VOLUME 5, NUMBER 15, APRIL 11, 1994
1.  International Narcotics Control Strategy Report--
Robert S. Gelbard
2.  Population and Sustainable Development:  Defining an
Agenda--Timothy E. Wirth
3.  Reforming Export Controls--Lynn E. Davis, White House
Statement, Fact Sheet
Article 1
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
Robert S. Gelbard
Opening statement at a State Department press briefing,
Washington, DC, April 4, 1994
On Friday, President Clinton sent to Congress his
decision on narcotics certification for the 26 major drug
producing and transit countries.  The State Department
also sent Congress its annual International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report.  You should all have the report,
which describes anti-narcotics efforts in Europe, the
former Soviet republics, plus all countries that have
received U.S. anti-narcotics assistance in the past two
In his directive on international narcotics policy signed
last November, the President instructed his
Administration to conduct the certification process
strictly and aggressively.  This year's decisions reflect
that position.
Before I talk about the specific decisions, let me
briefly describe the two-stage certification process.
First, the Foreign Assistance Act requires that the
President and the Secretary of State prepare a list of
the major drug producing and transit countries.  This
year's list was based on information from last year's
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, as well
as other sources.  The President transmitted the list to
Congress in early January.  Twenty-six drug producing and
transit countries are on the list and, therefore, subject
to the second stage of the process--the certification
Half of most types of U.S. foreign assistance to these
countries is withheld by law pending the President's
certification decision.  He must determine whether,
during 1993, they cooperated fully with the United States
or took adequate steps on their own to meet the goals and
objectives of the 1988 UN Convention on Drug Trafficking.
The 1988 Convention obligates countries to outlaw and
prosecute illicit drug production, trafficking, and money
laundering; to restrict chemicals which can be used to
process illegal drugs; and to cooperate in international
drug control efforts.  The law provides the President
three certification options:  First, he may certify a
country's counter-narcotics performance.  Second, he may
deny certification.  Third, for a country whose counter-
narcotics performance does not qualify for certification,
he may make a "national interest certification."  This is
done when vital U.S. national interests require that the
U.S. be able to cooperate, provide aid, or vote for
assistance from the multilateral development banks,
despite the country's failure to meet full narcotics
certification standards.
If the President determines that full certification or
national interest certification is appropriate, then the
aid which had been withheld is released.  However, if the
President denies certification, most categories of
assistance are immediately cut off.  This means cutting
off most forms of aid under the Foreign Assistance Act,
the Arms Export Control Act, and financing through the
Export-Import Bank.  The U.S. also is obliged to vote
against any multilateral development bank loans to the
The President notified Congress of his determinations
last Friday.  The law gives Congress 45 calendar days, if
it chooses, to disapprove the certifications by enacting
a joint resolution.
This year, the President certified the following
countries:  The Bahamas, Belize, Brazil, China, Colombia,
Ecuador, Guatemala, Hong Kong, India, Jamaica, Malaysia,
Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Thailand, and Venezuela.  The
President granted "national interest certifications" to
Afghanistan, Bolivia, Laos, Lebanon, Panama, and Peru.
The President denied certification to Burma, Iran,
Nigeria, and Syria.  In doing this, the President
employed very stringent standards in arriving at this
determination.  The certification process was objective
and carefully considered.  We hope this year's
certification decisions send a clear message:  This
Administration is serious about combatting international
narcotics trafficking.
The issue is an important part of our foreign policy and
our bilateral relations, especially with the major drug
producing and transit countries.  My message to countries
that did not receive full certifications is that this
Administration will not conduct business as usual on
narcotics certification decisions.  We will be taking a
hard look at their anti-drug efforts, and the efforts of
all the major drug producing and transit countries again
next year.  The United States will cooperate with other
countries, but the cooperation must be reciprocated.(###)
Copies of the 1994 International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report may be purchased from the U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402.  For more
information, call GPO at (202) 783-3238.
Electronic distribution of the report is available
through GPO's Federal Bulletin Board.  The report can be
found in the Department of State Narcotics library under
Global Issues.  For  more information, call the Office of
Electronic Information Dissemination Services at  (202)
512-1524.  (###)
Article 2
Population and Sustainable Development:  Defining an
Timothy E. Wirth
Statement at the Third Preparatory Meeting of the UN
International Conference on Population and Development,
New York City, April 5, 1994
Mr. Chairman, Madame Secretary General, and distinguished
delegates, my government is honored to be working with
you as we begin the final preparatory meeting prior to
the International Conference on Population and
Development.  We are fortunate to once again have the
skilled chairmanship of Dr. Fred Sai, to have benefited
from the tireless work of the Secretary General, and to
be supported by the able conference secretariat.
