear. Our engagement is firm. Our
vision
is powerful.
The rapid evolution of our hemisphere is a complex phenomenon involving
many
intertwining strands.
Far-sighted American business leaders understand this and are among the
strongest proponents of market-
driven change throughout the region. It is strongly in your interest, I
believe, to support Latin American
and Caribbean leaders who undertake the second generation of reforms I
mentioned
earlier--those aimed at
making growth inclusive and at giving a stake to all parts of society in
the
market-based democracies.
Structural reforms bring some costs, as all change inevitably does. We
are
aware that elements of the
business community, as well as other groups, opposed and still oppose
the
dismantling of special privileges
and protection. But it is a credit to the vision of many business
leaders that
they see beyond the temporary
costs of transition and change and recognize the immense benefits to
themselves
and to all in their societies
which come from greater competition and democracy. Your vision, energy,
and
talents are urgently
needed in making sure that the ideals of political and economic
democracy become
a reality for all.
Conclusion
Let me conclude by observing that what we are pursuing in our hemisphere
is more
than expanded free
trade. We seek a community of nations committed to democracy and human
rights,
bound together by
open markets and rising standards of living, and dedicated to the
peaceful
resolution of disputes. Such a
community implies a new kind of relationship between the United States
and our
neighbors: a more
mature partnership, based on mutual respect and cooperation and on the
convergence of our values,
interests, and objectives.
President Cesar Gaviria of Colombia, whom we are proud to have supported
in his
successful candidacy
for Secretary General of the Organization of American States, expressed
this
idea eloquently a month ago:
"From the Americas of the past with its arms extended and crying out for
its
proper destiny, we will see
born a new hemisphere that calls for solidarity and cooperation to
develop
economic and trade relations
based on parity and dignity."
We look forward to working together with him and with all of you to
realize this
vision. (###)
ARTICLE 4:
The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace
Operations
Madeleine K. Albright, Anthony Lake, Lieutenant General Clark, Executive
Summary
Madeleine K. Albright
Statement by the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations
before the
Subcommittee on
Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs of the House
Appropriations Committee,
Washington, DC, May 5, 1994.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am pleased
to be
here this morning, along
with my colleague, Assistant Secretary of State Doug Bennet, to discuss
U.S.
policy toward the UN and the
Administration's budget request for fiscal year 1995.
For purposes of time, I will confine my remarks to an issue of central
importance to the Administration and
of demonstrated interest to the Congress: the future of UN peace-
keeping.
Although this is an issue which
appears to be constantly in the news, it raises fundamental questions
that are
anything but new.
Today, we can look back at centuries of international efforts to deter
conflict
through a combination of
force and law. Before the UN, there was the League of Nations; before
that, the
Congress of Vienna;
before that, the Treaty of Westphalia; before that, medieval
nonaggression
pacts; and before that, the
Athenian League.
Obviously, no magic formula has been found. Today, some Americans see
UN
peace-keeping as a
dangerous illusion. Others consider it the linchpin of world peace.
The
Clinton Administration has a more
balanced view. We see UN peace-keeping as a contributor to, not the
centerpiece
of, our national security
strategy. We see it as a way to defuse crises and prevent breaches of
peace
from turning into larger
disasters. It lends global legitimacy to efforts to mediate disputes,
demobilize armed factions, arrange
cease-fires, and provide emergency relief. It reduces the likelihood of
unwelcome interventions by
regional powers. And it ensures a sharing of the costs and risks of
maintaining
world order.
But for reasons that may be inherent in the institution, the UN has not
yet
demonstrated the ability to
respond effectively when the risk of combat is high and the level of
local
cooperation is low. The UN's
impartiality can be a key to diplomatic credibility, but it is of less
help when
military credibility is what is
required. And the UN's resources have been stretched perilously thin by
the
dramatic increase in peace-
keeping requests it has received.
So UN peace-keeping is not, in our view, a substitute for vigorous
alliances and
a strong national defense.
When threats arise to us or to others, we will choose the course of
action that
best serves our interests. We
may act through the UN, we may act through NATO, we may act through a
coalition,
we may sometimes
mix these tools, or we may act alone. But we will do whatever is
necessary to
defend the vital interests of
the United States.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, the Administration has just completed a
comprehensive
review of peace-
keeping policy. The one-sentence summary of our policy is that it is
not
intended to expand UN peace-
keeping but to help fix it. We have already taken the first step by
insisting
that the Security Council
overhaul its process for deciding when a peace-keeping operation should
be
initiated or extended.
More Rigorous Decision-making
Last year, soon after I arrived in New York, I began to ask: What
criteria have
we been using to decide
whether or not to support a peace mission? What criteria did the
previous
Administration use, for example,
when it voted to support new operations in the former Yugoslavia,
Somalia,
Angola, El Salvador,
Cambodia, the Western Sahara, Mozambique, and Kuwait? What criteria
were other
members of the
Security Council using? There was no clear answer.
We have changed that. We believe that the value of UN peace-keeping
does not
depend on how many
missions are attempted but on how well each mission is conducted. So we
are
insisting that the key
questions be asked before, not after, new peace-keeping obligations are
undertaken. These questions
include the following.
-- Will UN involvement advance U.S. interests?
-- Is there a real threat to international peace and security?
-- Does the proposed peace-keeping mission have clear objectives, and
can its
scope be clearly defined?
-- If the operation is a peace-keeping--as opposed to peace
enforcement--mission, is a cease-fire in place,
and have the parties to the conflict agreed to a UN presence?
-- Are the financial and personnel resources needed to accomplish the
mission
available?
-- Can an end point to UN participation be identified?
-- What happens if we do not act?
These questions are intended to serve as an aid to decision-making, not
as a
substitute for it. Decisions
have been and will be based on the cumulative weight of the factors with
no
single factor being an absolute
determinant.
