US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 5, NUMBER 5, JANUARY 31, 1994
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
 
 
 
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1.  Intensifying U.S. Support for Russian Reform --
Strobe Talbott
2.  Negotiating a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty -- John
D. Holum
3.  Message From the President to the Conference on
Disarmament
4.  Haiti:  National Reconciliation and Working Toward
Building a Durable Democracy -- Lawrence Pezzullo
5.  Argentina and Chile Bring the Latin American Nuclear-
Weapons-Free Zone Into Force
6.  Focus on Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation:  Summary
of November 1993 Meetings
 
ARTICLE 1
 
Intensifying U.S. Support For Russian Reform
Ambassador Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary-designate
Statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
Washington, DC, January 25, 1994
 
Secretary Christopher has charged me with advising him on
our policy toward all 12 of the new independent states
that have emerged from the former Soviet Union.  But with
your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like today to
concentrate on one of them:  the Russian Federation.
That is because recent events have raised acute questions
about what is happening there, what will happen next, and
what we should be doing in response.
 
Also, as by far the largest and most powerful of the NIS,
Russia has a high degree of influence on its neighbors--
for better or for worse.  On his recent trip to the area,
President Clinton met with the leaders of Ukraine and
Belarus.  They reiterated what we have heard many times
from them and from virtually everyone else in the region:
The fate of reform in Russia will be a major factor in
determining the fate of reform in neighboring states.
 
The last several months have been, in several respects, a
time of troubles for Russian reform.  I last testified
before your committee on October 6. The Russian White
House, seat of the old, Soviet-era Parliament, was a
charred ruin.  President Yeltsin had just appeared on
television to denounce the armed mobs who had attacked
government buildings but also to lament that all Russians
had been seared by the hot breath of fratricide.
 
In the nearly four months that have passed since then,
Russian political life has continued to be tumultuous,
although, fortunately, without violence. Opposition to
reform has taken on a different manifestation.  A
substantial number of ultranationalist and communist
deputies won seats in the December 12 elections to the
new Parliament.
 
The mood of the Russian people, as reflected in those
election results, is heavy with resentment of present
realities, with fear of the future, and, accordingly,
with some nostalgia for the past.  That is an unhealthy
combination of humors to be coursing through the body
politic of any nation. It is, therefore, no surprise that
many reformers in Russia are worried and demoralized.
Last week, two prominent reformers, Yegor Gaidar and
Boris Fyodorov, left the government, calling into
question whether the ministers who remain will be
willing, or able, to carry out President Yeltsin's vow to
President Clinton that he will stay the course with
economic reform. Nor is it a surprise that many in the
West are concerned that what has sometimes been called
the second Russian revolution may have failed, that
counter-revolution has already set in, that Russian
reform is a lost cause.
 
That is not our view.  President Clinton and Secretary
Christopher drew another lesson from the events   of the
past two months.  That lesson is fortified by their own
recent visits to Russia.  In the Administration's view,
the Russian election, its aftermath that is now unfolding
in the Parliament and in shake-ups within the executive
branch, the tensions we felt in Moscow two weeks ago--all
that underscores what have been the four central premises
of our policy from the beginning of this Administration.
 
--  First, there is a titanic struggle underway in Russia
over the future of that country.
--  Second, we, the United States, have a huge stake in
the outcome of that struggle.
--  Third, we can have some effect on what that outcome
will be.
--  Fourth, this is a long-term process, and it will
require patience and steadiness on our part.
 
Mr. Chairman, as we have discussed in my previous
appearances before you, when we discuss the struggle over
Russia's future, we are talking about not just years but
decades--even a generation or more.  It was largely for
that reason that two weeks ago President Clinton chose an
audience of 700 Russian students to lay out his hopes for
Russia's future, which will so greatly affect our own.
 
As President Clinton stressed in his Moscow speech,
Americans want Russia to succeed in its transformation,
not just for its sake or for Europe's sake, but for our
own.  A stable, democratic, market-oriented Russia, a
Russia secure in its own borders and respectful of the
borders of others, a Russia integrated rather than
contained, will mean fewer U.S. tax dollars spent on
defense; a reduced threat from weapons of mass
destruction; new markets for U.S. products; and a
powerful, reliable partner for diplomacy as well as
commerce in the 21st century.
 
Let me add a word about the nearer term:  The next two
and a half years--between now and the elections scheduled
for mid-1996--will be a critical period.  The United
States cannot be a spectator.  We must remain engaged,
just as we were engaged this past year. When I say "we,"
I mean both branches of our government--the
Administration and the Congress.  We worked together to
assemble the series of initiatives last year; we put our
taxpayers' money where our nation's interests and
principles were; we set the tone and provided the key
ideas for the response from the international community
as a whole.  American engagement and American leadership
made a difference, and it will continue to make a
difference as those programs establish themselves on the
ground during the months and years ahead.
 
Let me now review how we see the state of and the
prospects for Russian reform in its three principal
dimensions:  politics, economics, and foreign policy.
 
Building a Democratic Process
The coverage and commentary on Russian politics has
tended of late to concentrate on the bad news.  That is
understandable.  The rise of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's
ultranationalist party is a disturbing development, both
because of the extreme views its leaders espouse and
because it has given the communists and their allies a
chance to position themselves as moderate, reasonable
centrists.
 
Nonetheless, the reformers and the independents who may
side with the reformers on key issues are in a rough
balance with the opponents of reform in the lower house.
They hold a somewhat stronger position in the upper
house.  That correlation of forces--combined with the
strong presidential powers conferred on Boris Yeltsin by
the new constitution--means that, overall, the forces of
reform, post-December 12, are down but not out.
 
Perhaps the most important point to stress here, Mr.
Chairman, is not so much the relative strength of the
different blocs and personalities at the moment, but the
process and the institution that are now in place:  It is
a democratic process and a democratic institution.
 
Real politics has come to Russia for the first time in
nearly a century--and, in many ways, for the first time
ever.  That, I would suggest, is a development to be
welcomed, encouraged, and supported.  This body--the U.S.
Congress--can be crucial to that support, since it now
has a real Russian counterpart with which to interact.
 
A program of cooperation has already been launched with
the new Parliament, which will include exchanges of
members and staff as well as linkages with various organs
of the U.S. Congress, such as the Congressional Research
Service (CRS).  Indeed, next month the Congress will host
a small group of Russian parliamentary staffers and the
first delegation from the new Duma with 20 members.  A
second group of  20 Russian parliamentarians will arrive
in March.  These groups will meet with their
congressional counterparts as well as with Administration
officials.  In addition, the Agency for International
Development will work with CRS to assist in establishing
an information and policy analysis network for the
Russian Parliament.  Five million dollars has been set
aside for assistance to the new Parliament.  We hope that
this Congress will be active in bringing these linkages
to life.
 
The continuing development of democratic mechanisms and
habits of civic activity will help determine whether the
reformers will be able to win back more public backing
than they could muster on December 12.
 
With funding from our assistance program, U.S. non-
governmental organizations are working to foster the
development of democratic institutions in Russia and the
other new independent states in a variety of areas:
local governance, rule of law, political processes, and
independent media.
 
In conjunction with our rule of law program, the American
Bar Association is helping the Russian Government in the
re-introduction of the trial-by- jury system in nine
target regions.  This initiative will advance the
protection of human rights and the development of an
effective and fair criminal justice system.
 
In the run-up to the December 12 elections in Russia,
several American NGOs and private voluntary organizations
offered assistance and advice to Russian organizations to
support free and fair elections.  The National Democratic
Institute and the International Republican Institute also
worked extensively with political parties to help them
develop into viable party structures.  Both also helped
to train poll watchers and to coordinate the
international monitoring of the elections that the
Russian Government had requested.  A conscious effort was
made to ensure that all parties had equal access to these
services.
 
The Russian Economy
But the principal factor affecting the outcome in 1996
will be the Russian economy.  There, too, the picture is
mixed.  We have cause both for concern and for an
intensification of our engagement.
 
We, like many of you, regret the departure of key reform
leaders from the government and the effect that the new
composition of the Parliament will have on the future of
economic reform in Russia.  We are urging the Russian
Government, at the highest level, not to slow the pace of
reform.
 
When President Clinton was in Moscow two weeks ago, the
principal subject on his agenda with President Yeltsin
was the Russian economy.  In their discussions, President
Yeltsin stressed the good news.
 
