US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 5, NUMBER 12, MARCH 21, 1994
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
 
 
 
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1.  Nuclear Situation in North Korea -- Lynn E. Davis
2.  President Clinton Extends Moratorium On Nuclear
Testing
3.  Argentina and Brazil:  Ratification of the
Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement
4.  President Clinton Meets With Georgia Chairman
Shevardnadze -- President Clinton
5.  Focus on Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation:  Finance
and Environment Ministers Meetings and 1994 Plans
6.  New Passport Being Issued
7.  What's in Print:  Foreign Relations of the United
States
 
 
ARTICLE 1:
 
Nuclear Situation in North Korea
Lynn E. Davis, Under Secretary for International Security
Affairs
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, DC, March 3, 1994
 
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to discuss
the current situation with respect to the North Korean
nuclear situation.  Preventing the spread of nuclear
weapons is one of the Clinton Administration's critical
foreign policy priorities.  We look forward to working
with the Congress, especially on the North Korean
situation.  A failure in achieving a non-nuclear Korea
could increase insecurity throughout Asia and undermine
the overall NPT regime.  But success could bring an end
to North Korea's isolation and threat while reinforcing
international norms against nuclear proliferation.
 
Today, I plan to review the most significant developments
since the beginning of our discussions with the D.P.R.K.
in June 1993 and to describe briefly our thinking about
how we plan to proceed in the coming weeks.
 
U.S. Policy
 
Our objectives in resolving the North Korean nuclear
issue are a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and a strong
non-proliferation regime.  We must ensure that North
Korea does not possess nuclear weapons and will not build
them in the future.
 
That means North Korea must agree to:
 
--  Full D.P.R.K. membership in the NPT;
--  Full cooperation with the IAEA in implementing
fullscope safeguards, including special inspections and
other measures to clear up the discrepancies in the
D.P.R.K.'s past declaration; and
--  Full implementation of the North-South
Denuclearization Declaration, which bans uranium
enrichment and reprocessing facilities and provides for a
bilateral inspection regime.
 
Through diplomacy, we have made a serious effort to find
out whether North Korea is willing to accept a nuclear-
free Korean Peninsula.  We have also created a firm
international coalition in support of our goals.  We
have, nevertheless, pursued our dialogue on the basis of
North Korean commitments neither to pursue any diversion
of nuclear material nor renounce its suspension of its
withdrawal from the NPT.  And we have made it clear to
North Korea that we will not continue discussions without
tangible progress toward resolution of the nuclear issue.
 
We have consulted closely with Japan and the Republic of
Korea through normal diplomatic channels as well as
through regular trilateral meetings.  Both Japan and the
Republic of Korea fully support our policy.
 
At the same time, we and the Republic of Korea have
continued to take prudent measures to ensure that our
defenses remain strong.  Last year, we conducted a number
of joint exercises designed to ensure our capabilities in
case of hostilities.  We are pursuing a force
modernization program begun in the late 1980s.  And we
continue to provide technical assistance, transfer
technology, and participate in a large number of co-
production programs with South Korea.  At the request of
the UN commander of U.S. forces in Korea, General Luck,
we have been considering a decision to deploy a Patriot
missile battalion to the R.O.K.  This would be a
defensive deployment in response to North Korean missile
capability and is a prudent military step in light of the
prevailing tension on the Korean Peninsula.  We are
continuing to consult with the R.O.K. on this matter with
the predisposition that we will go ahead when the time is
right.
 
Our Diplomatic Efforts
 
From the very beginning, we have recognized that
discussions with North Korea would be difficult and
protracted.  That has proven to be the case.  The North
has continuously tried to divide us from our allies:  the
R.O.K., Japan, and the IAEA; they have failed.
 
