US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 5, NUMBER 7, FEBRUARY 14, 1994
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
 
 
 
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1.  Deputy Secretary-Designate's Confirmation Hearing --
Deputy Secretary-Designate Talbott
2.  U.S. Lifts Trade Embargo Against Vietnam -- President
Clinton
3.  The Peace, Prosperity, and Democracy Act of 1994 --
Secretary Christopher
4.  International Affairs Budget:  An Investment in Peace
and Prosperity -- Secretary Christopher
5.  The NATO Summit and the Future of European Security -
- Stephen A. Oxman
6.  U.S. Expresses Outrage Over Marketplace Shelling --
President Clinton
7.  Reaction to the Sarajevo Marketplace Shelling --
Secretary Christopher
8.  Chiapas:  Implications for U.S.-Mexico Relations --
Alexander F. Watson
9.  Treaty Actions
 
 
ARTICLE 1:
 
Deputy Secretary-Designate's Confirmation Hearing
Deputy Secretary-Designate Talbott
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, DC, February 8, 1994
 
I am pleased to be back before this committee.  Since
appearing before you last March, I have had frequent
contact with a number of you and have benefited from your
counsel.  I know that Secretary Christopher greatly
values his interaction with you and your colleagues.  I
look forward to working with each of you on a broader
range of issues if you and the full Senate see fit to
approve my nomination.
 
If confirmed, I will dedicate myself to helping the
Secretary and the President advance our national security
interests as we seize the opportunities and grapple with
the dangers that have accompanied the end of the Cold
War.
 
Bill Clinton is our first President elected after the
Cold War ended.  Making sure that it stays over--making
sure the new opportunities prevail over the new dangers--
is the underlying theme, the overarching task, of our
foreign policy.
 
In my capacity as ambassador-at-large and special adviser
to Secretary Christopher for the new independent states
of the former Soviet Union, I have been deeply immersed
in that task in its most exhilarating and its most vexing
dimensions.
 
The very phrase "new independent states of the former
Soviet Union" bears repeating.  Not long ago, it would
have had the ring of political fiction, if not fantasy.
It is because those eight words now reflect reality that
we can even talk about the end of the Cold War--about a
post-Cold War global security order or a post-Cold War
mission for NATO, for American foreign policy, and for
the Department of State.  As Secretary Christopher's
Deputy, I will work with him to give concrete meaning to
those phrases--and to make them synonymous with the
safety and prosperity of our nation.  I will help him to
advance the strategic priorities he has identified for
American foreign policy.  These are:
 
--  Strengthening our nation's economic security;
--  Supporting reform in Russia and the other NIS;
--  Renewing NATO for a new Europe;
--  Deepening our engagement in Asia;
--  Working for peace in the Middle East; and
--  Curbing proliferation and addressing other global
issues such as environmental degradation and rapid
population growth.
 
Making the System Work
 
Let me begin with a few observations about the
institution over which Secretary Christopher presides and
about my role, as he has defined it, within the
Department.  The Deputy has traditionally devoted a
significant part of his energy and attention to making
sure that the building, its outposts abroad, and the
other U.S. Government agencies involved with foreign
policy issues all serve the President and the people of
the United States as effectively as possible.
 
I relish that aspect of the job for two reasons:  first,
because it is important; and second, because I am
confident that it can be done well.  I say that not so
much out of self-confidence as out of admiration for the
Foreign and Civil Service professionals with whom I have
worked so closely.
 
I have been impressed by the men and women, in Washington
and in the field, who carry out our policy on a day-to-
day basis.  I have had the most contact, naturally, with
those who concentrate on the former Soviet Union.  I have
visited all 12 of our embassies, most more than once.
All but one of these frontier posts of post-Cold War
diplomacy are headed by career Foreign Service officers.
 
Therefore, I come to this new challenge with a sense of
how good the people are and with a few ideas about how
the system of which they are a part can be made better,
both for their sake and for the sake of the national
interest.
 
Part of the Deputy Secretary's job is to ensure that the
Department's resources--budgetary, organizational, and
human--are productively harnessed to the Administration's
foreign policy priorities.  That task is particularly
important today as we diversify our attention and shift
our priorities.
 
Last week, the Secretary submitted to the Congress the
Peace, Prosperity, and Democracy Act of 1994.  The
international affairs account in the budget submitted by
the President yesterday is consistent with the framework
established by that legislation.  For the first time, it
is defined by and organized around overall national
objectives.  Both the Peace, Prosperity, and Democracy
Act and the budget reflect new priorities appropriate for
the post-Cold War era.
 
The task of better harnessing our resources to our
priorities is also reflected in the reorganization of the
State Department contained in the authorization bill that
the Senate passed last week.  Under that reorganization,
the Department will run more effectively as we streamline
operations.  We will also establish the position of Under
Secretary for Global Affairs to move these issues into
the mainstream of American foreign policy.
 
We are also developing a post-Cold War Foreign Service.
At the new National Foreign Affairs Training Center in
Arlington that the Secretary dedicated last October, we
are focusing on the diplomatic disciplines demanded   by
this new era.  We are strengthening the economic
awareness and commercial skills of all foreign affairs
professionals--not just economic officers--to bring to
life what we call a new "Diplomacy for Global
Competitiveness."  New courses and training are
reinforcing the priority of our new global issues agenda.
In the core skill area of foreign language proficiency,
the center is already teaching 10 of the languages of the
successor states of the former Soviet Union, none of
which were taught before.
 
The Former Soviet Union:  A Continuing Challenge
 
While asking me to take on new responsibilities, the
Secretary also expects me to continue to work with him in
overseeing our policy toward Russia, Ukraine, and the
other new independent states of the former Soviet Union.
 
When I came before you a little less than a year ago, I
stressed that the challenge of supporting reform in the
former Soviet Union would be as difficult as it would be
important.  From the beginning of this Administration,
our policy toward the new independent states has
proceeded from three central premises.
 
First, a titanic struggle is underway for the future of
that country.
 
Second, the United States has an immense stake in the
outcome of this struggle.
 
Third, we can have a positive effect on the outcome.
 
In the last few months, there has been understandable
concern about the prospects for reform in Russia, so let
me say a few words about that country in particular.
Russia is in the throes of a multiple transformation
without precedent:  from dictatorship to democracy; from
a command economy to the market; and from an empire to a
modern state.  As President Clinton stressed in the
speech he gave in Moscow, Americans want Russia to
succeed in this transformation not just for its sake or
for Europe's but for our own.  A stable, democratic,
market-oriented Russia, a Russia secure in its borders
and respectful of the borders of others --a Russia
integrated into the West rather than contained by the
West--will mean fewer U.S. tax dollars spent on defense;
a reduced threat from weapons of mass destruction; new
markets for U.S. products; and a powerful, reliable
partner for diplomacy and commerce in the 21st century.
 
The United States cannot be a spectator in the drama
unfolding in the former Soviet Union.  We must remain
engaged.  When I say "we," I mean both the Administration
and the Congress.  We worked together to assemble a
series of initiatives last year; we put our taxpayers'
money where our nation's interests and principles were.
We set the tone and provided the innovative ideas for the
international community's response. American engagement
and American leadership made a difference, and it will
continue to make a difference as those programs are
established on the ground.
 
Reform in the former Soviet Union is a long-term process.
It will inevitably involve setbacks that will test our
expertise, patience, staying power, dexterity, and hard-
headedness.  Precisely those qualities are personified by
James Collins, whom the Secretary is prepared to
recommend to be my successor as ambassador-at-large for
the new independent states.  Until last fall, he served
as deputy chief of mission and, frequently, charge
d'affaires under three ambassadors at embassy Moscow.
Since then, he has been coordinator of regional affairs
for Russia and the other NIS and my principal deputy.
Mr. Collins has an extraordinary grasp of both the
realities of the situation in the former Soviet Union and
the possibilities for American diplomacy.  He and I will
continue to work closely with Ambassador Pickering in
Moscow, Ambassador Miller in Kiev, our other diplomats in
the region, and our colleagues in Washington to offer the
Secretary the very best analysis and advice we can.
 
Toward a New Europe
 
Our policy toward the former Soviet Union must be seen--
and developed--in a wider context:  the whittling down of
divisions between states and the fostering of integration
among states in Europe and, more broadly, across Eurasia
and throughout the world.   The Secretary has asked me to
devote considerable time and energy to developing a
comprehensive policy toward all the countries emerging
from the shadow of Soviet domination.  We want to create
a policy supportive of democracy, independence, and
security in Central Europe as well as in the former
Soviet Union.
 
I look forward to that part of my job with special
enthusiasm, since I lived and worked in Central Europe
for two years in the early 1970s.  My wife and I lived in
Belgrade.  We have stood on the famous bridge in Sarajevo
and shopped in the now suddenly, tragically famous
market.  We traveled frequently to all the countries of
the region.  I feel I know that area and its people well.
I have a personal appreciation of their tragic history,
the complexity of their current situation, and the
immense promise of their future.
 