Already, our new policy is making a difference. For example, we have
made our
support for potential
expansion of missions in Angola and Liberia contingent on sustained
progress in
peace negotiations. We
supported an increased UN police presence in Mozambique--but on the
condition
that the additional costs
be offset by reductions in the military presence. We are insisting that
"sunset" clauses be inserted in
resolutions authorizing or extending peace-keeping missions so that the
burden
of proof rests on those who
favor extension rather than termination. We have established what we
hope will
be a precedent by
encouraging Cyprus--with help from Greece--and Kuwait to pay a
significant
portion of the costs of peace-
keeping operations on their territory. We are relying on regional
organizations
such as ECOWAS and the
CSCE wherever appropriate. And we review regularly the status of each
UN
operation to determine
whether its objectives are being achieved or can be achieved.
I also must observe that no new UN peace operation has yet been proposed
formally for Burundi, Sudan,
Nagorno-Karabakh, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, or Sierra Leone despite the
terrible
violence that has occurred
in each. This reflects not callousness on the part of the international
community but rather a recognition of
the limits of what UN peace operations can achieve in the absence of a
demonstrated will on the part of
contending factions to choose negotiations over force of arms.
Enhancing Capabilities
We also are working to make UN operations more efficient and effective
once they
are approved.
Currently, the UN does not have the ability to manage peace-keeping as
an
integrated whole. Instead, each
mission is financed and run separately by an understaffed Department of
Peacekeeping Operations. As a
result, support to the field suffers, economies of scale are lost, work
is
duplicated, and missions are
delayed. The UN is left to scrape together the money, troops, and
logistical
support necessary for each
operation essentially from scratch. To remedy these and other problems,
the
Administration is proposing
or supporting:
-- A unified budget for peace-keeping to replace the current ad hoc
system;
-- Reforms in procurement that will ensure competitiveness and provide
economies of scale;
-- The development of a computerized data base and a modular budget
template
that would allow for
standardization of costs, enable quick and accurate budget estimates,
and
prevent over-assessments;
-- A rapidly deployable headquarters unit with logistics support so
that the UN
can respond to emergencies
in a timely way; and
-- Improvements in planning, training, communications, intelligence,
and
logistics.
Our purpose in all of this is not to create some sort of global high
command but
rather to raise the level of
performance to the point where UN peace-keeping is credible, cost-
effective, and
professional.
The Value of Peace-keeping
Of course, none of this would matter if carefully defined and well-
executed UN
peace operations did not
serve the best interests of our people. This Administration, like prior
Administrations, believes that they
do; we think that most Americans agree.
First--to put things in perspective--the world spends about $900 billion
each
year for military forces. The
UN spends about one-third of 1% as much on peace-keeping. Here in the
United
States, we allocate
roughly $250-$300 for defense for every $1 we allocate to peace-keeping.
The
recent increase in peace-
keeping costs brought about in part by the end of the Cold War remains
far less
than the savings that have
been made possible by the relaxation of East-West tensions.
Second, the United States is one of five countries with the power to
veto any UN
peace-keeping operation.
I can assure you that we will use our influence--and if necessary our
veto--to
block operations that would
harm our interests. I can also assure you that our continued right to
the veto
is not negotiable.
Third, a narrow but not insignificant point: In 1993, UN Headquarters
purchased
more than $250 million
worth of goods and services from American sources--36% of the total
value of UN
Headquarters'
procurement for peace-keeping.
Fourth, well-planned and well-implemented UN peace operations do
contribute to
goals of direct interest to
us.
In Cambodia, the UN was asked to run elections, clear mines, repatriate
refugees, disarm the Khmer
Rouge, and help administer the country. The result was less than some
hoped but
far more than skeptics
predicted. The Cambodian people responded overwhelmingly to the promise
of
peace and to the
opportunity to vote. The result was an election with more than 90%
participation, a constitutional
government taking power, the repatriation of hundreds of thousands of
refugees,
and further discrediting of
the Khmer Rouge.
In El Salvador, the UN helped end a 12-year conflict that took 70,000
lives.
Observers from all sides agree
that only the UN had the credibility to oversee demobilization, monitor
human
rights, assign responsibility
for past atrocities, verify implementation of the peace agreement, and
pave the
way for elections which--
despite significant problems--were the freest and most peaceful in the
nation's
history.
In Cyprus, the UN has prevented the outbreak of war between two NATO
allies.
Through its presence on
the Golan Heights, it has helped to preserve peace between Israel and
Syria for
more than two decades. In
Namibia, it helped to create an outpost of democracy and stability in a
strategic part of Africa. In
Mozambique, it is arranging elections this fall and demobilizing
factions that
had waged a bloody civil
war. UN sanctions against Iraq, combined with a UN presence on the
Kuwait
border, are helping to keep
Saddam Hussein's ambitions in check.
A few weeks ago, I traveled to South Africa, where UN observers worked
hard to
make last week's
elections a success--to drive the final nail into the coffin of
apartheid and
make possible a government that
is truly responsive to the people. There is an abundance of bad news in
the
world today; there remain
enormous obstacles for South Africa, but the miracle of a democratic
transition
in that country should
inspire us all. President F.W. de Klerk and President-elect Nelson
Mandela
found a useful ally in the UN.
In Croatia and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, UN forces are
helping
prevent a wider
Balkan war. And in Bosnia, the UN has worked in a sometimes uneasy
partnership
with NATO to restore a
semblance of normal life to Sarajevo, to open the airport in Tuzla, to
end the
violence between government
and Bosnian Croat factions, to lend belated credibility to the safe-
haven
concept, and to maintain a
humanitarian lifeline to those in desperate need.
Last weekend, for the fourth time, the U.S., NATO, and the UN acted in
tandem to
implement Security
Council directives aimed at ending the violence and encouraging peace.
The
first time was in February,
when a NATO ultimatum resulted in the removal or control of heavy
weapons in and
around Sarajevo.
The second was in late February with the shootdown of Serb planes
violating the
no-fly zone. The third
was three weeks ago, when limited air strikes were ordered in response
to the
initial Bosnian Serb attacks
against Gorazde. The fourth was the NATO ultimatum demanding a
withdrawal of
Serb forces and heavy
weapons from around that same town.