Over one-fourth of the labor force  is now employed in
the private sector. More than three-quarters of Russia's
small businesses and retail shops are now privately
owned.  Over 7,000 medium and large enterprises are in
private hands.  Roughly 55 million Russians own a stake
in a private venture.  Prices have been freed on more
than 90% of goods and services.  The old centralized
distribution system has been virtually eliminated.  The
contraction in Russia's economy is slowing.  Exports are
up, and the inflation rate in December was the lowest
since September 1992, although indications are that
inflation is up in January.
 
Of course, there is still a long way to go.  Privatizing
firms is only a first step in developing profitable, job-
creating enterprises.  Production is still falling, and
the inflation figures are favorable only in the most
relative sense.  At 12% a month, prices are still
doubling every six months.
 
The Russian leadership understands that it needs to do a
better job of meeting the needs and allaying the
anxieties of the citizenry.  President Clinton got a
first-hand sense of those needs and anxieties too,
especially when he went for a walk around the city,
bought several loaves of bread in a store, and talked
with people on the streets.
 
The key to Russia's transition, however, is not simply
meeting the population's basic requirements but reforming
the economic systems that serve Russian citizens every
day. Similarly, the role for Western donor nations is not
to provide Russia with the commodities or funds it lacks
but, rather, to share Western expertise and skills so
that Russians can better provide for these needs
themselves and help open up economic opportunities in a
new market-oriented environment.
 
There are two dimensions to our program:  bilateral and
multilateral.  On the first score, we feel--and President
Yeltsin agrees--that we made a good start in 1993, in
terms of both strategy and delivery.  Our approach has
been to reinforce those trends in Russian political and
economic life that together, we believe, constitute the
essence of the great transformation underway in that
country.  They are democratization and privatization.
They are, in fact, interlocking; they are mutually
reinforcing.  The more people work in private enterprise,
the more they are likely to participate in the democratic
process--and the more they are likely to vote for
candidates who will support economic as well as political
freedom.
 
In our bilateral assistance program, we are concentrating
our activities on the more rapidly reforming regions of
Russia.  This strategic approach to assisting Russia's
regions should let us help reformers at the local level
demonstrate that they can prosper and provide adequate
social benefits for those people hit hard by economic
dislocation.  In this way, we believe these regions can
serve as examples to others and magnify the impact of our
program.
 
Support for democratization and privatization figured
prominently in the Administration's Vancouver and Tokyo
packages of bilateral assistance. The Vancouver package
was committed and is now being implemented with record
speed and, we believe, with a high degree of efficiency
and effectiveness.
 
We have worked hard to put in place our core technical
assistance programs, and we are moving quickly to expand
and build upon these programs with the $2.5 billion
appropriated by Congress for FY 1994.  Enterprise funds
are being set up for Russia, Central Asia, and the
western NIS; and programs to enhance cooperation in
health, environment, and energy--including upgrading
nuclear reactor safety--are underway.  As many of these
programs are multi-year endeavors, these resources will
be disbursed over the next few years.  Indeed, technical
assistance, by its very nature, must be provided over an
extended period to be effective.  In the long run, these
programs will provide the fundamental building blocks for
long-term American engagement in this new market through
expanded U.S.-Russian trade and investment.
 
Now, as we turn our attention to FY 1995, we are shifting
to the next phase of our program, which is support for
trade and investment.  We hope that capital flows from
our private sector can play a larger role in supporting
economic renewal in Russia.  This is a role that
President Yeltsin and the reformers understand and
encourage.
 
Vice President Gore has worked closely with Prime
Minister Chernomyrdin to begin laying the groundwork for
expanded trade and investment.  In the last five months,
the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission has moved quickly to
break through bottlenecks and bureaucratic inertia. The
commission helped put into place the Export-Import Bank
oil and gas financing program, worth up to $2 billion,
and a new project incentive agreement that will broaden
financing into other sectors.  The commission has
facilitated over $135 million in OPIC-financed
investments and has overseen the ratification of the
double taxation treaty, which will provide important
protection to U.S. investors.  These efforts will create
jobs and spur growth in both the U.S. and Russia.
 
As Secretary Christopher, Secretary Bentsen, and others
from the Administration have said repeatedly over the
past year--in congressional testimony, in public
statements, and in our dialogue with the Russians
themselves--the big money, the long-term support for
Russian reform, will come not from bilateral foreign aid
programs, but from the international business community
in the form of trade and investment, and from the
international financial institutions in the form of loans
to help Russia make the transition from a command to a
market economy.
 
In Moscow two weeks ago, Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton
reached an understanding:  Mr. Yeltsin vowed that he
would keep reform going full speed ahead, and Mr. Clinton
promised that, in response, the U.S. would use its
leadership position in the G-7 and the international
financial institutions to intensify multilateral support
for Russian reform.
 
President Yeltsin needs to have the confidence that if he
continues to press forward on a strong stabilization
program that limits government spending, controls the
growth in the money supply, and curbs inflation, Western
support will be swift and substantial.  To this end, we
are working with our G-7 counterparts to reaffirm and
reinforce our earlier commitment.  While the level of our
support still needs to be geared to the pace of reform,
the intensity of collaboration and the timeliness of that
measured support could be improved.
 
With respect to social support, the challenge is not so
much one of reconstructing the old social safety net as
it is building a new one that supports the emergence of a
market economy.  The distinction is important.  In the
Soviet Union, employment was virtually guaranteed.  With
that employment, the state provided and financed all the
necessary social services.  However, the Soviet economy
was bankrupt with the weight of defense and social
spending that was not matched by economic growth in other
areas.  As Russia restructures its economy to foster new
industrial growth, it needs to restructure the system of
social support to provide a comprehensive mechanism of
unemployment services, like temporary benefits and job
retraining.  It also needs to separate activities like
health care, housing, and education from individual
enterprises.
 
Most of the funding for these efforts can come from
redirecting the government's budget away from general
subsidies for large state enterprises to programs
targeted more narrowly at providing these services to the
truly needy.  However, there is a role for the G-7 and
international financial institutions in helping to bring
about this structural shift.  Western countries can
provide a great deal of technical assistance in designing
social programs to complement the market economy.  The
World Bank could help in both providing expert advice and
some transitional financing as the Russian Federation
shifts responsibility for social programs from
enterprises to local government.
 
Our Administration recognized the value of this type of
assistance nearly a year ago--well before the now-famous
"wake-up call" of December 12--when we proposed the
Special Privatization and Restructuring Program.  That
facility, which was adopted by the G-7 in Tokyo last
July, included $500 million in World Bank financing for
the restructuring of social programs in communities where
the authorities were breaking up and privatizing huge
state enterprises.  We plan to work with our G-7
colleagues to broaden and intensify efforts to move
forward in this area.
 
In short, one of the adjustments we have made since
December 12 is to give a greater emphasis to
international programs that will help the government in
Moscow and in many regions of the Russian Federation put
in place a viable network of necessary social services.
In that way, when the voters return to the polls in 1996,
they will be more likely to give reform the kind of
decisive mandate it failed to win on December 12.
 
But the Russian leadership--in both the executive and the
legislative branches--must understand the cause and
effect relationship between internal reform and outside
support:  Our support will follow their reform; it cannot
be the other way around.
 
To open the flow of funds from the international
financial institutions and from the Western private
sector, Russia needs to continue to take aggressive steps
to stabilize its economy.  Let me be more specific:  A
healthy market economy--one that is hospitable to large-
scale outside investment and that merits support from the
international financial institutions--requires a stable
currency, which, in turn, requires fiscal and monetary
responsibility.
 
The trouble, of course, is that keeping the money supply
under control often complicates another objective, which
is keeping employment rates high.  We have had some
experience with that dilemma in our own system.  It is
particularly stark in a transitional economy, especially
one that is simultaneously making the transition from a
communist system, where full employment was supposed to
be guaranteed to a democracy in which those who fear
losing their jobs can register their anxiety at the
polls. That strain, in essence, is what we have seen in
Russia these past several months.
 
Privatization involves closing down inefficient state
enterprises, while the shift to market economics--at
least initially--brings higher prices.  The result is
social pain, disruption, and fear of the future.  If they
reach critical mass, those ingredients can explode into a
political backlash against reform.
 