During his trip to Europe last month, President Clinton
reaffirmed the priority we attach to transatlantic
security and prosperity.  We must work for a democratic,
undivided Europe that includes a reformist, democratic
Russia.  Our task, in the wake of the Cold War, is to
reinforce reform in the East.  We can do that by
beginning to extend the benefits and obligations of the
same collective security order and liberal trading system
that have been the pillars of strength for the West.
 
The NATO allies took a momentous step in that direction
last month when they unanimously approved President
Clinton's Partnership for Peace initiative to deepen
NATO's engagement with the East and turn former
adversaries into lasting partners.  We have been
encouraged that so many nations in Central and Eastern
Europe have expressed a desire to participate in the
Partnership.
 
We do not have a crystal ball to foresee Europe's future,
but we do have, in the Partnership for Peace, the next
best thing:  a flexible mechanism for responding to
events in Europe as they unfold.  Developments in Russia,
of course, will profoundly influence what kind of
security structures evolve in Europe--and indeed, across
Eurasia.  If Russia hews to a course of internal reform,
respect for its neighbors' independence, and cooperation
with the West, NATO will continue to evolve in the
direction of maximum inclusiveness.  If, however, reform
in Russia falters, if new threats arise, NATO will be
able to work through the Partnership to protect regional
stability through closer ties--including NATO membership-
-with the active participants.  And we will have the
deeply enhanced military and political relationship
through the Partnership for Peace on which to build.
 
It's the Economy
 
Political and military security also depend on economic
integration.  Those nations committed to economic reform
must be able to deliver tangible benefits to their people
if they are to consolidate democracy and achieve
stability.  Western nations and institutions can and must
help by widening access to Western markets.
 
For the Clinton Administration, integration is a global
theme, with a heavy economic accent.  The Secretary has
assigned first priority to strengthening our nation's
economic security, but he has always emphasized that this
must be done in ways that lower old barriers rather than
build new ones.
 
In the post-Cold War world, the  distinction between
domestic and international policy has further blurred,
and economic issues are at the heart of both our domestic
and foreign policy.  President Clinton is spearheading
the most ambitious international economic agenda of any
Administration in nearly half a century.
 
With the passage of the federal budget last summer, we
reduced our deficit and regained our credibility as the
leader of the global economy.  With the approval of
NAFTA, we created export and job opportunities for
Americans and built a bridge to closer cooperation with
Latin America.  The vote of this Congress to approve
NAFTA was a watershed for the United States in the post-
Cold War world.
 
With the successful meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) leaders in Seattle, we built a
platform for prosperity by elevating our engagement with
the dynamic economies of that region.  This is the
world's most lucrative terrain for American exports and
jobs.  Over time, we expect APEC to gain greater
importance as a forum for economic cooperation.
 
With NAFTA and APEC, we have reaffirmed that our future
lies in greater economic integration, both in this
hemisphere and in the world.  This Administration has
emphasized that regional trade liberalization is
consistent with global liberalization, which is now
within our reach with the conclusion of the Uruguay Round
of the GATT.
 
As a general principle, Mr. Chairman, we need to ensure
that the emergence or strengthening of regional groupings
advances, rather than impedes, the emergence of a more
fully integrated international community and a more open
global trading system.  We seek a new economic and
security order that carries us beyond regional blocs
toward a safer, more prosperous, more integrated world.
 
Our commitment to place economic policy at the heart of
our foreign policy also applies to our relations with
Japan.  Last summer, we reached agreement with Japan to
undertake an intensive set of negotiations to establish a
new framework for our economic relations.  The framework
is aimed at correcting persistent trade imbalances
between our two nations and at resolving the chronic
market access problems that have long limited American
exports and investment.  The President will emphasize
this objective--and the need for progress--when he meets
with Prime Minister Hosokawa on Friday.  We have a broad
partnership with this important ally, including political
and security dimensions that are essentially in sound
condition.  But we must move toward resolution of our
economic problems if our overall relations are to
flourish.
 
Promoting Security and Democracy
 
Non-proliferation, which Secretary Christopher has
characterized as the arms control agenda of the 1990s,
represents one of the pressing global priorities for this
Administration.  It is also an area in which I have been
deeply involved over the last year.
 
The decision by Ukraine's parliament to approve the
trilateral agreement among the United States, Russia, and
Ukraine and to ratify START I unconditionally represents
a major victory in our efforts to reduce the threat posed
by nuclear weapons.  It follows the decisions by Belarus
and Kazakhstan to ratify START and accede to the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear-weapons
states.  We are actively supporting these breakthroughs
through the Nunn-Lugar Act, which will help to dismantle
thousands of former Soviet weapons safely and securely
and thereby directly strengthen American security.  The
funds provided under this act will make possible enormous
savings in our defense budget.  Its authors deserve
credit for this innovative example of defense by other
means.
 
But we still face serious non-proliferation challenges.
Clearly, the most immediate threat is the one posed by
North Korea's nuclear program.  The United States is
leading the international effort to persuade North Korea
to adhere to the NPT and abide by its nuclear safeguards
commitments.
 
Other global issues also affect our security and
prosperity.  I have mentioned Secretary Christopher's
determination to renew our leadership on the environment,
population, and sustainable development.  We are also
determined to advance democracy and human rights.  While
we search for more positive relations with China, we have
conditioned the renewal of its most-favored-nation status
on overall, significant progress on human rights.  The
President's decision last week to lift the trade embargo
on Vietnam will further the Administration's goal of the
fullest possible accounting for our MIAs.  In South
Africa, where freedom is ascendant, we are providing
assistance for the April election. Despite the continuing
turmoil and the difficulty of the road ahead, we look
forward to the transformation of that country into a non-
racial democracy.  We are also working to help democratic
institutions take hold throughout Africa.
 
Finally, in this hemisphere, we will move to sustain the
momentum created by NAFTA.  This year, the President will
host a summit of the Americas.  That summit will
celebrate and build on our shared commitment to
developing democracy, defending human rights, promoting
prosperity, and addressing global concerns such as
environmental degradation and narcotics trafficking.
 
We also witnessed, last year, a turning point for peace
in the Middle East, a region in which we have great
strategic, economic, and moral interests.  Our
relationship with Israel is based on the shared ideals
and values between our two democracies, on our unshakable
commitment to Israel's security, and on the commitment of
both of our nations to peace in the Middle East.  The
Israeli-PLO agreement of September 13 was made possible
by more than two decades of sustained, diplomatic
engagement on the part of the United States.  Since that
extraordinary breakthrough, we have worked to make the
peace process irreversible.  Secretary Christopher is
working tirelessly to assure implementation of the
Declaration of Principles.  At the same time, we are
encouraging Israeli agreements with Jordan, Lebanon, and
Syria.  President Asad's statement that Syria had made a
strategic choice for peace with Israel is a hopeful sign
that we may be able to widen the circle of peace.
 
Mr. Chairman, in this connection, and in conclusion, I
would like to go back to a point I was making at the
outset.  The Middle East is one of many examples where
breakthroughs that eluded us for decades are now possible
because of the end of the Cold War.
 
The world appeared simpler during the days of superpower
confrontation.  The Cold War made hot wars all the more
difficult to resolve, and it made vital issues, such as
development, human rights, and trade, much harder to
address in a global context.
 
The events of the last few years left us little time to
plan for the end of the Cold War.  But we do know that
the post-Cold War world will be far more complex than the
world to which we have grown accustomed.  It is more
complex because so much more is possible.  (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 2:
 
U.S. Lifts Trade Embargo Against Vietnam
President Clinton
Announcement of lifting of trade embargo on Vietnam,
Washington, DC, February 3, 1994
 
Thank you very much.  I want to especially thank all of
you who have come here on such short notice.  From the
beginning of my Administration, I have said that any
decisions about our relationships with Vietnam should be
guided by one factor and one factor only--gaining the
fullest possible accounting for our prisoners of war and
our missing-in-action.  We owe that to all who served in
Vietnam and to the families of those whose fates remain
unknown.
 
Today I am lifting the trade embargo against Vietnam
because I am absolutely convinced it offers the best way
to resolve the fates of those who remain missing and
about whom we are not sure.  We have worked hard over the
last year to achieve progress.  On Memorial Day, I
pledged to declassify and make available virtually all
government documents related to our POWs and MIAs.  On
Veterans Day, I announced that we had fulfilled that
pledge.  Last April, and again in July,   I sent two
presidential delegations to Vietnam to expand our search
for re-mains and documents.
 
We intensified our diplomatic efforts.  We have devoted
more re-sources to this effort than has any previous
Administration.  Today, more than 500 dedicated military
and civilian personnel are involved in this effort under
the leadership of General Shalikashvili, Secretary Aspin,
and our Commander in the Pacific, Admiral Larson.
 