The purpose of these actions is to see that the will of the Security
Council is
respected and that the parties
are encouraged to negotiate seriously for peace. The Bosnian Serbs must
understand that continued
aggression will be met by internationally sanctioned military force.
We Americans support these operations because they contribute to a world
that is
less violent, more stable,
and more democratic than it otherwise would be. History teaches us that
democracies rarely commit
aggression. And experience warns us that when small powers fight,
larger powers
are often drawn in and
that aggression, when unchecked, only leads to more aggression. It is
far more
effective and far less risky
to treat the symptoms of global disorder when they appear than to wait
until the
consequences of conflict
arrive at our door.
In summary, we should not ask the UN to take on jobs that we have not
equipped
it to do. And we should
equip the UN to do the jobs we would like it to do. The United States
will be
better off if the United
Nations is better able to prevent and contain international conflict.
Paying for Peace-keeping: The U.S. Share
Despite the burden-sharing aspects of UN peace-keeping, the United
States
remains by far the largest
single financial contributor to the UN, and no one should forget that.
This
reflects our position as a
permanent member of the Security Council and as the world's leading
economic and
military power.
The system for assessing peace-keeping costs was created in 1973 with
U.S.
support. For a variety of
reasons, the share of peace-keeping costs we are assessed has risen in
recent
years from about 28% to more
than 30%. In December 1992, the breakup of the Soviet Union and the
resultant
decrease in contributions
from that source caused the UN to raise our assessment even further--to
31.7%.
We made it clear that we
did not accept this most recent change, however, and continue to
acknowledge an
assessment rate of
30.4%, upon which our budget calculations are based. The Administration
believes that the 30.4% rate is
still too high, and we are seeking support at the UN for a reduction to
the 25%
rate recently mandated by
Congress beginning in 1996.
We have informed the Secretary General of our determination--and of
yours--to
see that the U.S.
assessment is reduced. He shares our concern and has sent emissaries to
conduct
consultations in key
foreign capitals. We are conducting our own consultations both in New
York and
abroad. We note that the
General Assembly will be reviewing requests for alterations in the
current
assessment scale this spring and
fall. I can assure you that we will keep you informed of developments
as they
occur.
The Administration's Budget
Successful UN peace-keeping operations serve our interests. But they
will more
likely succeed if we have
met fully our obligation to help pay for them and if we encourage other
member
states who have fallen
behind in their payments to do the same.
The funds appropriated by Congress last year for peace-keeping in FY
1994 had to
be used to meet prior-
year commitments. Thus, our entire assessed share of UN peace-keeping
costs in
the current fiscal year--
an amount we expect will exceed $1 billion--is currently unmet. We will
need
your help to find a way to
provide that money. We also face the possibility of additional costs
associated
with new or expanded
peace operations, both this year and next. As President Clinton made
clear
during his recent meeting with
congressional leaders, funding for our peace-keeping obligations is a
high
priority, and we are prepared to
work closely with you on this matter.
Our specific requests include $670 million in FY 1994 supplemental funds
and
$533 million in FY 1995,
including funds for additional payments on our estimated FY 1994
requirements.
We are also requesting
from your subcommittee $75 million in voluntary contributions for
multilateral
peace-keeping in FY 1995.
Because we believe that the Departments of State and Defense should have
shared
responsibility for peace-
keeping, the Administration is requesting, in addition, an appropriation
of $300
million for a new
Department of Defense peace-keeping account. Under the "shared
responsibility"
concept, the Defense
Department will have lead management responsibility within the U.S.
Government
for those UN peace
operations involving the likelihood of combat or the presence of U.S.
combat
units. This approach will
ensure that military expertise is brought to bear on those peace
operations that
have a significant military
component.
The State Department will continue to have lead management and funding
responsibility for traditional
peace-keeping operations that do not involve U.S. combat units. In all
cases,
the State Department will
retain its traditional diplomatic responsibilities with respect to all
peace-keeping operations and activities.
In urging favorable consideration by Congress of our peace-keeping
budget
requests, I stress three points.
First, UN peace-keeping will not be fixed unless it is supported
financially by
UN members. The current
funding shortfall complicates efforts to plan efficiently, to implement
reforms,
and to make the investments
that will save money in the long run. Already, the UN has fallen well
behind in
reimbursing troop
contributors. We know that some nations have informed the UN that they
will not
contribute troops to
future operations until past bills are reimbursed. This makes it harder
to find
additional troops for places
like Bosnia and to maintain troops at adequate levels in places like
Somalia.
This, in turn, jeopardizes the
success of such operations and puts the peace-keepers who are deployed
at
greater risk.
Second, we are already facing situations--and we can foresee others--in
which we
must choose between
rejecting an operation we believe is very important to our interests or
voting
for an operation for which
funds are not assured. This past week, for example, the Security
Council
voted--with U.S. support--to
expand the authorized strength of UNPROFOR. This expansion is essential
if our
policy of extending real
protection to designated safe areas such as Gorazde is to succeed. But
expanded
capabilities do not come
without increased financial obligations.
We also have a strong interest in seeing that conflicts in the former
Soviet
Union are resolved in ways that
maintain the integrity of the New Independent States. UN involvement is
one way
to advance that goal.
But if we can't support an operation due to lack of funds or if UN
members won't
contribute troops because
they fear they will not be reimbursed, the option disappears. This, in
my
personal judgment, is how grave
historical errors come to be made.
Third, my ability to push our reform agenda at the UN would be enhanced
greatly
if I were able to say with
confidence that we are going to pay our bills fully and promptly. This
is true
both with respect to the
inspector general issue--which Mr. Bennet will discuss--and gaining a
reduction
in the U.S. share of peace-
keeping costs.
An Appropriate Role for Congress
America cannot lead in international organizations by executive action
alone.
Congress must play an
important role because Congress, like the President, is accountable to
the
people. I can assure you, Mr.
Chairman, that with respect to both funding and policy, we want to work
with you
and with your
subcommittee. We have initiated and we will maintain close and regular
consultations concerning all
aspects of our peace-keeping policy.
