US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 5, NUMBER 13, MARCH 28, 1994
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
 
 
 
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1.  The U.S.-Japan Relationship:  The Responsibility to
Change -- Secretary Christopher
2.  The U.S.-China Relationship:  The Right Balance --
Secretary Christopher
3.  U.S. Commitment to Our POW/MIAs -- Secretary
Christopher
4.  The U.S. and Australia:  Close Allies and Trading
Partners -- Secretary Christopher
5.  U.S. Commitment to Cambodia -- Secretary Christopher
 
 
 
ARTICLE 1
 
The U.S.-Japan Relationship:  The Responsibility to
Change
Secretary Christopher
Address to the Japan Association of Corporate Executives,
Tokyo, Japan, March 11, 1994
 
Chairman Hayami, ladies and gentlemen:  It is a great
honor to address a group as distinguished as the Japan
Association of Corporate Executives.  I admire the
creative role that your members played in making Japan
one of the great economic success stories in history.
 
I am personally familiar with Japan's remarkable economic
accomplishments.  I have been coming to Japan since 1961
when President Kennedy asked me, as a young lawyer, to
represent the United States in trade negotiations.  I
have been an appreciative visitor many times since.
 
When I am abroad now, I spend most of my time meeting
other diplomats.  In those sessions, we often resort to
specialized language.  But on this visit, I wanted to
address a different audience and to deliver a message
that is straightforward and clear.  I am here today to
speak to you as business leaders and as citizens of
Japan.
 
As President Clinton told Prime Minister Hosokawa last
month in Washington, "no relationship in the world is
more important today" than the one between the United
States and Japan.  At a time of global and domestic
change, it is a relationship that endures because of
political, security, and cultural bonds that are
unbreakable.
 
The United States and Japan have the two largest
economies in the world.  We are bound by a solemn treaty
alliance.  We are a force for security and stability in
the Pacific.  We defend democracy and support sustainable
development around the world.  In each of these arenas,
we are called upon to lead.  The character of our
leadership will help to determine how secure, how free,
and how prosperous the world will be.
 
In his address at Waseda University last July, President
Clinton called on Japan to join the United States in
building a "New Pacific Community" based on "shared
strength, shared prosperity, and a shared commitment to
democratic values."  Constructing that Community will
require a vigorous partnership between the United States
and Japan.  And, as the President said, it also will
require "both our nations to lead and both our nations to
change."
 
It is with a clear understanding of how much is at stake
that I will address the future of the U.S.-Japan
partnership.  I will focus on economics and trade first
because it is our economic relationship that requires
urgent repair.
 
One month ago today, President Clinton and Prime Minister
Hosokawa met in Washington.  Their discussions
underscored the strength of the security and political
ties between us.  But the impasse in the Framework
negotiations that our governments launched last year also
revealed that we still need a better balance in our
overall relationship.  The United States is determined to
put its economic relationship with Japan on the same
constructive and responsible foundation on which our
diplomatic and security partnership rests.
 
The outcome on February 11 was without precedent.  For
the first time, an American President and a Japanese
Prime Minister said in public that they could not agree
in private.  Both the President and the Prime Minister
made a deliberate decision not to paper over our
differences.  The acknowledgment of that outcome was a
welcome sign of a new candor in our relationship.  But
that outcome also represented a failure to carry out the
Framework Agreement that our two nations had reached last
July.
 
For the world's two largest economies, agreeing to
disagree is not good enough.  Acknowledging our economic
differences must be a starting point for finally
resolving them.
 
Our relationship has always been more than the sum of its
parts.  Last month, we pledged not to let our
disagreements over the Framework interfere with our
continued cooperation in other vital areas.  But we must
not allow a situation to persist that might eventually
erode public and political support for our overall
relationship.
 
When we signed the Framework Agreement last July, we saw
it as a major step toward change.  The Agreement
represents a common understanding of our shared
responsibilities and the commitments we made to the
world.  We pledged jointly "to promote global growth,
open markets, and a vital world trading system."
 
Each government also made individual commitments.
 
For its part, the United States promised to reduce its
budget deficits and improve its competitiveness.  And we
pledged to keep our markets open.  It is beyond argument
that the United States has kept these commitments, and
the result has been strong growth and new jobs.
 
For more than a decade, Japan and the other G-7 countries
urged America to exercise greater fiscal discipline.  You
were right.  The American people elected President
Clinton, in part, to cut the budget deficit--and he has.
After a tough fight in Congress last summer, we passed a
bold deficit-reduction program.  Our deficit is projected
to shrink for the third year in a row, the first time
that has happened in more than four decades.
 
