VOLUME 5, NUMBER 16, APRIL 18, 1994
1.  Bosnia in Light of the Holocaust:  War Crimes
Tribunals -- Madeleine K. Albright
2.  Ratification Sought for the Convention on Biological
Diversity -- Timothy E. Wirth
3.  The Multilateral Dimension of the Peace Process --
Robert H. Pelletreau
4.  Deaths of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi --
President Clinton
5.  Sanctions Announced Against Taiwan For Trade in
Endangered Species
6.  Treaty Actions
Bosnia in Light of the Holocaust:  War Crimes Tribunals
Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Permanent Representative to
the United Nations
Address at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum,
Washington, DC, April 12,
It is both an honor and a challenge to be here with you
tonight.  This is not an easy building within which to
speak.  Inscribed on its walls are some of the most
eloquent manifestations of language ever recorded.
Embedded in its exhibitions are some of the most
monstrous deeds ever perpetrated.  Yet language must
confront deed in this living museum, which educates
beyond words and without compromise; educates deeply and
troubles deeply.  There is no more appropriate a place to
discuss the War Crimes Tribunal for the former
We all have a stake in the success of this tribunal.
Tonight, I will discuss why that is true, but I will
begin with the arguments of some who suggest it is not.
There are those who dismiss the War Crimes Tribunal as a
weak substitute for stronger international action; they
see it as a means for expiating guilt for failure to do
more earlier to stop the killing in Bosnia.  Others
ridicule the tribunal because it has no guaranteed means
of gaining custody over the principal suspects, even
those we consider most responsible for the atrocities
that have occurred.  Still others ask why the conflict in
the former Yugoslavia merits special attention.  War
crimes have been and are being committed elsewhere;
ethnic cleansing is perpetrated elsewhere; there are
other wars with more victims, other wars of international
aggression, other wars where outrages have been ordered
from the top.  Why punish crimes in the former Yugoslavia
and leave the likes of Pol Pot and Saddam Hussein
uncharged?  Finally, some see the tribunal as an obstacle
to peace, believing that the negotiators will never agree
to peace unless amnesty for war crimes is included.
The U.S. Government does not believe that because some
war crimes may go unpunished all must go unpunished.  We
do not believe that the difficulty of the tribunal's work
should bar the attempt.  We oppose amnesty for the
architects of ethnic cleansing.  We believe that
establishing the truth about what happened in Bosnia is
essential to--not an obstacle to--national
reconciliation.  And we know that the tribunal is no
substitute for other actions to discourage further
aggression and encourage peace.
Two weeks ago, I was in Sarajevo to dedicate the site of
America's new embassy.  I found there a new sense of hope
mixed with firm determination.  In central Bosnia,
reconciliation between the government and the Bosnian
Croat faction has ended the deadly siege of Mostar.  The
threat of intervention by Croatian troops has ended.  In
the embattled east, the airport in Tuzla is now open.  It
is becoming easier and safer to move around the country.
We hope that planners will soon be able to concentrate
less on humanitarian relief and more on laying the
groundwork for national reconstruction.
However, the road ahead remains steep.  Gains already
made must be consolidated.  Cease-fires must be expanded.
Further aggression in Gorazde and elsewhere must end.
Where possible, the displaced must be allowed to return
home.  The Bosnian Serbs must be persuaded to accept
peace.  And the principle that the Bosnian people fought
for, suffered for, died for, and lived for must be
preserved.  Bosnia must remain a multi-ethnic state.
The work of the War Crimes Tribunal does not and should
not depend on political events.  It stands on its own.
Its constituency is the civilized world; its hidden enemy
is the complacency of our world.  But complacency is not
something one is born with.  It is not an internal organ;
it is a choice.  And there is no more appropriate place
than here to sound a clarion call against indifference
and toward the harder choice of dedication to the rule of
The War Crimes Tribunal For the Former Yugoslavia
The War Crimes Tribunal was formally established by the
Security Council last May.  Its jurisdiction includes
several categories of serious violations of international
humanitarian law that I have subsumed under the heading
of "war crimes" for convenience tonight.  These include
grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Convention; genocide;
and crimes against humanity, as recognized in
conventional and customary international law and in the
Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal.
The tribunal's 11 judges, including Judge Gabrielle Kirk
McDonald of Texas, were elected last fall and are
preparing actively.  Rules of evidence and procedure are
now in place.  The UN has approved $11 million in budget
authority for 1994.  We believe that this amount, along
with the voluntary contributions received, will be fully
adequate to get the tribunal off the ground.
The search for a chief prosecutor has been long and
frustrating.  The UN Security Council's first choice
waited three months before formally declining to accept
the position.  The search for a successor has dragged on
too long, but we expect an announcement very soon.  I can
assure this audience that the United States did
everything it could to see that this critical position
would be filled.  Fortunately, the acting deputy
prosecutor--in whom we have great confidence--is hard at
The job of compiling the facts upon which investigations
and prosecutions must be based is well advanced.  Thou-
sands of pages of documentation and testimony are on
file.  Statements and reports have been received from
victims, witnesses, governments, UN agencies,
international organizations, non-governmental
organizations, and from the European Community's
investigation into crimes against Muslim women.  I
particularly want to salute the efforts of the non-
governmental organizations, which have performed
invaluable work in the cause of justice.
The United States is fully engaged.  We are working to
see that the tribunal is adequately funded:  We are
making a special voluntary contribution of $3 million;
Congress has authorized the President to provide up to
$25 million in goods and services to the tribunal, and,
last month, the President approved the first drawdown--
about $6 million--from that authority.  We also have
assembled a group of about 25 prosecutors, investigators,
area specialists, and others to work directly with the
tribunal, beginning in the next few weeks.  We are
constantly collecting and analyzing information
pertaining to war crimes, and we have provided hundreds
of refugee interview reports to the tribunal and are
preparing to provide hundreds more.
These reports were gathered through the diligent efforts
of U.S. Government employees in several parts of the
world.  Most are eyewitness accounts of atrocities or
ethnic cleansing.  As we speak, a member of my staff is
part of a team--operating under the auspices of the
tribunal prosecutor's office--that is interviewing the
victims of some of the worst violence of the war.
Finally, we repeatedly have asked other governments to
join us in supporting the tribunal financially,
politically, and legally.  Governments must be willing to
share information, interview witnesses, comply with
tribunal requests, and take custody of suspects found
within their jurisdictions.  In this regard, I note that
Germany has arrested a person suspected of ordering
horrible atrocities at a concentration camp in Bosnia.
Denmark also has a suspect under arrest.
The United States will continue to take into account good
faith cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal by Serbia-
Montenegro and the Bosnian and Croat Serbs in determining
how to sequence any easing or lifting of economic
sanctions imposed by the Security Council on Serbs in the
former Yugoslavia.
We should have no illusions about the obstacles that the
tribunal will face.  This is not Nuremberg; the accused
will not be the surrendered leaders of a broken power.
It will be very difficult to gain access to evidence,
including mass grave sites, especially in areas under
local Serb control.  It will be difficult to gain custody
over many of the accused.
But realism about the tribunal's prospects must not
engender cynicism about its importance.  Although there
will be no trials in absentia, there will be
investigations and findings of fact.  The tribunal is
empowered to deliver indictments and issue arrest
warrants.  Governments will be obliged to hand over for
trial those indicted who are within their jurisdiction.
The tribunal is empowered to request the UN Security
Council to take enforcement action against any government
that fails to do so.  And indicted individuals will face
the choice of standing trial or becoming international
pariahs--trapped within the borders of their own land,
subject to immediate arrest if they leave.
One advantage we have now is Nuremberg itself.  Many of
the legal arguments put forward by defendants at
Nuremberg were disposed of in the judgment there.  Today,
there should be no question that political and military
leaders may be held criminally accountable if they do not
stop atrocities by their followers or do not punish those
responsible.  A person who gives the order to commit a
war crime is culpable, as is the person who actually
commits it.  Conversely, a person acting pursuant to
orders remains responsible, provided a moral choice was,
in fact, available.  Neither "just following orders" nor
"just giving orders" is a tenable defense.
Let me now review the reasons why the U.S. Government
believes the War Crimes Tribunal is so important.
What Is At Stake
First, the magnitude of the war crimes committed in the
former Yugoslavia demands an international legal
response.  The war itself is the result of premeditated,
armed aggression.  Bosnian Serb leaders have sought a
"final solution" of extermination or expulsion to the
problem of non-Serb populations under their control.  The
means chosen include murder, torture, indiscriminate
bombing, fire, dismemberment, rape, and castration.  Half
of Bosnia's population has been displaced.  Five percent
have been killed.  Abuses have been massive, repeated,
deliberate, and gross.  And no side is without guilt.
