US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 5, NUMBER 14, APRIL 4, 1994
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
 
 
 
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1.  Bosnia and Croatia:  The Challenge of Peace and
Reconstruction --
President Clinton, White House Fact Sheet
2.  Non-Proliferation:  A Strategic Priority -- Secretary
Christopher
3.  Explanation of U.S. Vote on UN Resolution Regarding
the Hebron Massacre -- Secretary Christopher, Madeleine
K. Albright
4.  Supporting Democracy and Prosperity Through the OAS -
- Secretary Christopher
5.  U.S. Expresses Sympathy on Colosio Assassination --
President Clinton
6.  U.S. Policy Toward Russia:  Securing the Gains of
Freedom -- Deputy Secretary Talbott
7.  America and the League of Nations:  Lessons for Today
-- Madeleine K. Albright
8.  Update on the Crisis in Algeria -- Mark R. Parris
9.  Principal Elements of U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf
-- Toni G. Verstandig
10. North Korea and the Russian Proposal for
International Conference
 
 
 
ARTICLE 1:
 
Bosnia and Croatia:  The Challenge of Peace and
Reconstruction
President Clinton, White House Fact Sheet
 
President Clinton
Opening statement at signing of federation agreement,
Washington, DC, March 18, 1994.
 
We have come to bear witness to a moment of hope.  For 33
months, the flames of war have raged through the nations
of the former Yugoslavia.  By signing these agreements
today, Bosnian and Croatian leaders have acted to turn
back those flames and to begin the difficult process of
reconciliation.
 
Around the globe, the tension between ethnic identity and
statehood presents one of the great problems of our time.
But nowhere have the consequences been more tragic than
in the former Yugoslavia.  There nationalists and
religious factions, aggravated by Serbian aggression,
have erupted in a fury of ethnic cleansing and brutal
atrocities.
 
The agreements signed today offer one of the first clear
signals that parties to this conflict are willing to end
the violence and to begin a process of reconstruction.
The accords call for a federation between the Muslims and
Croats of Bosnia.  This Muslim-Croat entity has agreed on
the principles of a confederation with Croatia.
Together, these steps can help support the ideal of a
multiethnic Bosnia and provide a basis for Muslims and
Croats to live again in peace as neighbors and
compatriots.
 
The agreements are as important for Croatia's future as
they are for Bosnia's.  And it is the hope of all present
today that the Serbs will join in this process toward
peace as well.
 
These agreements are a testament to the perseverance and
to the resolve of many people:  the Croatian and Bosnian
diplomats who kept probing for openings toward peace; the
UN soldiers from many nations represented here today who
have worked to bring both stability and humanitarian
supplies; and the NATO pilots who have helped put air
power at the service of diplomacy.
 
I want to praise the leadership and courage of those who
have come to Washington to sign these agreements,
especially President Izetbegovic and President Tudjman.
I also want to recognize the tireless efforts of Thorvald
Stoltenberg and David Owen--and, of course, our own Cy
Vance, who is not here today--and especially, to express
my personal appreciation to the skilled diplomacy of
Ambassador Charles Redman.  Thank you, sir, for your
work.
 
All of these people have done much to bring us to this
point of agreement.  Through Ambassador Redman's efforts
and in many other ways, our Administration has worked
with our NATO allies, the European Union, Russia, the UN,
and others to help end this conflict.  The fact that we
have done this work together has made a significant
difference.  And to the Deputy Foreign Minister of
Russia, I say a special thank you, sir, for your renewed
energy in this area and our common hopes.
 
We have engaged in this work because the United States
has clear interests at stake:  an interest in helping to
prevent the spread of a wider war in Europe; an interest
in showing that NATO remains a credible force for peace;
an interest in helping to stem the terrible,
destabilizing flows of refugees this struggle is
generating; and, perhaps most clearly, a humanitarian
interest we all share in stopping the continuing
slaughter of innocents in Bosnia.
 
The documents signed here are only first steps, but they
are clearly steps in the right direction.  If they lead
to an overall negotiated settlement, if a lasting peace
takes hold in this war-torn land, the ceremony will be
remembered as an important event.  Whether that comes to
pass will depend less on our words today than on the
actions of Muslims, Croats, and Serbs on the ground
tomorrow and in the days to come.
 
For while documents like these can define the parameters
of peace, the people of the region themselves must create
that peace.  Economic, political, and security
arrangements for the new federation must be given a
chance to work.  The cease-fire between Croats and
Bosnian Government forces must hold.  Croats and Muslims,
who have fought with such intensity, must now apply that
same intensity to restoring habits of tolerance and co-
existence.
 
The issue of the Petrinja region of Croatia must be
resolved.  Serbia and the Serbs of Bosnia cannot sidestep
their own responsibility to achieve an enduring peace.
 
The new progress toward peace  will likely come under
attack by demagogues, by rogue riflemen, and by all those
who believe they can profit most from continued violence,
aggression, and human suffering.  Such attacks must be
met with the same steadiness and leadership that have
produced these agreements today.
 
Neither the United States nor the international community
can guarantee the success of this initiative.  But the
U.S. has stood by the parties as they have taken risks
for peace, and we will continue to do so.  I have told
Presidents Izetbegovic and Tudjman that the U.S. is
prepared to contribute to the economic reconstruction
that will bolster these agreements.  And as I have said
before, if an acceptable, enforceable settlement can be
reached, the U.S. is prepared, through NATO, to help
implement it.
 
All across Bosnia and Croatia, communities and entire
groups of people were once connected by ancient bridges--
like the great stone arch in Mostar, which for centuries
stood as the city's proud symbol.  Today, too many of
those bridges have been reduced to rubble or closed by
force.  The challenge for parties to this conflict is to
rebuild the bonds that those bridges represent.  The
announcement that Sarajevo's bridge of brotherhood and
unity soon will reopen is a hopeful sign that the parties
can begin to span the divide of hatred and violence.
 
The work ahead is, indeed, daunting, but all of us in the
international community are committed to help.  Together,
let us strive for peace.
 
 
 
White House Fact Sheet The following fact sheet was
released by the White House, Office of the Press
Secretary, Washington, DC, March 18, 1994.
 
Three documents were signed today at the White House.
President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, Bosnian Prime
Minister Haris Silajdzic, and Bosnian Croat
representative Kresimir Zubak signed a document endorsing
a constitution for a new bicommunal federation in Bosnia,
and a preliminary agreement on establishing a
confederation between the new federation and Croatia.
 
Prime Minister Silajdzic and Mr. Zubak signed the
constitution itself, undertaking to submit it for
approval to a constituent assembly that will be
established in accordance with the constitution.
Presidents Izetbegovic and Tudjman initialed the
preliminary agreement on confederation.  This signing
ceremony marks an important step in the search for an
overall settlement to the conflict in Bosnia.
 
The 49-page constitution was drafted during nine days of
intensive negotiations in Vienna ending on March 13.
U.S. Special Envoy for Yugoslavia, Ambassador Charles
Redman, mediated the negotiations.
 
Agreement to draft the constitution had been reached as
part of the Framework Agreement establishing the new
federation that was concluded in Washington on March 1.
The constitution represents a considerable achievement by
the Bosnian and Croat communities in Bosnia.  They have
gone to great lengths to meet each others' concerns
regarding the protection of human and political rights
and the security of minority communities.
 
As in the Framework Agreement, the constitution provides
for the appointment of a human rights ombudsperson by the
CSCE during the first three years of the new federation's
existence.  There also is a provision for the
International Court of Justice to appoint foreign judges
to fill one-third of the seats on the Constitutional
Court during the first five years of the federation.
 
The constitution strikes a careful balance between the
rights of the federal government and the regional
cantons, and contains safeguards guaranteeing significant
representation for both communities in executive,
legislative, and judicial bodies at each level of
government.
 
The preliminary agreement on confederation between the
new federation and Croatia establishes a series of
progressive steps in the economic cooperation of the
federation and Croatia, with the aim of eventually
establishing a confederation.
 
The next step will be to work with the Bosnian Serbs to
develop an overall political settlement in Bosnia.  (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 2:
 
Non-Proliferation:  A Strategic Priority
Secretary Christopher
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, DC, March 22, 1994
 
Mr. Chairman:  I am here today to express strong support
for the Chemical Weapons Convention and to seek the
Senate's expeditious advice and consent to its
ratification.  As you know, non-proliferation is a
strategic priority of our foreign policy and the most
urgent arms control issue of the 1990s.
 
Effort To Halt North Korea's Nuclear ProgramBefore I
discuss the Chemical Weapons Convention, let me say a few
words about a non-proliferation issue that has certainly
been on all of our minds these last few weeks:  the
international effort to halt North Korea's nuclear
program.
 
Over the last year, since North Korea announced its
intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), we have pursued a steady, deliberate
policy.  Our objective has been to bring North Korea back
into full compliance with its NPT obligations and to
restart talks with the Republic of Korea aimed at a
denuclearized Korean Peninsula. As you know, our
diplomatic efforts have reached an impasse.  The North
Koreans did not permit the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) to conduct essential activities during its
recent inspection.  As a result, the agency is unable to
certify that the North is not diverting or producing
nuclear material for non-peaceful purposes.  Yesterday,
the agency's Board of Governors passed a resolution
referring this matter to the UN Security Council.  The
North also has broken off negotiations with the South on
exchanging envoys to discuss the nuclear issue.
 
We will now turn to the Security Council, where
deliberations have already begun.  We expect that the
Council will soon consider a resolution calling on the
North to complete the inspections.  If there is no change
in the North's attitude, sanctions will be an option.
The United States will seek the broadest possible
international support to persuade North Korea to comply
with its international non-proliferation obligations.
 
Our diplomacy has reached a critical point.  We have made
it clear to North Korea that it must become a responsible
member of the international community or that community
will have no choice but to pursue progressively stronger
measures.
 
Our commitment to South Korea's security remains firm.
We are prepared to take all steps necessary to ensure
that the North does not misread our determination to
deter aggression.  The United States and South Korea
offered to suspend the Team Spirit '94 military exercise
on the premise that North Korea would fully implement the
IAEA inspection and exchange envoys with the South to
discuss the nuclear issue.  Because these steps have not
taken place, we are consulting with South Korea on
rescheduling Team Spirit '94.
 
The United States and South Korea have agreed to deploy
Patriot missiles to South Korea immediately.  The
deployment is a prudent and defensive response to the
threat posed by North Korea's ballistic missiles.
 
Mr. Chairman, this is a difficult situation.  It remains
a critical issue in our foreign policy, and we will
continue on a steady and resolute path to resolve it.
 
The Need To Ratify the Chemical Weapons ConventionLet me
now turn to our discussion of the Chemical Weapons
Convention.  Ratification of the Convention is a top
legislative priority for this Administration.  President
Clinton has described the Convention as one of the most
ambitious treaties in the history of arms control--one
that bans an entire class of weapons of mass destruction.
It will significantly enhance our national security and
contribute greatly to global security.
 