We recognize that reality, and we know that the Russian
leadership is focused on precisely that danger right now
as a result of December 12.  But fiscal and monetary
responsibility are not just abstract economic virtues;
they, too, constitute a political imperative.  They are
necessary to combat inflation, which poses a huge
political danger in its own right.  Inflation, especially
if it qualifies for the prefix "hyper," destroys savings,
investments, pensions, and currency.  In Russia,
inflation has already eliminated people's life savings;
impoverished people on fixed incomes; and eroded the
wages, morale, and effectiveness of teachers, doctors,
police, and scientists.  While privatization has
generated wealth, inflation has driven much of that
wealth out of the country--to the safety of Western
banks.  In short, inflation, if it gets out of control,
threatens to destroy the economic life of individuals and
states alike.  Therefore, it can topple governments,
sometimes with the ugliest and most dangerous of results.
 
Moreover, as Russia maps its economic course for the
coming year, its leaders must also realize that slowing
the pace of reform will not ease the social pain of
economic transition. In fact, quite the contrary:
Slowing down is likely to prolong and worsen the pain and
increase the threat of even more alarming political
developments. Gradual reform is a prescription for
hyperinflation and economic collapse.
 
So if there is a bottom line in the statistics now
swirling in the air about the Russian economy, it is the
inflation figure.  Since last April's referendum, Russia
has skirted the abyss of hyperinflation and, to the
credit of its leadership, backed away.  For its own sake
and for the world's, it must keep moving in that
direction.  Its government and its people must recognize
that controlling inflation is the priority objective in
protecting the basic welfare of the citizenry and laying
the ground for a prosperous future.
 
The challenge now facing the Yeltsin Government and its
allies in the new Parliament is to keep economic reform
going--which means, first and foremost, to control budget
deficits and inflation--while doing more to cushion the
adverse impact of reform on vulnerable groups.  President
Yeltsin and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin understand the
importance of controlling inflation; even after last
week's changes in the government, meeting this challenge
will remain a key priority.  The challenge now facing us
is to do everything we can to help.
 
At the same time, Mr. Chairman, we will be working to
support the cause of economic reform in other NIS as
well.  A delegation of senior Ukrainian officials is here
this week to discuss an expansion of our economic
cooperation with Ukraine.  We believe that it is
important for Ukraine to attack the hyperinflation that
is ravaging its economy, and to carry out the other
necessary market reforms that can bring prosperity to the
Ukrainian people.  As in the case with Russia, assistance
must follow reform if it is to be used effectively.
 
Our Ukrainian guests are also scheduled to meet with
Members of Congress.  I hope that you will share with
them our interest in building a strong U.S.-Ukrainian
relationship and supporting the necessary economic
transformation.  When President Kravchuk visits
Washington in the second week of March, we will have
another opportunity to explore ways that we can best
support Ukrainian reform.
 
I wish also to draw your attention to the very important
step that Kazakhstan is taking in negotiating a standby
arrangement with the International Monetary Fund.  We are
confident that the IMF board will, indeed, approve the
standby.  President Nazarbayev will be here in February.
His continued commitment to economic reform is
praiseworthy.
 
Russia and Its Neighbors
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and the other states around Russia's
borders need not only internal reform and external help,
they also need a Russian foreign policy that respects
their independence.  It is a bedrock principle of this
Administration's policy that we support the evolution of
a Russian state that is free, secure, democratic, and
prosperous--and one that allows other states to achieve
the same goals.  As President Clinton put it in Moscow
two weeks ago, Russia must demonstrate, particularly to
its former colonies that are now fellow new independent
states, that a big neighbor can be a good neighbor.
 
This redefinition of Russian statehood is, we believe,
very much in Russia's interests as well as our own.
Russia wants--and, if it remains on a reformist course,
deserves--to be integrated into the community of free,
democratic states.  That desire, while not universal in
Russia, is nonetheless widely held.  It is well
represented, we believe, not only in the executive, but
in the legislative branches of the government as well as
among regional and municipal authorities around the
country, in the burgeoning private sector, and at the
grass roots.
 
It is overwhelmingly in Russia's own interest, as well as
ours, that the forces advocating and aspiring to
integration prevail over other forces that are also much
in evidence--those of extremist nationalism, xenophobia,
and neo-imperialism.
 
In his speech in Moscow, President Clinton made this
point very clear.
 
. . . if we are to realize the greatness of Russia in the
21st century . . . your nation must be strong
democratically and economically.  And in this
increasingly interconnected world, you must be able to
get along together and to get along with and trade with
your neighbors close at hand and all around the globe.
 
Russia's integration into the international community
involves--indeed, depends upon--Russia's acceptance of
international standards of conduct outside its own
borders.  This is not a concession we are asking from
Russia; rather, it is an aspiration for Russia that we
share with Russia's reformers.
 
The recent record of Russian foreign policy is, like so
much else that we are discussing today, mixed. Russian
conduct in several of the neighboring states,
particularly in the Transcaucasus, has been troublesome,
and it has occasioned some blunt exchanges in our
diplomatic dialogue with Moscow.
 
Still, there have recently been some encouraging
developments.  The most dramatic is the trilateral
agreement among Presidents Clinton, Yeltsin, and Kravchuk
that will, we all hope, unblock the process of
denuclearizing Ukraine and lead to the transfer of all
nuclear weapons to Russia for dismantling.
 
This development is vastly important--for the cause of
global non- proliferation, for the cause of political
security and stability in Europe, for U.S. security, for
the national interests of Ukraine, and for those of
Russia as well.  The trilateral accord is a testament to
President Kravchuk's statesmanship and political courage,
but it is also a credit to President Yeltsin.  In signing
the agreement a week ago Friday in Moscow, he was
committing his government to providing Kiev fair
compensation for the value of the highly enriched uranium
in the weapons and to a series of important assurances
with regard to the security of Ukraine.  By extension,
those undertakings should be reassuring to other states
in the region as well.
 
If, as we hope he will, President Yeltsin comes to terms
soon with Latvia and Estonia on a timetable for the
withdrawal of Russian forces from those two states, that,
too, will not only be welcome in its own right, it will
also send a calming signal to other states that are
understandably wary of Russian intentions, given their
historical experience and in light of bellicose
statements from various Russian politicians.
 
Let me say a word in this connection about the
Partnership for Peace, which is the centerpiece of the
initiative that President Clinton has put forward for
building a new, post-Cold War security structure in
Europe.
 
The Russian Government has vowed to participate actively
in the Partnership for Peace.  In making that commitment
to President Clinton, President Yeltsin was reaffirming,
in yet another context, that his government will honor
the inviolability of interstate borders, since that
principle is explicit in the terms of membership for the
Partnership.
 
We feel that the President's initiative is well suited
both to the opportunities of the present moment and to
the uncertainty of the future. We do not have a crystal
ball, but we do have, in the Partnership for Peace, the
next best thing--a flexible mechanism for responding to
events in Europe as they unfold.  This was a point the
President made at every stop on his recent trip to
Europe.
 
When speaking to our allies in Brussels; the Central
European leaders in Prague; and those of the former
Soviet Union in Kiev, Moscow, and Minsk, President
Clinton and Secretary Christopher made clear that we and
NATO will continue to be prepared for any contingency,
but we are not going to assume the worst.  We are not
going to base policy today on worst-case assumptions
about what tomorrow may bring; we are not going to fall
into the trap of the self-fulfilling prophecy.
 
The message to the Russians is this:  Russia itself will
have a profound influence on what kind of security
structures evolve in Europe--and, indeed, across Eurasia.
If Russia hews to a course of internal reform, respect
for its neighbors' independence, and cooperation with the
West, NATO will continue to evolve in the direction of
maximum inclusiveness.
 
If, however, reform in Russia falters, NATO will be there
to provide for the allies' collective defense, as well as
to work through the Partnership to promote regional
stability with those who remain active participants in
developing the closer ties with NATO that the Partnership
is designed to foster.
 
In short, Russia's choice about its own future will
affect the future of NATO and the Partnership for Peace.
The Partnership, like Russia itself, can go either way.
If necessary, it can provide the basis for us and our
NATO allies to expand the bulwark of collective defense
against a new threat, should one emerge in the East.  Or,
if possible, it can serve as a mechanism to help all the
nations now emerging from Soviet-style communism
eventually attain complete and irreversible integration
into the community of prosperous democracies.
 
We have no doubt where the Russian reformers want to go,
and they must have no doubt that, as they keep moving in
that direction, we are with them.  (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 2
 
Negotiating a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
John D. Holum, Director, U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
Address before the opening plenary session of the Geneva-
based Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, Switzerland,
January 25, 1994
 
On behalf of the United States, may I first wish you
every success as you guide the work of this body to begin
this important year.  You will have the complete
cooperation of the United States delegation.  I thank
your predecessor, Ambassador Zahran of Egypt, for his
wise and skillful performance of the challenging duties
of president.  I would also like to congratulate the new
personal representative of the Secretary General of the
United Nations, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, and express our
confidence that we will have with him the same close and
productive relationship that we enjoyed with his
predecessor.
 
