US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 5, NUMBER 8, FEBRUARY 21, 1994
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
 
 
 
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE
1.  A New International Strategy To Combat Drugs --
Secretary Christopher, Robert S. Gelbard
 
2.  The United States and Russia:  An Assessment From
Moscow -- Thomas R. Pickering
 
3.  The U.S. and Japan:  Reinforcing a Vital Relationship
-- President Clinton, Japanese Prime Minister Hosokawa
 
4.  Responding to the Sarajevo Marketplace Shelling:
U.S. Leadership and NATO Resolve -- President Clinton
 
5.  New Releases:  U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-ROM
 
6.  The U.S. and Kazakhstan:  A Strategic Economic and
Political Relationship -- President Clinton, Kazakhstan
President Nazarbayev
 
7.  U.S. Recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia
 
8.  New Ambassadors
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 1:
 
A New International Strategy to Combat Drugs
Secretary Christopher, Robert S. Gelbard, Assistant
Secretary for International Narcotics Matters
 
Secretary Christopher
(Remarks at a briefing for foreign ambassadors,
Washington, DC, February 9, 1994.)
 
I welcome you to the Ben Franklin Room at the State
Department and express a deep appreciation to you all for
being fellow diplomats and participating in this event
today.
 
Your presence here underscores the global dimensions of
the narcotics problem and the international effort that
we undertake together to combat it.  As you well know,
this morning President Clinton, Dr. Brown, and other
members of the Cabinet announced the release of the
Administration's new drug control strategy.
 
The strategy recognizes that America's first line of
defense against drugs is to reduce drug abuse here at
home.  We are the world's largest illegal drug market--
nothing at all to be proud of--but definitely we should
shoulder our share of the responsibility for combatting
the drug scourge.
 
Sadly enough, we have heard a few frustrated voices--both
here at home and abroad--calling for a legalization of
dangerous drugs in recent days.  Let me be very clear:
This Administration strongly opposes drug legalization.
The costs to public safety and to public health would
simply be unacceptable.  We must continue to fight the
plague of drugs on every front--at home and abroad.  I
pledge to you that we certainly will.
 
We are here today, of course, to discuss the
international aspect of our drug control efforts.  They
are an absolutely essential part of the President's drug
control strategy.  Worldwide production of illicit drugs
is, unhappily, on the increase.  The international drug
trade poses an even more dangerous threat to a secure and
prosperous world.  Drug traffickers subvert the rule of
law, they sap democratic institutions, and they undermine
sustainable development.
 
I must say that the grip that drug dealers have on many
young governments is just terrifying to me.  No nation is
immune.  Many public officials have lost their lives.
Many others live in fear.  Indeed, some of the people
here in this room, I happen to know, resisted
intimidation by drug traffickers.  Let me say to all of
you who are on the front lines of the fight against drugs
that we are really inspired by the courage of your
efforts.
 
That dedication has paid off from time to time, most
recently in the hunt for Pablo Escobar, the world's most
notorious narco-trafficker. That success testifies to
what we can achieve through close cooperation.  Colombian
and U.S. law enforcement officials and diplomats worked
together for years to dismantle the cartel that he headed
and to hunt him down personally.  Having succeeded in
that mission, the United States will continue to support
the Colombian Government in its efforts to counter the
threat of narcotics trafficking and to counter terrorism.
 
Not every battle against drugs on a worldwide basis will
be so dramatic or so decisive, or even so successful.
But by reinforcing our commitment and our capabilities,
we will achieve steady progress.  President Clinton and
I, and all of our Cabinet Secretaries, are determined
that the United States will do its part.
 
Let me mention just a few of the key aspects of our
international drug control effort.  We will help to build
democratic institutions--the courts, law enforcement,
community and political organizations--institutions
strong enough to resist the reach of the drug trade.  We
will help drug-producing countries create economic
alternatives to narcotics and to advance opportunities
for sustainable development.  We will fight the
multinational drug cartels.  We will fight them with a
multi- national effort.
 
Together we must mount a stronger attack on the drug
kingpins and their organizations around the world. Our
traditional partners, such as the United Nations and the
Organization of American States, must remain involved.
We are going to reach out anew to the international
financial institutions to gather them into this process
of fighting the drug trade, which has so many financial
ramifications, and, perhaps, we can begin to reach
through some of the international financial institutions.
 
At the same time, we will try to sharpen our diplomatic
focus on narcotics wherever they are found--an effort
that must begin, of course, in our own hemisphere.  Later
this year, President Clinton will host the first-ever
hemispheric summit, the Summit of the Americas.  At that
summit, we will work to strengthen the hemispheric
commitment to attack drug trafficking and defend the
democratic institutions that it so often imperils.  We
will advance our shared vision of cooperation to address
the critical issues that cross all borders and affect all
our people.
 
Drugs, unfortunately, know no borders and affect people
throughout the hemisphere and throughout the world.
Cocaine and heroin are not just American problems, not
just Latin American problems, not just Asian problems, or
not just African problems.  They are a global menace that
threatens all of us.  With the Administration's new
strategy, we will achieve more effective international
cooperation.  I'm sure of that.  We will help to build a
safer world for each of our countries and for all our
children.
 
 
Robert S. Gelbard
(Remarks at a State Department news conference,
Washington, DC, February 9, 1994.)
 
I have just returned from hearing the President's
announcement of the Administration's new drug control
strategy.  The President made very clear that he and this
Administration take the issue of drug control, at home
and overseas, very seriously and want to respond with
effective action.
 
This afternoon, the Secretary of State will be hosting a
discussion of the international strategy for ambassadors
from major drug-producing, transit, and consuming
countries, as well as    officials from multilateral
organizations and U.S. Government agencies.  This is the
first such gathering ever convened here by a Secretary of
State, and it reflects the kind of high-level attention
that must be and will be focused on international drug
issues.
 
Before I elaborate on its specific  elements, let me
explain briefly how  we formulated this new strategy.
Last year, the President ordered an intensive review of
the threat and of the global response to it.  That review
found that the international drug trade had become a far
more complex and dangerous problem than we had been
prepared to address in the past.
 