Many work daily in the fields, jungles, and mountains of
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, often braving very dangerous
conditions, trying to find the truth about those we are
unsure of.  Last July, I said any improvement in our
relations with Vietnam would depend on tangible progress
in four specific areas:
 
First, the recovery and return of remains of our POWs and
MIAs;
 
Second, the continued resolution of discrepancy cases--
cases in which there is reason to believe individuals
could have survived the incident in which they were lost;
 
Third, further assistance from Vietnam and Laos on
investigations along their common border, an area where
many U.S. servicemen were lost and pilots downed; and,
 
Fourth, accelerated efforts to provide all relevant
POW/MIA-related documents.
 
Today, I can report that significant, tangible progress
has been made in these four areas.  Let me describe it.
 
--  Remains--Since the beginning of this Administration,
we have recovered the remains of 67 American servicemen.
In the seven months since July, we have recovered 39 sets
of remains, more than during all of 1992.
 
--  Discrepancy cases--Since the beginning of this
Administration, we have reduced the number of these cases
from 135 to 73.  Since last July, we have confirmed the
deaths of 19 servicemen whose names were on the list.  A
special United States team in Vietnam continues to
investigate the remaining cases.
 
--  Cooperation with Laos--As a direct result of the
conditions set out in July, the Governments of Vietnam
and Laos agreed to work with us to investigate their
common border.  The first such investigation took place
in December and located new remains as well as crash
sites that will soon be excavated.
 
--  Documents--Since July, we have received important
wartime documents from Vietnam's military archives that
provide leads on unresolved POW/MIA cases.  The progress
achieved on unresolved questions is encouraging, but it
must not end here.  I remain personally committed to
continuing the search for the answers and the peace of
mind that families of the missing deserve.
 
There has been a substantial increase in Vietnamese
cooperation on these matters during the past year.
Everyone involved in the issue has affirmed that.  I have
carefully considered the question of how best to sustain
that cooperation in securing the fullest possible
accounting.  I've consulted with my national security and
veterans affairs advisers and with several out-side
experts, such as Gen. John Vessey, the former Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who has been an emissary to
Vietnam for three Presidents now.  It was their view that
the key to continued progress lies in expanding our
contacts with Vietnam.
 
This was also the view of many distinguished Vietnam
veterans and former POWs who now serve in the Congress,
such as Senator Bob Kerrey and Congressman Pete Peterson,
who are here.  And I want to say a special word of thanks
to Senator John Kerry--is he here?  There he is--he just
came in--and to Senator John McCain, who had to go home
on a family matter and could not be here.  But I thank
the two of you so much for your leadership and your
steadfastness.  And to the rest of you--Senator Robb and
so many others, especially those who served in Vietnam,
for being counted on this issue and for taking all the
care you have for such a long time.
 
I have made the judgment that the best way to ensure
cooperation from Vietnam and to continue getting the
information Americans want on POWs and MIAs is to end the
trade embargo.  I've also decided to establish a liaison
office in Vietnam to provide services for Americans there
and to help us pursue a human rights dialogue with the
Vietnamese Government.
 
I want to be clear:  These actions  do not constitute a
normalization of our relationship.  Before that happens,
we must have more progress, more co-operation, and more
answers.  Toward that end, this spring, I will send
another high-level U.S. delegation to Vietnam to continue
the search for remains and for documents.
 
Earlier today, I met with the leaders of our nation's
veterans organizations.  I deeply respect their views.
Many of the families they represent have endured enormous
suffering and uncertainty.  Their opinions also deserve
special consideration.  I talked with them about my
decision.  I explained the reasons for that decision.
Some of them, in all candor, do not agree with the action
I am taking today.  But I believe we all agree on the
ultimate goal--to secure the fullest possible accounting
of those who remain missing.  I was pleased that they
committed to continue working with us toward that goal.
 
Whatever the Vietnam war may have done in dividing in our
country in the past, today our nation is one in honoring
those who served and in pressing for answers about all
those who did not return.  This decision today, I
believe, renews that commitment and our constant,
constant effort never to forget them until our job is
done.  Those who have sacrificed deserve a full and final
accounting.  I am absolutely convinced, as are so many in
the Congress who served there and so many Americans who
have studied this issue, that this decision today will
help to ensure that fullest possible accounting.  (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 3:
 
The Peace, Prosperity, and Democracy Act of 1994
Secretary Christopher
Opening statement at a State Department news conference,
Washington, DC, February 3, 1994
 
Good afternoon.  I'm pleased to be here with Brian Atwood
and Dick Moose to introduce the Peace, Prosperity, and
Democracy Act of 1994.
 
I'll say a few words about the act and then turn the
rostrum over to Brian and Dick.
 
The act was submitted to Congress yesterday.  It's the
result of intensive interagency processes and extensive
discussions with members of the Congress and their staffs
that began about three months ago.  We've also consulted
very widely with interested non-governmental
organizations.
 
The Clinton Administration is the first to be elected
since the Cold War ended.  We have the opportunity and
the responsibility to adapt our foreign policy to a world
no longer dominated by superpower confrontation.
 
Next Monday, I'll be talking about the first truly post-
Cold War foreign affairs budget.  Today, let me describe
how this new statutory proposal also reflects our new
foreign policy priorities.
 
We are still operating under the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961.  That act is a relic of the Cold War, passed a
few weeks after the Berlin Wall went up, and geared to
our global strategy of containment.  On a purely
practical basis, some of its provisions are obviously out
of date.
 
But foreign assistance itself is not out of date.  Our
assistance program can help to achieve the fundamental
purposes of our foreign policy, enhancing the security
and well-being of the American people.  Sharply focused
aid helps to support democracy and free market
institutions.  It bolsters preventative diplomacy as we
face global problems by narcotics trafficking and
environmental degradation.
 
Foreign assistance can give us great economic
opportunities.  For example, every year we get back in
sales to Korea triple the amount of assistance we
provided over a decade to Seoul.  Interestingly enough,
Seoul now has a foreign assistance program of its own to
aid others.
 
If our foreign assistance is to serve our interests
effectively, it must be targeted on our foreign policy
priorities.  The new act established a framework that
does just exactly that.  It seeks to encourage
sustainable development, to build democracy, to promote
peace, to provide humanitarian assistance, and to promote
economic growth through trade and investment.
 
The new act will aggressively promote U.S. economic
interests, one of our highest foreign policy priorities.
Through the act, we will encourage broad-based economic
growth, creating dynamic markets for U.S. exports in the
developing world where, by the year 2000, four out of
five consumers in the world will live.
 
To take another example, all Americans have a stake in
the success of political and economic reform in Russia
and the new independent states.  The new act enables the
President to assist nations that are seeking to join the
community of democratic states, not only in Central and
Eastern Europe and the new independent states but in
Africa, Asia, and Latin America as well.
 
This Administration is committed to helping achieve a
comprehensive peace in the Middle East.  The new act will
help to achieve that goal through programs to bring
economic growth to Gaza and the West Bank and through our
continued military and economic assistance for Israel and
Egypt.
 
We have also moved global issues into the mainstream of
American foreign policy.  The core goals of the new act
include the protection of the environment and the
stabilization of population growth.  These core global
goals also include human rights.
 
As you know, this week, in another important release, we
released our 1993 human rights report.  I've been
involved in these human right reports ever since the
first one in 1977.  I must say, I'm very proud that the
State Department is prepared to take--and the United
States Government is prepared to take--the courageous and
quite extraordinary step of releasing a human rights
report on 193 countries.  I also want to thank you for
the extensive coverage you've given to this important
document, which I think provides a baseline for measuring
performance and progress around the world.
 
I believe that this new act is a sound investment for
America.  Assistance to the priorities that I've outlined
today is highly cost-effective.  For example, compare the
cost of the infrastructure improvements in Gaza and
Jericho with the cost of continued conflict in the Middle
East.  Compare the cost of support for reform in Russia
to the increases in defense expenditures that would be
necessary if Russia were to revert to dictatorship.
Compare the price of population programs with the scourge
of starvation.
 
If we ignore these issues--the kind of issues that I've
mentioned here today--they will return compounded, more
costly, and sometimes deeply threatening to our security.
 
Let me make just one final point about the new act.  The
Agency for International Development was one of the first
laboratories for reinventing government.  The Vice
President's National Performance Review identified reform
of foreign assistance as one of the most critical actions
in the field of foreign affairs.  The new act responds by
making foreign assistance programs more efficient and
more responsive.
 