In his speech to the UN General Assembly last September,
the President called on all countries to ratify the
Convention quickly so it can enter into force at the
earliest possible time--January 13, 1995.  To meet this
goal, the United States and others must complete their
ratification procedures in time to deposit their
instruments with the UN Secretary General by July 17.
 
This hearing marks a historic and critical step toward
bringing the Chemical Weapons Convention into force.  For
more than 25 years, during Republican and Democratic
Administrations, the United States has participated in
international negotiations on the Chemical Weapons
Convention.  The Convention would help fulfill a U.S.
objective of even longer standing--the global elimination
of chemical weapons.
 
Much has been done in the last two years to achieve this
goal.  The Bush Administration helped conclude
negotiations in Geneva; the UN endorsed the Convention;
the Convention was opened for signature in Paris; the
Convention was signed by Secretary Eagleburger on behalf
of the United States and, to date, by more than 150 other
countries; and President Clinton submitted the Convention
to the Senate on November 23, 1993.
 
Other nations are awaiting U.S. action.  They are looking
to us to exert the leadership that is necessary to bring
this treaty into force.  Every move we make on the
Convention sends an important message around the world.
For that reason, Senate action is now vital.
 
The Chemical Weapons Convention is both a disarmament and
a non-proliferation treaty.
 
--  It addresses the demand for and the supply of
chemical weapons.
--  It requires parties to destroy their chemical weapons
and production facilities and to open their chemical
industries to international inspection.
--  It prohibits them from transferring chemical weapons
to others or assisting any other nation in any activity
prohibited under the Convention.  States that are party
to the Convention also must ban trade in specified
chemicals with countries that decline to join the
Convention.
--  Finally, in the event chemical weapons are used or
threatened to be used against parties, the Convention
contains procedures for assistance to those endangered or
threatened.
 
The Convention promises to eliminate a scourge that has
hung over the world for almost 80 years.  Unfortunately,
the threat chemical weapons pose to innocent civilians is
not merely theoretical.  Chemical weapons have been used
in the First World War, in local conflicts ranging from
Ethiopia in 1935 to the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, and
by Iraq against its citizens.
 
The United States originally pursued the Convention
during the Cold War to eliminate massive Soviet
stockpiles.  Now, with the support of Congress, we are
helping Russia destroy its chemical weapons.  The United
States already is legally required to eliminate the
majority of our stockpile, irrespective of the
Convention, and we are doing so.  U.S. ratification will
encourage Russia to ratify as well, and to destroy the
huge stocks it inherited from the former U.S.S.R.
 
The Convention is even more important in addressing the
threat posed by chemical weapons in regions such as the
Middle East and South Asia.  The Convention can play a
vital role in stabilizing the post-Cold War world--a
world in which dangerous low-intensity conflicts can be
made even more lethal by chemical weapons.  The
Convention's destruction and verification provisions can
build confidence among potential rivals that they need
not fear a chemical arms race.
 
The Convention's export-control requirements and its
prohibitions on assistance to chemical weapons programs
in other countries will support our global strategy of
curbing the spread of weapons of mass destruction.  They
also will complement the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
and the Biological Weapons Convention.
 
Most important, the Convention will help protect our
allies and friends from chemical attack, as well as our
troops deployed abroad.  American leadership is essential
to persuade other countries to ratify the Convention.  We
cannot lead if we have not ratified the Convention.  I
urge the Senate to heed the President's call and to
provide your expeditious advice and consent to
ratification.  With your help, we can continue long-
standing, bipartisan efforts to achieve a global ban on
these terrible weapons.  (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 3:
 
Explanation of U.S. Vote on UN Resolution Regarding The
Hebron Massacre
Secretary Christopher, Madeleine K. Albright
 
Secretary Christopher Statement released by the Office of
the Spokesman, Washington, DC, March 18, 1994.
 
As you know, the UN Security Council is just about to
conclude action on a resolution dealing with the tragic
events in Hebron on February 25.  You've just heard
Ambassador Albright address our position in her
explanation of our vote.  I'd like to take this
opportunity to put those views in context and to explain
how our actions are related to our efforts to get the
peace process back on track.
 
Several factors led us to concur in the adoption of this
resolution but to abstain on two paragraphs in the
preamble that contained language we  could not support.
 
First, it was important that there be a resolution by the
Council condemning the horrible and tragic massacre of
the Palestinian worshipers at the mosque in Hebron.  We
needed to send a strong signal to the extremists from any
quarter whose objective is to kill the peace process and
the hope that it can bring.  We cannot allow those who
oppose peace to prevail.
 
At the same time, it is important that the action taken
by the Security Council not prejudice or prejudge the
negotiations we want to promote.  The United States
cannot support two paragraphs in the preamble to the
resolution, because they inject sensitive issues in a way
that could prejudice how those issues may be resolved in
the final status negotiations.  These issues must be
resolved by the parties in those negotiations, not by
outsiders in advance of the negotiations themselves.
 
We needed to make a clear statement that whatever past
practice may have been, it is essential to avoid language
of this sort in the future.  It was also essential that
this resolution be part of the process that would lead to
the resumption of negotiations.
 
We have been involved in intensive efforts with the
parties to address the issues of Palestinian security in
the aftermath of the Hebron massacre and to try to set
the stage for resumption of the negotiations.  These
negotiations must quickly resolve the outstanding issues
that stand in the way of implementation of the Gaza-
Jericho accords.  Based upon intensive contacts in the
recent days, there are several developments that I want
to report to you that move us toward those objectives.
 
First, there have been intensive Israeli-Palestinian
contacts at the highest levels today, including a
telephone call between Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman
Arafat.
 
Second, a senior-level meeting between Israel and the PLO
will take place soon and will be announced by the
parties.
 
Finally, after intensive consultations between President
Clinton, President Asad, King Hussein, and between myself
and Prime Minister Hariri, the Arab states have agreed to
resume their bilateral negotiations with Israel in April.
We are consulting with our Russian co-sponsor about
precise dates.  In addition, Dennis Ross and our team
will be traveling to the region in the next few days for
additional consultations with the parties.
 
We believe that these intensive contacts and discussions
will move us toward putting the whole peace process back
on track.  Indeed, it is the expectation that these
discussions will lead to early resumption of negotiations
to implement the Declaration of Principles.
 
The United States is prepared to assist the parties in
these efforts, because it is convinced that only through
implementation can realities on the ground be changed.
Only in that way can Palestinian and Israel's security be
guaranteed, and only in that way can progress be made
toward the lasting peace that we all seek.
 
Madeleine K. Albright Statement by the U.S. Permanent
Representative to the United Nations before the UN
Security Council, New York City, March 18, 1994.
 
Council members are conscious of the difficult situation
that the Middle East now faces.  Leaders of courage on
both sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict have taken the
decision to end the decades of bloodshed and make peace.
A historic step was taken last September 13, when Israel
and the PLO signed the Declaration of Principles and
Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat shook hands.
The international community and the United Nations
expressed their overwhelming support for this
extraordinary act of reconciliation.
 
Since then, as negotiators have acted in good faith to
try to reach agreement on implementation of the
Declaration of Principles, extremists on both sides have
resorted to violence and terrorism to kill the peace.
Thirty-three Israelis have been killed--innocent victims
of Palestinian extremists.  And on February 25, in the
holy month of Ramadan, in the city of Hebron, more than
30 innocent Palestinians were gunned down by an Israeli
extremist settler as they bowed in prayer in the Mosque
of Ibrahim.
 
The world community reacted with revulsion.  The Prime
Minister of Israel spoke for his nation when he condemned
the action, expressed his shame, and took swift action to
investigate the crime and prevent its recurrence.  At the
time, President Clinton expressed the outrage of the
American people at this horrific act of murder, and we
join other members of the Council today in condemning the
massacre in the strongest possible terms.
 
My government is determined not to allow extremists and
terrorists to undermine or disrupt the peace process.
They are bent on dragging Israelis and Palestinians back
into the darkness of unending conflict and bloodshed.  We
have a collective responsibility to the people of the
Middle East and to the international community to prevent
them from extinguishing the hope of a normal, peaceful
life.
 
There is only one answer to Hebron.  It lies in the call
that the Council has issued today to Israel and the PLO
to redouble their efforts to bring their negotiations to
a prompt conclusion and begin the implementation of their
agreement as rapidly as possible.  The United States,
together with its Russian co-sponsor, stands ready to do
all it can to facilitate this objective.
 
It is precisely to serve and protect the peace process
that my government has--with great reluctance--made the
difficult decision to allow this resolution to pass
today, despite the existence of some language we find
objectionable.  For today in Washington my government has
announced several steps that will serve to restart the
stalled Middle East peace process.
 
First, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon have agreed to resume
bilateral negotiations with Israel in April.
 
Second, and of particular importance to the resolution we
are discussing today, Israel and the PLO have had
intensive discussions at the highest levels.  They have
finally agreed to convene a senior-level meeting, the
timing of which will be announced in the days ahead.
 
The United States supports the operative paragraphs of
the resolution that the Council has just adopted.
However, we sought a paragraph-by-paragraph vote on this
resolution because we wanted to record our objections to
language introduced there.  Had this language appeared in
the operative paragraphs of the resolution, let me be
clear:  We would have exercised our veto.  In fact, we
are today voting against a resolution in the Commission
on the Status of Women precisely because it implies that
Jerusalem is "occupied Palestinian territory."
 
We simply do not support the description of the
territories occupied by Israel in the 1967 war as
"occupied Palestinian territory."  In the view of my
government, this language could be taken to indicate
sovereignty, a matter which both Israel and the PLO have
agreed must be decided in negotiations on the final
status of the territories.  As agreed between them, those
negotiations will begin not later than two years after
the implementation of the Declaration of Principles.
 
Similarly, while my government reaffirms our view that
the Fourth Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, applies
to territories occupied by Israel since 1967, we oppose
the specific reference to Jerusalem in this resolution
and will continue to oppose its insertion in future
resolutions.  As I have noted already, had this language
been in the operative paragraphs, we would have vetoed
the resolution.
 
The U.S. Government chose instead to disavow this
language and express its opposition by abstaining on the
second and sixth preambular paragraphs.  We abstained on
these paragraphs today, because we want there to be no
doubt about our condemnation of the massacre and because
of our overriding concern to protect and promote the
peace process and our desire to see negotiations resume
very soon.
 
Jerusalem is one of the most sensitive issues to be
addressed in the negotiations.  As President Clinton
stated on March 16:
 
     In terms of the resolution of Jerusalem, the
position of the United States has not changed.  But that
is a matter for the parties to decide.  And in accord
with the declaration, it is something to be ultimately
decided at a later point.  That's what we think should be
done.
 
Under the Declaration of Principles, it is an issue which
Israel and the PLO have agreed will be dealt with in the
final status negotiations.  My government does not
believe that it is helpful to the negotiations to include
the kind of reference that is made to Jerusalem in this
resolution.  It could prejudice or prejudge the outcome
of the negotiations.  The Security Council should respect
the parties' agreement in this regard.
 