In that connection, I will end by citing the conclusion of an excellent
recent
study on peace-keeping that
was prepared under the auspices of the Stimson Center with the
participation of
Members of the House and
Senate from both parties. That conclusion is also a pretty good summary
of the
Administration's own
approach to peace-keeping policy.
"The US can be as tough on approving new UN operations as it wants to
be, and as
selective in deciding
whether or not US forces should participate as it wishes to be. But if
the UN's
capacity for peace
operations is improved successfully, it would provide a new security
option to
the United States, to be used
at the US Government's discretion, permitting us to avoid the necessity
of
choosing between unilateral
action and standing by helplessly when international conflict and
atrocities
occur."
Anthony Lake, Lt. Gen. Wesley Clark
Opening statements at a press briefing on the peace operations
presidential
decision directive (PDD) by
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,
and Lt.
Gen. Wesley Clark,
Director for Strategic Plans and Policy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, DC, May 5, 1994.
Anthony Lake. This week, President Clinton signed the first
comprehensive U.S.
policy on multilateral
peace operations suited to the post-Cold War era. This policy has the
full
support of the entire
Administration. It benefited very greatly from the work that had been
done in
the previous Administration
on this issue and from very detailed consultations in the Congress with
dozens
of key legislators. In fact, in
drafting the final policy, we incorporated many very useful
contributions by
Members of Congress.
The central conclusion of the Administration's study is that, when
properly
conceived and well-executed,
peace-keeping can be a very important and useful tool of American
foreign
policy. Our purpose is to use
peace-keeping selectively and more effectively than has been done in the
past.
The post-Cold War era is, as we see every day, a very dangerous time.
Its
defining characteristic is that
conflicts in this era take place more within nations than among them.
And this
makes it a particularly
difficult time, both conceptually and practically, for us in the
international
community to come to grips
with questions of when and how and where we will use force.
Some of these internal conflicts challenge our interests, and some of
them do
not. But the cumulative
effect of all of these internal conflicts around the world is
significant. We
have all, over the last year--you
and I and the others in the Administration--spent a great deal of time
working
on various conflicts of this
kind, whether in Somalia, or Rwanda, or Haiti, or Bosnia, or elsewhere.
The further problem here is that these kinds of conflicts are
particularly hard
to come to grips with and to
have an effect on from outside because, basically, of course, their
origins are
in political turmoil within
these nations. And that political turmoil may not be susceptible to the
efforts
of the international
community. So neither we nor the international community have the
mandate to,
the resources for, or the
possibility of resolving every conflict of this kind.
When I wake up every morning and look at the headlines and the stories
and the
images on television of
these conflicts, I want to work to end every conflict. I want to work
to save
every child out there. I know
the President does, and I know the American people do.
But neither we nor the international community have the resources or the
mandate
to do so. So we have to
make distinctions. We have to ask hard questions about where and when
we can
intervene. And the reality
is that we often cannot solve other people's problems--and we can never
build
their nations for them.
So the policy review is intended to help us make those hard choices
about where
and when the
international community can get involved; where and when we can take
part with
the international
community in getting involved; and, thus, where and when we can make a
positive
difference.
Let me emphasize again that, even when we do take action, the primary
responsibility for peace rests with
the people and the parties to the conflict. What the international
community
can do is to offer a kind of a
breathing space for the people involved to make and preserve their own
peace.
That's the principle, for example, that we have employed in recent
months in
Somalia. We continue to
urge the Somali people to take advantage of the breathing space that we
helped
provide for them and to
seize this opportunity to resolve their differences peacefully. While
we are
hopeful--and there are hopeful
signs--that they can do so, there are also disturbing signs in Somalia
in recent
weeks, and we do not know
what the outcome will be. But we did our job, we believe, in providing
that
breathing space, and we
believe that the more than 15,000 UN personnel there are doing theirs
today.
So we must be selective, as I have just said, and we must also be more
effective. The U.S. is committed to
strengthening UN peace-keeping capabilities, because effective peace-
keeping
serves both America's and
the world's collective interests. It can produce conflict resolution
and
prevention, as on the Golan or in El
Salvador; it can promote democracy as it has in Namibia and in Cambodia
and,
again, in El Salvador; and
it can serve our economic interests as well, as, for example, in the
Persian
Gulf.
And peace-keeping is burden-sharing, which is certainly in our
interests. We
pay less than one-third of the
costs of the UN troops and UN operations--and less than 1% of UN troops
in the
field are, in fact,
American.
While there are limits to peace-keeping--and even setbacks, as we have
seen in
Rwanda in recent days--we
have to be careful never to overlook the impressive successes and the
personal
courage that have been
shown and are being shown today by UN peace-keepers around the world.
Since 1948, over 650,000 men and women from all over the world have
served in UN
missions, and over
1,000 have given their lives--for example, some 200 in southern Lebanon,
over 70
in Bosnia, 100 in
Somalia, more than 150 in Cyprus. In Cambodia, Bulgarians and Japanese
and
Chinese and Bangladeshis
and others were victims of the Khmer Rouge, who attacked UN peace-
keepers trying
to oversee the
elections there and make them possible. There were stories that I'm
sure some
of you recall of villagers
stuffing messages into the ballot boxes in Cambodia thanking the UN
peace-keepers for what they were
doing and imploring them to stay on.
In the Bosnian town of Bakovici, some of you may remember that there
were 100
patients in a mental
hospital who were trapped there without heat or electricity over the
winter, and
UN peace-keepers were
going in, back and forth, bringing in supplies to the mental hospital
across the
lines and getting fired at
from both sides.
My point is that it is easy for all of us, when there is a setback, to
dismiss
the UN and the peace-keepers as
a whole. We must not do that, because it does a disservice to the
courage that
they are showing today and
to the sacrifices they have made in the past. Even so, because the
needs for
peace-keeping have outrun the
resources for peace-keeping, it's important that we ask the tough
questions
about when and where we will
support or participate in such operations. We are the first government
that
has--and this is the first time in
the history of the U.S. Government that we have--cared and dared enough
to do so
and to ask those
questions.