We are also honoring our commitment to improve American
competitiveness.  We are working to cut health care
costs, encourage new technology, and improve education
and training.  In industry after industry--from autos to
steel to computers--our private sector is becoming more
productive and competitive.  Quality is unquestionably
up; costs are down.   We are taking responsibility for
our economic problems.  We are not blaming others.
 
For its part in the Framework, the Government of Japan
also made significant commitments.  Japan promised to
give a strong and sustained boost to its domestic demand
in order to significantly reduce its current account
surplus.  Japan also committed to increase market access
for foreign goods and services and to open specified
sectors of its economy to more imports and greater
foreign investment.
 
These commitments have not been met.
 
First, Japan's trade surplus with the United States is
increasing, reaching a record $59 billion in 1993.
Moreover, Japan's imbalances span the globe.  Japan's
surpluses with the European Union and with its Asian
trading partners have nearly doubled since 1990.  Given
Japan's present policies, few are forecasting "the highly
significant decrease" in Japan's current account surplus
called for in the Framework.
 
Second, a reduction in Japan's current account surplus
and a sustained, significant increase in Japan's global
imports will depend in large part on macroeconomic
policies that stimulate demand in Japan.  The recent
stimulus packages, including the new budget announced
last month, are insufficient to produce sustained,
demand-led growth.
 
Third, Japan has pledged sectoral agreements that will
produce "tangible results" in certain areas.  But Japan
has been unwilling to reach agreements on specific steps
to open markets in the priority sectors of insurance,
government procurement, and autos and auto parts.  Our
two governments agreed in the Framework to use "objective
criteria" to evaluate progress in order to determine if
the agreements are succeeding in opening markets.  But
Japan has declined to provide realistic ways to measure
progress to ensure that any such agreements are working.
 
I came to Japan to make sure our message is understood:
Your government needs to take firm action to honor the
commitments it made in the Framework Agreement.  The
agreement represents commitments made voluntarily by
Japan to its most important partner and ally.  Trust and
confidence are important between good friends.
 
We do not seek new agreements for their own sake.  We
have had a decade of agreements--and still many Japanese
markets remain closed to American products and services
that are popular and competitive around the globe.
 
Our objectives are simple:  to open markets and to
promote global growth.  To advance those objectives,
Japan needs to take concrete and credible actions, and to
take them now.
 
The United States continues to champion free trade.  In
his first year in office, President Clinton has
registered the most significant accomplishments on behalf
of free trade and global growth of any U.S. President in
nearly half a century.
 
President Clinton pushed to conclude the Uruguay Round,
the most far-reaching trade agreement in history.
Against the odds, and at great political risk, he won
passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement.  And
he took an important initiative to deepen our engagement
in this dynamic region when he hosted, in Seattle, the
first-ever meeting of leaders from the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation forum.
 
As the President has said, America wants to compete in
the world, not retreat from it.  The United States
remains firmly committed to free trade in theory and in
practice.  And we expect the same of other nations.
 
President Clinton's decision last week to reinstate the
Super 301 provision of our trade law must be seen in this
light.  The President's purpose was to provide a basis to
open foreign markets, not to close ours.  Super 301 is
meant to supplement, not supplant, our bilateral trade
negotiations and our commitment to multilateral remedies.
It is a flexible, orderly, and transparent process that
helps to identify unfair trade practices and eliminate
them in ways consistent with the GATT.
 
Nobody wants a trade war.  We want trade opportunities--
for the United States, for Japan, and for the world.
 
Last July's Framework commitments were made for Japan's
benefit as well as that of the United States and other
nations.  By boosting domestic demand, opening markets,
welcoming foreign investment, and deregulating its
economy, Japan would create business opportunities for
Japanese as well as foreign companies.  It would spur
innovation and improve productivity.
 
Fulfilling the Framework commitments would expand choices
and lower prices for Japanese consumers and businesses.
Joint American and Japanese studies show that consumers
in Japan spend, on average, 40% more than Americans for
the goods they buy. For example, I am sure that you have
noticed prices for personal and office computers in Japan
are coming down as competitive American firms are able to
enter the Japanese market.  Open markets not only help
lower prices, they also fuel growth.  Ultimately, only
Japanese consumers, not the rest of the world, can pull
Japan out of recession.
 
Meeting the Framework commitments also would allow
Japan's people to enjoy more fully the benefits of their
hard work in an even more innovative and vibrant society.
The aspirations of the Japanese people are converging
with those of people in other advanced industrial
nations.  Amid all the initiatives, all the negotiations,
and all the agreements, let us be clear about the
benefits we seek:  more choices for our citizens, better
jobs, and greater rewards for our workers.
 