The United States asked for these unusual procedures this
afternoon in order to make it clear--for all to see--that
we cannot and will not support any efforts by the
Security Council to prejudice the outcome of the Middle
East peace process.  In this case, it is up to Israel and
the Palestinians--not the United Nations--to make the
hard decisions necessary for the promise of peace at the
negotiating table to become the reality of peace on the
ground.
 
The resolution also refers to measures to be taken to
guarantee the safety and protection of Palestinian
civilians, possibly to include a temporary international
or foreign presence.  The latter reference is to the
provisions of the Declaration of Principles, which
provide for the possibility of such a presence if agreed
upon by the parties.  If my government can do something
helpful in this area, we will seek to support the mutual
wishes of the parties.
 
The resolution signals the will of the international
community for peace in the Middle East.  The objective of
the United States and the Russian Federation, as co-
sponsors, is to accelerate the negotiations and to try to
bring them to a successful conclusion in the shortest
possible time.
 
In conclusion, my government is optimistic that the steps
announced today in Washington to put the peace process
back on track will lead to concrete achievements in
negotiations between the parties.  Without the confidence
that the peace process will shortly resume, positive
action on this resolution would not have been possible
today.
 
I know that my colleagues share my hopes that some day
soon the promise we all felt watching the momentous
handshake last September can be realized.  (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 4:
 
Supporting Democracy and Prosperity Through the OAS
Secretary Christopher
Remarks at an OAS luncheon, Washington, DC, March 26,
1994
 
Foreign ministers, heads of delegation, Mr. Secretary
General, Mr. Assistant Secretary General:  I appreciate
your joining me in our continuing dialogue within this
hemisphere.  I would like to recognize our Commerce
Secretary, Ron Brown.  I also want to recognize my Deputy
Secretary, Strobe Talbott, who will lead the U.S.
delegation at the OAS meeting tomorrow.  Let me also note
the presence of Sol Linowitz, former U.S. Representative
to the OAS, negotiator of the Panama Canal Treaties, and
one of the great figures in hemispheric relations.
 
As we come together today, the Americas share a deep
sorrow over the tragedy Wednesday in Mexico.  We extend
our sympathies to the people of that nation, and we
reaffirm as a hemisphere our collective commitment to
uphold democracy and oppose violence.  Luis Donaldo
Colosio represented hope for his country.  His death is a
great loss for his nation and for our hemisphere, but I
believe Mexico will find renewal in its people and in the
new generation of leaders so well represented by
President Salinas.
 
In that respect, I might note that we are gathered in a
room named for Thomas Jefferson, perhaps our nation's
greatest proponent of democracy and constitutionalism.
Once, looking back at the election of 1800, Jefferson
commented how that historic change in America's
leadership was "not affected by the sword, but by the
rational and peaceable instrument of reform, the suffrage
of the people."  Our democratic institutions and the
values our nations uphold have been tested by violence
many times since.  But I am confident they will pass this
tragic test, as they have passed others.
 
We all owe a great deal to Secretary General Baena Soares
for his leadership over the last 10 years.  The election
of a new OAS Secretary General is an ideal opportunity to
renew and reinforce our common efforts.  The agenda of
the next Secretary General will be full--promoting
democracy and human rights, expanding trade and
investment, strengthening hemispheric security,
combatting narcotics, and widening technical cooperation.
In each of these areas, the OAS has an important and
growing role to play.  In the Americas, as in other parts
of the world, regional challenges require effective and
creative  regional organizations.
 
When the nations of this hemisphere meet in the OAS, each
has one vote--no matter the size of that nation's
population, territory, or economy.  We respect each
other's sovereignty, and we recognize the rights and
needs of all our members.  The United States is working
through the OAS on the many important problems that elude
bilateral solutions.  The unanimous approval of the
Washington and Managua Protocols by the U.S. Senate
Foreign Relations Committee this week is a sign of our
commitment to the OAS.   These protocols, which we
anticipate the full Senate will approve for ratification
shortly, represent important progress in our collective
defense of democracy and in our commitment to balanced
development.
 
We must make progress on the two greatest challenges in
our hemisphere--strengthening democracies and sustaining
economic reform.  The election tomorrow will send a vital
signal throughout the hemisphere.  It will signal that we
are committed to strengthening multilateral diplomacy--to
deepening and expanding the cooperation among us.  It
will enable the OAS to build upon its recent successes
and to command maximum respect and resources for the
future.  We must ensure that the powerful movement to
democratic governments and open markets in this
hemisphere  becomes irreversible.  We must grasp the
historic opportunity to expand trade and investment and
promote sustainable development.
 
The United States, Mexico, and Canada took a decisive and
constructive step last year by ratifying NAFTA.  We
expect NAFTA to be a platform for greater prosperity
within North America and a bridge to greater economic
integration throughout the hemisphere.  We hope the
summit of the Americas in Miami this December will
produce initiatives that accelerate this momentum.  The
United States is also developing measures that address
concerns about the effect of NAFTA on trade and
investment in the Caribbean Basin countries.  This effort
was set in motion by President Clinton after he met with
Caribbean leaders last August and with Central American
leaders last November.
 
Our intention is to extend to the Caribbean Basin
obligations and benefits similar to those under NAFTA.
We hope to achieve greater liberalization in the textile
and apparel sector and greater protection for investment
and intellectual property rights.
 
We need to consult carefully and thoroughly with Congress
before going forward.  I can assure you that the nations
of the Americas have before them a period of great
promise and great hope.  Looking ahead to the summit of
the Americas, President Clinton has said that "we have a
unique opportunity to build a community of free nations,
diverse in culture and history, but bound together by a
commitment to responsive and free government, vibrant
civil societies, open economies, and rising living
standards."
 
The OAS has a chance to shape this brighter future.  I
look forward to working with each of you to ensure the
success of our collective effort to build a more open and
more prosperous  hemisphere.   Thank you very much.
(###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 5:
 
U.S. Expresses Sympathy on Colosio Assassination
Statement by President Clinton, released by the White
House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC,
March 24, 1994.
 
I am profoundly saddened to learn of the brutal
assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio, the presidential
candidate of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
in Mexico.  I deeply deplore this senseless act of
violence and have conveyed my deepest sympathies to the
Mexican people and to the family of Mr. Colosio, his wife
and two young children.
 
Mr. Colosio dedicated his life to public service and to
the betterment of his nation.  It is particularly tragic
when an assassin's bullet slays a man who still had so
much to contribute to history.  It is a great loss not
only for Mexico but for all of North America.
 
I telephoned President Carlos Salinas de Gotari shortly
after midnight last night to express my sorrow and that
of the American people and to offer my condolences to the
Colosio family.  I told President Salinas that the United
States stands ready to assist Mexico in the coming days
in any way it can.  (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 6:
 
U.S. Policy Toward Russia:  Securing the Gains of Freedom
Deputy Secretary Talbott
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, DC, March 23, 1994
 
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the chance to testify before
your committee on U.S. policy toward Russia.  There is no
more difficult and important issue confronting the
Department of State and the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.  This policy requires clarity of purpose and
steadiness of implementation.  To make sure that it meets
those standards, there must be frequent consultation and
a high degree of bipartisanship.  Only if we work
together can we ensure that our country will have a
broad-based strategy for dealing with a challenge that
will be with us well into the next century.
 
This committee had a chance to engage Secretary
Christopher in a discussion of policy toward Russia,
among other issues, on February 23.  As the Secretary's
Deputy, I will, of course, always be available to meet
with you on any subject.  Jim Collins will be a frequent
witness at this table in his capacity as the State
Department's senior officer working full-time on policy
toward the New Independent States of the former Soviet
Union.  Also joining me today is Tom Simons, the
coordinator of our assistance programs to the NIS.
 
Mr. Chairman, we would all agree, I think, that the
single, most positive event of our time has been the
rebirth of freedom where, for generations, communism held
sway.  A system that claimed to have harnessed the laws
of history and that oppressed hundreds of millions of
people came crashing down, because it was founded on an
economic system that did not work and an ideology based
on fear and force.  It failed because for four long
decades the Western democracies, led by the United
States, contained Soviet expansionism and deterred the
Soviet threat.
 
While the end of Soviet communism is indisputably good
news, it carries with it great challenges.  An old system
collapsed before a new one was ready to take its place.
The multiple transformations--from planned economies to
the market, from the rule by fear to the rule of law,
from a single empire to a continent of stable, sovereign
states--put huge strains on governments, societies, and
individuals.
 
All over the former Soviet Union, leaders face the same
dilemma:  how to reconcile democratic politics with the
demands of economic reform.  Reformers, who were once
dissidents in nations hungry for freedom, are now
politicians with constituents hungry for security.  They
must make compromises; they must build coalitions; they
must cope with entrenched interests; and they must deal
with reactionary or ultranationalist groups that exploit
popular discontent, disappointment, and fear of the
future.
 
That is the dynamic behind the   last several months of
developments   in Russia.  Largely as a result of the
parliamentary elections of last December 12, there is
widespread concern about what is happening in that
country, about the prospects for its political and
economic evolution, and about the role it is seeking to
play in its region and beyond.  In light of these
concerns, I particularly welcome the opportunity to
review with you the underlying premises and long-term
goals of our Administration's policy.
 
Despite the uncertainties and dangers inherent in the
Russian political situation, we should not lose sight of
the gains that the reform forces have made.  For the
first time in its history, Russia has a freely elected
president; a parliament chosen by free, equal, and
universal suffrage; and a constitution with the force of
law.  Increasingly, political combat is waged on the
floor of a parliament and on the hustings rather than on
the streets or in the form of underground dissent.
 
As for the economy, Russia continues to have difficulty
bringing its money supply and budget deficit under
control.  As President Clinton made clear to President
Yeltsin during their meeting in January, the ability of
the international community to support macroeconomic
stabilization depends on the Russian Government's ability
to impose monetary and fiscal discipline.  For the past
week, Mr. Camdessus, the Director of the International
Monetary Fund, has been in Moscow to negotiate with the
government the terms for the release of the second $1.5
billion installment of the Fund's stabilization program.
 
An ever-increasing amount of Russian economic life now
takes place beyond the purview of the finance ministry
and the central bank.  More than 40% of Russia's labor
force now works in the private sector.  Two-thirds of the
small shops are now in private hands.  Fifty million
Russians have become shareholders in privatized
companies.  Approximately 700 medium and large
enterprises are being privatized each month.  That is
over 2,000 since the December elections.
 
Support for privatization is one of the priorities of our
assistance programs in Russia and throughout the NIS.
Your committee, Mr. Chairman, is at work on a thoughtful
and constructive report on those programs, and I would
like to use this occasion to thank your staff members who
have put so much time and effort into this valuable
project.
 
It is important to be clear about where our assistance
goes and what it is designed to accomplish.  The purpose
of our assistance is to help the people of these nations
overcome the crushing legacy of decades of dictatorship
and central planning and to encourage trends that are in
our long-term national interest.
 
Our assistance is designed to reinforce reform by
promoting privatization and decentralization--the
prerequisites of a market economy.  It is also designed
to integrate into the community of free and prosperous
nations those countries that have emerged from decades of
communist rule.
 
