US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH VOLUME 5, NUMBER 12, MARCH 21, 1994 PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE: 1. Nuclear Situation in North Korea -- Lynn E. Davis 2. President Clinton Extends Moratorium On Nuclear Testing 3. Argentina and Brazil: Ratification of the Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement 4. President Clinton Meets With Georgia Chairman Shevardnadze -- President Clinton 5. Focus on Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation: Finance and Environment Ministers Meetings and 1994 Plans 6. New Passport Being Issued 7. What's in Print: Foreign Relations of the United States ARTICLE 1: Nuclear Situation in North Korea Lynn E. Davis, Under Secretary for International Security Affairs Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, March 3, 1994 Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the current situation with respect to the North Korean nuclear situation. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is one of the Clinton Administration's critical foreign policy priorities. We look forward to working with the Congress, especially on the North Korean situation. A failure in achieving a non-nuclear Korea could increase insecurity throughout Asia and undermine the overall NPT regime. But success could bring an end to North Korea's isolation and threat while reinforcing international norms against nuclear proliferation. Today, I plan to review the most significant developments since the beginning of our discussions with the D.P.R.K. in June 1993 and to describe briefly our thinking about how we plan to proceed in the coming weeks. U.S. Policy Our objectives in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue are a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and a strong non-proliferation regime. We must ensure that North Korea does not possess nuclear weapons and will not build them in the future. That means North Korea must agree to: -- Full D.P.R.K. membership in the NPT; -- Full cooperation with the IAEA in implementing fullscope safeguards, including special inspections and other measures to clear up the discrepancies in the D.P.R.K.'s past declaration; and -- Full implementation of the North-South Denuclearization Declaration, which bans uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities and provides for a bilateral inspection regime. Through diplomacy, we have made a serious effort to find out whether North Korea is willing to accept a nuclear- free Korean Peninsula. We have also created a firm international coalition in support of our goals. We have, nevertheless, pursued our dialogue on the basis of North Korean commitments neither to pursue any diversion of nuclear material nor renounce its suspension of its withdrawal from the NPT. And we have made it clear to North Korea that we will not continue discussions without tangible progress toward resolution of the nuclear issue. We have consulted closely with Japan and the Republic of Korea through normal diplomatic channels as well as through regular trilateral meetings. Both Japan and the Republic of Korea fully support our policy. At the same time, we and the Republic of Korea have continued to take prudent measures to ensure that our defenses remain strong. Last year, we conducted a number of joint exercises designed to ensure our capabilities in case of hostilities. We are pursuing a force modernization program begun in the late 1980s. And we continue to provide technical assistance, transfer technology, and participate in a large number of co- production programs with South Korea. At the request of the UN commander of U.S. forces in Korea, General Luck, we have been considering a decision to deploy a Patriot missile battalion to the R.O.K. This would be a defensive deployment in response to North Korean missile capability and is a prudent military step in light of the prevailing tension on the Korean Peninsula. We are continuing to consult with the R.O.K. on this matter with the predisposition that we will go ahead when the time is right. Our Diplomatic Efforts From the very beginning, we have recognized that discussions with North Korea would be difficult and protracted. That has proven to be the case. The North has continuously tried to divide us from our allies: the R.O.K., Japan, and the IAEA; they have failed. During high-level discussions in June and July, the D.P.R.K. agreed to suspend its withdrawal from the NPT and to "freeze" its nuclear activities at the Yongbyon site pending the outcome of our dialogue. That means no further reprocessing, acceptance of IAEA inspections to ensure that there has been no diversion of materials or reprocessing, and no refueling of the five MW reactors without IAEA inspectors present. The North also agreed in July to resume discussions with South Korea and the IAEA on the nuclear issue. Since August, we have held a number of working-level meetings with the North Korean representatives to secure implementation of these commitments. There have been two difficulties. First, while the North had agreed to allow IAEA inspections to maintain the continuity of safeguards, a dispute arose when the IAEA judged that it needed a more extensive inspection in September than the one conducted in August. Second, while the North agreed in principle to resume discussions of the nuclear issue with South Korea, no meetings had occurred. In late December, we reached agreement in principle to resolve these disputes. The North accepted IAEA inspections needed to maintain the continuity of safeguards at the seven declared sites. The purpose of these activities, according to the IAEA, is to ensure that no nuclear material has been diverted since earlier inspections and to facilitate future verification of nondiversion. Finally, the North agreed to resume North- South working level talks in Panmunjom to arrange modalities for an exchange of special envoys. In return, we agreed that when the IAEA inspections and the North-South talks begin, we would announce a date for the third round of U.S.