U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 4, NUMBER 51, DECMBER 20, 1993
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:

1.  GATT Negotiations Concluded -- President Clinton

2.  War and Peace:  The Problems and Prospects Of American Diplomacy in 
the Middle East -- Edward P. Djerejian

3.  Recent Events in Haiti -- Ambassador Pezzullo, Ambassador Swing

4.  Burundi:  U.S. Lifts Suspension of Aid 

ARTICLE 1
GATT Negotiations Concluded
President Clinton
Opening statement at a news conference, Washington, DC, December 15, 
1993

I am pleased to announce that the United States today, as you know, 
concluded negotiations with over 110 other nations on the most 
comprehensive trade agreement in history.  This agreement eliminates 
barriers to U.S. goods and services around the world.  It means new 
opportunities, more jobs, and higher incomes.  And it cements our 
position of leadership in the new global economy.

This GATT agreement advances the vision of economic renewal that I set 
out when I took the oath of office.  The first task in pursuing that 
vision was to get our economic house in order.  The economic plan which 
passed earlier this year has resulted in lower interest rates, lower 
inflation, booming home construction, the creation of more private-
sector jobs in this year than in the previous four years, and the 
highest level of consumer confidence in 17 years.

But our renewal also depends on engaging actively with other nations to 
boost worldwide economic growth and to open markets to our goods and 
services.  No wealthy country in the world today can hope to increase 
jobs and raise incomes unless there are more customers for its goods and 
services.

Just since the Fourth of July, our Administration has taken several 
major steps toward that goal.  First, at the Tokyo G-7 summit, we 
secured a market-opening agreement among the major economies that 
breathed new life into these world trade talks.  In November, the 
Congress passed the North American Free Trade Agreement which creates 
the world's largest free-trade area.  In the first-ever meeting of the 
Asia-Pacific economic leaders in Seattle, we strengthened our ties to 
the world's fastest-growing region.

Now, after negotiations that have spanned seven years and three U.S. 
Administrations, we have secured a new GATT agreement.  I have said, 
repeatedly, that I would not accept a bad agreement simply for the sake 
of getting one.  I made clear that the final product had to serve our 
nation's interests.

This agreement did not accomplish everything we wanted.  That has been 
well documented.  And we must continue to fight for more open markets 
for entertainment, for insurance, for banking, and for other industries.  
But today's GATT accord does meet the test of a good agreement for three 
reasons.  

First, this new agreement will foster more jobs and more incomes in 
America by fostering an export boom.  At its core, it simply cuts 
tariffs--the taxes charged by foreign nations on American products in 
8,000 different areas--on average by one-third.

By sparking global growth, it is estimated that this agreement can add 
as much as $100 billion to $200 billion per year to our economy once it 
is fully phased in.  It will create hundreds of thousands of good-paying 
American jobs.  

Second, this agreement sharpens our competitive edge in areas of U.S. 
strength.  Under this agreement, free and fair rules of trade will apply 
for the first time not only to goods, but to trade and services and 
intellectual property.  This will help us stop other nations from 
discriminating against world-class American businesses in such 
industries as computer services, construction, engineering, and 
architecture.  And it will crack down on piracy against the fruits of 
American innovation which, today, is costing U.S. firms $60 billion a 
year--about 1% of our total gross domestic product.

Finally, it does these things while preserving our ability to retaliate 
against unfair trade practices and our right to set strong environmental 
and consumer-protection standards for economic activity here in the 
United States.  That's why I believe this new GATT is good for America.

Over the coming years, we have a solemn obligation to ensure that its 
benefits are broadly shared among all the American people.  We must 
ensure that working men and women have the skills, the training, the 
education to compete and win under these new rules.  Our nation's gains 
must be their gains.  Next year, we will be working harder on that. 

Because this agreement will benefit our people and because it meets our 
standards of success, I've decided to notify the Congress today of my 
intention to sign this agreement.   I look forward to consulting closely 
with the Congress and the American people about how best to put its 
provisions into effect.

I want to congratulate all our trade negotiators--many of whom have 
hardly slept in the last several days, and, especially, Ambassador 
Mickey Kantor--for this historic breakthrough.  The American people 
should know that they were well represented by people I personally 
observed to be tough and tireless and genuine advocates for our 
interests and our ideals.