Our assistance to promote economic reform targets
projects that lead to tangible improvements in the lives
of ordinary people.  In particular, we seek to encourage
entrepreneurship and private initiative--the lifeblood of
any free economy.
 
Our assistance supports the essential task of privatizing
state-owned enterprises.  We have provided technical
assistance to the central and local governments
throughout the region to remove regulatory and legal
obstacles to the divestiture of government assets and
private capital formation.  In Russia, 77 of that
nation's 89 regional governments receive U.S. support to
train small business owners and to put in place
regulations that stimulate investment.  In addition, we
are helping local and national governments develop
efficient tax and expenditure policies.
 
Our assistance supports enterprise funds in Russia, the
western NIS, and Central Asia.  Over the next few years,
these funds will provide $690 million in desperately
needed capital to the small businessmen and -women who
are building the region's economies from the ground up.
They are on the cutting edge of the changes we most want
to encourage.
 
Our assistance supports environmental clean-up, nuclear
safety, and energy efficiency throughout the region.  For
example, U.S. technology is helping districts in Russia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia to achieve savings of
up to 30% in the massive metropolitan heating systems
that are relics of Soviet inefficiency.
 
Our assistance also includes humanitarian aid.  Since
1992, the U.S. has committed nearly $1.5 billion in food
assistance to Russia.  We have also provided vital
medical supplies to hospitals and public health agencies.
 
We are also encouraging American companies to seek new
trade and investment opportunities in the region.  Later
this month, Secretary Brown  will head a mission to
Russia of more than 30 CEOs from American aerospace,
telecommunications, medical, and energy companies,
including Westinghouse, Dresser Industries, and AT&T.
And later this spring, Vice President Gore will host
another meeting of the joint commission he chairs with
Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin on economic and
technological cooperation.  Last December, the commission
negotiated a score of agreements to allow our companies
to expand cooperation on space, the environment, and
nuclear safety.
 
Mr. Chairman, American companies, including the nearly
200 represented in the new U.S. Chamber of Commerce in
Moscow, would not be  doing business in Russia if they
did not think that they were making a sound investment on
behalf of their stockholders.
 
That is the way we regard our overall policy of support
for reform in Russia and the NIS--an investment in the
future on behalf of the long-term interests of the
citizens of the United States.  The investment is not, by
any means, risk-free, nor is it likely to pay us back
fully in the near-term.  But it is worth the risk and
worth the patience, because the payback, when it comes,
will greatly enhance our own security and prosperity.
 
We are also investing in the programs intended to help
Russia, over time, transform its political culture.  We
are assisting the emergence of free media, the rule of
law, and the empowerment of civic institutions that
ensure broad-based participation in political life.  For
example, with our support, the American Bar Association
has helped to draft democratic constitutions for a number
of countries in the region.  Its advisers have also
helped Russia to introduce trial by jury for the first
time since 1917.
 
The Library of Congress is helping the new Russian
Parliament to establish modern research and information
systems.  The National Democratic Institute and the
International Republican Institute have supported the
development of political parties across Russia.  The
International Media Fund has helped to launch independent
newspapers and radio stations.  The dollars the American
taxpayer provides reinforce the vital building blocks of
democracy and of civil society in nations struggling to
consolidate reform.
 
In the end, I believe that the cost of our engagement
with Russia and the other New Independent States will be
small compared to the potential cost of doing too little,
of giving up too early, and thus risking the defeat of
the goals we worked so long to achieve.
 
As you can see from even this brief overview of our
efforts, Mr. Chairman, U.S. assistance is focused on
supporting the forces of constructive change across the
breadth of the former Soviet Union.  Geographically, in
FY 1995, we propose that roughly half of our assistance
to the NIS will go to nations other than Russia.  In all
the NIS, less than one-quarter of these funds would be
managed through central governments.  To the greatest
extent possible, our assistance is channeled to
recipients outside the government sector--in regions and
at the grass roots.
 
Just as our assistance efforts extend far beyond Moscow,
so has our diplomatic engagement.  Last year, President
Clinton received President Akayev of Kyrgyzstan and
Former Chairman Shushkevich of Belarus at the White
House.  This year, in the wake of their courageous steps
to eliminate nuclear weapons from their soil, Presidents
Kravchuk and Nazerbayev came to Washington for wide-
ranging discussions with the President.  Most recently,
Chairman Shevardnadze visited the United States.  I know
that this committee had a productive discussion with him.
These high-level contacts in Washington, as well as our
vigorous diplomatic efforts in the field, reinforce the
goals of our assistance.
 
It will, as I think I've made clear, take years--perhaps
a generation--for Russia to complete its transformation
to a modern state, fully integrated into the global
economy.  It is in our long-term interest to pursue that
goal.  But we also have immediate interests in the here
and now.
 
First and foremost of these is the safety of our own
people from foreign enemies and from weapons of mass
destruction.  In that respect, as in others, it is easy--
amidst all the disturbing news coming out of the former
Soviet Union--to lose sight of the basic truth that we
are much safer today than we were just a few years ago.
 
The implementation of the START I and START II Treaties
will result in a nearly two-thirds reduction in Russian
nuclear warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs.  The agreements have
permitted our own nation also to reduce substantially the
number of nuclear weapons in our arsenal.  In order to
comply with the CFE treaty and associated agreements,
Russia will destroy approximately 25,000 pieces of
equipment, including tanks, artillery, armored combat
vehicles, combat aircraft, and helicopters.  And it will
make possible a reduction in those types of weapons
throughout Europe.
 
Thanks to the most important single piece of post-Cold
War arms  control legislation--the Nunn-Lugar Act--
thousands of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union
are destined for dismantlement.  At the beginning of this
year, President Clinton signed an accord with Presidents
Yeltsin and Kravchuk that has already begun the process
of eliminating nuclear weapons from Ukraine's territory--
and that shores up Ukraine's confidence in its long-term
security.
 
At the January summit, the two leaders also agreed to
jointly undertake a number of non-proliferation
initiatives, and we are already seeing early results.  We
are working together to enhance security and accounting
for nuclear materials in Russia, beginning to implement
the purchase of HEU removed from dismantled warheads, and
will be visiting each other's facilities.  For storing
plutonium removed from dismantled warheads, Russia has
agreed, in principle, to shut down the last three of its
plutonium production reactors.  We are continuing to work
together on these practical steps to serve our common
interest in preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons
and materials.
 
Finally, let me note that in January, Presidents Clinton
and Yeltsin agreed to detarget our strategic nuclear
missiles.  In effect, this means that the pistols we have
aimed at each other's heads will no longer be on hair
trigger.
 
If diminishing the nuclear danger is our first priority,
our second is doing everything we can to ensure that
Russian foreign policy respects inter- national law and
the independence of other states, particularly those
that--like Russia itself--have broken free of Soviet
communism.
 
We have heard a lot in recent months from various
Russians about the foreign policy of their country. Some
of what we have heard has been perplexing, some of it
ominous, some of it downright bellicose and
irresponsible.
 
We listen carefully to everything we hear, and we are not
just listening.   We are also in a constant dialogue with
the Russian leadership, including key deputies in the
Parliament and a broad range of the executive branch
officials. In assessing the words, we keep a watchful eye
on deeds.  It is against that backdrop that I will try to
summarize the most important, authoritative message we
are hearing from Moscow--and what we are saying in
response.
 
A week ago Monday, when he met with Secretary Christopher
in Vladivostok, Russia's Foreign Minister, Andrei
Kozyrev, reaffirmed that Russia believes the preservation
and development of U.S.-Russian cooperation is very much
in Russia's interest.  But he also said that his
government intends to strike a balance between the need
for integration with the West and the need to assert what
he and his colleagues consider to be Russia's own
interests.
 
We recognize that Russia continues to have a major role
to play in the world; that, like every other nation, it
has vital interests in promoting stability in its region;
and that it will continue to have an intense interest in
the well-being of the 25 million ethnic Russians who live
outside Russia.
 
It is possible for Russia to define and pursue these
national interests in a way that is compatible with its
international obligations--and, in many instances,
compatible with our own foreign policy objectives.
 
To take the most relevant and immediate example, we have
worked with Russia to find a peaceful solution to the war
in Bosnia.  Russia has supported our efforts, both in the
United Nations and on the ground, to encourage the Serbs
to join a larger settlement that will end the fighting
and allow the process of rebuilding to begin.  This week
in Zagreb, the United States and Russia are working
together to help negotiate a general cease-fire between
the Croatian Government and the Krajina Serbs.
Ambassador Redman and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister
Churkin are in daily contact to prepare for the next
phase of negotiations on an overall settlement in Bosnia.
 
However, there will be times when our interests, and
therefore our policies, are at odds.  When we can, we
will work together; when we cannot, we will need to find
ways of minimizing the damage, both to the issue at hand
and to the relationship as a whole.
 
As for Russia's interests in what it calls the "near
abroad," we have made clear the importance we attach to
the independence of all the states in the region.  That
has been a constant theme of our diplomacy with Russia,
going back to the beginning of this Administration.  We
have sought and will continue to seek--in word and in
deed--respect for the sovereignty of other states and the
sanctity of their borders.
 
We have had promising success in this effort.  In the
Trilateral Statement that President Yeltsin signed with
Presidents Clinton and Kravchuk in January, Russia
affirmed its commitment to Ukraine's territorial
integrity. Russian troops have already left Lithuania,
and last week, Russia initialed a troop withdrawal
agreement with Latvia.  We will continue to support the
full, timely, and unconditional withdrawal of Russian
troops from Latvia and Estonia.
 
The CSCE, of which Russia is a member, assures the rights
of minorities throughout Europe.  Russia has a legitimate
interest in seeing that the rights of ethnic Russians are
protected in the other New Independent States--just as
neighboring states have a legitimate interest in the
rights of their ethnic kinsmen living within the borders
of the Russian Federation.
 
Secretary Christopher spelled out the basic parameters of
our policy at the beginning of the Administration when he
met with Mr. Kozyrev in Geneva a year ago last month.  He
said that the United States considered the political
rights of Russians outside Russia to be a valid item on
the agenda in our dialogue with the Baltic states and
non-Russian NIS--just as the rights of non-Russians
inside Russia is on our agenda with Moscow.  In keeping
with this policy, President Clinton has pressed the case
for "inclusive democracy" with the Baltic leaderships.
 
The more Russia follows an integrationist course by
harmonizing its behavior and its policies with
international norms and institutions, the more it will be
able to advance the legitimate interests of ethnic
Russians in neighboring states.  At the same time, let me
make it clear that we do not, under any circumstances,
consider the issue of ethnic Russians in the so-called
"near abroad" to be a legitimate pretext for Russian
military intervention, political intimidation, or
economic coercion of those states.
 
We all understand why Russia's neighbors continue to feel
insecure.  For Lithuanians and Poles, as well as
Armenians, Georgians, Kazakhs, and Ukrainians, history
and geography have, for too long, been the enemies of
freedom.  These states have a right to deal with Russia
as an equal despite Russia's size, power, and proximity.
 