Peace-keeping is a part of our national security policy, but it is not
the
centerpiece. The primary purpose
of our military forces is to fight and win wars--as specified in our
bottom-up
review, to fight and win two
major regional contingencies nearly simultaneously and to do so
unilaterally
when necessary.
If peace-keeping operations ever conflicted with our ability to carry
out those
operations, we would pull
out of the peace operations to serve our primary military purposes. But
we
will, as the President has said
many times, seek collective rather than unilateral solutions to regional
and
intrastate conflicts that don't
touch our core national interests. And we'll choose between unilateral
and
collective approaches, between
the UN and other coalitions depending on what works best and what best
serves
American interests.
The policy review addresses six major issues. First, ensuring that we
support
the right operations; second,
that we reduce the cost of peace-keeping operations; third, that we
improve UN
peace-keeping capabilities;
fourth, that we ensure effective command and control of American forces;
fifth,
that we improve the way
the American Government manages the issue of peace-keeping; and, sixth,
to
enhance the cooperation
between the Congress and the executive branch. Let me say just a word
about
each.
First--ensuring that we support or participate only in the right types
of
peace-keeping operations. Not all
such operations, obviously, make sense. We are, as I said, I believe
the first
nation to ask the tough
questions at the UN before committing to costly new peace-keeping
operations.
The President said that we
would do so in his General Assembly speech last fall, and we are,
indeed, doing
just that.
We've developed two sets of questions in the study to determine, first,
when the
United States should vote
for such operations and, second, when the U.S. should participate in
them. In
the unclassified document
we've handed out--"The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming
Multilateral
Peace Operations,"
which summarizes the PDD--we have a complete list of those questions.
They
include such questions as:
-- Does the mission advance American interests?
-- Is there a threat to international peace and security?
-- Does it have a very clear mandate?
-- Does it have clear objectives?
-- Are the forces and the funds actually available for such an
operation?
Second, we believe that we have to reduce the peace-keeping costs to the
United
States and to the United
Nations. Peace-keeping simply costs too much right now. It can be a
very good
investment for us, but it
would be an even better investment if it were less costly. So, first,
we are
working to reduce American
costs. As the President has said, we are committed to reducing our
peace-keeping assessment to 25% by
January 1996, and we believe that other newly rich countries should pay
their
fair share. And, second, we
all save when the costs of UN peace-keeping operations are reduced
generally.
In the study, we propose--
have proposed already in a number of cases--numerous financial and
budget-management reforms to make
UN peace-keeping operations more efficient and cost effective. For
example, we
would like to see a
unified UN peace-keeping budget; we would like to see better procurement
procedures; and, as a top
priority and something we are working on right now, we would like to see
a
wholly independent office of
an inspector general with oversight for peace-keeping.
Third, we think we have to improve the UN's peace-keeping capabilities,
and we
are committed to doing
this. So we're going to work with the UN and member states on steps to
improve
the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations and its field missions--for example, enhancing
planning,
logistics, procurement,
command and control, public affairs, intelligence, and civilian police
capabilities. And we will lead an
effort in the UN to try to redeploy resources within the UN system to
fund these
reforms.
Fourth--and this is tremendously important--we have to ensure that there
is
effective command and control
of American forces when they are engaged in peace-keeping operations. I
will
ask Lt. Gen. Wes Clark to
address this for a moment.
Lieutenant General Clark. There has been a great deal of discussion on
the
issue of command and control,
so let me begin by laying out the definitions that are relevant here.
First of
all, by command, what we're
speaking of is the constitutional authority to establish and deploy
forces: to
issue orders, separate and
move units, resupply, provide medical support, enforce discipline. The
President will never relinquish
command of U.S. forces; that is inviolable.
Operational control is a subset of command. Operational control can be
given
for a specific time frame--
for a specific mission in a particular location. Operational control
may be the
assignment of tasks to
already-deployed forces led by U.S. officers. We may place the U.S.
forces
under the operational control
of foreign commanders. That's the distinction that's in this peace
operations
document.
Now the involvement with foreign commanders, I would tell you, is
nothing new.
In fact, that's the news
of this document--that from the perspective of command and control,
there is
nothing new. In World War I
and World War II, throughout our experience with NATO, and in Operation
Desert
Storm, we've always
had the ability to task, organize, and place some U.S. units under
foreign
operational control, if it was
advantageous to do so.
This PDD policy preserves our option to do that. We will be able to
place U.S.
forces under foreign
operational control when it's prudent or tactically advantageous. I
would tell
you that, as we look at it, the
greater the U.S. military role and the more likely the operations
involved
entail combat, the less likely we
are to place those forces under foreign operational control.
Even were we to do so, fundamental elements would still apply. The
chain of
command will be inviolate.
All our commanders will have the capability of reporting to higher U.S.
authority. They'll report illegal
orders--or orders outside the mandate that they've been authorized to
perform--to higher U.S. authority if
they can't work those out with the foreign commander on the ground.
Of course, the President retains the authority to terminate
participation at any
time to protect our forces.
There's no intent in this language to subvert an operational chain of
command.
What we're trying to do is
achieve the best balance between cohesive, trained, well-established
U.S. chains
of command and unity of
command in an operation involving foreign forces in a coalition or some
other
grouping.
So that's the intent behind this. And, as I say, it is no change from
the way
we've operated in the past. I
would also tell you that our military has played a major role in
defining the
command and control aspects
of this PDD. It's been thoroughly vetted in the Joint Chiefs of Staff
system.
It's been reviewed and
approved by the Chiefs of Staff of our services and by the commanders in
chief
of our forces overseas.
Anthony Lake. Also--fifth--we think it is important that we improve the
American Government's
management of peace-keeping. We think so because peace-keeping, as we
have
seen, is important and
complex and dangerous--and, thus, the perspective of our military and
defense
leaders should be brought
more to bear in it. So we concluded that the Department of Defense
should join
the State Department in
assuming both policy and financial responsibility for appropriate peace
operations--what we call shared
responsibility. You will not be surprised to know that each was more
anxious
for the policy responsibility
than the financial responsibility, but it has been worked out, we think,
very
well.