The President and I view passage of this bill as an
important step for our foreign policy.  We look forward
to working with Congress in the spirit of bipartisanship
as it debates the Peace, Prosperity, and Democracy Act.
(###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 4:
 
International Affairs Budget:  An Investment in Peace and
Prosperity
Secretary Christopher
Opening statement at a State Department news conference,
Washington, DC, February 7, 1994
 
This morning, the President sent to Congress the
Administration's budget for fiscal year 1995.  I am here
to describe to you the international affairs budget and
to highlight the new thinking that underlies it.
 
I am joined by Under Secretary Lynn Davis, who has been
very helpful in shaping our approach, and by Craig
Johnstone, who will shortly assume the important new
position of Director of Resources, Plans, and Policy.
 
Before Lynn and Craig take you through the details of the
budget, I want to describe to you in broad terms what we
have accomplished in the first international affairs
budget in the post-Cold War era.  Although the Berlin
Wall fell in 1989, to this moment our international
affairs budgets have failed to reflect the fact that the
world has changed dramatically.  Today, we break with
that past.
 
A result of our new thinking is that this budget is
organized for the first time in terms of our overall
national objectives--promoting American prosperity,
supporting democracy, fostering sustainable development,
building peace, providing humanitarian assistance, and
advancing preventative diplomacy.
 
As you know, we worked hard to ensure that we have
adequate resources to pursue our strategic priorities.
Although this is an austere budget, I am pleased with the
result.
 
Another product of our new thinking that underlies this
budget effort is that domestic and foreign policy have
truly become two sides of the same coin.  In other words,
this budget is not just about foreign aid.  The mindset
that walls off America's domestic and international
interests must be wiped away.
 
Our aim in this budget is to promote the security of
Americans through peace abroad and prosperity at home.
This budget reinforces what I have characterized as the
top strategic priority for our foreign policy--improving
the economic well-being of the American people.  It
encompasses the Administration's mission to open new
markets for our exporters and investors and help American
businesses compete and win in those markets.
 
This budget also supports America's commitment to promote
democracy around the world.  Democracy is the best means
to promote market reform and to guarantee human rights.
This is especially important in Central Europe and the
former Soviet Union, where support for reform remains the
wisest and the least expensive investment that we can
make in our own security.
 
Our preventative diplomacy and our efforts to promote
peace remain critical elements of our national security.
This budget reaffirms our commitment to European security
and maintains our investment in the Middle East at a time
when there is growing hope for peace in that part of the
world.
 
Although the risk of superpower confrontation has
receded, the danger to our security posed by the spread
of dangerous weapons has increased.  This budget funds a
combination of programs aimed at preventing proliferation
of such weapons.
 
We also provide in the budget for international peace-
keeping efforts.  Peace-keeping multiplies--not
displaces--the capabilities of the United States by
allowing the sharing of burdens and responsibilities.
Successful peace-keeping can help--and has helped--
diffuse and contain regional conflicts.
 
Financial resources are important to obtaining our goals
but they are only part of what we need to do the job.
Our success depends as much on the skill of the people
who staff our missions abroad.  Our budget anticipates
and supports the needs of these talented professionals in
this post-Cold War diplomatic period.
 
The budget also reflects a shift in our goals from the
containment of communism to the promotion of market
democracy and sustainable development.  We will fund
programs that foster economic growth and create export
markets for American companies and workers around the
world.
 
Foreign assistance will also be directed toward global
issues such as environmental degradation and population
growth.  With this budget, we signal that we intend to
seize the opportunities of this new era.  I ask you to
compare the relatively small cost of supporting reform in
Russia to the defense expenditures that would be required
if Russia were to revert to dictatorship.
 
In fact, in all the areas we addressed, the cost of doing
too little will, in the long run, be much greater than
what we now see.
 
The international affairs budget represents good value
for the American people and a wise investment in our
future. (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 5:
 
The NATO Summit and the Future of European Security
Stephen A. Oxman, Assistant Secretary for European and
Canadian Affairs
Statement before the Subcommittee on Coalition Defense
and Reinforcing Forces of the Senate Armed Services
Committee and the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC,
February 1, 1994
 
It is a pleasure to meet with you again as part of our
continuing consultations with the Congress. The
President's recent trip to Brussels, Prague, Kiev,
Moscow, and Minsk achieved remarkable results for the
United States, Europe, and the world. I want to focus
today on the results of the NATO summit and their
implications for the future of European security.
 
NATO and the Future Of European Security
 
From the outset, when President Clinton called for this
summit, we conceived it as a key opportunity to
accelerate NATO's transformation. NATO remains the
central element of the transatlantic security structure.
Its future must be to provide security to its members,
while taking on the new task of helping to integrate the
former communist states within the compass of Western
security and values.  Because Europe remains at the core
of U.S. security interests, because the U.S. commitment
to European security is enduring, and because NATO is
central to that commitment, the Clinton Administration
set this task for itself and our allies:  to make sure
that NATO is up to the security challenges of the new,
post-Cold War Europe and that the basis for continued
U.S. engagement and leadership in European security is
solid.
 
In preparing for the summit, we examined the challenges
confronting the alliance, with the tragedy of the former
Yugoslavia and the hard march to reform in the East
constant reminders of the new and difficult era before
us, and set out an agenda keyed to meeting these
challenges.
 
We determined that the summit, as its first priority, had
to deepen NATO's engagement with the East and transform
its former adversaries into lasting partners.  NATO's
unique strengths as a political instrument can help
ensure that for all the countries of Europe war becomes
as unthinkable as it has become among the NATO allies.
 
We also decided that we needed to adapt NATO's military
capabilities. In order to project stability throughout
Europe, NATO must continue to improve its capability to
carry out new missions and conduct what used to be called
out-of-area operations.
 
We also looked at the shifting political balance created
by the rati-fication of the Maastricht Treaty and
progress toward European integration, as well as the
drawdown of U.S. forces stationed in Europe.  We looked
for ways in which NATO could take the important step of
actively encouraging and supporting the development of a
"separable but not separate" European defense capability-
-anchored in NATO--which would respond to European
political and military requirements, avoid senseless
duplication, and strengthen the European contribution to
our trans-atlantic partnership.
 
And, finally, we decided that NATO should take up the
issue of how it can best contribute to controlling the
spread of weapons of mass destruction and dealing with
proliferation once it has occurred--efforts which are
vitally important to our security.
 
The summit took action to advance each of these
objectives.  All the key decisions of the summit resulted
from U.S. initiatives.  They also reflect close
cooperation with our allies.  Our proposals were intended
to help lay a foundation on which a future democratic and
prosperous Europe can rest, while leaving NATO's
effectiveness as a defensive alliance undiminished.
 
Taken together, the summit decisions mark a significant
and perhaps even historic change in NATO's role in
Europe.  They reflect our determination to find new
cooperative structures to meet new security threats.  At
bottom, they are grounded in a broad concept of security
that melds political, military, economic, and human
rights considerations.  Our policies seek to integrate
all of Europe based on shared values of democracy, market
economics, and military openness and cooperation--not to
redivide it.  NATO will play a key role in helping us
achieve these objectives.
 
The NATO Summit
 
NATO Expansion and the Partnership for Peace.  Let me
talk about the summit's achievements and how they
furthered our goals in a little more detail.  First and
foremost, the NATO allies made a historic choice by
opening the door to an evolutionary process of expansion
of NATO membership and initiating the Partnership for
Peace. These steps are an investment in a future Europe
undivided between allies and enemies.  Over the next
month, our focus will be on getting the Partnership up
and running.  The first partners are signing up, and we
expect all the members of the former Warsaw Pact to
subscribe along with other European states.  NATO
briefing teams are arriving in Eastern capitals as we
speak to begin implementing the Partnership. SHAPE is
ready to welcome partners to the day-to-day work of
building their relationship with NATO.
 
Our approach to the expansion of NATO and the Partnership
for Peace is a fundamentally important decision for the
future of Europe.  It has the enthusiastic support of all
of our allies and has now been widely welcomed in the
East.  But some in this country and abroad have objected
that the Partnership is a halfway measure which does not
go far enough to ensure the security of Central and
Eastern Europe, and that it falls short because it does
not offer the countries of Central and Eastern Europe
early NATO membership.  I disagree; the Partnership is
the right policy at this time for European security--and
our own.
 
From the first, the Clinton Administration decided that
the summit must transform NATO's relationship with the
East.  That, after all, is where today's greatest
European security challenges lie.  In answering the
question "how?", we had to balance three requirements:
 
--  Build a close and meaningful relationship between
NATO and the post-communist states that will allow us to
work together to address common problems;
 
--  Avoid drawing new lines in Europe that would in
themselves be destabilizing; and
 
--  Preserve NATO's essential capabilities and mission
undiminished.
 
The Partnership strikes the right balance among these.
 