-D.P.R.K. talks, and the R.O.K.-- with U.S. support--would agree to announce suspension of the joint military exercise "Team Spirit '94." We also told the North that we will not hold the third round of talks until the inspections were satisfactorily completed and a serious discussion on the nuclear issue occurs between the North and South. IAEA-D.P.R.K. Consultations The first step in implementing the December New York agreement was for the North to work out the detailed arrangements with the IAEA on the scope and timing of inspections necessary to maintain the continuity of safeguards. Let me emphasize that we have made it clear to the North that it must agree to IAEA requirements for continuity of safeguards and that the U.S. was not prepared to intervene in the discussions between the IAEA and the North. We have fully supported the IAEA's efforts to resolve this issue in a manner which does not undermine its functions or the international non- proliferation regime and will continue to do so. The talks between the IAEA and the D.P.R.K., which began in early January, resulted in an agreement on February 15. It is our understanding that the North has agreed to conduct all of the activities the IAEA feels necessary to verify that nuclear material in these facilities has not been diverted since earlier inspections. As Director General Blix recently stated, this upcoming inspection to verify the continuity of safeguards knowledge is "in complete consonance with the objective of safeguards as defined in safeguards agreements." The IAEA seeks to maintain "continuity of safeguards information" in order to keep track of the production, storage, and disposition of nuclear material. If the continuity of safeguards information is damaged or broken, the IAEA's ability to assure non-diversion is put into question. I would note that the North has understood since our dialogue began in June that it must continue to maintain the continuity of safeguards knowledge. Disputes have arisen not over the frequency of these inspections but over their scope. Next Steps Throughout this process, we have made it clear to the North that it must choose between two paths. If it rejects our requirements for a continuing dialogue and resolution of the nuclear issue, the international community will have no choice but to take steps to punish and isolate the D.P.R.K. On the other hand, if the North accepts our requirements, we and the international community are willing to take steps to address the North's stated security concerns and to move toward a more normal political and economic relationship. Our strategy, if diplomacy fails, takes us back to the UN Security Council and to steps to raise the costs to North Korea for failing to abide by its NPT commitments. We have a number of different options available for sanctions. We would begin by consulting with the P-5 and key regional allies, especially Japan and the R.O.K., on a sanctions strategy. I would note that both Japan and the Republic of Korea, as well as other members of the Perm Five, would fully support such action if the North does not move to resolve the international community's concerns. Our strategy for a third round, if diplomacy succeeds, is--as outlined by President Clinton and President Kim of South Korea--to pursue a "broad and thorough" approach to nuclear and other issues. Our primary goal is that the North must make a clear commitment to take the steps necessary to resolve the nuclear issue in the near future. It must demonstrate in actions, not just words, that it is renouncing a nuclear weapons capability. That means the North: 1. Must remain a member of the NPT and implement its IAEA fullscope safeguards agreement, including special inspections and any other measures needed to clear up past discrepancies; and 2. Must work with South Korea to fully implement the North-South Denuclearization Declaration. As the D.P.R.K. takes these steps, we are prepared to reciprocate with measures to address North Korea's stated security concerns and to move in the direction of improved political and economic relations. To implement this approach, we will need legal flexibility to use both inducements and potential "sticks" to influence the North. Therefore, we do not favor any legislation that would impose additional legal barriers to lifting existing economic sanctions. Conclusion In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, from the very beginning of our effort to resolve this issue, we have followed a careful and steady strategy. That strategy has been designed to prevent any further North Korean nuclear activity at its declared sites while testing the prospects of resolving the nuclear issue through diplomacy. Our diplomacy has played another role as well: to create a strong international coalition in support of our efforts, in case our dialogue fails and we are forced to return to the Security Council for further action. At the same time, we have maintained a strong defensive military posture in the region, in the event that our peaceful efforts fail. If the North executes the agreement we reached in December and its recent understanding with the IAEA on inspections needed to maintain the continuity of safeguards, the way will be open for a third round of U.S.