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen:  This is my first
opportunity to address a session of the Conference on
Disarmament (CD) as the Director of the United States
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.  This forum serves
the cause of a safer and more stable world, and my
presence here today reflects the commitment of the
Clinton Administration to the goals of arms control,
disarmament, and non-proliferation.  Upon my
confirmation, the President reiterated to me the high
priority he personally gives to making concrete, rapid
progress on strengthening international security through
multilateral cooperation.  The end of the Cold War has
created particular opportunities for the CD, and I am
here today to pledge to you that the United States will
do everything in its power to make the most of them.  In
this regard, I would like to read to you a message to the
conference from President Clinton [see next article].
 
The CD is the only multilateral forum to address global
arms control and disarmament issues on a continuing
basis.  Its membership covers every region of the globe
and reflects a wide range of concerns and interests.  We
have all come to accept the CD as both a marketplace of
ideas and a place where nations get down to practical
business and conclude the agreements that enhance
international security.
 
The United States recognizes the importance of the CD as
a multilateral arms control body, and we have
consistently supported appropriate membership expansion.
We do, however, insist that it is inappropriate to
elevate the status in the CD of a state whose behavior
continues to be flagrantly opposed to the goals of the
organization.  It is our hope that CD members will
continue working together to forge a consensus on an
acceptable membership package.
 
The conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
vividly demonstrates how the constructive competition of
ideas and the pursuit of diverse interests and concerns
can produce achievements to benefit the entire
international community.  I congratulate you on that
single accomplishment.
 
However, this is not the time for us to rest.  There is
much work to be done; the demands are immediate; and we
have a unique opportunity to help  shape the world
constructively.
 
The end of the Cold War actually has increased the need
for arms control.  There are new sources of proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles used to
deliver them.  Formerly contained ethnic tensions have
emerged in areas where adversaries are all too ready to
use violence as the instrument of first resort.  Sadly,
there is abundant evidence that we still live in a world
where technology advances faster than human wisdom.
 
Arms control can help us meet the challenge of bringing
peace and stability to a troubled new world order.  We
can limit and reduce destabilizing military forces.  We
can prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and
the missiles used to deliver them.  We can contribute to
confidence and trust through greater transparency about
our military activities.  Doing these things is not a
sign of weakness or of capitulation; it is a wise
investment in the future and a sure way to underwrite all
of our vital national interests.
 
Much is underway.  Less than three weeks ago, the
Presidents of Ukraine, the Russian Federation, and the
United States signed a statement that opens the way to
the elimination of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.  It
provides for the transfer of all nuclear weapons on
Ukrainian territory to Russia for their dismantlement,
while recording agreement on compensation for Ukraine;
previewing the security assurances that the United
States, Russia, and the United Kingdom will provide Kiev
once it accedes to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START
I) enters into force; and reiterating the U.S. commitment
to assist in eliminating strategic systems on Ukrainian
territory.
 
This trilateral statement advances the interests of all
three countries and of the international community in
general.  It will accelerate the entry into force and
implementation of the START I, bolster the NPT, and lead
to the dismantlement of thousands of nuclear weapons.
Equally important, this agreement should help establish a
pattern of stable political relationships.  It can
contribute to an environment in which democratic reform,
economic vitality, and social harmony can be pursued
without dangerous distraction.
 
Arms control and confidence-building efforts are being
seriously pursued elsewhere at the regional level,
including the Arms Control and Regional Security Working
Group created as part of the Middle East peace process;
the new regional forum created by the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations; the historic progress on arms
control and non-proliferation in Latin America; and the
agreement in principle between India and Pakistan to
establish a multilateral dialogue on regional security
and non-proliferation.  Similarly, we were encouraged
when CSCE ministers decided last December in Rome to
begin discussions in the forum for security cooperation
of possible arms control contributions for settling the
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.
 
Manifestly, the arms control negotiating tables are now
located not only in the conference rooms of Washington
and Moscow and the committee rooms here in Geneva, but
also in Buenos Aires, in New Delhi and Islamabad, in
Cairo and Tel Aviv, and in many other places around the
globe.  While the venues are varied, the objectives are
closely linked.  The CD has been the proving ground of
new ideas and has set in motion a new dynamic and a new
spirit of international negotiations.
 
A Challenging Agenda
With this dynamic in mind, let me turn to some of the
major items of business that will occupy you in the days
ahead.
 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.  In the short time I have
been in Geneva, I have already sensed the great
anticipation of our forthcoming negotiations of a
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); and we should be
excited.  A CTBT is long overdue.  We are beginning the
final steps in a journey of too many years.
 
Let me be clear at the outset:  U.S. policy--announced by
President Clinton on July 3--is one of strong support for
concluding a CTBT at the earliest possible time.  Now, in
the aftermath of the Cold War, a CTBT becomes even more
important.  A CTBT will be an important part of our
efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and
will place a major restraint on the nuclear-weapons
states.
 
The United States has been working hard--as have many of
you--to ensure a smooth start to the negotiations.  We
were pleased to be able to co-sponsor the United Nations
resolution supporting the objectives of a CTBT.  Its
acceptance by consensus provides a strong base from which
to launch your negotiations.
 
The consensus at the UN shows there is now virtually
universal support for a CTBT.  While the issues are
complex, they are not beyond our immediate reach.  We
should be able to work out the essential elements of a
treaty expeditiously.  "At the earliest possible time"
means just that.  Obviously, no country can unilaterally
set the pace, and we should avoid arbitrary deadlines.
But I assure you that, as compared to some past
deliberation on this issue, the United States will be out
front pulling, rather than in the back dragging our
heels.
 
A CTBT will be fully successful only with the
participation and support of the five nuclear-weapons
states and with broad international adherence.  The
nuclear-weapons states bear a special responsibility to
contribute to these negotiations, and you have our
commitment that the United States will meet its
responsibility.  For the United States, a tangible
demonstration of our commitment to the CTBT is our
continuing moratorium on nuclear testing.  In his message
to you, which I read just a few moments ago, the
President has again urged the other nuclear-weapons
states to refrain from testing.
 
Strengthening the NPT Regime.  With the end of the Cold
War, we have moved from a bipolar world to a multi-polar
world.  The threat of nuclear proliferation remains, and
with it comes the need to preserve the NPT as the primary
bulwark against the further spread of nuclear weapons.
The NPT reflects a broad consensus against nuclear
proliferation.  The treaty also establishes a framework
for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and for
facilitating and regulating cooperation among states in
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.  And it has proved
an important instrument for enhancing the social and
economic development of its members.
 
The U.S. welcomes the substantial progress made at the
second meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 1995
NPT Conference, including the decision to open its
proceedings to observers from both non-party states and
non-governmental organizations.  The PREPCOM reaffirmed
the importance of consensus as its method of decision-
making, and it agreed on the background documentation the
parties will need from the United Nations, the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and other
organizations to support their work.  The PREPCOM also
unanimously endorsed the candidacy of Ambassador Jayantha
Dhanapala of Sri Lanka for the Presidency of the 1995
conference.  The work of the PREPCOM is all the more
important because of the end to which it is directed.
The United States is committed to make every effort to
achieve the NPT's indefinite and unconditional extension
in 1995.  Without a stable and durable non-proliferation
regime, which includes a strong NPT, further arms control
methods will be jeopardized.
 
Indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 will ensure that
the many benefits the NPT provides to its parties will
remain available.  By indefinite extension, the
international community will send to would-be
proliferators the clearest possible signal that their
activities are not acceptable.
 
The threat of nuclear proliferation has diminished in
some regions, such as Latin America and Africa.  We need
to ensure that, for the future, such regional security
benefits provided by the NPT are not mortgaged by a
decision to limit its extension.  The full weight of the
NPT membership behind a treaty of unlimited duration
would be a formidable political force for non-
proliferation.  Moreover, it would provide an essential
foundation for building further on the historic measures
already taken to limit, reduce, and dismantle nuclear
weapons systems.
 
Fissile Material Cut-off.  Our objective of reshaping the
nuclear contours of the post-Cold War security landscape
does not end there.  The successful implementation of the
Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF); the
implementation of unilateral initiatives, such as
reduction and dismantling of tactical nuclear weapons;
and strategic arms reduction agreements, including START
I and START II, were significant contributions to the
process of halting the spread of nuclear arms.  Now we
can add not just the CTBT negotiations and NPT extension,
but also negotiations for a global agreement to prohibit
further production of highly enriched uranium and
plutonium for nuclear explosive purposes or outside
international safeguards, as President Clinton urged in
his address to the United Nations last September.
 