Earlier this year, I visited the mass grave near Vukovar.
What I saw there was a garbage dump--a field of rusted
refrigerators and scraps of farm equipment--beneath which
200 to 300 human beings are buried.  There are no
flowers, no signs or markers, no excavation of the soil.
Hannah Arendt wrote about the banality of evil.  There is
a sickening evil in the banality there.
I thought, during that same visit, of the pictures I had
seen of the streams of refugees expelled from their homes
in and around Vukovar.  The images were eerily familiar.
They could have come right out of the pictures in this
museum of families fleeing Warsaw or Minsk or Bucharest
or Prague.  The faces were not the same, but the
expressions and the movements were--the slow, stumbling,
bewildered pace of uprooted families, burdened by their
only remaining possessions, trudging down an unfamiliar
road toward an uncertain future, the strong helping the
weak until their own strength drained.
Most of the victims of the war in Bosnia--like the
victims memorialized in this building--are not soldiers.
They include average citizens of every description and of
various nationalities--children, grandparents, doctors,
nurses, mental patients, and church officials.  The
majority were killed not because they wandered into
crossfire or were too close to a military target; these
dead were not--in the terminology of the soldier--
collateral damage.  They were men and women like you and
me--boys and girls like those we know--intentionally
targeted not because of what they had done but for who
they were.
The racism at the center of Nazi ideology has not been
present in the conflict in Bosnia.  This is not the
Holocaust, but there have been crimes of genocide.  In
1939, when Field Marshall Wilhelm Keitel ordered the
purge of Poland, he called it "political housecleaning."
Today, it's called ethnic cleansing.  But the questions
raised are similar.
--  How do we respond when the authority and resources of
a state are directed toward the destruction of whole
categories of human beings?
--  How is it possible for so many people--capable of
generosity and warmth in other contexts--to descend to
the level of beasts?
--  How can civilization not respond to crimes of this
magnitude and still call itself "civilized?"
--  And how can we calibrate our response so that it
leads in the direction not of revenge but of justice?
This brings me to a second argument in support of the War
Crimes Tribunal:  Even the threat of punishment for war
crimes can save lives.  The prospect of war crimes trials
in the latter stages of World War II caused some Nazi
leaders to modify their treatment of Jews and other
prisoners.  In the former Yugoslavia, each time the
prospect of punishing war criminals has been publicized,
the treatment of detainees has improved, and atrocities
have diminished.  Today, there are signs that some of the
worst violators of human rights are being deprived of
their authority by one-time protectors who now fear
justice under the law.
In short, the more serious we are about the tribunal, the
greater the potential deterrent the tribunal will be.  If
this means that one village that would otherwise be
attacked is spared, that one woman who would otherwise be
violated is respected, that one prisoner who would
otherwise be executed is allowed to live--the existence
of the tribunal would be validated on these grounds
Third, the tribunal will make it easier for the Bosnian
people to reach a genuine peace.  The scars left on the
bodies and in the minds of the survivors of this war will
take time to heal.  In too many places, neighbors were
betrayed by neighbor and friend divided from friend by
fierce and hostile passion.  Too many families have
assembled at too many cemeteries for us to say that
ethnic differences in Bosnia do not matter.  But
responsibility for these crimes does not rest with the
Serbs or Croats or Muslims as peoples; it rests with the
people who ordered and committed the crimes.  The wounds
opened by this war will heal much faster if collective
guilt for atrocities is expunged and individual
responsibility is assigned.
Fourth, the tribunal can provide a deterrent to other
potential aggressors.  Adolf Hitler once dismissed
arguments against killing Jews with the rhetorical
question, "Who, after all, remembers the Armenians?"  If
the architects of war and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia go
unpunished, the lesson for would-be Milosevics around the
globe will endanger us all, for today's world is a
tinderbox of open and potential nationalist conflict.
National pride can be the custodian of rich cultural
legacies.  It can unite people in defense of a common
good; it can provide a sense of identity and belonging
that stretches across territory and time.  But when pride
in "us" curdles into hatred of "them," the result is a
narrowing of vision and a compulsion to violence.  As we
saw in Germany a half-century ago, as we have seen in
America with the Ku Klux Klan, and as we see in Serbia
today, at the far fringe of ethnic pride is fascism.
There are thousands of self-defined ethnic groups in the
world--more than 100 in the former Soviet Union alone.
Not every one can reasonably expect to have its own flag,
currency, airline, and state.
Today, violent separatist movements are gaining strength.
Left unchecked, they may engulf in conflict  whole chunks
of Europe, Asia, and Africa.  History from Sarajevo to
Sarajevo warns us that when small powers fight, big
powers are often drawn in.  We have a stake in seeing
that the embers of ethnic conflict are cooled and that
models for easing fear, reconciling ambition, and
clarifying principle are established.
That is why we will continue to stress our view that
individuals are entitled to basic human rights
irrespective of group identity.  It is why we will
continue to support the work of the CSCE and others to
enhance respect for the rights of minorities.  It is why
we will continue to work through the UN and regional
organizations to settle disputes peacefully.  It is why
we should be determined to salvage from the conflict in
Bosnia, if we can, two lessons:  first, that aggressors
and outlaws will be called to account; and, second, that
the problem of minorities cannot be resolved through
ethnic cleansing.  And it is why we will continue to view
with deadly seriousness the rise of ultra-nationalist
groups in strategic parts of the globe.
Let us never forget that the extreme views of Adolf
Hitler caused many to ridicule him when they should have
opposed him.  Today, we may want to agree with the
Russian Foreign Minister that Vladimir Zhirinovskiy is
less a political problem than a medical one.  But it is
disquieting to see bonds build between radical
nationalists in Russia and in the former Yugoslavia.  And
history teaches us that individuals can be deranged and
dangerous at the same time.
Finally, the War Crimes Tribunal can strengthen the
fabric of international law.  What we have witnessed in
the former Yugoslavia goes beyond war to the
brutalization of law and civilization itself.  We
Americans, living in a free society, have a deep interest
in a world where acceptable "rules of the game" are
observed.  Today, the most severe threats we face come
from regimes that have chosen to operate outside the law.
We are determined that a price be exacted for such
behavior, whether in the form of diplomatic isolation,
economic sanctions, military containment, or coercion.
The War Crimes Tribunal complements this approach.
For example, it gives life to the principle that the laws
of war should be applied irrespective of battlefield
success.  It reinforces the status of rape during armed
conflict as a violation of international humanitarian
law.  It recognizes that interference with the delivery
of humanitarian aid is a war crime, something which has
broad implications for future UN missions.  And it
clarifies that there is a corollary to the right to
emigrate--what the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Dr.
Sadako Ogata, has called "the right to remain"--a right
directly opposed to ethnic cleansing.
These are key principles.  Made concrete, they would
shield the citizens of not just one ethnic group in the
former Yugoslavia but of all.  And they would provide an
extra margin of security to us all.
Clearly, the War Crimes Tribunal will not revolutionize
human behavior.  It will not stop all aggression.  It
will not end war crimes.  It will not--even in the best
case--ensure more than a measure of justice in the former
Yugoslavia.  But it will at least place the force and
prestige of international law squarely on the side of the
victims of this conflict.  It will enhance the prospects
for a durable peace.  It will add a measure of caution to
the scales in the minds of would-be aggressors.  It will
strengthen perceptibly the foundations of civilized
society in a perilously unstable world.  And it will
rebut the song The New York Times reports is now popular
in Belgrade: "Daddy is a War Criminal, But No One Dares
Take Him to Court."
Tonight--with both the war and the War Crimes Tribunal in
mind--here in this museum dedicated to memory, let us vow
not to allow the future to be defined by the past.  There
are those who say we are all the prisoners of history and
that the violence that has wracked the former Yugoslavia
was but the inevitable aftershock of grievances incurred
decades--even centuries--before.  There are those who
feel unaffected by crimes perpetrated against the people
of Bosnia because the victims are so far away and because
other problems--and other crimes--demand our attention
here at home.  There are those who view the human tragedy
and legal outrage in Bosnia against a broad geopolitical
canvas and say it would be "unrealistic" for us to care
very much or for very long.  There are those so appalled
by the savagery of this and other wars that they despair
of human progress and refuse to recognize that some
measure of justice is preferable to no justice at all.