Two weeks ago, I had the privilege of visiting Cairo,
where I was warmly received by President Mubarak; the
Honorable Interior Minister Al-Alafi; and the Honorable
Professor Maher Mahran, Minister of Population and Family
Welfare and our chief host for the ICPD.  I also met with
the national Egyptian NGO steering committee chair, Aziza
Hussein.  We are greatly indebted to the Government of
Egypt for the extensive preparations they are making to
ensure the success of this historic conference.
The Foundation for a Program of Action
During the past year, the foundation has been laid for
the most successful effort ever to link population and
development as shared priorities and common cause for
nations the world over.  Almost one year ago, meeting
here at the second Prepcom, a successful partnership was
initiated--between North and South, between nations and
this international institution, between governments and
citizens.  It is a partnership increasingly reflected in
the extraordinary new common ground shared by many women,
environmentalists, demographers, health professionals,
and development experts alike.
This partnership is also reflected in the draft Program
of Action developed by the secretariat, which
comprehensively defines an agenda for our future
recognizing that:
--  A humane and effective population strategy must be
comprehensive and integrated with other development
imperatives for education, especially for girls;
increased economic opportunities for women; and the
elimination of legal and social barriers to gender
--  Population growth and consumption patterns play major
roles in the constellation of factors which cause
environmental degradation;
--  Development and family planning can work
independently to slow population growth, but they work
best when pursued together;
--  There is wide agreement--echoed in the 1993 World
Development Report--that family planning programs should
be a core element of global efforts to provide
comprehensive reproductive and primary health care
These broad themes underlie our common efforts to
mobilize the world and implement the Program of Action on
an international scale.  Our job over the next three
weeks is to sharpen the program's focus and help make it
a clarion call to citizens everywhere.
The United States believes that the ICPD can help launch
a renewed and revitalized process of development--
development that is in the long-term interests of all
nations.  Successfully realized, this concept of
sustainable development will promote broad-based economic
growth and protect the environment; it will enhance human
capability and uphold democratic values; it will improve
the quality of life for current generations and increase
that opportunity for future generations.
Agenda Priorities
What might we then realistically define as a central
agenda for the Cairo Conference and for sustained,
priority action in the remainder of this century and on
into the 21st?  Let me offer a few suggestions.  These
priorities do not fully define our agenda for sustainable
development.  But if Cairo could launch action on these
challenges, we could make significant progress toward
stabilizing the world's population, improving the quality
of life for millions of individuals, and realizing the
promise of sustainable development.
First, a determined, cooperative effort must be launched
to make good-quality, voluntary family planning and the
full range of reproductive health services universally
available early in the next century.  Broadening--through
research--the contraceptive methods from which
individuals can choose, expanding the reproductive health
services offered, and improving the distribution and the
professionalism with which services are delivered will
greatly enhance people's lives and augment our chances of
realizing voluntary family-planning goals.  Coercion must
be absent from all such programs.  And, as President
Clinton has said to our nation, "Abortion should be safe,
legal, and rare."  Every effort should be made to prevent
unwanted pregnancies, but--in the interest of public
health and as a matter of principle--women should have
access to safe abortion services and to humane services
for complications due to unsafe abortions.
Simply investing in the wisdom of women is a second
priority.  The failure to educate females is tragic not
just for human intellectual development but also because
it contributes to the low status of women, infant and
maternal mortality, and poverty.  We must strive to close
the enormous gap in educational opportunity that exists--
for gender reasons alone--so that girls are able to fully
realize their intellectual, economic, and political
potential as well as their basic rights.  As recent
reports have indicated and common sense tells us, gender
equity in education promises to yield enormous dividends
for our population and development objectives.
