US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 5, NUMBER 10, MARCH 7, 1994
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
 
 
 
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1.  Advancing the Strategic Priorities of U.S. Foreign
Policy and the FY 1995 Budget--Secretary Christopher
 
2.  Initiative To Reform U.S. International Affairs
Programs--Richard M. Moose
 
3.  The International Economic Agenda And the State
Department's Role--Joan E. Spero
 
4.  Fact Sheet:  Protection of Intellectual Property
Rights
 
5.  Mid-Term Review of Most-Favored-Nation Status for
China--Winston Lord
 
6.  Economic and Democratic Support for South Africa--
George E. Moose
 
7.  Fact Sheet:  U.S.-Mexico Cooperative Efforts To Save
Endangered Sea Turtles
 
8.  Treaty Actions
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 1:
 
 
Advancing the Strategic Priorities Of U.S. Foreign Policy
and the FY 1995 Budget
Secretary Christopher
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, DC, February 23, 1994
 
 
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee:  I am pleased to
be back before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and
have this opportunity to talk to you today about the
challenges facing America's foreign policy.  Your
expertise and support are absolutely vital to me and this
Administration as we chart a successful course for
America in the post-Cold War era.
 
When I last appeared before the Committee, I observed
that this is a period in which we are no longer driven by
the demands of containment, nor limited by that strategic
imperative.  This new era does not lend itself to
catchphrase characterizations.  In this time of profound
transition, Mr. Chairman, our major task in setting this
nation's foreign policy course is clear:  to identify
with care and to pursue with tenacity those interests
that are vital to the continued safety and prosperity of
the American people.
 
Earlier this month, the President forwarded to the
Congress the proposed Peace, Prosperity and Democracy
Act, which defines the overall national security
objectives of the United States for the post-Cold War
era.  The President's fiscal 1995 budget is consistent
with the objectives outlined in the act.  Today I would
like to focus on six priorities within these overall
objectives.  These are the six strategic priorities of
our foreign policy that I first identified to this
Committee last November.  They are the priorities that, I
believe, we must address if we are to meet the great
challenges of this era of change.  I am pleased to report
that in each of these areas, we have exercised strong
leadership, and we have made significant progress.
 
After that review, I will address briefly how we propose
to allocate our resources in support of these priorities
and our other foreign policy objectives.  Our proposed
fiscal 1995 budget is the first true post-Cold War
foreign affairs budget.  Indeed, the strategic priorities
we have set, the budget that we have proposed, and our
reorientation of foreign assistance through the Peace,
Prosperity and Democracy Act all embody President
Clinton's vision of the new challenges facing American
foreign policy in the 21st century.  These are the
challenges of promoting democracy, enhancing prosperity,
and confronting both new and old threats to our security.
 
But before reviewing our strategic priorities and our
budget with you, I will address events that are
undoubtedly on the minds of this Committee and the
American people and that have a direct effect on one of
those priorities--our interest in a secure and stable
Europe.  I want to begin by describing where matters
stand in Bosnia today.
 
Bosnia
We look forward to a new and more hopeful chapter in
Bosnia.  The cease-fire that now prevails in the
embattled city of Sarajevo represents a unique
collaborative effort of the United States, the European
Union, NATO, Russia, and the United Nations.  The United
States is committed to engage actively in the peace
process in the former Yugoslavia.  We will bring our full
diplomatic weight to bear on finding a solution that can
stop the killing.
 
Congress and the American people should have a clear
understanding of the national interests that have guided
our actions.  President Clinton stated these interests in
his address to the nation last Saturday.  We have a
strategic interest in preventing this conflict from
"becoming a broader European conflict, especially one
that could threaten our NATO allies or undermine the
transition of former communist states to peaceful
democracies."  We have a political interest in ensuring
the credibility and integrity of the NATO Alliance, an
Alliance that has appealed to us for leadership in
addressing this crisis.  We have an interest in curbing
the destabilizing movement of refugees that this struggle
is generating throughout Europe.  And certainly we have a
humanitarian interest in opposing the horrors of ethnic
cleansing and easing the plight of those at risk of
starvation.
 
It was this assessment of our interests that led
President Clinton to propose and win NATO agreement to
threaten air strikes to stop the killing of civilians in
Sarajevo and to give new impetus to the peace process.
As you know, on February 9, NATO ordered all heavy
weapons threatening the city to be placed under UN
control or removed to a 20-kilometer exclusion zone
around the city.
 
To date, three days after the 10-day implementation
deadline, that ultimatum has been effective.  This is in
large measure due to the firmness and solidarity of the
NATO Alliance, led by the United States.  In light of
this firmness of purpose, and after direct talks between
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, the Russians have pressed
to gain Bosnian Serb compliance with the NATO ultimatum.
 
Let no one doubt our resolve to use force if necessary.
If heavy weapons return to Sarajevo, they are subject to
attack.  If the shelling of Sarajevo resumes, the heavy
weapons responsible, wherever located, will be subject to
attack.  We will provide close air support if UN troops
are attacked and ask for help.  And we will consider
whether the approach used to stop the shelling in
Sarajevo can be applied effectively elsewhere in Bosnia.
Our interests have no expiration date--nor does the NATO
decision that those interests inspired.
 
At the President's direction, we are now working actively
with the parties and other interested nations to achieve
a settlement that will ensure a viable Bosnian state and
a lasting peace.  We will work closely with the Bosnian
Government to determine its reasonable requirements for a
negotiated settlement and help it achieve them.  We will
count on the European Union and the Russians to work
together with us to convince the other parties--
principally the Serbs--to settle.  If there is a viable
settlement, the United States reaffirms its readiness to
participate, with Congressional concurrence, in a NATO
effort to implement the settlement.
 
As our initiative moves forward in the coming weeks, I do
not want to create the impression that success is around
the corner.  The negotiations are difficult and highly
complex.  But with a clear understanding of what our
interests are and how they can be served, the United
States will work with diligence and persistence to assist
the parties in reaching an agreement that will endure.
The momentum and enhanced credibility that came from the
Sarajevo initiative open up several new possibilities.
We will be pursuing every avenue to peace.
 
Mr. Chairman, as important and troubling as the problems
in Bosnia may loom today, we cannot let them turn us from
pursuit of our broader foreign policy goals.  Let me now
discuss and review with you our progress in pursuing the
six strategic priorities of our foreign policy, as well
as the resources that support those and other national
security objectives.
 
1.  Promoting Economic Security Through Global Growth
 
When I was last before this Committee, I identified
economic security as the first of these priorities.  I
did so deliberately, even at the expense of challenging
foreign policy orthodoxy.  In the post-Cold War world,
economic issues must be at the heart of both our domestic
and foreign policy.  President Clinton is spearheading,
with striking success, the most important and ambitious
international economic agenda of any President in nearly
half a century.
 
On November 4, I pointed out that with NAFTA, APEC, and
GATT there was an extraordinary convergence of
opportunity for the United States.  I am pleased that we
pulled off that triple play for America's economic
future.
 
When Congress approved NAFTA, we created opportunities
for high-paying export jobs at home, and we built a
bridge of greater economic and political cooperation to
Latin America, beginning with Mexico.  When the President
hosted a successful meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation forum in Seattle, we reached out  to a
dynamic region that attracts an increasing volume of U.S.
exports and supports high-wage American jobs.  When we
successfully ended the Uruguay Round negotiations, we
concluded the most far-reaching trade agreement in
history--an agreement to cut tariffs, lower barriers,
spur growth, create American jobs, and add $5 trillion to
the world's output over the next decade.
 
President Clinton's determination to put economic policy
at the heart of our foreign policy is evident in these
areas where we have succeeded.  That determination is
equally evident in an arena where we are still working
for success:  our economic relations with Japan.
 
This Administration remains committed to placing our
trade and economic relationship with Japan on as firm a
foundation as our security and diplomatic cooperation.
The trade surpluses that Japan runs with the United
States and most other countries are no longer acceptable.
 
The framework agreement reached with Japan last July is
aimed at widening market access and correcting Japan's
unacceptable trade imbalance with the world.  But since
then, we have not seen satisfactory progress in any of
the baskets--government procurement, insurance, or autos-
-or with respect to the macroeconomic steps we expected
Japan to take.
 
We are considering our options.  We do not want a trade
war; we want trade opportunities.  Japan must meet its
responsibility as one of the world's largest economies
and greatest trading nations.  It must make good on its
promises to us and to the rest of the world.  This is a
global problem, not just an American problem.  And any
progress we make will help the world economy as well as
our own.  I will be going to Japan next month to reaffirm
our position to Japan's leaders.
 
2.  Advancing Reform in Russia And the Other New
Independent States
 
Mr. Chairman, since this Administration took office, our
policies toward Russia and the other New Independent
States have been based on two key premises.  First,
reform in the former Soviet Union is in the overriding
interest of the United States.  Second, reform will not
be easy and will require persistent and firm support from
the international community.
 
We recognize the enormous difficulty in the region's
multiple transformations from totalitarian to democratic
governments, from command to market economies, and from a
single empire to many New Independent States.  We must be
realistic in our expectations, steady in our support for
reform, and unequivocal in our opposition to forces whose
policies are contrary to our interests.
 
As you know, yesterday in a court in Alexandria,
Virginia, an American employee of the CIA and his wife
were formally charged with espionage on behalf of the
former USSR and the Russian Federation.  This is a very
serious matter.
 
Yesterday I called in the Russian Charge d'Affaires to
protest in the strongest terms the actions of the Russian
intelligence service.  Ambassador Pickering also raised
this issue with senior Russian officials in Moscow, and
we will continue these discussions at the senior level
both in Washington and Moscow.  The President has
directed an intensive Administration review of the
implications of this case for our national security.
 
The continuation of Russian espionage activities against
the United States is unacceptable.  The United States
will continue to take every measure to prevent such
activities from being carried out against it.  The extent
of the effect of this incident on our relationship with
Russia will depend on Russian actions in the days ahead.
 
Events of the past weeks have revived fears about
Russia's future.  But these events should be seen in
perspective and against the backdrop of a U.S.-Russian
relationship that has changed radically over the last
decade.
 
Russia has made some significant strides.  For the first
time in its history, it has an elected President, an
elected parliament, and a meaningful constitution.  We
are witnessing our era's boldest experiment in building
democracy.  We are also beginning to see a market economy
emerge, with 40% of Russia's labor force now working in
the private sector and two-thirds of the small shops
privatized.
 
The dangers in Russia remain very real.  We must be
prepared for the possibility that reform could be
reversed and that an aggressive Russian nationalism could
emerge from the ashes of communism--even by democratic
means.  At the same time, we should not assume the worst
but work to build a true partnership with a reforming
Russia.  The Russian people should have no doubt that as
long as they keep moving in the right direction, we will
support them, as President Clinton made clear in Moscow
last month.  Our message is clear:  Russia's choice about
its own future will affect the future of our
relationship.
 
The President has also made clear the importance he
attaches to the independence and territorial integrity of
Russia's neighbors.  We recognize that Russia has
interests in developments on its borders, including
concerns about the rights of ethnic Russians abroad.  But
we must insist--as we do with all nations, friend and foe
alike--that Russia's behavior toward its neighbors
conform with established principles of international law,
including respect for the territorial integrity and
independence of other states, as embodied in the UN
Charter and the Helsinki Final Act.  These principles
also apply to any activities of Russian troops in
neighboring states.
 
We must also be ready to work to ensure that Russia and
its neighbors resolve their disputes peacefully--disputes
that directly affect our stake in the region's economic
and political reform.  Our efforts have already helped
achieve results.  For example, we are actively working to
help bring about the full and timely withdrawal   of all
Russian troops from the Baltic states this year.  And
last month, after painstaking diplomacy and President
Clinton's personal engagement, Ukraine signed the
trilateral accord with the United States and Russia,
opening the way for the elimination     of nuclear
weapons on Ukrainian territory.
 
One of President Clinton's top national security
priorities has been to ensure that the breakup of the
former Soviet Union does not produce new nuclear states.
We have now secured commitments to ensure that it will
not.  Ukrainian agreement to ratify START I and its
commitment to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) clears the way for closer relations between our
nations.  This should reduce tension in a region that is
vital to the long-term peace and stability of Europe.  We
have already doubled economic assistance.  We also will
increase our assistance for the dismantling of Ukraine's
missiles and launchers.  We look forward to President
Kravchuk's visit to Washington next week.
 
3.  Renewing the Transatlantic Relationships and NATO
 
Last month in Europe, President Clinton reaffirmed the
vital importance of the transatlantic relationship to
American security.  He also outlined his vision of a "new
security" for a new Europe.  The President said that
security "must be found in the successful expansion of
military cooperation, democratic government, and market
economies."  We must support the transition to market
democracy in the East by beginning to extend to all of
Europe the benefits and obligations of the same liberal
trading system and collective security order that have
been pillars of strength for the West.
 