During high-level discussions in June and July, the
D.P.R.K. agreed to suspend its withdrawal from the NPT
and to "freeze" its nuclear activities at the Yongbyon
site pending the outcome of our dialogue.  That means no
further reprocessing, acceptance of IAEA inspections to
ensure that there has been no diversion of materials or
reprocessing, and no refueling of the five MW reactors
without IAEA inspectors present.  The North also agreed
in July to resume discussions with South Korea and the
IAEA on the nuclear issue.
 
Since August, we have held a number of working-level
meetings with the North Korean representatives to secure
implementation of these commitments.  There have been two
difficulties.
 
First, while the North had agreed to allow IAEA
inspections to maintain the continuity of safeguards, a
dispute arose when the IAEA judged that it needed a more
extensive inspection in September than the one conducted
in August.
 
Second, while the North agreed in principle to resume
discussions of the nuclear issue with South Korea, no
meetings had occurred.
 
In late December, we reached agreement in principle to
resolve these disputes.  The North accepted IAEA
inspections needed to maintain the continuity of
safeguards at the seven declared sites.  The purpose of
these activities, according to the IAEA, is to ensure
that no nuclear material has been diverted since earlier
inspections and to facilitate future verification of
nondiversion.  Finally, the North agreed to resume North-
South working level talks in Panmunjom to arrange
modalities for an exchange of special envoys.
 
In return, we agreed that when the IAEA inspections and
the North-South talks begin, we would announce a date for
the third round of U.S.-D.P.R.K. talks, and the R.O.K.--
with U.S. support--would agree to announce suspension of
the joint military exercise "Team Spirit '94."  We also
told the North that we will not hold the third round of
talks until the inspections were satisfactorily completed
and a serious discussion on the nuclear issue occurs
between the North and South.
 
IAEA-D.P.R.K. Consultations
 
The first step in implementing the December New York
agreement was for the North to work out the detailed
arrangements with the IAEA on the scope and timing of
inspections necessary to maintain the continuity of
safeguards.  Let me emphasize that we have made it clear
to the North that it must agree to IAEA requirements for
continuity of safeguards and that the U.S. was not
prepared to intervene in the discussions between the IAEA
and the North.  We have fully supported the IAEA's
efforts to resolve this issue in a manner which does not
undermine its functions or the international non-
proliferation regime and will continue to do so.
 
The talks between the IAEA and the D.P.R.K., which began
in early January, resulted in an agreement on February
15.  It is our understanding that the North has agreed to
conduct all of the activities the IAEA feels necessary to
verify that nuclear material in these facilities has not
been diverted since earlier inspections.
 
As Director General Blix recently stated, this upcoming
inspection to verify the continuity of safeguards
knowledge is "in complete consonance with the objective
of safeguards as defined in safeguards agreements."  The
IAEA seeks to maintain "continuity of safeguards
information" in order to keep track of the production,
storage, and disposition of nuclear material.  If the
continuity of safeguards information is damaged or
broken, the IAEA's ability to assure non-diversion is put
into question.
 
I would note that the North has understood since our
dialogue began in June that it must continue to maintain
the continuity of safeguards knowledge.  Disputes have
arisen not over the frequency of these inspections but
over their scope.
 
Next Steps
 
Throughout this process, we have made it clear to the
North that it must choose between two paths.  If it
rejects our requirements for a continuing dialogue and
resolution of the nuclear issue, the international
community will have no choice but to take steps to punish
and isolate the D.P.R.K.  On the other hand, if the North
accepts our requirements, we and the international
community are willing to take steps to address the
North's stated security concerns and to move toward a
more normal political and economic relationship.
 
Our strategy, if diplomacy fails, takes us back to the UN
Security Council and to steps to raise the costs to North
Korea for failing to abide by its NPT commitments.  We
have a number of different options available for
sanctions.  We would begin by consulting with the P-5 and
key regional allies, especially Japan and the R.O.K., on
a sanctions strategy.  I would note that both Japan and
the Republic of Korea, as well as other members of the
Perm Five, would fully support such action if the North
does not move to resolve the international community's
concerns.
 