Almost eight years ago, the ground-breaking Maekawa
Report called for a more open economy and a smaller trade
surplus.  Since that report was issued, the world has
seen remarkable change.  The Berlin Wall fell; the Soviet
Union disintegrated; South Africa abolished apartheid;
Israel and the Palestinians made an historic breakthrough
for peace.  We also have seen your nation assume ever-
greater responsibilities for promoting security and
development around the globe.
 
Still, Japan's unbalanced economic relationship with the
world persists.  Japan's surpluses with the United
States, Europe, and Asia are now a major asymmetry in the
global economy.  At the same time, the share of income in
Japan devoted to consumption has actually fallen.
 
In addition, Japan still has the lowest rate of foreign
direct investment among the world's advanced economies.
While the United States has 29% of the world's foreign
direct investment and the European Union has 39%, Japan
has less than 1%.  This shows that, despite its
spectacular export performance, Japan has a long way to
go to become fully integrated into the global economy.
 
Your organization has been a pioneering advocate for
economic reform.  As Mr. Hayami has said, Japan's
economic challenge today remains fundamentally the same
as that described in the Maekawa Report.  The study you
issued last November concluded that such a course would
boost Japan's economy and lift its living standards.
Earlier this week, Mr. Hayami conveyed to the Prime
Minister a new report calling for open markets and
expanded domestic demand.  I expect that your report will
be taken very seriously.
 
Today, many Japanese are voicing a desire for reform.
Whether business leaders such as yourselves, or political
leaders, or consumers, they are supporting change.  The
demand for reform has inspired--and elected--a new
generation of leaders.  Prime Minister Hosokawa has shown
a commitment and determination to change by reforming
Japan's political system, opening its construction and
rice markets, and seeking to deregulate the economy.  We
know he is committed to further economic change and
openness.  We commend him, and we encourage him to push
ahead.
 
As Japan assumes the global leadership role it has
earned, we can begin to build a new Pacific future in
which open societies are linked by shared values and open
markets.  To widen the circle of democracy and prosperity
in the region, we also must strengthen the circle of
security and stability.  Whatever the economic challenges
we must overcome--and they are great--our security
alliance will remain a solid anchor of our relationship.
 
President Clinton is reinforcing America's security
engagement in the region.  During his trip to Asia last
July, he outlined four priorities for Asia-Pacific
security.  Our first priority is a continued American
military commitment, based upon our treaty alliances with
Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the
Philippines.  We will maintain a substantial forward-
deployed presence in the Asia-Pacific as the linchpin of
that commitment.  We will soon have as many military
personnel stationed in East Asia as in Europe.
 
Yesterday, the Under Secretary of Defense and I met with
your Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to discuss
bilateral and regional security issues.  This morning, we
convened a meeting of the Security Consultative
Committee, the first ever at this level, to consider ways
of further strengthening our security partnership.
 
Another priority is to curb the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction.  North Korea's nuclear program is a
threat to regional stability and our common goal of non-
proliferation.  With Japan's support, and working closely
with the Republic of Korea, we have begun discussions
with the North Koreans to help resolve the nuclear issue.
Although we have made some progress, the challenge ahead
remains very great.
 
We recognize that the promotion of democracy enhances our
security because democratic nations rarely start wars or
threaten their neighbors.  The United States and Japan
have worked together to help the people of one of Asia's
most tortured countries, Cambodia, shape a free society.
Yesterday, I joined your Foreign Minister at the
International Conference on the Reconstruction of
Cambodia as we reaffirmed our commitment to help Cambodia
rebuild.  Our joint efforts demonstrate that even the
most bitter conflicts can be resolved by patient
diplomacy and determined peacemaking.  The Cambodian
people demonstrated another truth when they voted last
May:  The demand for liberty is a human instinct, not a
Western export.
 
Tonight I travel to Beijing, where I will reiterate that
overall significant progress on human rights remains
necessary if I am to recommend the renewal of most-
favored-nation trade status for China.  What we seek in
China should not be regarded as extraordinary.  What we
seek is no more than the recognition of the most basic,
universally recognized human rights.  And human rights is
a key issue in our relations with several other Asian
countries, including Vietnam and Burma.  We look forward
to joining Japan, East Asia's largest democracy, in a
constructive approach toward each of these nations.
 