From an economic standpoint, we strengthened the
transatlantic partnership when the United States and the
European Union came together to complete the Uruguay
Round.  The agreement will spur growth and create jobs on
both sides of the Atlantic.  It will also help the
Central and Eastern European nations sustain the hard
march of economic reform.  But Western nations and
institutions must further widen access to Western
markets.
 
We know that the process of building market democracy in
Central and Eastern Europe is far from complete.  That is
why President Clinton, during his January visit to
Prague, set forth a comprehensive agenda for the region.
In addition to efforts to widen market access, we are
assisting these countries in absorbing the social impact
of reform, promoting Western investment, and helping them
to develop and strengthen democratic institutions.
 
The new European democracies are also yearning for a
closer relationship with Western political and security
institutions, especially NATO.  And the Alliance has
responded to President Clinton's call to reach eastward
to build that relationship.  At the NATO summit in
January, the Allies approved President Clinton's
Partnership for Peace initiative to deepen NATO's
engagement with the East.  Already, nine nations have
begun the formal process to participate in the
Partnership, and we expect more states to follow soon.
Partners will conduct joint exercises and training with
NATO, beginning later this year.  Participation in the
Partnership can develop and enhance the habits of
cooperation and political consultation that are the
lifeblood of the Alliance.  The Partnership is both a way
to address common threats to European security and the
beginning of an evolutionary process of NATO expansion.
 
Our vision for NATO's continuing essential role in
preserving transatlantic security is matched by our
continuing support for European unity.  Through our work
together on the Uruguay Round, NATO, Bosnia, and other
issues, we have put our political relationship with the
EU and individual states on a sound footing.
 
I have already spoken about our efforts to lead the
Alliance in encouraging a settlement in Bosnia.
Important as they are, our efforts in Bosnia are not
limited to galvanizing the Alliance and others to
encourage a political settlement.  We have also led
efforts to mitigate the humanitarian disaster in Bosnia.
We have undertaken the longest-lasting coordinated
airlift of food and medicine in history.  We have
provided more humanitarian assistance that any other
single nation--more than $550 million since the conflict
began.  We also have led the effort to establish the
United Nations War Crimes Tribunal so that the
international community may bring to justice the
individuals who have perpetrated war crimes in Bosnia.
 
4.  Putting a New   Asia and the Pacific
 
A signal aspect of this Administration's foreign policy
is a new emphasis on advancing our interests in the Asia-
Pacific region.  No area of the world is more important
for us than this region.  Its dynamic economies and their
explosive growth rates make it a critical area for
American exports and jobs.  We have vital security
interests and alliances in Asia.  And we have an interest
in promoting democratic values in a part of the world
where democracy is on the move, yet repressive regimes
remain.
 
As you know, the President's first overseas trip was to
Asia.  On that trip, the President told the Korean
National Assembly last July, "We must always remember
that security comes first."  In Asia, that security
begins with our treaty alliances with Japan, South Korea,
Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines.  We are
maintaining our forward-deployed military presence
throughout the Pacific.  And in conjunction with our
allies, we are actively participating in regional
security dialogues, including the ASEAN Regional Forum,
to ease tensions and stem arms races.
 
North Korea's threat to withdraw from the NPT is a
challenge to security on the peninsula and to the global
nuclear non-proliferation regime.  The United States is
working closely with South Korea, Japan, and others in
the region to ensure a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula and a
strong international non-proliferation regime.
 
Our determination to achieve these goals is firm.  Our
preferred path is dialogue.  We were encouraged that a
week ago, North Korea announced that, it would accept the
inspections required by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) to ensure the continuity of safeguards.
They must now without delay make good on their commitment
to allow the inspections to take place as soon as
possible and without interference.  Satisfactory
completion of these inspections will help the IAEA
reassure the international community that there has been
no diversion from North Korea's nuclear facilities.
While this is an important development, the key issues
must still be resolved.  And if we are to continue our
talks with North Korea, it must resume the North-South
dialogue aimed at a non-nuclear peninsula.
 
The international community does not seek to isolate
North Korea.  If North Korea abandons its nuclear weapons
option, honors its international obligations, and takes
other steps to conform to the norms of international
behavior, the door is open for North Korea to improve
relations with the rest of the world.
 
Turning to our wider objectives in the Asia-Pacific, we
are determined to deepen American engagement in the
region and achieve a better balance in our key bilateral
relationships.
 
I have already emphasized the priority we attach to
improving our economic and trade relations with Japan, as
we maintain our important security and political links.
We also are working to reach a greater balance in our
relations with China.  We seek a comprehensive
relationship with China that permits resolution of
differences over human rights, proliferation, and trade.
President Clinton wants to build a more positive
relationship with China, but China must also demonstrate
overall significant progress on human rights.  As a
result of our efforts, some progress has been made on
bilateral issues, including human rights.  Let there be
no misunderstanding.  More progress on human rights must
urgently be made if the President is to renew MFN this
spring.
 
I emphasized these points in direct talks with Chinese
officials last month and will do so again next month in
Beijing.  I will reaffirm the seriousness with which both
the Administration and the Congress approach these
issues.
 
Earlier this month, the President announced he was
lifting our trade embargo against Vietnam and
establishing a liaison office in Hanoi.  His action came
shortly after a strong majority of the Senate had urged
the President to end the embargo.  The President's
decision was based on his assessment of Vietnam's
cooperation and his conviction that these steps would
stimulate continued progress on the fullest possible
accounting for our POWs/MIAs.  As the President said, "We
owe that to all who served in Vietnam and to the families
of those whose fate remains unknown."  Our future
relations with Vietnam will continue to be guided by
progress on this issue.  Certainly, economic and
diplomatic benefits should also flow from the President's
decision, but they would be the results of that decision,
not the cause for it.  In moving forward in our
relationship, we will also be putting emphasis on human
rights concerns.
 
5.  Promoting   the Middle East
 
In the Middle East, achieving a just and comprehensive
Arab-Israeli peace through direct negotiations remains a
high priority for this Administration.  The issues
involved in these negotiations are complex, yet we
continue to see progress.  The President and I remain
committed to playing as full and active a role as
necessary to ensure that progress continues.
 
The agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians
achieved February 9 in Cairo demonstrates the kind of
progress that is possible.  It is a major step in the
implementation of the September 13 Declaration of
Principles between Israel and the PLO.  It resolved some
difficult security questions and demonstrated that the
parties can negotiate very complex issues directly and
find practical solutions.  While we want to see
implementation get under way so that the realities on the
ground will begin to change, we also want the parties to
produce an agreement that will last.
 
As the Israelis and the Palestinians negotiate directly,
the United States is helping to support the agreements.
We are working to ensure that U.S. and international
economic assistance to Gaza and the West Bank, proceeding
from the Conference to Support Middle East Peace last
October, leads to projects that improve the lives of the
Palestinians.  We are assisting private sector efforts
such as the "Builders for Peace" project of Arab-American
and Jewish-American business leaders.
 
We also have been actively promoting progress on the
other bilateral tracks.  The President's mid-January
meeting with Syrian President Asad in Geneva was a step
forward that set the stage for the resumption of
negotiations in Washington on all four bilateral tracks.
On the Israeli-Syrian track, the negotiations have been
serious, but it will take time to work through the
complex relationships among the three core issues of
peace, withdrawal, and security.  We have seen a new
energy and purpose on the other tracks.  For example, the
discussions between Israel and Jordan are proceeding on
practical issues like water, energy, and the environment.
 
We are also working to break down region-wide barriers to
Arab-Israeli contact.  We are working hard to end the
anachronistic Arab boycott.  We have made some progress
in lifting parts of the secondary and tertiary boycott,
and we are determined to end the discrimination against
American firms that these practices inflict.  We will not
stop there.  We will continue our efforts until the
boycott is lifted entirely.
 
The peace process represents one major element of our
regional policy.  In the Persian Gulf, we seek to contain
in separate ways potential threats from Iran and Iraq.
Our goal is Iraq's full compliance with all UN Security
Council resolutions, including long-term monitoring.  It
is premature to consider lifting sanctions when Iraq
remains in violation of relevant Security Council
resolutions.
 
Our policy toward Iran is one of active containment, but
its focus and methods differ from those of our Iraq
policy.  We seek to end Iran's quest for weapons of mass
destruction, its support for terrorism and subversion,
its violent opposition to the peace process, and its
human rights abuses.  We have made clear our readiness
for official dialogue with Iran.  But we want Iran to
understand our purpose clearly:  It should not and will
not enjoy normal relations with the international
community, and with the United States in particular, as
long as it continues its egregious behavior.
 
6.  Putting Non-proliferation and Other Global Issues in
the Mainstream of American Foreign Policy
 
Mr. Chairman, we must continue our efforts to control the
spread of both nuclear and advanced conventional weapons.
Such weapons give rogue states disproportionate power.
They can turn low-level conflicts into large-scale
disasters.  We are pursuing regional strategies to curb
proliferation and to limit the emergence of new nuclear
states.  I have already mentioned our efforts in Korea,
where we still face the most immediate challenge, as well
as the progress we have made in the former Soviet Union,
our biggest success to date.  Other areas of concern and
attention are the Middle East and South Asia.
 
Our regional strategies are complemented by a global
effort to curb the demand for weapons of mass destruction
and the supply of sensitive items.  We are working to put
a COCOM replacement regime in place, to extend the NPT
indefinitely in 1995, and to negotiate a comprehensive
test ban.
 
We urge the Congress to take up the Chemical Weapons
Convention as a priority and to give its advice and
consent to its ratification this spring and approval of
the implementing legislation as soon as possible.  Early
support for ratification is necessary to ensure that the
Convention can enter into force by the earliest possible
date.  This Convention is a foreign policy priority of
this Administration and a central element of our non-
proliferation policy.
 
Under President Clinton, the United States has regained
its leadership on global issues that affect our security
and prosperity and that of succeeding generations.  These
challenges include promoting sustainable development,
addressing the upsurge in refugees and migration,
combating terrorism and illegal narcotics, and supporting
democracy and human rights.  These problems often cross
national borders and threaten political, social, and
economic stability.
 
Sustainable development empowers the people of developing
nations to become participants, producers, and consumers
in the global economy.  It requires a healthy global
environment and a workable balance between available
resources and population.  Last year, President Clinton
renewed American leadership on environmental issues by
taking important initiatives to implement the climate
change agreement and by signing the Bio-diversity Treaty.
The agreement and the treaty stem from the 1992 Rio
conference.  The treaty is now before the Senate, and we
urge its speedy ratification.
 
We also have reasserted our nation's leadership in
stabilizing population growth.  We are working with other
nations and with non-governmental organizations to ensure
that the upcoming UN International Conference on
Population and Development in Cairo advances global
cooperation on this issue.
 
Two weeks ago, President Clinton released the
Administration's new drug control strategy.  While
America's first line of defense against drugs is to
reduce abuse here at home, we also believe that this
plague must be fought on the international front as well.
In key transit and drug-producing countries, we will
focus our efforts on strengthening democratic
institutions, creating economic alternatives to the
narcotics trade, stepping up eradication programs, and
dismantling the drug cartels.
 
Our engagement in the Western Hemisphere advances the
full range of our global agenda as well as our top
priority, economic security.  The remarkable changes in
the world over the last few years were foreshadowed in
Latin America, where democracy has made dramatic gains in
the last decade.  The Summit of the Americas that
President Clinton will host later this year will focus on
strengthening democracy and good governance; spurring
trade and economic growth; curbing narcotics trafficking;
and addressing the environment, population, and other
issues at the core of sustainable development.
 
Our policy toward Africa underscores the importance we
attach to democracy and human rights.  Africa faces
enormous challenges both in building democratic
institutions and in making progress toward sustainable
development.  Given the pervasive poverty and human
displacement Africa faces, continued international
assistance and new private investment will be necessary
to promote economic growth and to encourage political
change.
 
One African country of key concern to us is, of course,
South Africa.  We must help ensure that all South
Africans can participate in a peaceful multi-party
election in April.  Looking beyond the election, we are
developing an assistance package to help South Africa's
people overcome the legacies of apartheid and secure the
benefits of citizenship in the new democratic South
Africa.
 
FY 1995 Budget
 
Mr. Chairman, I have just reviewed our progress in
advancing the current strategic priorities of our foreign
policy.  Our broader foreign policy goals are captured
and given concrete expression in the Peace, Prosperity
and Democracy Act (PPDA), which provides the framework
for our fiscal 1995 International Affairs Budget.  I
should add here that the reforms to our foreign
assistance program embodied in the new act are an
important part of this Administration's legislative
agenda.
 