Third, all countries should, over the next several years,
assess the extent of the national unmet need for
antenatal care, childbirth care, immunization, and the
monitoring of growth and development, paying particular
attention to the most vulnerable and under-served groups
in the population.  Further, it must be the goal of
public and private child survival programs to remove all
program-related barriers in the next decade to increase
the ability of women and families to access these
Fourth, we can reinforce health, education, and economic
objectives by paying special attention to the needs of
young women and men.  In addition to emphasizing to
adolescents the importance of interpersonal relationships
and the responsibilities of sexuality, we need to have
girls recognized for their full social and economic
potential.  We know that this strategy is not only the
right thing to do for individual well-being and justice
but that it also will help delay pregnancy and slow
population momentum.  We can hardly imagine the potential
that would be unleashed if young women had--and believed
in the possibility of--roles in addition to marriage and
Fifth, as women are empowered, so must we empower--some
would say enlighten--men to act on their responsibilities
related to fertility and sexual and reproductive health--
and rights.  As ever, men exercise more than their fair
share of power in decision making related to family
planning and reproductive choice.  Men the world over
need to accept and fulfill their responsibilities for
promoting the rights of women, for pre- and post-natal
care, for child rearing, and for prevention of sexually
transmitted diseases.
Sixth, we must encourage responsible, mutually respectful
sexual behavior among both men and women and teach the
importance of such behavior to both boys and girls.  No
one has the right to be irresponsible, particularly when
the lives and well-being of people--especially our
children--are at stake.
Seventh, any discussion of responsibility must also
include emphasis on the family--the basic unit of
societies the world over and challenged globally as never
before.  Strengthening the family and intergenerational
bonds and engaging citizens in their communities are
ideas with greater currency today than ever before and
are ideas of highest value to my government and its 260
million constituents.
Eighth, we need to take the opportunity of the Cairo
Conference to discuss today's unprecedented migrations of
human populations around the world.  Two aspects of this
problem are particularly relevant to the ICPD:  the link
between environmental degradation and migration and the
potential effect of development programs on population
Finally, together we are nurturing North-South
partnerships, recognizing the mutually reinforcing roles
and responsibilities of all countries for sustainable
development.  In the North, a commitment is necessary to
help provide the financial wherewithal to realize an
integrated global population strategy and to take on the
difficult issues of wasteful resource consumption and the
disproportionate impact the developed world has on the
earth's environment.  In the South, a corresponding
commitment is needed to make family planning, health
care, and women's empowerment among the highest national
Everywhere we must have and we must generate the
political will at the highest levels of government to
live up to these responsibilities.  These are daunting
challenges, but there are sound reasons for optimism.
For all the suffering still in the world, in the last 50
years we have made more progress in alleviating human
misery than in the previous two millennia.  If we could
do that while burdened with the political and economic
costs of the Cold War and other regional conflicts, how
much greater should be the goals we set for ourselves in
Last fall, in his speech to the UN General Assembly,
President Clinton outlined the high priority that the
Clinton-Gore Administration gives to the various elements
of sustainable development.  Under his leadership, the
United States has begun the process of shifting its
priorities to reflect the changing nature of national
security and long-term international cooperation.  Much
has been accomplished in this first year, and we look
forward to working with all parties to create a vigorous
agenda for Cairo and the decade ahead.
Together we are working on the most important
contribution which we can make to future generations--no
other group in the world today has a greater opportunity
to serve posterity.  Let us hope that history will have
reason to judge us well. (###)
Article 3
Reforming Export Controls
Lynn E. Davis, White House Statement, Fact Sheet
Lynn E. Davis
Opening statement by Under Secretary for International
Affairs Lynn E. Davis at a State Department press
briefing, Washington, DC, April 7, 1994.
I will just briefly give you a sense of   what happened
last week in The Hague and what our hopes are for
constraining dangerous arms and dual-use technologies
over the coming years to meet the new security threats
and dangers.  As most of you know and reported last week,
COCOM ended on the 31st of March.  We ended an East-West
regime focused on preventing the sale of arms and
dangerous dual-use technologies to communist countries.
It was a regime born in the Cold War and it has ended
with the end of the Cold War [see White House statement
and Fact Sheet].
But at the same time, the COCOM partners recognize that
there are still threats to the peace in the post-Cold War
world.  We've set about working to establish a new
multilateral regime designed to respond to these new
security threats--to the possibility that there are
dangers to peace and stability in new regions of the
world, particularly the Middle East and South Asia, and
also threats posed by rogue countries such as Iran, Iraq,
Libya, and North Korea.  So the two major goals of the
new regime will be to work together to deny trade in
dangerous arms and sensitive technologies to those
regions and to those states.  We put together last week
in The Hague a framework and set as a target goal for the
establishment of that regime October 1994.
What we're doing is, for the first time, seeking to put
in place among the major Western suppliers of arms a
multilateral approach to information-sharing and to
restraint.  This will build on the discussions that
followed on from the Gulf war among the five permanent
members of the Security Council.  We will build on those
discussions, but we will expand the regime to include not
only armaments  but also trade in dual-use technologies.