The emerging nexus between international narcotics
trafficking and other organized crime, such as alien
smuggling, is adding a dangerous new dimension to the
threat.  I saw this first hand during a two-week visit to
China, Thailand, and Hong Kong--from where I just
returned on Friday--where it has sparked considerable
high-level concern and attention.  We really cannot delay
in addressing this.
 
If the drug trade is not controlled, the power wielded by
traffickers--their violence and wealth--will undermine
and jeopardize important democratic and economic reforms
underway in most parts of the world.
 
However, the emergence of democratic governments offers a
new drug-control opportunity that did not exist a few
years ago.  These governments are more likely to
recognize the dangers of the drug trade and respond with
a stronger commitment and effort, fostering greater
opportunities for international cooperation.  It was
against this backdrop that we put together the elements
of the international strategy.
 
First, we will be supporting the   development of
stronger democratic counter-narcotics institutions.
Strong institutions provide the foundation for what we
all want to accomplish.  Strong institutions are
essential for conducting effective counter-narcotics
operations.  They do not succumb to the corrosive
influence of narco-corruption and intimidation.
 
Second, we will back sustainable development programs to
strengthen the economies of key drug-producing and
transit countries.  Having spent considerable time among
the coca growers in Bolivia, I know that many took up the
trade because they had no alternative.  Stronger
economies can remedy this condition.
 
The Secretary has invited representatives from
multilateral organizations and international financial
institutions to his discussion this afternoon.  This is a
new emphasis.  We will promote greater involvement by a
wider range of multilateral and regional organizations in
drug control efforts.
 
We will continue working, of course, with our traditional
partners--the United Nations Drug Control Program, the
Dublin Group, and, in this hemisphere, the OAS, through
its institution, CICAD.  But we will be enlisting, for
the first time, the support of the international
financial institutions for sustainable development
projects to counter narco-economies.
 
Finally, our strategy will enhance worldwide law
enforcement efforts to target kingpins and their
organizations. Recent enforcement operations by Colombia
against Pablo Escobar and the Medellin Cartel convinced
us that such cooperative efforts can succeed.
 
We will encourage more evidence-sharing, tougher action
on chemical and money controls, extraditions, and other
measures to weaken the major organizations, and expose,
apprehend, and convict their leaders.
 
The new strategy is not a blueprint for instantaneous
success.  There is no such thing.  Look how long it's
taken us, in the United States, to make inroads against
traditional organized crime in this country.  We must be
in this for the long term.  We seek lasting and
fundamental results.  These include more self-reliance by
governments to confront narcotics production and
trafficking, greater international awareness and
commitment to the problem, disrupting trafficking
operations, and diminishing the narcotics threat to our
political and economic systems.  The eventual goal, of
course, is less narcotics production and abuse and safer
and healthier societies for all of us.  Copies of the new
drug control strategy are available for those of you who
don't already have them. (###)
 
 
Single copies of the National Drug Control Strategy may
be obtained from the Drugs and Crime Data Center and
Clearinghouse in Rockville, MD.  The toll-free number for
the center is 1-800-666-3332.  (###)
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 2:
 
The United States and Russia:
Thomas R. Pickering, U.S. Ambassador to Russia
Address before the Council on Foreign Relations, New York
City, February 10, 1994
 
As I discuss Russian affairs today,some of you may wonder
whether I am talking about the same country you have been
reading about and hearing about in the media.  Like many
Americans who live in Russia, I am constantly the subject
of worried inquiries from people back home who seem to
imagine our conditions are comparable to those of Somalia
or Bosnia.
 
I certainly do not want to belittle Russia's manifold
problems, and no Russian of my acquaintance would do so.
But most sensible people can distinguish between trouble
and tragedy.  There are places in the world today sunk
into genuine tragedy; Russia is not one of them.
 
Why should Russia merit our attention in a world of so
many competing demands?  At the most basic level, Russia
is the world's only emerging democracy in possession of
30,000 thermonuclear weapons, and it will continue to be
for many years.
 
More broadly is the question of what kind of world we
want in the approaching 21st century.  The first half of
our own century was about as bad a stretch of mass
violence and suffering as any in the human chronicle.
The second half-century did not produce so much
bloodshed--no third world war, thank God--but created
dangers of Armageddon such as the world had never before
imagined.  Go to a library and select at random a
newspaper for any day of the four decades after the end
of the Second World War and read about the dangers of the
world we lived in.  Is this the kind of experience we
wish to repeat?  I can tell you the Russians do not.
 
Russia is especially important to America because
Russia's future and America's, as De Tocqueville foresaw
in the early part of the 19th century, will separately
and jointly help shape much of the destiny of the world.
We did not shrink from this burden when the question was
one of rivalry; we should not turn away when the
opportunity is one of genuine partnership.
 
America has a great deal to gain in our relations with
Russia--and potentially also a great deal to lose.  We do
not possess, and never have possessed, the will or the
means to determine--let alone to dictate--the future
course of that vast country.  At the risk of sounding
simplistic, I remind you that Russia is neither a
prostrate nor defeated country.  It remains a great
power, sovereign and independent, with vast resources and
capacities and with the potential to play a very
constructive role in the world.
 
Despite some of the doomsday scenarios, Russia is not on
the verge of civil chaos, of economic collapse or
critical human deprivation, or of political
disintegration.  To live there is quite a different
experience from reading about it here.  Russia has
immense and deep-rooted problems--I see them constantly--
but it remains a civil society, in some ways perhaps more
civil than a few years ago.
 
The absence of panic buying and hoarding of commodities,
which happened several times in the not-so-distant past,
testifies that people expect their tomorrows to be hard,
but not so hard as to imperil the social fabric or throw
them into an every-man-for-himself struggle.  There are a
few places in the world today where every citizen must
look toward tomorrow with genuine dread.  Russia is not
such a place, nor should we think of it so.
 