Mr. Chairman, for more than 40 years, the International
Affairs budget proceeded from the premise that our
overriding national security objective was the
containment of Soviet power.  Even with the end of the
Cold War, the budget continued to define national
security in narrow terms, and failed to address the
problems and possibilities presented by the fall of the
Soviet Union.  As the new priorities of the Clinton
foreign policy demonstrate,   we have been given--and we
have seized--the chance to remake American diplomacy and
to reinforce American security in a world unburdened by
superpower confrontation.
 
The President's fiscal 1995 budget supports our core
responsibility of maintaining our national defense and
promoting peace.  It also broadens the concept of
national security by placing greater emphasis on
America's economic interests, building democracy, and
meeting the threats posed by arms proliferation,
environmental degradation, rapid population growth,
illegal narcotics, and terrorism.
 
This redefinition of national security also requires
changes in the structure of our budget.  The budget is
divided into a number of mutually reinforcing goals,
consistent with those in the PPDA.  It is to these larger
objectives that I will now turn.
 
Promoting U.S Prosperity
As I suggested to you when I reviewed our number one
strategic priority--our economic security--the nation's
prosperity is tied inextricably to the growth and
integration of the global economy.  Exports are the
fastest growing source of high-paying jobs in our
economy.  This budget funds the aggressive export
promotion programs of Eximbank, OPIC, the Trade and
Development Agency, and the Department of Agriculture.
These programs are complemented by those of the
Departments of Commerce and State, both at home and at
our embassies.  The $1 billion requested in this budget
is an investment in American jobs and in America's
economic security.
 
Building Democracy
Building democracy is a long and difficult process that
requires steady and patient support.  But the rewards of
success, measured against the costs of failure, amply
justify our efforts.
 
The $1.3 billion we have requested in fiscal 1995 would
fund democracy-building programs in Central Europe and
the former Soviet Union, where we have a vital interest
in strengthening new democratic institutions.  Our budget
also contains a new account to assist countries
undergoing a transition to democracy.  Most of these
funds would be spent in Africa, Latin America, and Asia.
 
A key component of our democracy programs is funding for
the National Endowment for Democracy, which strengthens
institutions that foster pluralism, democratic
governance, civic education, human rights, and respect
for the rule of law.  And to amplify support for
democracy, we must harness contemporary communications
technology.  The United States Information Agency is
restructuring its capabilities to play this role.
 
Sustainable Development
As I mentioned in my review of our global priorities, the
Administration believes that too little attention has
been paid to the interlocking threats of rapid population
growth, poverty, and environmental degradation.  If we do
not confront these crises, large parts of the world will
be unable to sustain economic growth.  The result will be
widespread suffering abroad, and the loss of export
opportunities for American companies, workers, and
farmers.  By increasing funding for population and
environmental programs, we promote sustainable
development and invest in America's future.
 
The United States is not alone in trying to address these
issues.  The multilateral development banks and the IMF
advance similar goals.  These institutions made more than
$45 billion in loans in 1993.  They are the largest
contributors to global sustainable development.  Our
contributions to these organizations multiply the
effectiveness of our efforts.
 
Finally, this budget contains a modest increase for one
of America's most successful and most admired programs,
the Peace Corps.
 
Promoting Peace
The largest share of our budget request, $6.4 billion, is
for promoting peace.  More than 80% of this is for
maintaining and advancing peace in the Middle East.  At a
time when there is so much hope--and so many remaining
dangers--such funds are critical.  Our programs will
support our continuing commitment to Israel's security,
reflect Egypt's vital role, and provide for new economic
development efforts in the West Bank and Gaza.
 
Also included in this section of the budget are funds for
non-proliferation and disarmament, one of our strategic
priorities.  This includes funding for the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency to implement the Chemical Weapons
Convention, and efforts to extend the NPT and to
strengthen the IAEA, which has been playing a key role in
our efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation in Korea.
 
In addition, this budget category includes programs to
counter narcotics, terrorism, and crime.  These cost-
effective programs are of direct benefit to the American
people.
 
We have also requested funds for UN peace-keeping.  As
you know, Mr. Chairman, the Administration has completed
its comprehensive review of our peace-keeping policy, and
the entire Administration is unanimous in support of its
conclusions.
 
Our aim is not to expand our peace-keeping commitments,
but instead to establish a process for making sound
judgments about when we participate in peace-keeping
operations and to improve the way the UN conducts peace-
keeping operations.  We will always reserve the right to
act unilaterally to protect American interests.  But when
a collective, multi-national approach such as a peace-
keeping operation best serves our interests, we want to
ensure that it works effectively.
 
If you believe, as I do, that carefully defined UN peace-
keeping operations are an effective means to defuse
tensions and deter violence, and that the costs of such
efforts should be shared with others, we must live up to
our obligations to the UN.  We expect to be $1 billion in
arrears to the UN for peace-keeping by the end of the
fiscal year.  If we do not find a way to pay these
arrears, it is likely that the UN will have to close down
some of its existing operations.  We expect to begin
consultations shortly with the Congress on how we might
work together to address a growing funding problem for
peace-keeping.
 
We believe that there should be a shared responsibility
between the Departments of State and Defense for managing
and paying for peace-keeping operations.  We intend to
ask tough questions before we vote to approve each new
peace-keeping mission.  What U.S. interests are at stake?
Is the mission clearly defined, and is there an
identifiable end point?  Are resources available?  We
also will continue Ambassador Albright's efforts to
reduce our peace-keeping assessments and establish an
independent Inspector General at the UN.
 
I also want to mention a critical part of our policy:
command and control of U.S. forces in peace-keeping
operations.  Let me state clearly that the President will
never relinquish his ultimate command over U.S. forces.
And under no circumstances will the men and women in our
armed forces be sent into situations in which hostilities
are likely, unless there is proper command and control.
 
As a practical matter, when large-scale or high-risk
combat operations are contemplated, and American
involvement is necessary, we will be unlikely to accept
UN operational control over our forces.  Rather, we will
ordinarily rely on our resources or those of a regional
alliance, such as NATO, or on an appropriate coalition,
such as the one assembled during Operation Desert Storm.
 
Finally, Mr. Chairman, we also want to improve
cooperation and consultations between the Administration
and Congress on peace-keeping operations.  We have a
number of proposals that we think will address your
concerns, and we look forward to working with you.
 
Humanitarian Assistance
We have requested $1.6 billion for humanitarian
assistance.  These programs project the character of the
American people.  These funds will assist refugees,
alleviate the suffering caused by disasters, and provide
food to impoverished people.  Let me add that by
promoting peace, fostering economic growth, and building
democracy, we hope over time to reduce future needs for
such assistance.
 
Advancing Diplomacy
This budget request includes $4.1 billion to support the
operations of the Department of State, USAID and our
assessed contributions to international organizations.
The effective use of diplomacy--through reporting, crisis
prevention, and the adept use of membership in the UN and
other international organizations--is critical to success
in achieving America's broad national security goals.
 
The State Department and the other foreign affairs
agencies are undertaking major reforms, working closely
with Vice President Gore and the National Performance
Review.  The Department has instituted broad-based
reorganization and reform of its operations to keep pace
with change both here and abroad.  In addition, the
fiscal 1995 request strongly supports the President's
plan for reducing administrative overhead and employment
by assuming substantial savings in these areas.
 
Mr. Chairman, the President's fiscal 1995 budget defines
our long-term policy objectives and funds the six
strategic priorities I outlined earlier.  This is an
austere budget, consistent with the President's deficit
reduction plan.  It is also a budget with a single
unifying theme:  investing in the security of the United
States.   (###)
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 2:
 
Initiative To Reform U.S. International Affairs Programs
Richard M. Moose, Under Secretary for Management
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, DC, February 9, 1994
 
I am pleased to be here this morning to testify before
this committee on the Administration's proposed Peace,
Prosperity, and Democracy Act of 1994.  This legislation
represents the Clinton Administration's initiative to
achieve long-overdue reform of our international affairs
programs.
 
The Secretary of State is committed to seeking these
reforms as a part of this Administration's efforts to
open a new era in American foreign policy.  It is not
just a traditional foreign aid bill:  It is a foreign
policy bill.  Together, Brian Atwood and I will be
describing for you the changes that the Administration
seeks to enable foreign assistance to function more
effectively as a tool of U.S. foreign policy, both by
making it more streamlined and by tying it more closely
to the President's goals for America.
 
Brian will give a history of the legislation with special
emphasis on those elements of the reform proposal that
speak directly to the role of the U.S. Agency for
International Development--promoting sustainable
development and humanitarian assistance.  My presentation
will focus on the ways in which our reform proposal
improves links between our overseas programs and our
foreign policy objectives, particularly America's
economic competitiveness.  I will also spend a few
moments describing those parts of our proposal which
concern building democracy, promoting peace, and
advancing diplomacy.
 
Foreign Policy Objectives
Profound shifts have taken place in America's foreign
relations over the past several years.  When this
Administration came into office, we faced dramatically
changed international conditions and problems, but we
inherited foreign policies and institutions still geared,
in many ways, to the conditions and needs of the Cold
War.  Nowhere is this more true than in the area of our
international programs and specifically the Foreign
Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961.  Over the years, that law,
first enacted during some of the most tense years of the
Cold War, has become laden with competing--and sometimes
conflicting--goals and objectives.  Appropriate to a time
when these programs proceeded from the premise that our
overriding national security objective was the global
containment of Soviet power, the FAA is now a relic,
unsuited to meeting the challenges of the post-Cold War
world.
 
Let me take a moment to review our foreign policy
priorities and describe for you the importance of this
reform bill to the pursuit of those objectives.  The
Clinton Administration has clearly stated its foreign
policy priorities.  They are:
 
--  Ensuring the economic competitiveness and security of
the United States;
 
--  Supporting reform in Russia and the New Independent
States of the former Soviet Union;
 
--  Renewing and revitalizing our critical security
relationship with NATO and Europe;
 
--  Expanding economic and political cooperation across
Asia and the Pacific;
 
--  Forging an enduring peace in the Middle East; and
 
--  Meeting the challenges to American security posed by
global problems like proliferation, environmental
degradation, excessive population growth, narcotics
trafficking, and terrorism.
 
Not all of these challenges represent issues that are
dealt with primarily through foreign assistance.  Some,
like renewing our security ties with Europe and building
greater cooperation with the nations of Asia and the
Pacific, represent challenges first and foremost for
American diplomacy.  Others, however, require that we
combine U.S. leadership with U.S. resources in order to
safeguard vital interests and gain the cooperation of
other nations in dealing with shared problems.
 
In a time of reduced budgets, it is more important than
ever that our programs be reformed and our scarce
resources be targeted accurately and used effectively.
We cannot afford waste and inefficiency.  That is why we
seek to replace the existing Foreign Assistance Act with
a new set of basic authorities to match the new
challenges of our foreign policy.  Indeed, if we cannot
reform and streamline our assistance tools to meet new
challenges, we can scarcely hope for success in meeting
those challenges
.
Our proposed replacement for the Foreign Assistance Act
sets forth a comprehensive framework that reflects the
major changes we are carrying out in the content,
direction, and institutions which ensure that our
interests are promoted and defended abroad.  The
authorities and accounts in the existing FAA based on
functional types of aid--for example, foreign military
financing, economic support funds, and development
assistance--no longer reflect the links between our
international programs and our policy objectives.  Not
surprisingly, foreign aid has come to be seen as
something we do for others rather than as something we do
to advance the security and well-being of Americans.
 
The new Peace, Prosperity, and Democracy Act represents
an effort not only to update and rationalize our foreign
assistance authorities but also to put those authorities
in a framework that ties our overseas programs to the
President's goals for our nation.  The new act will
authorize programs across the full range of international
activities.  These include programs to promote business
opportunities overseas for Americans firms; to help
countries make the transition from communism and
authoritarianism to free markets and democracy; and to
respond to new security challenges such as proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, threats to the global
environment, excessive population growth, the movement of
refugees, and the international flow of narcotics.  These
programs will be organized in a way that demonstrates our
recognition that the American public is demanding a
foreign policy that serves the U.S. domestic agenda.
 
Instead of functional authorities, the new Peace,
Prosperity, and Democracy Act is organized around
mutually reinforcing strategic objectives.  Under each of
these objectives, the act authorizes types of assistance
appropriate to meeting that objective.  We hope, through
this new structure, to shift our focus away from how we
do things and toward what we are trying to accomplish--
away from process to results.  We will set clearly
understood goals by which our programs can be measured,
and we will demand measurable results.  The new act also
substantially reduces the number of accounts and
strengthens authorities for our foreign aid programs.
The President's FY 1995 budget, submitted to the Congress
on Monday, reflects the new account structure in our
proposal.
 
The objectives which form the building blocks of the new
act are:
 
--  Promoting growth through trade and investment;
--  Building democracy;
--  Sustainable development;
--  Promoting peace;
--  Providing humanitarian assistance; and
--  Advancing diplomacy.
 