-D.P.R.K. talks at which we will seek a political resolution of the nuclear issue. If it does not, then the issue will be returned to the UN Security Council for further action, including sanctions. (###) ARTICLE 2: President Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Testing Statement by White House Press Secretary Dee Dee Myers, Washington, DC, March 15, 1994. The President informed Congress yesterday that he was extending the moratorium on nuclear testing by the United States through September 1995. The President's decision was based on fundamental U.S. national security interests, weighing the contribution further tests would make to improving the safety and reliability of the U.S. arsenal in preparation for a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) against: -- The restraint the other declared nuclear powers have shown in not responding to China's nuclear test last October with tests of their own; -- The encouraging progress recorded in the CTB negotiations since they formally opened on January 25; and, -- The adverse implications further U.S. nuclear tests would have on our broader non-proliferation objectives, including, most notably, our interest in securing the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty next year. The President will decide next year whether to extend the moratorium beyond September 1995, taking into account the same four factors noted above. (###) ARTICLE 3: Argentina and Brazil: Ratification of the Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement Statement by Department Spokesman Michael McCurry, Washington, DC, March 4, 1994. Brazil completed ratification on February 25 of the Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement (QSA). This, together with Argentina's earlier ratification of this comprehensive nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the bilateral Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), will bring the landmark nuclear non-proliferation agreement into full effect. We congratulate Argentina and Brazil for clearly demonstrating firm commitment to arresting the global spread of weapons of mass destruction. Their joint initiative will contribute to international security and serve as a model for others. (###) ARTICLE 4: President Clinton Meets With Georgia Chairman Shevardnadze President Clinton Opening statement at a news conference following a meeting with Chairman Shevardnadze, Washington, DC, March 7, 1994 It's a real pleasure and an honor for me to welcome Chairman Eduard Shevardnadze to the White House today. Few leaders in our time have earned the degree of international respect that Chairman Shevardnadze enjoys. He's a statesman whose vision and diplomacy have played an immeasurably important role in bringing a peaceful end to the Cold War. This was our first personal meeting, although we've talked by phone on other occasions. It was a productive one. We discussed the great political and economic challenges facing Georgia. We discussed the steps the United States can take to help Georgia meet those challenges. I reaffirmed in very strong terms America's support for the independence, the sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of Georgia. And I expressed support for the efforts sponsored by the United Nations to find a lasting political settlement in the Abkhaz region of Georgia. I'm hopeful that the parties to that conflict can achieve in their negotiations and maintain an effective cease- fire. If they can, the United States would be inclined to support a UN peace-keeping operation in Georgia, an operation that would not involve U.S. military units. We've already begun consultations on this issue with the Congress, whose views and support will be important. And Chairman Shevardnadze will have the opportunity to discuss this and other matters with Members of Congress during his stay here with us. In our meeting today, we also discussed Georgia's efforts to expand cooperation with other nations in the Caucasus region. We agreed that both our nations have a tremendous stake in the success of reform in Russia--that a democratic and market-oriented Russia at peace with its neighbors is in the interests of Georgia and the United States. I made it clear in our talks that the United States is committed to encouraging greater political freedom and economic renewal in Georgia. That commitment is outlined by the joint declaration and bilateral investment treaty we've signed today. Our commitment is also underscored by the $70 million in assistance the U.S. has