All of us can be proud that, at this critical moment when many nations 
are facing economic troubles that have caused them to turn inward, the 
United States has once again reached outward and has made global 
economic growth its cause.

This year, we've worked hard to put the economic interest of America's 
broad middle class back at the center of our foreign policy as well as 
our domestic policy.  Not since the end of World War II has the United 
States pushed to completion trade agreements of such significance as 
NAFTA  and GATT.  We've shown leadership by example.  We've set forth a 
vision for a thriving global economy.  And our trading partners, to 
their credit, have also rallied to that cause. Today's agreement caps a 
year  of economic renewal for our nation.  It should give us added 
reason for confidence as we enter the new year.  But it should also 
reinforce our determination to do better in the new  year. (###)


The text of the President's letter to congress and the Executive Summary 
of the results of the GATT Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations will be printed in Dispatch Supplement Vol. 4, No. 5. (###)




ARTICLE 2

War and Peace:  The Problems and Prospects of American Diplomacy in the 
Middle East
Edward P. Djerejian, Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs
Address before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, November 30, 1993

At its most basic level, foreign policy is concerned with the questions 
of war and peace.  As we move into the post-Cold War era, other issues--
especially transnational ones such as economics, the environment, human 
rights, and democratization --have rightly taken a more prominent place 
on the foreign policy agenda.  But as the headlines remind us--from 
Tajikistan to the Caucasus to the Balkans, from the Persian Gulf to the 
Horn of Africa--the primordial issues of conflict and reconciliation 
have a chronic way of reasserting themselves.

The politics of war and peace have  a particular resonance in the Middle 
East.  David Fromkin reminds us in his book on the creation of the 
modern Middle East (1914-22) that this region, as we know it today, 
emerged from decisions made by the Allies during and after World War I.  
He quotes Archibald Wavell, an officer who served under Allenby in the 
Palestine campaign, commenting on the treaties bringing the First World 
War to an end:

     After the war to end all war, they seem to have been pretty 
successful in Paris at making 'a peace to end all peace.'

Indeed, the history of the region has been plagued with conflict.

I have been involved during a good part of my 30 years in the Foreign 
Service in Middle East affairs.  Over this period, American interests in 
the area have been challenged by war along two axes:  in the Levant, 
which is at the crossroads of Asia, Africa, and Europe; and in the 
Persian Gulf.

The Arab-Israeli conflict has turned into a shooting war at least five 
times since the founding of Israel in 1948 and has affected U.S. 
interests in the region as a whole.  One of the basic tenets of our 
policy throughout this period was and remains our commitment to Israel's 
security and well-being.  That commitment, I underscore, is unshakable.  
This is especially the case as Israel takes the risks for peace in the 
Arab-Israeli peace process.

Our interests in the region also have been threatened by the efforts of 
one power or another to achieve undue influence in the Persian Gulf.  I 
do not need to belabor the strategic importance of this area:  65% of 
the world's known petroleum reserves are located there.  Our willingness 
to commit human and material resources for its defense demonstrates the 
importance of our interests in the Persian Gulf area.  Dangers posed by 
the Iran-Iraq war led us to provide armed convoys for shipping in the 
Gulf in the 1980s.  And, of course, Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait 
prompted a U.S.-led coalition to take up arms to roll back Iraq's 
aggression against Kuwait.

In short, regional conflict threatens our objectives of promoting 
stability, broadened political participation, economic growth, and 
social justice in the Middle East.  Weapons of mass destruction pose a 
serious threat to the region as a whole; the rise of extremism in either 
a religious or a secular guise is an important and destabilizing factor; 
unresolved political conflicts and border disputes need to be addressed 
peacefully through negotiations and not by military means; and the 
increasingly pressing needs of the people of the region for broader 
political participation and social and economic justice must be 
addressed in a much more responsive manner by governments.

We have, therefore, a major interest not just in preventing the outbreak 
of conflict and promoting the peaceful resolution of disputes, but also 
in changing the behavior and limiting the means at the disposal of 
potential war-makers and in isolating extremists willing to pursue the 
options of destabilization and conflict.  These elements inform one side 
of our policy in the region that can be defined as preventive diplomacy 
and deterrence.