These objectives are interlocking and mutually
reinforcing.  For example, democracy and free-market
reforms help to promote sustainable development and
economic growth.  Together they form a comprehensive
framework which ensures that our international programs
support our foreign policy.  I would like to spend a few
moments discussing a few of these and share with you some
of the highlights of the bill.
 
Promoting Prosperity at Home and Abroad
We have put economic competitiveness at the heart of our
foreign policy, as we must in a global economy.
America's future prosperity is tied irreversibly to the
growth and integration of the global economy.  More and
more Americans earn their living by producing goods and
services for overseas markets.  Exports are the highest-
paying and fastest-growing sector of our economy.  Our
most important task in this area is to open and to
improve our access to markets overseas for U.S. goods and
services.  Our successes in achieving NAFTA, completing
the Uruguay Round, and opening up new opportunities in
Asia and the Pacific are evidence of our commitment to
use diplomacy to advance American prosperity.
 
In addition to opening markets, we also intend to invest
resources in helping U.S. business to penetrate these
markets through programs to promote exports.  The Peace,
Prosperity, and Democracy Act authorizes the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation, which supports, finances,
and insures sound business projects that increase U.S.
employment and our global competitiveness, at the same
time assisting the host countries' economy and
development.
 
The act also authorizes the activities of the Trade and
Development Agency which enhance market opportunities for
U.S. companies in the infrastructure and industrial
sectors of middle income and developing countries.  TDA
works closely with foreign governments and other entities
to involve U.S. business in the early planning stages of
projects in these sectors.  The resulting opportunities
provide U.S. companies with market entry, exposure, and
information, thus assisting them in establishing a
position in markets that are otherwise difficult to
penetrate.  This is particularly important in the
emerging market-oriented democracies of Central and
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
 
While Brian will cover them in greater detail, I think it
is important to note that programs to promote sustainable
development under Title I of the new act are closely
related to the programs I have just described under
promoting prosperity.  By helping to build vibrant,
growing economies in the developing world, we support a
healthy global economy and build markets for U.S.
exports.
 
Building Democracy
In the State of the Union address, the President noted
that ". . .the best strategy to ensure our security and
build a durable peace is to support the advancement of
democracy elsewhere."  Enlargement of the community of
market democracies is a central strategic priority of the
Clinton Administration--both as a way of ensuring our
security and as a means of promoting our economic well-
being.  Democracies make better partners in trade, are
more peaceful, and cooperate in managing global problems.
The Peace, Prosperity, and Democracy Act of 1994
authorizes programs to pursue this critical objective
under Title II--building democracy.
 
The most important of our programs to build democracy are
our continuing efforts to promote political and economic
reform in the New Independent States and Central and
Eastern Europe.  Americans have a huge stake in the
success of those reforms.  If democracy fails in the
former Soviet Union, Americans could pay a severe price
though increased defense budgets driven by a revived
military threat.  The success of reform, on the other
hand, offers the promise of partnership with stable,
prosperous market economies based on mutual interests and
shared values.
 
The Peace, Prosperity, and Democracy Act incorporates, as
part of Title II, the historic Freedom Support Act, which
has served as the basic authority for many of our
assistance programs in the former Soviet Union.
Similarly, Title II also incorporates the Support for
Eastern European Democracy, or SEED, Act of 1989.
 
Also included in Title II is a general sub-chapter for
building democracy in countries in transition.  This
chapter authorizes flexible assistance across the full
spectrum of possible activities in order to promote
transition to democracy, assist democratic governments
emerging from civil strife, and provide urgent assistance
where democracy and democratic institutions are
threatened.  Assistance under this chapter would enable
us to support emerging democracies in Africa, Asia, and
Latin America.
 
As the committee is aware, we engaged in an extensive
consultation process preparatory to the submission of the
Peace, Prosperity, and Democracy Act.  In the course of
this consultation, the staff and representatives of
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) questioned the broad
authority contained in the countries-in-transition
sections, so I would like to explain the rationale for
our approach.
 
There is, of course, no single path to democracy, and
none of them is easy.  Countries attempting to join the
community of democratic nations can benefit from many
different types of assistance as they grapple with the
challenges of reform.  In some situations, our assistance
may be concentrated upon strengthening democratic
institutions such as programs to promote electoral
reform, effective administration of justice, or respect
for the proper role of the military in a democratic
society.  In others, the transition to democracy may
require assistance to support economic reform or provide
urgent economic support.  Humanitarian assistance can
help deal with the hardship and dislocation that often
accompany the transition to free markets and democracy.
 
Countries emerging from civil strife may require
assistance aimed at aiding in reconstruction and the
demobilization and re-employment of former combatants in
civilian pursuits.  In truly exceptional cases, economic
and military aid may be necessary to help democratic
governments meet threats to democracy from, for example,
anti-democratic insurgencies or backlash states like
Iraq, Libya, or North Korea.  Given this wide variation
in the types of assistance needed to promote democracy
around the world, we have laid out broad authorities
enabling the President to seize opportunities to assist
nations seeking to join the community of democratic
nations.
 
Promoting Peace
The central purpose of our foreign policy is to ensure
the security of our nation, thus promoting peace remains
a critical element of our national security.  Title III
of the Peace, Prosperity, and Democracy Act will
authorize programs designed to promote peace through, for
example, multilateral peace-keeping and support for the
Middle East peace process.  It also authorizes programs
to respond aggressively to new international security
challenges like proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and narcotics trafficking, while maintaining
existing authorities to assist countries in meeting
security threats, as well as to share in the burden of
collective security.
 
Chapter 1 of Title III consolidates into one bill the
existing accounts for U.S.-assessed and voluntary peace-
keeping contributions and would allow for funds to be
transferred between the two accounts.  The authority in
this chapter is part of a broader new policy to enable us
to better manage U.S. involvement in international
peacekeeping operations.  A centerpiece of this new
policy is a sharing of responsibility between State and
the Department of Defense for managing and funding peace-
keeping operations.  Basically, DoD will be responsible
for peace-enforcement operations and State for more
traditional peace-keeping operations.
 
Chapter 2 of Title III would contain the authorization
for the non-proliferation and disarmament fund, an
initiative this Administration first proposed and
established in fiscal year 1994.  Designed to complement
our vigorous diplomatic efforts to stem the spread of
weapons of mass destruction, this account makes available
small amounts of assistance to help countries improve
their own non-proliferation efforts and to assist them in
meeting their international non-proliferation
commitments.
 
Chapter 3, Regional Peace, Security, and Defense
Cooperation, provides the bill's broadest new authority
to furnish assistance for security and economic purposes.
Chief among these purposes will continue to be support
for the Middle East peace process, a constant and
essential goal of U.S. foreign policy.  Programs will
include economic assistance needed to bring growth to
Gaza and the West Bank as well as continued economic and
military assistance for Israel and Egypt.
 
Despite the positive trends in the post-Cold War world,
our national security strategy must recognize that
threats do exist, allow for uncertainty, and prepare for
the possibility for setbacks.  Through the Regional
Peace, Security, and Defense Cooperation account, the
Peace, Prosperity, and Democracy Act seeks to maintain
programs to assist friendly and allied nations to deter
and defend against aggression and to cement cooperative
defense relationships through peacetime assistance
programs, especially military training programs.
 
Chapter 4 of Title III consolidates and streamlines
existing authorities for programs to combat international
terrorism and narcotics trafficking.  The legislation
also adds new authority to provide assistance for
international crime prevention.  These programs together
represent highly cost-effective investments in enhancing
the safety of the American people.  It is far less
expensive to help countries seize drugs overseas than to
do so in the United States.  Similarly, the price of our
anti-terrorism efforts pales in comparison to a single
terrorist act such as the World Trade Center bombing last
year.
 
Providing Humanitarian Assistance
Humanitarian assistance is important to U.S. foreign
policy:  Assistance to the victims of natural and man-
made disasters is both a tangible expression of the
values of the American people and an essential strategy
for achieving sustainable development.  In times of
crisis, new democracies and struggling economies are
often dependent on international assistance to avoid a
breakdown of the fragile political and social order.
 
Our concept in drafting Title IV is to group in one place
the three primary channels of the U.S. humanitarian
response--refugee assistance, disaster assistance, and
food aid programs.  While we hope that this unified
presentation will enhance the understanding of the
American people and of other nations of the scope of U.S.
worldwide assistance efforts, let me assure the committee
that this grouping will not lead to any change in the way
these programs are administered.  State will continue to
manage U.S. refugee and migration programs, including our
annual refugee admissions program, which falls under the
oversight of the judiciary committees.  USAID will
administer disaster and food assistance.
 
Advancing Diplomacy
The effective practice of diplomacy is critical to our
success in achieving the goals and priorities of this
rewritten and strengthened foreign assistance act.
Without a strong core foundation for the conduct of U.S.
foreign policy, we would be left with a "hollow"
diplomatic infrastructure inadequate to respond to the
challenges and opportunities of the post-Cold War world.
 
Through a network of over 260 overseas posts, the State
Department exercises the leadership and provides the
operational support necessary to advance U.S. foreign
policy goals.  Its people and missions are critical
components of our efforts to promote peace, prosperity,
and democracy in a changing world.  It is imperative that
in conjunction with drafting a new charter for this
nation's foreign assistance programs, we also strengthen
the people and institutions that will carry out the
mandates of this new chapter in U.S. foreign policy.
 
Recognizing this critical link, we have included Title
VI, Advancing Diplomacy, in the new Peace, Prosperity,
and Democracy Act which, though it does not authorize
such programs, includes language that makes it clear that
without skillful diplomacy our overseas programs are
unlikely to contribute to the realization of our national
goals of prosperity and peace.
 
Mr. Chairman, as you know, this bill is the product of
close consultation between the executive branch and the
Congress.  The Administration appreciates the effort that
you and your staff have invested in helping us to craft
this proposal.  Because we recognize the vital links
between our international programs and our ability to
successfully pursue our foreign policy priorities, we
take this effort seriously and look forward to working
with you to move this legislation.  (###)
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 3:
 
The International Economic Agenda  And the State
Department's Role
Joan E. Spero, Under Secretary for Economic and
Agricultural Affairs
Excerpts from address before the Congressional
International Economic  Issues Forum, Washington, DC,
February 25, 1994
 
It is a great pleasure to be here to help you launch the
Congressional International Economic Issues Forum.  That
the offices of over 200 members have joined this forum is
a good indication of what I want to talk about today:
the growing importance and centrality of economics in our
foreign policy and the growing connection between greater
American economic engagement in the world and our own
well-being here at home.  I would like to talk also about
what we in the State Department and our Foreign Service
are doing to bring economics into the forefront of our
foreign policy and how we intend to support the
President's and our nation's effort to build a new high-
wage, high-skill economy. . . .
 
The Importance of Economics
. . . The interaction of politics and economics is an old
theme in the study of international relations from the
17th century onward.  But in the 20th century, studies of
politics and economics were isolated from each other.
This was more than a problem of theory and analysis; in
the conduct of our diplomacy as well, we tended to
divorce our economic and political interests as we
pursued our policies.  Economics and our economic
strength were taken for granted.
 
Economics was there to be used:  to pay for our military
strength; to provide assistance for other nations, often
for political and not economic reasons; or to be used as
leverage to attain non-economic goals when the Soviet
Union or others misbehaved.  But in the past decades, for
the United States to pursue its economic interests
abroad, to care about jobs and exports for our people and
companies, to demand that other countries grant us the
same access to their markets in trade and investment that
we give them to ours--all this was seen as secondary for,
or even unworthy of, a great nation like ours.
 
I don't need to tell you that today all of this has
changed, because change it must.  The Cold War is over,
and with it has gone our traditional frame of reference
for looking at our international involvement.  It is
almost a cliche now to say that our future will be
described in economic terms.  This will be a world of
economic opportunity but also one filled with economic
challenges.  We may be the world's only political and
military superpower, but when it comes to economic and
business matters, we have a lot of competition.
 
We also now recognize that successful economic policies
provide the underpinning for our broader foreign policy
goals.  The peace and stability we see in the Asia-
Pacific region today is the result of that region's
economic "miracle" just as much as it is thanks to the
political support and security that the United States
provided over the past four decades.  In the world of the
future--whether in Russia or the Middle East or South
Africa--success in our political goals must be
accompanied by success in our economic goals.  And as we
work to accomplish other foreign policy objectives, from
human rights to non-proliferation to protection of the
environment, our economic ties increasingly will be seen
. . . as providing the leverage we need to produce change
in non-economic areas.  In short, economics matters, and
it has acquired a new centrality in our foreign policy.
 
In today's interconnected and interdependent world, what
increasingly matters are the linkages--the interactions
between business and government, between politics and
economics, between our domestic economy and the global
economy, and between international political developments
and economic change.  I am proud to be part of an
Administration that recognizes those linkages and that is
pursuing policies to bring the benefits of the global
economy home to the American people.
 
