US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH VOLUME 5, NUMBER 7, FEBRUARY 14, 1994 PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE: 1. Deputy Secretary-Designate's Confirmation Hearing -- Deputy Secretary-Designate Talbott 2. U.S. Lifts Trade Embargo Against Vietnam -- President Clinton 3. The Peace, Prosperity, and Democracy Act of 1994 -- Secretary Christopher 4. International Affairs Budget: An Investment in Peace and Prosperity -- Secretary Christopher 5. The NATO Summit and the Future of European Security - - Stephen A. Oxman 6. U.S. Expresses Outrage Over Marketplace Shelling -- President Clinton 7. Reaction to the Sarajevo Marketplace Shelling -- Secretary Christopher 8. Chiapas: Implications for U.S.-Mexico Relations -- Alexander F. Watson 9. Treaty Actions ARTICLE 1: Deputy Secretary-Designate's Confirmation Hearing Deputy Secretary-Designate Talbott Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, February 8, 1994 I am pleased to be back before this committee. Since appearing before you last March, I have had frequent contact with a number of you and have benefited from your counsel. I know that Secretary Christopher greatly values his interaction with you and your colleagues. I look forward to working with each of you on a broader range of issues if you and the full Senate see fit to approve my nomination. If confirmed, I will dedicate myself to helping the Secretary and the President advance our national security interests as we seize the opportunities and grapple with the dangers that have accompanied the end of the Cold War. Bill Clinton is our first President elected after the Cold War ended. Making sure that it stays over--making sure the new opportunities prevail over the new dangers-- is the underlying theme, the overarching task, of our foreign policy. In my capacity as ambassador-at-large and special adviser to Secretary Christopher for the new independent states of the former Soviet Union, I have been deeply immersed in that task in its most exhilarating and its most vexing dimensions. The very phrase "new independent states of the former Soviet Union" bears repeating. Not long ago, it would have had the ring of political fiction, if not fantasy. It is because those eight words now reflect reality that we can even talk about the end of the Cold War--about a post-Cold War global security order or a post-Cold War mission for NATO, for American foreign policy, and for the Department of State. As Secretary Christopher's Deputy, I will work with him to give concrete meaning to those phrases--and to make them synonymous with the safety and prosperity of our nation. I will help him to advance the strategic priorities he has identified for American foreign policy. These are: -- Strengthening our nation's economic security; -- Supporting reform in Russia and the other NIS; -- Renewing NATO for a new Europe; -- Deepening our engagement in Asia; -- Working for peace in the Middle East; and -- Curbing proliferation and addressing other global issues such as environmental degradation and rapid population growth. Making the System Work Let me begin with a few observations about the institution over which Secretary Christopher presides and about my role, as he has defined it, within the Department. The Deputy has traditionally devoted a significant part of his energy and attention to making sure that the building, its outposts abroad, and the other U.S. Government agencies involved with foreign policy issues all serve the President and the people of the United States as effectively as possible. I relish that aspect of the job for two reasons: first, because it is important; and second, because I am confident that it can be done well. I say that not so much out of self-confidence as out of admiration for the Foreign and Civil Service professionals with whom I have worked so closely. I have been impressed by the men and women, in Washington and in the field, who carry out our policy on a day-to- day basis. I have had the most contact, naturally, with those who concentrate on the former Soviet Union. I have visited all 12 of our embassies, most more than once. All but one of these frontier posts of post-Cold War diplomacy are headed by career Foreign Service officers. Therefore, I come to this new challenge with a sense of how good the people are and with a few ideas about how the system of which they are a part can be made better, both for their sake and for the sake of the national interest. Part of the Deputy Secretary's job is to ensure that the Department's resources--budgetary, organizational, and human--are productively harnessed to the Administration's foreign policy priorities. That task is particularly important today as we diversify our attention and shift our priorities. Last week, the Secretary submitted to the Congress the Peace, Prosperity, and Democracy Act of 1994. The international affairs account in the budget submitted by the President yesterday is consistent with the framework established by that legislation. For the first time, it is defined by and organized around overall national objectives. Both the Peace, Prosperity, and Democracy Act and the budget reflect new priorities appropriate for the post-Cold War era. The task of better harnessing our resources to our priorities is also reflected in the reorganization of the State Department contained in the authorization bill that the Senate passed last week. Under that reorganization, the Department will run more effectively as we streamline operations. We will also establish the position of Under Secretary for Global Affairs to move these issues into the mainstream of American foreign policy. We are also developing a post-Cold War Foreign Service. At the new National Foreign Affairs Training Center in Arlington that the Secretary dedicated last October, we are focusing on the diplomatic disciplines demanded by this new era. We are strengthening the economic awareness and commercial skills of all foreign affairs professionals--not just economic officers--to bring to life what we call a new "Diplomacy for Global Competitiveness." New courses and training are reinforcing the priority of our new global issues agenda. In the core skill area of foreign language proficiency, the center is already teaching 10 of the languages of the successor states of the former Soviet Union, none of which were taught before. The Former Soviet Union: A Continuing Challenge While asking me to take on new responsibilities, the Secretary also expects me to continue to work with him in overseeing our policy toward Russia, Ukraine, and the other new independent states of the former Soviet Union. When I came before you a little less than a year ago, I stressed that the challenge of supporting reform in the former Soviet Union would be as difficult as it would be important. From the beginning of this Administration, our policy toward the new independent states has proceeded from three central premises. First, a titanic struggle is underway for the future of that country. Second, the United States has an immense stake in the outcome of this struggle. Third, we can have a positive effect on the outcome. In the last few months, there has been understandable concern about the prospects for reform in Russia, so let me say a few words about that country in particular. Russia is in the throes of a multiple transformation without precedent: from dictatorship to democracy; from a command economy to the market; and from an empire to a modern state. As President Clinton stressed in the speech he gave in Moscow, Americans want Russia to succeed in this transformation not just for its sake or for Europe's but for our own. A stable, democratic, market-oriented Russia, a Russia secure in its borders and respectful of the borders of others --a Russia integrated into the West rather than contained by the West--will mean fewer U.S. tax dollars spent on defense; a reduced threat from weapons of mass destruction; new markets for U.S. products; and a powerful, reliable partner for diplomacy and commerce in the 21st century. The United States cannot be a spectator in the drama unfolding in the former Soviet Union. We must remain engaged. When I say "we," I mean both the Administration and the Congress. We worked together to assemble a series of initiatives last year; we put our taxpayers' money where our nation's interests and principles were. We set the tone and provided the innovative ideas for the international community's response. American engagement and American leadership made a difference, and it will continue to make a difference as those programs are established on the ground. Reform in the former Soviet Union is a long-term process. It will inevitably involve setbacks that will test our expertise, patience, staying power, dexterity, and hard- headedness. Precisely those qualities are personified by James Collins, whom the Secretary is prepared to recommend to be my successor as ambassador-at-large for the new independent states. Until last fall, he served as deputy chief of mission and, frequently, charge d'affaires under three ambassadors at embassy Moscow. Since then, he has been coordinator of regional affairs for Russia and the other NIS and my principal deputy. Mr. Collins has an extraordinary grasp of both the realities of the situation in the former Soviet Union and the possibilities for American diplomacy. He and I will continue to work closely with Ambassador Pickering in Moscow, Ambassador Miller in Kiev, our other diplomats in the region, and our colleagues in Washington to offer the Secretary the very best analysis and advice we can. Toward a New Europe Our policy toward the former Soviet Union must be seen-- and developed--in a wider context: the whittling down of divisions between states and the fostering of integration among states in Europe and, more broadly, across Eurasia and throughout the world. The Secretary has asked me to devote considerable time and energy to developing a comprehensive policy toward all the countries emerging from the shadow of Soviet domination. We want to create a policy supportive of democracy, independence, and security in Central Europe as well as in the former Soviet Union. I look forward to that part of my job with special enthusiasm, since I lived and worked in Central Europe for two years in the early 1970s. My wife and I lived in Belgrade. We have stood on the famous bridge in Sarajevo and shopped in the now suddenly, tragically famous market. We traveled frequently to all the countries of the region. I feel I know