1.  Strengthening the Coordination Of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance 
-- Madeleine K. Albright
2.  South Korean President Visits the United States -- President 
Clinton, South Korean President Kim, Secretary Christopher, South Korean 
Foreign Minister Han
3.  Chemical Weapons Convention -- President Clinton
4.  Status Report on Iraq's Non-Compliance With UN Resolutions -- 
President Clinton 
5.  The Cuban Democracy Act:  One Year Later -- Alexander F. Watson 
6.  UN Security Council Resolution 878 on Somalia 


Strengthening the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance
Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United 
Statement before the UN General Assembly, New York City, November 19, 

Mr. President, I welcome the opportunity to address the General Assembly 
today regarding the pressing subject of humanitarian assistance.

The community of nations should do all it reasonably can to relieve the 
suffering resulting from natural and human-caused disaster.  But meeting 
this responsibility is growing more difficult.  Devastation wrought by 
nature's fury is more than matched by the fury and folly of humankind.  
Ethnic and other subnational conflicts have created unprecedented 
demands for UN help.  The number of displaced persons and refugees--the 
international homeless--is at an all-time high.  The fabric of the 
international relief system has been stretched taut.

Over the years, UN agencies with a relief role have saved countless 
lives.  There are enormous grounds for pride in what has been 
accomplished.  But when we contemplate current and future challenges, 
there are no grounds for complacency.

A look around the world tells us that the infectious consequences of 
conflict continue to spread.  Africa alone is home to a dozen ongoing 
insurgencies and 6 million refugees.  Fighting in the Caucasus has 
prompted Iran to set up refugee camps inside Azerbaijan.  Armenia faces 
a second harsh winter cut off from adequate supplies of food, water, and 
power.  Hundreds of thousands are threatened in Georgia and Tajikistan.  
More than 2 million Afghans and 1 million Iraqi Kurds remain in need.  
And in Bosnia the war continues, and the suffering grows worse.

The quantity of resources available to respond to those emergencies has 
not kept pace with rising demand.  There is a risk of donor fatigue and, 
potentially, even donor collapse.  Already, the gap between needs and 
responses in many locations is enormous.

All this makes efficiency a matter of much more than bureaucratic 
interest.  Let us never forget that the stakes are not statistics or 
politics or camera placements and news stories.  Rather, what is at 
stake is life or death for blameless children and grandparents and 
mothers and fathers.  Their fate depends upon our choices.  My 
government believes that the UN system must choose to become more 
efficient and professional in coordinating its disaster relief programs.

The effort to reform UN humanitarian programs extends back at least to 
the creation of the UN Disaster Relief Office in 1972.  UNDRO was 
supposed to improve coordination, eliminate duplication, and put someone 
clearly in charge.  It didn't.  So two years ago, we  created a 
Department of Humanitarian Affairs, or DHA, with new tools to do the 
same jobs and more.

Although DHA's efforts have been spread thin by the new wave of 
humanitarian emergencies, its work has begun to take root.  Consolidated 
appeals have been established.  The Central Emergency Revolving Fund has 
helped speed aid to victims.  The Inter-Agency Standing Committee could 
become an effective coordinating forum for UN agencies and humanitarian 
organizations.  The effectiveness of these tools will be enhanced 
further as the conclusions reached at ECOSOC this past summer are 

As I will describe in greater detail, my government is prepared to help 
bolster DHA in conjunction with reforms within that department.  We are 
pleased that Under Secretary General Eliasson is taking steps to 
increase the efficiency and effectiveness of DHA, and we fully support 
him in this effort.  We also believe that DHA capabilities need to be 
reinforced in three critical areas.

First, DHA must have the recognized leadership role, the authority, and 
the resources to ensure that the UN's rapid response to emergencies is 
properly coordinated.  DHA must be the party responsible for systems-
wide performance in the delivery of humanitarian assistance in complex 

Second, DHA must have a modern information system encompassing all 
emergency requirements.  This includes providing data on assessed needs 
and tracking the capabilities and contributions of agencies and donors 
in response to those needs.

The United States already provides funds for the International Emergency 
Readiness and Response Information System.  As part of a joint 
initiative with Japan, the United States is now prepared to make two new 
commitments as DHA implements its reforms.  We will give DHA the 
equipment necessary to establish a modern information network system in 
New York which can be linked to Geneva and the field.  And we will 
provide five portable satellite communications earth stations for links 
with field offices in emergencies.  The total value of this new U.S. 
contribution exceeds $500,000.  We are pleased that the Government of 
Japan is able to join us in contributing to this critical information 
function, and we invite others to do so as well.

Third, and finally, DHA needs the resources necessary to coordinate a 
rapid response by the UN to an emergency where insufficient capacity 
exists in the field.  DHA must determine when field deployments are 
required, including its own when necessary, and must be responsible for 
seeing that sufficient resources are put in place.  Accordingly, we urge 
that DHA be given access to the interest earned by the Central Emergency 
Revolving Fund for this purpose until a permanent solution is found.

Let me also mention the role Under Secretary General Eliasson has 
played.  He has established a new department in the midst of an 
unprecedented increase in humanitarian emergencies.  He has worked to 
help those at risk, whether from drought in Southern Africa, from civil 
violence in the wintry hills of Georgia, or from other forms of 
catastrophe.  So I am particularly pleased to announce today these new 
contributions to support DHA.

I would also like to address myself to the UN humanitarian agencies 
which I hope are represented here today.  As I have said, you all have 
our gratitude for your dedication and extraordinary hard work.  However, 
the United States believes that DHA is not the only part of the UN 
humanitarian system that needs to be strengthened.  We urge the UN 
humanitarian agencies to cooperate with DHA and to accept its leadership 
in coordinating responses to complex emergencies.  That may require some 
loss of customary independence, but it will result in major gains in 
overall effectiveness.