The Clinton International Economic Agenda
The other day someone said that President Clinton is the
first American President who looks at the world like it's
a global marketplace.  The first speech the President
gave on foreign policy last year gave a clear indication
that economics would play a central role in his foreign
policy.  After one year, I think it is clear that we are
carrying through on that policy vision.  In his speech,
the President laid out five goals for our policy.
 
The first goal is to get our own economic house in order,
and we are now doing this.  This is the most important
contribution we can make to a healthy international
economy as well as to the American people.
 
The Administration's second goal is to open global
markets.  The President has said "we must compete, not
retreat," and has backed it up by coming out forcefully
for open markets and fair competition and against
protectionism.  NAFTA, APEC, the Uruguay Round, our
efforts to open Japan's markets--our goal is to open
global markets wide to American and other countries'
products and services.
 
Our third goal is to improve coordination among the G-7
industrialized countries to promote global growth.
Thanks to deficit reduction and the actions of our
companies and workers, America's economy is on the move,
helping to stimulate world growth.  But we cannot do it
alone.  We are urging Germany, Japan, and the rest of the
G-7 to adopt policies for growth.
 
Our fourth goal is to promote sustainable and broad-based
growth in the developing world.  We want to add to the
impressive list of economic success stories in the
developing world.  Over the longer term, as we have seen,
economic growth leads to political stability and a
greater respect for democratic practices and human
rights.  Economic growth in these countries benefits us
as well; in the past few years, U.S. exports to
developing nations have been increasing faster than those
to the developed world.
 
Our fifth goal is to help the people of Russia and other
New Independent States build free societies and market
economies and to better integrate them into the community
of free nations.  Probably the greatest challenge we face
in this decade is to successfully integrate these
countries into the global economy.  This transition, as
we have seen, is not going to be easy for either of us--
the donors or the recipients--but that does not make the
task any less important.
 
Our support for the economic transformation of the former
Soviet-bloc countries demonstrates very clearly that, in
our post-Cold War foreign policy, success in our
political goals and success in our economic goals are
intimately linked.  In fact, you could go so far as to
say that we cannot achieve our political goals unless our
economic policies are successful.  For example, should
Russia turn away from economic reform and its economic
transformation fail, there will be serious political
costs--in the worst-case scenario, a revived nuclear
threat, increased defense spending, instability, regional
tensions, and a setback for democracy worldwide.
 
In the Middle East, as well, we see the linkage.  The
Israelis and Palestinians took a major step toward peace
when they signed the Declaration of Principles.  But for
the political goal of a stable and durable peace to be
achieved, economic success also is required.  The
Palestinian leadership took a risk in signing the
declaration, and the international community responded
less than two weeks later with over $2 billion in pledged
support.  Now we need economic success on the ground; the
Palestinian people increasingly will judge their leaders
on their ability to bring economic as well as political
benefits.
 
The State Department's Role
These are the key goals on the Clinton Administration's
international economic agenda.  In short, as Secretary
Christopher has testified, the economic security of the
American people is the first of our foreign policy
priorities.
 
What is the State Department's role in all this?  When
you look at the Washington bureaucratic landscape and
think trade, you think USTR; when you think business and
trade promotion, you think Commerce.  Treasury "does"
international economic and financial matters and the
MDBs; Transportation, Agriculture, Labor, Energy, and so
on all have their lead roles as well.  So just what does
the State Department do?
 
. . . It is easier to explain how we support our
international economic goals by starting overseas.  We
have 275 Foreign Service posts around the world--from
Tokyo to Tashkent, from Ottawa to Ouagadougou--operating
under the direction of the Secretary of State.  We have
over 900 Foreign Service officers specializing in
economic affairs, and the reporting that they provide is
the primary source of information and analysis for all
Washington agencies.
 
In almost all cases overseas, it is the State Department
economic officers and their bosses--our ambassadors and
DCMs--who represent and pursue the interests of
Washington agencies.  Treasury Department financial
attaches are stationed in only a handful of major
capitals; in the rest of the world, State Department
officers report on economic developments.  FCS officers
from Commerce are located at 67 posts around the world in
our major markets; at the remaining 200-plus posts,
including most of the developing world, the State
Department is responsible for trade pro- motion.  USTR is
represented abroad only in Geneva and Brussels; it is
State Department officers who support USTR and pursue our
trade policy and market-opening efforts around the world.
Our officers overseas backstop and support all of our
other economic agencies as well.
 
Our ambassadors overseas, as leaders of our "country
teams," increasingly understand that supporting American
economic and business interests is a key part of their
job.  As the President told a group of American business
leaders just last Wednesday, "our embassies are now on
your side."  Secretary Christopher has made it clear that
he expects our embassies to be fully supportive of
American business.  The Department each year now
recognizes the officer who has provided the best support
for American business; competition for this award is
growing.
 
The Secretary practices what he preaches; each time he
travels overseas, he makes it a point to meet with the
American business community and to raise key commercial
issues with the host government.  On his first trip to
Japan as Secretary of State, in April 1993, the first
thing the Secretary said to his counterpart at the
Foreign Ministry was, "I want to talk to you about the
problem we're having selling computers to the Japanese
Government."  I don't know who was more shocked--the
Japanese Government officials present or our embassy
staff.
 
The Secretary and I are pleased to receive an increasing
number of letters from the American business community
praising our ambassadors and embassy officers overseas.
We know that we have a long way to go, we want to do a
better job, and we hope that you will let us know when we
fall short.  But I think that at last we are headed in
the right direction.
 
In the United States
Back here at home, at the State Department, the Secretary
has made it clear that he expects every officer to be
sitting behind the "America's desk" with him.  It is my
primary job to ensure that this happens:  to ensure that
our economic interests are fully integrated into the
development and implementation of our foreign policy; to
get working-level Department officers to understand that
in this new era, economics matters--especially to their
bosses, the President and the Secretary of State--and
that it had better matter to them as well.  We have been
working very closely with our six geographic bureaus to
ensure that economic issues are given full and equal
consideration in policy decisions and that the concerns
of American business are fully weighed along with our
other interests.
 
It is not an easy job to turn the great ship of State. .
. .  But the process has begun.  We want the State
Department to be responsive to economic and business
concerns.  And here again, we need your help.  When we
fall short, let us know; but when we do a good job, I
hope you will let us know as well.
 
The Secretary has named a former ambassador to be the
Department's first commercial coordinator, and we now
have commercial coordinators in all of our six geographic
bureaus to serve as a point of contact to support U.S.
business abroad and improve the Department's partnership
with American business.
 
My colleague Dick Moose, our Under Secretary for
Management, is leading an effort to reform our Foreign
Service personnel system.  We will be working with him to
strengthen the recruitment, training, and performance of
our economic officers to ensure that we carry out our
economic mandate effectively.  At the State Department,
our greatest resource is our people, and that's where
most of our budget goes.  We want to make sure that we do
the best job possible to support our nation's economic
agenda.
 
Our traditional economic work continues with a more
intense focus.  The Department has a leading role,
working with the Department of Transportation, in civil
aviation negotiations; we also have the leading
interagency role in international telecommunications
policy.  I am the alternate U.S. governor to the World
Bank and the regional development banks.  We work very
closely with USAID to promote sustainable development.
We backstop and support USTR, as I mentioned earlier, on
all of our trade policy and market-opening efforts.  As
one example, we have the equivalent of nine officers
supporting our market-opening efforts with Japan, and I
have been chairing one of the three so-called baskets in
the Framework talks.  We were involved from start to
finish in the Uruguay Round, not only in Geneva but
around the world, through our diplomatic efforts with
other governments.
 
I could go on and on, but the point is that the State
Department is an active participant in developing and
implementing the President's international economic
agenda.  It is Secretary Christopher's goal, and my goal,
to ensure that we become an even more active and
effective player in this effort.  We want to make sure
that everyone in the State Department understands that
economics is now central to our concerns and must be
front and center in American foreign policy. . . .
 
Conclusion
President Clinton is carrying out the most important and
ambitious international economic agenda of any President
in nearly half a century.  Over the past year, I have
made a number of trips abroad and met countless foreign
officials and business persons here in Washington.  To
all of them, it is clear--and I have been able to state
honestly--that "America is back" as a responsible manager
of its own economy and as a responsible international
leader.  Our government, our companies, and our workers
are now working together to create a "new American
economy."
 
. . . Today, I am in the right place at the right time.
I am pleased to be at the Department of State today, for
we--and our 275 Foreign Service posts around the world--
intend to support the President fully and to work with
you just as closely in our efforts to restore the
strength of the American economy and build a better
future for the American people at home and abroad.  (###)
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 4:
 
Fact Sheet:  Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
 
Overview
The protection of intellectual property rights
represented by copyrights, patents, trademarks, and trade
secrets is an essential element of U.S. economic policy.
Such protection stimulates research, technological
innovation, and creativity because it allows individuals
and companies to enjoy the benefits of their creative
efforts.  International emphasis on high-technology
industries highlights the fact that the protection of
U.S. intellectual property rights worldwide is essential
to America's ability to compete in the global market.
 
In some parts of the world, piracy--the unauthorized
copying of books, films, sound recordings, computer
software, and semi-conductor chips--and counterfeiting
are commonplace.  Counterfeiting, once limited to illegal
copies of brand-name consumer goods, now occurs in
products such as pharmaceuticals, agrichemicals, and
spare parts for aircraft.  Estimated losses to U.S.
owners of intellectual property rights from these illegal
activities amount to billions of dollars each year.
 
The U.S. Strategy
The United States has a two-pronged approach to
strengthening the protection of intellectual property
abroad:  It seeks to raise international standards of
protection through international agreements and
organizations, and it pursues improvements in protection
and enforcement in bilateral negotiations with its
trading partners.  In addition, a foreign country's
record of protection for intellectual property is linked
in U.S. legislation to eligibility for benefits under the
Generalized System of Preferences and the Caribbean Basin
Initiative.
 
Multilateral Actions
The United States made intellectual property protection a
major focus of its efforts in the Uruguay Round trade
negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT).  The agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), which was part of
the package to emerge from the Uruguay Round, will
significantly strengthen the protection of intellectual
property internationally.  Improvements mandated by the
TRIPs agreement include:
 
--  Protection of computer programs as literary works;
--  Rental rights for computer programs and sound
recordings;
--  Fifty years of copyright protection for sound
recordings and motion pictures;
--  Product and process patent protection for virtually
all types of inventions;
--  A minimum patent term of 20 years;
--  Protection for service marks;
--  Stronger protection for internationally well-known
marks; and
--  Protection for trade secrets, integrated circuits,
industrial designs, and non-generic geographical
indications used to describe wines and spirits.
 
In addition, TRIPs requires effective enforcement
measures by GATT members, both internally and at their
borders.
 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
concluded in 1993, provides for even higher standards of
intellectual property rights protection in the United
States, Canada, and Mexico, than required under TRIPS.
 
The United States also works to strengthen existing
intellectual property conventions and to develop new
agreements under the auspices of the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO), which acts as secretariat
for these conventions.  Among the new agreements under
discussion in WIPO are a protocol to expand coverage of
the Berne Copyright Convention, a new agreement to
protect performers and producers of sound recordings, and
a Patent Harmonization Treaty.
 
Bilateral Actions
In recent years, the United States has initiated
discussions with many foreign governments on intellectual
property protection.  These discussions have resulted in
bilateral agreements on intellectual property rights
protection with a number of important U.S. trading
partners, including South Korea, China, Taiwan, the
Philippines, Russia, and Poland.
 
The United States urges countries to adopt laws to
protect intellectual property rights.  China and Russia
have adopted new patent, copyright, and trademark
legislation during the past year.  Taiwan has enacted new
copyright and patent laws and is in the process of
enacting new legislation on the protection of trademarks
and trade secrets.
 
New Domestic Legislation
In 1992, Congress passed legislation designed to further
strengthen protection of intellectual property rights
embodied in sound recordings.  The legislation requires
that manufacturers or importers of digital audio
recording devices and digital recording media pay a
prescribed royalty on all such equipment or media
manufactured or imported into the United States.  The
royalties collected by the Copyright Office will be
distributed to sound recording producers, music copyright
holders, and performers to compensate them for the
copying of their recordings.  The legislation also
requires safeguards to prevent second generation copying
of pre-recorded copyrighted sound recordings.  (###)
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 5:
 
Mid-Term Review of Most-Favored-Nation Status for China
Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs
Statement before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House
Ways and Means Committee, Washington, DC, February 24,
1994
 
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee:  I appreciate the
opportunity to provide you with a mid-term review on the
implementation of the President's May 28, 1993, executive
order extending China's most-favored-nation (MFN) trade
status.  This Administration has placed great emphasis on
close and regular consultations with the Congress.  The
Ways and Means Committee has a particularly important
role to play on the MFN issue because of its
responsibilities for overseeing trade matters.
 