that area and its people well. I have a personal appreciation of their tragic history, the complexity of their current situation, and the immense promise of their future. During his trip to Europe last month, President Clinton reaffirmed the priority we attach to transatlantic security and prosperity. We must work for a democratic, undivided Europe that includes a reformist, democratic Russia. Our task, in the wake of the Cold War, is to reinforce reform in the East. We can do that by beginning to extend the benefits and obligations of the same collective security order and liberal trading system that have been the pillars of strength for the West. The NATO allies took a momentous step in that direction last month when they unanimously approved President Clinton's Partnership for Peace initiative to deepen NATO's engagement with the East and turn former adversaries into lasting partners. We have been encouraged that so many nations in Central and Eastern Europe have expressed a desire to participate in the Partnership. We do not have a crystal ball to foresee Europe's future, but we do have, in the Partnership for Peace, the next best thing: a flexible mechanism for responding to events in Europe as they unfold. Developments in Russia, of course, will profoundly influence what kind of security structures evolve in Europe--and indeed, across Eurasia. If Russia hews to a course of internal reform, respect for its neighbors' independence, and cooperation with the West, NATO will continue to evolve in the direction of maximum inclusiveness. If, however, reform in Russia falters, if new threats arise, NATO will be able to work through the Partnership to protect regional stability through closer ties--including NATO membership- -with the active participants. And we will have the deeply enhanced military and political relationship through the Partnership for Peace on which to build. It's the Economy Political and military security also depend on economic integration. Those nations committed to economic reform must be able to deliver tangible benefits to their people if they are to consolidate democracy and achieve stability. Western nations and institutions can and must help by widening access to Western markets. For the Clinton Administration, integration is a global theme, with a heavy economic accent. The Secretary has assigned first priority to strengthening our nation's economic security, but he has always emphasized that this must be done in ways that lower old barriers rather than build new ones. In the post-Cold War world, the distinction between domestic and international policy has further blurred, and economic issues are at the heart of both our domestic and foreign policy. President Clinton is spearheading the most ambitious international economic agenda of any Administration in nearly half a century. With the passage of the federal budget last summer, we reduced our deficit and regained our credibility as the leader of the global economy. With the approval of NAFTA, we created export and job opportunities for Americans and built a bridge to closer cooperation with Latin America. The vote of this Congress to approve NAFTA was a watershed for the United States in the post- Cold War world. With the successful meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders in Seattle, we built a platform for prosperity by elevating our engagement with the dynamic economies of that region. This is the world's most lucrative terrain for American exports and jobs. Over time, we expect APEC to gain greater importance as a forum for economic cooperation. With NAFTA and APEC, we have reaffirmed that our future lies in greater economic integration, both in this hemisphere and in the world. This Administration has emphasized that regional trade liberalization is consistent with global liberalization, which is now within our reach with the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT. As a general principle, Mr. Chairman, we need to ensure that the emergence or strengthening of regional groupings advances, rather than impedes, the emergence of a more fully integrated international community and a more open global trading system. We seek a new economic and security order that carries us beyond regional blocs toward a safer, more prosperous, more integrated world. Our commitment to place economic policy at the heart of our foreign policy also applies to our relations with Japan. Last summer, we reached agreement with Japan to undertake an intensive set of negotiations to establish a new framework for our economic relations. The framework is aimed at correcting persistent trade imbalances between our two nations and at resolving the chronic market access problems that have long limited American exports and investment. The President will emphasize this objective--and the need for progress--when he meets with Prime Minister Hosokawa on Friday. We have a broad partnership with this important ally, including political and security dimensions that are essentially in sound condition. But we must move toward resolution of our economic problems if our overall relations are to flourish. Promoting Security and Democracy Non-proliferation, which Secretary Christopher has characterized as the arms control agenda of the 1990s, represents one of the pressing global priorities for this Administration. It is also an area in which I have been deeply involved over the last year. The decision by Ukraine's parliament to approve the trilateral agreement among the United States, Russia, and Ukraine and to ratify START I unconditionally represents a major victory in our efforts to reduce the threat posed by nuclear weapons. It follows the decisions by Belarus and Kazakhstan to ratify START and accede to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear-weapons states. We are actively supporting these breakthroughs through the Nunn-Lugar Act, which will help to dismantle thousands of former Soviet weapons safely and securely and thereby directly strengthen American security. The funds provided under this act will make possible enormous savings in our defense budget. Its authors deserve credit for this innovative example of defense by other means. But we still face serious non-proliferation challenges. Clearly, the most immediate threat is the one posed by North Korea's nuclear program. The United States is leading the international effort to persuade North Korea to adhere to the NPT and abide by its nuclear safeguards commitments. Other global issues also affect our security and prosperity. I have mentioned Secretary Christopher's determination to renew our leadership on the environment, population, and sustainable development. We are also determined to advance democracy and human rights. While we search for more positive relations with China, we have conditioned the renewal of its most-favored-nation status on overall, significant progress on human rights. The President's decision last week to lift the trade embargo on Vietnam will further the Administration's goal of the fullest possible accounting for our MIAs. In South Africa, where freedom is ascendant, we are providing assistance for the April election. Despite the continuing turmoil and the difficulty of the road ahead, we look forward to the transformation of that country into a non- racial democracy. We are also working to help democratic institutions take hold throughout Africa. Finally, in this hemisphere, we will move to sustain the momentum created by NAFTA. This year, the President will host a summit of the Americas. That summit will celebrate and build on our shared commitment to developing democracy, defending human rights, promoting prosperity, and addressing global concerns such as environmental degradation and narcotics trafficking. We also witnessed, last year, a turning point for peace in the Middle East, a region in which we have great strategic, economic, and moral interests. Our relationship with Israel is based on the shared ideals and values between our two democracies, on our unshakable commitment to Israel's security, and on the commitment of both of our nations to peace in the Middle East. The Israeli-PLO agreement of September 13 was made possible by more than two decades of sustained, diplomatic engagement on the part of the United States. Since that extraordinary breakthrough, we have worked to make the peace process irreversible. Secretary Christopher is working tirelessly to assure implementation of the Declaration of Principles. At the same time, we are encouraging Israeli agreements with Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. President Asad's statement that Syria had made a strategic choice for peace with Israel is a hopeful sign that we may be able to widen the circle of peace. Mr. Chairman, in this connection, and in conclusion, I would like to go back to a point I was making at the outset. The Middle East is one of many examples where breakthroughs that eluded us for decades are now possible because of the end of the Cold War. The world appeared simpler during the days of superpower confrontation. The Cold War made hot wars all the more difficult to resolve, and it made vital issues, such as development, human rights, and trade, much harder to address in a global context. The events of the last few years left us little time to plan for the end of the Cold War. But we do know that the post-Cold War world will be far more complex than the world to which we have grown accustomed. It is more complex because so much more is possible. (###) ARTICLE 2: U.S. Lifts Trade Embargo Against Vietnam President Clinton Announcement of lifting of trade embargo on Vietnam, Washington, DC, February 3, 1994 Thank you very much. I want to especially thank all of you who have come here on such short notice. From the beginning of my Administration, I have said that any decisions about our relationships with Vietnam should be guided by one factor and one factor only--gaining the fullest possible accounting for our prisoners of war and our missing-in-action. We owe that to all who served in Vietnam and to the families of those whose fates remain unknown. Today I am lifting the trade embargo against Vietnam because I am absolutely convinced it offers the best way to resolve the fates of those who remain missing and about whom we are not sure. We have worked hard over the last year to achieve progress. On Memorial Day, I pledged to declassify and make available virtually all government documents related to our POWs and MIAs. On Veterans Day, I announced that we had