There is much within our experience to support each of
these attitudes.  There is much within this building to
cause pessimism and despair.  We cannot escape the
damnable duality of human nature.  We cannot base our
lives or our policies on illusions about human character.
But we can understand that there will be limits on what
we can accomplish without ourselves limiting what we
attempt.  We can accept the reality of cruelty without
accepting cruelty.  We can think of Auschwitz and
despair--or we can contemplate Auschwitz and vow never to
allow despair to excuse inaction.
We are the same species as Adolf Hitler but also Anne
Frank, Oskar Schindler, Raoul Wallenberg, and the rebels
in the ghetto in Warsaw.  We are the same species as the
stranglers of Sarajevo--and of its defenders; the same as
the killers of Bosnia--and the same as the many,
including many Bosnian Serbs, who have risked their lives
to save others.
We are the inheritors of a nation that did too little,
too late to stop the Holocaust--and that liberated
Buchenwald.  We are a nation that has been hesitant to
get involved directly in Bosnia--and that has done more
than any other nation to inspire hope.
We do not come to this museum for facile understanding.
We do not come here for reassurance.  We come here to
learn not answers but questions.  The War Crimes Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia is a test of whether we are
asking the right questions.  By supporting it and
fighting for it, we can do our part not to be imprisoned
by history but to shape it:  to build a world not without
conflict but in which conflict is effectively contained;
a world not without repression but in which the sway of
freedom is enlarged; a world not without lawless behavior
but in which the interests of the law-abiding are
progressively more secure.
This museum demands what life demands--that we choose
either to stand aside as long as we can or to do as much
as we can.  Let us, in the name of the long and newly
dead--and of the living and of those to come--do all we
can to stop genocide and serve life.  Thank you very
much.  (###)
Ratification Sought for the Convention on Biological
Timothy E. Wirth, Counselor of the DepartmentStatement
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, DC, April 12, 1994 (includes annex on
statements of understanding and on the relationship of
the convention to the GATT TRIPs agreement)
I am pleased to be here today to urge your support for
ratification of the Convention on Biological Diversity,
which was signed by the United States on June 4, 1993.
This comprehensive agreement, signed by 170 nations and
ratified by more than 50, marks an unprecedented
worldwide commitment to stem the loss of the earth's
species and their habitats and ecosystems.  By joining
with other countries in implementing the convention, the
United States can continue to play a leadership role in
ensuring that future generations can enjoy the economic,
health, nutritional, aesthetic, and other benefits
derived from our planet's rich biological inheritance.
This treaty has been the subject of extensive review and
discussion among U.S. Government agencies, U.S.
commercial and environmental interests, and the U.S.
Congress as well.  Concerns that have been raised about
some of the treaty's provisions were examined in detail
and have been addressed.  We believe strongly that U.S.
interests will be best served by ratifying the convention
and working to implement its provisions in an effective
Indeed, the United States has for some time been
pioneering efforts to preserve biodiversity under
existing U.S. laws that meet the convention's
requirements for domestic action.  Therefore, no
implementing legislation or changes in U.S. regulations
or existing state-federal relationships will be needed to
fulfill the domestic requirements of a convention party.
The Conference of the Parties (COP) will designate an
institutional structure to operate the financial
mechanism under the convention.  Assuming that the Global
Environment Facility (GEF) is chosen as the permanent
institutional structure, the United States will implement
its funding obligations through its periodic
contributions to the GEF.  The GEF is a unique
cooperative arrangement between the World Bank, the
United Nations Development Programme, and the United
Nations Environment Programme.  It has been restructured
in order, in part, to support the biodiversity
The Biodiversity Issue
Before discussing how the convention addresses the
problem of biodiversity loss, it is important to
understand what biodiversity is and why we should be
concerned with maintaining it for this and future
generations.  Most simply stated, biodiversity is the sum
total of all life forms that exist on earth; it is the
wealth of species, ecosystems, and ecological processes
that help make possible our economic and environmental
systems.  Estimates of the number of species that make up
the earth's biodiversity range from 10 million to 100
million, yet only some 1.4 million are currently known to
science.  We can measure the distance to the moon to a
matter of centimeters, but we can't even narrow estimates
of the number of species here on earth to below a factor
of ten.
Such knowledge is important because biodiversity is vital
to the well-being of humankind.  At the most basic level,
we depend on the earth's biodiversity for food, fiber,
and medicines and for its contribution to the health of
ecosystems.  Additionally, biological materials are
fundamental in our industrial processes and enable
development of new products from the rapidly expanding
field of biotechnology.  For example, plant species
provide the active ingredient for an estimated 25% of the
prescription drugs sold in the United States, with an
annual market value well over $10 billion.  A number of
important medical compounds have been developed from
marine organisms.  For example, sponges are the source of
anti-viral drugs with annual sales of $50 million to $100
Even beyond the promise for new drugs, uses of
biodiversity have revolutionized medical technologies.  A
bacterium discovered in Yellowstone's hot springs has
allowed us to dramatically reduce the time required to
analyze medical tests, so tests that took days can now be
done in hours.  The cumulative effect of these savings on
the health and productivity of our work force cannot be
For U.S. agriculture, which is based largely on food
crops that originated in other parts of the world, our
industry remains dependent on the use of poorly known and
often poorly protected wild strains from outside the
United States.  U.S. wheat farmers, for example, are
using varieties developed from wild strains in the Near
East that are resistant to aphids and other pests.  Using
genetic diversity in plant breeding programs to improve
crop yields, U.S. agriculture has increased its
productivity dramatically over the past 60 years.
Experts estimate that this use of biodiversity has added
a value of about $3.2 billion to our $11-billion annual
production of soybeans and about $7 billion in added
value to our $18-billion annual corn crop.
We have barely begun to understand the value of the 1.4
million species that have been catalogued to date.  We
can only guess the potential value to humankind of the
millions of species that are not yet discovered in the
oceans and on land.  These resources are like vast
libraries of knowledge completely obscured from our
comprehension.  The largest of these libraries are found
outside the United States and constitute a critical
resource that this and future generations can use to
solve some of the globe's most pressing concerns.
Already, there has been much promising research on newly
discovered species and genetically engineered products
that could prove valuable in dealing with problems from
AIDS to oil spills to world hunger.
Tragically, despite the overwhelming importance of
biodiversity, it is now being lost at alarming rates.  In
the past decade, a broad scientific consensus has emerged
that biodiversity is being lost faster today than at any
time since the dinosaurs became extinct some 65 million
years ago.  Unlike previous extinctions, which were
primarily a result of natural events, this destruction of
our planet's life forms is largely a result of human
action, in particular the degradation of biologically
rich ecosystems like tropical rainforests, grasslands,
and coral reefs.  If current trends persist, some 20% of
the earth's species may become extinct by the year 2020,
and we will have failed in our task as stewards for our
children and grandchildren.
Convention on Biological Diversity
The biodiversity convention is an unprecedented effort by
the nations of the world to take action now to deal with
biodiversity loss before it is too late.  The convention
does this by:
1.  Calling for domestic actions to conserve
biodiversity;2.  Encouraging the sustainable use of
biodiversity; and3.  Promoting benefit sharing.
The convention seeks to achieve these objectives through
a series of provisions.
As an essential first step for national actions, the
convention calls on all parties to adopt sound national
conservation regimes, similar to those that the United
States has long had in place.  Nations are called on to
establish national parks and protected areas; promote the
recovery and rehabilitation of threatened species; and
expand research and training, public education, and the
use of environmental impact assessments.  These
provisions are enormously important for those nations
that lack the conservation regimes they need to make
progress in this area.
The convention also recognizes that biodiversity can be
used in perpetuity to benefit humankind.  The second
major objective of the convention is, thus, to promote
the sustainable use of biodiversity.  By emphasizing
measures to realize the economic and other benefits of
biodiversity in a sustainable manner, the convention
encourages countries to conserve their biodiversity.
Third, because so much of the planet's biodiversity lies
in less developed countries, the convention places great
emphasis on promoting benefit sharing through
international cooperation.  The United States supports
this concept, by which benefits stemming from the
productive use of genetic resources flow back to those
nations that act to conserve biological diversity and
provide access to their genetic resources.  These
benefits--determined on the basis of voluntary agreements
among all concerned--could take the form of monetary
compensation for the use of genetic resources or of
technology transfer programs in training, participation
in research, cooperative work programs, and improved
access to information.
The benefit-sharing provisions provide an important
market-based incentive for countries, in particular poor
countries, to protect their resources.  Many developing
countries are already entering into agreements with U.S.