As you know, two weeks ago,  President Clinton told
President Shevardnadze that the U.S. would support the
creation of a UN peace-keeping mission in Georgia, as
long as conditions on the ground permit it to be deployed
and as long as we can work out the appropriate funding
mechanisms.  I believe this demonstrates our continuing
interest in resolving conflicts on Russia's borders as
well as our commitment to the sovereignty of the NIS.  It
is important to remember that both Russia and Georgia
have requested international support in resolving this
conflict.
 
In short, Russia intends to remain a great power, but it
has also renounced the Soviet ambition to be an imperial
power.  As President Clinton put it in his address in
Moscow two months ago, Russia is being called upon to:
 
     . . . redefine its greatness in terms that are
appropriate to the present day and to the future, in ways
that will enable [it] to be strong and free and
prosperous and at peace.
 
We have made it clear that in a democratic Europe there
should be no more lines of division, no more spheres of
influence.  What we must build instead--for the first
time--is a community of independent nations, linked by
open societies and open markets, by common interests and
common values.
 
To reinforce stability in the East, we must begin to
extend the benefits and obligations of the same
collective security order and liberal trading system that
have been pillars of strength for the West.  The NATO
allies took a large step in that direction in January
when they approved President Clinton's Partnership for
Peace initiative, laying the groundwork for an eventual
enlargement of NATO.  To date, 18 nations, including
Russia, have expressed their readiness to participate in
the Partnership.  The challenge ahead of us--all of us--
in the months and years ahead is to make the Partnership
as meaningful and useful as possible in the larger cause
of European security and integration.
 
Mr. Chairman, the victory of all democrats in the Cold
War was due, in no small measure, to the perseverance of
a generation of leaders who had faith in the staying
power of democratic government.  At the beginning of that
long twilight struggle, Harry Truman professed his belief
that ultimately, if we were patient, the totalitarian
experiment was bound to fail.  In his final State of the
Union address, President Truman told the Congress that he
had "a deep and abiding faith in the destiny of free men
As our world grows stronger," he said, "more united, more
attractive to men on both sides of the iron curtain, then
inevitably there will come a time of change in the
communist world."
 
Now that that time has come--much earlier than any of us
ever expected--we would do well to draw from that same
confidence in democracy and in human resilience as we
work to secure the gains of freedom in the East.  (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 7:
 
America and the League of Nations: Lessons for Today
Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Permanent Representative to
the United NationsAddress at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, March
4, 1994
 
Let me start by wishing a happy 25th birthday to the
Wilson Center.  I will never forget my own time here as a
Wilson fellow.  Where else can you do truly independent
research, meet scholars from all over the world, and get
paid for working in a castle?  I have always felt that in
a town full of monuments, the Center is unique because it
is a living monument; it memorializes not only Wilson but
Wilson's lifelong effort--as an educator and President--
to map a trail for the future that would elude the traps
of the past.
 
That effort is especially relevant to the commemoration
of the 75th anniversary of the League of Nations.  For
although the League did not survive, many of the
controversies surrounding it are with us still.
 
Then and NowSeventy-five years ago, the world was
witnessing, as are we, the end of one historical era and
the beginning of another.  Then, too, revolution in
Russia was sending ripples of change around the world.
Then, too, peoples long suppressed by empire were
clamoring for recognition; violence reigned in the
Caucasus and the Balkans; and debate raged about the uses
of multilateral peace-keeping and international law.  And
then, too, American leaders were challenged to create a
conceptual framework for engagement in a world that
appeared to pose no "clear and present" danger to the
American people.
 
We cannot observe the League's 75th anniversary--or
contemplate the UN's upcoming 50th--without recognizing a
fundamental reality.  During this century, we have
transformed utterly the daily environment in which we
live.  We have realized many of the dreams--and some of
the nightmares--of our greatest scientists.  We can
transplant hearts, split the atom, and dial Mongolia
directly.  We have reinvented the world, but we have not
reordered it as envisioned by President Wilson or even by
President Bush in his "new world order" speech of less
than three years ago.
 
The truth is that we are wrestling with many of the same
questions that bedeviled President Wilson.
 
--  Is collective security the key to world peace, an
illusion that could imperil our own security, or
something in between?
 
--  How do we accommodate the legitimate hopes of
nationalities without encouraging separatism and ethnic
cleansing?
 
--  How do we make economic sanctions a more effective
way of isolating and influencing rogue regimes?
 
--  How do we generate greater respect for international
law?
 
--  How do we forge a consensus within America so that we
can play the leading role we must play if international
institutions are to be effective?
 
To me, as a child of Prague, Woodrow Wilson was a giant.
A free Czechoslovakia had arisen like a phoenix from the
Fourteen Points.  The Czech constitution was modeled on
America's.  In almost every town, you could find a train
station or some other public place named after Woodrow
Wilson.
 
Wilson asked all of us to believe in "the people."  He
felt that only informed publics could move governments
away from war, away from the stockpiling of arms, and
away from an obsession with the balance of power.
 
In an era of American exceptionalists, Wilson was no
exception.  He affirmed repeatedly that America had a
special place among nations--that we, more than others,
took an expansive and uplifting view of national
interest.  He had the confidence to predict that America
would take pride in offering every dollar of its wealth,
every drop of its blood, every energy of its people to
maintain the peace upon a foundation of international
law.
 
Wilson's decision to enter the war and his vision of a
just peace established American credentials on the world
stage.  But he lost the fight for the League, because his
view of American leadership did not account for our age-
old caution about entanglements overseas.  He was right
that without the U.S., the League would likely fail.  He
was right when he said that if the League failed, another
attempt would be made to crush the new nations of Europe.
But he couldn't convince the Senate that without the
League, U.S. interests would be imperiled.  This fissure
between the executive and Congress did not profit either
side.  Rather, it harmed America and reduced U.S.
influence in a turbulent world.
 
An Updated Fourteen PointsToday, we are relearning both
the imperative of American leadership and the habit of
American caution.  To avoid past mistakes, we must marry
purpose with practice, emphasizing not plans that promise
much but strategies that deliver what they promise.  To
that end, I will outline tonight an updated Fourteen
Points--fourteen principles derived from the League of
Nations experience but applied to our own very different
day.  Now I remind you this is the Clinton
Administration:  points one through seven are domestic
policy--the economy, jobs, trade, health care, welfare
reform, crime, and national service--so I'll  start with
number eight.
 
Point eight.  Number eight is simply that the
isolationists of today are as wrong as those of 75 years
ago.  American leadership in the world is essential to
American interests and inseparable from American
character.
 
Few imagined in Wilson's time that when shots rang out in
Sarajevo hundreds of thousands of American troops would
be drawn across the Atlantic, many never to return.  The
linkages among nations today are far closer.  Political
borders are being overrun by everything from refugees to
Reeboks to revolutionary ideas--being overrun, it
sometimes seems, by refugees in Reeboks with
revolutionary ideas.
 
We have no interest, in Theodore Roosevelt's phrase, in
becoming an "international Meddlesome Matty."  We can't
play Dr. Welby to the world.  But experience warns us
that it is far more effective, far less expensive, and
far less risky to treat the symptoms of global disorder
when they appear than to sit and wait until the
contagious consequences of conflict arrive at our door.
It is in our interest to promote cooperative arrangements
that enlarge freedom, prevent strife, control the spread
of nuclear weapons, and penalize those who run roughshod
over international law.  Nations, in this sense, are like
people.  The quality of our life depends not only on the
kind of home we make for ourselves but on the kind of
international neighborhood in which we live.
 
Point nine.  The next point is number nine.  We must
demolish the myth that effective multilateral
institutions can be built only at the expense of national
sovereignty.
 
Seventy-five years ago, opponents charged that the League
of Nations would "send Japanese over here to crowd out
our workmen . . . seize our homes . . . [and] turn our
wives and children [into] beggars . . . ."
 
Today, some are accusing the Clinton Administration of
taking its foreign policy marching orders from the UN.
These charges are equally ridiculous.  The UN's authority
comes from the member states; it is servant, not master.
Its job is to help governments do together what they
cannot do as easily or as well on their own.
 
The challenge for us is to judge when working through the
UN serves our interests and when it does not.  We do not,
for example, look to the UN to defend our territory, to
set the rules of trade, or to define international
economic policy.  But the universality of the UN can be
helpful in, among other things:
 
--  Keeping the peace, especially where there is a
genuine peace to keep;
--  Controlling the spread of nuclear arms;
--  Monitoring elections;
--  Advocating human rights
--  Stopping the spread of disease;
--  Fighting pollution;
--  Responding to emergencies;
--  Caring for the victims of war; and
--  Prosecuting the criminals of war, starting with those
in the former Yugoslavia.
 
Acting through the UN does not foreclose opportunities to
act on our own.  On the contrary, it puts the UN's
prestige and resources at the service of goals that
Americans support.  This does not diminish our
sovereignty, it strengthens it.  It allows us to
contribute to a global system more acceptable than
anything either we or others could achieve alone.  And
the cost is not large at a price per capita for us--for
everything from blue helmets for peace-keepers to polio
vaccines for babies--of less than $7 a year.  That's
about the same as a ticket to see America's hottest
movie, which these days gives you a choice between
"Schindler's List" and "Ace Ventura, Pet Detective."
 
Point ten.  Point ten is related to point nine.  We must
recognize both the potential and the limits of UN peace-
keeping.
 
From our perspective, near millennium's end, we can look
back at centuries of international efforts to deter
conflict through a combination of force and law.  Before
the UN, there was the League of Nations; before that, the
Congress of Vienna; before that, the Treaty of
Westphalia; before that, medieval non-aggression pacts;
before that, the Athenian League.  Still, no magic
formula has been found.  In America today, there are
those from both political parties who would walk away
from UN peace-keeping altogether.  There are others, like
former President Reagan, who have called for "a standing
UN force--an army of conscience . . . prepared to carve
out humanitarian sanctuaries through force if necessary."
 
The Clinton Administration is navigating a middle course.
UN peace-keeping is a contributor to, not the centerpiece
of, our national security strategy.  It is no substitute
for vigorous alliances and a strong national defense.
When threats arise to us or to others, we will choose the
course of action that best serves our interests.  We may
act through the UN, we may act through NATO, we may act
through a coalition, we may sometimes mix these tools, or
we may act alone.  But we will do whatever it takes to
defend the vital interests of the United States.
 
We know that past UN peace missions have achieved
important goals in places as diverse as the Middle East,
Namibia, El Salvador, and Cambodia.  To the extent future
missions succeed, they will lift from the shoulders of
American soldiers and taxpayers a great share of the
burden of collective security.  When we intervene alone,
we bear all the costs and all the risks.  When the UN
intervenes, the bulk of the burden falls to others.  Of
the 70,000 peace-keepers now deployed around the world,
the U.S. contribution is less than 5%.  Of the total
costs, America bears 30%, and we are going to get that
reduced.  Of the more than 1,000 UN peace-keepers who
have died on the job, 36 were Americans.
 
But if UN peace-keeping is to be effective, it must be
made ready for the 21st century.  UN peace-keepers need
better planning and organization, reformed budget
procedures, more dependable sources of personnel, better
training, better intelligence, better equipment, and more
adequate resources.  We are working with the UN and other
member states to achieve these reforms.
 