Our policy toward China does, indeed, merit close and
careful review because the bilateral relationship is of
growing importance for America's interests in Asia and
around the world. Neither Congress nor the Administration
nor the American people can afford to lose sight of these
factors.  China plays an influential role in the region,
particularly on sensitive issues like North Korea and
Indochina.  It holds a permanent seat on the UN Security
Council.  It is one of the largest and fastest-growing
economies in the world, with major potential for U.S.
exports and jobs.  A military power, China possesses
nuclear weapons and exports nuclear and missile
technology.  And its actions on the environment,
narcotics trafficking, refugees, and population have
global consequences. It is, therefore, in the U.S.
interest to promote China's opening up to the outside
world in economic, political, strategic, and humanitarian
dimensions.
 
Administration Policy
Last spring at the outset of the new Administration, we
worked intensively with the Congress to develop a
bipartisan approach to our policy toward China.  During
these consultations, we made a special effort to reach a
consensus on how to address human rights, which remain a
core concern in our relationship.  It is of signal
importance for the executive branch and the Congress to
speak with one voice on China rather than many discordant
ones, as was the case during the previous Administration.
Only through unity can we expect to impress most
forcefully upon China's leaders the need to take positive
action not only on human rights but on other U.S.
concerns as well.
 
The President's May 28 executive order reflected this
broad consensus.  Members of both parties concurred that
China's MFN status should continue, but they wanted
renewal of MFN in 1994 to be conditioned on human rights
improvements.  They also wanted the Administration to
pursue our trade and non-proliferation objectives with
China vigorously through other policy instruments rather
than linkage to MFN.
 
The executive order makes the Secretary of State's
recommendation for a further extension of MFN status
contingent upon a determination that, one, the extension
will substantially promote the freedom of emigration
objectives of the Trade Act of 1974 and, two, China is
complying with the 1992 bilateral agreement concerning
prison labor.  The executive order further states that,
in making this recommendation, the Secretary shall
determine whether China has made "overall, significant
progress" in a number of human rights areas, which I will
review with you shortly.  In addition, the executive
order directs U.S. agencies to pursue vigorously our non-
proliferation and economic-commercial objectives through
existing legislative and executive means.
 
Immediately following the issuance of the executive
order, we initiated a dialogue with China on steps that
would be necessary to renew MFN status this year.  To
ensure that we were making use of all available
opportunities to develop constructive relations with
China and resolve our core concerns, the President, last
September, approved an expanded strategy of comprehensive
engagement.  The President's decision followed an
extensive interagency policy review that concluded that a
healthy bilateral relationship was essential to address a
wide range of U.S. strategic concerns.  These include, of
course, our core concerns on human rights, non-
proliferation, and trade and investment.  But they also
encompass such diverse but vitally important issues as
stability in the Asia-Pacific region, the Korean
Peninsula, Hong Kong, and the Taiwan Strait area; issues
before the United Nations and other international bodies;
and global challenges such as the environment, refugees,
and narcotics trafficking.
 
The President's strategy was designed to engage the
Chinese at levels of seniority required to achieve
progress in areas of paramount concern to us.  First and
foremost, we wanted China to understand that, overall,
significant progress on human rights was necessary for
MFN renewal.  At the same time, we wanted to underscore
our determination to advance the relationship and provide
opportunities to discuss key issues with senior Chinese
officials having policymaking authority.  By broadening
the scope of our dialogue to include issues of mutual
concern, we have sought to give China the incentive to
move forward on difficult matters as it sees more clearly
the benefits of a healthy, constructive relationship with
the United States.  And by raising the level of our
dialogue, we were meeting Chinese wishes as well as
serving American interests.
 
In short, we are pursuing a policy that reflects China's
status as a major power and pays due regard to Chinese
sensitivities.  In return, we expect China to pay due
regard to our needs and to take seriously the President's
determination to achieve real progress on human rights
and other issues.
 
During the past five months, we have energetically
implemented this strategy.
 
--  Secretary Christopher has established a regular
channel of communication with Chinese Vice Premier and
Foreign Minister Qian.  They have met on four occasions--
in Singapore, New York, Seattle, and, most recently, in
Paris on January 24.  The Secretary has emphatically
pressed our core concerns while listening to Chinese
perspectives.
 
--  In September, Assistant Secretary of State Shattuck
began a series of high-level meetings to discuss human
rights and the need for progress in areas identified in
the executive order as well as other areas.
 
--  U.S. Trade Representative officials, including
Ambassador Kantor and Ambassador Barshefsky, who is with
us today, have held extensive discussions with the
Chinese on market access, textiles, intellectual property
rights protection, and services.  Ambassador Barshefsky
is prepared to brief you in more detail on these talks.
 
--  We have pursued a vigorous dialogue on non-
proliferation issues at the senior level.  In addition to
the Secretary's meetings, Under Secretary Tarnoff and
Under Secretary Davis have met with their counterparts to
seek progress in this area, with particular emphasis on
missile proliferation and North Korea's nuclear program.
 
--  Other senior U.S. officials are also playing
important roles in implementing the President's strategy.
Agriculture Secretary Espy visited China in October,
Secretary Bentsen made a trip in January, and Secretary
Brown will meet with his counterpart in Washington in
April.  While their focus has been on economic issues,
they have articulated firmly and cogently the need for
progress on human rights and other non-economic issues of
concern.
 
--  Ambassador Roy in Beijing and high-level U.S.
officials here have conducted a steady exchange with our
Chinese counterparts.
 
--  Our senior-level exchanges have also expanded to
include a resumption of strategic dialogue; cooperation
on narcotics trafficking, alien smuggling, and crime
enforcement; and appropriate military exchanges.  The
military exchanges are designed to enhance understanding
of each side's security concerns and defense capabilities
and to promote a dialogue on issues such as peace-keeping
responsibilities and non-proliferation.
 
--  Most importantly, the President himself has been
engaged.  In the context of the APEC leaders meeting in
Seattle last November, he met with President Jiang to
outline his vision of U.S.-China relations and to convey
his conviction that this vision cannot be achieved unless
the Chinese respond to our core concerns, particularly on
human rights.
 
Meanwhile, there has been a steady stream of
congressional delegations to China in recent months--some
90 visitors since last fall.  In each case, the
Administration has worked closely with members and staff
to update them on developments in our strategy and
coordinate our message to China's leaders.  These visits
have been very helpful in underscoring the determination
of the U.S. Government to advance our key objectives,
particularly on human rights.
 
Results to Date
We have begun to see tangible results from this strategy,
more significant in some areas than in others.  On
economic issues, we have had a number of productive
discussions with the Chinese.  In January, we concluded
an agreement to address the illegal trans-shipment of
textiles to the United States.  There has also been some
progress on implementation of the market access agreement
and, to a lesser degree, on protection of intellectual
property rights and on services.  On these, I defer to
Ambassador Barshefsky for a more detailed report and
assessment.
 
On non-proliferation, we have worked closely with China
on the crucial set of issues involving North Korea.  The
Chinese share our interest in assuring that the Korean
Peninsula is free of nuclear weapons, and they have
weighed in with Pyongyang on the side of moderation and
progress in North Korea's talks with the IAEA.  If
negotiations with North Korea were to falter because of
its intransigence, we expect that China would cooperate
with the world community on alternative measures.
 
We thus far have not resolved some of our differences
with China concerning proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.  In particular, we have not yet won Chinese
agreement to a missile non-proliferation accord having
the precision and binding effect to permit us to waive
the missile sanctions we imposed in August 1993.
Nevertheless, the Chinese recently held talks with us on
these issues at a high level and have agreed in principle
to continue discussions at the expert level.  We are
pursuing this actively.
 
On human rights, I will tell you frankly that Chinese
actions thus far have been limited and less than our
hopes and needs.  But we have an obligation to
acknowledge progress made as well as distance to go.  The
steps China has taken recently are not inconsequential.
We neither exaggerate nor denigrate what has occurred.
Let me identify some actions and areas of progress that I
believe are worthy of note.
 
Under the terms of the President's May 28, 1993,
executive order, the Secretary must attest to Chinese
compliance on emigration and prison labor.  In the past,
we have consistently found China to be in compliance with
the emigration requirement. Large numbers of Chinese
continue to emigrate or leave China on business,  but
Chinese handling of a few cases remains troublesome.
 
With regard to prison labor, following productive
working-level discussions led on the U.S. side by the
Customs Service, Secretary Bentsen pressed the Chinese to
improve implementation of the prison labor memorandum of
understanding during his visit in January.  The Chinese
indicated a willingness to cooperate in this area, and we
are now working constructively to ensure that the follow-
through matches the oral agreements.  The Chinese have
agreed to all five additional prison visits requested by
U.S. Customs.
 
The situation in the other five human rights areas listed
in the executive order--where we look for "overall,
significant progress"--is more problematic.  The
Administration has not yet come to any judgment regarding
the degree of progress thus far achieved.  Nor will it
make that judgment for about another three months.  We
want to look at the whole picture as we consider the
decision to be made prior to June 3 concerning renewal of
China's MFN status.  This includes areas of slippage.
The Chinese know that they cannot take significant steps
backward in some areas without jeopardizing our overall
assessment of progress.
 
It is, of course, premature to predict at this time how
much progress will have occurred by the end of May or how
the Administration will deal with the question of MFN
extension.  I would hope that this committee and the
Congress generally would similarly reserve judgment.
 
Senior Chinese officials at various times have made
positive statements to both Administration officials and
Members of Congress on possible human rights actions.
They have given assurances that the Chinese will take
actions which are possible under their law and, when
desired actions cannot be taken, will explain to us the
reasons.  In some areas, concrete steps have already
occurred.
 
--  The Chinese have entered into an extensive bilateral
dialogue with us on human rights.  Assistant Secretary
Shattuck met with his counterpart in New York in
September; visited China--including Tibet--in October;
met again with his counterpart in Seattle in November;
and returns to China this month for further talks.
 
--  Some dissidents have been released from jail prior to
completion of their term--either unconditionally or on
medical parole.  These include Wei Jingsheng, the best-
known prisoner of the Democracy Wall period of 1979-80,
and Tibetan tour guide Gendun Rinchen, whose case
received widespread attention in the United States and
internationally.  Others, including Catholic and lay
Protestant leaders, have also been released.  On the
other hand, there is disturbing recent news of pressures
against individuals attempting to practice their
religion--for example, the detention of foreign
Christians for several days in Henan Province.
 
--  The Chinese have provided an initial response to a
list of prisoners presented by Assistant Secretary
Shattuck last October.  And they have indicated a
readiness to discuss their response in more detail during
his forthcoming visit.
 
--  The Chinese have held talks in Beijing with the
International Committee of the Red Cross on possible
visits to Chinese prisons.  Moreover, the Chinese have
suggested possible further moves.  But these have yet to
be translated into meaningful steps.
 
In these areas we welcome what has occurred, but we need
to see more concrete actions to meet the standard of
overall, significant progress in the areas listed in the
executive order. In other areas specified in the
President's executive order, we also look for concrete
actions.  It is important, for example, that the Chinese
Government meet with the Dalai Lama or his representative
for serious talks.  We look for a cessation of the
obstruction of international broadcasts into China,
including Voice of America broadcasts.  We strongly
encourage the Chinese Government to remove all obstacles
to the return to China by any Chinese citizen in
conformity with the basic right enshrined in the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights.
 
Realism and Commitment
When the President considered how his executive order
should be structured and what it should contain, our
intent was not to impose specifically American values nor
to erect impossibly high barriers to achievement.  The
United States--as do other democratic countries around
the world--looks to China to abide by universally
recognized standards regarding treatment of its citizens,
including obligations under the UN Charter.  We sought to
formalize this Administration's strongly held view that
human rights must be a cornerstone of foreign policy.
But we also proceeded with a realistic appreciation of
both the strategic and economic importance of U.S.-China
relations and the domestic political and social milieu in
China.
 
We believed then, as we do now, that the requirements set
out in the President's executive order are reasonable and
achievable.  No one, not even the most ardent activists
on human rights, expects a dramatic change in Chinese
society in the next three months.  What we are all
looking for--and what is realistic for the Chinese--is a
positive trend.  The steps to date, while important, need
to be followed by more positive actions.  In all of our
discussions with the Chinese, including our high-level
dialogue, we feature this analysis and this set of
expectations.
 
We believe that China and the Chinese people will be the
direct beneficiaries of the human rights progress we
seek.  We have repeatedly stressed to the Chinese that
human rights progress is necessary to place our bilateral
relationship on a healthier foundation for the long term.
Moreover, it seems to us that China's international
stature can only rise as it becomes clear that China's
policies are producing not solely a more prosperous
nation but also a more humane one.
 