Through the Partnership for Peace, we will build close
political and military ties with the emerging
democracies. These ties will be real and concrete. The
political commitments that partners must make to civilian
control of the military and transparency in defense
budgeting and the joint planning and training that
partners will do with each other and with NATO will
advance the process of integrating Europe.  And partners
will have the right to consult with NATO if there is a
direct and immediate threat to their security.  The
attraction of NATO, like the attraction of the EU, will
be a powerful force for cooperation and integration.
 
But our approach does not recreate the division of
Europe.  It opens the door equally to all who are willing
to transform themselves politically and militarily.  Why,
as the President asked in Brussels, should we foreclose
the best possible future for Europe--a democratic Russia
committed to and working with NATO for the security of
all its European neighbors, a democratic Ukraine
comfortable with its neighbors both East and West, and
democratic governments throughout post-communist Europe?
We would like to see all of these countries moving
forward, at different speeds and levels, but all
committed to economic progress and prosperity, to shared
security and democratic ideals.
 
That is the future President Clinton wants to work for.
And our desire to provide for this "best possible future"
is at the heart of the partnership initiative.  Our
approach is hopeful but not starry-eyed.  It is not a
halfway measure nor was it adopted in deference to
Russian objections.  We proposed it and our allies
endorsed it because we want to build toward the
possibility of a future that leaves behind, finally,
Europe's destructive past.
 
But at the same time, it preserves the means to deal with
a darker future should it occur.  If necessary, it can
provide the basis for NATO to strengthen its collective
defense role against a new threat should one emerge in
the East.  Russia's integration into the European
community depends upon its acceptance of international
standards of conduct outside its borders.  Its choices
about its own future will affect the future of NATO and
the Partnership for Peace.  The Partnership, like Russia,
can go either way.
 
Immediate NATO membership may sound like an easy solution
to the security problems of Eastern Europe.  But as H.L.
Mencken said, for every complex problem there is a
solution which is neat, plausible--and wrong.  NATO has
opened the door to expansion.  It has given partner
nations the chance to develop military and political
cooperation with NATO and with each other.  Those who so
wish can develop the capacity to assume the heavy
responsibilities of full membership.  The ultimate
decision on NATO membership will be a political one made
by us and our allies after close consultation with the
Congress and one based on an assessment of the needs of
transatlantic security and the prospective members'
commitment to the principles of democracy, individual
liberty, the rule of law, and the peaceful settlement of
disputes, which are at the heart of the North Atlantic
Treaty.
 
European Security and Defense Identity.  The summit made
other important decisions as well.  NATO's endorsement of
our proposal to support separable but not separate
European defense capabilities will enable our European
partners to take on more responsibility for their own
security. This will better balance the burden of
responsibilities within the alliance, while putting to
rest any doubt that the United States supports European
integration or will remain engaged in European affairs.
Our European allies have already shown their willingness
to take on a greater security burden, including their
efforts in the former Yugoslavia.  NATO will now help
them do so, by providing command and control and
logistics support for European military operations.  This
will prevent costly duplication.  Europe will be able to
act, with the support of other allies and common NATO
assets, in cases where NATO itself chooses not to engage.
In the end, this will strengthen the alliance itself and
vindicate our postwar efforts to help reconstruct a
strong, united Europe.
 
Combined Joint Task Forces.  NATO itself needs new
capabilities to support its new missions, and the summit
decided further to adapt NATO's military structure by
developing the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces
(CJTF).  This initiative will create tools for a much
more flexible NATO--headquarters units which rapidly can
assemble ad hoc military formations to conduct specific
missions short of the defense of NATO territory itself.
This will be used to support NATO out-of-area operations.
It will enable NATO to work better with countries that
are not part of its military structure.  The CJTF will
serve as an important vehicle for supporting European
capabilities and contributing to UN and CSCE operations
or those under the Partnership for Peace.  It is the
operational key to NATO's new military roles, and we are
pushing work forward as a matter of priority.
 
Non-Proliferation.  Finally, the summit commissioned a
full review of NATO's role in non-proliferation, making
this key issue an important part of NATO's future work.
We want NATO, without duplicating the work already
underway in other forums, to reinforce ongoing prevention
efforts and reduce and protect against the proliferation
threat.  We need to bring NATO's unique political and
military capabilities to bear.
 
Bosnia.  As you know, the summit also addressed Bosnia.
We told our allies that the U.S. remains committed to
helping NATO implement a viable settlement freely agreed
to by all the parties.  We also made clear we would seek
the support of Congress on this issue.  The summit
reaffirmed NATO's August warning on air strikes to
prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo and other areas.
The President's emphasis on the seriousness of the
warning and the need for NATO to be prepared to follow
through give this reaffirmation added significance.  We
urged UNPROFOR to do the planning needed to ensure the
rotation of UN troops in Srebrenica and to open up the
Tuzla airport.  That planning has been completed, and the
UN is prepared to achieve those objectives through
negotiation if possible--but with the use of UNPROFOR
military assets if necessary.  NATO close air support
will play an important role in support of UN forces.  In
connection with these operations, the UN Secretary
General has delegated to his Special Representative the
authority to call in close air support.  We will carry
out this action if we are called upon to do so.
 
The Bosnian conflict is the type of regional crisis that
presents a danger to European stability.  That is why we
have worked--successfully so far--to prevent the conflict
from spreading. The summit decisions, especially on the
Partnership, were taken to try to move toward a Europe in
which conflicts like this one do not happen again.  It is
much easier to prevent fighting than to stop it--and
democracies working together in an integrated framework
of political, economic, and military cooperation are much
less likely to begin conflict.
 
There are many near-term problems in European security,
as we all know.  They require innovative solutions,
including the creative use of military power.  Our
actions at the summit will enable NATO to contribute to
these solutions through its military and political
capabilities.  In the longer term, NATO has an important
role to play in creating a Europe of integration and
cooperation in which new democracies are committed to
each others' security in the same way as NATO countries
are today.  We are putting NATO at the center of a
growing array of practical security ties that cross old
boundaries of enmity, helping to moderate the security
concerns of both allies and partners.  NATO will remain
at the core of the defense of its members against any
threat, and Europeans will take on a larger
responsibility for aspects of their own security.  The
United States will continue to be engaged and to provide
the leadership which will be essential for the future
peace and stability that we are laying the groundwork for
today.  (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 6:
 
U.S. Expresses Outrage Over Marketplace Shelling
Statement by President Clinton released by the White
House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC,
February 5, 1994.
 
I am outraged by this deliberate attack on the people of
Sarajevo.
 
There can be no possible military justification for an
attack against a marketplace where women, men, and
children of the city were pursuing their everyday lives.
 
The United States should urgently investigate this
incident and clearly identify those who are guilty.
 
I have directed that Secretary Christopher engage our
allies in Europe and the United Nations on the situation
and on appropriate next steps.  As he and Secretary of
Defense Perry have stated, we rule nothing out.
 
I have also directed the Department of Defense to offer
its assistance in evacuating, hospitalizing, and treating
those injured in this savage attack.
 
I know I speak for all Americans in expressing our
revulsion and anger at this cowardly act.  (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 7:
 
Reaction to the Sarajevo Marketplace Shelling
Statement by Secretary Christopher released by the Office
of the Spokesman, Washington, DC February 7, 1994.
 
The civilized world is outraged by the savage bombing of
the Sarajevo marketplace on Saturday.  The death toll
from this shelling is not only the worst since this
tragic conflict began, it is also a part of a pattern of
shelling of civilian areas by Serb artillery that has
continued despite NATO's repeated warnings.
 
I have been in touch with several of my NATO counterparts
over the weekend to discuss how the alliance and the
international community should respond to Saturday's
tragedy.
 
UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali has requested that the
North Atlantic Council take the necessary decisions to
enable NATO military forces to be prepared to respond to
a UN request for air strikes.  Under Boutros-Ghali's
proposal, air strikes would be directed against artillery
and mortar positions in and around Sarajevo when UNPROFOR
determines that they are responsible for attacks against
civilian targets.
 
The proposal made by Boutros-Ghali would expand on NATO's
current policy of being ready to respond to UN requests
for close air support to assist UNPROFOR if it is
attacked in carrying out its humanitarian missions in
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
 
We welcome Boutros-Ghali's proposal and will support it
when we and our allies take it up at the North Atlantic
Council later this week.  His request indicates that the
United Nations and NATO are and will continue to be
working closely together on this terrible problem.
 
At NATO, we are also looking at other possible steps to
respond to Saturday's attack, and we are also looking at
the larger problem of the Serbs' unacceptable actions
against the civilian population in Bosnia's capital.  We
expect that the North Atlantic Council will decide on a
course of action--an overall strategy--within the next
few days.
 
While attention has been properly focused on Saturday's
tragic events, we are continuing the search for ways to
reinvigorate the diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving a
political settlement of the conflict in Bosnia.
 