We are also working to bring UN responsibilities into
line with its capabilities.  The success of peace-keeping
does not depend on how many operations there are but on
how well each operation is conducted.  So we are
insisting that tough questions concerning mission,
resources, risk, scope, and duration be asked before, not
after, new obligations are undertaken.
 
I emphasize that the purpose of our policy is not to
expand UN peace-keeping but to fix it.  We want to know
that when we do turn to the UN, it will be able to do the
job at an acceptable cost in a finite period of time.  We
know that threats that affect our interests will continue
to arise.  The world will continue to look to us for
leadership.  We will continue to provide that leadership,
but we should not bear the full burden alone.  We will be
better off if the UN is better able to prevent and
contain international conflict.
 
Point eleven.  We must work to make economic sanctions a
more effective instrument of international policy.
 
One of the designers of the League of Nations predicted
that "the economic weapon [would be] the great discovery
and the most precious possession of the League."  But the
success of an international organization depends not on
what member states are pledged on paper to do but on what
they are willing, in reality, to do.  In 1935, when Italy
invaded Ethiopia, League members were not willing to do
very much.  Sanctions were too gradual, too limited, and
too poorly enforced.  Mussolini later said that if the
League had embargoed oil, he would have withdrawn his
troops within a week.  The League did embargo arms but,
hauntingly in light of our recent experience in Bosnia,
to aggressor and victim alike.
 
In the UN during the Cold War, superpower rivalry
prevented sanctions, like peace-keeping, from being used
very often.  More recently, they have been imposed
against the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Haiti, and Libya.
As long as the permanent members of the Security Council
continue to cooperate, sanctions will be an option for
responding to potential crises.  But they will be a
better option if we are able to transform them from a
blunt instrument into a more precise tool of policy.
That process has only begun.
 
As I mentioned earlier, we are asking tough questions
whenever a new UN peace-keeping operation is considered.
I have appointed a task force at our mission in New York
to recommend similar questions for when UN sanctions are
considered.  Conventional wisdom dictates, for example,
that sanctions should be applied before resorting to
military force.  That is logical and in most cases would
seem right.  But we should at least ask whether imposing
sanctions is preferable in each case to the use or
threatened use of force.
 
We also need to consult closely with other nations so
that we are clear about objectives.  Do we seek sanctions
to protest, to punish, to deter, or to compel a
government or some combination of those?  Do we seek to
bring a target government down or simply to change its
policies?  If sanctions don't work, what are next steps?
What must happen before sanctions are lifted?  Can the
sanctions be enforced?  Might they boomerang by
mobilizing domestic support for an embattled regime?
Might the sanctions create unintended hardships for
neighboring countries or for innocent people within the
targeted state?  If so, is there a plan to mitigate those
hardships?
 
These and other questions should be considered before
sanctions are imposed.  As the Bosnian arms embargo
illustrates, an ill-advised step can be difficult to take
back.  Sanctions must be more than a reflex born of
frustration, a rain dance we perform when we are unable
to make it rain.  Unless sanctions are ultimately to add
to public cynicism, they must have clear and achievable
goals clearly explained.  Sanctions can be valuable, but
they are not cost-free--and they should not be over-sold.
 
Point twelve.  The twelfth point is no simpler.  We must
find ways to accommodate legitimate aspirations for
ethnic and national identity without encouraging
separatism, extremism, or violence.
 
My father was a Czech patriot who once served as
ambassador from what is now the former Czechoslovakia to
what is now the former Yugoslavia.  He described
nationalism as "a permanent, vital and influential force
for good and evil."  It was his experience, as it is
ours, that national pride can be the custodian of rich
cultural legacies.  It can unite people in defense of a
common good; it can provide a sense of identity and
belonging that stretches across territory and time.  But
when pride in "us" curdles into hatred of "them," the
result is a narrowing of vision and a compulsion to
violence.  As we saw in Germany a half-century ago, as we
have seen in America with the Ku Klux Klan, and as we see
in Serbia today, at the far fringe of ethnic pride is
fascism.
 
Throughout history, when great multiethnic empires have
broken up, nationalist movements have emerged.  That
happened in Woodrow Wilson's time; it is happening today.
The Soviet empire sought to destroy the separate ethnic
identities of its subject peoples--to rewrite history, to
manipulate provincial borders, to discourage religion, to
create what Vaclav Havel has called "the monstrous
illusion that we are all the same."  But now, as Havel
has observed:
 
      After decades of falsified history . . . nothing
has been forgotten.  Nations are now remembering their
ancient achievements . . . their ancient suppressors . .
. their ancient statehoods and their former borders.
 
There are thousands of self-defined ethnic groups in the
world--more than 100 in the former Soviet Union alone.
Not every one can reasonably expect to have its own flag,
currency, airline, and state.  President Wilson--who has
been called the father of self-determination--never
equated that concept with ethnicity nor believed that
ethnic and political boundaries should be the same.  Nor
can we say that the world would be a better place if they
were the same.
 
Clearly, something has to give.  Separatist movements
today are gaining strength.  Left unchecked, they may
engulf in conflict whole chunks of Europe, Asia, and
Africa.  History from Sarajevo to Sarajevo warns us that
when small powers fight, big powers are often drawn in.
We have a stake in seeing that the embers of ethnic
conflict are cooled and that models for easing fear,
reconciling ambition, and clarifying principle are
established.
 
That is why we support the work of the CSCE and others to
enhance respect for the rights of minorities.  It is why
we will continue to work through the UN and regional
organizations to settle disputes peacefully.  It is why
we will continue to stress the principle that individuals
are entitled to basic human rights irrespective of group
identity.  And it is why we will continue to view with
deadly seriousness the rise of ultra-nationalist groups
in strategic parts of the globe.
 
Let us never forget that the extreme views of Adolf
Hitler caused many to ridicule him when they should have
opposed him.  Today, we may want to agree with the
Russian Foreign Minister that Vladimir Zhirinovskiy is
less a political problem than a medical one.  But it is
disquieting to see bonds build between radical
nationalists in Russia and those in Milosevic's Serbia.
And history teaches us that individuals can be deranged
and dangerous at the same time.
 
Point thirteen.  The thirteenth point is basic.  We must
have congressional and public support for our policies at
the UN.
 
Woodrow Wilson has been quoted as saying that "I would
rather lose in a cause that will someday win than win in
a cause that will someday lose."  The current
Administration prefers to prevail in a policy that will
serve American interests long and well.  That requires
understanding something that President Wilson appears not
to have understood sufficiently.  American leadership in
international organizations does not depend on executive
action alone.  Congress, like the President, must play an
important role because Congress, like the President, is
accountable to the people.
 
There will always be some on both sides of the political
spectrum with whom agreement is--shall we say--difficult.
In its day, the League was assailed from the left as "a
capitalist scheme" and from the right as a plot hatched
by "Negroes and . . . mulattoes."  There are some in our
day who see every UN issue through a narrow, partisan
lens.  But most Members of Congress are looking for a
formula that will allow them to further American
objectives at the UN without wasting American dollars.
 
Such a formula was suggested in a recent study headed by
Representative Lee Hamilton and Senator Nancy Kassebaum.
It includes:
 
--  Reforms to eliminate waste and to professionalize
management at the UN;
--  Changes in the financing of UN peace-keeping
operations, including a reduction in the share of costs
to be borne by the United States;
--  An appropriate congressional role in U.S. decisions
about UN peace operations; and
--  A congressional commitment to full payment of UN
assessments.
 
Clearly, if the UN is to succeed, it must enter a "season
of reform."  It must become more accountable, more
professional, more equitable in its sources of funding,
and more service-oriented in its outlook.  At the same
time, our leadership at the UN will be undermined if the
U.S. falls too far behind in paying its bills.  What we
need is a comprehensive approach, perhaps along the lines
suggested by the Hamilton-Kassebaum study.  That is
precisely what the Administration is now exploring at the
UN and with the Congress.
 
Point fourteen.  Finally, the fourteenth point--
encompassing all of the others:  We must not allow the
future to be defined by the past.
 
There are those who say that we are the prisoners of
history, that we can do little to contain ethnic violence
because the scars of past grievance are too often too
deep.  There are those who say that we will never succeed
in enlarging democracy or extending free markets or
relieving poverty or enhancing human rights because too
many cultures are impervious to change.  There are those
who say that "Cold War I" will inevitably be  followed by
"Cold War II."  And there are those who say that
international institutions are doomed to fail.
 
There is much within our experience to support each of
these grim conclusions.  This evening, I have cited
puzzles that have resisted solution from Woodrow Wilson's
time to our own.  It is no wonder that there is a
pessimistic and despairing side to us all.  But let us
not, in studying history, get our lessons wrong.
 
Eleanor Roosevelt once said that "within all of us there
are two sides.  One reaches for the stars, the other
descends to the level of beasts."  We honor Woodrow
Wilson precisely because he spoke to the more hopeful
side of our nature--to the side that Jefferson spoke to
in the Declaration of Independence and Lincoln in his
second inaugural address; to the side that liberated
Buchenwald, resisted apartheid, marched on Washington,
and faced down tanks in Tiananmen and Prague.  He spoke
to the side of our nature that prompted two bitter rivals
to shake hands last September on the White House lawn and
that created the United Nations not because human society
is capable of perfection but because it is not.
 
Make no mistake--there is purpose to our efforts in the
world today:  to weave out of the varied threads of
peace-keeping, sanctions, human rights, international
law, and military resolve a tapestry that will brighten
the tomorrows of our people and of all people.  That
purpose is redeemed daily:  in the eyes of Cambodian
children; the dreams of entrepreneurs in Poland; the
courage of political prisoners in Burma; the pride of
American servicemen and -women wherever they serve; and
the stubborn will to survive of people, just like us, who
happen to live in Srebrenica and Mostar.
 
In his final public speech, Woodrow Wilson acknowledged
that there can be no absolute guarantee against the
errors of human judgment or the violence of human
passion.  But we have a responsibility in our time--as
others have had in theirs--not to be imprisoned by
history but to shape it:  to build a world not without
conflict but in which conflict is effectively contained;
a world not without repression but in which the sway of
freedom is enlarged; a world not without lawless behavior
but in which the interests of the law-abiding are
progressively more secure.
 
That is our mission as we enter this new era.  And that
is a future we can bequeath with pride to our children
and to theirs.  Thank you very much.  (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 8:
 
Update on the Crisis in AlgeriaMark R. Parris, Acting
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern AffairsStatement
before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, March 22, 1994
 
Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to speak to you
today about the situation in Algeria, which has been of
growing concern to us over the past two years.
 
The Algerian Government faces very serious challenges,
which have brought the country to the brink of crisis.
Since the decision by Algeria's leaders in January 1992
to cancel the second round of parliamentary elections--
which the Islamic Salvation Front, the FIS, was poised to
win--Islamic fundamentalist groups have steadily
intensified their campaign to overthrow the secular
regime through violence.  Efforts by government security
forces to crush the Islamist opposition have failed.
Guerrillas are attacking security personnel daily and
have established strongholds in certain Algiers
neighborhoods and other parts of the country.  In an
audacious opera- tion just 10 days ago, an Islamist
insurgent group assaulted a prison in central Algeria and
freed nearly 1,000 detainees.
 