But to succeed, we'll need to bring in, as an equal
partner, Russia.  We're working with the Russians to make
them a founding partner.  They've already participated in
a working group that was held on armaments earlier this
year in London.  The one major obstacle so far to
Russia's participation in this regime is whether or not
they're prepared to accept all the policies of the new
regime.  A particular concern of ours is their continuing
sales of arms to Iran.
For the interim--between the time that COCOM disappeared
and the time that we actually establish this new regime--
the COCOM partners have taken some steps that are very
important to our goals of restraining trade in dangerous
arms and of focusing our policies toward the new security
threats.  We agreed last week in The Hague to continue
controls or licensing on the most sensitive items in
arms, as these have been listed in the COCOM list of the
past.  We will continue controls on these most sensitive
items by all the former COCOM partners, but we will now
apply these controls on a global basis.  No longer will
they be applied in an East-West context.  The controls
will be applied globally.  We've agreed to exercise
extreme vigilance on a global basis for all trade in the
most sensitive of these items.  We will be continuing to
control these most sensitive items not only to the
formerly proscribed countries of Russia and China but
also now around the world to include countries such as
Through our bilateral discussions and understandings in
this multilateral framework, we can say and have
confidence that our respective controls will further
restrict the trade that would contribute to military
instability, to the support of terrorist activities, and
so forth.  The end of COCOM is not the end of controls,
but it is the end of a focus primarily in the East-West
context.  Now we're looking to a global focus so that we
can assure that trade in these most sensitive items is
appropriately controlled.  At the same time that we took
the steps last week in The Hague--as you have also
reported--we agreed to some further liberalization with
respect to some of these items, particularly in the areas
of computers and telecommunications.
So that's briefly our report.  It's not a statement that
we've put the new regime in place, but I think we've made
considerable progress, and I didn't want the opportunity
to pass to say that we're working to get there.  We're
not quite there, but we're aiming for October.  It will
be a multilateral approach, and we're taking the time
necessary to bring everybody together to put in force a
very serious regime.
Export Control Reform
Statement by White House Press Secretary Dee Dee Myers,
Washington, DC, March 30, 1994.
Today the President announced another step in U.S.
efforts to reform the export control system.  From the
outset, this Administration has been committed to
combating the proliferation of dangerous weapons and
sensitive technologies, while at the same time ensuring
that American workers and firms remain the most
competitive in the world.  Our policies seek to balance
these goals.  As global technology advances, export
controls must be updated in order to remain focused on
those items that still make a difference to programs of
proliferation concern.  To promote U.S. economic growth,
democratization abroad, and international stability, we
actively seek expanded trade and technology exchange with
nations--including former adversaries--that abide by
global non-proliferation norms.
As of April 1, 1994, we will liberalize licensing
requirements on the export of nearly all civilian
telecommunications equipment and computers that operate
up to 1,000 MTOPS (million theoretical operations per
second) to civilian end-users in all current COCOM-
controlled countries except North Korea.
This action is consistent with our national security
requirements, because we are retaining individual
licensing requirements for high-end computers and for
transfers to military end-users.  We are not changing our
non-proliferation controls, which require a license for
any export that would contribute to a program of
proliferation concern.
Last year, the Commerce Department received approximately
25,000 export license applications; with these and other
changes announced by this Administration, it is expected
that the number will be cut by nearly half.  When this
Administration came into office, certain basic personal
computers, such as IBM PCs and Apple Macintoshes, were
still being controlled.  Last September, we took the
first step to liberalize licensing requirements for over
$30 billion in computer exports.
Today's decision is compatible with our national security
and non-proliferation objectives.  By liberalizing
licensing requirements on items that routinely are
granted licenses, we will concentrate our export control
efforts on denying technologies that still make a
difference to the development of dangerous arms.  Most of
the items currently controlled by the United States will
remain subject to licensing requirements, including dual-
use goods and technologies controlled due to their use in
chemical, biological, nuclear, advanced conventional
weapons, and missile delivery systems.
The members of COCOM have agreed to end the Cold War
regime, effective tomorrow.  The end of the Cold War and
the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw
Pact led us and our allies to the view that COCOM's
strategic rationale was no longer tenable.
In its stead, the COCOM members agreed to work together
toward a new, more broadly based arrangement designed to
enhance transparency and restraint in sales of
conventional weapons and transfers of sophisticated
technologies to countries whose behavior is cause for
serious concern and also to regions of potential
instability.  The new arrangement thus will have a
completely different purpose than COCOM.  It will seek to
put in place multilateral approaches to controls aimed at
the threats we face today.  We hope that Russia will
become a founding member of the new regime.  We are
working to achieve this.