We welcome the statement of the Bosnian Government
leaders that, despite what happened Saturday, they remain
committed to the negotiating process.  We are looking for
ways to bring additional support to these efforts to
obtain a viable settlement.  (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 8:
 
Chiapas:  Implications For U.S.-Mexico Relations
Alexander F. Watson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-
American Affairs
Statement before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere
Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
Washington, DC, February 2, 1994
 
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee:  I appreciate
this opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
the implications of the recent events in the southern
state of Chiapas for U.S.-Mexican relations.
 
I would like to begin today by underscoring the fact that
never before in history has the United States enjoyed
better relations with its neighbor to the south and
third-largest trading partner.  The ratification of the
NAFTA treaty symbolizes the new opportunities in our
often complicated and strained partnership, one in which
Mexico has often charted a course in domestic and foreign
policy at variance with that of the United States.  The
end of the Cold War, dramatic transformations in Mexican
economic policy, the beginnings of liberalization of the
Mexican political system, and a growing awareness on the
part of the United States of the importance of Mexico and
Latin America to U.S. national interests have brought the
United States and Mexico closer together in many ways.
These promise to contribute to a growing and solid
relationship based on mutual trust and commonality of
interests.
 
I would like to highlight, Mr. Chairman, that improved
relations with Mexico parallel a fundamental change in
the overall relations of the United States with Latin
America.  After a difficult decade of economic reversals,
the region has implemented far-reaching political and
economic reforms that have contributed to an economic
upturn that has attracted investors worldwide.  Mexico
has led the way on many of these initiatives, and we are
confident that the implementation of NAFTA will open up
further opportunities for investment, while adding to our
capacity to export to its growing domestic market.
 
At the same time, the uprising in Chiapas illustrates the
serious challenges Mexico and other countries in the
region face in addressing the still unresolved issues of
poverty and lack of opportunity for important sectors of
society.  The legitimate grievances of the people of
southern Mexico were neither caused by NAFTA, nor should
NAFTA be in any way compromised by these developments.
Indeed, the events in Chiapas demonstrated more clearly
than ever the need for NAFTA. With NAFTA, Mexico will
continue on the path of free market reform, providing the
private sector with strong incentives to energize the
country's economy and attract foreign investment.  With
NAFTA, Mexico will be drawn more into the Western
community of nations, one in which free market reforms
are closely linked with the political legitimacy that
stems from open, free, and democratic politics.  The
United States is confident that the Mexican Government
has responded to the situation in Chiapas in a
forthcoming and responsible way.  We hope that
developments since the Chiapas uprising will further
enhance democratic reform, rather than jeopardize it.  I
will return to these points during the course of my
testimony.
 
Chiapas Uprising
 
On the first of January, a group of armed insurgents of
the self-proclaimed Zapatista Army of National
Liberation, or EZLN by its Spanish acronym, launched
attacks on four municipalities in the southern Mexican
state of Chiapas:  Ocosingo; Las Margaritas; Altamirano;
and San Cristobal de las Casas--the second-largest city
in the state and an important religious, commercial, and
tourist center.  Government offices were seized, records
and property destroyed, prisons stormed, and prisoners
released.  An attack was also launched on the Mexican
army camp of Rancho Nuevo, some 10 kilometers outside San
Cristobal.
 
Although the Mexican Government had known of guerrilla
activity in the region for some time, the composition of
the guerrilla group, the timing, and the scope of the
attack took the Mexican army and governmental authorities
by surprise.  We, too, were aware of reports of groups,
some armed, in Chiapas--though exact size, identity, and
motives were not known.  We were equally surprised by the
ferocity of the January 1 attacks and the size of the
EZLN forces.
 
The geography of Chiapas favored the formation in secrecy
of the EZLN.  Separated from much of the rest of Mexico
by mountains and forest, Chiapas shares a long border
with Guatemala.  For years, indigenous people from
Guatemala have crossed into Chiapas to escape fighting
between local insurgents and the Guatemalan Government.
Currently, more than 40,000 Guatemalan refugees reside in
temporary refugee camps in southern Mexico, many in
Chiapas.  Thousands more who fled to southern Mexico are
residing in towns and cities in Chiapas and neighboring
states.  Guatemalan insurgents have been suspected of
seeking sanctuary in the Chiapas interior and--together
with international drug traffickers who transit the state
or common bandits-- could have accounted for the earlier
sightings reported in Chiapas.
 
First reports out of Mexico suggested that, while many of
the fighters were drawn from local Indian groups, the
leadership may have come from Mexico City or from outside
Mexico, particularly the guerrilla groups in neighboring
Guatemala.  It appears, however, that there were no
organic ties with any foreign group or movement.  The
Mexican Government, which has been a prime facilitator of
the peace process in Guatemala, concluded that there were
no links between the EZLN and the Guatemalan National
Revolutionary Unity.
 
The Mexican Government's initial hesitation to counter-
attack the rebel offensive was followed by a firm
response to the uprising.  By January 5, the Mexican army
had re-established control of the municipalities attacked
on New Year's Day.  Some human rights abuses may have
occurred in connection with the retaking of these
municipalities.  The insurgents took several hostages,
including a former governor of Chiapas, and retreated to
remote hamlets and rural areas.  Security forces pursued
them with helicopter gunships and other aircraft,
strafing and firing rockets at suspected rebel positions.
It was during this period of stepped-up military action
that other human rights abuses are reported to have
occurred.  Our embassy moved quickly in response to the
events in Chiapas.  Embassy personnel arrived in San
Cristobal and the state capital, Tuxtla Gutierrez, on
January 2, the day after the beginning of the uprising,
to provide assistance to U.S. citizens in the area and
assess the unfolding developments.  Our embassy in Mexico
City had conveyed to the highest levels of the Mexican
Government our concern for the security situation in the
region--and, in particular, for the potential for human
rights abuses--prior to the initial press reports of
possible human rights violations.  During the course of
many contacts, we noted the importance of attempting to
establish a peaceful dialogue with the rebels.
 
The Mexican Government also became concerned over the
potential for human rights abuses in a policy aimed at
controlling the rebellion by force.  On January 6,
President Salinas gave instructions to the government's
authorities operating in Chiapas to respect the human
rights of the civilian population and guarantee the work
of the mass media.  On January 10, he called for a
peaceful solution to the crisis in Chiapas and on January
12 ordered an immediate and unilateral cease-fire by
security forces.  He further promised to grant amnesty to
rebels who put down their arms.  His call for dramatic
changes was reinforced by changes in the composition of
his cabinet.  The Minister of the Interior--who is
responsible for internal security forces, state-federal
relations, and the conduct of elections and who served as
governor of Chiapas until January 1993--was removed from
office.  He was replaced by Jorge Carpizo, the Attorney
General and former head of Mexico's human rights
commission.  Carpizo is a man widely known for his
scholarship, personal integrity, and commitment to human
rights and democratic reforms.  Foreign Minister Manuel
Camacho Solis, a man who had won widespread praise for
his adept stewardship of the mayoralty of Mexico City and
his skills as a negotiator, was named to serve as
Commissioner for Peace and Reconciliation.
 
At the same time, the head of the autonomous and highly
credible National Commission for Human Rights (known as
CNDH by its Spanish acronym), Jorge Madrazo, was sent to
investigate possible human rights abuses.  Under the
terms of the cease-fire, Mexican security forces were
ordered not to seek out and engage EZLN insurgents but to
employ force only if attacked or if civilians were
threatened.  Through these actions, President Salinas
demonstrated a decisive commitment to due process and
human rights and a conviction that the path to peace in
Chiapas will come through reconciliation, not prolonged
conflict.  The Mexican Government is investigating all
charges of human rights abuses through the Attorney
General's office, the CNDH, and the military justice
system.  We have been assured by the Mexican Government
that those found guilty of committing abuses will be
punished.  In his January 10 speech, President Salinas
conceded that the federal government had failed to
address many of the social grievances of the inhabitants
of southern Mexico, despite increased expenditures on
social welfare.  He ordered the Secretary for Social
Development to travel to Chiapas and begin consultation
with local leaders on federal support for regional needs.
Subsequently, President Salinas traveled to the region on
January 25 to dialogue with representatives of indigenous
groups who expressed their frustrations over the economic
and social inequities of the region.
 
Mr. Chairman, we were encouraged by President Salinas'
decisive steps in moving away from a policy of military
confrontation to one that sought to engage the rebels in
dialogue, recognizing that, while some of the leaders of
the uprising may have had specific political objectives,
their appeal to rural campesinos and indigenous groups
drew on legitimate grievances stemming from the serious
socio-economic problems of Chiapas.
 