It is also vital that the Under Secretary General for Humanitarian 
Affairs ensure that the humanitarian dimension is incorporated into the 
planning and execution of political and peace-keeping missions.  The 
delivery of emergency relief is often among the primary purposes of such 
a mission.  It is both necessary and appropriate, therefore, that the UN 
official responsible for humanitarian affairs be involved in developing 
and implementing the response.  Such an integrated approach should 
ensure that the peace-keeping, political, and humanitarian elements of 
UN operations do not work at cross purposes.

The role of the Secretary General is also critical.  In the end, his 
leadership will determine whether the UN system coordinates smoothly in 
responding to humanitarian crises and whether it does not.  We urge him 
to take up this challenge forcefully.

The DHA planning effort must also emphasize early intervention.  
Droughts may be inevitable, but famines resulting from drought are not.  
Human conflicts are inevitable, but destructive wars resulting from such 
conflicts are not.  Early intervention requires good information, which 
means UN departments and agencies must pool their data.  It requires a 
willingness on the part of the UN to respond quickly and appropriately 
to threatened emergencies.  And it requires decisive leadership both 
from UN officials and from member states.

Finally, planning for disaster relief must emphasize the continuum 
between emergency help and development ever we respond to an emergency, 
we should begin preparing for the day when the primary mission changes 
from relief to recovery.  Today, there is no better example of this need 
than Somalia.  I, myself, saw that relief efforts in that country have 
saved hundreds of thousands of lives.  Agricultural lands once ravaged 
by violence are now under cultivation.  Children who seemed to have no 
futures are now returning to school.  Basic health needs are being given 
attention.  Somalia is entering the recovery phase.

The test now is whether Somalis are willing and able to take the steps 
that will make an enduring recovery possible.  The conference scheduled 
for November 29 in Addis Ababa is a key opportunity.  If Somali leaders 
demonstrate their own commitment to peace, which is the prerequisite for 
development, international donors will respond.  If they fail to do so, 
the space for effective international action will diminish.

The United States is prepared to lead by example.  At the Addis Ababa 
conference, we will announce an assistance package to Somalia of 
approximately $100 million in new and programmed funds.  These funds 
will be used for humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation projects in 
those regions where progress on political reconciliation and security 
has been made.  These funds will be available if, and only if, Somalis 
make real progress in creating a secure environment and reconciling 
politically.  We urge other donors to participate actively in this 

The international relief system is under grave strain.  We should 
respond by strengthening DHA and by emphasizing the kind of 
comprehensive approach that complex emergencies demand.  We must also 
work together to overcome the obstacles created by political and 
military conflict to the delivery of emergency relief.

Although it is sometimes difficult to separate the humanitarian from 
other components of a peace-keeping mission, there is a difference.  A 
combatant force may well refuse to cease hostilities, to disarm or to 
demobilize out of a legitimate concern for survival.  But there is 
nothing legitimate about using force to starve or freeze innocent 
civilians.  There is nothing legitimate about denying medical aid so 
that children lie screaming as legs are amputated without anesthesia.  
There is nothing legitimate about extorting food or other supplies meant 
for humanitarian relief.  There is, in short, nothing legitimate about 
denying access to the means of human survival.

This issue of access for relief convoys and aircraft will be especially 
critical in Bosnia this winter.  For many, it may mean the difference 
between mere hardship and certain death.  The Bosnian people are weaker 
today than they were last year.  Their capacity to endure hardship has 
been sapped.  If fighting continues, the number in need will be far 
greater and the gravity of their need far more severe than last winter.

The international community is responding.  The Sarajevo airlift has now 
gone on longer than the Berlin airlift 45 years ago.  Pilots from 20 
countries have flown more than 6,000 flights over 500 days.  America 
alone has contributed more than $400 million to the relief effort.  The 
U.S. Department of Defense has developed a new food ration that is high 
in nutrition; it can survive a 10,000 foot airdrop and requires no water 
or fuel for preparation.  And 80% of the airdrops in Bosnia have been 
from American planes.

UN agencies have made plans for this winter.  So have the 
nongovernmental organizations.  We are all prepared and preparing to do 
more.  The U.S. is prepared to make a major contribution to address 
needs during the upcoming winter in Bosnia, and we hope this will 
encourage other donors to make similar contributions.  We congratulate 
Mrs. Ogata on achieving an agreement between the parties in Bosnia to 
ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance by suspending hostilities 
and allowing free and unconditional access to those in need.

We must strive to convince those of all factions and nations, in former 
Yugoslavia and elsewhere, not to interfere with the delivery of 
emergency aid.  One of our great challenges is to establish the 
principle that the UN has a nonviolable right to deliver humanitarian 
relief and that the victims of violence have an equal right to receive 

In closing, I want to thank you once again for the opportunity to 
discuss these issues with you today.  Because of the very great 
challenges we face, it is as important as it has ever been that we work 
together to advance our common goals.  Because the need is so great, our 
efforts, too, must be great.  We must rise above institutional 
jealousies and move beyond the promise of reform to the reality of 
change.  And we must keep the faith that each child fed, each refugee 
housed, each family reunited will inspire others to join with us in 
reducing the toll of tragedy in this troubled world.   (###)


South Korean President Visits the United States 
President Clinton, South Korean President Kim, Secretary Christopher, 
South Korean Foreign Minister Han

Presidents Clinton and Kim 
Opening remarks at White House news conference, Washington, DC, November 
23, 1993.

President Clinton.  Good afternoon.  It is a great pleasure and an honor 
for me to welcome President Kim Yong-sam to Washington today.  During my 
visit to Seoul in July, I had the opportunity to visit with President 
Kim at the Blue House, which is Korea's presidential residence.  I am 
honored to return his gracious hospitality today by welcoming him to our 
White House.