Government agencies and private sector companies to
provide access to their genetic resources under a
mutually agreed benefit-sharing arrangement.  Under one
such arrangement, the National Cancer Institute is
studying a vine in Cameroon that contains a potentially
promising anti-HIV agent; should this particular
substance fulfill its initial promise, Cameroon would
realize significant benefits from development of this
The convention also calls on parties, in particular
developed countries, to provide financial resources in
support of convention provisions.  The Global Environment
Facility acts as the interim institutional mechanism for
both the biodiversity and climate change conventions.  A
substantial portion of GEF funding will be devoted to
supporting the biodiversity convention.
Finally, the biodiversity convention creates a global
forum for countries to share their experience and
knowledge on the conservation and sustainable use of
biodiversity.  This will be an effective venue for
implementing convention provisions and maintaining a
long-term focus on biodiversity issues.
U.S. Implementation Of the Convention
The Administration strongly supports the Convention on
Biological Diversity as an important vehicle for the
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity
worldwide.  It sets in place a global commitment to
promote biodiversity conservation and sustainable use for
the benefit of this and future generations.  U.S.
adherence to the convention is critical for global
efforts to conserve and utilize biodiversity and for
maintaining our position as the world leader in
environmental protection.
As noted above, no implementing legislation will be
required.  The existing assemblage of federal, state, and
private sector biodiversity programs--comprising numerous
state and federal laws and programs and an extensive
system of federal and state wildlife management areas,
marine sanctuaries, parks and forests, and research and
education programs--is considered sufficient in meeting
our responsibilities under the convention.  The
Administration does not intend through this convention to
disrupt the existing balance of state and federal
authorities and, indeed, is committed to expanding and
strengthening these productive partnerships.
U.S. funding for convention-related activities will be
handled through periodic contributions to the Global
Environment Facility.  The United States has committed to
provide $430 million over the next four fiscal years
toward the replenishment of the recently restructured
GEF; total pledges by all countries will come to slightly
more than $2 billion over the replenishment period.  In
order to make clear how the United States interprets key
funding provisions of the convention, the Administration
has recommended several understandings to be deposited
with our instrument of ratification; these understandings
are discussed in detail in the annex to my testimony.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, industry has expressed
concerns about the way some of the language in the
convention is drafted, particularly on the issues of
intellectual property rights protection, terms of
transfer of technology, and participation in U.S.
research projects.  We share those concerns but feel we
can best protect U.S. interests by:
1.  Sending clear messages to the rest of the world as to
how the U.S. expects these provisions to be implemented
by all parties;2.  Participating actively in the
convention to protect U.S. intellectual property rights
interests; and3.  Depositing with our instrument of
ratification statements of understanding on specific
issues raised in articles of the convention.
Specifically, we propose to deposit with our instrument
of ratification statements of U.S. understanding that
make clear our position on the issues of technology
transfer and intellectual property rights, research,
funding, sovereign immunity, and the Article 3 Principle.
The content of these understandings is provided in detail
in the annex to this testimony.
On the critical issue of technology transfer, our
understandings make clear that any access to and transfer
of technology that occurs under the convention must
recognize and be consistent with the adequate and
effective protection of intellectual property rights
(IPR).  The U.S. understandings also make clear that the
term "fair and most favorable terms" for technology
transfer contained in Article 16(2) of the convention
means terms that are voluntarily agreed to by all parties
to the transaction.  This lays down the clear marker to
all other countries that the convention cannot be used by
any party to unilaterally impose terms or obligations on
any other party regarding technology transfer.
With respect to provisions addressing the conduct and
location of research based on genetic resources, our
understandings emphasize that the convention cannot serve
as a basis for any party unilaterally to change the terms
of existing agreements involving public or private U.S.
entities.  We further clarify which provisions of the
convention apply to research conducted by the U.S.
Government and which apply to research by public or
private entities.
Industry representatives also have inquired as to U.S.
intentions regarding the negotiation of a biosafety
protocol under the convention.  We stated at the time we
signed the convention that the need for a protocol must
be demonstrated before further steps are considered.  At
the first intergovernmental meeting relating to the
convention, we restated this position, adding that--based
on our experience--we did not feel that a biosafety
protocol to this convention is warranted.  However,
should negotiations on a protocol eventually proceed, we
will be in a better position to protect U.S. interests if
we have a seat at the table.  And the United States, in
cooperation with U.S. industry and other interested
groups, would work to ensure that any protocol is
scientifically based and analytically sound.
Finally, many have asked what mechanisms are available to
the United States to ensure that any decisions of the
Conference of the Parties accord with U.S. interests.
First, we will ensure that the COP's rules of procedure,
which will be adopted by consensus, are fully acceptable
to the United States.  Second, we have supported a
proposal to require that all decisions concerning the
financial mechanism are also made by consensus.  Most
importantly, however, the Conference of the Parties could
not legally bind the United States to a legal
interpretation of the convention that the U.S. did not
accept.  The United States will have an opportunity to
formally accept or reject any amendment or protocol to
the convention.
We believe the approach outlined above, which has broad
support among both U.S. commercial and environmental
groups, adequately addresses concerns raised by
convention provisions.  It is worth noting that the
debate over certain convention provisions opened the door
to an unprecedented display of cooperation among U.S.
industry and environmental organizations to forge a
common understanding on the convention.  For example, one
gathering of industry and environmental representatives,
the so-called Group of Six, independently analyzed the
convention in painstaking detail and helped U.S. interest
groups understand the convention's implications.  With an
open ear to the concerns of all U.S. interests, the
Administration was able to establish a basis upon which
it could sign the convention and proceed with the
ratification process.
Mr. Chairman, in closing let me reiterate that U.S.
adherence to the Convention on Biological Diversity is of
the utmost importance.  In the Renaissance, philosophers
spoke of a "chain of being," of which humanity was but
one of an infinite series of links.  Now we realize that
nature is both too complicated and too fragile to be
thought of as a chain; rather, it is a delicate web,
which we can tear to pieces if we are not careful.  Our
commitment to the conservation of biodiversity is no more
than our realization, at this late hour, that the web
must remain unbroken.
Our task will not be easy.  Recently, Time magazine ran a
cover story on the precarious state of the tiger.  The
article described the efforts of many dedicated men and
women around the world to preserve these magnificent
creatures.  We will not know for several years whether
those efforts will be successful in ensuring that tigers
exist outside a few zoos and circuses.  But while we
ponder the fate of this one familiar species, consider
this:  In the short period since that issue of Time hit
the newsstands, some scientists estimate that as many as
1,000 species--unlamented, unstudied, their properties
and potential value unknown--may have vanished forever
from the face of the earth.
I believe that we owe it to this and future generations
to participate as willing and constructive partners in
what is an unprecedented global effort to save the
world's biodiversity.  Membership in the Convention on
Biological Diversity provides a forum for us to shape the
world's approach to biodiversity so that it is effective,
pragmatic, scientifically based, and successful.  I urge
your support for ratification of this important treaty
and look forward to working with you in this effort to
conserve and utilize the planet's biological wealth.
Annex:  The Statements of Understanding and the
Relationship of the Convention to the GATT TRIPs
This annex provides a further explanation of the
statements of understanding to be included in the U.S.
instrument of ratification and a discussion of the
relationship of the biodiversity convention to the GATT
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property (GATT TRIPs).
The Statements of Understanding
This Administration developed the statements of
understanding with an open ear to all concerns.  The
statements of understanding will not only guide our
participation in the convention but also serve as notice
to other convention parties as to how the United States
interprets the convention.
However, the statements of understanding are only one
part of the overall approach with respect to the
convention.  Thus, they cannot be read in isolation from
the statements of Administration policies and other
statements of interpretation set forth in the testimony,
the President's letter of transmittal, and the report of
the Secretary of State.
Technology Transfer
The following understandings should be included in the
United States instrument of ratification:
It is the understanding of the Government of the United
States of America with respect to provisions addressing
access to and transfer of technology that:
a.  "fair and most favorable terms" in Article 16(2)
means terms that are voluntarily agreed to by all parties
to the transaction;b.  with respect to technology subject
to patents and other intellectual property rights,
Parties must ensure that any access to or transfer of
technology that occurs recognizes and is consistent with
the adequate and effective protection of intellectual
property rights, and that Article 16(5) does not alter
this obligation.
It is the understanding of the Government of the United
States of America with respect to provisions addressing
the conduct and location of research based on genetic
resources that:
a.  Article 15(6) applies only to scientific research
conducted by a Party, while Article 19(1) addresses
measures taken by Parties regarding scientific research
conducted by either public or private entities;b.