Promoting Security in the Gulf
In this vein, a key objective is to ensure the physical security of the 
Persian Gulf--to reduce the chances that another aggressor will emerge 
to seek control over the area, threaten the independence of existing 
states, and dictate policy in the region.  In the wake of the Gulf war 
of 1991, we have been working toward this in a number of ways.  Part of 
our strategy has been to build up the defense capabilities of our 
friends in the area.  In this connection:

--  We have encouraged the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council to 
work more closely together on collective defense and security 
arrangements;

--  We have helped individual GCC countries meet their appropriate 
defense requirements, including arms sales that increase their 
capabilities to conduct coordinated operations with U.S. and other GCC 
forces; and

--  We have worked to build up our own ability to act in the region by 
maintaining strong forces there, by pre-positioning vital equipment and  
material, and by concluding access agreements with four GCC states.  We 
hope to sign a new agreement with a fifth GCC state early next month.

Our goal here is to complement, not replace, the Gulf states' collective 
security efforts.  We do not intend to station troops permanently 
anywhere in the region.  Our objective is to deter threats and to raise 
the threshold at which direct U.S. military action would be needed.

Another element of our strategy in the Gulf is to circumscribe potential 
threats to the region.  Today, those threats are likely to come from two 
sources--Iraq and Iran.

Iraq remains a regional power with a long-term potential to threaten 
regional and U.S. interests, but it is subject to an extensive and 
highly rigorous set of international restrictions, under the aegis of 
the United Nations, on its freedom of action.  In this context, our goal 
is unambiguous--Iraq's full compliance with all UN Security Council 
resolutions and with the measures taken by the international coalition 
to enforce and monitor them.

There is no convincing evidence that Saddam Hussein's regime is prepared 
to meet this standard.  Iraq is not, at this time, in full compliance 
with any of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions.  It has not 
even met the requirements of the resolution that ended the fighting in 
the Gulf war. With such a record, Iraq's calls for negotiations to end 
international sanctions are, at best, premature.

Let me be clear:  We bear no ill will toward the Iraqi people.  Saddam 
Hussein's regime's brutal repression of its civilian population is a 
matter of horrific record.  The Iraqi Government could today alleviate 
the suffering of the Iraqi people by ceasing its repression, especially 
in the north against the Kurds and in the south against the Shiites, and 
by taking advantage of UNSC Resolutions 706 and 712, which allow Iraq to 
sell limited oil exports  under UN control to purchase food, medicine, 
and other humanitarian goods.  

We have never called into question Iraq's territorial integrity, which 
should be maintained.  In sum, we are determined that the will of the 
international community as expressed in UN Security Council resolutions 
be enforced to ensure that Iraq can never again threaten its neighbors 
or pose a threat to peace.

As for Iran, we have very deep and serious concerns about its behavior 
in five areas:

--  Iran's quest for nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and 
the means for their delivery;

--  Iran's continued involvement in terrorism and assassination 
worldwide;

--  Iran's opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process, and its support 
for groups like Hizballah that seek to obstruct the peace process 
through violence;

--  Iran's threats and subversive activities against its neighbors; and

--  Iran's dismal human rights record at home.

Our policy is not aimed at changing the Iranian Government but at 
inducing Iran to change its behavior in these areas.  We have made clear 
that we are prepared to enter into dialogue with authorized 
representatives of the Iranian Government to discuss the differences 
between us.  We seek to persuade Iran that it cannot expect to enjoy 
normal state-to-state relations so long as it violates the norms of the 
international community.  This means working with members of the 
international community to deny Iran access to technology and other 
means by which it can facilitate the pursuit of policies of 
destabilization, terrorism, and acquisition of weapons of mass 
destruction.

Stanching the Flow of Weapons Of Mass Destruction
An important part of the threats posed by Iraq and Iran--and other 
regional actors, such as Libya--stems from their efforts to acquire and 
develop non-conventional weaponry and advanced conventional arms.  So a 
central policy objective is to stanch the flow of weapons of mass 
destruction into the region.  In any future conflict in the Middle East, 
the use of such weapons would have devastating consequences, and every 
effort must be made to prevent this worst-case scenario.  Already, the 
Middle East is one of the most heavily-armed regions in the world.