fulfilled that pledge. Last April, and again in July, I sent two presidential delegations to Vietnam to expand our search for re-mains and documents. We intensified our diplomatic efforts. We have devoted more re-sources to this effort than has any previous Administration. Today, more than 500 dedicated military and civilian personnel are involved in this effort under the leadership of General Shalikashvili, Secretary Aspin, and our Commander in the Pacific, Admiral Larson. Many work daily in the fields, jungles, and mountains of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, often braving very dangerous conditions, trying to find the truth about those we are unsure of. Last July, I said any improvement in our relations with Vietnam would depend on tangible progress in four specific areas: First, the recovery and return of remains of our POWs and MIAs; Second, the continued resolution of discrepancy cases-- cases in which there is reason to believe individuals could have survived the incident in which they were lost; Third, further assistance from Vietnam and Laos on investigations along their common border, an area where many U.S. servicemen were lost and pilots downed; and, Fourth, accelerated efforts to provide all relevant POW/MIA-related documents. Today, I can report that significant, tangible progress has been made in these four areas. Let me describe it. -- Remains--Since the beginning of this Administration, we have recovered the remains of 67 American servicemen. In the seven months since July, we have recovered 39 sets of remains, more than during all of 1992. -- Discrepancy cases--Since the beginning of this Administration, we have reduced the number of these cases from 135 to 73. Since last July, we have confirmed the deaths of 19 servicemen whose names were on the list. A special United States team in Vietnam continues to investigate the remaining cases. -- Cooperation with Laos--As a direct result of the conditions set out in July, the Governments of Vietnam and Laos agreed to work with us to investigate their common border. The first such investigation took place in December and located new remains as well as crash sites that will soon be excavated. -- Documents--Since July, we have received important wartime documents from Vietnam's military archives that provide leads on unresolved POW/MIA cases. The progress achieved on unresolved questions is encouraging, but it must not end here. I remain personally committed to continuing the search for the answers and the peace of mind that families of the missing deserve. There has been a substantial increase in Vietnamese cooperation on these matters during the past year. Everyone involved in the issue has affirmed that. I have carefully considered the question of how best to sustain that cooperation in securing the fullest possible accounting. I've consulted with my national security and veterans affairs advisers and with several out-side experts, such as Gen. John Vessey, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who has been an emissary to Vietnam for three Presidents now. It was their view that the key to continued progress lies in expanding our contacts with Vietnam. This was also the view of many distinguished Vietnam veterans and former POWs who now serve in the Congress, such as Senator Bob Kerrey and Congressman Pete Peterson, who are here. And I want to say a special word of thanks to Senator John Kerry--is he here? There he is--he just came in--and to Senator John McCain, who had to go home on a family matter and could not be here. But I thank the two of you so much for your leadership and your steadfastness. And to the rest of you--Senator Robb and so many others, especially those who served in Vietnam, for being counted on this issue and for taking all the care you have for such a long time. I have made the judgment that the best way to ensure cooperation from Vietnam and to continue getting the information Americans want on POWs and MIAs is to end the trade embargo. I've also decided to establish a liaison office in Vietnam to provide services for Americans there and to help us pursue a human rights dialogue with the Vietnamese Government. I want to be clear: These actions do not constitute a normalization of our relationship. Before that happens, we must have more progress, more co-operation, and more answers. Toward that end, this spring, I will send another high-level U.S. delegation to Vietnam to continue the search for remains and for documents. Earlier today, I met with the leaders of our nation's veterans organizations. I deeply respect their views. Many of the families they represent have endured enormous suffering and uncertainty. Their opinions also deserve special consideration. I talked with them about my decision. I explained the reasons for that decision. Some of them, in all candor, do not agree with the action I am taking today. But I believe we all agree on the ultimate goal--to secure the fullest possible accounting of those who remain missing. I was pleased that they committed to continue working with us toward that goal. Whatever the Vietnam war may have done in dividing in our country in the past, today our nation is one in honoring those who served and in pressing for answers about all those who did not return. This decision today, I believe, renews that commitment and our constant, constant effort never to forget them until our job is done. Those who have sacrificed deserve a full and final accounting. I am absolutely convinced, as are so many in the Congress who served there and so many Americans who have studied this issue, that this decision today will help to ensure that fullest possible accounting. (###) ARTICLE 3: The Peace, Prosperity, and Democracy Act of 1994 Secretary Christopher Opening statement at a State Department news conference, Washington, DC, February 3, 1994 Good afternoon. I'm pleased to be here with Brian Atwood and Dick Moose to introduce the Peace, Prosperity, and Democracy Act of 1994. I'll say a few words about the act and then turn the rostrum over to Brian and Dick. The act was submitted to Congress yesterday. It's the result of intensive interagency processes and extensive discussions with members of the Congress and their staffs that began about three months ago. We've also consulted very widely with interested non-governmental organizations. The Clinton Administration is the first to be elected since the Cold War ended. We have the opportunity and the responsibility to adapt our foreign policy to a world no longer dominated by superpower confrontation. Next Monday, I'll be talking about the first truly post- Cold War foreign affairs budget. Today, let me describe how this new statutory proposal also reflects our new foreign policy priorities. We are still operating under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. That act is a relic of the Cold War, passed a few weeks after the Berlin Wall went up, and geared to our global strategy of containment. On a purely practical basis, some of its provisions are obviously out of date. But foreign assistance itself is not out of date. Our assistance program can help to achieve the fundamental purposes of our foreign policy, enhancing the security and well-being of the American people. Sharply focused aid helps to support democracy and free market institutions. It bolsters preventative diplomacy as we face global problems by narcotics trafficking and environmental degradation. Foreign assistance can give us great economic opportunities. For example, every year we get back in sales to Korea triple the amount of assistance we provided over a decade to Seoul. Interestingly enough, Seoul now has a foreign assistance program of its own to aid others. If our foreign assistance is to serve our interests effectively, it must be targeted on our foreign policy priorities. The new act established a framework that does just exactly that. It seeks to encourage sustainable development, to build democracy, to promote peace, to provide humanitarian assistance, and to promote economic growth through trade and investment. The new act will aggressively promote U.S. economic interests, one of our highest foreign policy priorities. Through the act, we will encourage broad-based economic growth, creating dynamic markets for U.S. exports in the developing world where, by the year 2000, four out of five consumers in the world will live. To take another example, all Americans have a stake in the success of political and economic reform in Russia and the new independent states. The new act enables the President to assist nations that are seeking to join the community of democratic states, not only in Central and Eastern Europe and the new independent states but in Africa, Asia, and Latin America as well. This Administration is committed to helping achieve a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. The new act will help to achieve that goal through programs to bring economic growth to Gaza and the West Bank and through our continued military and economic assistance for Israel and Egypt. We have also moved global issues into the mainstream of American foreign policy. The core goals of the new act include the protection of the environment and the stabilization of population growth. These core global goals also include human rights. As you know, this week, in another important release, we released our 1993 human rights report. I've been involved in these human right reports ever since the first one in 1977. I must say, I'm very proud that the State Department is prepared to take--and the United States Government is prepared to take--the courageous and quite extraordinary step of releasing a human rights report on 193 countries. I also want to thank you for the extensive coverage you've given to this important document, which I think provides a baseline for measuring performance and progress around the world. I believe that this new act is a sound investment for America. Assistance to the priorities that I've outlined today is highly cost-effective. For example, compare the cost of the infrastructure improvements in Gaza and Jericho with the cost of continued conflict in the Middle East. Compare the cost of support for reform in Russia to the increases in defense expenditures that would be necessary if Russia were to revert to dictatorship. Compare the price of population programs with the scourge of starvation. If we ignore these issues--the kind of issues that I've mentioned here today--they will return compounded, more costly, and sometimes deeply