Our strategy for a third round, if diplomacy succeeds,
is--as outlined by President Clinton and President Kim of
South Korea--to pursue a "broad and thorough" approach to
nuclear and other issues.  Our primary goal is that the
North must make a clear commitment to take the steps
necessary to resolve the nuclear issue in the near
future.  It must demonstrate in actions, not just words,
that it is renouncing a nuclear weapons capability.  That
means the North:
 
1.  Must remain a member of the NPT and implement its
IAEA fullscope safeguards agreement, including special
inspections and any other measures needed to clear up
past discrepancies; and
 
2.  Must work with South Korea to fully implement the
North-South Denuclearization Declaration.
 
As the D.P.R.K. takes these steps, we are prepared to
reciprocate with measures to address North Korea's stated
security concerns and to move in the direction of
improved political and economic relations.  To implement
this approach, we will need legal flexibility to use both
inducements and potential "sticks" to influence the
North.  Therefore, we do not favor any legislation that
would impose additional legal barriers to lifting
existing economic sanctions.
 
Conclusion
 
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, from the very beginning of
our effort to resolve this issue, we have followed a
careful and steady strategy.  That strategy has been
designed to prevent any further North Korean nuclear
activity at its declared sites while testing the
prospects of resolving the nuclear issue through
diplomacy.  Our diplomacy has played another role as
well:  to create a strong international coalition in
support of our efforts, in case our dialogue fails and we
are forced to return to the Security Council for further
action.  At the same time, we have maintained a strong
defensive military posture in the region, in the event
that our peaceful efforts fail.
 
If the North executes the agreement we reached in
December and its recent understanding with the IAEA on
inspections needed to maintain the continuity of
safeguards, the way will be open for a third round of
U.S.-D.P.R.K. talks at which we will seek a political
resolution of the nuclear issue.  If it does not, then
the issue will be returned to the UN Security Council for
further action, including sanctions.  (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 2:
 
President Clinton Extends Moratorium on Nuclear Testing
Statement by White House Press Secretary Dee Dee Myers,
Washington, DC, March 15, 1994.
 
The President informed Congress yesterday that he was
extending the moratorium on nuclear testing by the United
States through September 1995.
 
The President's decision was based on fundamental U.S.
national security interests, weighing the contribution
further tests would make to improving the safety and
reliability of the U.S. arsenal in preparation for a
Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) against:
 
--  The restraint the other declared nuclear powers have
shown in not responding to China's nuclear test last
October with tests of their own;
 
--  The encouraging progress recorded in the CTB
negotiations since they formally opened on January 25;
and,
 
--  The adverse implications further U.S. nuclear tests
would have on our broader non-proliferation objectives,
including, most notably, our interest in securing the
indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty next year.
 
The President will decide next year whether to extend the
moratorium beyond September 1995, taking into account the
same four factors noted above.  (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 3:
 
Argentina and Brazil:  Ratification of the Quadripartite
Safeguards Agreement
Statement by Department Spokesman Michael McCurry,
Washington, DC, March 4, 1994.
 
Brazil completed ratification on February 25 of the
Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement (QSA).  This, together
with Argentina's earlier ratification of this
comprehensive nuclear safeguards agreement with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the
bilateral Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and
Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), will bring the
landmark nuclear non-proliferation agreement into full
effect.
 
We congratulate Argentina and Brazil for clearly
demonstrating firm commitment to arresting the global
spread of weapons of mass destruction.  Their joint
initiative will contribute to international security and
serve as a model for others.  (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 4:
 
President Clinton Meets With Georgia Chairman
Shevardnadze
President Clinton
Opening statement at a news conference following a
meeting with Chairman Shevardnadze, Washington, DC, March
7, 1994
 
It's a real pleasure and an honor for me to welcome
Chairman Eduard Shevardnadze to the White House today.
Few leaders in our time have earned the degree of
international respect that Chairman Shevardnadze enjoys.
He's a statesman whose vision and diplomacy have played
an immeasurably important role in bringing a peaceful end
to the Cold War.
 