We have several initiatives under way to address this problem.  These 
include seeking accession by regional parties to the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty.  Our Arms Control in the Middle East Initiative 
addresses the influx of advanced and destabilizing conventional weapons 
into the region.  The multilateral working group on arms control and 
regional stability set up at the Madrid peace conference continues its 
valuable work exploring confidence-building measures.

Political Extremism and Terrorism
The aggressive designs of regional powers are not the only source of 
turmoil in the Middle East.  The emergence of extremist movements and 
terrorism also contributes to regional instability.

Let me reflect for a moment on the question of political extremism--
either secular or religious.  When I joined the Foreign Service in the 
early 1960s, secular and radical Arab nationalism was in its heyday.  I 
witnessed the phenomenon first-hand in Beirut, which hosted an array of 
Arab nationalist parties from all over the Middle East.  The years since 
then have overtaken this movement.  Its appeal has diminished in the 
Arab "street."  In its place, in part--reflecting how the Middle East is 
coping with the challenge of modernity, and the pressing economic, 
social, and educational requirements of a burgeoning, youthful 
population--we have witnessed an Islamic revival in all its diversity.

This revival causes a great deal of apprehension and misunderstanding.  
Some say that it is causing a widening gap between Western values and 
those of the Muslim world.  It is important to assess this phenomenon 
carefully so that we do not fall victim to misplaced fears.  I dealt 
with this subject in more detail in a speech I gave at Meridian House in 
June 1992.

In sum, the Cold War is not being replaced with a new competition 
between Islam and the West.  Americans recognize Islam as one of the 
world's great faiths.  It is practiced on every continent.  It counts 
among its adherents millions of citizens of the United States.  As 
Westerners, we acknowledge Islam as a historic civilizing force among 
the many that have influenced and enriched our culture.

In countries throughout the Middle East and North Africa, we see groups 
or movements seeking to reform their societies in keeping with Islamic 
beliefs and ideals.  Considerable diversity    exists in the expression 
of Islamic aspirations.  What we see are believers in different 
countries placing renewed emphasis on Islamic principles, and 
governments accommodating Islamic political activity to varying degrees 
and in different ways.

Indeed, the Arab world's approach to political participation is varied, 
with parliamentary elections in Yemen, Jordan, and Kuwait and the 
establishment of Consultative Councils in some of the Gulf countries, 
including Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the UAE.  In Jordan, the  Islamic 
groups have participated fully in the election process.  In Algeria, the 
electoral process was suspended and the government is coping with the 
requirements of political and economic reform.

We detect no monolithic, international effort behind these Islamic 
movements, but we are seriously concerned over Iran's exploitation of 
Islamic extremist groups throughout the region and over Sudan's role in 
supporting such groups in North Africa.  Increasing coordination between 
such regimes and extremist groups and their resort to terrorism demands 
our vigilance.  In the last analysis, however, it is social injustice--
the lack of economic, educational, and political opportunities--that 
gives the extremists their constituency in each country.

With this in mind, our efforts to combat extremism and terrorism have 
several facets.  We start from the premise of our own basic values as 
Americans:  respect for human rights, pluralism, women's and minority 
rights, and popular participation in government.  On the one hand, we 
seek to address the political, social, and    economic conditions that 
serve as a spawning ground for extremist movements.  On the other hand, 
we take vigorous action to deter, isolate, and punish terrorist groups 
and to deal firmly with states that support terrorism.  The UN embargo 
placed on Libya for its role in the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 and UTA 
flight 772 is a clear reminder of our--and the international 
community's--strong stance against state-sponsored terrorism.

Changing the Middle East Equation:  The Peace Option
The elements of our policy that I have addressed thus far are, in a 
sense, of a deterrent and defensive nature, designed to avert, deter, or 
contain the dangers of war, terrorism, and extremism.  That is only one 
side of the story.  I have come here to talk about war and peace in the 
Middle East.  And the good news of late from the region concerns the 
prospects for and the first breakthroughs toward peace since the Camp 
David accords.