The State Department will both manage and pay for traditional, non-
combat
peace-keeping operations--i.e.,
under Chapter VI of the Charter--when there are not American combat
units
involved. This represents, by
far, the greatest number of such operations. The Defense Department
will manage
and pay for all peace
enforcement operations under Chapter VII of the Charter--for example, in
Somalia, the former Yugoslavia,
and Kuwait now--and those traditional peace-keeping operations under
Chapter VI
in which there are
American combat units.
We believe that this shared responsibility will not only mean better
management
but will help us solve the
long-term funding problem that we face in peace-keeping. We still have
an
immediate arrears problem in
our peace-keeping debts, and without new funding, the American arrearage
will be
over $1 billion by the
end of this fiscal year--the end of September. The President is very
committed
to paying off this debt, and
he and we are working very closely with the Congress now to devise the
means to
do so.
Finally, in the study, we have worked to recognize the need to improve
the
relationships and consultations
between the executive branch and the Congress on peace-keeping
operations. And
we're going to take a
number of steps to improve the information flow between the
Administration and
the Congress on these
issues.
In short, the policy is designed to impose more discipline on the UN and
on
ourselves so that peace-
keeping will be a more effective collective security tool for American
foreign
policy. This is a new era; we
are all learning how to come to grips with the new problems that it
presents to
us. But there is no doubt in
my mind that peace-keeping offers a very important way of making sure
that
today's problems don't
become tomorrow's crises--because those crises will cost us a lot more
in the
long run than peace-keeping
does right now.
This is an important--not the most important but an important--part of
our
national security policy. It is
very, very important that we and the United Nations get it right, and
that's
what this study is about.
Executive Summary
Text of the executive summary from "The Clinton Administration's Policy
on
Reforming Multilateral
Peace Operations" released by the White House, May 5, 1994.
Last year, President Clinton ordered an inter-agency review of our
nation's
peacekeeping policies and
programs in order to develop a comprehensive policy framework suited to
the
realities of the post-Cold
War period. This policy review has resulted in a Presidential Decision
Directive (PDD). The President
signed this directive, following the completion of extensive
consultations with
Members of Congress. This
paper ["The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral
Peace
Operations"] summarizes the
key elements of that directive.
As specified in the "Bottom-Up Review," the primary mission of the U.S.
Armed
Forces remains to be
prepared to fight and win two simultaneous regional conflicts. In this
context,
peacekeeping can be one
useful tool to help prevent and resolve such conflicts before they pose
direct
threats to our national
security. Peacekeeping can also serve U.S. interests by promoting
democracy,
regional security, and
economic growth.
The policy directive (PDD) addresses six major issues of reform and
improvement:
1. Making disciplined and coherent choices about which peace operations
to
support--both when we vote
in the Security Council for UN peace operations and when we participate
in such
operations with U.S.
troops.
To achieve this goal, the policy directive sets forth three increasingly
rigorous standards of review for U.S.
support for or participation in peace operations, with the most
stringent
applying to U.S. participation in
missions that may involve combat. The policy directive affirms that
peacekeeping can be a useful tool for
advancing U.S. national security interests in some circumstances, but
both U.S.
and UN involvement in
peacekeeping must be selective and more effective.
2. Reducing U.S. costs for UN peace operations, both the percentage our
nation
pays for each operation
and the cost of the operations themselves.
To achieve this goal, the policy directive orders that we work to reduce
our
peacekeeping assessment
percentage from the current 31.7% to 25% by January 1, 1996, and
proposes a
number of specific steps to
reduce the cost of UN peace operations.
3. Defining clearly our policy regarding the command and control of
American
military forces in UN
peace operations.
The policy directive underscores the fact that the President will never
relinquish command of U.S. forces.
However, as Commander-in-Chief, the President has the authority to place
U.S.
forces under the
operational control of a foreign commander when doing so serves American
security interests, just as
American leaders have done numerous times since the Revolutionary War,
including
in Operation Desert
Storm.
The greater the anticipated U.S. military role, the less likely it will
be that
the U.S. will agree to have a UN
commander exercise overall operational control over U.S. forces. Any
large
scale participation of U.S.
forces in a major peace enforcement operation that is likely to involve
combat
should ordinarily be
conducted under U.S. command and operational control or through
competent
regional organizations such
as NATO or ad hoc coalitions.
4. Reforming and improving the UN's capability to manage peace
operations.
The policy recommends 11 steps to strengthen UN management of peace
operations
and directs U.S.
support for strengthening the UN's planning, logistics, information and
command
and control capabilities.
5. Improving the way the U.S. Government manages and funds peace
operations.
The policy directive creates a new "shared responsibility" approach to
managing
and funding UN peace
operations within the U.S. Government. Under this approach, the
Department of
Defense will take lead
management and funding responsibility for those UN operations that
involve U.S.
combat units and those
that are likely to involve combat, whether or not U.S. troops are
involved.
This approach will ensure that
military expertise is brought to bear on those operations that have a
significant military component.
The State Department will retain lead management and funding
responsibility for
traditional peacekeeping
operations that do not involve U.S. combat units. In all cases, the
State
Department remains responsible
for the conduct of diplomacy and instructions to embassies and our UN
Mission in
New York.
6. Creating better forms of cooperation between the Executive, the
Congress and
the American public on
peace operations.
The policy directive sets out seven proposals for increasing and
regularizing
the flow of information and
consultation between the executive branch and Congress; the President
believes
U.S. support for and
participation in UN peace operations can only succeed over the long term
with
the bipartisan support of
Congress and the American people. (###)
ARTICLE 5:
Annual Terrorism Report Released
Statement by Acting Department Spokesman Christine Shelly, Washington,
DC, May
9, 1994.
Available in the Press Office are copies of Patterns of Global
Terrorism: 1993.