You may have seen a recent article in the Washington Post
about a rather curious phenomenon for a country supposed
to be in such a crisis.  That is, the fact that many
thousands of workers from countries bordering on Russia
go there to find jobs--and do find them--because
employment opportunities and wages are so much better in
Russia.
 
At the same time, we should recognize that the United
States and even the entire outside world do not shape the
course of Russian affairs; Russians themselves do, and
with comparatively little recourse to us.  During the
autumn election campaign, the question of foreign
influence played a very small role in the debates.
Candidates talked about what Russia can, should, or must
do for itself, not about what the West might, ought, or
had not done.
 
A cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with
the United States is broadly accepted across most of the
political spectrum with only some exceptions.  The terms
and conditions of the relationship are matters for
debate, as they are in our own country or would be in any
country.
 
Foreigners, foreign products, and foreign ideas are
common in Russia today--a sharp contrast from a few years
ago when most citizens had never even seen a person from
the West.  Most important, the fear of contact with
foreigners, so pervasive in the old system, is a thing of
the past.  Open interchange is the norm, not the
exception.
 
It is not the case, however, that foreigners define
Russia's future, however much some may imagine they do.
Russia is in a profound process of self-redefinition,
with the emphasis on "self."  Russians listen to what
outsiders have to say, although they have become a bit
impatient with what they refer to as "assistance
tourism."  They study foreign models of various kinds.
They travel abroad to see how things are done in other
countries.  Then something happens which some foreign
advisers had not anticipated:  The Russians make up their
own minds, based on their estimation of their needs in
the context of their national traditions.
 
To get down to cases, I am on record in my regret at the
departure from the Russian administration of Yegor Gaidar
and Boris Fyodorov.  Both men contributed much to the
economic reforms already accomplished.  In the aftermath
of the recent parliamentary elections, each man came to
feel he could no longer make the kind of contribution and
exert the kind of influence on policy he wished, and
chose to depart.
 
Again, I regret their decisions.  However, I see no
reason to expect catastrophic consequences from these
actions, still less reason for apocalyptic assessments
here.  Reform in Russia is a long-term process, and some
setbacks were inevitable.  Both Gaidar and Fyodorov will
continue to be active in the new State Duma, where Gaidar
has the challenging task of trying to lead the largest
bloc of pro-reform deputies, perhaps a tougher job than
he has ever taken on before and--who knows?--perhaps as
important.
 
It is just nonsense to believe or state that there are no
reformers left in the Russian Government.  For example,
President Yeltsin is a bit past the halfway mark of his
five-year term of office.  I have recently spent time
with President Yeltsin and can testify to his personal
vigor, to his mental dynamism and detailed command of the
issues, and to his resolute determination to create a
legacy of fundamental political and economic reform from
his presidency.
 
Boris Yeltsin is not a man to lose sight of or to
underestimate.  Under the newly ratified Russian
constitution, President Yeltsin exercises considerable
executive authority.  He has overcome many, many
obstacles in the past and has almost always exceeded the
expectations of outside observers.  I believe President
Yeltsin has not come this far only to let things slide
backward.  That is not his way.  I believe he will devote
his vast energies and talents to the same purpose of
democratic and market reform in the second half of his
presidency as in the first.
 
At the same time, I find it hard to recognize Prime
Minister Chernomyrdin from some portrayals I have read.
The Prime Minister has stood with President Yeltsin
through some pretty rough periods in the past year--often
literally at the President's shoulder--and has led an
administration containing a broad spectrum of views.
 
Chernomyrdin has said publicly and often that the changes
already undertaken are irreversible and that he is fully
dedicated to the continuation of systemic reform.  He has
also identified control of inflation as his top priority,
although not his exclusive priority.  The Prime
Minister's approach to reform may not be the same as
those of the departing ministers, but he hardly merits
the "red manager" badge he has been given.
 
I also think it is frivolous and rather insulting to
people like Deputy Prime Minister Anatoliy Chubays,
Nationalities Minister Sergey Shakhray, the new Finance
Minister, Sergey Dubinin, Economics Minister Aleksandr
Shokhin, and Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev--and to many
others--to read "reform is dead in Russia" pieces in
Western journals, which should know better and think
deeper.
 
Reform in a country 11 time zones wide does not hang on
individuals.  Put bluntly, had Gaidar and Fyodorov never
been born, Russia today would still be casting off the
discredited legacy of its Soviet past more or less
swiftly and more or less to the same extent.  The same
truth applies even to Boris Yeltsin, great as has been
his contribution and great as I expect it to continue to
be.  Russia would also be seeking to preserve traditions
and achievements from its long history and not throw out,
indiscriminately, the good with the bad.
 
It is no tribute to Western understanding of Russia that
so much attention is devoted to the vagaries of
individuals and so little to the underlying forces which
caused Russia to alter its historic path--and to do so by
its own choice rather than by the diktat of an outside
power.
 
I think that if Leo Tolstoy were alive he would scoff at
the "indispensable man" notions of the "reform is dead"
articles, just as he scoffed at the Napoleon-worship of
his own day.
 
If the Marquis de Custine--that acerbic and often
ungenerous French observer of Russia a century and a half
ago--were alive, he might take satisfaction in the
fulfillment of his prediction for the Russian people:
 
Nations are mute only for a time.  Sooner or later the
day of discussion arises.  Thus, as soon as speech is
restored to this silenced people, one will hear so much
dispute that an astonished world will think it has
returned to the confusion of Babel.
 
In this Babel of Russia's self-redefinition, we should be
prepared to listen sympathetically to a great many
voices--and unsympathetically to a few.  We should be
clear, however, where our priorities and interests lie.
 
By far the most important development in Russia's
transformation is the birth of representative democracy
and the long-term development of functioning and
resilient democratic institutions.  As in the economic
field, this will not be quick, nor easy, nor without
setbacks.  Nonetheless, the quality of Russia's emerging
democracy--the form of political organization of the
state--is critical because it is the role of democratic
institutions to set economic priorities and then to be
accountable to the electorate for those priorities.
 