Let me begin with a personal observation.  During my years with the 
State Department, successive U.S.  Administrations wrestled with the 
seemingly intractable problems of the Near East.  Peace initiatives were 
launched and launched again in hopes of finding solutions to the 
region's wars, terrorism, assassinations, and deep-rooted animosities.  
Those of us working on these issues exploited any viable opening to 
bring the antagonists together.  Our efforts often met with frustration 
or were interrupted by unexpected tragedies.  Some did succeed, such as 
the Camp David accords. 

Having experienced this, I can tell you that there is something 
different again in the air these days.  Israel's and the PLO's decision 
to recognize each other and their September 13 signing at the White 
House of the Declaration of Principles have opened a new vista in which 
we can see, perhaps for the first time, the outlines of an enduring and 
comprehensive Middle East peace settlement.

The Donors' Conference
Let us review what has happened.  Two weeks after the signing of the 
Declaration of Principles, together with our Russian co-sponsors we 
organized the Conference to Support Middle East Peace.  Forty-six 
countries and international organizations pledged more than $600 million 
in aid for the first year covered by the Declaration of Principles, and 
$1 billion for the first two years.  For the five-year period covered by 
the agreement, pledges of support approached $2 billion.  The U.S. 
contribution is $500 million over five years.

The purpose of the conference is to help improve conditions on the 
ground--in the West Bank and Gaza--so the people who live there will see 
material improvements in their lives.  Once they see that they have a 
stake in this peace process, they will make it work.  By holding this 
conference, the international community was sending the signal that this 
peace effort must not fail.  But this is only part of the story.  The 
major responsibility for advancing the process rests with the parties.  
Let us not forget that the two fundamental precepts of the peace process 
launched at Madrid are:  first, UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338, which are 
based on the principle of land for peace; and second, direct face-to-
face negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations
Within this framework, the Declaration of Principles established an 
ambitious set of objectives toward which Israelis and Palestinians must 
work.  Among other things, it calls for:

--  Concluding an agreement by December 13, 1993, on Israeli withdrawal 
from Gaza and Jericho and the structure of the withdrawal;
--  Completing Israeli withdrawal and transferring authority in Gaza and 
Jericho to the Palestinians by April 13, 1994; and
--  Elections for an interim self-government authority in the West Bank 
and Gaza by July 13, 1994.

Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat moved quickly to take up this 
work in an October 6 meeting in Cairo.  A number of rounds of talks on 
Israeli withdrawal and security issues have been held in recent weeks in 
Egypt.  Difficulties have arisen on some key questions, but the Israelis 
and the Palestinians have been working them out directly and 
constructively in subsequent talks.  These meetings demonstrate that the 
hard work of peace-making is under way.

The Other Bilaterals
My tenure as Assistant Secretary coincided with the start of the Madrid 
peace process, when Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Palestinians agreed 
to commence bilateral negotiations with Israel.  Those of us involved 
with the talks thought that the key to success toward a comprehensive 
settlement was achieving a breakthrough in one area that could spur 
progress in the other negotiating tracks.  The Israeli-Palestinian 
Declaration of Principles seems to have provided that catalyst.

The day after the signing of the Declaration of Principles, the Israelis 
and the Jordanians initialed a substantive common agenda for their 
negotiations.  This agenda codifies the progress made thus far in their 
talks and provides the framework for further discussion leading to a 
final settlement.

October 1, the day of the donors' conference, Israeli-Jordanian 
relations took a more dramatic step forward.  Jordanian Crown Prince 
Hassan and Israeli Foreign Minister Peres appeared with President 
Clinton at the White House to announce the creation of a trilateral 
U.S.-Israel-Jordan economic committee to look at next steps for economic 
development in the two Middle Eastern countries and how they will work 
with the Palestinians in Gaza and Jericho.  That committee held its 
first meeting three weeks ago in Paris and will meet again next week in 
Washington.

While the Palestinian issue is the political heart of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, the Israel-Syria negotiations address the conflict's core 
geopolitical and strategic issues.  Therefore, tangible progress in the 
Israel-Syria track is essential to securing a comprehensive regional 
settlement.  While the parties continue to differ over key questions 
such as land, peace, and security, they remain committed to these 
negotiations with the aim of reaching agreement on their own Declaration 
of Principles.  President Clinton and Secretary Christopher have been 
directly and actively involved in helping move this track forward.