The report describes the
dimension of the international terrorist threat during calendar year
1993,
during which we recorded 427
international terrorist attacks. This is an increase from the 361
incidents
recorded the previous year. The
main reason for the increase was an accelerated terror campaign
perpetrated by
the Kurdistan Workers
Party (PKK) against Turkish interests. Most of the group's 150 attacks
took
place on only two days--24
June and 4 November--and were staged throughout Western Europe. Had it
not been
for these two days of
coordinated attacks, the level of terrorism would have continued the
downward
trend of recent years.
The list of states that sponsor terrorism grew by one last year. We
added Sudan
to the list in August 1993.
The other nations that remain on the list are Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya,
North
Korea, and Syria. All seven are
discussed in the report.
The bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City and the ensuing
fire and
smoke caused six
deaths and 1,000 injuries. It was the only terrorist incident in 1993
that
claimed American lives. Through
the hard work of U.S. law enforcement agencies, the Administration
successfully
tracked down and
brought to justice perpetrators of the World Trade Center bombing. The
World
Trade Center bombing and
the FBI's discovery of the plot to blow up selected targets in New York
City,
including the United Nations
and the Holland and Lincoln Tunnels, show that because American targets
are
vulnerable to terrorist
threats, we cannot let down our guard.
The report also describes how the United States is countering the
threat. We
have been resolute in
demanding justice for the families of the victims of the Pan Am 103
bombing, and
we remain determined
to ensure that Libya surrender the two suspects for trial in Scotland or
the
United States. We fought for and
obtained tighter sanctions against Libya and are vigorously enforcing
them.
President Clinton sent Saddam
Hussein a strong and unequivocal message once evidence was uncovered
that his
government was
responsible for the plot to assassinate former President Bush. We took
military
action against the Iraqi
intelligence headquarters that planned the attack last June, an
important and
appropriate response. This
Administration is committed to maintaining an effective international
counter-terrorism policy.
How To Get the 1993 Terrorism Report
The full report is available electronically through the U.S. Government
Printing
Office's Federal Bulletin
Board Service (BBS); the price is $15.00. The report can be found in
the
Department of State Global
Issues Library under Terrorism. For information on how to access the
BBS, see
the inside back cover of
this issue.
[Editor's Note: Access to the BBS information is noted as last article
in this
Dispatch issue.]
Paper copies of the report may be obtained from:
The Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism
U.S. Department of State
Washington, DC 20520
(FAX: 202-647-0221). (###)
ARTICLE 6:
Treaty Actions
Multilateral
Finance
Agreement establishing the International Fund for Agricultural
Development.
Done at Rome June 13,
1976. Entered into force Nov. 30, 1977. TIAS 8765; 28 UST 8435.
Accession: Eritrea, Mar. 31, 1994.
Genocide
Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide.
Adopted
by UN General
Assembly at Paris Dec. 9, 1948. Entered into force Jan. 12, 1951; for
the U.S.
Feb. 23, 1989.
Accession: Liechtenstein, Mar. 24, 1994.
Succession: Slovakia, May 28, 1993.
Human Rights
International covenant on civil and political rights. Adopted by the UN
General
Assembly Dec. 16, 1966.
Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976; for the U.S. Sept. 8, 1992.
Accession: Dominica, June 17, 1993.
Succession: Slovakia, May 28, 1993.
International covenant on economic, social, and cultural rights.
Adopted by the
UN General Assembly
Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 1976 (1).
Accession: Dominica, June 17, 1993.
Succession: Slovakia, May 28, 1993.
Judicial Procedure
Convention abolishing the requirement of legalization for foreign public
documents, with annex. Done at
The Hague Oct. 5, 1961. Entered into force Jan. 24, 1965; for the U.S.
Oct. 15,
1981. TIAS 10072; 33
UST 883.
Succession: Macedonia, Sept. 30, 1993.
Convention on the service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents
in
civil or commercial matters.
Done at The Hague Nov. 15, 1965. Entered into force Feb. 10, 1969.
TIAS 6638;
20 UST 361.
Territorial application: United States extended to the Commonwealth of
the
Northern Mariana Islands,
Mar. 31, 1994.
Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction. Done
at The
Hague Oct. 25, 1980.
Entered into force Dec. 1, 1983; for the U.S. July 1, 1988. TIAS 11670.
Accession: Chile, Feb. 23, 1994 (3).
Labor
Instrument for the amendment of the constitution of the International
Labor
Organization. Done at
Montreal Oct. 9, 1946. Entered into force Apr. 20, 1948; reentered into
force
for the U.S. Feb. 18, 1980.
TIAS 1868; 62 Stat. 3485.
Acceptance: Oman, Jan. 31, 1994.
Narcotics
Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at New York Mar. 30,
1961.
Entered into force Dec. 13,
1964; for the U.S. June 24, 1967. TIAS 6298; 18 UST 1407.
Succession: Slovakia, May 28, 1993.
Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done
at Geneva
Mar. 25, 1972.
Entered into force Aug. 8, 1975. TIAS 8118; 26 UST 1439.
Succession: Slovakia, May 28, 1993.
Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971.
Entered
into force Aug. 16, 1976;
for the U.S. July 15, 1980. TIAS 9725; 32 UST 543.
Accession: Sudan, July 26, 1993; Zimbabwe, July 30, 1993.
Succession: Slovakia, May 28, 1993; Croatia, July 26, 1993.
Territorial Application: Extended to Anguilla, Bermuda, the British
Antarctic
Territory, the Cayman
Islands, the Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Montserrat, South Georgia and
the
South Sandwich Islands, and
the Turks and Caicos Islands, June 3, 1993.
United Nations convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances, with annex
and final act. Done at Vienna Dec. 20, 1988. Entered into force Nov.
11, 1990.
[Senate] Treaty Doc. 101-
4.
Accession: Zimbabwe, July 30, 1993; Latvia, Feb. 24, 1994.
Acceptance: Netherlands, Sept. 8, 19932; Finland, Feb. 15, 1994.