Such an agreement should be formally negotiated here in
the CD.  We were greatly encouraged by the consensus
support at the UN for such a convention.  A
nondiscriminatory, multilateral, and effectively
verifiable fissile material production ban could bring
the unsafeguarded nuclear programs of certain non-NPT
states under some measure of restraint for the first
time.  It would also halt the production of plutonium and
highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons in the five
declared nuclear-weapons states.
 
Negative Security Assurances.  Negative security
assurances are also related to the cause of non-
proliferation.  We adhere to a policy that has been
reiterated by several previous administrations, namely:
 
The United States will not use nuclear weapons against
any non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or any comparable
internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear
explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the
United States, its territories or armed forces, or its
allies, by such a state allied to a nuclear-weapon state
or associated with a nuclear-weapon state in carrying out
or sustaining this attack.
 
As we have stated repeatedly in this forum, the United
States is open to discussion on this issue.
 
We cannot disinvent nuclear weapons, but we can control
them.  We can limit their impact and influence.  Deep
reductions in nuclear weapons inventories, strengthened
and extended non-proliferation norms, conclusion of a
CTBT, a global ban on fissile material production, and
other measures will alter fundamentally the role of
nuclear weapons in the world of the 21st century.  All
these steps will contribute to the important goal we all
share--a safer and more stable world.
 
The Challenge of Conventional Weapons.  The devastating
destructive power of nuclear weapons and the dangers
posed by other weapons of mass destruction demand that
they remain high on our arms control agenda, but they
cannot be the only items.  Another crucial element of the
arms control equation is conventional arms.
 
We are reminded daily that the end of the Cold War has
not by any means removed all conflict and danger from the
world.  Regional arms races and destabilizing
accumulations of arms well beyond those realistically
needed for defense are all too common.  Reversing these
trends is a global responsibility.  We can help reduce
the sources of tension that generate such accumulations.
We must continue working to discourage the use of arms in
resolving disputes.
 
The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe is a
landmark in the reduction of conventional weapons.  It
serves as the foundation for a post-Cold War security
architecture in Europe based on cooperation rather than
confrontation.  We look forward to its full
implementation in 1995, and note with satisfaction that
tens of thousands of items of equipment have already been
destroyed.
 
The immediate challenge to this forum is to promote
greater transparency about security matters.
Transparency, in turn, fosters the greater confidence and
trust upon which stable political relationships can rest.
 
Last year the CD created the Ad Hoc Committee on
Transparency in Armaments (TIA).  As the first new
committee established by the CD in a number of years, it
demonstrated the CD's ability to adapt to the challenges
of the post-Cold War era.  It is important as well
because it is the only item on your agenda that addresses
the conventional arms challenge.  I strongly encourage
you to build on the very useful work begun in the TIA Ad
Hoc Committee last year.  I also recommend the ideas put
forward last year by the United States to promote
transparency regarding conventional arms.
 
Some object that we should instead pay even more
attention to weapons of mass destruction and the missiles
used to deliver them.  Let us discuss those concerns
seriously, but let us not create yet another setting
where we repeat ourselves endlessly to the point where
other important business is neglected.  If we slacken in
our willingness to address the conventional weapons
problems that first gave rise to the TIA initiative, we
will not make much progress, and we will begin to slide
away from our global conventional arms control
objectives.
 
Just as in the nuclear area, the work done here in Geneva
on conventional arms will have a significant impact on
related efforts elsewhere.  We share your pride in the
successful initiation of the UN Register of Conventional
Arms.  The first year's experience with the register was
good--but not good enough.  Eighty-two responses
represent answers from less than half the UN's
membership.  We must do better; our goal should be
universal participation, which your work here at the CD
can encourage.
 
The United States also looks forward to the experts'
meeting on these issues in New York next month.  We will
play an active part in moving their efforts to a
successful conclusion.
 
Another conventional arms issue  on which we have taken a
first step relates to land mines.  These weapons continue
to wreak havoc on civilian populations, whether or not
they are any longer in an active war zone.  The UN has
supported, by consensus, the U.S.-initiated resolution
calling for a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel
land mines.  We must now take the next step and make the
global moratorium a reality.  In doing so, we not only
protect the futures of many innocent civilians, but we
also draw attention to a range of problems long thought
too difficult for arms control to solve.
 
This process will also be fortified by this year's
experts' deliberations leading to a review conference on
the convention on weapons that may be deemed to be
excessively injurious or have indiscriminate effects.
Although not presently a party to this convention, the
United States will closely follow the progress of the
conference as an observer, and the President intends to
submit the convention to the United States Senate this
year for advice and consent to ratification.
 
These positive developments can mutually reinforce one
another, forming a tide that can break down resistance to
progress on the conventional arms control agenda.  The CD
should help swell that tide.
 
An Extensive Agenda Remains
In my closing minutes, Mr. President, let me briefly
touch on the other developments and other issues that are
part of U.S. arms control, disarmament, and non-
proliferation efforts.
 
Despite the fact that the Chemical Weapons Convention has
now passed beyond the CD's purview, I know that many of
you remain keenly interested in its fate.  In Washington
this past November, President Clinton submitted the CWC
to the United States Senate for advice and consent and
will push for ratification early this year.  The United
States urges every other signatory to do the same, so
that the convention will enter into force for the
critical parties at the earliest possible date.  The
United States has also been pleased by the progress made
by the Preparatory Commission in The Hague on elaborating
the complex procedures that will guarantee the
convention's smooth and effective functioning.
 
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) has
been strengthened since its entry into force by increased
membership and by the confidence-building measures
developed by successive review conferences.  We believe
the world can go further.  President Clinton has
announced that the United States will promote new
measures to increase transparency of activities and
facilities that could have biological and toxin weapons
applications.  The United States also supports the work
of the Ad Hoc Group of Government Experts convened to
identify and examine potential BWC verification measures
from a scientific and technical standpoint.  We support
an early conference to consider the report and to discuss
the next steps to strengthen the international norm
against a scourge that could well be-come the next weapon
of mass destruction of choice.
 
The Clinton Administration's non-proliferation policy
also attempts to find solutions where non-proliferation
norms have not taken hold.  The United States has taken a
strong stand against any North Korean nuclear weapon
ambitions.  In coordination with many other countries, we
have made it clear to North Korea that, to resolve the
nuclear issue, it will have to provide the international
community with assurance that it does not possess nuclear
weapons, and it will not build them in the future.  This
means that North Korea must remain a full party to the
NPT, and must fully cooperate with the IAEA, including
accepting regular and special inspections and fully
implementing the denuclearization agreement reached by
North and South Korea.  Our position remains unchanged:
North Korea will have to meet these obligations aimed at
ensuring a nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula and a
strong international non-proliferation regime.
 
Proliferation threats are acute in South Asia and the
Middle East.  The United States is encouraging India and
Pakistan to join in a multilateral effort to examine
regional security and arms control issues.  We continue
to support the activities of the Middle East Arms Control
and Regional Security Working Group.
 
The diffusion of missile technology makes the world a
more dangerous place for all of us.  The United States
wants to strengthen the Missile Technology Control Regime
to ensure that it continues to be an effective vehicle to
combat missile proliferation.
 
Conclusion
Mr. President, the Conference on Disarmament is
strengthened by its success with the Chemical Weapons
Convention negotiations.  It is energized by the prospect
of the negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
It is challenged by the demands of enhancing transparency
in armaments.  It is bolstered by important arms control
developments beyond these halls.
 
Our responsibility now is to make the most of the
opportunity before us.  The task is immediate, but our
results will be long-lasting.  The challenges are
enormous, but they are matched by the promise of profound
results.  The path will be difficult, but it will be
worth every effort when we arrive at our destination.
Let us get down to
work.  (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 3
 
Message From the President to The Conference on
Disarmament
Statement released by the White House, Washington, DC,
January 25, 1994.
 
The United States congratulates the Governments and
Congresses of Argentina and Chile for bringing into force
the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in
Latin America and the Caribbean, also known as the Treaty
of Tlatelolco.  This important action will strengthen the
security of countries throughout the Western Hemisphere
and reinforce the worldwide non-proliferation regime.  It
is the latest in a series of major contributions by
Argentina and Chile to the non-proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction.
 