I am cautiously optimistic about the political trends in
post-Soviet Russia because there is a broad consensus in
the society in favor of democracy, while there is not yet
a full consensus on all the economic priorities and
mechanisms.  We in the West should value this growth of
democracy because, quite simply, we believe a democratic
Russia is more likely to be a helpful and cooperative
great power--and a great power Russia will remain--than
under any other political system.
 
I am surprised how few recent commentaries about Russia
have acknowledged its achievements in creating democratic
institutions.  Russia now has a popularly approved
constitution, closely modeled on that of the French Fifth
Republic and incorporating unprecedented protections for
human rights and civil liberties.  Russia carried out a
general election, which 1,000 foreign observers deemed to
be free and fair and which presented the Russian voters a
range of political choice and a candidness of debate rare
even in developed democracies.  Russia now has a
legislature composed entirely of popularly elected
members; in two years' time, the electors again will
choose another lower house of parliament.
 
Many people, both in Russia and abroad, were disappointed
and even shocked by the results of that election.  I am
among those who would have preferred a different outcome,
but I am not a Russian--it is not my country, it is not
my choice to make.  The point of an election, after all,
is to determine what the people really want and do not
want.  If we are not prepared to live with popular will,
we have no business proclaiming the virtues of democracy
as we do.  Americans were shocked and dismayed when
Winston Churchill lost an election at the moment of his
greatest triumph.  He was not amused either, but accepted
the popular judgment.  You can be sure that Stalin
regarded the whole thing as bizarre and would never have
tolerated such a surprise.  Fortunately, the days of pre-
cooked elections in Russia are over.
 
On December 12, the pro-reform parties did more poorly
than they had hoped.  The neo-communist parties,
representing some very large constituencies in many parts
of the country, did quite well.  The voters who decided
to send Moscow a message--which is what much of
Zhirinovskiy's support amounts to--were more numerous and
more vociferous than perhaps they themselves realized.
During the election campaign, Mr. Zhirinovskiy not only
supported the new constitution but hewed closely to a
populist anti-establishment message and muted many of the
more outlandish and outrageous themes he has trumpeted
since.
 
With genuine elections comes the birth of genuine
accountability in the political system.  What could be
more natural, after all, than that the results of a
general election should have an impact on public policy--
in other words, that the message of the people should be
heard.
 
In his own public statements, President Yeltsin has
acknowledged the frustrations and anxieties of the
voters; after all, he left the Communist Party precisely
because he listened to and understood the people.
President Yeltsin also has indicated quite clearly that
he believes in leading from in front, that he believes
the continuation of basic reform is the best way to
accommodate popular needs.
 
How this will play out in government policy and in the
actions of the new legislature--because the Russian
parliament, as in any democracy, enjoys power of the
purse--remains to be seen in the months ahead.  I
confidently predict the process will be difficult,
because the problems and realities Russia inherited from
its Soviet past are difficult in the extreme--almost
beyond description.
 
The Polish reformer Adam Michnik put it well when he said
making a market-oriented economy out of a centralized
planned economy is like making an aquarium from fish
soup.  Anyone can make a fish soup from an aquarium of
live fish, he noted, but going the other way is quite a
different matter.
 
One area which we think is critical and where we have
made our views very clear--including by President Clinton
in his public statements in Moscow--is the need to
control inflation and avoid entering the kind of
inflationary spiral which can propel forward the
geometric increases of hyperinflation.  We think this is
a subject on which Russia's friends and partners have a
legitimate voice to be heard and a legitimate cooperative
role to play.
 
The inflationary demon may be even more dangerous now
than it was before.  When Gaidar began price
liberalization reform in early 1992, the Russian economy
had a quite primitive degree of monetization; most
decisions on the distribution of goods and services still
were made administratively.  Today, this is no longer so.
Although Russia is not a fully money-based economy, it is
well along that road.  Therefore, the danger of large
government credit emissions fueling an inflationary
spiral is even greater.
 
Many people also are talking today as if the imperialism
of the communists or of the czars had returned to haunt
the scene.  There are serious crises around the periphery
of Russia.  Russia is concerned--as we would be in the
same position.  But Russian efforts to withdraw troops
from the Baltics--down to 15,000 in two countries from
120,000 in three countries just two years ago--are
genuine and encouraging.  The distaste of the Russian
military for foreign deployments is much more evident
than the interest of some few military and others in
intervention.
 
Russian foreign policy has been directed at conflict
resolution in Russia's neighborhood.  The success of the
tripartite statement on removing nuclear weapons from
Ukraine has been a genuine step forward for non-
proliferation and good neighborliness.  These are not the
policies of an offensive juggernaut.  They do not answer
all the questions we and others have, but they do point a
clear path toward how our partnership can develop a
successful approach to resolving these problems.  As
President Clinton signaled in his State of the Union
address, we want to invoke new rules for international
peace-keeping, and we are pleased with the signals from
Russia that it is prepared to play by these rules.
 
Just as the abandonment of communism has left Russia on a
new, untrodden, and dangerous path, so too the
dissolution of the Soviet Union has left all of the
states in a position to face internal quarrels, ethnic
strife, and the need for a new definition of their
relations.  We believe that an imperial Russia is not the
answer; most Russians also appear to agree with us, and
Russian leaders are pursuing policies, working closely
with us, that reflect that new consensus.
 
It is far too early to know how things will turn out, and
certainly far too early to make the kind of sweeping
judgments we have been treated to in recent weeks.  As we
observe--and in limited ways try to assist--the Russians
in their stupendous tasks, we should always be governed
by an appreciation that Russia is a different kind of
society from ours, the product of a vastly different
national experience, whose history, traditions, and even
geography and climate have made them what they are--and,
for the most part, very proud of what they are.
 
What constitutes success in an American context may seem
a false priority in the Russian.  Theirs is a society
which places a higher priority on the community relative
to the individual than we do--and did so long before the
Bolshevik coup d'etat.  Russia is also a country with a
very long tradition of state direction of national
economic priorities to an extent alien to us but by no
means unique among the industrial countries of the world.
 
Finally, Russia is a country which knows it has made
terrible mistakes and inflicted terrible, needless
suffering on itself.  It is looking for new answers.  Two
years ago, despite our protests, many Russians imagined
we in the United States had all the answers; now they
know we do not.
 