I have a great deal of admiration for President Kim, who for decades has 
worked tirelessly to broaden Korea's democracy at great personal cost to 
himself.  His democratic passage to the presidency is an inspiring 
measure of Korea's progress--proof that freedom knows no regional 
bounds.  I am delighted that his contributions to Korean democracy were 
acknowledged when he received the Averell Harriman Award from the 
National Democratic Institute last evening.

The discussions President Kim and I held today were far-ranging and 
highly productive.  We continued our conversation from the APEC leaders 
meeting in Seattle and expressed our mutual support for APEC's ideal of 
an Asia-Pacific region even more closely integrated through open markets 
and open societies.

Today, we discussed the actions President Kim is taking to advance that 
vision in his nation.  He has taken a number of encouraging steps to 
remove barriers to foreign investment,  to open financial markets, and 
to strengthen intellectual property rights.  I am also very encouraged 
by the good start of the U.S.-Korean dialogue on economic cooperation.  
We must work now to implement the proposals raised in that dialogue.  
Our economic cooperation will be especially vital as both our nations 
seek to achieve a new GATT agreement in the next few weeks.  Like the 
United States, Korea has both a crucial role and a substantial stake in 
bringing the Uruguay Round to a successful conclusion.

The most important piece of our discussions centered on North Korea.  We 
are both concerned by North Korea's concentration of forces near the 
Demilitarized Zone and by its refusal to grant international inspectors 
full access to its nuclear sites.

In recent weeks, my Administration has been working with the Congress, 
South Korea, Japan, our partners in the UN Security Council, and others 
to address North Korea's nuclear program in a firm manner.  Today, I 
reaffirmed to President Kim America's unyielding commitment to South 
Korea's security.  My Administration has made it clear to North Korea 
that it now faces a simple choice.  If it abandons its nuclear option 
and honors its international non-proliferation commitments, the door 
will be open on a wide range of issues--not only with the United States, 
but with the rest of the world.  If it does not, it risks facing the 
increased opposition of the entire international community.

Our goals in this matter are clear:  a non-nuclear peninsula and a 
strong international non-proliferation regime.  To these ends, we are 
prepared to discuss with North Korea a thorough, broad approach to the 
issues that divide us and, once and for all, to resolve the nuclear 
issue.  But we cannot do that in the absence of a dialogue between North 
and South Korea and while there is still growing doubt about the 
continuity of IAEA safeguards.

North Korea's nuclear program and its continuing military threat pose 
serious challenges to both South Korea and America.  Our two nations 
have worked together to overcome these challenges before.  Our 
friendship was forged in the heat of war as our forces fought shoulder-
to-shoulder to turn back aggression.  Our friendship has continued over 
four decades since that war ended, as the people of Korea have 
transformed their country into an economic and democratic model for the 
entire region.

I have enjoyed working with   President Kim to deepen the historic 
friendship between our two nations.  I look forward to working with him 
and with the Korean people in the days to come--on economic issues and 
on important issues of security.  Mr. President.

President Kim.  Ladies and gentlemen:  First of all, I would like to 
thank President Clinton for his welcome extended to me at the White 
House today.  Having met with President Clinton in Seoul in July, in 
Seattle last week, and here in Washington, DC, today, I feel like I am 
meeting an old friend.  

President Clinton has aptly summarized what was discussed in our meeting 
this morning, so I would like to add only a few points to what he has 
mentioned.  President Clinton reaffirmed the strong commitment of the 
United States to the security of Korea and made it clear that there 
would not be an additional reduction of U.S. troops stationed in Korea 
until the North Korean nuclear issue has been resolved.

President Clinton and I agreed to continue our close working 
relationship to ensure peace on the Korean Peninsula as well as its 
regional stability.  In particular, I welcomed and supported President 
Clinton's policy of continuing to maintain the strategy of forward 
deployment by the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, including 
the Korean Peninsula.

As for the North Korean nuclear issue, President Clinton and I 
reaffirmed our shared belief that the resolution of this issue should 
not be delayed any longer, as it poses great threats not only to the 
security of Korea, but also to the global non-proliferation regime.  In 
particular, we agreed to make thorough and broad efforts to bring about 
a final solution, bearing in mind the grave concern the international 
community has demonstrated over this issue.  Both of us expressed 
satisfaction with the close cooperation between our two governments on 
this issue.  And we once again agreed that maintaining a close working 
relationship is essential to the complete resolution of this issue.

President Clinton and I share the mutual satisfaction with the success, 
thus far, of the dialogue for economic cooperation--a mechanism that we 
had agreed to establish during our meeting in July.  We hope that our 
two countries will be able to draw up a long-term plan to expand our 
mutually beneficial economic cooperation.

I also explained to President Clinton that the internationalization of 
the Korean economy, along with liberalization and deregulation, were 
major goals of the new economic policy that my government has actively 
pursued, and that the new economic policy would help broaden the scope 
of the Korea-U.S. economic partnership.

During our discussion, I congratulated President Clinton on the success 
of the APEC leaders' economic conference that was held in Seattle last 
week.  And I would like to pay high tribute to the President for his 
outstanding leadership which helped to make the meeting a resounding 

We are convinced that this meeting will be recorded as an important 
milestone that heralds the coming era of a new Asia-Pacific partnership.  
Based upon the continued development of APEC, President Clinton and I 
reaffirmed our resolve to work closely together to build a new Pacific 

I am entirely satisfied with today's meeting.  I am confident that our 
meeting will help Korea-U.S. relations to evolve to an even higher 
dimension of partnership. 

Finally, I again would like to express my gratitude to President Clinton 
for the warm welcome and hospitality.

Secretary Christopher and Foreign Minister Han 
Opening remarks prior to signing the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, 
Washington, DC, November 23, 1993. 