A climate of fear and intimidation has deepened in recent
months as extremists have assassinated dozens of Algerian
political figures, journalists, academics, and other
civilians, as well as over 30 foreigners.  This wave of
terrorism suggests that extremists are gradually
eclipsing moderates in Algeria's loosely organized and
disparate Islamist movement.  While most of the original
leaders of the FIS have spent the past two years in
Algerian prisons or in exile, armed Islamist groups with
more radical agendas have taken a leading role in the
insurgent campaign.  As a result, the security situation
is more acute today than even six months ago.  Over 3,000
people have died so far.
 
In this tense environment, human rights abuses have been
committed on all sides.  The Algerian Government
continues to detain, in many cases without due process,
well over 2,000 people suspected of Islamist activities
or sympathies.  Special anti-terrorist courts created
under the "state of emergency," which the regime declared
in 1992, have handed down more than 300 death sentences
in trials which failed to accord protections necessary to
meet internationally accepted standards for fairness.
There have been repeated allegations of torture and
extrajudicial killings.  At the same time, Algerian media
have reported numerous atrocities carried out by members
of armed Islamist groups, in addition to the highly
publicized assassinations of foreigners and Algerian
intellectuals to which I have already referred.
 
Mr. Chairman, the United States has publicly and
privately condemned violence and human rights abuses from
all quarters in Algeria.  We reject attempts to justify
such violence.
 
Roots of the CrisisAlgeria's crisis is largely home-
grown, rooted in frustration arising from political
exclusion and economic misery.  Opponents of the regime
have benefited from a growing sense of alienation among
Algeria's young people, who have lost hope for political
participation and a better life.  The Algerian ruling
elite, which emerged from the war of independence from
France in 1962, has tenaciously held power for 32 years,
allowing relatively little in the way of political
liberties.  Steps toward a more democratic, multiparty
system, which former President Benjedid initiated in
1989, ended with the suspension of elections in 1992.
 
Widespread discontent over three decades of socialist
mismanagement of the economy provides fertile ground for
extremism.  Algerian governments, since 1962, have
squandered resources on unproductive state enterprises
and suppressed the development of a free market.  As a
result, the Algerian people today live with a
dysfunctional economy characterized by high inflation,
unemployment estimated at over 25%, chronic housing and
food shortages, and a steady decline in living standards.
Virtually all of the country's revenues from oil and gas
exports go to servicing a $26-billion external debt.
 
At the time of the legislative elections in 1991, most
observers recognized that the Islamic Salvation Front
appealed both to Algerian voters, who were attracted to
the religious and social tenets of the party and to a
great many Algerians, who simply wanted to send a message
of protest.  Although it is difficult today to gauge the
degree of popular support for the various elements of the
Islamist insurgency, there can be no doubt that political
Islam has become an important feature of the Algerian
political landscape.
 
Need for Political Dialogue and Economic ReformPresident
Lamine Zeroual, whom the army appointed nearly two months
ago, has reiterated the pledges made by previous Algerian
leaders to open a political dialogue with opponents who
eschew terrorism and to implement economic reforms.  In
his first major address to the nation on February 7,
President Zeroual affirmed that security measures alone
cannot end the crisis.  He stated, and I quote:  "The
political crisis can be solved only through dialogue and
with the participation of all political forces of the
nation without exception."  On the question of economic
liberalization, Zeroual spoke of the need "to implement
reforms which aim at freeing the national economy from
monopoly and centralization."  We agree with these
priorities, and we would like to see Algeria succeed in
implementing the course which the President has staked
out.
 
The U.S. Government has long believed--and has repeatedly
stressed to Algerian leaders at the highest levels--that
there is an urgent need for real political dialogue.  The
regime must find a means of bringing disaffected elements
of the populace into a process to chart a new, democratic
course for Algeria.  We agree with the major Algerian
parties, which insist that this process must involve a
broadening of political participation to encompass all
factions, including Islamist leaders who reject
terrorism.  We have followed with interest indications
from Algiers that government officials have met with
representatives of the Islamic Salvation Front.  But we
have not yet seen the fruits of such contacts--if,
indeed, they have occurred.  In order for such a dialogue
to succeed, each side will need to take tangible steps to
show good will.  As each month passes without progress,
chances will recede for political accommodation between
the regime and its opponents, Islamist or secular.
 
Recognizing the need for economic reform, the U.S.
Government has given encouragement to Algerian officials
in their ongoing attempts to design a reform program
which the International Monetary Fund could support.
These consultations, we understand, are making progress.
Although the structural economic adjustments and fiscal
austerity--which such a program would entail--might
create hardship in the short term, special attention has
been paid to the need to reinforce Algeria's social
safety net.  We remain convinced that Algeria's best
course is to accept and implement such measures, which
are essential for an eventual economic recovery and for
the long-term well-being of the Algerian people.
 
U.S. Policy Goals
 
Thus, Mr. Chairman, the goals of U.S. policy concerning
Algeria are clear.  We favor:
 
--  The development of a more democratic system which
allows broad, popular participation in government;
--  An eventual resumption of the suspended electoral
process;
--  Economic reforms which satisfy the long-term needs of
the Algerian people; and
--  Respect for basic human rights.
 
This has been our consistent message to Algerian leaders
since January 1992.  We have consulted closely with other
concerned governments, among them Algeria's major
creditors, and will try to coordinate with them as events
unfold.  European governments have delivered demarches to
the regime along lines similar to ours.
 
I regret to say, however, that despite the stated
intention of all Algerian governments in the past two
years to undertake genuine political and economic
reforms, we have seen little progress toward these goals.
The failure of the government-sponsored "national
conference" in January, which all major opposition
parties boycotted, demonstrated that the regime has yet
to convince opposition elements of its willingness to
permit them a meaningful role in governing during a
transition period.  Many of the actions which the
government has taken in the economic domain, such as
promulgating new trade and investment codes, have not
thus far significantly changed economic realities in
Algeria.
 
It is important, Mr. Chairman, to appreciate the limits
of U.S. influence in Algeria.  Unlike France and other
European governments, the U.S. has not been a traditional
donor of bilateral aid to the Algerian Government.  Our
involvement with Algeria is indirect.  The U.S. Export-
Import Bank has provided guarantees for over $2 billion
in private bank loans for projects involving U.S.
companies in Algeria's oil and gas sector.  Similarly,
the Department of Agriculture, as part of the Commodity
Credit Corporation program, makes available credit
guarantees for short-term, private bank loans to Algerian
importers of U.S. agricultural commodities up to $550
million this year.
 
The U.S. gives no military assistance to Algeria.  A
modest IMET program of $50,000 this year provides
instruction to a small number of Algerian military
officers in human rights, respect for civilian authority,
and responsible resource management.
 
Given the complexities of this highly fluid situation, it
is difficult to speculate about the eventual outcome of
the crisis in Algeria.  What is clear is that we remain
deeply concerned over the steadily deteriorating
situation there.  Events of the past two years
demonstrate that Algeria's leaders cannot ease this
crisis through over-reliance on repressive policies.  In
the absence of serious political change, violence is
likely to continue to escalate and to threaten Algeria's
stability.  President Zeroual's words hold out some hope
for an approach based on compromise and dialogue.  We
sincerely hope that his words will be matched by actions.
 
Regional ImplicationsThe crisis in Algeria has provoked
concern from neighboring countries and raised the obvious
question of whether or not the situation there threatens
the stability of the region.  It is important to
understand up-front what most of the testimony I've just
given tries to make plain:  that Algeria's predicament is
driven by events in that country and results from a
history very different from that of its neighbors in the
Arab Maghreb.  While political Islam responds to the
search for a unique identity and to socioeconomic
difficulties shared by the North African states, Tunisia
and Morocco have significant strengths that are not
shared by Algeria.
 
Tunisia has a much smaller and more homogeneous society
than Algeria and a vibrant, market-oriented economy that
is one of the success stories of the region.  Its own
Islamist movement, when last tested by elections, was far
less vigorous than the FIS.  Tunisia has been markedly
free of the bloodshed that has scarred Algeria in recent
years.  Its stable and cohesive society, bolstered by a
vigorous and well-educated middle class, would benefit
from greater political openness.  The modest expansion of
the political process to include opposition members
elected to Tunisia's parliament in last Sunday's
elections is a welcome step in this direction.
 
Morocco is also a different case from Algeria.  During
the colonial period, Morocco was not made a part of
France.  Its rich historical traditions, including a
native dynasty now going back nearly 400 years, were
largely untouched.  Morocco did not resort to central
planning, with all its disruptions and inefficiencies,
and it did not collectivize agriculture, driving farmers
off the land.  Instead, increased reliance on the private
sector and the successful implementation of an IMF
program in the 1980s have given Morocco a solid market
economy that, while far from free of problems, is
attracting international attention as an emerging market
and bringing benefits to people throughout the country.
 
In looking at the potential effect of political Islam on
Morocco, an important factor to consider is the religious
legitimacy of the Moroccan throne, which goes back many
centuries.  Perhaps because of this tradition and the
very strength of its society and traditions, Morocco
allows Islamist movements to organize so long as they do
not actively engage in politics.
 
All this is not to say that fundamentalism is not a
factor to be watched in Morocco.  For many of the
disadvantaged in a society facing the socioeconomic
challenges of income inequality, urbanization, and
unemployment, the appeal of an Islamist solution is
strong.  (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 9:
 
Principal Elements of U.S. Policy In the Persian Gulf
Toni G. Verstandig, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near
Eastern AffairsAddress to the National Security
Industrial Association, Washington, DC, March 22, 1994
 
I appreciate very much the opportunity to speak to you
today on a subject which is of abiding interest to all of
us--the geopolitical situation in the Persian Gulf.
 
On February 12, 1945, King Abdul Aziz al-Saud, King of
Saudi Arabia, boarded a U.S. Navy destroyer, the U.S.S.
Murphy, and pitched his tent on the deck, where he
sheltered with 48 advisers and seven sheep for the short
trip from Jeddah to the Great Bitter Lake and his secret
rendezvous with  President Roosevelt.  Although that
brief meeting was focused heavily on President
Roosevelt's search for Arab acquiescence in the creation
of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, it also served to
cement the U.S.-Saudi strategic alliance.
 
Within a few years of the meeting at Great Bitter Lake,
the U.S. and Saudi Arabia signed a lease permitting U.S.
use of the Dhahran airbase.  The U.S. began to supply
Saudi Arabia with military equipment, and an American
military mission arrived to start a training program for
the Saudi armed forces.  Every administration since
Truman's has reiterated, in one form or another, the
commitment to protecting the integrity and independence
of Saudi Arabia.  Early in 1980, after the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan raised the spectre that the
Soviets were seeking control over the world's oil
lifeline, President Carter sealed the understanding with
a doctrine asserting that the U.S. would resist any
attempt by any "outside force" to "gain control of the
Persian Gulf region."
 