Most Russians still want a cooperative relationship with
us--a partnership--if we are willing to respect their
right to make their own choices.  It is this partnership
which holds the promise of enduring benefit for the
United States and for the world as a whole.  It is this
partnership which has removed the global competition and
danger of conflict which consumed so much effort, blood,
and treasure for so many years.  It is this partnership
which has made Europe a whole continent again, rather
than a divided one.  It is this partnership which permits
us to work together to eliminate the hair-trigger of the
nuclear balance of terror and to reduce the awful
arsenals of mass destruction.
 
It is this partnership which helps us discuss areas of
cooperation--and areas of disagreement as well--like
rational adults, without ideological overlay or
calculation of zero-sum results.
 
Such an American-Russian partnership is not a
condominium:  It will not divide the world into spheres
of influence, it will not surrender the independence or
sovereignty of other states, nor will it exclude or
derogate from the positive relations and partnerships
each of us enjoys with other countries.  Our partnership
does not seek to create a threatening alliance, but
rather a meeting of minds.
 
George Santayana said those who do not know history are
doomed to fulfill it.  For most of us the Cold War is so
recent as to constitute more current events than history.
The question is whether we--in partnership with Russia--
can learn enough from the dangers of our past rivalry to
consign it to history and not resume our previous
adversarial relationship.  To do so will require patience
and understanding on both sides and, above all, mutual
respect for our respective national identities. (###)
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 3:
 
The U.S. and Japan:  Reinforcing a Vital Relationship
President Clinton, Japanese Prime Minister Hosokawa
Opening statements at a news conference, February 11,
1994
 
President Clinton.  Good afternoon.  It's a pleasure to
welcome Prime Minister Hosokawa to the White House.  The
Prime Minister and I met last in Seattle at the APEC
Conference.  Our dialogue there was based on a new
honesty and respect that continued in our talks today.
 
Both of us were elected on a mandate for change, and the
Prime Minister has shown real courage and commitment to
making change occur-- by advocating and securing
political reforms, by opening Japan's construction and
rice markets, and by seeking to deregulate Japan's
economy.  He also ushered through a tax cut that is a
step toward spurring growth.  And I know the Prime
Minister proposed an even larger budget stimulus.  I
commend all these steps which can move Japan toward
greater openness.
 
The United States and Japan have a long, deep, and rich
relationship.  No relationship in the world is more
important today.  Our security alliance, which is
stronger than ever, is essential to the Asia-Pacific and
elsewhere.  Today we discussed our shared interest in the
Asia-Pacific and its stability, including developments in
Russia, China, and elsewhere.  And I look forward to
continuing this discussion this summer at the G-7 summit
in Naples.
 
Our shared interests are nowhere clearer than on the
Korean Peninsula.  North Korea's nuclear program poses a
serious threat to regional stability and international
non-proliferation efforts.  We agreed to continue our
close cooperation in pursuing a non-nuclear Korean
Peninsula.
 
Our nations today have also embraced a common agenda for
cooperation on global issues such as population,
transportation technology, and the environment.  It
includes a $12-billion joint initiative to address
population and AIDS in developing nations and new
environmental assistance to Central and Eastern Europe.
 
Our discussions today focused chiefly on economics.  The
central concern of my Administration has been preparing
our country for the new global economy in the 21st
century.  That is why we've invested in our people, cut
our deficits, and pursued more open markets through
NAFTA, through the Uruguay Round of GATT, and through
APEC.
 
As the world's second-largest market, Japan must be our
strategic partner in efforts to spur global growth.  That
is why I've attached as much importance to our economic
alliance as to our political and security alliance.  For
our relationship to be strong, we must have a more
mutually beneficial economic partnership.  Such a
partnership will benefit all our citizens with more jobs
and opportunities for American workers and more choices
and lower prices for Japanese consumers.  Indeed, we seek
to open Japan's economy not only for our own products,
but for those from the rest of the world as well.
 
Even though we have negotiated over 30 trade agreements
with Japan since 1980, Japan still remains less open to
imports than any other G-7 nation.  Its regulations and
practices screen out many of our products, even our most
competitive products.  To take one example, when our
medical technology firms sell in Europe, they earn 40% of
the market there.  In Japan, they earn just 15%.  The
same holds true in many other sectors.
 
Last July, our two governments agreed on a framework to
address a wide range of macroeconomic structural and
sectoral trade issues.  We focused on opening markets.
We agreed to seek agreements containing--and I quote--
"objective criteria" that would result in "tangible
progress."  We agreed to hold two summits each year to
evaluate that progress.  Today was the first such
meeting.
 
Unfortunately, we've not been able to reach agreement in
any of the four areas we identified last July.  Japan's
offers made in these negotiations simply did not meet the
standards agreed to in Tokyo.
 
Today, we could have disguised our differences with
cosmetic agreements.  But the issues between us are so
important for our own nations and for the rest of the
world that it is better to have reached no agreement than
to have reached an empty agreement.  Of course, Japan has
further proposals; our door remains open.  But
ultimately, Japan's market must be open.
 
Over the past 40 years, the relationship between the
United States and Japan has been the strongest when all
three of its components--security, political, and
economic--were seen by both our peoples as mutually
beneficial.  I am committed to improving our economic
ties not only because doing so will mean more jobs and
better standards of living in both nations, but because
it will strengthen every aspect of our relationship.  I
remain confident that we can work together to provide
leadership in this new global economy.  I have enormous
confidence in the sincerity and the capacity and the
vision of Prime Minister Hosokawa.  And I am absolutely
convinced that the relationship between the United States
and Japan, founded on mutual respect and responsibility,
ever growing in its maturity, will, as it must, remain
vibrant and strong.
 
Mr. Prime Minister.
 
 
Prime Minister Hosokawa.  Thank you, Mr. President.
Today, President Clinton and I discussed wide-ranging
issues from trade and economic matters, the current
international situation, and the future of the Asia-
Pacific region and our cooperation on global issues.  The
list of these extensive issues reflects the matured
relationship between Japan and the United States.  And,
to be very candid, I think we had a very good meeting.
 