Secretary Christopher.   Foreign Minister Han, ladies and gentlemen:  
The signing today of this Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty symbolizes the 
determination of both our countries to develop and maintain an 
increasingly close and effective system of bilateral law enforcement 

There has been excellent, mutually beneficial, informal cooperation on 
law enforcement matters for many years, but the United States is 
delighted today to move to establish a more formal bilateral 
relationship by means of this treaty.  The MLAT, which it is called for 
short, covers a broad range of criminal offenses and will provide a 
bilateral mechanism for the provision of evidence and other forms of law 
enforcement assistance for criminal investigations and proceedings.  
When the treaty enters into force, it should provide extraordinarily 
valuable tools for the law enforcement authorities of our two countries, 
particularly in combating various forms of white-collar crime and 
narcotics offenses.

We were also pleased to sign today  an extension of our Special Measures 
Agreement on the U.S.-Republic of  Korea Status of Forces Agreement.  
This agreement provides the framework under which the Government of the 
Republic of Korea helps to support the stationing of U.S. forces in 
South Korea. 

I would like to take this opportunity to express our deep appreciation 
for the contributions the Korean Government has made pursuant to this 
agreement.  As President Clinton has recently affirmed, indeed, just 
within the last two hours, I think:  The commitment of the United States 
to the security of the Republic of Korea remains rock solid.

This agreement, by supporting the deterrent posture of U.S. forces on 
the Korean Peninsula, serves the interest of our two nations and 
contributes directly to the maintenance of peace and stability in the 
northeast Asian region.  Mr. Minister, I am delighted to have a chance 
to sign this with you and shake hands again here and express 

Foreign Minister Han.  Mr. Secretary, I am very pleased to have signed, 
on behalf of my government, the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty and the 
renewed Defense Cost-Sharing Agreement between the Republic of Korea and 
the United States.  My honor is made all the greater by our signing of 
these two treaties here in Washington, DC, during the Korean 
presidential visit to this country. 

Today's treaty signing is proof of the lasting partnership between our 
two countries.  The MLAT is the first step, and a very important one, 
toward the joint prevention of various forms of crime through the 
creation of a bilateral mechanism for law enforcement.  The Defense 
Cost-Sharing Agreement is a device aimed at maintaining a close 
bilateral security cooperation in tune with the changes in regional and 
international circumstances.

I hope that the follow-up measures for the implementation of these two 
treaties will be undertaken in the smooth manner in which they are 
intended so that they will serve as another stepping stone for the 
further promotion of bilateral cooperation in the areas of national 
security and criminal justice.  (###)


Chemical Weapons Convention 
President Clinton
Text of a letter to the Senate, November 23, 1993.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to 
ratification, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their 
Destruction (the "Chemical Weapons Convention" or CWC).  The Convention 
includes the following documents, which are integral parts thereof:  the 
Annex on Chemicals, the Annex on Implementation and Verification, and 
the Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information.  The Convention 
was opened for signature and was signed by the United States at Paris on 
January 13, 1993.  I transmit also, for the information of the Senate, 
the Report of the Department of State on the Convention.

In addition, I transmit herewith, for the information of the Senate, two 
documents relevant to, but not part of, the Convention:  the Resolution 
Establishing the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Text on the Establishment of a 
Preparatory Commission (with three Annexes), adopted by acclamation by 
Signatory States at Paris on January 13, 1993.  These documents provide 
the basis for the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (Preparatory Commission), which is 
responsible for preparing detailed procedures for implementing the 
Convention and for laying the foundation for the international 
organization created by the Convention.  In addition, the recommended 
legislation necessary to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention, 
environmental documentation related to the Convention, and an analysis 
of the verifiability of the Convention consistent with Section 37 of the 
Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, will be submitted 
separately to the Senate for its information.

The Chemical Weapons Convention is unprecedented in its scope.  The 
Convention will require States Parties to destroy their chemical weapons 
and chemical weapons production facilities under the observation of 
international inspectors; subject States Parties' citizens and 
businesses and other non-governmental entities to its obligations; 
subject States Parties' chemical industry to declarations and routine 
inspection; and subject any facility or location in the territory or any 
other place under jurisdiction or control of a State Party to 
international inspection to address other States Parties' compliance 

The Chemical Weapons Convention is also unique in the number of 
countries involved in its development and committed from the outset to 
its nonproliferation objectives.  This major arms control treaty was 
negotiated by the 39 countries in the Geneva-based Conference on 
Disarmament, with contributions from an equal number of observer 
countries, representing all areas of the world.  To date, more than 150 
countries have signed the Convention since it was opened for signature 
in January of this year.

The complexities of negotiating a universally applicable treaty were 
immense.  Difficult issues such as the need to balance an adequate 
degree of intrusiveness, to address compliance concerns, with the need 
to protect sensitive nonchemical weapons related information and 
constitutional rights, were painstakingly negotiated.  The international 
chemical industry, and U.S. chemical industry representatives, in 
particular, played a crucial role in the elaboration of landmark 
provisions for the protection of sensitive commercial and national 
security information.

The implementation of the Convention will be conducted by the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).  The OPCW 
will consist of the Conference of the States Parties, which will be the 
overall governing body composed of all States Parties, the 41-member 
Executive Council, and the Technical Secretariat, an international body 
responsible for conducting verification activities, including on-site 
inspections.  The OPCW will provide a forum in and through which members 
can build regional and global stability and play a more responsible role 
in the international community.

The Convention will enter into force 180 days after the deposit of the 
65th instrument of ratification, but not earlier than 2 years after it 
was opened for signature.  Thus, the Convention can enter into force on 
January 13, 1995, if 65 countries have deposited their instruments of 
ratification with the depositary for the Convention (the Secretary 
General of the United Nations) by July 1994.  The 2-year delay before 
the earliest possible entry into force of the Convention was intended to 
allow Signatory States time to undertake the necessary national 
legislative and procedural preparations and to provide time for the 
Preparatory Commission to prepare for implementation of the Convention. 