threatening to our security. Let me make just one final point about the new act. The Agency for International Development was one of the first laboratories for reinventing government. The Vice President's National Performance Review identified reform of foreign assistance as one of the most critical actions in the field of foreign affairs. The new act responds by making foreign assistance programs more efficient and more responsive. The President and I view passage of this bill as an important step for our foreign policy. We look forward to working with Congress in the spirit of bipartisanship as it debates the Peace, Prosperity, and Democracy Act. (###) ARTICLE 4: International Affairs Budget: An Investment in Peace and Prosperity Secretary Christopher Opening statement at a State Department news conference, Washington, DC, February 7, 1994 This morning, the President sent to Congress the Administration's budget for fiscal year 1995. I am here to describe to you the international affairs budget and to highlight the new thinking that underlies it. I am joined by Under Secretary Lynn Davis, who has been very helpful in shaping our approach, and by Craig Johnstone, who will shortly assume the important new position of Director of Resources, Plans, and Policy. Before Lynn and Craig take you through the details of the budget, I want to describe to you in broad terms what we have accomplished in the first international affairs budget in the post-Cold War era. Although the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, to this moment our international affairs budgets have failed to reflect the fact that the world has changed dramatically. Today, we break with that past. A result of our new thinking is that this budget is organized for the first time in terms of our overall national objectives--promoting American prosperity, supporting democracy, fostering sustainable development, building peace, providing humanitarian assistance, and advancing preventative diplomacy. As you know, we worked hard to ensure that we have adequate resources to pursue our strategic priorities. Although this is an austere budget, I am pleased with the result. Another product of our new thinking that underlies this budget effort is that domestic and foreign policy have truly become two sides of the same coin. In other words, this budget is not just about foreign aid. The mindset that walls off America's domestic and international interests must be wiped away. Our aim in this budget is to promote the security of Americans through peace abroad and prosperity at home. This budget reinforces what I have characterized as the top strategic priority for our foreign policy--improving the economic well-being of the American people. It encompasses the Administration's mission to open new markets for our exporters and investors and help American businesses compete and win in those markets. This budget also supports America's commitment to promote democracy around the world. Democracy is the best means to promote market reform and to guarantee human rights. This is especially important in Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, where support for reform remains the wisest and the least expensive investment that we can make in our own security. Our preventative diplomacy and our efforts to promote peace remain critical elements of our national security. This budget reaffirms our commitment to European security and maintains our investment in the Middle East at a time when there is growing hope for peace in that part of the world. Although the risk of superpower confrontation has receded, the danger to our security posed by the spread of dangerous weapons has increased. This budget funds a combination of programs aimed at preventing proliferation of such weapons. We also provide in the budget for international peace- keeping efforts. Peace-keeping multiplies--not displaces--the capabilities of the United States by allowing the sharing of burdens and responsibilities. Successful peace-keeping can help--and has helped-- diffuse and contain regional conflicts. Financial resources are important to obtaining our goals but they are only part of what we need to do the job. Our success depends as much on the skill of the people who staff our missions abroad. Our budget anticipates and supports the needs of these talented professionals in this post-Cold War diplomatic period. The budget also reflects a shift in our goals from the containment of communism to the promotion of market democracy and sustainable development. We will fund programs that foster economic growth and create export markets for American companies and workers around the world. Foreign assistance will also be directed toward global issues such as environmental degradation and population growth. With this budget, we signal that we intend to seize the opportunities of this new era. I ask you to compare the relatively small cost of supporting reform in Russia to the defense expenditures that would be required if Russia were to revert to dictatorship. In fact, in all the areas we addressed, the cost of doing too little will, in the long run, be much greater than what we now see. The international affairs budget represents good value for the American people and a wise investment in our future. (###) ARTICLE 5: The NATO Summit and the Future of European Security Stephen A. Oxman, Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs Statement before the Subcommittee on Coalition Defense and Reinforcing Forces of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, February 1, 1994 It is a pleasure to meet with you again as part of our continuing consultations with the Congress. The President's recent trip to Brussels, Prague, Kiev, Moscow, and Minsk achieved remarkable results for the United States, Europe, and the world. I want to focus today on the results of the NATO summit and their implications for the future of European security. NATO and the Future Of European Security From the outset, when President Clinton called for this summit, we conceived it as a key opportunity to accelerate NATO's transformation. NATO remains the central element of the transatlantic security structure. Its future must be to provide security to its members, while taking on the new task of helping to integrate the former communist states within the compass of Western security and values. Because Europe remains at the core of U.S. security interests, because the U.S. commitment to European security is enduring, and because NATO is central to that commitment, the Clinton Administration set this task for itself and our allies: to make sure that NATO is up to the security challenges of the new, post-Cold War Europe and that the basis for continued U.S. engagement and leadership in European security is solid. In preparing for the summit, we examined the challenges confronting the alliance, with the tragedy of the former Yugoslavia and the hard march to reform in the East constant reminders of the new and difficult era before us, and set out an agenda keyed to meeting these challenges. We determined that the summit, as its first priority, had to deepen NATO's engagement with the East and transform its former adversaries into lasting partners. NATO's unique strengths as a political instrument can help ensure that for all the countries of Europe war becomes as unthinkable as it has become among the NATO allies. We also decided that we needed to adapt NATO's military capabilities. In order to project stability throughout Europe, NATO must continue to improve its capability to carry out new missions and conduct what used to be called out-of-area operations. We also looked at the shifting political balance created by the rati-fication of the Maastricht Treaty and progress toward European integration, as well as the drawdown of U.S. forces stationed in Europe. We looked for ways in which NATO could take the important step of actively encouraging and supporting the development of a "separable but not separate" European defense capability- -anchored in NATO--which would respond to European political and military requirements, avoid senseless duplication, and strengthen the European contribution to our trans-atlantic partnership. And, finally, we decided that NATO should take up the issue of how it can best contribute to controlling the spread of weapons of mass destruction and dealing with proliferation once it has occurred--efforts which are vitally important to our security. The summit took action to advance each of these objectives. All the key decisions of the summit resulted from U.S. initiatives. They also reflect close cooperation with our allies. Our proposals were intended to help lay a foundation on which a future democratic and prosperous Europe can rest, while leaving NATO's effectiveness as a defensive alliance undiminished. Taken together, the summit decisions mark a significant and perhaps even historic change in NATO's role in Europe. They reflect our determination to find new cooperative structures to meet new security threats. At bottom, they are grounded in a broad concept of security that melds political, military, economic, and human rights considerations. Our policies seek to integrate all of Europe based on shared values of democracy, market economics, and military openness and cooperation--not to redivide it. NATO will play a key role in helping us achieve these objectives. The NATO Summit NATO Expansion and the Partnership for Peace. Let me talk about the summit's achievements and how they furthered our goals in a little more detail. First and foremost, the NATO allies made a historic choice by opening the door to an evolutionary process of expansion of NATO membership and initiating the Partnership for Peace. These steps are an investment in a future Europe undivided between allies and enemies. Over the next month, our focus will be on getting the Partnership up and running. The first partners are signing up, and we expect all the members of the former Warsaw Pact to subscribe along with other European states. NATO briefing teams are arriving in Eastern capitals as we speak to begin implementing the Partnership. SHAPE is ready to welcome partners to the day-to-day work of building their relationship with NATO. Our approach to the expansion of NATO and the Partnership for Peace is a fundamentally important decision for the future of Europe. It has the enthusiastic support of all of our allies and has now been widely welcomed in the East. But some in this country and abroad have objected that the Partnership