As to the framework talks, we have not yet come to agree
on all the important issues, despite our intensive
negotiations over the past six months.  We are, however,
in agreement that we should in no way allow this result
to undermine the strong and friendly relationship between
our two countries.
 
Since I assumed office, my Administration has launched a
series of measures for macroeconomic management in Japan.
The other day, I announced a comprehensive package of
economic measures, the total amount of which is the
largest ever.  I am convinced that, through these
measures, reinforced by appropriate economic policies by
other governments, we'll be able to achieve over the
medium term a highly significant decrease in our current
account surplus.
 
As to the sectoral issues of the framework talks, our
respective positions regarding the relationship between
the objective criteria and the numerical targets did not
converge.  As part of my inner-driven reform, I am
determined to take initiatives on our government
procurement.  To this end, for example, the Government of
Japan has already announced such measures as the action
program on government procurement, and concrete efforts
are being made in line with this program.
 
In addition, as to the insurance issue, I place
particular emphasis on achieving greater transparency in
administrative procedures and promoting deregulation,
which will create a better business climate for foreign
insurance companies in Japan.  In the area of autos and
auto parts, the positive effects of industrial
cooperation between Japan and the U.S. are now steadily
becoming apparent.  The Government of Japan will continue
to provide all possible support to cooperation between
our private sectors in this field.
 
There is no doubt that Japan-U.S. cooperation in the
areas of political and security relations has expanded
and intensified.  The increasing possibility of the Asia-
Pacific region evolving into a community would give our
partnership a new task and a prospect for further
development.  The suspected development of nuclear
weapons by North Korea is currently the highest concern
for security in northeast Asia.  This issue also poses a
great challenge to the international nuclear non-
proliferation regime.  Today, the President and I had a
very meaningful discussion on this matter.
 
In this post-Cold War era, the possible areas of
cooperation between Japan and the United States are
enormous.  In fact, under the framework talks the two
countries have discussed such issues of mutual concern as
global environment, population, and human immune
deficiency virus, or AIDS.  Japan will mobilize
approximately $3 billion over the next seven years to
bear on urgent matters of growing global population and
AIDS.  The President and I are fully committed to
cooperation in these areas.
 
In the past, Japan and the U.S. sometimes have reached
ambiguous agreements which glossed over the problems of
the time, only to find them become sources of later
misunderstandings between our two countries from time to
time.  Now I firmly believe that our relationship in this
new era is maturing to an extent that each of us respects
and has confidence in the judgments of the other, each of
us makes the utmost effort to tackle the issues that each
side responsibly understands and identifies, but at the
same time, each frankly admits what we can and what we
cannot do despite such best efforts.  I believe such is
the relationship between grown-ups, as we two are.
 
Since I took office, I've sought to realize a general
reinstatement of politics in the management of the
critical processes of politics, economics, and government
administration.  As a like-minded colleague trying to
bring about reforms in the social and political
processes, I highly appreciate and respect the leadership
exercised by President Clinton and his Administration on
both the domestic and international front, including
budget deficit reduction and bringing NAFTA to a
successful conclusion, and in opening a new frontier for
APEC.  I am firmly convinced that the reform efforts that
President Clinton and I are undertaking would reinforce
the vital Japan-U.S. relationship and lead to further
progress in the world community.  (###)
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 4:
 
Responding to the Sarajevo Marketplace Shelling:  U.S.
Leadership and NATO Resolve
President Clinton
Statement by the President, Washington, DC, February 9,
1994
 
Good evening.  Over the past year, our Administration has
been working to do what we could to help end the tragic
conflict in Bosnia and ease the suffering it has caused.
Like people everywhere, I was outraged by the brutal
killing of innocent civilians in the Sarajevo market last
Saturday.  The events of the past year and the events of
the past few days reinforce the belief I have that more
must be done to stop the shelling of Sarajevo and the
murder of innocents.
 
Therefore, the United States, working with our allies,
has developed a series of proposals to address the
situation in Sarajevo and reinvigorate the negotiations
to bring the bloodshed and aggression in Bosnia to an
end.  As a result, just now in Brussels, NATO has decided
that if any Bosnian Serb heavy weapons are found within
20 kilometers of Sarajevo after 10 days--or if there is
any further shelling of Sarajevo--NATO commanders stand
ready to conduct air strikes against Serb artillery
positions.  NATO would carry out such strikes in accord
with procedures it agreed on last August.
 
There are reports that as a result of NATO's impending
action, Bosnian Serbs have already agreed to withdraw
their heavy guns.  If these reports are true, I welcome
them.  We hope that the Bosnian Serb actions will make
air strikes unnecessary.  But no one should doubt NATO's
resolve.  NATO is now set to act.  Anyone--anyone--
shelling Sarajevo must recognize this fact and be
prepared to deal with the consequences.
 
Our nation has clear interests at stake in this conflict.
We have an interest in helping prevent a broader conflict
in Europe that is most compelling.  We have an interest
in showing that NATO, history's greatest military
alliance, remains a credible force for peace in post-Cold
War Europe.  We have an interest in stemming the
destabilizing flows of refugees that this horrible
conflict is creating.  And we clearly have a humanitarian
interest in helping prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo
and the continuing slaughter of innocents in Bosnia.
These interests do not justify unilateral American
intervention in the crisis, but they do justify the
involvement of America and exercise of our leadership.
 
I have been meeting, over the last hour, with leaders of
both parties in Congress, and I stressed to them that our
contribution to resolving the Bosnian conflict will be
proportionate to our interests--no more and no less.  We
have also insisted that NATO not commit itself to any
objectives it cannot achieve.  Important as these NATO
actions are, we must understand that in the end, this
conflict must be settled at the negotiating table by the
parties themselves.  In short, they must want to stop
killing each other and to settle this, to resume their
peaceful life before that will occur.
 