While the Carter doctrine was aimed principally at
blocking the perceived threat of Soviet expansionism, it
was the reality of Iran's and Iraq's search for hegemony
and regional dominance which finally drew a U.S. military
response--first through protection of Kuwaiti oil
shipments during the Iran-Iraq war and, then,
significantly, in the coalition effort to liberate Kuwait
and defeat Iraqi aggression.  Today, we recognize that
the greatest potential danger to regional security lies
in the threats which may come from either Iran or Iraq.
These states pose different challenges.  Their threats
require different policies as have been detailed by
National Security Advisor Lake in his recent Foreign
Affairs article, "Backlash States."
 
U.S. StrategyThe basic strategic principle for the U.S.
in the Gulf, as defined in the Lake article, is to
protect critical American interests in the security of
our friends and in the free flow of oil at stable prices.
In pursuing that balance, the U.S. concentrates on two
sets of key objectives:  limiting the ability of both
Iran and Iraq to threaten regional stability and
bolstering the defensive capabilities of our friends in
the region--individually, in tandem with their regional
partners, and in concert with the U.S. and other friendly
outside powers.
 
We have the means to check immediate, overt threats.
Iraq is constrained by international sanctions which were
first affirmed by the UN.  Iran is weakened by war and
cannot directly challenge the U.S. Navy.  No superpower
is urging on either one or extending a protective
umbrella.  The situation is not static, however, and it
is worth noting in some detail the major, specific
elements of our Iran and Iraq policies.
 
Iraq.  Iraq remains a regional power with a long-term
potential to threaten regional and U.S. interests, but it
is subject to an extensive and highly rigorous set of
international restrictions on its freedom of action.  Our
stance toward Iraq is clear:  It must fully comply with
all relevant UN Security Council resolutions and with the
measures taken by the international coalition to enforce
and monitor them.
 
There is no convincing evidence that Saddam Hussein's
regime is prepared to meet this standard.  Iraq is not in
full compliance with any of the relevant UN Security
Council resolutions.  It continues to reject elements  of
UN Security Council Resolution 687, which ended fighting
in the Gulf war, such as recognizing Kuwait's borders.
With such a record, Iraq's calls for negotiations to end
international sanctions are, at best, premature.
 
We strongly support the continued territorial integrity
and unity of Iraq.  We support the Iraqi National
Congress in its efforts to unify and strengthen the Iraqi
opposition and to  contribute to the process of bringing
about a democratic, pluralistic government in Iraq, which
can live in peace with its neighbors and its own people.
In sum, we are determined that the will of the
international community, as expressed  in UN Security
Council resolutions, be enforced to ensure that Iraq can
never again threaten its neighbors or pose a threat to
peace.
 
Let me reiterate that the U.S. bears no ill will toward
the Iraqi people.  Saddam Hussein's brutal treatment of
Iraq's civilian population is a matter of record.  The
Iraqi Government could alleviate the suffering of the
Iraqi people by ceasing its repression, especially in the
north against the Kurds and in the south against the
Shi'ites, and by taking advantage of UN Security Council
Resolutions 706 and 712, which allow Iraq to sell limited
quantities of oil, under UN control, to purchase food,
medicine, and other humanitarian goods.
 
Iran.  As for Iran, we have deep and serious concerns
about its behavior in five areas:
 
--  Its quest for nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction and the means of their delivery;
--  The continued involvement of the Iranian Government
in terrorism and assassination worldwide;
--  Support for violent opposition to the Arab-Israeli
peace process;
--  Threats and subversive activities against its
neighbors; and
--  Its dismal human rights record at home.
 
Our policy is not aimed at changing the Iranian
Government but at inducing Iran to change its behavior in
these areas.  We seek increased international economic
pressure to persuade Iran that it cannot expect to enjoy
normal state-to-state relations as long as it violates
basic standards of international behavior.  This means
working with other countries to deny Iran access to
technology and other means by which  it can facilitate
the pursuit of policies  of destabilization, terrorism,
and the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.  At
the same time, we have made it clear that we do not seek
the overthrow of the Iranian regime.  We have made it
clear that we are prepared to enter into a dialogue with
authorized representatives of the Iranian Government to
discuss the differences between us.
 
Security CooperationOne of the clear lessons of the past
decade has been that containment of regional threats
alone is not sufficient.  We also need to work with our
friends in the region to develop a strong regional
deterrent to those who would threaten its security or
stability.  Many of you in the audience today have been
directly involved in these efforts.  Let me review with
you our approach to bolstering the security of our
friends in the area.  The U.S. is:
 
--  Encouraging the members of the Gulf Cooperation
Council to work more closely together on collective
defense and security arrangements;
 
--  Helping individual GCC countries meet their
legitimate defense requirements, including arms sales
that increase their capabilities to conduct coordinated
operations with U.S. and other GCC forces; and
 
--  Working to strengthen its own ability to act quickly
in the region by maintaining strong forces there, by
prepositioning vital equipment and material, and by
concluding defense access agreements with the GCC states.
 
The recent reassessment of U.S. defense strategy and
resources carried out by the Clinton Administration--the
bottom-up review--reaffirmed the importance of the Gulf
and committed major U.S. defense assets to a continuing
mission in the region.  Our goal here is to complement,
not replace, the Gulf states' own collective security
efforts.  We do not intend to station troops permanently
anywhere in the region.  Our objective is to increase
regional stability, deter threats, and raise the
threshold at which direct U.S. military action would be
needed; that is, to reduce the likelihood that the U.S.
and its allies would have to fight to repel aggression.
 
We also recognize that equipment alone cannot address the
requirement for regional security.  Small populations,
absorption issues, and the need--in this era of lower oil
prices--for the Gulf states to budget carefully for their
military procurement, all lead to the conclusion that the
appropriate response to Gulf security requirements is a
diverse one.  For that reason, the U.S. particularly
welcomed the decision of the GCC summit meeting in Riyadh
last year to endorse a number of recommendations of the
GCC defense ministers for enhanced GCC cooperation and
coordination.  These include, for example, joint efforts
in the area of air defense command and control.  We
believe, and have underlined with our friends in the
area, that continued measures aimed at improved GCC
cooperation form an important component of enhanced
deterrence for the region.
 
Human Rights, Democracy, and IslamAs a final element of
our framework, I would like to say a few words about the
connection we see between human rights, democracy, and
Islam on one hand, and the implications for U.S. policy,
security, and stability in the region on the other.
While the issue of political Islam is highly complex and
varies considerably in each country, the U.S. approach to
the phenomenon can be outlined in a few basic points.
 
--  We do not view Islam as the next "ism" confronting
the West or threatening world peace.
 
--  We part company with those--whether their message is
religious or secular--who practice terrorism, oppress
minorities, preach intolerance, violate human rights, or
pursue their political goals through violence.
 
--  We do not seek a "made in America" model for other
societies, but we are proud of our traditions and values.
And we support those in the region who seek to expand
both political participation and respect for basic human
rights.
 
--  Finally, we are wary of those who would use the
democratic process to come to power, only to destroy that
very process in order to retain power and political
dominance.
 
The Gulf is no exception to our general interest in
supporting democratization and human rights.  We have
been clear in our discussions with the leaders of the
Gulf states in stating our view that increased popular
participation in government would enhance, not diminish,
regional and internal stability, and would contribute to
the success of our cooperative efforts.  We have welcomed
the steps, albeit tentative so far, to broaden that
participation throughout the Gulf, whether it is the
elections in Kuwait or the development of advisory
councils in Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Bahrain.  We look
forward to continued progress along these lines.
 
ConclusionFifty years ago, when Abdul Aziz left his
kingdom to travel to his meeting with President
Roosevelt, the trip was conceived and executed in such
secrecy that news of it left the King's enemies
proclaiming that he had fled his country or had been
kidnaped by the Americans.  Members of his household were
distraught--some dressed in mourning to bewail their
sudden abandonment, and it left the British community in
Jeddah furious at the impudence of American intervention
in a region long dominated by Britain.  But today, the
partnership whose foundations were laid that day has
emerged at the center of regional security relations.
Through the development of our ties to friendly states of
the Gulf, we seek to ensure that those states enjoy the
fruits of security and stability and that the
international community preserves access to the vital
natural resources of the region.  The progress we have
witnessed in the peace process, too, will contribute to
the preservation of stability in the Gulf and will help
erase the need of the past to balance our cooperation
with Israel and with the Gulf Arab states against each
other.  Given the confluence of events, we are encouraged
by our success thus far in achieving those worthy
objectives and are firmly committed to pursuing them to
their ultimate success in the future.  (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 10:
 
North Korea and the Russian Proposal for International
Conference
Statement by Department Spokesman Michael McCurry,
Washington, DC, March 24, 1994.
 
The North Korean nuclear program is of concern to the
entire international community, and it is important that
we make clear to the North Koreans the importance of
complying with the terms set forward by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
 
We welcome Russia's commitment to support the draft UN
Security Council resolution now under development.  The
UN remains the most appropriate forum for resolution of
this matter and is the umbrella under which all previous
discussions with North Korea have transpired.
 
We will be consulting with our allies--in particular
South Korea and Japan--as we consider Russia's proposal
to hold an international conference to address the
nuclear issue.  Our general view of a conference of this
type is that it must be very carefully prepared in order
to be successful.  In connection with diplomatic
initiatives that would be designed to address the North
Korean nuclear issue, it would be important to include
some very essential elements that the United States
identifies.
 
First, there will have be full adherence on the part of
North Korea to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.  That ought
to be an overall objective of these discussions.
 
Second, North Korea should accept fullscope safeguards,
as defined by the IAEA.
 
Third, there needs to be full implementation of the
North-South Declaration on Denuclearization.
 
Fourth, there needs to be a recognition that peace and
security on the Korean Peninsula are first and foremost a
question for the Korean people to decide.
 
Those are fundamental objectives that we think should
underpin diplomatic efforts related to this question.
 
At the same time, we would oppose any process that allows
North Korea to refuse to accept the safeguards
requirements that it has already committed to through the
IAEA.  We would refuse to accept any process that allows
North Korea to refuel its reactor.
 
We want to make sure that any diplomatic initiative shows
real progress on nuclear issues while the process is
underway.  It cannot be an excuse to stand still.  It
also has to deal with issues like whether or not
reprocessing would continue during the duration of such a
diplomatic effort.
 
Finally, it is very important that no diplomatic
initiative undermine the existing relationship between
the Republic of Korea and the United States.  It is in
that context that we will evaluate any initiative put
forward to address this problem, such as the one publicly
announced by Russia today.  (###)
 
 
 
[END OF DISPATCH VOL 5, NO 14]

To the top of this page


Index of Dispatch Magazine Archives 1994 Issues|| Index of Dispatch Magazine Archives|| Index of "Briefings and Statements"
Index of Electronic Research Collections ERC Reference Desk || Alphabetic Index || Sitemap || ERC Homepage
Last modified: Jun. 3, 1999
Designed by: Lin Dou