Article 19(1) cannot serve as a basis for any Party to
unilaterally change the terms of existing agreements
involving public or private U.S. entities.
Terms of Technology Transfer.  Article 16(2) states that
access to and transfer of technology shall be provided
and/or facilitated under "fair and most favorable terms,"
including on concessional and preferential terms where
mutually agreed.  "Fair and most favorable terms" are not
defined in the convention, and we do not purport to
define them in this statement of understanding.  However,
we wish to make very clear that whatever their
definition, no provision of the convention regarding
access to or transfer of technology can be used by any
party to unilaterally impose terms or obligations on any
other party regarding technology transfer.
This issue should be clarified in the United States
instrument of ratification by a statement that, with
respect to provisions addressing access to and transfer
of technology, "fair and most favorable terms" in Article
16(2) means terms that are voluntarily agreed to by all
parties to the transaction.
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights.  The
extension of adequate and effective protection for
intellectual property rights is an essential prerequisite
to achievement of the convention's objectives on
conservation of biological diversity, sustainable use of
biological resources, and benefit sharing.  The
biodiversity convention contains perhaps the most
stringent obligation to protect intellectual property
rights in an environ- mental agreement to date.  Article
16(2) states that technology transfers involving
technology subject to intellectual property rights must
be handled in a way that is consistent with the adequate
and effective protection of the intellectual property
rights in the technology.
However, Article 16(5) provides that the parties,
recognizing that patents and other property rights may
have an influence on the implementation of this
convention, shall cooperate in this regard subject to
national legislation and international law in order to
ensure that such rights are supportive of and do not run
counter to its objectives.
We recognize that other countries may have a perspective
on intellectual property rights inconsistent with that of
the United States.  Apart from the clear obligation in
Article 16(2), we do not anticipate that the biodiversity
convention alone will change that perspective.  However,
we do wish to make clear that the convention does not
provide a basis upon which other parties can deny
adequate and effective protection to technology subject
to intellectual property rights.  To pre-empt any such
misapplication of Article 16(5) by any party, it is
essential to include in the United States instrument of
ratification a statement reaffirming the obligation of
parties to ensure that access to or transfer of
technology under the convention is consistent with the
adequate and effective protection of intellectual
property rights and that Article 16(5) does not alter
this obligation.
Participation in Biotechnological Research.  Finally, the
statement of understanding addresses those provisions of
the convention that provide for participation by
developing countries in research derived from the
development of their genetic resources.
First, the statement of understanding clarifies which
provisions of the convention apply to research conducted
by the U.S. Government and which provisions apply to
research conducted by either public or private entities.
The subject matters of Articles 15(6) and 19(1) are
virtually identical, although the legal obligations of
each vary slightly.  Article 15(6) provides that each
party shall endeavor to develop and carry out scientific
research based on genetic resources by other parties with
the full participation of and, where possible, in the
territory of such parties.  Article 19(1) provides for
the effective participation in biotechnology research
activities by those parties that provided the genetic
resources for such research--where feasible, in the
territory of such parties.
The understanding that Article 15(6) applies only to
scientific research conducted by a party while Article
19(1) addresses measures taken by parties regarding
scientific research conducted by either public or private
entities should be included in the United States
instrument of ratification.
Second, the understanding clarifies the scope of Article
19(1).  To implement Article 19(1), the parties should
take measures that promote the negotiation of agreements
regarding research on genetic resources.  Ultimately,
however, it is up to the entity conducting the research
to determine the circumstances under which it is
appropriate to provide for the participation of
developing countries and whether it is feasible for such
research to be performed in the territory of the
developing country.
These obligations apply prospectively.  Accordingly, the
United States wishes to make clear in its instrument of
ratification that the convention cannot be used by any
developing country to change the terms of existing
agreements for development of genetic resources by U.S.
The convention contains two articles on funding.  Article
20 sets forth the undertakings of all parties with
respect to financial contributions; Article 21
establishes a financial mechanism.  These provisions are
largely modeled on those of the climate change convention
to which the Senate gave advice and consent in 1992.
The following statement of understanding should be
included in the United States instrument of ratification:
It is the understanding of the Government of the United
States of America that, with respect to Article 20(2),
the financial resources provided by developed country
Parties are to enable developing country Parties to meet
the agreed full incremental costs to them of implementing
measures that fulfil the obligations of the Convention
and to benefit from its provisions and that are agreed
between a developing country Party and the institutional
structure referred to in Article 21.
It is the understanding of the Government of the United
States of America that, with respect to Article 21(1),
the "authority" of the Conference of the Parties with
respect to the financial mechanism relates to
determining, for the purposes of the Convention, the
policy, strategy, program priorities and eligibility
criteria relating to the access to and utilization of
such resources.
The Government of the United States of America
understands that the decision to be taken by the
Conference of the Parties under Article 21, Paragraph 1,
concerns "the amount of resources needed" by the
financial mechanism, and that nothing in Article 20 or 21
authorizes the Conference of the Parties to take
decisions concerning the amount, nature, frequency or
size of the contributions of the Parties to the
institutional structure.
Agreement on Costs and Measures.  Among other things,
Article 20 requires developed country parties to provide
new and additional financial resources to enable
developing country parties:
--  To meet the agreed full incremental costs to them of
implementing measures which fulfill the obligations of
the convention; and
--  To benefit from its provisions;
and which costs are agreed between a developing country
party and the institutional structure operating the
financial mechanism.
To qualify for funding, the United States interprets the
convention to require that both the cost of a project and
the project itself be agreed between the institutional
structure and the developing country.  To preempt an
argument, albeit unlikely, that a developing country is
entitled to funding once the cost of the project alone is
agreed, the United States should state its understanding
that the financial resources provided under Article 20
are to enable developing country parties to meet the
agreed full incremental costs of measures that are agreed
between a developing country party and the institutional
structure referred to in Article 21.
The "Authority" of the Conference of Parties.  Article 21
of the convention establishes a financial mechanism and
provides for an institutional structure to which the
operation of the mechanism will be entrusted.  It also
describes the relationship between the Conference of the
Parties and the financial mechanism.
Article 21(1) provides that the mechanism shall function
under the authority and guidance of and be accountable to
the Conference of the Parties.  In addition, it states
that the Conference of the Parties shall determine the
policy, strategy, program priorities, and eligibility
criteria relating to the access to and utilization of the
financial resources.
In this context, the United States understands that the
"authority" of the Conference of the Parties relates to
determining policy, strategy, program priorities, and
eligibility criteria.  In other words, the convention
does not give the Conference of the Parties the authority
to govern the GEF or make its project funding decisions.
A statement to this effect should be included in the
United States instrument of ratification.
Amount of Resources Needed.  Article 21(1) further
provides that contributions to the financial mechanism
shall be such as to take into account the need for
predictability, adequacy, and timely flow of funds in
accordance with the amount of resources needed to be
decided periodically by the Conference of the Parties.
At the time of the adoption of the agreed text of the
convention, 19 countries (including the United States)
declared their understanding that the decision to be
taken by the Conference of the Parties under Paragraph 1
refers to the "amount of resources needed" by the
financial mechanism, not to the extent or nature and form
of the contributions of the parties.
The Administration therefore intends to reiterate this
understanding in its instrument of ratification.
Other Proposed Statements of Understanding
The Administration intends to make statements of
understanding on the Article 3 Principle and on sovereign
The Article 3 Principle.  The convention states verbatim
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration from the 1972
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment.  This
principle recognizes the sovereign right of states to
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental policies and the concomitant responsibility
to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or
control do not cause damage to the environment of other
states or of areas beyond the limits of national
The Administration understands that it references a
principle that the parties will bear in mind in their
actions under the convention.  The following
understanding should be included in the United States
instrument of ratification:
The Government of the United States of America
understands that Article 3 references a principle to be
taken into account in the implementation of the
Sovereign Immunity.  Article 22(2) obligates the parties
to implement the convention with respect to the marine
environment consistently with the rights and obligations
of states under the law of the sea.  During the
negotiations, the United States proposed, in addition to
Article 22(2), the inclusion of a sovereign immunity
clause, i.e., that the convention does not apply to
military vessels or aircraft but that each party has an
obligation to ensure--by the adoption of appropriate
measures not impairing operations or operational
capabilities of such vessels or aircraft owned or
operated by it--that such vessels or aircraft act in a
manner consistent, so far as is reasonable and
practicable, with the convention.