I have directed the Secretary of State to have the United
States play a more active role in the negotiations.
These efforts are well underway.  We hope that our
efforts and the efforts of other NATO countries and of,
perhaps, other nations as well can help reinvigorate the
process of peace and bring these parties to an agreement.
 
The ongoing tragedy in Sarajevo and Bosnia should
catalyze all of our efforts to seek negotiated solutions.
The actions that I have proposed and that NATO has
approved today demonstrate that our nation and the
international community cannot and will not stand idly by
in the face of a conflict that affects our interests,
offends our consciences, and disrupts the peace. (###)
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 5:
 
New Releases:  U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-ROM (USFAC)
 
U.S. Foreign Affairs on CD-ROM (USFAC) is the first-ever
disk by the U.S. Department of State containing speeches,
testimony, and briefings by the top foreign policy makers
in the Clinton and Bush Administrations.  Easy to use and
priced at just $29, the disk enables quick computer
searches of more than 800 documents featuring the
President, Secretary of State, and other officials from
January 1990 through May 1993.
 
USFAC also includes key foreign policy publications that
chart the making of American foreign policy, such as
Background Notes for more than 100 countries and
international organizations; the Department's weekly
Dispatch magazine (Vol. 1 through Vol. 4, No. 22);
congressional reports on human rights, global terrorism,
and narcotics; plus directories of key officers of
foreign service posts, tips for travelers, maps, and a
number of special reports.  Transcripts of the
Department's daily press briefings (1991-92 only) also
are included.
 
The disk is specifically designed for librarians,
researchers, journalists, and schools who need to rapidly
search and retrieve by any word in the database or by
title, speaker, subject, date, region, or country.  A
range of advanced search and editing features is
included.  The search software is included on the disk.
 
This low-cost CD-ROM requires an IBM or compatible with
MSDOS 3.0 or better to run.  USFAC is available for $29
($36.25 foreign) each from:
 
Superintendent of Documents
Government Printing Office
P.O. Box 371954
Pittsburgh, PA   15250-7954
 
or by FAX at (202) 512-2250.  The order code is S/N 044-
000-02355-5.
 
As an annual release, USFAC complements the Department's
more timely electronic releases on the Government
Printing Office's Federal Bulletin Board Service and on
Internet.  For more information, contact the Office of
Public Communication, U.S. Department of State at (202)
647-6512. (###)
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 6:
The U.S. and Kazakhstan:  A Strategic Economic and
Political Relationship
President Clinton, Kazakhstan President Nazarbayev
Remarks during a White House signing ceremony,
Washington, DC, February 14, 1994
 
President Clinton.  Good afternoon.  I'm delighted to
welcome President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan to the White
House today.  This was our first meeting, and it was a
very good one.
 
Over the last year, I asked both Vice President Gore and
Secretary of State Christopher to visit Kazakhstan during
their trips to the region.  Both told me how impressed
they were by the great progress Kazakhstan has achieved
under the strong leadership of President Nazarbayev.
 
While there are many aspects to the widening relationship
between our two nations, one of the most important is our
work in nuclear non-proliferation.  When the Soviet Union
was dissolved in 1991, four of the new independent
states--Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan--had
Soviet strategic nuclear weapons on their territory.  One
of my highest national security priorities has been to
ensure that the breakup of the former Soviet Union did
not lead to the creation of new nuclear states.  Such a
development would increase the risks of nuclear
accidents, diversion, or terrorism.
 
That is why, when I was in Minsk last month, I praised
Belarus for working to eliminate its nuclear weapons and
why last month's historic agreement to destroy over 1,800
nuclear weapons in Ukraine is so important.
 
In the two years since Kazakhstan attained its
independence, it has shown the leadership to meet its
international arms control obligations and address the
most dangerous legacy of the Cold War.  Kazakhstan signed
a protocol in Lisbon making it a party to the START
treaty.  In July of 1992, Kazakhstan ratified that
accord.  And last December, Vice President Gore had the
privilege of being in Almaty when Kazakhstan's parliament
voted to accede to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
as a non-nuclear state.
 
Today, I was honored when President Nazarbayev presented
me with his government's instrument of accession to the
NPT.  This historic step sets an example for the entire
world at a pivotal time in international non-
proliferation efforts.  It will affect over 1,000
warheads from SS-18 missiles, the most deadly in the Cold
War arsenal of the former Soviet Union.
 
This step also will allow Kazakhstan and the United
States to develop a full and mutually beneficial
partnership.  To strengthen that partnership and support
Kazakhstan's economic reforms, I am announcing today a
substantial increase in the United States assistance to
Kazakhstan--from $91 million last year to over $311
million this year.  In addition, we are prepared to
extend another $85 million in funds for the safe and
secure dismantlement of nuclear weapons in 1994 and 1995.
 
President Nazarbayev and I also agreed today to continue
our efforts to encourage and facilitate trade and
investment between our two nations.  We signed a charter
on democratic partnership which states our common
commitment to democratic values, including the rule of
law and respect for individual rights.  These values are
a source of strength in both our multi-ethnic societies.
 
The United States and Kazakhstan will also sign
agreements today on scientific cooperation, space,
defense conversion, investment protection, and other
areas.  These are the building blocks of a strong and
enduring relationship.
 
The President's visit here today opens a bright new era
for that relationship, and the United States looks
forward to being Kazakhstan's friend and partner in the
months and the years ahead.  We believe we have
established the basis for a long-term partnership of
immense strategic importance and economic potential for
the United States.
 
President Nazarbayev has shown great courage, vision, and
leadership.  We are prepared and eager to work closely
with him and with the people of Kazakhstan.  Mr.
President, the microphone is yours.
 
President Nazarbayev.
 
 
 Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen:  The [inaudible]
official visit to the United States is a crucial stage in
the development of the Kazakh-American relationship.
 
Today, President Clinton and I had talks that were held
in a cordial and friendly atmosphere.  This has been our
first personal meeting, and I'm satisfied to state that
it has been a fruitful one.
 
We have discussed openly a number of important issues of
mutual interest.  At the center of this discussion were
the issues related to a further development of the
Kazakh-American bilateral relationship, the latest
developments in the Commonwealth of Independent States
and Central Asia, and strengthening of international
security.
 