Although the specific procedures of the new regime are
still being developed, COCOM member governments have
agreed to maintain the capability after April 1 to
control--on a national basis to any destination--items
previously contained in the COCOM lists (industrial,
military, and atomic energy ) while new control lists and
arrangements are being finalized.
As we look ahead, there is much work to be done with
other governments.  We must continue to work to establish
a regime to control sensitive exports to countries of
concern and to regions of potential instability.  Here at
home, we will work with the Congress to pass an Export
Administration Act that brings the export control system
in line with the new challenges we face to our national
security and economic competitiveness.
FACT SHEET:  Export Control Arrangements Pursuant to
Phasing Out COCOM and Creating a New Regime
The international security environment has changed in the
past few years.  As a result, the United States and its
COCOM partners are revamping approaches to export
controls to deal with the new challenges of the post-Cold
War era.  Members of COCOM-- the Coordinating Committee
on Multilateral Export Controls--have agreed to end the
Cold War regime effective March 31, 1994, and work
together to establish a new arrangement aimed at
enhancing transparency and restraint in arms sales and
transfers of sensitive technology.  COCOM members have
agreed to maintain the existing lists as the basis for
national export controls after March 31.  The Department
of Commerce will publish a Federal Register notice
outlining U.S. licensing procedures.
Changing Security Environment For Export Controls
In the past, the U.S. and its allies had a clear
understanding of the need for export controls--the Warsaw
Pact countries, as well as other communist countries,
posed a serious and clearly defined threat to the United
States and to the West generally.  With the establishment
of COCOM in 1949, the U.S. and its allies jointly
undertook to deny the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact
countries, China, and, eventually, Vietnam access to
weapons and dual-use items and technologies.  The COCOM
member countries are NATO countries (except Ireland),
Japan, and Australia.  COCOM operated on a rule of
unanimity so any member could veto a proposed export of
items agreed to be controlled.
The end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the Soviet
Union, deep cuts in the strategic arsenals of both sides,
and the goal of assisting economic and political reform
in Russia and the New Independent States led the U.S. and
its allies to the view that COCOM's strategic rationale
was no longer tenable.  Over the past year, the U.S. and
its COCOM partners have substantially liberalized
controls on exports to COCOM-proscribed countries.  Last
fall, the U.S. announced a series of licensing reforms,
liberalizing licensing requirements on billions of
dollars of goods.
Today the world confronts very different threats to
peace, and they exist in regions outside Europe--the
Korean Peninsula, the Persian Gulf, and in South Asia--
where no multilateral controls exist outside non-
proliferation regimes and UN embargoes.  These threats
are made more dangerous by the spread of weapons of mass
destruction and the behavior of such countries as Iran,
Iraq, Libya, and North Korea.  Therefore, the United
States and its COCOM partners agreed, in November 1993,
to work together toward a new, more broadly based
arrangement designed to enhance transparency and
restraint in sales of conventional weapons and transfers
of sophisticated technologies to countries whose behavior
is cause for serious concern and also to regions of
potential instability.
The new arrangement thus will have a completely different
purpose from COCOM.  It will seek to put in place
multilateral approaches to controls aimed at new threats.
Although the specific procedures of the new regime are
still being developed, COCOM member governments agree to
maintain the capability to control--on a national basis
to any destination-- items previously contained on the
COCOM lists (industrial, military, and atomic energy)
while new control lists and arrangements are being
New Licensing Arrangements
In keeping with these understandings, the U.S. Department
of Commerce will publish a Federal Register notice
outlining procedures for licensing during the
transitional period.  The procedures include provisions
for liberalized licensing procedures on the least
sophisticated items on the lists, primarily those covered
by Administrative Exception Notes in the regular COCOM
review process before January 1, 1994.   A new general
license, GLX, will be available for exports to civilian
users and civilian uses in country groups Q, W, and Y--
the former Soviet bloc--and China.  This new licensing
procedure will expedite exports to countries such as
Russia and China.
Nothing will change with respect to exports to North
Korea and to the military in Russia and China, nor with
respect to items controlled for non-proliferation reasons
or to prevent acquisition by terrorist states.  Strict
licensing policy will be continued for national security
reasons on very sensitive items such as chemical weapons
precursors, supercomputers, and sensitive electronic
equipment with significant military applications.(###)

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