The Chinese have a good sense of what is required to
satisfy the executive order.  We still have three months
remaining until a decision is required on MFN extension.
We will press for further progress and urge the Chinese
Government to respond with an eye to the long-term
importance of a constructive U.S.-China bilateral
relationship.  In this regard, it is in both countries'
interest that Secretary Christopher's forthcoming visit
to Beijing produce tangible results.
 
The U.S. national interest requires a relationship with a
friendly and  open China that is strong, stable, and
prosperous.  The Chinese understand that the
Administration does not wish to revoke MFN and, indeed,
prefers to build a healthier, more positive relationship.
 
On the other hand, we frankly are not certain that the
Chinese take seriously the requirement for more
significant progress on human rights before June.  The
President, Secretary Christopher, Members of Congress,
and others have made this requirement unmistakably clear
in candid exchanges.  Nevertheless, there are still some
indications that the Chinese somehow may believe that the
Administration will be satisfied with cosmetic
improvements and, in eagerness to extend MFN, will find a
way to paper over problems.
 
Mr. Chairman, I am authorized today to state emphatically
once again the official position of the Administration:
More progress on human rights is needed for the President
to extend MFN.  The President will keep faith with his
convictions and his compact with Congress.  Secretary
Christopher will make sure in his forthcoming talks in
Beijing that there can be no misperceptions, no
illusions, and no wishful thinking on the part of his
interlocutors.  If this hearing removes any remaining
miscalculation in Beijing, it will perform a major
service not only for American interests but for Chinese
interests as well.
 
I recognize that there are differences of view in this
country, in the Congress, and in this committee, on how
the Administration should balance the pursuit of our
human rights objectives with other vital concerns.  But I
can say with confidence that we all agree progress on
human rights in China serves our long-term interests and
should be vigorously pursued.  We agree that our economic
interests and the interests of a favorable business
environment are served by steady and clear progress on
human rights in China.  And we share the view that it
would be far more desirable to extend MFN than to revoke
it.  This will only be possible, however, if we all send
an unambiguous message that further progress on human
rights is required.
 
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, in concluding,
let me sum up the main points.
 
--  China is an increasingly important country in
bilateral, regional, and global terms.
 
--  President Clinton would like to forge a constructive
bilateral relationship and has demonstrated this with his
policy of intensive engagement.
 
--  Overall, significant progress on human rights is
necessary to sustain and strengthen the relationship.
 
--  In close consultations with the Congress, the
President set forth criteria in his executive order of
May 28, 1993, that are important and principled on the
one hand and attainable and politically realistic for the
Chinese on the other.
 
--  The President has also authorized a process of
continued high-level and working-level visits, meetings,
and negotiations that broaden the framework of our
bilateral relations, allow the Chinese to advocate their
concerns, and give them the incentive and con- text
within which to make progress on human rights and other
difficult issues.
 
--  Since September there has been significant movement
on several fronts, including human rights, coupled with
slippage in certain areas.
 
--  More progress on human rights is needed for the
President to extend MFN treatment this June.  This is a
challenging task, but it is entirely possible.
 
--  The Chinese know what is required, although, somehow,
they may still not believe that we are serious about our
readiness to withdraw MFN.
 
--  Revocation of MFN would have serious economic and
political consequences for China and the United States,
for our bilateral relations, and for innocent bystanders
like Hong Kong and Taiwan.
 
--  But we will be guided by what the President has set
forth in his executive order.  Our recommendation cannot
be for MFN extension without overall, significant
progress on human rights.  Neither will we submit a
report on human rights that is not credible.
 
--  Whatever one's views on Administration policy, it is
now in everyone's interest--including the Congress, this
committee, the business community, and visitors to
Beijing--to make clear to the Chinese that they need to
take additional concrete steps in the areas specified in
the executive order to meet the standard of overall,
significant progress.
 
We look forward to consulting closely with members of the
committee and other Members of Congress on this issue as
well as our overall policy toward China.  Let us hope we
can work together to raise Sino-American relations to a
new plane.  If the Chinese respond to our positive
approach, we will promote the interests not only of two
great nations but also of global prosperity and peace.
(###)
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 6:
 
Economic and Democratic Support For South Africa
George E. Moose, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
Remarks at the Conference of the Southern Africa
Grantmakers' Affinity Group of the Council on
Foundations, Kaiser Family Foundation, Washington, DC,
February 23, 1994
 
It is a pleasure for me to be here this morning as part
of this distinguished program.  I'm particularly
delighted to see that Mrs. Adelaide Tambo is here;
together with her husband, she helped sustain the South
African liberation movement in exile for over 30 years.
I'm also pleased to see Ambassador Harry Schwarz is here,
as well as Jim Joseph, Chairman of the Council on
Foundations.
 
I applaud the Southern Africa Grantmakers' Affinity Group
for its long-term commitment to the vision of a better
South Africa.  Organizations such as yours are pivotal to
the combination of private and public sector assistance
necessary to secure the future for South Africa's people.
 
South Africa clearly is receiving lots of attention in
the United States these days, but our interest in that
country is nothing new.  The U.S. connection with South
Africa--or, at least, with the area of Africa that became
South Africa--is a long one.  In 1799, when the United
States was barely 10 years old, we sent one of our first
diplomatic envoys 10,000 miles away to establish
relations with the Cape Colony.  Since that time--be it
Pentecostal missionaries in the 19th century, the
financiers who helped found the Anglo-American
conglomerate, or African-American academics and writers
who helped provide inspiration to South Africa's
disenfranchised majority--links between our two countries
have been many and diverse.  And those links, of course,
include the contributions of many in this room.
 
Looking back, it is hard to believe that it has been only
four short years since Nelson Mandela walked free from
Robben Island after 27 years of imprisonment.  Few of us
then could have anticipated that the bold initiatives
taken by President de Klerk and Mr. Mandela could move
South Africa so quickly to the beginning of a new era of
nonracial democracy.  In a sense, South Africa, itself,
walked away from 350 years of self-imprisonment in
December, when it established the Transitional Executive
Council, effectively ending exclusive white rule.  The
world was treated to Mr. Mandela and Mr. de Klerk jointly
receiving the Nobel Prize for Peace.  This honor speaks
loudly and clearly of the resilience and talent of all of
South Africa's people, as well as the remarkable
reservoir of good will they have been able to maintain.
 
Now, however, is when the real challenge begins for South
Africans--and for South Africa's friends in the
international community.  South Africa faces two crucial
months until the country's first nonracial elections
begin on April 26.  One major difficulty is that some of
South Africa's political groups remain outside the
process leading to the elections.  We have consistently
urged those groups to join the process, and we have
encouraged continuing efforts to reach out to them and
bring them in.
 
Another difficulty is the violence that has become all
too familiar in the country.  Approximately 15,000 people
have been killed in politically motivated violence over
the last four years.  Many fear that the violence might
escalate during the weeks leading up to the election.
 
The election itself, of course, will not bring about an
end to South Africa's political complications.  After
April 28, the new government will have the difficult task
of persuading all parties, including those on the left
and the far right, to cooperate within the framework of a
nonracial government.
 
Compounding the political challenges is the parlous state
of South Africa's economy, which suffers from decades of
economic policies rooted in apartheid.  Those policies
created structural inefficiencies, distortions in labor
and capital markets, and impediments to free trade.  The
exclusion of 80% of the population from meaningful
economic participation--and the denial of their right to
develop and use their talent and skills--have also taken
a terrible human toll.
 
The results have been slow growth, four years of
recession, soaring unemployment, and inflation.  The
situation is aggravated by the depressed world economy
and a dramatic decline in investment resulting from
diminished consumer and business confidence.  Worldwide
economic and financial sanctions tightened the screws,
and the devastating drought of two years ago, which
forced South Africa to import large quantities of food,
drove home the realities of South Africa's desperate
predicament.
 
On the international front, South Africa will have to
reinvigorate lost markets and rediscover access to scarce
credit sources in a highly competitive economic
environment.  It is a formidable task.
 
South Africa, however, has much in its favor.  It has the
highest GNP and per capita GNP in Africa.  Its
infrastructure rivals that of the developed world.  Its
physical location--near major international
transportation routes and in the highest growth area in
Africa--makes it an important base for international
trade.  Its location also makes it a natural springboard
for business opportunities in the region and the
continent.  Few countries anywhere can match South
Africa's mineral wealth.
 
Most important, the people of South Africa have faced the
challenge of apartheid, and they have won.  In a system
that denied them opportunities which we take for granted,
many young South Africans have persevered and succeeded.
It is a talent pool that begs to be tapped.
 
A vibrant, free-market economy is vital to generating the
resources to address socioeconomic inequalities that are
the cruel legacies of apartheid.  So striking are those
legacies--backlogs in housing, education, health care,
and social services--that one of our ambassadors
characterized them as "the vultures of apartheid."  The
establishment of genuine democracy in South Africa will
not by itself be enough to attract badly needed capital
or trade.  The new government must adopt policies that
promote growth and demonstrate, concretely, a commitment
to creating a favorable investment climate.
 
Fortunately, the major parties in South Africa appear to
accept that a healthy private sector is essential to
sustained economic growth and that only growth can
generate the resources necessary to attack the legacy of
apartheid.  I am encouraged that the debate on South
Africa's economic future turns less and less on matters
of ideology and focuses increasingly on seeking pragmatic
solutions that work.  Those solutions will need to ensure
both economic growth and economic equity.  Without a
healthy economy--one which can provide jobs for the
nearly 50% of the work force, which is unemployed, as
well as for the 330,000 young people entering the job
market each year--no new constitutional system can be
secure.
 
But South Africa cannot do it alone.  Outside investment
and expertise will be crucial to consolidating South
Africa's democratic transformation and economic recovery.
In conjunction with public sector activities--domestic
and foreign--private sector resources can transform South
Africa's economic system into one that affords equal
opportunities to all of South Africa's citizens.
 
The Clinton Administration stands prepared to do its part
throughout the transition and beyond.  Secretary of
Commerce Ron Brown's recent trade and investment mission
has sown the seeds of American public and private sector
support for South Africa's economic and political
recovery.  Our current bilateral assistance program in
South Africa will continue and expand.  Funnelled almost
entirely through non-governmental and private voluntary
organizations, this unique program focuses on education,
community development, and housing to help  empower--
politically, socially, and economically--those who were
most disadvantaged by apartheid.
 
We believe that the time has also come for the
international financial institutions to re-engage South
Africa.  The IMF, the African Development Bank, and the
World Bank can play a substantial role in South Africa's
economic recovery.  The Administration has already
cleared the way for one new IMF loan by lifting its
previous restrictions.  The World Bank is proceeding with
plans for a substantial program in South Africa following
the April elections.  The World Bank's experience in
poverty-reduction and development programs makes it well-
placed to assume the lead in coordinating international
donor support for South Africa.
 
While the public sector can make a contribution, it is
the private sector that will fire South Africa's economic
engine and revive the stagnant economy.  The programs of
the U.S. Government will actively encourage and support
the American private sector in seizing the opportunities
in the new South Africa.  The Export-Import Bank, as an
example, is actively seeking new business in South
Africa.  In addition, we are in the final stages of an
interagency process to identify new and innovative ideas
that can promote private and public sector involvement in
South Africa.
 
The establishment of a stable economic climate must begin
by ensuring that South Africans exercise the full
benefits of credible and orderly elections in April.
Here violence remains an issue of great concern.
Everyday, it threatens to transform hope and vision into
fear and despair.  We urge that the leadership of all
groups stress clearly, loudly, and frequently to their
followers that violence is an unacceptable means of
political expression.
 
Last weekend, at least 42 people were murdered in Natal,
many as a result of political clashes.  Fourteen ANC-
aligned youths were murdered while participating in a
voter education program.  Attacks on buses marred an
Inkatha Freedom Party rally near Pietermaritzburg.  Seven
people died in factional fighting near Ladysmith.  We
view this violence as a cowardly affront to the process
of democratic reform in South Africa.
 
We have consistently and openly emphasized that violence
must be halted, and we have followed up our words with
deeds.  Part of our assistance already goes to groups
actively involved in curbing the violence, and we will
continue such funding.  We are also supporting entities
such as the Goldstone Commission and the National Peace
Accord.
 
South Africa's transition to democracy will be one of the
decade's dramatic developments.  We are committed to
assisting the electoral process.  We have provided $35
million to help prepare election monitors, support voter
education programs, and provide technical assistance to
parties that have not previously participated in a
national election.
 
In the end, however, it will be the South Africans
themselves--black and white, liberal and conservative--
who will have to live together and make it work.  We see
in our own country that defending narrow, parochial
interests is often an easy and appealing path.  But in
South Africa--as here--this is not a viable option.  All
of South Africa's leaders must demonstrate the courage
and leadership to make the tough decisions needed to
reach a final and peaceful political settlement.  It
would be a tragedy if this opportunity for change were
lost.
 