Our cooperation on global issues such as the environment
and population is also strong and growing.  We are
working together to develop advanced transportation and
environmental technologies.  Last month, President
Clinton and Prime Minister Hosokawa agreed, as part of
the common global agenda of the Framework, to coordinate
a $12 billion assistance program to stem population
growth and to prevent AIDS in developing countries.
Yesterday I recommended to your government that we
continue and expand these efforts.
 
These many examples of our diplomatic and security
cooperation point to the deep and abiding strength of our
bilateral relationship.  They demonstrate our shared
determination to promote global peace and prosperity.
Japan should continue to assume greater responsibilities
in the post-Cold War world.  That is why the United
States strongly supports a permanent seat for Japan on
the UN Security Council.
 
I was born in 1925, just before the start of the Showa
Era.  I have seen Japan prosper.  I have seen the
relationship between our nations mature.  As we approach
the next century, in the early years of the Heisei Era, I
am confident that we will continue to prosper and mature.
But I hope my years give me the perspective to say this:
For our overall relationship to improve, we must change.
 
The vitality of our partnership depends on our capacity
to adapt to a changing world.  Our security and
diplomatic partnership is already evolving to meet new
challenges.  Now our economic partnership must adapt as
well.
 
I have assumed that I could speak openly today about our
economic differences precisely because our broader
relationship continues to be so secure.  We cannot
realize the full potential of our relationship unless we
have harmony and strength among all its elements.  We
must make our economic and trade links as mutually
beneficial as our political and security bonds.
 
I acknowledge that there are some who are pessimistic
about the future of our partnership.  I want you to know
that I am not one of them.  I am optimistic that we will
meet our responsibility to change.
 
As we move ahead, I am confident we will sustain the
maturity that has developed in our relations.  But that
maturity also means taking responsibility for our
respective parts of the problem and taking action to
repair them.  We cannot let political deadlock, or
bureaucratic inertia, or outdated thinking stand in the
way.
 
If together we meet this test of history, our two nations
will be far better placed to meet the regional and global
challenges of the 21st century.  The world looks to us
for leadership.  As the world's two largest economies, we
share great responsibilities:  to build a better future
for the Japanese people, for the American people, and for
the world.  We must accept these responsibilities.
 
Thank you very much.  (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 2
 
The U.S.-China Relationship:  The Right Balance
Secretary Christopher
Statement by Secretary Christopher, Washington, DC, March
22, 1994
 
President Clinton has placed America's economic strength
at the heart of our national security strategy in the
post-Cold War world.  Our Administration's foreign
policy, like our country, stands for open societies as
well as open markets.  We are convinced that the two are
inseparably linked.
 
This balance shapes our approach toward China.  As the
President has said, our policy recognizes "the value of
China and the values of America."  This approach also
guided my recent trip to Beijing in advance of the early
June deadline for the President's decision on renewing
most-favored-nation trade status.  My purpose was to
inform China's leaders of the urgent need to make further
progress on human rights, and to reaffirm our intention
to engage China constructively on the many issues where
our interests coincide.
 
The United States seeks a broad, positive relationship
with a strong, secure, and prosperous China.  We pursue
many important common goals on a bilateral, regional, and
global basis.  We share a powerful interest in a stable
and secure Asia.  Both nations have a strong interest in
ensuring a non-nuclear Korean peninsula, and we have been
cooperating to achieve that objective.  And with drug
trafficking, alien smuggling, environmental degradation,
and other global issues, our agenda is growing as we head
toward the next century.
 
Our economic interests are also converging.  China's
explosive growth is increasingly attractive to American
exporters and investors.  We are determined to expand
American participation in the Chinese market.  China has
an even more significant stake in open and profitable
access to the American market.  We account for almost 40%
of China's total exports, and its trade surplus with the
United States is more than $20 billion.
 
But we must not assume that a free market in goods can
produce or protect a free market in ideas.  Nor can we
abandon our responsibility to support human rights around
the world.  The character of our relationship with China
depends significantly on how the Chinese Government
treats its people.  The American people would have it no
other way.
 
Last May, President Clinton forged the first consensus--a
consensus of conscience--on American policy toward China
since the horrors of Tiananmen Square four years earlier.
The core of our policy, the President said, would be "a
resolute insistence" on overall significant progress on
human rights if MFN for China was to be renewed once
again.  The executive order that the President issued was
shaped in the closest consultation with Congress, and it
won wide support from business leaders and human rights
advocates alike.  This approach avoided more rigid
legislation and stipulated that trade, nonproliferation,
and other issues would be addressed through instruments
other than MFN.
 