The Convention is designed to exclude the possibility of the use or 
threat of use of chemical weapons, thus reflecting a significant step 
forward in reducing the threat of chemical warfare.  To this end, the 
Convention prohibits the development, production, acquisition, 
stockpiling, retention, and, direct or indirect, transfer to anyone of 
chemical weapons; the use of chemical weapons against anyone, including 
retaliatory use; the engagement in any military preparations to use 
chemical weapons; and the assistance, encouragement, or inducement of 
anyone to engage in activities prohibited to States Parties.  The 
Convention also requires all chemical weapons to be declared, 
declarations to be internationally confirmed, and all chemical weapons 
to be completely eliminated within 10 years after its entry into force 
(15 years in extraordinary cases), with storage and destruction 
monitored through on-site international inspection.  The Convention 
further requires all chemical weapons production to cease within 30 days 
of the entry into force of the Convention for a State Party and all 
chemical weapons production facilities to be eliminated (or in 
exceptional cases of compelling need, and with the permission of the 
Conference of the States Parties, converted to peaceful purposes).  
Cessation of production, and destruction within 10 years after the entry 
into force of the Convention (or conversion and peaceful production), 
will be internationally monitored through on-site inspection.

In addition, the Convention prohibits the use of riot-control agents as 
a method of warfare, reaffirms the prohibition in international law on 
the use of herbicides as a method of warfare, and provides for the 
possibility for protection against and assistance in the event of use or 
threat of use of chemical weapons against a State Party.  The 
Administration is reviewing the impact of the Convention's prohibition 
on the use of riot control agents as a method of warfare on Executive 
Order No. 11850, which specifies the current policy of the United States 
with regard to the use of riot control agents in war.  The results of 
the review will be submitted separately to the Senate.

The Convention contains a number of provisions that make a major 
contribution to our nonproliferation objectives.  In addition to 
verification of the destruction of chemical weapons, the Convention 
provides a regime for monitoring relevant civilian chemical industry 
facilities through declaration and inspection requirements.  States 
Parties are also prohibited from providing any assistance to anyone to 
engage in activities, such as the acquisition of chemical weapons, 
prohibited by the Convention.  Exports to non-States Parties of 
chemicals listed in the Convention are prohibited in some instances and 
subject to end-user assurances in others.  Imports of some chemicals 
from non-States Parties are also banned.  These restrictions will also 
serve to provide an incentive for countries to become parties as soon as 
possible.  Finally, each State Party is required to pass penal 
legislation prohibiting individuals and businesses and other 
nongovernmental entities from engaging in activities on its territory or 
any other place under its jurisdiction that are prohibited to States 
Parties.  Such penal legislation must also apply to the activities of 
each State Party's citizens, wherever the activities occur.  Through 
these provisions, the Convention furthers the important goal of 
preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons, while holding out the 
promise of their eventual worldwide elimination.

The Convention contains two verification regimes to enhance the security 
of States Parties to the Convention and limit the possibility of 
clandestine chemical weapons production, storage, and use.  The first 
regime provides for a routine monitoring regime involving declarations, 
initial visits, systematic inspections of declared chemical weapons 
storage, production and destruction facilities, and routine inspections 
of the relevant civilian chemical industry facilities.  The second 
regime, challenge inspections, allows a State Party to have an 
international inspection conducted of any facility or location in the 
territory or any other place under the jurisdiction or control of 
another State Party in order to clarify and resolve questions of 
possible noncompliance.  The Convention obligates the challenged State 
Party to accept the inspection and to make every reasonable effort to 
satisfy the compliance concern.  At the same time, the Convention 
provides a system for the inspected State Party to manage access to a 
challenged site in a manner that allows for protection of its national 
security, proprietary, and constitutional concerns.  In addition, the 
Convention contains requirements for the protection of confidential 
information obtained by the OPCW.

The Convention prohibits reservations to the Articles.  However, the CWC 
allows reservations to the Annexes so long as they are compatible with 
the object and purpose of the Convention.  This structure prevents 
States Parties from modifying their fundamental obligations, as some 
countries, including the United States, did with regard to the Geneva 
Protocol of 1925 when they attached reservations preserving the right to 
retaliate with chemical weapons.  At the same time, it allows States 
Parties some flexibility with regard to the specifics of their 
implementation of the Convention.

Beyond the elimination of chemical weapons, the Chemical Weapons 
Convention is of major importance in providing a foundation for 
enhancing regional and global stability, a forum for promoting 
international cooperation and responsibility, and a system for 
resolution of national concerns.

I believe that the Chemical Weapons Convention is in the best interests 
of the United States.  Its provisions will significantly strengthen 
United States, allied and international security, and enhance global and 
regional stability.  Therefore, I urge the Senate to give early and 
favorable consideration to the Convention, and to give advice and 
consent to its ratification as soon as possible in 1994.

William J. Clinton  (###)


Status Report on Iraq's Non-Compliance With UN Resolutions
President Clinton
Text of a letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, Washington, 
DC, November 29, 1993.

Dear Mr. Speaker:
(Dear Mr. President:)

Consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq 
Resolution (Public Law 102-1), and as part of my effort to keep the 
Congress fully informed, I am reporting on the status of efforts to 
obtain Iraq's compliance with the resolutions adopted by the U.N. 
Security Council.