This was our first personal meeting, although we've
talked by phone on other occasions.  It was a productive
one.  We discussed the great political and economic
challenges facing Georgia.  We discussed the steps the
United States can take to help Georgia meet those
challenges.
 
I reaffirmed in very strong terms America's support for
the independence, the sovereignty, and the territorial
integrity of Georgia.  And I expressed support for the
efforts sponsored by the United Nations to find a lasting
political settlement in the Abkhaz region of Georgia.
I'm hopeful that the parties to that conflict can achieve
in their negotiations and maintain an effective cease-
fire.  If they can, the United States would be inclined
to support a UN peace-keeping operation in Georgia, an
operation that would not involve U.S. military units.
 
We've already begun consultations on this issue with the
Congress, whose views and support will be important.  And
Chairman Shevardnadze will have the opportunity to
discuss this and other matters with Members of Congress
during his stay here with us.
 
In our meeting today, we also discussed Georgia's efforts
to expand cooperation with other nations in the Caucasus
region.  We agreed that both our nations have a
tremendous stake in the success of reform in Russia--that
a democratic and market-oriented Russia at peace with its
neighbors is in the interests of Georgia and the United
States.
 
I made it clear in our talks that the United States is
committed to encouraging greater political freedom and
economic renewal in Georgia.  That commitment is outlined
by the joint declaration and bilateral investment treaty
we've signed today.
 
Our commitment is also underscored by the $70 million in
assistance the U.S. has allocated to Georgia so far this
year.  Most of these funds are dedicated to humanitarian
efforts.  As Georgia moves toward peace and proceeds with
reform, we're prepared to increase our technical and
economic assistance as well.
 
This is clearly a difficult time of transition for
Georgia.  But throughout its rich history, Georgia many
times has met and overcome adversity.  I'm hopeful that
the renowned resilience of the Georgian people will serve
them well as they build a more stable and prosperous
future.  As they face that work, the Georgian people are
indeed fortunate to have a leader with a vision, the
stature, the leadership, and the courage of Chairman
Shevardnadze.  And I look forward to working with him in
the days ahead.  (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 5:
 
Focus on Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
Finance and Environment Ministers Meetings and 1994 Plans
 
Background
 
The 17-member APEC forum is building on and contributing
significantly to the dramatic economic transformation of
the Asia-Pacific region.  Since its establishment in
1989, APEC has evolved into the most promising forum
available to promote greater economic cooperation and
trade liberalization in the region.  The APEC economies
together represent about half the world's population,
about half the world's output, and just over 40% of world
trade.  This cooperation is important for the U.S.  For
example, in 1993, almost 60% of U.S. merchandise exports
and 67% of U.S. merchandise imports were with other APEC
member economies.  Last year, total U.S. trade with APEC
economies was just over three times that with the
European Union.
 
The November 1993 APEC Ministerial in Seattle ended the
U.S. year as APEC chair.  APEC ministers took important
steps to strengthen the organization and to make it
increasingly relevant to the real work of the region's
business people, and they agreed to work toward more open
and collaborative economic relations in the Asia-Pacific
region.
 
At Blake Island, near Seattle, President Clinton hosted a
historic meeting of APEC leaders.  This unprecedented
gathering marked the emergence of a new voice for the
region and an opportunity to build a new foundation that
harnesses the energy of these diverse and dynamic
economies.  The leaders' discussion centered on economic
challenges, national priorities, and mechanisms for
achieving real economic prosperity throughout the region.
The leaders developed a range of initiatives for action
in the coming year that will build on the spirit of
openness and cooperation and contribute to the economic
growth of the entire Pacific Basin.  APEC efforts are
underway to follow up on these initiatives, which
include:
 
--  Convene an APEC finance ministers meeting to discuss
broad economic issues;
--  Establish a Pacific Business Forum in which senior
business representatives will identify issues APEC should
address to facilitate regional trade and investment;
--  Establish an APEC Education Program to develop
regional cooperation in higher education;
--  Establish an APEC Business Volunteer Program to
promote cooperation in human resource development;
--  Convene a meeting of APEC ministers involved with
small and medium-sized enterprises to discuss ways to
improve the environment for the operation of these
enterprises;
--  Develop a non-binding code of principles covering
investment issues;
--  Develop APEC's policy dialogue and action plan for
conserving energy, improving the environment, and
sustaining economic growth; and
--  Establish a center to facilitate the exchange of
technology and technology management skills among APEC
members.
 