The United States strongly supports the Treaty of
Tlatelolco which, for more than a quarter of a century,
has been a critical building block of peace and stability
throughout Latin America.  We seek its full entry into
force for all the states of Latin America.  The
Governments of Argentina and Chile have shown courage and
vision in bringing that goal nearer to fruition.  We urge
the remaining non-parties to do the same at the earliest
opportunity.  (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 4
 
Haiti:  National Reconciliation and Working Toward
Building  a Durable Democracy
Ambassador Lawrence Pezzullo, Special Adviser on Haiti
Address to the Miami Conference on Haiti, Miami, Florida,
January 15, 1994
 
On behalf of my government, I would like to express our
appreciation for the opportunity to address this
conference.  I note with satisfaction that
representatives of the various institutions of the
Haitian Government and the diverse political and social
groups of Haiti are present here today.  It is to you,
the representatives of the Haitian people, that I would
like to address my remarks.
 
Your task is a crucial one for the future of Haiti. You
know better than anyone the implications of the disaster
that has befallen your country.  Many of you understand
the true causes. Although it is easy to blame your
political opponents for their failures--or forces real or
imagined--the fact is that assigning blame will not do a
thing to end the downward spiral upon which your society
has embarked.
 
Your countrymen have lost hope. You have the
responsibility to restore their hope and to lead them out
of the crisis. And you have the capacity to do so, if you
work together.
 
We hope that at this conference a fruitful discussion can
begin on how the various Haitian parties can come
together to implement the agreement reached at Governors
Island six months ago.  The Governors Island agreement
remains a viable framework for Haiti to emerge from the
crisis and to establish a rule of law which guarantees
freedom, security, and human rights for all.
 
Some means must be found urgently to address those
elements of the Governors Island accord which have not
been implemented.  Serious dialogue among all the Haitian
parties is the only way to do this.  No one else can do
this for you.  We hope this conference will begin that
dialogue.  We hope that you will explore ways of
satisfying both that critical need to work out the
specific steps to end the current crisis within the
framework already agreed to at Governors Island, but also
begin to create the broader national consensus and
reconciliation that you must nurture if your country is
to have a future.
 
In emphasizing the central role   you must play as the
representatives of the Haitian people, I do not mean to
minimize the role or responsibility of the international
community.  We have a stake in the future of your
country--not because we covet its territory or resources,
nor because we favor particular parties or personalities
in Haiti--rather, we are deeply interested in the welfare
of the Haitian people.
 
Our determination to see democracy restored in Haiti is a
reflection of our interest in Haiti finding political
harmony as well as our strongly held conviction that
democracy is the only means to assure respect for human
rights and freedoms.  We do not believe that a durable
political system can be maintained in your country or
elsewhere absent the growth of democratic traditions and
institutions.
 
You, perhaps more than any other people in this
hemisphere, have suffered the consequences of an absence
of democracy.  The past two years are  a stark
demonstration of the consequences of an attempt to rule
without democratic legitimacy.  It is for this reason of
maintaining stability that we have been so insistent that
the coup of September 1991 not be allowed to succeed.
And it is for this same reason that our interest in
ensuring that the rights and freedoms of all be respected
and not cease once democratic government is restored.
 
The first step to begin this process of establishing
stability is to end the current crisis by resuming the
implementation of the Governors Island accord.  Governors
Island is, in our view, the only possible basis for a
solution, not only because it was agreed to by the
parties, but because the steps it calls for are those
that are, in any event, essential to ending the crisis
and establishing democratic legitimacy.
 
To be precise, the Governors Island accord, signed on
July 3, established a nine-step process of political
reconciliation and restoration of constitutional
government.  The Pact of New York, which was envisioned
in the Governors Island accord, forms an integral part of
the process by spelling out the responsibilities of the
Haitian Parliament in the process.
 
Unfortunately, all of the steps agreed upon have not been
realized, largely because of the failure of the Haitian
military leadership thus far to fulfill its commitments.
While it should not ignore these setbacks, this
conference also should not focus solely on past failures
to implement the accord.  Now is the time to search for
positive ways for Haitians of all sectors to come
together in the larger interests of the Haitian nation
and for the Haitian people to work for a democratic and
prosperous future.
 
Let me enumerate briefly what remains to be done.  With
the resignation of Prime Minister Malval, a new Prime
Minister, one who can win the confidence of the
legitimate Haitian Parliament, must be named and
ratified.  This is what your constitution requires, in
any event.  The Prime Minister and President must begin
to create a government of concorde nationale as envisaged
in the Pact of New York that will be able to gain the
necessary support in the Parliament.
 
Again, this is a constitutional requirement.  The
executive and the Parliament must cooperate under a
political truce, agreed to in the Pact of New York, to
pass the legislation enumerated in that agreement.  Key
among the legislative agenda outlined in that document is
passage of the civilian police law, the amnesty law, and
the abolition of paramilitary forces, such as the
attaches.  The President must nominate a new commander-
in-chief of the armed forces who is qualified in
accordance with the constitution and who can win the
confidence of the necessary majority in the Parliament.
Similarly, with the passage of the law establishing a new
police force, the President must nominate and the
Parliament confirm a new chief of police.
 
Also essential is creation of an environment which
permits the new government and Parliament to function
without fear for their safety.  The Haitian military must
be responsible for creating such an environment.  The
armed forces of Haiti must create a proper environment in
which these legislative actions can be taken by
guaranteeing the security of all parliamentarians and by
ceasing all acts of bribery and intimidation of the
parliamentarians.  The military must also facilitate
changes in the leadership of the police and military as
called for in the Governors Island accord.  Also, they
must help create a proper environment for the return of
President Aristide by publicly reaffirming their
acceptance of his return, by guaranteeing his security,
and by taking necessary steps to control paramilitary
forces.  Finally, the military must create a proper
environment for the deployment of the UN police and
military assistance mission.  If you accomplish these
actions, then sanctions will be lifted.
 
These ideas are not new ones;  they are steps to which
all parties have agreed and steps which all parties
recognize as necessary.  Part of the problem in carrying
out these obligations has been the deliberate efforts of
a few to sabotage progress in order to advance their own
personal interests  at the expense of the Haitian people.
Nowhere is this more prevalent than in the Haitian
military.  A few officers have abused the trust bestowed
upon them to the detriment of their institution and its
members, including by creating and arming gangs of toughs
to intimidate and steal from the population.  Not only is
this the antithesis of the military's proper role in
assuring public safety and tranquility, it is a threat to
the military institution itself.
 
We recognize that there are officers and soldiers who
want to develop the reputation of their institution as a
professional body dedicated to the welfare of the Haitian
people within the framework of the constitution. We
appeal to these honest soldiers to make their views known
and to support a prompt, democratic solution to the
crisis.
 
Apart from the deliberate efforts  to thwart
implementation of the agreements reached, we have noted a
reluctance to move forward rooted in the deep-seated
fears of all parties to act without some guarantee that
the other political actors will fulfill their
obligations.  As a result of these fears, implementation
is paralyzed.  Breaking through this paralysis requires
true reconciliation.  Here, all of the Haitian parties
have a responsibility.  Haitians from all sides must
reach out to their opponents and take concrete steps to
build confidence and quell fears.  This is what this
conference in Miami should seek to accomplish.
 
We believe that a good start toward building mutual
confidence could be made if the parties were to develop
ideas on how all these interdependent steps can occur in
unison.  This would assure all parties that none could
seek to take improper advantage of the others.
 
As I indicated previously, these steps toward
implementing the agreements reached at Governors Island
and the Pact of New York as well as the broader national
reconciliation they entail can only be taken by Haitians.
The international community can provide support, but you
must create something for us to support.  For example,
Special Envoy Caputo has previously indicated that the
international community would be prepared to negotiate
arrangements for verification and enforcement of the
agreements you reach in order to enhance confidence and
to prevent abuses from any source.
 
Haitians have a tough road ahead, but they are not alone.
The U.S. and the international community will continue to
stand with those who seek  a negotiated settlement which
restores democracy and returns President Aristide to his
duly-elected position. We have helped to broker
negotiations and dialogue.  We have put in place, and
will continue vigorously to enforce and enhance as need
be, unprecedented international sanctions to make it
clear to those who are intent on thwarting democracy that
they will not be allowed to succeed.  We have put  in
place major programs of humanitarian assistance to
alleviate the effects of the crisis on the poor.  We
stand ready to help rebuild Haiti as well.  With a
resolution of this crisis, economic sanctions will be
lifted, and more than $400 million in international
assistance will be made available to help Haitians
rebuild Haiti.
 