Inspections and sanctions have significantly debilitated Iraq's ability 
to reconstitute its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in the 
near future.  The U.N. Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have effectively put the Iraqi 
nuclear weapons program out of business in the near term.  The United 
Nations has destroyed Iraqi missile launchers, support facilities, and a 
good deal of Iraq's indigenous capability to manufacture prohibited 
missiles.  It has reduced Iraq's ability to produce chemical weapons; 
UNSCOM teams continue to inventory and destroy chemical munitions.  The 
United Nations has inspected, and will monitor, several facilities 
identified by Iraq as capable of supporting a biological weapons 

Continued vigilance is necessary, however, because we believe that 
Saddam Hussein is committed to rebuilding his WMD capability, especially 
nuclear weapons, and is most likely continuing to conceal weapons-
related activities from the U.N.  It is therefore extremely important 
that the international community maintain current sanctions and continue 
its  efforts to establish the long-term monitoring regime required by 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 715.  Although Iraq has said that it is 
ready to comply with that Resolution, it still must take significant 
steps, including the provision of new data about the suppliers of its 
WMD program.  Rolf Ekeus, the Chairman of UNSCOM, has told Iraq that it 
must establish a clear track record of compliance before he can report 
favorably to the Security Council.  We strongly endorse this approach.

The "no-fly zones" over northern and southern Iraq permit the monitoring 
of Iraq's compliance with Security Council Resolutions 687 and 688.  
Over the last two years, the northern no-fly zone has deterred Iraq from 
a major military offensive in the region.  Since the no-fly zone was 
established in southern Iraq, Iraq's use of aircraft against its 
population in the region has stopped.  

The United States is working closely with the United Nations and other 
organizations to provide humanitarian relief to the people of northern 
Iraq, in the face of Iraqi Government efforts to disrupt this 
assistance.  We have provided temporary generators and spare parts to 
preserve supplies of electricity in the region since the Iraqi 
Government cut off power on August 5, 1993.  We continue to support U.N. 
efforts to mount a relief program for persons in Baghdad and the South 
and to ensure that supplies are not diverted by the Iraqi Government.  
We are continuing to work toward the placement of human rights monitors 
for Iraq as proposed by Max van der Stoel, Special Rapporteur of the 
U.N. Human Rights Commission, and to work for the establishment of a 
U.N. Commission to investigate and publicize Iraqi war crimes and other 
violations of international humanitarian law.

On September 20, after a review of Iraqi compliance with Security 
Council resolutions, the President of the Security Council issued a 
statement noting that there was no consensus to modify the existing 
sanctions regime.  That regime exempts medicine and, in the case of 
foodstuffs, requires only that the U.N. Sanctions Committee be notified 
of food shipments.  The Sanctions Committee also continues to consider 
and, when appropriate, approve requests to send to Iraq materials and 
supplies for essential civilian needs.  The Iraqi Government, in 
contrast, has maintained a full embargo against its northern provinces 
and has acted to distribute humanitarian supplies only to its supporters 
and to the military.

The Iraqi Government has so far refused to sell $1.6 billion in oil as 
previously authorized by the Security Council in Resolutions 706 and 
712.  Talks between Iraq and the United Nations on implementing these 
resolutions have ended unsuccessfully.  Iraq could use proceeds from 
such sales to purchase foodstuffs, medicines, materials, and supplies 
for essential civilian needs of its population, subject to U.N. 
monitoring of sales and the equitable distribution of humanitarian 
supplies (including to its northern provinces).  Iraqi authorities bear 
full responsibility for any suffering in Iraq that results from their 
refusal to implement Resolutions 706 and 712.

Proceeds from oil sales also would be used to compensate persons injured 
by Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait.  The U.N. 
Compensation Commission has received about two million claims so far, 
with another 500,000 expected.  The U.S. Government is preparing to file 
a sixth set of individual claims with the Commission, bringing U.S. 
claims filed to roughly 3,000.  At its most recent session September 27-
29, the Commission's Governing Council discussed how to allocate funds 
among different claimants but did not make decisions.  

Security Council Resolution 778 permits use of a portion of frozen Iraqi 
oil assets to fund crucial U.N. activities concerning Iraq, including 
humanitarian relief, UNSCOM, and the Compensation Commission.  (The 
funds will be repaid, with interest, from Iraqi oil revenues as soon as 
Iraqi oil exports resume.)  The United States is prepared to transfer up 
to $200 million in frozen Iraqi oil assets held in U.S. financial 
institutions, provided that U.S. contributions do not exceed 50 percent 
of the total amount contributed.  We have arranged a total of over $100 
million in such matching contributions thus far.  

Iraq still has not met its obligations concerning Kuwaitis and third-
country nationals it detained during the war. Iraq has taken no 
substantive steps to cooperate fully with the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC), as required by Security Council Resolution 687, 
although it has received over 600 files on missing individuals.  We 
continue to work for Iraqi compliance.

Although the Iraq-Kuwait border has been demarcated, incidents continue.  
On November 15, Iraq released Mr. Kenneth Beaty, a U.S. citizen, who had 
been detained by Iraq since he crossed the border accidentally in April 
1993.  Also on November 2, a small group of Iraqi police in uniform 
entered Kuwaiti territory and, with their guns drawn, stopped Kuwaiti 
citizens in two vehicles.  Three Iraqis were wounded in an ensuing 
fight.  Iraq admitted that its police had crossed into Kuwait.  The U.N. 
Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) continues to monitor the border.

Iraq can rejoin the community of civilized nations only through 
democratic processes, respect for human rights, equal treatment of its 
people, and adherence to basic norms of international behavior.  Iraq's 
government should represent all Iraq's people and be committed to the 
territorial integrity and unity of Iraq.  The Iraqi National Congress 
(INC) espouses these goals, the fulfillment of which would make Iraq a 
stabilizing force in the Gulf region.

I am grateful for the support by the Congress of our efforts.

William J. Clinton  (###)


The Cuban Democracy Act:   One Year Later
Alexander F. Watson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
Statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, 
November 18, 1993

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to discuss recent 
developments in Cuba, U.S. Cuban policy, and the impact of the Cuban 
Democracy Act of 1992.  Let me state at the outset that President 
Clinton's policy toward Cuba is to maintain our economic embargo until 
there is true, democratic reform and respect for human rights, while 
reaching out to the Cuban people to alleviate their distress.  He does 
not intend to deviate from this policy.