Lebanon and Israel are continuing in their effort to reach agreement on 
a political frame of reference dealing with the key issues of land and 
peace, and to establish a military committee to discuss the pressing 
issue of security, especially in southern Lebanon.  In this respect, let 
me reiterate our firm commitment to Lebanon's political independence, 
sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

We remain active in all the bilaterals, seeking ways to bring the 
parties closer together.  President Mubarak's visit in October and Prime 
Minister Rabin's visit earlier this month were opportunities to exchange 
views with key players at the highest levels.  With Secretary 
Christopher's trip to the region next week, we will continue to explore 
the openings in pursuit of a genuine, lasting, comprehensive peace--a 
peace on all fronts.

Further Opportunities
We are heartened by the significant progress in recent months and are 
following up energetically in the bilateral negotiations.  But 
extraordinary opportunities remain, beyond the bilaterals, to expand the 
horizon for productive and creative interaction transcending old taboos 
among the peoples of the region.

Look at the signs.  They are everywhere.  In the working groups on the 
multilateral side of the peace process, Israelis and interlocutors from 
12 Arab countries are taking on issues of mutual interest regarding arms 
control, the environment, economic development, water, and refugees.  
This fall, the multilaterals reached another milestone as the refugee 
working group met in Tunis and the environmental group met in Cairo, 
putting working groups into the region for the first time.

Outside the multilaterals, the barriers to Arab-Israeli normalization 
are also falling.  This was evident after the signing of the Declaration 
of Principles.  On the way back to Israel, Prime Minister Rabin stopped 
in Morocco for a well-publicized meeting with King Hassan.

But we must overcome and remove continuing barriers to reconciliation 
and cooperation.  First and foremost, we must broaden the scope of 
economic interaction in the region.  The countries of the Middle East 
share many problems and advantages.  All would gain from economic 
integration.  A key first step toward this must be an end to the Arab 
boycott.

The Israelis have made a major gesture in their agreement with the PLO.  
The Arab world must reciprocate.  In light of the latest advances in the 
peace process--and especially when Israel and the PLO are discussing 
economic issues in a joint committee--the boycott is an anachronism.  It 
punishes Palestinians and Israelis alike.  It punishes American 
businesspeople and companies.  It is time to end it.

In light of the breakthrough last month, we are already seeing reports 
of contacts between Arab and Israeli businessmen and women and even the 
establishment of joint ventures.  Regional entrepreneurs understand the 
business opportunities that will accompany the achievement of peace.  
Indeed, this is precisely the kind of cooperation that will cement the 
peace and make it real.

Closing the Circle:  Limiting the Cycle of War
Progress toward Arab-Israeli peace is important to us on several levels.  
On the most immediate one, resolving the long-standing antagonisms 
between Israel and its neighbors is the most direct way to ensure 
Israel's long-term security and well-being, and to reduce tensions in 
the Levant.

Yet on a broader level, progress in the Arab-Israeli peace process 
contributes to stability in a major way by circumscribing the option of 
conflict and war throughout the Middle East.  It does so in different 
ways:

--  Since the creation of Israel, extremists in the region have 
exploited the Palestinian issue to advance their political agendas.  
Resolving Palestinian-Israeli differences removes a key rallying point 
for radical elements--secular and religious.

--  The arms race in the Middle East is partly fueled by the Arab-
Israeli conflict.  Its resolution should lead to some easing in arms 
acquisitions and the lessening of heavy burdens of defense expenditures 
for Israel and Arab countries alike.  The hoped-for savings can go into 
urgently needed economic and social programs.

--  According to population projections by the United Nations,  the 
Middle East's population is likely to double in the next 30 years.  By 
2025, between 490 million and 560 million people could be living in the 
Middle East.  The implication of this growth on the delicate balance 
among people, politics, and resources, especially water, is evident.  
The work begun in the multilateral working groups on these key issues is 
an important first step as the governments and peoples of the area look 
to regional solutions to pressing political, economic, and social needs.

As I look back at the period I have been Assistant Secretary since 1991, 
and before I assume my new duties as Ambassador to Israel early next 
year, I am at once hopeful and prudent.  While essential and historic in 
its consequences, a fair and comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace is no 
panacea.  As I outlined earlier, the Middle East remains a dangerous 
neighborhood.  It would not banish the specter of war or terrorism from 
the Middle East.  It would not diminish the efforts of Iraq and Iran to 
acquire weapons of mass destruction.