is a halfway measure which does not go far enough to ensure the security of Central and Eastern Europe, and that it falls short because it does not offer the countries of Central and Eastern Europe early NATO membership. I disagree; the Partnership is the right policy at this time for European security--and our own. From the first, the Clinton Administration decided that the summit must transform NATO's relationship with the East. That, after all, is where today's greatest European security challenges lie. In answering the question "how?", we had to balance three requirements: -- Build a close and meaningful relationship between NATO and the post-communist states that will allow us to work together to address common problems; -- Avoid drawing new lines in Europe that would in themselves be destabilizing; and -- Preserve NATO's essential capabilities and mission undiminished. The Partnership strikes the right balance among these. Through the Partnership for Peace, we will build close political and military ties with the emerging democracies. These ties will be real and concrete. The political commitments that partners must make to civilian control of the military and transparency in defense budgeting and the joint planning and training that partners will do with each other and with NATO will advance the process of integrating Europe. And partners will have the right to consult with NATO if there is a direct and immediate threat to their security. The attraction of NATO, like the attraction of the EU, will be a powerful force for cooperation and integration. But our approach does not recreate the division of Europe. It opens the door equally to all who are willing to transform themselves politically and militarily. Why, as the President asked in Brussels, should we foreclose the best possible future for Europe--a democratic Russia committed to and working with NATO for the security of all its European neighbors, a democratic Ukraine comfortable with its neighbors both East and West, and democratic governments throughout post-communist Europe? We would like to see all of these countries moving forward, at different speeds and levels, but all committed to economic progress and prosperity, to shared security and democratic ideals. That is the future President Clinton wants to work for. And our desire to provide for this "best possible future" is at the heart of the partnership initiative. Our approach is hopeful but not starry-eyed. It is not a halfway measure nor was it adopted in deference to Russian objections. We proposed it and our allies endorsed it because we want to build toward the possibility of a future that leaves behind, finally, Europe's destructive past. But at the same time, it preserves the means to deal with a darker future should it occur. If necessary, it can provide the basis for NATO to strengthen its collective defense role against a new threat should one emerge in the East. Russia's integration into the European community depends upon its acceptance of international standards of conduct outside its borders. Its choices about its own future will affect the future of NATO and the Partnership for Peace. The Partnership, like Russia, can go either way. Immediate NATO membership may sound like an easy solution to the security problems of Eastern Europe. But as H.L. Mencken said, for every complex problem there is a solution which is neat, plausible--and wrong. NATO has opened the door to expansion. It has given partner nations the chance to develop military and political cooperation with NATO and with each other. Those who so wish can develop the capacity to assume the heavy responsibilities of full membership. The ultimate decision on NATO membership will be a political one made by us and our allies after close consultation with the Congress and one based on an assessment of the needs of transatlantic security and the prospective members' commitment to the principles of democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law, and the peaceful settlement of disputes, which are at the heart of the North Atlantic Treaty. European Security and Defense Identity. The summit made other important decisions as well. NATO's endorsement of our proposal to support separable but not separate European defense capabilities will enable our European partners to take on more responsibility for their own security. This will better balance the burden of responsibilities within the alliance, while putting to rest any doubt that the United States supports European integration or will remain engaged in European affairs. Our European allies have already shown their willingness to take on a greater security burden, including their efforts in the former Yugoslavia. NATO will now help them do so, by providing command and control and logistics support for European military operations. This will prevent costly duplication. Europe will be able to act, with the support of other allies and common NATO assets, in cases where NATO itself chooses not to engage. In the end, this will strengthen the alliance itself and vindicate our postwar efforts to help reconstruct a strong, united Europe. Combined Joint Task Forces. NATO itself needs new capabilities to support its new missions, and the summit decided further to adapt NATO's military structure by developing the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). This initiative will create tools for a much more flexible NATO--headquarters units which rapidly can assemble ad hoc military formations to conduct specific missions short of the defense of NATO territory itself. This will be used to support NATO out-of-area operations. It will enable NATO to work better with countries that are not part of its military structure. The CJTF will serve as an important vehicle for supporting European capabilities and contributing to UN and CSCE operations or those under the Partnership for Peace. It is the operational key to NATO's new military roles, and we are pushing work forward as a matter of priority. Non-Proliferation. Finally, the summit commissioned a full review of NATO's role in non-proliferation, making this key issue an important part of NATO's future work. We want NATO, without duplicating the work already underway in other forums, to reinforce ongoing prevention efforts and reduce and protect against the proliferation threat. We need to bring NATO's unique political and military capabilities to bear. Bosnia. As you know, the summit also addressed Bosnia. We told our allies that the U.S. remains committed to helping NATO implement a viable settlement freely agreed to by all the parties. We also made clear we would seek the support of Congress on this issue. The summit reaffirmed NATO's August warning on air strikes to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo and other areas. The President's emphasis on the seriousness of the warning and the need for NATO to be prepared to follow through give this reaffirmation added significance. We urged UNPROFOR to do the planning needed to ensure the rotation of UN troops in Srebrenica and to open up the Tuzla airport. That planning has been completed, and the UN is prepared to achieve those objectives through negotiation if possible--but with the use of UNPROFOR military assets if necessary. NATO close air support will play an important role in support of UN forces. In connection with these operations, the UN Secretary General has delegated to his Special Representative the authority to call in close air support. We will carry out this action if we are called upon to do so. The Bosnian conflict is the type of regional crisis that presents a danger to European stability. That is why we have worked--successfully so far--to prevent the conflict from spreading. The summit decisions, especially on the Partnership, were taken to try to move toward a Europe in which conflicts like this one do not happen again. It is much easier to prevent fighting than to stop it--and democracies working together in an integrated framework of political, economic, and military cooperation are much less likely to begin conflict. There are many near-term problems in European security, as we all know. They require innovative solutions, including the creative use of military power. Our actions at the summit will enable NATO to contribute to these solutions through its military and political capabilities. In the longer term, NATO has an important role to play in creating a Europe of integration and cooperation in which new democracies are committed to each others' security in the same way as NATO countries are today. We are putting NATO at the center of a growing array of practical security ties that cross old boundaries of enmity, helping to moderate the security concerns of both allies and partners. NATO will remain at the core of the defense of its members against any threat, and Europeans will take on a larger responsibility for aspects of their own security. The United States will continue to be engaged and to provide the leadership which will be essential for the future peace and stability that we are laying the groundwork for today. (###) ARTICLE 6: U.S. Expresses Outrage Over Marketplace Shelling Statement by President Clinton released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, February 5, 1994. I am outraged by this deliberate attack on the people of Sarajevo. There can be no possible military justification for an attack against a marketplace where women, men, and children of the city were pursuing their everyday lives. The United States should urgently investigate this incident and clearly identify those who are guilty. I have directed that Secretary Christopher engage our allies in Europe and the United Nations on the situation and on appropriate next steps. As he and Secretary of Defense Perry have stated, we rule nothing out. I have also directed the Department of Defense to offer its assistance in evacuating, hospitalizing, and treating those injured in this savage attack. I know I speak for all Americans in expressing our revulsion and anger at this cowardly act. (###) ARTICLE 7: Reaction to the Sarajevo Marketplace Shelling Statement by Secretary Christopher released by the Office of the Spokesman, Washington, DC February 7, 1994. The civilized world is outraged by the savage bombing of the Sarajevo marketplace on Saturday. The death toll from this shelling is not only the worst since this tragic conflict began, it is also a part of a pattern of shelling of civilian areas by Serb artillery that has continued despite NATO's repeated