Cuba today is confronting the most serious economic crisis in its 
history.  Six billion dollars in annual Soviet aid has ended.  The 
ensuing economic collapse has laid bare the simple, sad truth that 
Cuba's inefficient, planned economy is unable to meet its people's most 
basic needs.  Remember that in the 1950s, Cuba had a per capita income 
among the very highest in Latin America; today, it is among the very 
lowest.  Foreign trade has fallen by 75%.  Factories are closing, under- 
and unemployment may well be approaching 40%, and the 1992 sugar harvest 
was the smallest in 30 years.  Rationing has never been tighter.  Milk 
is only available to children under seven, and Cubans are authorized but 
one shirt, one pair of shoes, and one pair of pants or a skirt per year.

These tragic facts should come as no surprise.  They are the result of 
the failures of Cuba's command economy.  Command economies everywhere 
have produced shortages and rationing, whether in Europe, the Soviet 
Union, Africa, Southeast Asia, or the Caribbean.  

In the face of this economic disaster, the Cuban Government has made 
some grudging modifications, but they have been too little and too late.  
The government's first priority is clear:  to maintain control of the 
Cuban people.  For example, individual private enterprise, abolished in 
1968, is again permissible, but the individual must fall within 1 of 
about 130 specific categories and register with and be approved by the 
state.  Those engaged in private enterprise cannot be university 
graduates and may not hire another person or form a company.  Farmers 
still cannot sell their produce to city dwellers, and it is still 
illegal for Cubans to freely buy and sell their homes or make a private 

Cuba touts its high-priority tourism and biotechnology industries in 
which it has invested so many scarce hard-currency resources.  However, 
these industries cannot succeed in resolving Cuba's pressing economic 
needs, mired as they are in centralized inefficiency.  In addition, Cuba 
maintains an enormous and costly military and security apparatus.  Its 
armed forces--although smaller than in the past--are still the third-
largest in Latin America, after only Brazil and Mexico, countries with 
populations significantly larger than Cuba's.  Its massive state 
security forces seek to control every detail of the daily life of the 
average Cuban.  They are an enormous drain on the Cuban economy.  More 
importantly, however, they indicate the regime's determination to 
maintain absolute political control.  

The modest economic changes I have outlined have not been accompanied by 
political change.  Basic human rights remain repressed and democratic 
practices are not tolerated.  In short, Cuba is a country at a dead end.  
Its economic and political systems have failed and provide the Cuban 
people with neither the prosperity nor the freedom that they long for.  
Their daily existence is marked by scarcity, rationing, and long lines.  
Their future under the current regime is without hope.  

What is our response to this human tragedy, in a country just 90 miles 
from our shores?  On the one hand, we will continue our diplomatic, 
political, and economic isolation of the Cuban Government and maintain 
our economic embargo as a form of leverage and pressure on the Cuban 
Government to start to meet the economic and political needs of its 
people.  On the other hand, we will actively reach out to the Cuban 
people with humanitarian assistance, an offer of improved 
telecommunications, and an increased flow of information.  This two-
track policy, which is reflected in the Cuban Democracy Act, is 
supported by this Administration because it meets our strategic as well 
as our humanitarian interests as a nation.

These two tracks are clearly complementary.  As the authors of the Cuban 
Democracy Act wisely recognized, we must make it clear that the regime's 
denial of basic human rights is and will remain unacceptable to the 
United States, while still reaching out to the Cuban people.  Against 
this backdrop of Cuba's current situation, let me review the act section 
by section.

Section 1703 of the Cuban Democracy Act correctly describes current U.S. 
policy.  We believe that the future of Cuba is for the people of Cuba to 
decide through free and fair elections under international observation.  
We believe that the economic embargo and diplomatic isolation are the 
best ways to maintain pressure on the Cuban Government to adopt 
democratic reforms and to start respecting the human rights of the Cuban 
people.  We also want the Cuban people to know, to use the words of 
Section 1703, that we are also willing to "reduce the sanctions in 
carefully calibrated ways in response to positive developments in Cuba."  
To date, we have seen no movement toward democracy or toward respect for 
human rights.  

Section 1704 authorizes the President to suspend foreign assistance to 
any country that provides assistance, including loans, leases, or 
credits at non-market rates, to Cuba.  We continue to monitor this 
situation closely.  Although $6 billion a year in Soviet assistance to 
Cuba has ended, we have made very clear to the Russian Government 
repeatedly and at the very highest levels the potential and serious 
consequences of any contravention of this provision.  Earlier this year, 
Russia announced a $380-million credit to complete projects started by 
the Soviet Union in Cuba, and we are monitoring the agreement to ensure 
that it is on strict market terms.

Many Western countries, such as Sweden, Canada, and Germany, have ended 
their modest aid programs to Cuba due to human rights concerns.  Others, 
such as Mexico and Venezuela, no longer provide goods to Cuba on 
concessional terms because Cuba failed to pay back earlier concessional 
credits.  Although the EC and Spain have made loans for humanitarian 
assistance to Cuba in 1993, France is the only country we know of that 
maintains an assistance program to Cuba today.  Neither France nor the 
EC receives any U.S. aid; Spain is a candidate for some IMET funds.  
Spain's loan to Cuba, however, was for humanitarian purposes, 
specifically the purchase of food.

Section 1705, "Support for the Cuban People," is being implemented.  
Food donations to Cuba-based individuals or non-governmental 
organizations have been deregulated.  Medicine and medical supplies may 
be licensed by the Department of Commerce for private donation to 
individuals and non-governmental organizations in Cuba.  The 
humanitarian sale of medicine to Cuba may also be licensed when there is 
adequate on-site inspection and other appropriate means to verify that 
the export is not misused.