Indeed, we stand ready to assist Haiti, but we cannot
take these steps for Haiti.  Only Haitians can come to an
agreement to work together and rebuild their nation.  We
hope that this conference is the beginning of a true
dialogue and spirit of cooperation.  Only then can Haiti
close this painful chapter of its history and begin a new
one focused on democracy and economic prosperity where
all Haitians can live in safety.  (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 5
 
Argentina and Chile Bring the Latin American Nuclear-
Weapons-Free Zone Into Force
Statement released by the White House, Office of the
Press Secretary, Washington, DC, January 25, 1994.
 
The United States congratulates the Governments and
Congresses of Argentina and Chile for bringing into force
the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in
Latin America and the Caribbean, also known as the Treaty
of Tlatelolco.  This important action will strengthen the
security of countries throughout the Western Hemisphere
and reinforce the worldwide non-proliferation regime.  It
is the latest in a series of major contributions by
Argentina and Chile to the non-proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction.
 
The United States strongly supports the Treaty of
Tlatelolco which, for more than a quarter of a century,
has been a critical building block of peace and stability
throughout Latin America.  We seek its full entry into
force for all the states of Latin America.  The
Governments of Argentina and Chile have shown courage and
vision in bringing that goal nearer to fruition.  We urge
the remaining non-parties to do the same at the earliest
opportunity.  (###)
 
 
 
ARTICLE 6
 
Focus on Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
 
Summary of November 1993 Meetings
From November 15 to 20, 1993, several Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) meetings and events were held
in and near Seattle, Washington:  the  economic leaders
meeting, the ministerial meeting, and a customs-trade
symposium.  This issue of Focus summarizes what happened
at each.
 
APEC Economic Leaders Meeting
On November 20, 1993, President Clinton hosted a
historic, informal meeting of APEC economic leaders on
Blake Island near Seattle, Washington.  In their "vision
statement," the President and other leaders stated that:
 
In this post Cold War era, we have an opportunity to
build a new economic foundation for the Asia Pacific that
harnesses the energy of our diverse economies,
strengthens cooperation and promotes prosperity.
 
The leaders added that their meeting "reflects the
emergence of a new voice for the Asia Pacific in world
affairs."  Commenting on the dynamic growth in the Asia-
Pacific region, they noted that:
 
Our success has been the result of the ability of our
societies to adapt to changing circumstances.  Our
economies are moving toward interdependence and there is
a growing sense of community among us.  We are united in
our commitment to create a stable and prosperous future
for our people.
 
Leaders' Vision for the Region
The APEC economic leaders' vision statement put forward
the following as a guide to future development of the
region.  The statement envisions "a community of Asia-
Pacific economies" in which:
 
--  The spirit of openness and partnership deepens,
enabling us to find cooperative solutions to the
challenges of our rapidly changing regional and global
economy;
 
--  We are a vast Asia Pacific market of two billion
people where dynamic economic growth continues,
contributing to an expanding world economy and supporting
an open international trading system;
 
--  We continue to reduce trade and investment barriers
so that our trade expands within the region and with the
world and goods, services, capital and investment flow
freely among our economies;
 
--  Our people share the benefits of economic growth
through higher incomes, high skilled and high paying jobs
and increased mobility;
 
--  Improved education and training produce rising
literacy rates, provide the skills for maintaining
economic growth  and encourage the sharing of ideas that
contribute to the arts and sciences;
 
--  Advances in telecommunications and transportation
shrink time and distance barriers in our region and link
our economies so that goods and people move quickly and
efficiently;
 
--  Our environment is improved as we protect the quality
of our air, water, and green spaces and manage our energy
sources and renewable resources to ensure sustainable
growth and provide a more secure future for our people.
 
Leaders' Initiatives
The APEC economic leaders also:
 
--  Pledged to try to bring the GATT Uruguay Round to a
successful conclusion by December 15, 1993;
 
--  Reaffirmed support for APEC as a forum dedicated to
producing tangible economic benefits to the region and
urged APEC to expand its economic dialogue and advance
its specific work projects;
 
--  Welcomed the challenge presented in the report of the
APEC Eminent Persons Group (EPG) to achieve free trade in
the Asia-Pacific, advance global trade liberalization,
and launch concrete programs to move the region toward
those long-term goals;
 
--  Asked APEC to undertake work aimed at deepening and
broadening  the outcome of the Uruguay Round,
strengthening trade and investment liberalization in the
region, and facilitating regional cooperation, including
in such areas as standards;
 
--  Agreed to convene a meeting of APEC finance ministers
to consult on broad economic issues, including
macroeconomic developments and capital flows;
 
--  Asked business leaders to establish a Pacific
Business Forum to identify issues that APEC should
address to facilitate regional trade and investment;
 
--  Asked APEC to strengthen its policy dialogue on
small- and medium-sized business enterprises;
 
--  Agreed to establish an APEC Education Program to
develop regional cooperation in higher education, study
key regional economic issues, improve worker skills,
facilitate cultural and intellectual exchanges, enhance
labor mobility, and foster understanding of the diversity
of the region;
 
--  Agreed to establish an APEC Business Volunteer
Program to promote cooperation in the areas of human
resource development and the exchange of management
skills and techniques; and
 
--  Resolved, as members of APEC, to deepen the spirit of
community based on a shared vision of achieving
stability, security, and prosperity for the region's
peoples.
 
APEC Ministerial Meeting
Prior to the APEC economic leaders' meeting, Secretary of
State Warren Christopher on November 17-19, 1993, chaired
the fifth APEC ministerial meeting in Seattle,
Washington.  Secretary of Commerce Ronald Brown and U.S.
Trade Representative Michael Kantor also participated.
In his opening remarks, Secretary Christopher stated that
trade and investment within Asia and the Pacific are
weaving a new web of human and commercial relationships
and that APEC can play a crucial role in developing these
Asia-Pacific networks.
 
The ministerial capped the United States' year as APEC
chair.  After the Seattle ministerial, the chair was
passed to Indonesia, which plans meetings of senior
officials and a ministerial meeting for 1994.  In
addition, Indonesian President Soeharto will host a
second meeting of APEC economic leaders in 1994.  By
then, APEC members will have developed further the ideas
and initiatives that emerged from the Seattle meeting.
Future chairs will include Japan (1995) and the
Philippines (1996).
 
Overview of Ministerial Accomplishments
The achievements of the Seattle ministerial provide APEC
additional momentum in strengthening its role as a
regional organization.  At the meeting, ministers:
 
--  Confirmed trade and investment liberalization as the
cornerstone of APEC;
 
--  Agreed that the GATT Uruguay Round must be concluded
successfully by December 15, demonstrated their
commitment to this goal by offering to take specific
trade liberalizing measures, and challenged other Uruguay
Round participants to enhance their own contributions to
the round's successful conclusion;
 
--  Agreed on a Declaration on an APEC Trade and
Investment Framework;
 
--  Established a Committee on Trade and Investment (with
South Korea as chair and the U.S. and the Philippines as
vice chairs) and an accompanying 1994 work plan;
 
--  Extended the mandate of the non-governmental Eminent
Persons Group to develop more specific proposals on how
the recommended long-term vision might be realized;
 
--  Issued separate ministerial statements on
telecommunications, tourism, and marine resources
conservation; and
 
--  Welcomed two new members, Mexico and Papua New
Guinea, at this meeting and decided to admit Chile at the
next ministerial meeting in 1994.
 
The ministers also endorsed the following:
 
--  The successful establishment of a permanent APEC
Secretariat in Singapore in 1993;
 
--  The greater policy focus achieved by the 10 APEC
working groups; and
 
--  More active private sector involvement in APEC.
 
Uruguay Round
The strong ministerial declaration on the Uruguay Round--
unlike previous APEC ministerial statements on the round-
-contained specific offers for trade liberalization and
tariff reductions.  APEC ministers challenged Uruguay
Round participants to improve market access and offered
to eliminate, reduce, or harmonize tariffs and non-tariff
barriers in certain sectors.  Ministers decided to
accelerate work on regional bilateral negotiations to
expand market access opportunities in goods and services
of particular interest to APEC economies.  They agreed
that a successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round would
require the strongest possible package of agricultural
trade liberalization, including for processed products.
 