allocated to Georgia so far this year. Most of these funds are dedicated to humanitarian efforts. As Georgia moves toward peace and proceeds with reform, we're prepared to increase our technical and economic assistance as well. This is clearly a difficult time of transition for Georgia. But throughout its rich history, Georgia many times has met and overcome adversity. I'm hopeful that the renowned resilience of the Georgian people will serve them well as they build a more stable and prosperous future. As they face that work, the Georgian people are indeed fortunate to have a leader with a vision, the stature, the leadership, and the courage of Chairman Shevardnadze. And I look forward to working with him in the days ahead. (###) ARTICLE 5: Focus on Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Finance and Environment Ministers Meetings and 1994 Plans Background The 17-member APEC forum is building on and contributing significantly to the dramatic economic transformation of the Asia-Pacific region. Since its establishment in 1989, APEC has evolved into the most promising forum available to promote greater economic cooperation and trade liberalization in the region. The APEC economies together represent about half the world's population, about half the world's output, and just over 40% of world trade. This cooperation is important for the U.S. For example, in 1993, almost 60% of U.S. merchandise exports and 67% of U.S. merchandise imports were with other APEC member economies. Last year, total U.S. trade with APEC economies was just over three times that with the European Union. The November 1993 APEC Ministerial in Seattle ended the U.S. year as APEC chair. APEC ministers took important steps to strengthen the organization and to make it increasingly relevant to the real work of the region's business people, and they agreed to work toward more open and collaborative economic relations in the Asia-Pacific region. At Blake Island, near Seattle, President Clinton hosted a historic meeting of APEC leaders. This unprecedented gathering marked the emergence of a new voice for the region and an opportunity to build a new foundation that harnesses the energy of these diverse and dynamic economies. The leaders' discussion centered on economic challenges, national priorities, and mechanisms for achieving real economic prosperity throughout the region. The leaders developed a range of initiatives for action in the coming year that will build on the spirit of openness and cooperation and contribute to the economic growth of the entire Pacific Basin. APEC efforts are underway to follow up on these initiatives, which include: -- Convene an APEC finance ministers meeting to discuss broad economic issues; -- Establish a Pacific Business Forum in which senior business representatives will identify issues APEC should address to facilitate regional trade and investment; -- Establish an APEC Education Program to develop regional cooperation in higher education; -- Establish an APEC Business Volunteer Program to promote cooperation in human resource development; -- Convene a meeting of APEC ministers involved with small and medium-sized enterprises to discuss ways to improve the environment for the operation of these enterprises; -- Develop a non-binding code of principles covering investment issues; -- Develop APEC's policy dialogue and action plan for conserving energy, improving the environment, and sustaining economic growth; and -- Establish a center to facilitate the exchange of technology and technology management skills among APEC members. APEC Finance Ministers Meeting One of the leaders' initiatives was a first-ever meeting of the 17 APEC finance ministers hosted by Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen in Honolulu on March 18-19, 1994. -- This meeting focused on regional macroeconomic developments, highlighting successful growth strategies. Emphasis was on the significant role of private investment, including foreign investment, in generating strong growth. -- With the high demand for expanded or modernized infrastructure in the region, ministers discussed how to finance both this investment and the continued strong pace of private investment. -- Particular emphasis was on the effectiveness of domestic and international capital markets and the challenges facing these markets in meeting demand for financing. APEC Environment Ministers Meeting APEC ministers concerned with the environment will meet on March 24-25, 1994, at the first high-level APEC meeting devoted to environmental issues. Canadian Deputy Prime Minister and Environment Minister Sheila Copps will host the meeting in Vancouver, Canada. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Carol M. Browner will lead the U.S. delegation. Over 12,000 participants are expected to attend the GLOBE 94 International Trade Fair and Conference taking place in Vancouver at the same time as the APEC environment ministers meeting. The GLOBE conference will focus on "Business and the Environment" to identify business opportunities arising from today's environmental challenges. At the APEC environmental meeting, ministers will discuss: -- A vision statement to underline APEC members' commitment to the environment and sustainable development; -- Principles for integrating economic and environmental considerations into APEC; -- Environmental technology, such as pollution prevention and clean technology; -- Policy tools, such as economic instruments and environmental standards; -- Sustainable cities; and -- Environmental education and information. Results of Jakarta SOM In Jakarta on February 2-4, 1994, Indonesia hosted the first of four APEC senior officials meetings (SOMs). The next three will be in Indonesia during the weeks of May 16, September 5, and, finally, just before the APEC Ministerial meeting in November 1994. Senior officials oversee the work of APEC during the year and prepare APEC for the annual ministers meeting. The Indonesian senior official is Ambassador Wisber Loeis, who chaired the Jakarta SOM. The U.S. senior official is Sandra B. O'Leary, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. The Jakarta SOM marked a smooth transition from the U.S. to Indonesian chair of the organization and showed that the momentum achieved in the Seattle meetings will continue toward substantive outcomes. It showed that the Blake Island leaders meeting brought APEC into a new phase: from a preoccupation with what APEC should be as an institution, to a focused effort on what APEC can do under an increasingly complex and substantive program involving APEC's Committee on Trade and Investment, Ad Hoc Economic Trends and Issues Group, and 10 working groups. A major accomplishment in Jakarta was the successful launching of the new Committee on Trade and Investment (CTI) and its 10-point work program including customs, tariff data base, investment, administrative aspects of market access, standards and conformance, implementation of the GATT Uruguay Round provisions, and small and medium-sized enterprises. Several other highlights during the CTI meeting included agreement to a U.S. proposal to convene an experts meeting to review APEC member investment regimes. The CTI would consider binding and non-binding investment approaches as well as investment facilitation programs. The CTI agreed on an APEC standards and conformance framework. The CTI also accepted the U.S. offer to organize a meeting of experts to focus on Uruguay Round implementation. The U.S. has offered to host a meeting of APEC trade ministers this autumn. Senior officials agreed that a major focus of APEC's work this year will be human resources development and small and medium-sized enterprises. The SOM agreed to convene an experts meeting to make recommendations on an APEC work program for small and medium-sized enterprises. It also agreed to continue efforts to fully involve the private sector in APEC working group activities. Another accomplishment of the Jakarta SOM was the establishment of the new APEC Budget and Administrative Committee, which will meet soon to review APEC's budgetary procedures and make recommendations for improving administrative and operational efficiency. The United States was selected by the other members to chair the committee this year. In Jakarta, senior officials provided advice to the Eminent Persons Group on the longer-term recommendations in its report. They recommended that in considering longer-term regional trade liberalization, the group take into account different paths toward liberalization, including sectoral approaches, the broad impact of the Uruguay Round outcome, and issues arising from sub- regional trade agreements. Key APEC Meetings Ministers--Seattle, 11/17-11/19/93 Leaders--Blake Island, 11/20/93 Senior Officials--Jakarta, 2/2-2/4/94 Finance Ministers--Honolulu, 3/18-3/19/94 Environment Ministers--Vancouver, 3/24-3/25/94 Trade Ministers--location TBA, 9/94 Small and Medium-sized Enterprise Ministers--Osaka, 10/94 Ministers--Indonesia, 11/94 Leaders--Indonesia, 11/94 APEC Member Economies Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, People's Republic of China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Republic of the Philippines, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, and the United States. APEC Investment Guidebook One of APEC's achievements under the U.S. chair in 1993 was the publication of the Guide to the Investment Regimes of the then-15 APEC member economies (not including new members Mexico and Papua New Guinea). This guide presents the edited responses of the 15 APEC members to a survey in which members describe, among other things, their investment systems in terms of existing legislation, mandates, preferential incentives offered to encourage investors, and reasons why investment in their economies is desirable. The guide may be obtained by writing to the Director for Public Affairs, APEC Secretariat, 438 Alexandra Road, #19-01/04, Alexandra Point, Singapore 0511. Telephone: (65) 276-1880. FAX: (65) 276-1775. TELEX: RS 37206 APEC. The price is U.S. $30 or Singapore $46, payable by certified check or mail order only. Please contact the APEC Secretariat for information about postage and handling fees. U.S. Merchandise Trade by Selected Region, 1993 Total exports: $465 billion Exports to APEC economies: $277 billion APEC economies--60%; European Union--21%; Other economies--19%. Total imports: $581 billion Imports from APEC economies: $388 billion APEC economies--67%; European Union--17%; Other economies--16%. Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 1992 U.S. Direct Investment in APEC Economies ($ million)* Total APEC--157,154; Canada--68,432; Japan--26,213; Australia--16,697; Mexico--11,457; Hong Kong--8,544; Singapore--6,631; Indonesia--4,278; New Zealand--3,008; Chinese Taipei--2,870; Republic of Korea--2,779; Thailand--2,459; Malaysia--1,714; Republic of the Philippines--1,565; People's Republic of China--469; Brunei Darussalam--42; Papua New Guinea--(4) 1992 APEC Economies Direct Investment in the U.S. ($ million)* Total APEC--147,820; Japan--96,743; Canada--38,997; Australia--7,140; Hong Kong--1,714; Mexico--1,184; Chinese Taipei--1,154; Singapore--847; Thailand--138; People's Republic of China--126; New Zealand--108; Republic of the Philippines--59; Malaysia--54; Indonesia- -52; Papua New Guinea--0; Brunei Darussalam--0; Republic of Korea--(496) * Net investment Source: U.S. Department of Commerce Focus on Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation is an ongoing series on APEC developments published by the Bureau of Public Affairs in Dispatch magazine. It also is available electronically. For general information on APEC, contact the Office of Economic Policy of the Bureau for East Asian and Pacific Affairs at (202) 647-4835.(###) ARTICLE 6: New Passport Being Issued Statement released by the Office of the Spokesman, Washington, DC, March 7, 1994. This month, the Department of State is changing the U.S. passport in its efforts to make continuing enhancements to the security of the document. Innovations make the new passport more resistant to alteration and fraudulent use by terrorists, drug traffickers, international criminals, and alien smugglers. U.S. passports are periodically upgraded to incorporate new technologies to thwart counterfeiters and forgers. The passport was most recently revised in April 1993 and contained a number of new security features. This latest passport will include additional state-of-the-art innovations, including security thread embedded in the paper and special inks. Production of the passport will employ advanced printing technology to provide an additional deterrence to fraud. The previous U.S. passport featured a green cover and included a special one-page tribute to Ben Franklin in commemoration of the 200th anniversary of the U.S. Consular Service. The cover of the new passport will revert to the traditional blue color but will retain the woven cloth material used in the green cover. In keeping with the Department of State's desire to continually modernize the passport, future upgrades will contain improvements such as a computer-printed, digitized photograph. Testing is now underway on technology that will make this possible in the foreseeable future. The green-cover passports now in circulation will remain valid and travelers do not need to replace them before their normal expiration date. Domestic passport agencies will begin issuing the new passports around March 7. U.S. embassies and consulates overseas will begin issuing the new series at a later date. (###) ARTICLE 7: What's in Print: Foreign Relations of The United States Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume X, Part 2, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey This volume is one of 19 in the Foreign Relations series that document the foreign policy of U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower during 1958-60. It focuses on U.S. policy toward Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Yugoslavia, Finland, Greece, and Turkey. Included are records of U.S. efforts to break down Soviet control over the states of Eastern Europe and to strengthen simultaneously the political and economic security of key nations bordering the Soviet empire. Part 1 of Volume X, covering U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and Cyprus, was published in September 1993. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961-1962 This volume is one of 25 print volumes and 6 microfiche supplements covering the foreign policy of U.S. President John F. Kennedy. It contains high-level documentation-- primarily from the White House and the Department of State--showing how President Kennedy and his advisers perceived the threat from the Soviet Union and how U.S. diplomacy and military power were deployed to cope with it. The volume presents U.S. strategy as evolved by the President, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, other ranking officials, and experts such as former Secretary of State Dean Acheson and retired Gen. Lucius Clay. Volume XV, documenting the Berlin crisis from March 1962 through 1963, will be published later this year. Volume X, Part 2 (GPO Stock No. 044-000-02369-5) may be purchased for $38 and Volume XIV (GPO Stock No. 044-000- 02367-9) for $39. (Add 25% for foreign orders.) Both are available from: Superintendent of Documents Government Printing Office P.O. Box 371954 Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954 To FAX orders, call (202) 512-2250. Checks payable to the Superintendent of Documents are accepted, as are VISA and MasterCard. For further information, contact Glenn W. LaFantasie, General Editor, Foreign Relations series, at (202) 663-1133; FAX (202) 663-1289. (###) END OF DISPATCH VOL 5, NO 12.
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