APEC Finance Ministers Meeting
 
One of the leaders' initiatives was a first-ever meeting
of the 17 APEC finance ministers hosted by Treasury
Secretary Lloyd Bentsen in Honolulu on March 18-19, 1994.
 
--  This meeting focused on regional macroeconomic
developments, highlighting successful growth strategies.
Emphasis was on the significant role of private
investment, including foreign investment, in generating
strong growth.
--  With the high demand for expanded or modernized
infrastructure in the region, ministers discussed how to
finance both this investment and the continued strong
pace of private investment.
--  Particular emphasis was on the effectiveness of
domestic and international capital markets and the
challenges facing these markets in meeting demand for
financing.
 
APEC Environment Ministers Meeting
 
APEC ministers concerned with the environment will meet
on March 24-25, 1994, at the first high-level APEC
meeting devoted to environmental issues.  Canadian Deputy
Prime Minister and Environment Minister Sheila Copps will
host the meeting in Vancouver, Canada.  U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Carol M.
Browner will lead the U.S. delegation.
 
Over 12,000 participants are expected to attend the GLOBE
94 International Trade Fair and Conference taking place
in Vancouver at the same time as the APEC environment
ministers meeting.  The GLOBE conference will focus on
"Business and the Environment" to identify business
opportunities arising from today's environmental
challenges.
 
At the APEC environmental meeting, ministers will
discuss:
 
--  A vision statement to underline APEC members'
commitment to the environment and sustainable
development;
--  Principles for integrating economic and environmental
considerations into APEC;
--  Environmental technology, such as pollution
prevention and clean technology;
--  Policy tools, such as economic instruments and
environmental standards;
--  Sustainable cities; and
--  Environmental education and information.
 
Results of Jakarta SOM
 
In Jakarta on February 2-4, 1994, Indonesia hosted the
first of four APEC senior officials meetings (SOMs).  The
next three will be in Indonesia during the weeks of May
16, September 5, and, finally, just before the APEC
Ministerial meeting in November 1994.
 
Senior officials oversee the work of APEC during the year
and prepare APEC for the annual ministers meeting.  The
Indonesian senior official is Ambassador Wisber Loeis,
who chaired the Jakarta SOM.  The U.S. senior official is
Sandra B. O'Leary, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
 
The Jakarta SOM marked a smooth transition from the U.S.
to Indonesian chair of the organization and showed that
the momentum achieved in the Seattle meetings will
continue toward substantive outcomes.  It showed that the
Blake Island leaders meeting brought APEC into a new
phase:  from a preoccupation with what APEC should be as
an institution, to a focused effort on what APEC can do
under an increasingly complex and substantive program
involving APEC's Committee on Trade and Investment, Ad
Hoc Economic Trends and Issues Group, and 10 working
groups.
 
A major accomplishment in Jakarta was the successful
launching of the new Committee on Trade and Investment
(CTI) and its 10-point work program including customs,
tariff data base, investment, administrative aspects of
market access, standards and conformance, implementation
of the GATT Uruguay Round provisions, and small and
medium-sized enterprises.
 
Several other highlights during the CTI meeting included
agreement to a U.S. proposal to convene an experts
meeting to review APEC member investment regimes.  The
CTI would consider binding and non-binding investment
approaches as well as investment facilitation programs.
The CTI agreed on an APEC standards and conformance
framework.  The CTI also accepted the U.S. offer to
organize a meeting of experts to focus on Uruguay Round
implementation.  The U.S. has offered to host a meeting
of APEC trade ministers this autumn.
 