In view of the reference in Paragraph 22(2) to the law of
the sea and the recognition by many delegations during
the negotiations that the United States proposal was a
principle of customary international law and therefore
superfluous, the United States withdrew its proposal.  To
reaffirm this understanding, the following statement
should be included in the United States instrument of
The Government of the United States of America
understands that although the provisions of this
Convention do not apply to any warship, naval auxiliary,
or other vessels or aircraft owned or operated by a State
and used, for the time being, only on government non-
commercial service, each State shall ensure, by the
adoption of appropriate measures not impairing operations
or operational capabilities of such vessels or aircraft
owned or operated by it, that such vessels or aircraft
act in a manner consistent, so far as is reasonable and
practicable, with this Convention.
Relationship of the Biodiversity Convention to GATT TRIPs
The TRIPs agreement defines substantive, minimum
intellectual property rights standards all GATT member
countries will have to provide.  The TRIPs agreement
explicitly permits GATT members to provide more expansive
protection than is outlined in the agreement.  As such,
the TRIPs agreement will function as a "floor" for
substantive protection for intellectual property rights
by GATT TRIPs parties under the biodiversity convention.
It will significantly improve global standards for
protecting intellectual property over current standards.
For example, the TRIPs agreement requires parties to make
product patent protection available for inventions in
essentially all fields of technology.  This means that
patents will be available for many important
biotechnology products, including new pharmaceuticals,
genetically engineered microorganisms, proteins, and
genetic constructs.
TRIPs will also restrict the ability of countries to
license patent rights without the consent of the patent
owner.  And although TRIPs permits parties to exclude
patent protection for new and useful plant and animal
invention, GATT members will have to provide protection
for new plant varieties.  In this regard, we will stress
the benefits to our trading partners of adopting
standards consistent with the 1991 revision of the
International Convention for the Protection of New
Varieties of Plants (the UPOV convention).  Finally,
TRIPs provides a good basic model for ensuring protection
of confidential business information and trade secrets.
The biodiversity convention and the TRIPs agreement are
fully compatible in their goals and principles and in
their obligations.  Indeed, the conclusion of the TRIPs
will serve to further strengthen the obligations in the
biodiversity convention to provide adequate and effective
protection of intellectual property rights.  (###)
The Multilateral Dimension Of the Peace Process
Robert H. Pelletreau, Assistant Secretary for Near
Eastern Affairs
Address at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies,
Georgetown University, Washington, DC, April 7, 1994
Ladies and gentlemen, let me begin by congratulating the
Center for Contemporary Arab Studies for this
distinguished gathering.  I want to thank the center, and
Barbara Stowasser in particular, for the invitation to
speak on the Middle East peace process.
For many in the Middle East, this is a time of promise
and growing expectation.  The political leaders engaged
in negotiations have started the region's transition from
an era of conflict, and they recognize that continued
movement toward peace and normal relations is imperative.
Yet this will necessarily be a rough road.  The obstacles
that the process has experienced, and those to come, are
not just related to the intrinsic difficulties of the
issues under negotiation--as the prospects for peace grow
brighter, they also include the growing efforts by
extremists to do what they can to sabotage the process.
Today, I want to talk to you about the multilateral
dimension of the peace process, the second of the two
tracks or levels established by the October 1991 Madrid
peace conference.  Although it has attracted fewer
headlines than the bilateral track, its achievements and
contribution to the overall peace process are worthy of
our attention.  First, however, let me set the stage with
a few remarks on the current scene.
The Hebron Detour
Last February 25, the world was stunned by the massacre
of worshippers at a Hebron mosque.  The impact on the
peace process was immediate.  Israeli-Palestinian talks
on implementing the Declaration of Principles signed last
September stopped.  Bilateral talks in Washington
involving Israelis, Jordanians, Lebanese, Palestinians,
and Syrians came to a halt a couple of days before the
scheduled recess.
While formal negotiations stopped, contacts between the
parties did not.  Israelis and Palestinians quickly
resumed contact to address the security concerns that
came to light with the Hebron massacre.  We, Egypt,
Norway, and Russia energetically engaged with parties to
the negotiations.  President Clinton and Secretary
Christopher were regularly on the phone with Israeli and
Arab leaders, and our Middle East peace team twice
visited the region.
The results of this diverse diplomatic activity were
productive and in conformity with UN Security Council
Resolution 904.  The Israelis and Palestinians reached
agreement on security arrangements that will put
international observers into Hebron.  They agreed on the
early deployment of Palestinian police into Gaza and
Jericho.  And on March 31, the two parties resumed
negotiations on implementing the Declaration of
Principles in Cairo with a renewed determination to reach
agreement as soon as possible.  At the same time, all the
parties to the bilaterals agreed to resume talks in
Washington this month.  We are consulting with the
Russians on dates for the talks.
The lesson here is that extremist violence will not stop
the peace process.  This is true about the slaughter of
Palestinians in Hebron.  It is equally true about the
terrorist bombing, on April 6, against Israelis in Afula.
In both cases, we have condemned the cowardly violence
against innocents.  Such incidents only strengthen our
resolve--and the resolve of the regional parties--to move
forward in the peace process.
The Bilaterals
Attention now is properly returning to the substance of
the bilateral negotiations.  With that in mind, it might
be useful to look at the individual negotiations.
Israeli-Palestinian Talks.  The Declaration of Principles
signed at the White House last September established an
ambitious set of objectives toward which Israelis and
Palestinians are working.  In pursuit of these goals, the
parties have been negotiating the modalities for Israeli
withdrawal and transferring authority to the Palestinians
in Gaza and Jericho and for holding elections for an
interim Palestinian self-government in the area.  Soon
they will negotiate the range of issues associated with
Palestinian interim self-government in the rest of the
occupied territories.
The U.S. is actively supporting the implementation
process.  The Conference to Support Middle East Peace,
which we organized and hosted in October, raised more
than $2 billion in commitments from 46 participants for
projects that will demonstrate to the Palestinians the
tangible benefits of peace.  The United States has
pledged to provide $500 million in aid over the next five
years.  Some of this assistance will be in the form of
housing for the Palestinians and in non-lethal equipment
for their emerging police force.  In cooperation with
other participants, we created the Ad Hoc Liaison
Committee and a World Bank-led Consultative Group to
coordinate donor efforts and delivery of the assistance.
Israel-Jordan Talks.  Israeli-Jordanian negotiations have
also produced some steps forward.  Last fall, following
the Israeli-Palestinian breakthrough, Israel and Jordan
agreed to a common negotiating agenda and to establish a
joint economic commission.  Israeli-Jordanian
negotiations subsequently yielded a banking agreement and
are now proceeding on such practical issues as water and
the environment.  The time is ripe for these two
neighbors to focus on the full range of issues that
divide them and promptly reach a full peace agreement.
Israeli Talks With Syria and Lebanon.  The Syrian and
Lebanese negotiations with Israel have been conducted to
date with seriousness and energy.  Differences remain
between Syria and Israel on the key issues of land and
security and the shape and context of peace.  Lebanon and
Israel are continuing in their effort to reach agreement
on a political frame of reference dealing with the key
issues of land and peace and, as a first step, to
establish a military committee to discuss the pressing
issues of security, especially in southern Lebanon.  In
this respect, let me reiterate the Administration's firm
commitment to Lebanon's political independence,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity.
The Egyptian Dimension.  It is important to underscore
the timely and positive role of Egypt in advancing
bilateral negotiations.  By its example, thoughtful
advice, and energetic involvement in helping various
parties overcome obstacles and apparent impasses, Egypt
is making a unique contribution to broadening the peace.
In sum, the bilateral talks have broken new ground on a
number of very sensitive issues.  Much more work,
however, needs to be done to fulfill the promise of peace
ushered in by the Madrid conference.  We, Egypt, and
others will remain actively engaged as facilitators of
these talks, but it must be emphasized that further
meaningful progress will come only through continued
direct negotiations.
The Multilaterals
The multilateral track of the peace process was designed
to complement the bilaterals by bringing a wider array of
regional and extra-regional parties together to develop
coordinated approaches to regional problems.  This also
fosters broader human contact between Israelis and Arabs
and demonstrates that peace is not an abstraction but a
vehicle that can bring practical, concrete benefits to
people's lives.  It is both visionary and very practical.
It overarches the bilateral negotiations, establishing a
conducive regional environment for progress and buffering
periods of bilateral tension and hiatus.