President Clinton and I highly appreciate the dynamics of
development of the Kazakh-American relationship.  We
unanimously have agreed that [inaudible] enjoy good
prospects for a further expansion and deepening of our
cooperation in various areas.
 
The most important among the documents that were signed
today is the Charter of Democratic Partnership between
the Republic of Kazakhstan and the United States of
America.  This document, in everyone's opinion, marks a
principally new phase in our relationship that has given
a larger-scale [inaudible] basis.  It covers such aspects
as politics, economy, military cooperation, science and
technology, ecology, health care, and others.
 
I familiarized President Clinton with the situation in
our region.  And I'm satisfied with his deep
understanding of Kazakhstan's interest to safe- guard its
security, territorial integrity, and inviolability of
existing borders, to [inaudible] stability and create a
favorable environment to follow the path of democratic
development and economic reforms.
 
These issues are of exceptional importance to us due to
the signing of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by
Kazakhstan as a non-nuclear state.  Security guarantees,
provided by the United States as contained in the charter
as well as by our participation in multilateral
cooperation within the framework of partnership in the
name of peace--the program initiated by NATO--
strengthened our confidence in the future of Kazakhstan
as a sovereign state.
 
During the talks, both parties confirmed their interest
in the increased contribution that American businesses
can make to develop the economy of Kazakhstan.  The
conditions that are necessary for this to happen are
there.  We believe that American companies that have
partaken in this [inaudible] could determine one of the
more promising and mutually beneficial trends in our
cooperation.  The list of such entities has been
submitted to the American business community.
 
We also believe that setting up the Kazakh-American
Business Council for Economic Cooperation and the Central
Asian funds for small business development, with
headquarters at Almaty, also will contribute to obtaining
the aforementioned objectives.
 
An entirely new aspect of our cooperation will develop
when American companies take part in the conversion of
the defense industry in Kazakhstan.  Agreements have been
made to set up a bilateral committee that will deal with
these issues.
 
I'd like to express my gratefulness personally, and on
behalf of my delegation, for the hospitality and warm
reception, and for the fact that all the problems that
were discussed found deep understanding.  I believe that
the strategic relationship in economics and politics
between the United States and Kazakhstan will serve the
cause of democracy and economic reforms and will also
help establish a just order of [inaudible] former Soviet
Union.
 
I have invited President Clinton to visit Kazakhstan
officially, the time of which will be agreed on through
diplomatic channels.  (###)
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 7:
 
U.S. Recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia
Statement released by the White House, Office of the
Press Secretary, Washington, DC, February 9, 1994
 
Today, the United States extended formal recognition to
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and declared
its intent to establish full diplomatic relations.  The
President conveyed this decision in a letter delivered in
Skopje to President Gligorov.  This move is in
recognition of the democratic expression of the citizens
of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to establish
a sovereign and independent state based on democratic
principles.  This action will help promote stability in
the region.  We join nearly every other country of Europe
in taking this step.
 
In extending formal recognition, we have taken into
account the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's
commitment to peaceful cooperative relations and its
respect for the territorial integrity of all of its
neighbors, and the inviolability of existing boundaries.
Establishment of diplomatic relations will take place
upon receipt of assurances regarding matters of
importance to the U.S., including respect for CSCE norms
and principles, enforcement of UN-imposed sanctions
against Serbia and Montenegro, and a commitment to work
constructively with the United Nations to resolve
differences with our long- time ally, Greece.
 
We recognize that Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia have outstanding differences, which we
expect will be resolved through good-faith negotiations.
We further expect that our recognizing the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will encourage flexibility
in addressing the symbolic and constitutional issues
which separate the two parties so that they can overcome
the problems that stand in the way of a normal bilateral
relationship.  We believe that lasting peace and
stability in the Balkans depends on states' mutual
respect and adherence to CSCE principles.  We also take
note of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's
commitment to democratic principles; to human rights; to
the creation of an open, free market economy; and to its
desire to seek peaceful solutions to problems in the
region.  (###)
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 8:
 
New Ambassadors
 
Australia--Edward Joseph Perkins, October 20, 1993
Austria--Swanee Grace Hunt, November 4, 1993
Belgium--Alan John Blinken, November 12, 1993
Brunei--Theresa Anne Tull, November 12, 1993
Bulgaria--William Dale Montgomery, October 18, 1993
Comoros, Mauritius--Leslie M. Alexander, November 29,
1993
Cyprus--Richard A. Boucher, October 18, 1993
Denmark--Edward Elliott Elson, November 23, 1993
Djibouti--Martin L. Cheshes, December 13, 1993
Ecuador--Peter F. Romero, November 5, 1993
Eritrea--Robert Gordon Houdek, December 16, 1993
Greece--Thomas Michael Tolliver Niles, October 12, 1993
Haiti--William Lacy Swing, October 12, 1993
Iceland--Parker W. Borg, October 28, 1993
South Korea--James T. Laney, October 19, 1993
Laos--Victor L. Tomseth, December 10, 1993
Lebanon--Mark Gregory Hambley, November 24, 1993
Mali--William H. Dameron III, October 8, 1993
Mozambique--Dennis C. Jett, October 8, 1993
Norway--Thomas A. Loftus, November 10, 1993
Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu--Richard W.
Teare, October 29, 1993
Peru--Alvin P. Adams Jr., December 6, 1993
Philippines--John D. Negroponte, October 15, 1993
Poland--Nicholas Andrew Rey, November 23, 1993
Rwanda--David P. Rawson, December 8, 1993
Slovakia--Theodore E. Russell, December 8, 1993
Spain--Richard N. Gardner, October 4, 1993
Suriname--Roger R. Gamble, October 19, 1993
Ukraine--William Green Miller, October 13, 1993
Zambia--Roland Karl Kuchel, December 17, 1993
U.S. Mission to the European Office of the UN--Daniel L.
Spiegel, November 8, 1993  (###)
 
 
 
END OF DISPATCH VOL 5, NO 8

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