Our specific conditions for renewing MFN are reasonable
and attainable.  We are looking for positive trends--and
we have made clear what is needed in the seven areas set
forth in the President's executive order.  We are not
asking China to apply American prescriptions, only to
adhere to the universal standards of human rights that
bind most nations in the world today.
 
The President has reiterated that our intention is not to
isolate China but to integrate it more fully into the
global community and the global economy.  Since last
September, the Administration has pursued a strategy of
intensive diplomatic engagement with China to advance a
range of security, political, and economic goals.  Within
this comprehensive framework, we have given the Chinese
the incentive and the latitude to demonstrate progress on
human rights.
 
Congressional support for the President's policy has
remained steady and strong.  Last month, more than two-
thirds of the Senate voted to support the President's
executive order and his approach toward human rights in
China.  And on the eve of my visit two weeks ago, 275
members of the House of Representatives sent me a letter
backing the President's policy   on MFN.
 
The suggestion that the Chinese discouraged my visit is a
pure canard.  Chinese Foreign Minister Qian has been
encouraging me to visit for five months, most recently in
our late January meeting in Paris.  The Chinese confirmed
plans for my visit in late February, asking only that I
not arrive on March 10, the opening day of the National
People's Congress.  I obliged them by arriving on March
11.
 
Some say I should have canceled my trip, particularly in
the face of the Chinese Government's deplorable efforts
to silence its citizens.  But that course would have been
a grave error.  I went to Beijing to carry out the
President's policy and to make sure that the Chinese
Government--at the highest levels--does not misunderstand
our nation's position and does not underestimate the
strong support that our policy commands from Congress and
the American people.   Despite some of the atmospherics,
I believe that this message now has been clearly received
by China's leaders.  And I believe that they now realize
that complacency is not an option.
 
In the course of very tough exchanges, we made progress
on the two mandatory issues specified in the executive
order.  We signed a joint declaration to end exports to
the United States of goods produced by prison labor.  We
also received concrete assurances on inspections of all
suspected Chinese facilities, within strict time limits.
And China promised to resolve the few outstanding
emigration cases.
 
On other issues, China agreed, for the first time, to
review interference with VOA signals.  It agreed to begin
talks with Red Cross experts to arrange visits to
prisoners of conscience.  China also supplied information
on about 235 prisoners we had identified, and, for the
first time, promised to provide information on the status
of 106 imprisoned Tibetans.
 
I told China's leaders that these steps represented
improvement, but more is needed.  Particular progress is
required with respect to the release of prisoners and the
situation in Tibet.  Anyone who has worked to advance
human rights knows that it is tough, slogging work and
the progress usually comes only in incremental stages.  I
will not invent or inflate that progress.
 
We will be seeking--and evaluating--further progress as
we move toward decisions on renewing MFN.  That goal is
attainable if Beijing truly wants the more constructive
relationship that is within reach.
 
President Clinton's policy toward China keeps faith with
American      ideals--and keeps focused on American
interests.  That essential balance is the heart of the
consensus we have achieved with the Congress and the
public.  It must remain at the heart of our nation's
relationship with China.  (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 3
 
U.S. Commitment to Our POW/MIAs
Secretary Christopher
Remarks following meeting with Admiral Larson, Hickham
Air Force Base, Honolulu, Hawaii, March 5, 1994
 
It was a great pleasure to see Admiral Larson again--the
Com-mander in Chief of Pacific Forces--at the Central
Identification Laboratory.  He is one of the outstanding
military officers whom I've known over the years, and the
commitment, dedication, and skill he brings to this job
are really quite extraordinary.
 
We discussed a number of issues, including North Korea
and the nuclear situation there.  We talked about the
importance of our security presence in the region.  As
you know, the United States is determined to remain a
Pacific power.  I came here to have a full briefing on
our forces and resources in this area, and I certainly
received that from Admiral Larson.
 
As you know, we have five important bilateral alliances
in the Pacific region.  They are the cornerstone of our
security in this area.  The excellent briefing I had
today provides the foundation for our U.S.-Australian
ministerial, at which Admiral Larson will join me.  The
U.S.-Australian alliance has been a model.  It has been
productive and cooperative.  The Australians have been
with us through the years and through many wars.
 
In addition to the discussion of our forces in the
Pacific, today our meeting has focused on the Pacific
Command's impressive efforts to find answers about
servicemen and -women who did not come home from the war
in Indochina, as well as some of the other conflicts in
which the United States has been involved around the
world.
 
The Admiral briefed me on the extensive work that our men
and women from this command are doing on the ground in
Vietnam and in Laos and Cambodia.  I also met with the
staff of the lab, which Admiral Larson has identified as
having the solemn duty of identifying the remains of the
people who did not come home.
 