The multilateral track consists of five working groups
dealing with key issues affecting the region as a whole--
water, the environment, economic development, refugees,
and arms control and security.  A Steering Group guides
the multilateral process, chaired by the U.S. and Russia,
as the Madrid co-sponsors.  The Palestinians regularly
join Israel and 11 Arab countries as participants in the
multilaterals.  And delegations from outside the region--
Europeans, Canada, Japan, the UN--also take part.
The first phase of the multilaterals was one of mutual
familiarization, or "getting to know you."  There was
also an emphasis in the first meetings on education.
Scores of workshops and seminars were held so the parties
could assess the scope of the issues they had agreed to
address and establish a common vocabulary and terms of
The Next Stage--Concrete Steps.  After this period of
seminars, information exchanges, and the establishment of
professional ties across political boundaries, there has
been a quickening pace of activity over the past year and
a marked shift toward concreteness.  Examples of this new
emphasis on results can be seen in each of the five
working groups:
--  The Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) Working
Group--which is led by the U.S. and Russia--is close to
establishing a communications network involving regional
ACRS participants.  A demonstration of search and rescue
operations at sea will soon take place.
--  The Environment Working Group, with Japan in the
lead,  is working on establishing a center for marine
disaster in the Gulf of Aqaba.  In addition, under its
aegis, five regional parties are working on a common
agenda to control desertification.
--  The Refugee Working Group, under Canadian
chairmanship, completed a study on living conditions of
refugees in the occupied territories, which is now being
used to set up a Palestinian statistical office there.
--  The Regional Economic Development Working Group, with
the European Union in the chair, endorsed an action plan
consisting of 35 projects, including feasibility studies
and workshops on transportation, tourism, communications,
training, and agriculture.  Well before the signing of
the Declaration of Principles last September, this group
commissioned the immensely valuable World Bank study of
economic conditions in the occupied territories.
--  The Water Resources Working Group, led by the U.S.,
has installed pilot rain catchment systems to provide new
sources of water in the Gaza Strip and is collecting data
for regional water data banks.  It is also researching
desalination technologies worldwide, with a view to
establishing a regional research center and identifying
low-cost desalination techniques for use in these poorer
regions of the Middle East.
Despite the progress in the multilaterals, Syria and
Lebanon have thus far declined to join the process until,
as they put it, there is concrete progress in the
bilaterals.  With the signing of the Palestinian-Israeli
Declaration of Principles last September and since then,
there has been substantial forward movement on the
bilateral track.  We hope that this movement will soon
eliminate these artificial impediments to bringing Syria
and Lebanon in.  Meanwhile, we have made a special effort
to keep these two governments briefed on progress in the
multilaterals so that they can enter in full stride when
the time comes.
Looking to the Future.  The focus on concrete projects is
meant to bring to the peoples of the Middle East early
and visible fruits of the peace environment, even before
a comprehensive Middle East peace is reached on the
bilateral tracks.  In addition, beginning in round five,
the multilateral participants also began to consider what
the Middle East region as a whole might look like after
peace is achieved.
To consider one element of this question, the Arms
Control and Regional Security Working Group has begun
work on a "Declaration of Principles."  Agreement on this
declaration would provide a road map to achieving
specific arms control and the security arrangements in a
post-peace-process Middle East.
The Steering Group has also been actively looking at the
future of the region.  It has begun to grapple with
principles or guidelines that might determine the shape
of the region following the achievement of Arab-Israeli
peace.  It has also launched a study of what the region
might look like at that time and how to get there.
The multilateral track has come a long way since its
organizing meeting in Moscow.  It has moved from seminars
to concrete steps.  It has also moved increasingly to the
region itself.  In this upcoming sixth round, four of the
five working groups and the Steering Group will be hosted
by regional parties.  The Water Resources group will meet
in Oman; the Arms Control and Regional Security group in
Qatar; the Refugee Working Group in Egypt; the Regional
Economic Development group in Morocco; and the Steering
Group in Tunisia.  In a sense, the regional parties are
increasingly taking ownership of this process, a
development which we wholeheartedly support.
The principles that are accepted and the relationships
that are forged in the multilaterals may prove to be the
crucible of the future Middle East.  The overall
structure of these negotiations--embracing a co-sponsored
international conference and mutually reinforcing
bilateral and multilateral levels of negotiation--breaks
new ground as a model for international peace-making.
Our diplomacy is energetically engaged to advance the day
that a just and lasting Arab-Israeli peace is achieved
and to maximize the prospects that, when peace arrives,
prosperity and cooperation grace the entire region.
Deaths of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi
Statement by President Clinton released by the White
House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC,
April 7, 1994.
I was shocked and deeply saddened to learn of the tragic
deaths of President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda and
President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi last night in a
plane crash outside Kigali, Rwanda.  The two Presidents
were returning from a regional summit in Arusha,
Tanzania, intended to bring an end to the civil wars that
have plagued their two countries for more than three
Both Presidents were seeking means to end the bloodshed
in their troubled countries and facilitate a movement
toward peace and democracy.  Their deaths are a tragic
blow to the long-suffering Rwandan and Burundian people.
I am equally horrified that elements of the Rwandan
security forces have sought out and murdered Rwandan
officials, including the Prime Minister, Agathe
On behalf of the people of the United States, I extend my
condolences to the families of the deceased Presidents
and the Prime Minister as well as to the peoples of the
two nations.
I strongly condemn these actions, and I call on all
parties to cease any such actions immediately.  These
tragedies must not derail Rwanda and Burundi from
pursuing national reconciliation and democracy.  (###)
Sanctions Announced Against Taiwan For Trade in
Endangered Species
Statement by White House Press Secretary Dee Dee Myers,
Washington, DC, April 11, 1994.
President Clinton announced today trade sanctions against
Taiwan for its lack of progress in eliminating its
illegal trade in tigers and rhinoceroses.  The action
signals a strong stance by the Administration against
illegal trade in endangered species and represents an
important event in the movement to save the tiger and
rhinoceros from extinction.  The President stated that:
This is the first time any country has acted on the
international call for trade sanctions to protect
endangered species, but if the illegal trade in rhinos
and tigers is not eliminated, these species could be
extinct in five years.  This Administration recognizes
that threats to endangered species are of critical
importance.  The world must know that the United States
will take strong actions to protect the earth's natural
The President directed that imports of wildlife from
Taiwan be prohibited.  The trade sanctions against Taiwan
will take effect immediately following a Federal Register
notice and public comment period.  The Federal Register
notice will solicit comments on the specific targeted
products.  Examples include coral and mollusk shell
products and jewelry; and snake, lizard, and crocodile
skin shoes and other leather products.
The population of the world's rhinoceroses has declined
90% within the last 23 years to present levels of 10,000
animals, and the tiger population has declined 95% within
this century to present levels of 5,000.  The primary
threat to both species is the poaching that continues in
their native ranges fueled by the market demand for
medicinal products made from tiger and rhinoceros parts.
In November, the President warned China and Taiwan that
import prohibitions would be necessary if they did not
demonstrate "measurable, verifiable, and substantial
progress" in reducing illegal trade in tiger and
rhinoceros parts and products by March 1994.  Although
the international body controlling trade in endangered
species recently noted "with satisfaction the progress
demonstrated by China," it expressed "concern" that
Taiwan's actions "have not yet been implemented," making
trade sanctions against Taiwan necessary.
With today's action, the Clinton Administration initiated
the first trade measures to protect endangered species
ever taken under the authority of the Pelly amendment to
the Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967.
The President stated that the Pelly amendment warning
will remain in place for both China and Taiwan and called
on each to take further actions toward eradicating
illegal trade in endangered species.  The United States
will review the progress of both China and Taiwan again
at the end of this year.  These sanctions against Taiwan
will be adjusted as appropriate depending on the extent
of the illegal trade.  The enactment of adequate
legislation, coupled with enforcement actions that result
in significant reductions in the illegal trade in
rhinoceros and tiger parts, would be grounds for an
immediate reconsideration of the decision. The President
also reiterated the U.S. offer to explore with China and
Taiwan possible arrangements for technical and law
enforcement assistance.
The international agreement controlling trade in
endangered species is called CITES--the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of wild fauna
and flora.  With over 120 member countries, CITES
prohibits international trade in endangered wildlife
species.  The United States was closely involved in
drafting CITES and was one of the first countries to
ratify the treaty, which came into force in 1975.  The
next meeting of the CITES members is scheduled for
November 7-18, 1994, in Fort Lauderdale, Florida.  (###)
Treaty Actions
Convention establishing the multilateral investment
guarantee agency (MIGA), with annexes and schedules.