warnings. I have been in touch with several of my NATO counterparts over the weekend to discuss how the alliance and the international community should respond to Saturday's tragedy. UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali has requested that the North Atlantic Council take the necessary decisions to enable NATO military forces to be prepared to respond to a UN request for air strikes. Under Boutros-Ghali's proposal, air strikes would be directed against artillery and mortar positions in and around Sarajevo when UNPROFOR determines that they are responsible for attacks against civilian targets. The proposal made by Boutros-Ghali would expand on NATO's current policy of being ready to respond to UN requests for close air support to assist UNPROFOR if it is attacked in carrying out its humanitarian missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We welcome Boutros-Ghali's proposal and will support it when we and our allies take it up at the North Atlantic Council later this week. His request indicates that the United Nations and NATO are and will continue to be working closely together on this terrible problem. At NATO, we are also looking at other possible steps to respond to Saturday's attack, and we are also looking at the larger problem of the Serbs' unacceptable actions against the civilian population in Bosnia's capital. We expect that the North Atlantic Council will decide on a course of action--an overall strategy--within the next few days. While attention has been properly focused on Saturday's tragic events, we are continuing the search for ways to reinvigorate the diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving a political settlement of the conflict in Bosnia. We welcome the statement of the Bosnian Government leaders that, despite what happened Saturday, they remain committed to the negotiating process. We are looking for ways to bring additional support to these efforts to obtain a viable settlement. (###) ARTICLE 8: Chiapas: Implications For U.S.-Mexico Relations Alexander F. Watson, Assistant Secretary for Inter- American Affairs Statement before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, February 2, 1994 Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee: I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the implications of the recent events in the southern state of Chiapas for U.S.-Mexican relations. I would like to begin today by underscoring the fact that never before in history has the United States enjoyed better relations with its neighbor to the south and third-largest trading partner. The ratification of the NAFTA treaty symbolizes the new opportunities in our often complicated and strained partnership, one in which Mexico has often charted a course in domestic and foreign policy at variance with that of the United States. The end of the Cold War, dramatic transformations in Mexican economic policy, the beginnings of liberalization of the Mexican political system, and a growing awareness on the part of the United States of the importance of Mexico and Latin America to U.S. national interests have brought the United States and Mexico closer together in many ways. These promise to contribute to a growing and solid relationship based on mutual trust and commonality of interests. I would like to highlight, Mr. Chairman, that improved relations with Mexico parallel a fundamental change in the overall relations of the United States with Latin America. After a difficult decade of economic reversals, the region has implemented far-reaching political and economic reforms that have contributed to an economic upturn that has attracted investors worldwide. Mexico has led the way on many of these initiatives, and we are confident that the implementation of NAFTA will open up further opportunities for investment, while adding to our capacity to export to its growing domestic market. At the same time, the uprising in Chiapas illustrates the serious challenges Mexico and other countries in the region face in addressing the still unresolved issues of poverty and lack of opportunity for important sectors of society. The legitimate grievances of the people of southern Mexico were neither caused by NAFTA, nor should NAFTA be in any way compromised by these developments. Indeed, the events in Chiapas demonstrated more clearly than ever the need for NAFTA. With NAFTA, Mexico will continue on the path of free market reform, providing the private sector with strong incentives to energize the country's economy and attract foreign investment. With NAFTA, Mexico will be drawn more into the Western community of nations, one in which free market reforms are closely linked with the political legitimacy that stems from open, free, and democratic politics. The United States is confident that the Mexican Government has responded to the situation in Chiapas in a forthcoming and responsible way. We hope that developments since the Chiapas uprising will further enhance democratic reform, rather than jeopardize it. I will return to these points during the course of my testimony. Chiapas Uprising On the first of January, a group of armed insurgents of the self-proclaimed Zapatista Army of National Liberation, or EZLN by its Spanish acronym, launched attacks on four municipalities in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas: Ocosingo; Las Margaritas; Altamirano; and San Cristobal de las Casas--the second-largest city in the state and an important religious, commercial, and tourist center. Government offices were seized, records and property destroyed, prisons stormed, and prisoners released. An attack was also launched on the Mexican army camp of Rancho Nuevo, some 10 kilometers outside San Cristobal. Although the Mexican Government had known of guerrilla activity in the region for some time, the composition of the guerrilla group, the timing, and the scope of the attack took the Mexican army and governmental authorities by surprise. We, too, were aware of reports of groups, some armed, in Chiapas--though exact size, identity, and motives were not known. We were equally surprised by the ferocity of the January 1 attacks and the size of the EZLN forces. The geography of Chiapas favored the formation in secrecy of the EZLN. Separated from much of the rest of Mexico by mountains and forest, Chiapas shares a long border with Guatemala. For years, indigenous people from Guatemala have crossed into Chiapas to escape fighting between local insurgents and the Guatemalan Government. Currently, more than 40,000 Guatemalan refugees reside in temporary refugee camps in southern Mexico, many in Chiapas. Thousands more who fled to southern Mexico are residing in towns and cities in Chiapas and neighboring states. Guatemalan insurgents have been suspected of seeking sanctuary in the Chiapas interior and--together with international drug traffickers who transit the state or common bandits-- could have accounted for the earlier sightings reported in Chiapas. First reports out of Mexico suggested that, while many of the fighters were drawn from local Indian groups, the leadership may have come from Mexico City or from outside Mexico, particularly the guerrilla groups in neighboring Guatemala. It appears, however, that there were no organic ties with any foreign group or movement. The Mexican Government, which has been a prime facilitator of the peace process in Guatemala, concluded that there were no links between the EZLN and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity. The Mexican Government's initial hesitation to counter- attack the rebel offensive was followed by a firm response to the uprising. By January 5, the Mexican army had re-established control of the municipalities attacked on New Year's Day. Some human rights abuses may have occurred in connection with the retaking of these municipalities. The insurgents took several hostages, including a former governor of Chiapas, and retreated to remote hamlets and rural areas. Security forces pursued them with helicopter gunships and other aircraft, strafing and firing rockets at suspected rebel positions. It was during this period of stepped-up military action that other human rights abuses are reported to have occurred. Our embassy moved quickly in response to the events in Chiapas. Embassy personnel arrived in San Cristobal and the state capital, Tuxtla Gutierrez, on January 2, the day after the beginning of the uprising, to provide assistance to U.S. citizens in the area and assess the unfolding developments. Our embassy in Mexico City had conveyed to the highest levels of the Mexican Government our concern for the security situation in the region--and, in particular, for the potential for human rights abuses--prior to the initial press reports of possible human rights violations. During the course of many contacts, we noted the importance of attempting to establish a peaceful dialogue with the rebels. The Mexican Government also became concerned over the potential for human rights abuses in a policy aimed at controlling the rebellion by force. On January 6, President Salinas gave instructions to the government's authorities operating in Chiapas to respect the human rights of the civilian population and guarantee the work of the mass media. On January 10, he called for a peaceful solution to the crisis in Chiapas and on January 12 ordered an immediate and unilateral cease-fire by security forces. He further promised to grant amnesty to rebels who put down their arms. His call for dramatic changes was reinforced by changes in the composition of his cabinet. The Minister of the Interior--who is responsible for internal security forces, state-federal relations, and the conduct of elections and who served as governor of Chiapas until January 1993--was removed from office. He was replaced by Jorge Carpizo, the Attorney General and former head of Mexico's human rights commission. Carpizo is a man widely known for his scholarship, personal integrity, and commitment to human rights and democratic reforms. Foreign Minister Manuel Camacho Solis, a man who had won widespread praise for his adept stewardship of the mayoralty of Mexico City and his skills as a negotiator, was named to serve as Commissioner for Peace and Reconciliation. At the same time, the head of the autonomous and highly credible National Commission for Human Rights (known as CNDH by its Spanish acronym), Jorge Madrazo, was sent to investigate possible human rights abuses. Under the terms of the cease-fire, Mexican security forces were ordered not to seek out