Succession: Croatia, July 26, 1993.
Ratification: Panama, Jan. 13, 1994 (2).
Territorial application: Extended to the Isle of Man, subject to
reservations
and notifications, Dec. 2,
1993.
Patents
Patent cooperation treaty with regulations. Done at Washington June 19,
1970.
Entered into force Jan. 24,
1978. TIAS 8733; 28 UST 7645.
Accession: Lithuania, Apr. 5, 1994.
Property
Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of Mar.
20, 1883,
as revised. Done at
Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force May 19, 1970; for the U.S.
Aug. 25,
1973. TIAS 6923, 7727;
24 UST 2140.
Accession: Paraguay, Feb. 25, 1994.
Racial Discrimination
International convention on the elimination of all forms of racial
discrimination. Adopted by the UN
General Assembly Dec. 21, 1965. Entered into force Jan. 4, 1969 (1).
Successions: Bosnia-Herzegovina, July 16, 1993; Slovakia, May 28, 1993.
Torture
Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or
punishment. Adopted by
the General Assembly of the United Nations Dec. 10, 1984. Entered into
force
June 26, 1987 (1). [Senate]
Treaty Doc. 100-20.
Accession: Ethiopia, Mar. 14, 1994.
Succession: Slovakia, May 28, 1993.
Women
Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against
women.
Adopted by the UN General
Assembly Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 3, 1981 (1).
Signature: South Africa, Jan. 29, 1993.
Succession: Slovakia, May 28, 1993.
Bilateral
Belgium
Basic exchange and cooperative agreement concerning mapping, charting,
and geodesy cooperation. Signed at Fairfax Mar. 1, 1994. Entered into
force Mar. 1, 1994.
Bolivia
Agreement amending the agreement of Oct. 13, 1992, regarding the
consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of certain debts owed to,
guaranteed by, or insured by the U.S. Government and its agencies.
Effected by exchange of notes at La Paz Mar. 2 and Apr. 13, 1994.
Entered into force Apr. 13, 1994.
Brazil
Agreement amending and extending the agreement of Feb. 6, 1984, as
extended, relating to cooperation in science and technology. Signed at
Brasilia Mar. 21, 1994. Enters into force on the date that both
governments have notified each other that their respective requirements
have been fulfilled.
Guyana
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of
certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the U.S. Government
and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Washington Apr. 5, 1994.
Enters into force following signature and receipt by Guyana of written
notice from the United States that all necessary domestic legal
requirements have been fulfilled.
Jamaica
Agreement concerning the protection and enforcement of intellectual
property rights. Signed at Kingston Mar. 17, 1994. Enters into force
upon an exchange of notes indicating all legislation and regulations
necessary to give full effect to obligations undertaken therein have
come into force.
Kyrgyzstan
Agreement concerning the provision of training related to defense
articles under the United States International Military Education and
Training (IMET) Program. Effected by exchange of notes at Bishkek Feb.
7 and 25, 1994. Entered into force Feb. 25, 1994.
Mali
Postal money order agreement. Signed at Bamako and Washington Feb. 10
and Apr. 7, 1994. Entered into force May 1, 1994.
Moldova
Agreement regarding cooperation to facilitate the provision of
assistance. Signed at Chisinau Mar. 21,1994. Entered into force Mar.
21, 1994.
Nauru
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed
at Washington and Nauru Oct. 8,1993 and Jan. 17, 1994. Entered into
force Apr. 4, 1994.
Russia
Agreement to establish a joint commission for agribusiness and rural
development, with annexes. Signed at Moscow Mar. 11, 1994. Entered
into force Mar. 11, 1994.
Uruguay
Treaty on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. Signed at
Montevideo May 6, 1991. [Senate] Treaty
Doc. 102-19. Entered into force Apr. 15, 1994.
Uzbekistan
Agreement regarding cooperation to facilitate the provision of
assistance. Signed at Tashkent Mar. 1,1994. Entered into force Mar. 1,
1994.
1 Not in force for the U.S.
2 With reservation(s).
3 With declaration(s). (###)
Inside Back Cover:
Electronic Services
Federal Bulletin Board
The U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO) provides the public with
immediate, self-service, and cost-effective access to federal electronic
information through its Federal Bulletin Board Service (BBS). The State
Department's Bureau of Public Affairs provides Dispatch, country
Background Notes, daily press briefings, and special publications on the
BBS.
Users can immediately access free services on the bulletin board with a
personal computer, modem (settings: 8 bit, no parity, 1 stop bit, speeds
300-9600 baud), telecommunications software, and telephone line by
dialing (202) 512-1387.
To access BBS through the Internet, Telnet to FEDERAL.BBS.GPO.GOV 3001
(where 3001 is the port number).
There is no charge for browsing the list of files, downloading copies of
instructional and product description files or publication schedules,
or using electronic mail to order files on personal computer diskettes
or as hard copy. To download files, prices are reasonable: the minimum
charge per file is $2 (upto 50 kilobytes); a full megabyte file costs
$15. For BBS purchases, you may pay by Visa, MasterCard, or GPO Deposit
Account. To pay be credit card, GPO requires 24 hourse to validate the
information from the time you register on the BBS as a new user. A GPO
Deposit Account can be opened by calling (202) 512-0822 (FAX: (202)
512-1262). For additional information about GPO's service, call the
Office of Electronic Information Dissemination Services at (202) 512-
1530.
Consular Affairs Bulletin Board
The Department of State's Bureau of Consular Affairs provides Consular
Information Sheets, Travel Warnings, and helpful tips to travelers on
the Consular Affairs Bulletin Board (CABB). Access is free of charge to
anyone with a personal computer, modem, telecommunications software, and
telephone line. Dial (202) 647-9225 and follow the screen prompts to
retrieve and download data. For further informationon the CABB and
materials provided, write to: Department of State, Bureau of Consular
Affairs, Office of
Public Affairs, Room 5807, Washington, DC 20520; or telephone (202) 647-
1488.
(###)
END OF DISPATCH VOL 5, NO 20.
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