Done at Seoul Oct. 11, 1985.  Entered into force Apr. 12,
Ratification:  South Africa, Mar. 2, 1994.
Judicial Procedure
Convention on the civil aspects of international child
abduction.  Done at The Hague Oct. 25, 1980.  Entered
into force Dec. 1, 1983; for the U.S. July 1, 1988.  TIAS
Accession:  Panama, Feb. 2, 1994.
Convention abolishing the requirement of legalization for
foreign public documents, with annex.  Done at The Hague
Oct. 25, 1961.  Entered into force Jan. 24, 1965; for the
U.S. Oct. 15, 1981.  TIAS 10072; 33 UST 883.
Accession:  Armenia, Nov. 19, 1993.
Succession:  Bosnia-Herzegovina, Aug. 23, 1993; effective
Dec. 20, 19911.
Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961.  Done at New
York Mar. 30, 1961.  Entered into force Dec. 13, 1964;
for the U.S. June 24, 1967.  TIAS 6298; 18 UST 1407.
Accessions:  Lithuania, Feb. 28, 1994; Macedonia, Oct.
13, 1993.
Succession:  Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sept. 1, 1993, effective
Mar. 6, 1992.
Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic
drugs, 1961.  Done at Geneva Mar. 25, 1972.  Entered into
force Aug. 8, 1975.  TIAS 8118; 26 UST 1439.
Accession:  Macedonia, Oct. 13, 1993.
Succession:  Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sept. 1, 1993, effective
Mar. 6, 1992.
Convention on psychotropic substances.  Done at Vienna
Feb. 21, 1971.  Entered into force Aug. 16, 1976; for the
U.S. July 15, 1980.  TIAS 9725; 32 UST 543.Accession:
Lithuania, Feb. 28, 1994.
United Nations convention against illicit traffic in
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, with annex
and final act.  Done at Vienna Dec. 20, 1988.  Entered
into force Nov. 11, 1990.  [Senate] Treaty Doc. 101-4.
Accession:   Macedonia, Oct. 13, 1993.
Acceptance:  Finland, Feb. 15, 1994.
Succession:  Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sept. 1, 1993, effective
Mar. 6, 1992.
Ratifications:  Brunei Darussalam, Nov. 12, 19932;
Germany, Nov. 30, 19931; Sudan, Nov. 19, 1993.
Nuclear Weapons--Non-Proliferation
Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.  Done
at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968.  Entered
into force Mar. 5, 1970.  TIAS 6839.
Accession:  Georgia, Mar. 7, 1994.
Patent cooperation treaty with regulations.  Done at
Washington June 19, 1970.  Entered into force Jan. 24,
1978.  TIAS 8733; 28 UST 7645.Accession:  Kenya, Mar. 8,
1994.Successions:  Kyrgyz Rep., Moldova, Tajikistan, Feb.
14, 1994.
Strasbourg agreement concerning the international patent
classification.  Done at Strasbourg Mar. 24, 1971.
Entered into force Oct. 7, 1975.  TIAS 8140; 26 UST
1793.Succession:  Tajikistan, Feb. 14, 1994.
Budapest treaty on the international recognition of the
deposit of microorganisms for the purposes of patent
procedure, with regulations.  Done at Budapest Apr. 28,
1977 and amended on Sept. 26, 1980.  Entered into force
Aug. 19, 1980.  TIAS 9768; 32 UST 1241.
Successions:  Moldova, Tajikistan, Feb. 14, 1994.
Convention for the protection of producers of phonograms
against unauthorized duplication of their phonograms.
Done at Geneva Oct. 29, 1971.  Entered into force Apr.
18, 1973; for the U.S. Mar. 10, 1974.  TIAS 7808; 25 UST
309.Ratification:  Colombia, Feb. 14, 1994.
Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property
Organization.  Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967.  Entered
into force Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1970.
TIAS 6932; 21 UST 1749.
Successions:  Kyrgyz Rep., Tajikistan, Feb. 14, 1994.
Nice agreement concerning the international
classification of goods and services for purposes of the
registration of marks of June 15, 1957, as revised.  Done
at Geneva May 13, 1977.  Entered into force Feb. 6, 1979;
for the U.S. Feb. 29, 1984.  [Senate Exec. E, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess.]
Succession:  Tajikistan, Feb. 14, 1994.
Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial
property of Mar. 20, 1883, as revised.  Done at Stockholm
July 14, 1967.  Entered into force May 19, 1970; for the
U.S. Aug. 25, 1973.  TIAS 6923, 7727; 24 UST 2140.
Accession:  Lithuania, Feb. 21, 1994.
Successions:  Kyrgyz Rep., Tajikistan, Feb. 14, 1994.
Convention relating to the status of refugees, with
schedule and annex.  Signed at Geneva July 28, 1951.
Entered into force Apr. 22, 19543.  TIAS 6577.
Accessions:   Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Nov. 3,
19931; Tajikistan, Dec. 7, 19931.
Protocol relating to the status of refugees.  Done at New
York Jan. 31, 1967.  Entered into force Oct. 4, 1967; for
the U.S. Nov. 1, 1968.  TIAS 6577; 19 UST 6223.
Accession:  Tajikistan, Dec. 7, 1993.
Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment.  Adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations Dec. 10, 1984.
Entered into force June 26, 19873.  [Senate] Treaty Doc.
Ratification:  Costa Rica, Nov. 11, 1993.
Constitution of the United Nations Industrial Development
Organization, with annexes.  Done at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.
Entered into force June 21, 1985.  [Senate Exec. 97-19,
97th Cong., 1st Sess.]Accession deposited:  Azerbaijan,
Nov. 23, 1993.
Weapons, Conventional
Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of
certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be
excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects,
with annexed protocols.  Adopted at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980.
Entered into force Dec. 2, 19833.
Ratification:  Spain, Dec. 29, 1993.
Succession:  Croatia, Dec. 2, 1993, effective Oct. 8,
Cross-serving agreement, with annexes.  Signed at
Washington Jan. 20, 1994.  Entered into force Jan. 20,
Agreement for scientific and technological cooperation,
with annexes.  Signed at Washington Mar. 18, 1994.
Enters into force upon an exchange of notes confirming
that the parties have completed their respective internal
Agreement concerning technology research and development
projects, with annex.  Signed at Paris and Washington
Dec. 9, 1993 and Jan. 10, 1994.  Entered into force Jan.
10, 1994.
Agreement incorporating an intellectual property annex
into cooperative agreements between U.S.-F.R.G.
scientific and technical agencies.  Effected by exchange
of notes at Washington Mar. 4 and 7, 1994.  Entered into
force Mar. 7, 1994.
Treaty concerning the reciprocal encouragement and
protection of investment, with annex.  Signed at
Washington May 19, 1992.  [Senate] Treaty Doc. 103-12.
Ratifications exchanged Dec. 13, 1993.  Entered into
force Jan. 12, 1994.
Kyrgyz Republic
Treaty concerning the encouragement and reciprocal
protection of investment, with annex.  Signed at
Washington Jan. 19, 1993.  [Senate] Treaty Doc. 103-13.
Ratifications exchanged Dec. 13, 1993.  Entered into
force Jan. 12, 1994.
Basic exchange and cooperative agreement for topographic
mapping, nautical and aeronautical charting, geodesy and
geophysics, digital data and related mapping, charting
and geodesy materials.  Signed at Vilnius Jan. 21, 1994.
Entered into force Feb. 15, 1994.
Agreement on mutual administrative assistance in the
exchange of information in futures matters.  Signed at
Washington Apr. 29, 1993.  Entered into force Feb. 1,
Treaty concerning the reciprocal encouragement and
protection of investment, with annex, protocol, and
related exchange of letters.  Signed at Bucharest May 28,
1992.  [Senate] Treaty Doc. 102-36.  Ratifications
exchanged  Dec. 16, 1993.  Entered into force Jan. 15,
Agreement on the protection and preservation of cultural
heritage.  Signed at Washington Mar. 4, 1994.  Entered
into force Mar. 4, 1994.
Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on
income and capital, with protocol.  Signed at Washington
Mar. 4, 1994.  Enters into force on the date of exchange
of instruments of ratification.
Agreement on science and technology cooperation, with
annex.  Signed at Washington Mar. 4, 1994.  Entered into
force Mar. 4, 1994.
Postal money order agreement.  Signed at Sanaa and
Washington Jan. 29 and Mar. 7, 1994.  Entered into force
Apr. 1, 1994.
1  With declaration(s).
2  With reservation(s).
3  Not in force for the U.S.  (###)

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