It's interesting to note that some soldiers in this
command were not born until after the war ended, but
that, nevertheless, they have committed themselves to
this on a volunteer basis.  It is a difficult and
sometimes dangerous job.
 
I was enormously impressed with the dedication and
professionalism of the men and women who do this work.
They are clearly determined to go to the ends of the
earth to find identifications if they possibly can.  I
was also impressed with the fact that they did not easily
assume that they had reached the right conclusion.  They
tested every conclusion and then tested it again, because
they knew that one of the worst things they could do
would be to make a misidentification and then have the
families or someone else prove that they were incorrect.
 
I think they believe as I do:  Each American who gave his
or her life in Vietnam deserves to have a final
accounting.  They believe the same is true with every
American who lost a husband, a child, or a parent.  They
all deserve to know the truth.  As you know, there are
eight teams in the field in Vietnam engaged in what is
very difficult and dangerous work.  They are scaling
cliffs.  They go through difficult jungle terrain; they
cross minefields.  Their excavation sites often involve
unexploded bombs.  I think you probably had some of the
same briefing that I did.  You see the terrain that they
have had to go through to try to identify these remains.
 
We believe that last year was the most productive since
the end of the war in making progress on POW/MIA issues.
In 1993, we repatriated the remains of 67 Americans.  In
early February of this year, we brought home 15 more.
Since the beginning of the Clinton Administration, we
have confirmed the deaths of 62 individuals on the list
of discrepancy cases, which reduces that number by almost
half.
 
We believe we now have the means to get the fullest
possible accounting. We can excavate crash sites and
burial locations.  We can investigate reports of possible
live prisoners.  We can interview witnesses in villages
and interview the Vietnamese military because we have the
cooperation of the Vietnamese Government.  We have
received a great deal of assistance from the Vietnamese
Government as well as from Vietnamese citizens who know
what a solemn and sacred duty we are undertaking here.
We need continued cooperation and persistence on the part
of the Americans as well as the Vietnamese friends there.
 
Earlier this month, the President announced that he was
lifting our trade embargo against Vietnam and
establishing a liaison office in Hanoi.  The President's
decision was based upon his assessment of Vietnam's
cooperation as well as on his conviction that taking
these two steps would stimulate additional cooperation
and thus lead to possible further accounting of POWs and
MIAs.
 
My discussions here today leave me absolutely confident
that we are doing everything we can to fulfill the
promise that President Clinton made:  that we would take
every conceivable step to try to help identify these
remains and to be as faithful as we could to the desires
and very necessary concerns of the families.
 
I am convinced that the dedication, expertise, and
commitment of the men and women of the Joint Task Force
and the Central Identification Laboratory will help us
reach the goal of the fullest possible accounting.
(###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 4
 
The U.S. and Australia:  Close Allies  And Trading
Partners
Secretary Christopher
Remarks before the American Chamber of Commerce in
Australia, Canberra, Australia, March 9, 1994
 
I welcome this chance to meet with representatives of
American business.  Whether I am in Washington or
traveling in the United States or abroad, I learn a great
deal from these sessions.  I look forward to your
comments and observations, and I hope you will be as
candid as you can be.
 
I am here--along with Frank Wisner, Under Secretary of
Defense, and Assistant Secretary Lord of the State
Department--to lead the annual ministerial-level talks
with the Australian Government.  We have discussed a wide
range of issues--and, I must say, this is a model
relationship.  We have a very strong trading relationship
with Australia.  Exports to Australia exceed $9 billion,
amounting to 180,000 jobs.  Australia is one of our
largest markets, and the United States is the largest
foreign investor in Australia.
 
Our relations have been enhanced by the very liberalized
course that Australia has followed in recent years.  In
many ways, it has set a standard for the rest of the
world.  Australia has helped lead regional and global
liberalization efforts through the Cairns Group and
through its great assistance in completing the GATT
Uruguay Round.
 
Our ties with Australia are also stronger because of the
emphasis that President Clinton and I are placing on the
Asia-Pacific region.  We have made it one of our six
strategic priorities, along with economic growth and
trade, which is the first of our priorities.  So what
we're doing here--and what all of you are doing in
Australia--fits in exactly with the President's
priorities.
 
A number of favorable things have happened in the United
States with respect to business and trade.  When the
President got the deficit reduction package passed last
year, it did a great deal to increase our economic
credibility.  The confidence generated by the deficit
reduction package has been a major factor in the economic
upturn in the United States.  Then the triple play of
NAFTA, APEC, and GATT underscored and confirmed the
primacy that President Clinton is giving to economic
matters and showed the results that can be achieved
through sustained effort.
 