and engage EZLN insurgents but to employ force only if attacked or if civilians were threatened. Through these actions, President Salinas demonstrated a decisive commitment to due process and human rights and a conviction that the path to peace in Chiapas will come through reconciliation, not prolonged conflict. The Mexican Government is investigating all charges of human rights abuses through the Attorney General's office, the CNDH, and the military justice system. We have been assured by the Mexican Government that those found guilty of committing abuses will be punished. In his January 10 speech, President Salinas conceded that the federal government had failed to address many of the social grievances of the inhabitants of southern Mexico, despite increased expenditures on social welfare. He ordered the Secretary for Social Development to travel to Chiapas and begin consultation with local leaders on federal support for regional needs. Subsequently, President Salinas traveled to the region on January 25 to dialogue with representatives of indigenous groups who expressed their frustrations over the economic and social inequities of the region. Mr. Chairman, we were encouraged by President Salinas' decisive steps in moving away from a policy of military confrontation to one that sought to engage the rebels in dialogue, recognizing that, while some of the leaders of the uprising may have had specific political objectives, their appeal to rural campesinos and indigenous groups drew on legitimate grievances stemming from the serious socio-economic problems of Chiapas. A resolution of the broader problems in Chiapas will not be achieved overnight. Chiapas is a region of Mexico in which the reforms of the Mexican revolution were never fully implemented. It is an area of deep inequalities, where powerful landlords and local bosses have conspired to thwart the aspirations for justice and better standards of living for the rural populations. It suffers from tensions between the indigenous and non- indigenous population, between different Indian communities and between adherents to diverse religious beliefs. The human rights abuses in Chiapas and neighboring states, reported in our annual human rights reports, are symptomatic of numerous conflicts and unfulfilled expectations. Land-ownership patterns and rapid population increases--4.9% growth rates versus 2.2% for Mexico as a whole--in the region are causing severe demographic pressures and scarcity of arable land. Of the more than 195,000 farmers in Chiapas, 95% hold individual parcels of land of no greater than 5 hectares. Falling coffee prices have added to the economic squeeze in a region of the country that has not benefited from modern Mexico's extraordinary growth and development in the center of the country and near the border with the United States. We remain concerned that prior to the peace initiative, human rights abuses may have been committed on both sides, particularly by the security forces. The prompt involvement of Mr. Camacho, the Mexican human rights commission, and Catholic Church authorities in the region may have helped limit the problem. Some 140 non- governmental human rights organizations--Mexican and non- Mexican--have sent personnel to Chiapas to assess the situation. The CNDH, through January 27, had received 179 complaints from Chiapas residents, of which 107 inquiries have been carried out. Seventy-two complaints of possible human rights violations remain under investigation, as do 123--of a total of over 400--missing persons reports. The issue of access to prisons has been of concern to you, I know, Mr. Chairman. Let me summarize the action that the Mexican Government has taken. The CNDH has assisted three non-Mexican human rights organizations in gaining access to the Cerro Hueco Prison in Tuxtla Gutierrez to interview detainees. We are aware that not all of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were satisfied with the arrangements provided by the local representatives of CNDH for access to the prison. We are confident, however, that these difficulties resulted from administrative problems at the local level and not from a deliberate policy on the part of the authorities to bar international NGOs. The CNDH continues to pursue its investigations, and Mexican officials have made clear their determination to clarify the truth of what happened in Chiapas during the past month. As of today, fighting in the area has stopped. The government's actions contributed to shifting the conflict to the negotiating stage. Mr. Camacho has voiced concern that the EZLN may be pursuing a broad national agenda at the expense of local talks aimed at addressing the needs of Chiapas. However, prospects for direct talks and talks mediated through the good offices of Bishop Samuel Ruiz appear very encouraging. We expect that these will take place shortly. As a further step to reduce tensions, Mr. Camacho announced on February 1 the withdrawal of army troops from occupied towns and the designation of two villages as neutral zones, off-limits to EZLN rebels and army troops. Chiapas, Economic Reforms, And NAFTA While the problems of Chiapas date back centuries, recent changes in the economy of Mexico and the global economy have certainly contributed to social upheaval in southern Mexico. As the Mexican Government has instituted financial, economic, and trade reforms --steps which we have seen as crucial to long-term growth and stability-- there have been shocks to its economy, particularly to those sectors which were inefficient or protected from competition. In Chiapas, 58% of the population is dependent upon agriculture for their livelihood. Government efforts to modernize the agricultural sector through land reform and changes in support programs, coupled with worldwide declines in commodity prices for some of the state's main crops, have impacted significantly on this sizeable segment of the Chiapas economy. Chiapas has been targeted by the Salinas government to receive a large share of funds from government programs designed to provide a social safety net during the period of economic reform. The best known program is "Solidarity." One of the most significant aspects of the economic reforms of the Salinas administration has been the successful conclusion of the North American Free Trade Agreement. NAFTA entered into force on January 1 and has begun to permanently alter the trading patterns of North America. The opening of the Mexican economy will increase overall economic efficiency and growth, but that growth will benefit some regions more than others at the outset. It is up to the Mexican Government to best use its fiscal and social policies to redistribute the benefits of growth to include regions of slower growth. The Mexican Government understands this and is committed to increasing its social expenditures in Chiapas. The first phase of NAFTA implementation is fully underway. Reports indicate that it is proceeding with few difficulties. Ambassador Jim Jones reports that our embassy and consulates are being inundated with inquiries from U.S. businessmen and -women seeking information on doing business in Mexico. The inaugural meeting of the NAFTA Commission was held in Mexico City on January 14 and addressed a number of crucial implementation issues, including the creation of the NAFTA Secretariat. Representatives from the Department of State, Labor, and the Environmental Protection Agency continue to work with their Mexican and Canadian counterparts on organizing the commissions required in the labor and environment supplemental agreements and the border environmental cooperation agreement. We hope the first meetings of the labor and environment commissions will occur in the spring. In the EZLN's initial "declaration of war" on the Mexican Government, NAFTA was deemed the death knell for the Indians of Chiapas. I do not accept that judgment. Such a statement is little more than EZLN rhetoric that makes for catchy headlines. The EZLN itself claims to have been preparing for its "war" for some 10 years-- obviously, long before NAFTA was on the table. NAFTA is not the cause of the social and economic inequalities in Chiapas which spawned the uprising any more than NAFTA can be blamed for poverty or social tensions elsewhere in Mexico or the rest of North America. NAFTA only became operational on January 1 of this year. But make no mistake about the expectations of the Clinton Administration. NAFTA by itself is not viewed as the panacea to those problems. As the majority of economic studies project, NAFTA will increase trade and investment flows among the partners and stimulate the economies of all three. This will lead to job creation and allow for more balanced development throughout Mexico. To quote U.S. Trade Representative Kantor from remarks made at the January 14 inaugural session of the NAFTA Commission: The whole idea of the North American Free Trade Agreement is to raise standards of living, to increase incomes, to increase productivity, to make all of North America more competitive. That creates jobs. . . . The ability of all three countries to create jobs and to raise their standard of living obviously addresses grievances that many have in all three countries. As it comes into full implementation, NAFTA will bring some dislocations to segments of the economies of all three NAFTA partners. It has been suggested that corn producers in Mexico--corn is a primary crop in Chiapas-- will suffer disproportionately from NAFTA's opening of the Mexican market to cheaper and more efficiently produced U.S. corn. The importance of corn production to the Mexican economy was taken into consideration in NAFTA, as witnessed in the long phase-in period of the corn provisions--15 years, almost a generation. In addition, the Salinas administration announced last October a new income support program for subsistence farmers, including corn growers, known as PROCAMPO. PROCAMPO will provide direct income support to farmers who generally have not benefited from past Mexican price support programs. At the same time, it is designed to be phased out over the 15 years scheduled for NAFTA implementation. In 1994 alone, the Mexican Government will spend $3.5 billion on PROCAMPO nationwide. Chiapas and the uprising there do not make Mexico an unreliable trading partner. Poverty in Chiapas predates NAFTA. But increased trade, which NAFTA fosters, will bring rising prosperity in Mexico and, ultimately, in Chiapas. Expanded resources and expanded incomes will make for a better