A separate statement on the Uruguay Round was negotiated
by APEC members participating in the GATT negotiations.
It contains new commitments on sectoral duty-free
initiatives in electronics, non-ferrous metals, paper,
wood, scientific equipment, toys, and oilseeds; and on
harmonization initiatives in fish and non-ferrous metals.
These initiatives will be added to an existing package--
known as the July 1993 Quadrilateral Package--which
already includes:  duty-free initiatives on
pharmaceuticals, steel, construction equipment,
agricultural equipment, medical equipment, furniture,
beer and distilled spirits; and harmonization in
chemicals.
 
APEC ministers also called for a meeting of ministers
concerned with trade policy to review the results of the
Uruguay Round and its implications for the region.  This
post-Uruguay Round meeting will consider next steps for
regional and global trade liberalization.
 
Trade and Investment
The "Declaration on an APEC Trade and Investment
Framework" significantly advances APEC's commitment to
reducing barriers to trade in goods and services and
investment.  This was a major U.S. initiative during its
year as APEC chair.  The declaration articulates a trade
policy role for APEC and serves as an important
instrument to further define APEC's identity; expand
economic activity; and facilitate the flow of goods,
services, capital, and technology within the region.
 
The declaration establishes an APEC Committee on Trade
and Investment to pursue opportunities to liberalize and
expand trade; to facilitate a more open environment for
investment; and to develop concrete initiatives to
realize these goals in a manner consistent with GATT
principles.  For the next two years, South Korea will
chair the new committee, with the U.S. and the
Philippines serving as vice chairs.
 
A 1994 work program was adopted for the committee and
encompasses these issues:  the evolving
interrelationships of the APEC and the global economies;
impediments and distortions affecting trade and
investment; reduction of transaction costs of doing
business in the region; trade and investment policy
issues of APEC working groups and activities; and ways to
mobilize the APEC business sector in the evolution of
APEC trade policies.
 
Specific tasks in the work program to address these
issues include:  pursuing efforts to simplify and
harmonize customs procedures; undertaking a pilot study
for a regional electronic database of member tariffs;
defining APEC's role in harmonizing standards and
conformance/certification arrangements; and enhancing the
environment for small- and medium-sized enterprises in
the region.
 
Eminent Persons Group
EPG Chairman Fred Bergsten reported to ministers on the
region's current and future trade and economic outlook,
highlighting APEC's medium- and long-term role in
enhancing regional trade and economic activity.  The
report emphasized that APEC must, through accelerated and
expanded cooperation, respond to three threats to the
region's continued vitality:  erosion of the multilateral
global trading system; evolution of inward-looking
regionalism; and risk of fragmentation within the Asia-
Pacific region.  The EPG recommended that APEC undertake
initiatives in four areas:  regional and global trade
liberalization; trade facilitation programs; technical
cooperation; and institutionalizing APEC.
 
Ministers welcomed the report's broad thrust and
direction and instructed APEC's senior officials to
implement EPG recommendations on trade liberalization and
facilitation, technical cooperation, and developing
APEC's structure and decision-making process.  Short-,
medium-, and long-term plans for implementation will be
developed.  Ministers also expanded the EPG's mandate by
asking the group to present, at the 1994 Indonesia
ministerial, more specific proposals on how to realize
the recommended long-term vision for APEC.
 
The EPG report, "A Vision for APEC:  Towards an Asia
Pacific Economic Community," may be obtained by
contacting the APEC Secretariat, 438 Alexandra Road, #19-
01/04 Alexandra Point, Singapore 0511; telephone 011-(65)
2761880;   FAX 011-(65) 2761775.
 
New APEC Members
Both of the newly admitted members, Mexico and Papua New
Guinea, participated fully in the Seattle ministerial,
and ministers encouraged Chile to participate in working
group activities in anticipation of its 1994 admission.
Ministers also agreed to defer consideration of any
additional members for three years, while APEC's
membership policies are reviewed.  This will give APEC
time to consolidate its work programs and to strengthen
its organizational structure.
 
To meet the continuing interest expressed by other
economies and organizations in APEC participation,
ministers agreed that:
 
APEC should develop more systematic means of addressing
the issue of new members in a manner which is responsive
to APEC's needs while promoting constructive interaction
with other economies and organizations in the region.
 
APEC will also be looking further at the question of
APEC's links with other international organizations.
 
APEC Work Programs, Private Sector Participation, And
Other Issues
Ministers in Seattle approved policy-oriented "vision
statements" and the 1994 work programs of APEC's 10
working groups.  Through these groups, APEC members have
been building practical links among member
representatives, business sectors, and academia.
Ministers directed working groups to enhance their
outreach to the private sector and identify other avenues
for expanding APEC's cooperation with business.  Private
sector groups interested in participating in APEC work
programs should contact the U.S. Government officials
listed on the following page for further information
about the activities of the individual working groups.
 
In directing senior officials to implement EPG
recommendations on restructuring APEC, ministers high-
lighted the crucial role of the new permanent
Secretariat, which facilitates coordination between
members and APEC's work programs and which manages APEC's
budget (an approved $2 million for 1994).
 
Ministers also welcomed Canada's offer to host a meeting
of APEC ministers concerned with the environment.  The
Vancouver meeting will be held on March 25-26, 1994, in
connection with the Globe '94 conference and
environmental exhibition.
 
APEC Customs-Trade Symposium
The Washington State Convention and Trade Center in
Seattle was the site for the two-day customs-trade
symposium held on November 15-16, just prior to the APEC
ministerial meeting.  Some 1,200 participants included
private industry representatives, officials of the APEC
economies, and 350 exhibitors from businesses and
governments.  Customs officials of APEC member economies
staffed "counseling booths" to field questions from the
trade community.  Nine panel discussions were held on
subjects ranging from cooperation in detecting and
preventing customs fraud, to the development and use of
electronic data interface for the movement of goods in
the region, to APEC's role in regional trade
liberalization.
 
The symposium's goal was to promote better understanding
and cooperation between customs administrations and
private sector trade communities of the Asia-Pacific
region.  The symposium also was an opportunity for the
private sector to learn about APEC activities and to
discuss benefits of trade liberalization in the region.
(###)
 
 
APEC Economic Leaders Blake Island Meeting, November 20,
1993
Australia--Prime Minister Keating
Brunei--Sultan Bolkiah
Canada--Prime Minister Chretien
China--President Jiang
Hong Kong--Finance Secretary McLeod
Indonesia--President Soeharto
Japan--Prime Minister Hosokawa
South Korea--President Kim
New Zealand--Prime Minister Bolger
Philippines--President Ramos
Singapore--Prime Minister Goh
Chinese Taipei--Chairman of Economic Policy Development
Council Siew
Thailand--Prime Minister Chuan
United States--President Clinton  (###)
 
APEC Member Economies
Australia
Brunei
Canada
China
Hong Kong
Indonesia
Japan
South Korea
Malaysia
Mexico
New Zealand
Papua New Guinea
Philippines
Singapore
Chinese Taipei
Thailand
United States  (###)
 
APEC Eminent Persons Group
United States--C. Fred Bergsten (Chair)
Australia--Neville Wran
Canada--John S. MacDonald
China--Huang Wenjun
Hong Kong--Victor Fung
Indonesia--Suhadi Mangkusuwondo
Japan--Ippei Yamazawa
South Korea--Mahn Je Kim
Singapore--Hank Lim
Chinese Taipei--Rong-I Wu
Thailand--Narongchai Akrasanee  (###)
 
 
U.S. Government Contacts for APEC Working Groups
Trade and Investment Data--Sumiye McGuire, Department of
Commerce, (202) 482-1675
 
Trade Promotion--Sarah Kemp, Department of Commerce
(202) 482-2422
 
Investment and Industrial Science and Technology--Raphael
Cung, Department of Commerce, (202) 482-3877
 
Human Resources Development--Randall Yamada, USAID, (202)
647-2658
 
Regional Energy Cooperation--Bob Price, Department of
Energy, (202) 586-6130
 
Marine Resources Conservation--Bill Sullivan, Department
of State, (202) 647-0240
 
Telecommunications--Richard  Beaird, Department of State,
(202) 647-5832
 
Transportation--Kevin Sample, Department of
Transportation, (202) 366-9526
 
Tourism--Ginger Smith, Department of Commerce, (202) 482-
0137
 
Fisheries--Bill Dilday, Department of State, (202) 647-
1948
 
Other Contacts
Committee on Trade and Investment--Nancy Adams, U.S.
Trade Representative, (202) 395-4755
 
Ad Hoc Group on Economic Trends and Issues--Alison
Shelton, Treasury Department, (202) 622-0354  (###)
 
END OF DISPATCH VOLUME 5, NO. 5

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