Senior officials agreed that a major focus of APEC's work
this year will be human resources development and small
and medium-sized enterprises.  The SOM agreed to convene
an experts meeting to make recommendations on an APEC
work program for small and medium-sized enterprises.  It
also agreed to continue efforts to fully involve the
private sector in APEC working group activities.
 
Another accomplishment of the Jakarta SOM was the
establishment of the new APEC Budget and Administrative
Committee, which will meet soon to review APEC's
budgetary procedures and make recommendations for
improving administrative and operational efficiency.  The
United States was selected by the other members to chair
the committee this year.
 
In Jakarta, senior officials provided advice to the
Eminent Persons Group on the longer-term recommendations
in its report.  They recommended that in considering
longer-term regional trade liberalization, the group take
into account different paths toward liberalization,
including sectoral approaches, the broad impact of the
Uruguay Round outcome, and issues arising from sub-
regional trade agreements.
 
 
Key APEC Meetings
 
Ministers--Seattle, 11/17-11/19/93
Leaders--Blake Island, 11/20/93
Senior Officials--Jakarta, 2/2-2/4/94
Finance Ministers--Honolulu, 3/18-3/19/94
Environment Ministers--Vancouver, 3/24-3/25/94
Trade Ministers--location TBA, 9/94
Small and Medium-sized Enterprise Ministers--Osaka, 10/94
Ministers--Indonesia, 11/94
Leaders--Indonesia, 11/94
 
 
APEC Member Economies
 
Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, People's Republic
of China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea,
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Republic
of the Philippines, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand,
and the United States.
 
 
APEC Investment Guidebook
 
One of APEC's achievements under the U.S. chair in 1993
was the publication of the Guide to the Investment
Regimes of the then-15 APEC member economies (not
including new members Mexico and Papua New Guinea).  This
guide presents the edited responses of the 15 APEC
members to a survey in which members describe, among
other things, their investment systems in terms of
existing legislation, mandates, preferential incentives
offered to encourage investors, and reasons why
investment in their economies is desirable.
 
The guide may be obtained by writing to the Director for
Public Affairs, APEC Secretariat, 438 Alexandra Road,
#19-01/04, Alexandra Point, Singapore 0511.  Telephone:
(65) 276-1880.  FAX:  (65) 276-1775.  TELEX:  RS 37206
APEC.  The price is U.S. $30 or Singapore $46, payable by
certified check or mail order only.  Please contact the
APEC Secretariat for information about postage and
handling fees.
 
 
U.S. Merchandise Trade by Selected Region, 1993
 
Total exports:  $465 billion
Exports to APEC economies:  $277 billion
APEC economies--60%; European Union--21%; Other
economies--19%.
 
Total imports:  $581 billion
Imports from APEC economies:  $388 billion
APEC economies--67%; European Union--17%; Other
economies--16%.
 
Source:  U.S. Department of Commerce
 
 
1992 U.S. Direct Investment in APEC Economies ($
million)*
 
Total APEC--157,154; Canada--68,432; Japan--26,213;
Australia--16,697; Mexico--11,457; Hong Kong--8,544;
Singapore--6,631; Indonesia--4,278; New Zealand--3,008;
Chinese Taipei--2,870; Republic of Korea--2,779;
Thailand--2,459; Malaysia--1,714; Republic of the
Philippines--1,565; People's Republic of China--469;
Brunei Darussalam--42; Papua New Guinea--(4)
 
1992 APEC Economies Direct Investment in the U.S. ($
million)*
 
Total APEC--147,820; Japan--96,743; Canada--38,997;
Australia--7,140; Hong Kong--1,714; Mexico--1,184;
Chinese Taipei--1,154; Singapore--847; Thailand--138;
People's Republic of China--126; New Zealand--108;
Republic of the Philippines--59; Malaysia--54; Indonesia-
-52; Papua New Guinea--0; Brunei Darussalam--0; Republic
of Korea--(496)
 
* Net investment
 
Source:  U.S. Department of Commerce
 
 
Focus on Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation is an ongoing
series on APEC developments published by the Bureau of
Public Affairs in Dispatch magazine.  It also is
available electronically.
 