future for the people of Chiapas. Furthermore, the NAFTA process is more than a closer linking of our trading patterns. This process accelerates a comprehensive integration of our two countries in many areas. It helps energize local non- governmental organizations and forges links between them and like-minded NGOs in the international community. The process increases Mexican sensitivities toward democratic values and human rights. Under NAFTA, Mexico is now more than ever part of the global village. Democratization in Mexico Mr. Chairman, I would now like to turn to the other topic of today's hearing: democratization in Mexico. As you know, Mexico has long been dominated by the PRI-- Institutional Revolutionary Party--the political organization which emerged after the Mexican revolution. Over the years, the PRI has provided Mexico with considerable stability and presided over a remarkable transformation of the country. It is also acknowledged by most observers that the prominence of the PRI has historically discouraged the development of an open and competitive democratic process. Just as we are witnessing a remarkable transformation in Mexico, from a statist and protectionist economy toward an open economy that encourages free markets, we are also witnessing dramatic transformations in the Mexican political system. Under the leadership of President Salinas, Mexico has taken bold steps toward guaranteeing the protection of fundamental human rights and permitting an open and fair democratic process. For the first time in history, opposition parties have gained governorships in several states and significantly improved their representation in the legislature. Electoral reforms in 1990 and 1993, including the Federal Electoral Processes and Institutions Code, introduced reforms in voter registration, placed limits on campaign spending, and created an electoral court to adjudicate electoral disputes. These reforms, however, failed to fully satisfy opposition parties concerned about the impartiality of the electoral authorities. During the recent elections in the state of Yucatan, opposition parties complained of extensive fraud. It is for that reason, Mr. Chairman, that we welcomed the announcement on January 27 that all of the candidates for the presidency in Mexico had reached an agreement entitled "Peace, Democracy, and Justice." I cannot sufficiently underscore the historic dimensions of this agreement to which the leading opposition parties--the PRD and the PAN--as well as the PRI are signatories. It recognized that a necessary and unavoidable condition to a just and lasting peace is the advancement of democracy through free elections. In the agreement, the parties pledged to work for: -- The impartiality of electoral authorities; -- Permanent access to voter lists and registration data; -- Equality in access to and coverage by the media; -- Prevention of the use of public funds and programs to favor particular parties or candidates; -- Revision of the rules for party financing; -- Review of the points in the penal code which could restrict political rights; -- Consideration of a special federal prosecutor for election-related crimes; and -- A consensus to work together for democracy and convocation, if warranted, of a special session of the congress to consider further reforms. The United States believes that this accord, properly implemented, will strengthen democratic practices precisely at a time when Mexico is moving to establish closer ties with the United States and other democratic nations of the hemisphere. It is a tribute to the strength of the Mexican political process that these watershed agreements have emerged less than a month after the incidents in Chiapas. Chiapas, rather than representing a reversal in the process of economic and political transformation in Mexico, has proven to be a further energizing factor contributing to a deepening of the reform process. We hope and expect that this process will continue. The United States has been supportive of democratic opening in Mexico. We have discussed frequently with Mexican officials our willingness to cooperate in ways which are in full conformity with Mexican law. The State Department has also met with non-governmental organizations to discuss how they might be able to assist Mexican NGOs in ensuring the full implementation of electoral laws. Conclusion In closing, I would like to reiterate that we view with great optimism the development of closer ties with Mexico and applaud the process of economic reform and political opening that is taking place in that country. The United States looks forward to deepening ties with Mexico and working fully with whomever the Mexican people elect as their leaders in the upcoming presidential race. We are confident that the implementation of NAFTA will continue to improve relations between our countries in the years ahead. In the aftermath of Chiapas, we are also mindful of the fact that Mexico, as well as other countries in the hemisphere, need to pay more attention to the plight of those sectors of the population which have been left behind by the swift changes of modern life. Just as President Clinton has emphasized the need to address many of the basic and fundamental social problems that we continue to face in the United States, we welcome the renewed commitment of Mexico toward addressing the problems of poverty and inequality. A policy of peace, reconciliation, and democratic reform with respect for human rights will help strengthen the ties of our people on both sides of the border. Our own principles call for nothing less in the conduct of one of our most important bilateral relationships. (###) ARTICLE 9: Treaty Actions Multilateral Aviation Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered into force Apr. 4, 1947. TIAS 1591; 61 Stat. 1180. Accession deposited: Georgia, Jan. 21, 1994. Consular Relations Convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820; 21 UST 77. Accession deposited: Kazakhstan, Jan. 5, 1994. Copyrights Berne convention for the protection of literary and artistic works of Sept. 9, 1886, revised at Paris July 24, 1971, and amended in 1979. Entered into force for the U.S. Mar. 1, 1989. Accessions deposited: Albania, Dec. 2, 1993; El Salvador, Nov. 18, 1993. Succession deposited: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dec. 23, 1993. Diplomatic Relations Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961. Entered into force Apr. 24, 1964; for the U.S. Dec. 13, 1972. TIAS 7502; 23 UST 3227. Accession deposited: Kazakhstan, Jan. 5, 1994. Labor Instrument for the amendment of the constitution of the International Labor Organization. Done at Montreal Oct. 9, 1946. Entered into force Apr. 20, 1948; reentered into force for the U.S. Feb 18, 1980. TIAS 1868; 62 Stat. 3485. Acceptance deposited: Tajikistan, Nov. 26, 1993. Patents Patent cooperation treaty with regulations. Done at Washington June 19, 1970. Entered into force Jan. 24, 1978. TIAS 8733; 28 UST 7645. Accessions deposited: Slovenia, Dec. 1, 1993; Trinidad and Tobago, Dec. 10, 1993. Budapest treaty on the international recognition of the deposit of microorganisms for the purposes of patent procedure, with regulations. Done at Budapest Apr. 28, 1977, and amended on Sept. 26, 1980. Entered into force Aug. 19, 1990. TIAS 9768; 32 UST 1241. Accessions deposited: Cuba, Nov. 19, 1993; Yugoslavia, Nov. 25, 1993. Property Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1970. TIAS 6932; 21 UST 1749. Accession deposited: Bhutan, Dec. 16, 1993. Succession deposited: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dec. 23, 1993. Bilateral Barbados Protocol amending the convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, with exchange of notes and understandings. Signed at Washington, Dec. 18, 1991. Entered into force: Dec. 29, 1993. Canada Agreement concerning the privileges and immunities of members of the administrative and technical staffs of the Embassy of Canada in the United States and the Embassy of the United States in Canada. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa Aug. 26 and Sept. 2, 1993. Entered into force Sept. 21, 1993. Czech Republic Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital. Signed at Prague Sept. 16, 1993. Entered into force: Dec. 23, 1993. Djibouti Memorandum of understanding concerning scientific and technical cooperation in the earth sciences, with annexes. Signed at Reston and Djibouti Apr. 29 and Dec. 9, 1993. Entered into force Dec. 9, 1993. Kyrgyz Republic Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official government employees. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Dec. 6 and 22, 1993. Entered into force Dec. 22, 1993. Agreement to establish a joint commission for agribusiness and rural development, with annexes. Signed at Bishkek Dec. 13, 1993. Entered into force Dec. 13, 1993. Mexico Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, with protocol. Signed at Washington Sept. 18, 1992. Entered into force: Dec. 28, 1993. Netherlands Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, with understanding and exchange of notes. Signed at Washington Dec. 18, 1992. Entered into force: Dec. 31, 1993. Protocol amending the convention of Dec. 18, 1992, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, with exchange of notes. Signed at Washington Oct. 13, 1993. Entered into force: Dec. 30, 1993. Panama Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official government employees. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Nov. 26, 1993. Entered into force Nov. 26, 1993. Russian Federation Agreement on science and technology cooperation, with annexes. Signed at Moscow Dec. 16, 1993. Entered into force Dec. 16, 1993. Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the fields of mining research and minerals information, with annex. Signed at Moscow Dec. 16, 1993. Entered into force Dec. 16, 1993. Grant agreement for an energy efficiency and environment commodity import program. Signed at Moscow Dec. 16, 1993. Entered into force Dec. 16, 1993. Slovak Republic Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital. Signed at Bratislava Oct. 8, 1993. Entered into force: Dec. 30, 1993. Tunisia Consular convention. Signed at Tunis May 12, 1988. Entered into force: Jan. 15, 1994. Turkmenistan Agreement regarding cooperation to facilitate the provision of assistance. Signed at Ashgabat Nov. 30, 1993. Entered into force Nov. 30, 1993. (###) END OF DISPATCH VOL 5, NO 7.
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