But contrary to what happened in the post-World War I period, it could 
be a peace to build a larger peace.  It would help marginalize the 
extremists and the enemies of peace.  It would greatly strengthen the 
hands of all moderate forces seeking stability, cooperation, and 
socioeconomic progress in the Middle East.  It would enable the core 
parties to the conflict to turn more of their attention inward, to 
devote their resources to building the necessary political and economic 
infrastructure for development.  Further, it would provide the basis for 
effective regional cooperation at various levels.  It would also portray 
to the region and the world  that ancient animosities are susceptible to 
peaceful, diplomatic resolution.

Statecraft has no more compelling goal than to seek and consolidate 
peace and reconciliation between countries and peoples.  Where else can 
this be more significant than in the Middle East, where three of the 
worlds' major religions originated--Judaism, Christianity, and Islam?  
President Clinton, Secretary Christopher, and all of us involved in 
carrying out our policy will do everything in our power to make that 
goal the reality in tomorrow's Middle East. (###)



ARTICLE 3

Recent Events in Haiti
Ambassador Lawrence Pezzullo, Special Adviser to the Secretary on Haiti, 
U.S. Ambassdor to Haiti William Swing
Opening statements from a briefing, Washington, DC, December 7, 1993

Ambassador Pezzullo.  As you probably know, yesterday Prime Minister 
Malval announced that he would do two things:  One, he would launch a 
new initiative to call for a conference of all Haitian parties--I mean 
by that not political parties, but people within the society:  private 
sector, labor, military--to see if they could bring a modicum of 
consensus to their thinking so that they can deal with, as he puts it, a 
situation which  has brought the country to the end of its rope.

He also announced that he would be stepping down as Prime Minister on 
the 15th of December, as he had previously said, but would stay on as 
acting Prime Minister during this period.  We find this a most 
intriguing initiative in the sense that what has been lacking in the 
Haitian issue has been this element of reconciliation--of the Haitian 
people actually coming together from all sources and accepting the fact 
that the society will keep unraveling itself if it doesn't deal with the 
major problems.

As you know, we had an international effort--which began early this year 
with the President making a major statement of U.S. support for a 
negotiated settlement to be conducted under the auspices of the United 
Nations and the Organization of American States--that led, over a period 
of time, to the Governors Island meeting at which both the President of 
the country, Aristide, and the commander-in-chief of the army signed the 
Governors Island agreement, which saw a process that would result in a 
return to constitutional government and, ultimately, the return of the 
President himself.

That began a process of change within the society that saw the return of 
a constitutional government--with Prime Minister Malval becoming the 
embodiment of the constitutional government--and which then broke down 
when the military failed to uphold its portion of the agreement.

Under the Governors Island agreement, there was an automatic return of 
the sanctions.  The sanctions under Governors Island were suspended, 
rather than lifted, when the Prime Minister became confirmed.  So they 
were lifted on his confirmation--were suspended and then reinstituted 
when the military failed to fulfill its obligations.

So they're under the reimposition of those sanctions, which is 
pressuring the country, creating a shortage of gasoline and fuel, and 
which is responsible, in large measure, for the end-of-the-rope comment 
by the Prime Minister.  We very strongly endorse his new initiative.  
We're hopeful that it will force the military to take cognizance of 
where they're taking the country and will bring about, as I said, a 
consensus within the society which can bring a return to a more peaceful 
way of life and, ultimately, the support of the international community 
for a constitutional government which serves the people of the country.

Let me stop here and have Ambassador Swing touch on two other topics, 
and then we'll both be here to take your questions.


Ambassador Swing.  Thank you very much.  As the international community-
-and our own country, the United States of America--under Security 
Council resolutions continues to implement the most comprehensive 
sanctions and embargo we have known in the Western Hemisphere, I know 
that there are at least two issues uppermost in the minds of all of us 
and, I suspect, you.  If we look at media reporting, these issues are 
continually coming to the fore.

One, of course, is the effect of sanctions on the Haitian people, 
especially the most vulnerable groups in society; and, secondly, the 
effect of sanctions on refugees and migration and what we often call the 
"boat people," especially as the January period, which is the principal 
period of exodus, approaches.