A resolution of the broader problems in Chiapas will not
be achieved overnight.  Chiapas is a region of Mexico in
which the reforms of the Mexican revolution were never
fully implemented.  It is an area of deep inequalities,
where powerful landlords and local bosses have conspired
to thwart the aspirations for justice and better
standards of living for the rural populations.  It
suffers from tensions between the indigenous and non-
indigenous population, between different Indian
communities and between adherents to diverse religious
beliefs.  The human rights abuses in Chiapas and
neighboring states, reported in our annual human rights
reports, are symptomatic of numerous conflicts and
unfulfilled expectations.  Land-ownership patterns and
rapid population increases--4.9% growth rates versus 2.2%
for Mexico as a whole--in the region are causing severe
demographic pressures and scarcity of arable land.  Of
the more than 195,000 farmers in Chiapas, 95% hold
individual parcels of land of no greater than 5 hectares.
Falling coffee prices have added to the economic squeeze
in a region of the country that has not benefited from
modern Mexico's extraordinary growth and development in
the center of the country and near the border with the
United States.
 
We remain concerned that prior to the peace initiative,
human rights abuses may have been committed on both
sides, particularly by the security forces.  The prompt
involvement of Mr. Camacho, the Mexican human rights
commission, and Catholic Church authorities in the region
may have helped limit the problem.  Some 140 non-
governmental human rights organizations--Mexican and non-
Mexican--have sent personnel to Chiapas to assess the
situation.  The CNDH, through January 27, had received
179 complaints from Chiapas residents, of which 107
inquiries have been carried out.  Seventy-two complaints
of possible human rights violations remain under
investigation, as do 123--of a total of over 400--missing
persons reports.
 
The issue of access to prisons has been of concern to
you, I know, Mr. Chairman.  Let me summarize the action
that the Mexican Government has taken.  The CNDH has
assisted three non-Mexican human rights organizations in
gaining access to the Cerro Hueco Prison in Tuxtla
Gutierrez to interview detainees.  We are aware that not
all of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were
satisfied with the arrangements provided by the local
representatives of CNDH for access to the prison.  We are
confident, however, that these difficulties resulted from
administrative problems at the local level and not from a
deliberate policy on the part of the authorities to bar
international NGOs.  The CNDH continues to pursue its
investigations, and Mexican officials have made clear
their determination to clarify the truth of what happened
in Chiapas during the past month.
 
As of today, fighting in the area has stopped.  The
government's actions contributed to shifting the conflict
to the negotiating stage.  Mr. Camacho has voiced concern
that the EZLN may be pursuing a broad national agenda at
the expense of local talks aimed at addressing the needs
of Chiapas. However, prospects for direct talks and talks
mediated through the good offices of Bishop Samuel Ruiz
appear very encouraging.  We expect that these will take
place shortly.  As a further step to reduce tensions, Mr.
Camacho announced on February 1 the withdrawal of army
troops from occupied towns and the designation of two
villages as neutral zones, off-limits to EZLN rebels and
army troops.
 
Chiapas, Economic Reforms, And NAFTA
 
While the problems of Chiapas date back centuries, recent
changes in the economy of Mexico and the global economy
have certainly contributed to social upheaval in southern
Mexico.  As the Mexican Government has instituted
financial, economic, and trade reforms --steps which we
have seen as crucial to long-term growth and stability--
there have been shocks to its economy, particularly to
those sectors which were inefficient or protected from
competition.  In Chiapas, 58% of the population is
dependent upon agriculture for their livelihood.
Government efforts to modernize the agricultural sector
through land reform and changes in support programs,
coupled with worldwide declines in commodity prices for
some of the state's main crops, have impacted
significantly on this sizeable segment of the Chiapas
economy.  Chiapas has been targeted by the Salinas
government to receive a large share of funds from
government programs designed to provide a social safety
net during the period of economic reform.  The best known
program is "Solidarity."
 
One of the most significant aspects of the economic
reforms of the Salinas administration has been the
successful conclusion of the North American Free Trade
Agreement.  NAFTA entered into force on January 1 and has
begun to permanently alter the trading patterns of North
America.  The opening of the Mexican economy will
increase overall economic efficiency and growth, but that
growth will benefit some regions more than others at the
outset.  It is up to the Mexican Government to best use
its fiscal and social policies to redistribute the
benefits of growth to include regions of slower growth.
The Mexican Government understands this and is committed
to increasing its social expenditures in Chiapas.
 
The first phase of NAFTA implementation is fully
underway.  Reports indicate that it is proceeding with
few difficulties.  Ambassador Jim Jones reports that our
embassy and consulates are being inundated with inquiries
from U.S. businessmen and -women seeking information on
doing business in Mexico.  The inaugural meeting of the
NAFTA Commission was held in Mexico City on January 14
and addressed a number of crucial implementation issues,
including the creation of the NAFTA Secretariat.
Representatives from the Department of State, Labor, and
the Environmental Protection Agency continue to work with
their Mexican and Canadian counterparts on organizing the
commissions required in the labor and environment
supplemental agreements and the border environmental
cooperation agreement.  We hope the first meetings of the
labor and environment commissions will occur in the
spring.
 
In the EZLN's initial "declaration of war" on the Mexican
Government, NAFTA was deemed the death knell for the
Indians of Chiapas.  I do not accept that judgment.  Such
a statement is little more than EZLN rhetoric that makes
for catchy headlines.  The EZLN itself claims to have
been preparing for its "war" for some 10 years--
obviously, long before NAFTA was on the table.
 
NAFTA is not the cause of the social and economic
inequalities in Chiapas which spawned the uprising any
more than NAFTA can be blamed for poverty or social
tensions elsewhere in Mexico or the rest of North
America.  NAFTA only became operational on January 1 of
this year.  But make no mistake about the expectations of
the Clinton Administration.  NAFTA by itself is not
viewed as the panacea to those problems.  As the majority
of economic studies project, NAFTA will increase trade
and investment flows among the partners and stimulate the
economies of all three.  This will lead to job creation
and allow for more balanced development throughout
Mexico.  To quote U.S. Trade Representative Kantor from
remarks made at the January 14 inaugural session of the
NAFTA Commission:
 
The whole idea of the North American Free Trade Agreement
is to raise standards of living, to increase incomes, to
increase productivity, to make all of North America more
competitive.  That creates jobs. . . . The ability of all
three countries to create jobs and to raise their
standard of living obviously addresses grievances that
many have in all three countries.
 
As it comes into full implementation, NAFTA will bring
some dislocations to segments of the economies of all
three NAFTA partners.  It has been suggested that corn
producers in Mexico--corn is a primary crop in Chiapas--
will suffer disproportionately from NAFTA's opening of
the Mexican market to cheaper and more efficiently
produced U.S. corn.  The importance of corn production to
the Mexican economy was taken into consideration in
NAFTA, as witnessed in the long phase-in period of the
corn provisions--15 years, almost a generation.
 
In addition, the Salinas administration announced last
October a new income support program for subsistence
farmers, including corn growers, known as PROCAMPO.
PROCAMPO will provide direct income support to farmers
who generally have not benefited from past Mexican price
support programs.  At the same time, it is designed to be
phased out over the 15 years scheduled for NAFTA
implementation.  In 1994 alone, the Mexican Government
will spend $3.5 billion on PROCAMPO nationwide.
 
Chiapas and the uprising there do not make Mexico an
unreliable trading partner.  Poverty in Chiapas predates
NAFTA.  But increased trade, which NAFTA fosters, will
bring rising prosperity in Mexico and, ultimately, in
Chiapas.  Expanded resources and expanded incomes will
make for a better future for the people of Chiapas.
 
Furthermore, the NAFTA process is more than a closer
linking of our trading patterns.  This process
accelerates a comprehensive integration of our two
countries in many areas.  It helps energize local non-
governmental organizations and forges links between them
and like-minded NGOs in the international community.  The
process increases Mexican sensitivities toward democratic
values and human rights.  Under NAFTA, Mexico is now more
than ever part of the global village.
 
Democratization in Mexico
 
Mr. Chairman, I would now like to turn to the other topic
of today's hearing: democratization in Mexico.  As you
know, Mexico has long been dominated by the PRI--
Institutional Revolutionary Party--the political
organization which emerged after the Mexican revolution.
Over the years, the PRI has provided Mexico with
considerable stability and presided over a remarkable
transformation of the country.  It is also acknowledged
by most observers that the prominence of the PRI has
historically discouraged the development of an open and
competitive democratic process.
 
Just as we are witnessing a remarkable transformation in
Mexico, from a statist and protectionist economy toward
an open economy that encourages free markets, we are also
witnessing dramatic transformations in the Mexican
political system.  Under the leadership of President
Salinas, Mexico has taken bold steps toward guaranteeing
the protection of fundamental human rights and permitting
an open and fair democratic process.  For the first time
in history, opposition parties have gained governorships
in several states and significantly improved their
representation in the legislature.  Electoral reforms in
1990 and 1993, including the Federal Electoral Processes
and Institutions Code, introduced reforms in voter
registration, placed limits on campaign spending, and
created an electoral court to adjudicate electoral
disputes.
 