For general information on APEC, contact the Office of
Economic Policy of the Bureau for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs at (202) 647-4835.(###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 6:
 
New Passport Being Issued
Statement released by the Office of the Spokesman,
Washington, DC, March 7, 1994.
 
This month, the Department of State is changing the U.S.
passport in its efforts to make continuing enhancements
to the security of the document.  Innovations make the
new passport more resistant to alteration and fraudulent
use by terrorists, drug traffickers, international
criminals, and alien smugglers.
 
U.S. passports are periodically upgraded to incorporate
new technologies to thwart counterfeiters and forgers.
The passport was most recently revised in April 1993 and
contained a number of new security features.  This latest
passport will include additional state-of-the-art
innovations, including security thread embedded in the
paper and special inks.  Production of the passport will
employ advanced printing technology to provide an
additional deterrence to fraud.
 
The previous U.S. passport featured a green cover and
included a special one-page tribute to Ben Franklin in
commemoration of the 200th anniversary of the U.S.
Consular Service.  The cover of the new passport will
revert to the traditional blue color but will retain the
woven cloth material used in the green cover.
 
In keeping with the Department of State's desire to
continually modernize the passport, future upgrades will
contain improvements such as a computer-printed,
digitized photograph.  Testing is now underway on
technology that will make this possible in the
foreseeable future.
 
The green-cover passports now in circulation will remain
valid and travelers do not need to replace them before
their normal expiration date.  Domestic passport agencies
will begin issuing the new passports around March 7.
U.S. embassies and consulates overseas will begin issuing
the new series at a later date.   (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 7:
 
What's in Print:  Foreign Relations of The United States
 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume
X, Part 2, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey
 
This volume is one of 19 in the Foreign Relations series
that document the foreign policy of U.S. President Dwight
D. Eisenhower during 1958-60.  It focuses on U.S. policy
toward Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Yugoslavia,
Finland, Greece, and Turkey.  Included are records of
U.S. efforts to break down Soviet control over the states
of Eastern Europe and to strengthen simultaneously the
political and economic security of key nations bordering
the Soviet empire.
 
Part 1 of Volume X, covering U.S. policy toward Eastern
Europe, the Soviet Union, and Cyprus, was published in
September 1993.
 
 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume
XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961-1962
 
This volume is one of 25 print volumes and 6 microfiche
supplements covering the foreign policy of U.S. President
John F. Kennedy.  It contains high-level documentation--
primarily from the White House and the Department of
State--showing how President Kennedy and his advisers
perceived the threat from the Soviet Union and how U.S.
diplomacy and military power were deployed to cope with
it.  The volume presents U.S. strategy as evolved by the
President, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, other ranking
officials, and experts such as former Secretary of State
Dean Acheson and retired Gen. Lucius Clay.
 
Volume XV, documenting the Berlin crisis from March 1962
through 1963, will be published later this year.
 
 
Volume X, Part 2 (GPO Stock No. 044-000-02369-5) may be
purchased for $38 and Volume XIV (GPO Stock No. 044-000-
02367-9) for $39.  (Add 25% for foreign orders.)  Both
are available from:
 
Superintendent of Documents
Government Printing Office
P.O. Box 371954
Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954
 
To FAX orders, call (202) 512-2250.  Checks payable to
the Superintendent of Documents are accepted, as are VISA
and MasterCard.  For further information, contact Glenn
W. LaFantasie, General Editor, Foreign Relations series,
at (202) 663-1133; FAX (202) 663-1289.  (###)
 
END OF DISPATCH VOL 5, NO 12.

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