Americans have played a part in helping dismantle the
pillars of apartheid.  Now, as we continue our commitment
to helping nurture democracy in South Africa, we must
turn our attention and efforts to a new phase of that
struggle.
 
Investors can both contribute to and benefit from a new,
stable South Africa.  As citizens, one way we can help is
to push for the removal of all state and local sanctions
on South Africa.  Of the 168 state and local sanctions,
which were in effect last year, fully 122 have now been
repealed.  We urge that the remaining 46 state and local
economic sanctions be lifted as quickly as possible.
 
As grant-making foundations, you can help by continuing
the dedicated and important contributions you are making
to the future of South Africa.  South Africa can be a
model for other nations striving for democracy, not only
in Africa but around the world.  With our help, it can
become a beacon of hope and an engine of growth
throughout Southern Africa and beyond.  We have a unique
opportunity to help make genuine democracy in South
Africa a reality and, at the same time, demonstrate our
continuing commitment to the whole of Africa.  (###)
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 7:
 
Fact Sheet:  U.S.-Mexico Cooperative Efforts To Save
Endangered Sea Turtles
 
Background
All sea turtles found in the waters of the Gulf of
Mexico, the Caribbean, and the western Atlantic Ocean
belong to threatened or endangered species.  However, the
Kemp's-Ridley sea turtle, which is found only in the
waters of the Gulf of Mexico, is one of the most
endangered sea turtle species in the region.  The limited
habitat of this species makes cooperative efforts between
the United States and Mexico crucial to its survival.
 
A principal threat to all sea turtle species in the
region is the use of shrimp trawl nets.  Sea turtles are
often caught unintentionally in these nets, and large
numbers drown because they are unable to escape.  But
devices have been developed that virtually eliminate the
capture of turtles in the nets.  These turtle-excluder
devices (TEDs) are so effective that, since 1989, the
United States has required all commercial shrimp trawlers
operating in U.S. waters in the Gulf of Mexico and along
the southeastern coast of the United States to use TEDs.
Furthermore, U.S. law bans imports of shrimp from
countries with commercial shrimp trawl fisheries in the
region that do not require the use of TEDs .
 
 
Cooperative Efforts With Mexico
The United States and Mexico have worked cooperatively
since 1991 to promote effective   enforcement of TED
programs throughout the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean
and to ensure that the programs meet the requirements of
both Mexican and U.S. law.
 
As part of that cooperation, in 1991, specialists from
the U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) began a
series of TED training sessions in Mexico for fishermen,
gear technicians, and fisheries officials.  These
training sessions continued through 1992.  In November of
that year, a joint study was conducted by scientists from
NMFS and the Mexican National Institute of Fisheries.
The study showed clearly that TEDs could be used as
effectively in Mexico as in the United States, and, in
April 1993, the Mexican Government made the use of TEDs
mandatory on all commercial shrimp trawl vessels
operating in its waters in the Gulf of Mexico and the
Caribbean.
 
The Government of Mexico reports that since the TED
requirement went into effect, it has not granted any
commercial shrimp trawlers permission to fish unless
proper installation of approved TEDs has been verified by
Mexican authorities.  The Mexican Government's efforts
with respect to the use of TEDs have met all requirements
of U.S. law governing imports of shrimp from countries
whose commercial shrimp fishing operations may adversely
affect sea turtles protected under U.S. law.
 
 Independent efforts by the Mexican and U.S. Governments
to strengthen enforcement and compliance with the TED
requirement will continue, as will the excellent
cooperative efforts of the two governments. (###)
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 8:
 
Treaty Actions
 
Multilateral
 
Atomic Energy
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.  Done
at New York Oct. 26, 1956.  Entered into force July 29,
1957.  TIAS 3873.  Acceptances deposited:  Kazakhstan,
Feb. 14, 1994; Lithuania, Nov. 18, 1993; Marshall
Islands, Uzbekistan, Jan. 26, 1994.
 
Amendment of Article VI.A.1 of the Statute of the
International Atomic Energy Agency of Oct. 26, 1956, as
amended (TIAS 3873, 5284, 7668).  Done at Vienna Sept.
27, 1984.  Entered into force Dec. 28, 1989.  [Senate]
Treaty Doc. 99-7.  Acceptance deposited:  Indonesia, Oct.
28, 1993.
 
Consular Relations
Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on consular
relations concerning the compulsory settlement of
disputes.  Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963.  Entered into
force Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 1969.  TIAS
6820; 21 UST 325.  Succession deposited:  Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Jan. 12, 1994.
 
Cultural Relations
Agreement for facilitating the international circulation
of visual and auditory materials of an educational,
scientific, and cultural character and protocol.  Done at
Lake Success July 15, 1949.  Entered into force Aug. 12,
1954; for the U.S. Jan. 12, 1967.  TIAS 6116; 17 UST
1578. Succession deposited:  Bosnia-Herzegovina, Jan. 12,
1994.
 
Judicial Procedure
Convention on the civil aspects of international child
abduction.  Done at The Hague Oct. 25, 1980.  Entered
into force Dec. 1, 1983; for the U.S. July 1, 1988.  TIAS
11670.  Accession deposited:  Honduras, Dec. 20, 1993.
 
Law, Private International
Statute of The Hague conference on private international
law.  Done at The Hague Oct. 9-31, 1951.  Entered into
force July 15, 1955; for the U.S. Oct. 15, 1964.  TIAS
5710; 15 UST 2228.  Acceptance deposited:  Macedonia,
Dec. 1, 1993, effective Sept. 20, 1993.
 
Narcotics
Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961.  Done at New
York Mar. 30, 1961.  Entered into force Dec. 13, 1964;
for the U.S. June 24, 1967.  TIAS 6298; 18 UST 1407.
 
Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic
drugs, 1961.  Done at Geneva Mar. 25, 1972.  Entered into
force Aug. 8, 1975.  TIAS 8118; 26 UST 1439.
 
Convention on psychotropic substances.  Done at Vienna
Feb. 21, 1971.  Entered into force Aug. 16, 1976; for the
U.S. July 15, 1980.  TIAS 9725; 32 UST 543.  Succession
deposited:  Czech Republic, Dec. 30, 1993.
 
United Nations convention against illicit traffic in
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, with annex
and final act.  Done at Vienna Dec. 20, 1988.  Entered
into force Nov. 11, 1990.  [Senate] Treaty Doc. 101-4.
Ratification deposited:  Sudan, Nov. 19, 1993. Succession
deposited:  Czech Republic, Dec. 30, 1993.
 
Nuclear Weapons--Non-Proliferation
Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.  Done
at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968.  Entered
into force Mar. 5, 1970.  TIAS 6839.  Accession
deposited:  Kazakhstan, Feb. 14, 1994.
 
Patents
Patent cooperation treaty with regulations.  Done at
Washington June 19, 1970.  Entered into force Jan. 24,
1978.  TIAS 8733; 28 UST 7645.  Succession deposited:
Georgia, Jan. 18, 1994.
 
Phonograms
Convention for the protection of producers of phonograms
against unauthorized duplication of their phonograms.
Done at Geneva Oct. 29, 1971.  Entered into force Apr.
18, 1973; for the U.S. Mar. 10, 1974.  TIAS 7808; 25 UST
309.  Succession deposited:  Bosnia-Herzegovina, Jan. 12,
1994.
 
Prisoners of War
Geneva convention relative to the treatment of prisoners
of war.  Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 1949.  Entered into
force Oct. 21, 1950; for the U.S. Feb. 2, 1945.  TIAS
3364; 6 UST 3316.  Accessions deposited:  Andorra, Sept.
17, 1993; Uzbekistan, Oct. 8, 1993.  Succession
deposited:  Macedonia, Sept. 1, 1993; effective from date
of independence, Sept. 8, 1991.1
 
Property
Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial
property of Mar. 20, 1883, as revised.  Done at Stockholm
July 14, 1967.  Entered into force for the U.S. Aug. 25,
1973.  TIAS 6923, 7727; 24 UST 2140.  Succession
deposited:  Georgia, Jan. 18, 1994.
 
Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property
Organization.  Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967.  Entered
into force Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1970.
TIAS 6932; 21 UST 1749.  Accession deposited:  Brunei,
Jan. 21, 1994.   Succession deposited:  Georgia, Jan. 18,
1994.
 
Red Cross
Geneva convention for the amelioration of the condition
of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field.
Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 1949.  Entered into force Oct.
21, 1950; for the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956.  TIAS 3362; 6 UST
3114.
 
Geneva convention for the amelioration of the condition
of the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed
forces at sea.  Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 1949.  Entered
into force Oct. 21, 1950; for the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956.
TIAS 3363; 6 UST 3217.
 
Geneva convention relative to the protection of civilian
persons in time of war.  Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 1949.
Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for the U.S. Feb. 2,
1956. TIAS 3365; 6 UST 3516. Accessions deposited:
Andorra, Sept. 17, 1993; Georgia, Sept. 14, 1993;
Uzbekistan, Oct. 8, 1993.  Succession deposited:
Macedonia, Sept. 1, 1992, effective Sept. 8, 1991.1
 
Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of Aug. 12,
1949, and relating to the protection of victims of
international armed conflicts (Protocol I), with annexes.
Done at Geneva June 8, 1977.  Entered into force Dec. 7,
1978.2  Accessions deposited:  Colombia, Sept. 1, 1993;
Georgia, Sept. 14, 1993; Uzbekistan, Oct. 8, 1993.
Succession deposited:  Macedonia, Sept. 1, 1992,
effective Sept. 8, 1991.1
 
Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of Aug. 12,
1949, and relating to the protection of victims of non-
international armed conflicts (Protocol II).  Done at
Geneva June 8, 1977.  Entered into Oct. 8, 1993.
Succession deposited:  Macedonia, Sept. 1, 1992,
effective Sept. 8, 1991.1
 
Treaties
Vienna convention on the law of treaties, with annex.
Done at Vienna May 23, 1969.  Entered into force Jan. 27,
1980.2  Accession deposited:  Kazakhstan, Jan. 5, 1994.
 
United Nations
Convention on the privileges and immunities of the United
Nations.  Done at New York Feb. 13, 1946.  Entered into
force Sept. 17, 1946; for the U.S. Apr. 29, 1970.  TIAS
6900; 21 UST 1418.  Accession deposited:   Lithuania,
Dec. 9, 1993.
 
Women
Convention on the elimination of all forms of
discrimination against women.  Adopted by the UN General
Assembly Dec. 18, 1979.  Entered into force Sept. 3,
1981.2  Accession deposited:  Lithuania, Jan. 18, 1994.
 
Bilateral
 
Belarus
Agreement on science and technology cooperation, with
annex.  Signed at Minsk Jan. 14, 1994.  Entered into
force Jan. 14,1994.
 
Cote d'Ivoire
Postal money order agreement.  Signed at Abidjan and
Washington Jan. 5 and 25, 1994.  Entered into force Mar.
1, 1994.
 
Croatia
Postal money order agreement.  Signed at Zagreb and
Washington  Jan. 19 and Feb. 10, 1994.  Entered into
force Apr. 1, 1994.
 
France
Agreement extending the interim agreement of Feb. 24,
1987 relating to the employment of dependents of official
government employees.  Effected by exchange of notes at
Paris Dec. 31, 1993.  Entered into force Dec. 31, 1993.
 
Kazakhstan
Agreement on science and technology cooperation, with
annex.  Signed at Washington Feb. 14, 1994.  Entered into
force Feb. 14, 1994.
 
Netherlands
Agreement on mutual administrative assistance in the
exchange of information in futures matters.  Signed at
Washington Apr. 29, 1993.  Entered into force Feb. 1,
1994.
 
Nicaragua
Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of
official government employees.  Effected by exchange of
notes at Managua Jan. 26 and Feb. 2, 1994.  Entered into
force Feb. 2, 1994.
 
Grant agreement for economic recovery and development
program I.  Signed at Managua Jan. 19, 1994.  Entered
into force Jan. 19, 1994.
 
Qatar
Agreement of educational, cultural, and informational
cooperation.  Signed at Washington Jan. 25, 1994.  Enters
into force on date on which the parties have exchanged
written notification that they have complied with their
respective requirements.
 
Russian Federation
Agreement on cooperation in the fields of public health
and bio-medical research.  Signed at Moscow Jan. 14,
1994.  Entered into force Jan. 14, 1994.
 
Protocol on cooperation in the implementation of certain
defense conversion projects.  Signed at Moscow Dec. 16,
1993.  Entered into force Dec. 16, 1993.
 
Memorandum on cooperation in the field of defense
conversion.  Signed at Moscow Dec. 16, 1993.  Entered
into force Dec. 16, 1993.
 
Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in fundamental
aeronautical sciences, with annex.  Signed at Moscow Dec.
16, 1993.  Entered into force Dec. 16, 1993.
___________
 
1  With declaration(s).
 
2  Not in force for the U.S. (###)
 
END OF DISPATCH VOL. 5, NO. 10

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