These reforms, however, failed to fully satisfy
opposition parties concerned about the impartiality of
the electoral authorities.  During the recent elections
in the state of Yucatan, opposition parties complained of
extensive fraud.  It is for that reason, Mr. Chairman,
that we welcomed the announcement on January 27 that all
of the candidates for the presidency in Mexico had
reached an agreement entitled "Peace, Democracy, and
Justice."  I cannot sufficiently underscore the historic
dimensions of this agreement to which the leading
opposition parties--the PRD and the PAN--as well as the
PRI are signatories.  It recognized that a necessary and
unavoidable condition to a just and lasting peace is the
advancement of democracy through free elections.  In the
agreement, the parties pledged to work for:
 
--  The impartiality of electoral authorities;
--  Permanent access to voter lists and registration
data;
--  Equality in access to and coverage by the media;
--  Prevention of the use of public funds and programs to
favor particular parties or candidates;
--  Revision of the rules for party financing;
--  Review of the points in the penal code which could
restrict political rights;
--  Consideration of a special federal prosecutor for
election-related crimes; and
--  A consensus to work together for democracy and
convocation, if warranted, of a special session of the
congress to consider further reforms.
 
The United States believes that this accord, properly
implemented, will strengthen democratic practices
precisely at a time when Mexico is moving to establish
closer ties with the United States and other democratic
nations of the hemisphere.
 
It is a tribute to the strength of the Mexican political
process that these watershed agreements have emerged less
than a month after the incidents in Chiapas.  Chiapas,
rather than representing a reversal in the process of
economic and political transformation in Mexico, has
proven to be a further energizing factor contributing to
a deepening of the reform process.  We hope and expect
that this process will continue.  The United States has
been supportive of democratic opening in Mexico.  We have
discussed frequently with Mexican officials our
willingness to cooperate in ways which are in full
conformity with Mexican law.  The State Department has
also met with non-governmental organizations to discuss
how they might be able to assist Mexican NGOs in ensuring
the full implementation of electoral laws.
 
Conclusion
 
In closing, I would like to reiterate that we view with
great optimism the development of closer ties with Mexico
and applaud the process of economic reform and political
opening that is taking place in that country.  The United
States looks forward to deepening ties with Mexico and
working fully with whomever the Mexican people elect as
their leaders in the upcoming presidential race.  We are
confident that the implementation of NAFTA will continue
to improve relations between our countries in the years
ahead.  In the aftermath of Chiapas, we are also mindful
of the fact that Mexico, as well as other countries in
the hemisphere, need to pay more attention to the plight
of those sectors of the population which have been left
behind by the swift changes of modern life.
 
Just as President Clinton has emphasized the need to
address many of the basic and fundamental social problems
that we continue to face in the United States, we welcome
the renewed commitment of Mexico toward addressing the
problems of poverty and inequality.  A policy of peace,
reconciliation, and democratic reform with respect for
human rights will help strengthen the ties of our people
on both sides of the border.  Our own principles call for
nothing less in the conduct of one of our most important
bilateral relationships.  (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 9:
 
Treaty Actions
 
Multilateral
 
Aviation
Convention on international civil aviation.  Done at
Chicago Dec. 7, 1944.  Entered into force Apr. 4, 1947.
TIAS 1591; 61 Stat. 1180.
Accession deposited:  Georgia, Jan. 21, 1994.
 
Consular Relations
Convention on consular relations.  Done at Vienna Apr.
24, 1963.  Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S.
Dec. 24, 1969.  TIAS 6820; 21 UST 77.
Accession deposited:  Kazakhstan, Jan. 5, 1994.
 
Copyrights
Berne convention for the protection of literary and
artistic works of Sept. 9, 1886, revised at Paris July
24, 1971, and amended in 1979.  Entered into force for
the U.S. Mar. 1, 1989.
Accessions deposited:  Albania, Dec. 2, 1993; El
Salvador, Nov. 18, 1993.
Succession deposited:  Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dec. 23, 1993.
 
Diplomatic Relations
Vienna convention on diplomatic relations.  Done at
Vienna Apr. 18, 1961.  Entered into force Apr. 24, 1964;
for the U.S. Dec. 13, 1972.  TIAS 7502; 23 UST 3227.
Accession deposited:  Kazakhstan, Jan. 5, 1994.
 
Labor
Instrument for the amendment of the constitution of the
International Labor Organization.  Done at Montreal Oct.
9, 1946.  Entered into force Apr. 20, 1948; reentered
into force for the U.S. Feb 18, 1980.  TIAS 1868; 62
Stat. 3485.
Acceptance deposited:  Tajikistan, Nov. 26, 1993.
 
Patents
Patent cooperation treaty with regulations.  Done at
Washington June 19, 1970.  Entered into force Jan. 24,
1978.  TIAS 8733; 28 UST 7645.
Accessions deposited:  Slovenia, Dec. 1, 1993; Trinidad
and Tobago, Dec. 10, 1993.
 
Budapest treaty on the international recognition of the
deposit of microorganisms for the purposes of patent
procedure, with regulations.  Done at Budapest Apr. 28,
1977, and amended on Sept. 26, 1980.  Entered into force
Aug. 19, 1990.  TIAS 9768; 32 UST 1241.
Accessions deposited:  Cuba, Nov. 19, 1993; Yugoslavia,
Nov. 25, 1993.
 
Property
Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property
Organization.  Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967.  Entered
into force Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1970.
TIAS 6932; 21 UST 1749.
Accession deposited:  Bhutan, Dec. 16, 1993.
Succession deposited:  Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dec. 23, 1993.
 
Bilateral
 
Barbados
Protocol amending the convention for the avoidance of
double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with
respect to taxes on income, with exchange of notes and
understandings.  Signed at Washington, Dec. 18, 1991.
Entered into force:  Dec. 29, 1993.
 
Canada
Agreement concerning the privileges and immunities of
members of the administrative and technical staffs of the
Embassy of Canada in the United States and the Embassy of
the United States in Canada.  Effected by exchange of
notes at Ottawa Aug. 26 and Sept. 2, 1993.  Entered into
force Sept. 21, 1993.
 
Czech Republic
Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on
income and capital.  Signed at Prague Sept. 16, 1993.
Entered into force:  Dec. 23, 1993.
 
Djibouti
Memorandum of understanding concerning scientific and
technical cooperation in the earth sciences, with
annexes.  Signed at Reston and Djibouti Apr. 29 and Dec.
9, 1993.  Entered into force Dec. 9, 1993.
 
Kyrgyz Republic
Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of
official government employees.  Effected by exchange of
notes at Washington Dec. 6 and 22, 1993.  Entered into
force Dec. 22, 1993.
 
Agreement to establish a joint commission for
agribusiness and rural development, with annexes.  Signed
at Bishkek Dec. 13, 1993.  Entered into force Dec. 13,
1993.
 
Mexico
Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on
income, with protocol.  Signed at Washington Sept. 18,
1992.  Entered into force:  Dec. 28, 1993.
 
Netherlands
Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on
income, with understanding and exchange of notes.  Signed
at Washington Dec. 18, 1992.  Entered into force:  Dec.
31, 1993.
 
Protocol amending the convention of Dec. 18, 1992, for
the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of
fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, with
exchange of notes.  Signed at Washington Oct. 13, 1993.
Entered into force:  Dec. 30, 1993.
 
Panama
Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of
official government employees.  Effected by exchange of
notes at Panama Nov. 26, 1993.  Entered into force Nov.
26, 1993.
 
Russian Federation
Agreement on science and technology cooperation, with
annexes.  Signed at Moscow Dec. 16, 1993.  Entered into
force Dec. 16, 1993.
 
Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the fields
of mining research and minerals information, with annex.
Signed at Moscow Dec. 16, 1993.  Entered into force Dec.
16, 1993.
 
Grant agreement for an energy efficiency and environment
commodity import program.  Signed at Moscow Dec. 16,
1993.  Entered into force Dec. 16, 1993.
 
Slovak Republic
Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on
income and capital.  Signed at Bratislava Oct. 8, 1993.
Entered into force:  Dec. 30, 1993.
 
Tunisia
Consular convention.  Signed at Tunis May 12, 1988.
Entered into force:  Jan. 15, 1994.
 
Turkmenistan
Agreement regarding cooperation to facilitate the
provision of assistance.  Signed at Ashgabat Nov. 30,
1993.  Entered into force Nov. 30, 1993.  (###)
 
END OF DISPATCH VOL 5, NO 7.

To the top of this page


Index of Dispatch Magazine Archives 1994 Issues|| Index of Dispatch Magazine Archives|| Index of "Briefings and Statements"
Index of Electronic Research Collections ERC Reference Desk || Alphabetic Index || Sitemap || ERC Homepage
Last modified: Jun. 3, 1999
Designed by: Lin Dou