I am going to Japan later today to meet with government
and business leaders and to continue to work on obtaining
greater market access.  This will benefit not only the
United States but Australia.  Since market access is not
just a U.S.-Japan problem but a global problem--in which
Japan's overall trade imbalance is more than $120
billion--this is something that we all need to work on
together.  For its part, the U.S. is determined to place
its economic relations with Japan on as sound a basis as
our security and political relations.
 
With all that has happened--GATT, NAFTA, APEC, our
efforts with Japan--it is fair to say that the United
States is back as a global economic leader.  Let me tell
you about another of the ways in which we are exercising
our leadership.  We have launched an initiative to
curtail the use of bribery to secure foreign contracts.
Illicit payments are a serious problem around the world.
They distort commercial transactions and prevent American
businesses from competing on the basis of price and
quality.
 
I know that in Australia the problem does not exist.  But
as business leaders, you probably are finding it in many
other areas where you are trying to compete.
International cooperation is vital.  Our businesses are
at a disadvantage if countries like the United States and
Australia have strong anti-bribery laws while the rest of
the world operates free of such constraints.  So we are
working with Australia and other industrialized countries
to try to get the OECD to adopt strong provisions to
prevent these illegal payments.  We are hoping that we
can persuade all countries to make a commitment to this
effort and have OECD support that regime.
 
Let me emphasize that we are supporting American business
not only through our policies, but through personal
efforts.  I have made it clear to the Department and to
our embassies around the world that we should work
vigorously to support American firms.  On almost every
trip, I have done something to promote American business.
We want to ensure that American businesses have a full
opportunity to compete fairly--that the deck is not
stacked against American business.
 
We are also taking steps to ensure that State Department
personnel are trained at our new National Foreign
Affairs Training Center to understand the centrality of
economic issues and to cope with the new world in which
we find ourselves.  We are preparing a new generation of
foreign affairs professionals to help all of you.
 
At the same time, we understand that business, not
government, determines whether the United States benefits
from international trade.  Our government is committed to
opening markets, but the private sector has to penetrate
them.  Fortunately, American goods and services are
highly competitive.  Every place I go, I hear that there
has been a major change in that regard:  The
manufacturing sector in the United States is robust and
producing products of very high quality, and our
services, of course, are the most advanced in the world.
 
The success of our firms here is a strong and graphic
illustration of what the private sector can achieve.  We
want to work together to expand trade between our two
countries.  We hope to deepen U.S. involvement in this
region, the most dynamic in the world.  We think we can
brighten the future of this region and America's future
by working together.  (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 5
 
U.S. Commitment to Cambodia
Secretary Christopher
Statement before the International Committee on the
Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC), Tokyo, Japan, March
10, 1994
 
Cambodia is now emerging from a quarter century of
violence.  In the last year it has been the scene of one
of the most remarkable, and most welcome, of the many
transformations made possible by the end of the Cold War.
 
The Cambodian people are survivors of a succession of
unforgiving conflicts.  They have seen foreign armies
come and go.  They have suffered massive dislocation.
They endured an extraordinarily bloody revolution.
 
When the Cambodia Settlement Agreement was signed in
Paris in October 1991, our objective was to end the
violence that had ravaged Cambodia for so many years.
The May 1993 election, in which 90% of the registered
voters participated, gave us a reason to believe that
Cambodia's peace will last.
 
Last May, Cambodians reminded us that the demand for
liberty is universal.  After all, farmers and monks and
former soldiers did not cross mine fields or risk threats
of violence on election day to embrace an alien creed.
They did so to assert their human rights after years of
having their destiny ruled by others.  To those who say
that democracy is a Western contrivance, I say, you
forgot to tell the Cambodian people.
 
King Sihanouk--to whom I wish a full and speedy recovery-
-has played a vital role in Cambodia's renewal.  I
congratulate the parties represented in the Royal
Cambodian Government for their perseverance and for their
commitment to the principles of democracy and economic
reform.  This reflects the wise leadership of First Prime
Minister Prince Ranariddh and of Second Prime Minister
Hun Sen.
 
The United Nations has also been indispensable to this
effort.  The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia was a
stunning peacekeeping success at a time when the focus
has been on shortcomings of such UN endeavors.  Few would
have predicted that during UNTAC's mandate, external
influence in Cambodia would be sharply reduced, violence
would be greatly lessened, almost 400,000 refugees would
return to their homes, and free and fair elections would
be conducted.
 