I thought it might be useful if I said just a little bit on each subject 
to get our discussion going.  First of all, as regards humanitarian 
relief, I think you know that we are implementing a two-track policy:  
applying the pressure, as Ambassador Pezzullo has already mentioned, 
through the sanctions and embargo operation to try to move the 
democratic process forward; and at the same time, on the other track, to 
try to protect those groups which are most affected by the sanctions--
particularly small children and babies, mothers, pregnant women, and old 
and infirm people.

So we are continuing, and actually increasing, our feeding programs.  We 
feed approximately 680,000 Haitians one meal a day through our own U.S. 
aid programs.  These are matched--probably by another 200,000--by other 
friendly governments and international organizations.

At the same time, we are providing access to various medical services--
from medicines to family planning and AIDS prevention--to another 2 
million Haitians.  These programs are ongoing.

I know there's been a lot of concern on the part of everyone about the 
effect of the fuel scarcity on our ability to keep these services going.  
First of all, we pre-positioned stocks near the feeding centers well 
before the sanctions were resumed in late October.

Secondly, the private volunteer organizations on which we depend have 
already been able to get some relief from the government's 800,000-
gallon strategic fuel supply.  In addition to that--and I wouldn't want 
to go into detail in this forum, today, because I think it's premature, 
I think decisions are being taken probably as we talk--we did send down 
to Haiti a team from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance--and the 
United Nations has had its own officials on the spot--to develop 
together a fuel distribution plan, which would probably be administered 
through some form of international cooperative agreement with the Malval 
government, to ensure that fuel continues to get to the private 
volunteer organizations on whom distribution of our food stocks and 
medicines depend.

You'll hear more about that.  We're basically optimistic.  It's a good 
plan.  There are some details to be worked out, but we are confident 
that this will be in place very soon; and, therefore, we will be 
positioned for the difficult period ahead as the sanctions and embargo 
begin to take full effect.

The second concern that I know has been reflected in a lot of articles 
and editorials has to do with the on-going question of the Haitian "boat 
people."  I think you should know--and I apologize if I'm going over old 
ground with you--this Administration has taken a very clear position on 
the migrant issue.  It has essentially said that, in addition to the 
relief measures which I will outline for you, it is prepared to review 
the migrant policy once the democratic system in Haiti is restored.

Meanwhile, what we have done, beginning in February 1992, is to 
establish the possibility of being processed as an immigrant in-land--in 
Haiti.  We opened our first refugee processing center in Port-au-Prince 
in February 1992, then moved from our consular section to an actual 
center--which is separate from the consulate and the embassy and, 
therefore, more politically acceptable--in October 1992.

We opened a large center in Les Cayes in April 1993, and the next month 
in Cap-Haitien, the second- largest city, which is in the northern part 
of the country.  I visited all those centers.  They're functioning very 
well.  The numbers are up.  We have so far processed about 51,000 
people.  About  2,000 applications have been approved and more than 
1,500 Haitians, under this new system, have arrived in the United States 
with the assistance of the Red Cross and volunteer organizations in the 
United States.

We will continue that policy, believing that this is a more humane 
policy than having people strike out to sea in unseaworthy vessels.  I 
should leave it at that, at this point, and will be happy to take your 
questions.   (###)



ARTICLE 4

Burundi:  U.S. Lifts Suspension of Aid

Statement by Acting Department Spokesman Christine Shelly, Washington, 
DC, December 10, 1993.

The United States is pleased to announce that, effective immediately, it 
is lifting the suspension of aid to Burundi.  This decision was taken in 
light of the failure of the October 21 coup attempt and in response to 
the request of Burundi's elected government.  We view the lifting of the 
suspension as a concrete sign of our support for and confidence in the 
government.

We are encouraged by the Burundi Government's efforts to consolidate its 
control and restore order and democracy to the country.  We were pleased 
that the ceremonies honoring slain President Ndadaye and other officials 
were held in a calm and peaceful atmosphere befitting the solemn 
occasion.  The U.S. Government continues to urge all Burundians to cease 
all violence, respect the authority of the elected government, and 
return to the path of national reconciliation. (###)

END OF DISPATCH VOL 4, NO 51.