The UNTAC mission involved more than just keeping the
peace.  It required registering voters, organizing
elections, repatriating refugees, training police,
protecting human rights, and supervising state
institutions.  The United States commends the men and
women who served in Cambodia, under the leadership of the
Secretary General's Special Representative, Yasushi
Akashi, and the commander of UNTAC forces, Gen. John
Sanderson.  For 21 months, they gave Cambodia a respite
from fear.  They gave Cambodians a chance to rid their
country of violence and build a better future.
 
The peacekeepers have left Cambodia, and so far the peace
has held.  But Cambodians will not be able to recover
from the disasters of their past without sustained
international  assistance. Our challenge now is to help
Cambodians take charge of their future.  We must all do
our share so that their hard-won achievements are made
secure.
 
At our Tokyo meeting, in June 1992, donors pledged a
total of $880 million for the reconstruction and
rehabilitation of Cambodia, far in excess of the
Secretary General's appeal.  The additional $97 million
pledged at the ICORC meeting in September 1993, marked
the continuing commitment of donors to rebuilding
Cambodia.
 
The United States has provided more than $135 million in
humanitarian and development assistance for Cambodia,
meeting the pledge we made at the 1992 Tokyo conference.
This was in addition to the $517 million we contributed
through the United Nations to support the Cambodian peace
process.  Last year, we assisted in the repatriation of
almost 400,000 refugees from Thailand.  We have also
helped private voluntary organizations assure the
delivery of social services throughout the country.
 
Our aid has been well directed.  Before the elections,
the United States helped to nurture the growth of viable
political parties in Cambodia.  We are now providing
technical support to the key ministries in the new
government. At the request of King Sihanouk, we are
reconstructing the road from Phnom Penh to the deep-water
port of Sihanoukville--an alternative route to the
capital--so that supplies and trade goods need not be
shipped up the Mekong River through Vietnam.  We have
also provided $6 million to strengthen Cambodia's
capacity to clear its countryside of land mines.
 
Events in Cambodia no longer make front page news around
the world.  That is, in many ways, a happy sign.  But it
is not a reason to shift our attention.  As Cambodia
moves from crisis toward normality, it is vital that we
stay engaged.
 
At this afternoon's session, the Deputy Administrator for
our Agency for International Development, Carol
Lancaster, will announce our pledge to support the relief
and rehabilitation   effort we launched last year, and to
support programs to expand basic health care and
education throughout Cambodia.
 
My presence here today reflects the U.S. Government's
continuing commitment to Cambodia, its democratic
government, and its nascent market economy.  We are now
working with the Cambodian Government to base our
assistance strategy on what the Cambodians themselves
identify as critical needs for their nation's
reconstruction.
 
In that regard, I am very pleased that President Clinton
has just nominated Charles Twining as Ambassador to
Cambodia.  His distinguished career in the Foreign
Service includes superb leadership of the U.S. mission
during the period when Cambodia moved from horror to
hope.
 
Cambodia's experience holds powerful lessons for the
international community, particularly for the developing
world.  It shows that patient diplomacy and determined
peacemaking, together with the courage of a people, can
produce results, even after years of bitter conflict.
 
The future of democracy in Cambodia can hardly be taken
for granted. The Khmer Rouge has not yet disarmed.
Cambodia is in great need of better communications,
reliable electricity, and clean water.  The involvement
of the donor community must, therefore, remain
unwavering.  The commitment of the Cambodian Government
to sound economic policies must also remain firm if the
assistance we provide is to be effective.
 
We are heartened by our exchanges with the Royal
Cambodian Government.  I would also like to note the
important contribution made by the World Bank and the IMF
in preparing for this meeting.  We hope that the donor
community will continue to rely on these institutions.
We hope that with their help, Cambodia will one day join
the ranks of Asia's economic success stories.
 
Last year, speaking at Tokyo's Waseda University,
President Clinton outlined his vision of a "New Pacific
Community," based on "shared strength, shared prosperity,
and shared commitment to democratic values."  As we
continue to join our efforts with those of the Cambodian
people, Cambodia will assume its place in that Pacific
Community.  I hope that as it begins to prosper, Cambodia
will help lift the curtain that separates the nations of
Indochina from the growing economies and opening
societies of East Asia.
 
The United States will continue to be a partner in this
cooperative effort, which our Japanese hosts have done so
much to advance.  If we are to widen the circle of
prosperity and strengthen the circle of peace in Asia, it
is vital that this endeavor succeed.    (###)
 
END OF DISPATCH VOLUME 5, NO 13

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