Since the CDA was passed last year, licenses valued at over $3 million 
have been authorized for large humanitarian aid shipments to Cuba.  
These have included medicines and dental, medical, and hospital supplies 
to numerous non-governmental organizations in Cuba, including the Cuban 
Red Cross; the Cuban Ecumenical Council; the Cuban Baptist Convention; 
the Jewish Casa de la Comunidad Hebrea; and CARITAS Cuba, the charitable 
organization of the Catholic bishops.

Earlier this year, the Administration also authorized the "Basta!" 
organization to send two flotillas from Key West, Florida, with cargos 
of medical and hospital supplies for the Cuban Red Cross and other non-
governmental groups.  These large shipments are, in addition to the 
thousands of fully licensed packages that individuals send to their 
relatives, on the island.  We continue to look at ways to streamline 
procedures for sending humanitarian goods directly 
to the Cuban people.

I want to emphasize, Mr. Chairman, that there are legal means to provide 
significant amounts of humanitarian assistance to the Cuban people.  
This Administration will continue to vigorously oppose politically 
motivated efforts to undermine the U.S. economic embargo.  

In regard to telecommunications, the Cuban Democracy Act authorizes 
"efficient and adequate" telecommunications between the U.S. and Cuba.  
Under guidelines issued by the Administration, U.S. companies are now 
negotiating with Cuban authorities for a substantial increase in 
telephone links, with full current settlement at standard international 
rates.  Unfortunately, the Cuban response has initially been less than 
positive.  However, we know how important it is to Cuban-Americans to be 
able to talk with their loved ones and will continue working for better 
phone links.

In regard to direct mail delivery, our approach to Cuba in the past for 
such service met with a negative Cuban response.  We hope that 
subsequent overtures will be more fruitful.

On assistance to support democracy in Cuba, the National Endowment for 
Democracy continues to support human rights projects related to Cuba, 
disbursing over $500,000 in FY 1993.  These projects are undertaken by a 
wide variety of groups outside of Cuba, such as Freedom House, the Jose 
Marti Foundation, the American Institute for Free Labor Development, the 
Cuban Committee for Human Rights, and the Human Rights Information 
Bureau.  They are designed to promote nonviolent democratic change, as 
the CDA calls for.

Section 1706 (a), the prohibition on licensing trade with Cuba by 
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms, has been in effect since the act was 
signed on October 23, 1992.  The Department of the Treasury has ceased 
to issue licenses for trade with Cuba by U.S.-owned or -controlled firms 
located in third countries that had previously been permitted under 
certain circumstances by Treasury's Cuban Assets Control Regulations.  
Subsequent to the act's passage, and consistent with its provisions, 
Treasury only licensed such transactions where the underlying contracts 
were entered into before the act was enacted.

Section 1706 (b), sanctions on vessels calling at Cuban ports, has also 
been implemented.  The Department of Treasury, in coordination with the 
Customs Service, has issued notices to all U.S. port authorities, 
informing all shipping agents of the CDA prohibitions.  All indications 
have been that notification deterred such vessels coming into our ports 
to load or unload cargo.  

Sections 1707 and 1708 concern U.S. aid and assistance to a transitional 
and to a democratic Cuban government.  We, of course, will be ready to 
help Cuba in appropriate ways in its transition to democracy once the 
process is underway.  We have read the draft "Free Cuban Support Act" 
legislation, proposed by Congressman Menendez and several co-sponsors, 
with interest and wish to work with this committee on ways to respond to 
the inevitable change in Cuba.

Although the CDA does not deal extensively with the issue of travel to 
Cuba, I believe it is an important issue to address, since it has 
received widespread attention in the past few months.  The freedom to 
travel is a right that Americans cherish.  As you know, U.S. law does 
not prohibit travel to Cuba.  It does, however, prohibit spending money 
on travel to Cuba except for certain authorized categories, such as a 
visit with close relatives or professional journalists reporting on 
events in Cuba.  Over 15,000 American citizens and residents traveled 
legally to Cuba last year.  The U.S. Government has no desire to keep 
its citizens from learning about the country of Cuba, its people, and 
its culture, but we do want to deny the Cuban Government hard currency.  
We do not want to prolong the suffering of the Cuban people under a 
dictatorship, which could happen were the Cuban Government to receive 
the economic windfall open travel would provide.

In October, the State Department gave provisional approval to the 
application of a licensed air charter service provider to increase 
flights to Cuba, following changed visa procedures by the Cuban 
Government.  The Congress and the Administration were concerned that we 
not acquiesce in any attempt by the Cuban Government to require 
individuals going to visit relatives to purchase hotel accommodation 
packages in order to obtain expedited visas.  Therefore, the Office of 
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a general circular advising 
licensed travel service providers that they could sell such packages 
only if a traveler voluntarily indicated he wished to stay in a hotel.

We have been monitoring the new travel procedures carefully since the 
issuance of the OFAC circular.  Information received from the air 
charter service provider indicates there has been compliance with the 
circular.  We intend to work with OFAC to continue close monitoring of 
these travel-related transactions to ensure that any hotel packages sold 
are purchased on a voluntary basis.  Meanwhile, we have begun a policy 
of approving additional flights, after a careful review, on a month-to-
month basis.  The demand, however, has not been as great as the air 
charter service provider anticipated.  

Also on the subject of travel, approximately 170 members of the Ad Hoc 
Committee for Freedom to Travel took a protest trip to Havana the second 
week of October.  Their publicly stated goal was to violate the 
embargo's ban on travel-related expenditures and assert an unqualified 
right to travel for any reason.  Customs officials interviewed many of 
the protesters and confiscated passports which had Cuban entry stamps as 
evidence of travel to Cuba, for possible use in prosecutions.  The 
Department of Justice is reviewing the situation to determine if there 
is sufficient evidence to warrant prosecution.  As with humanitarian 
donations, the President's policy on travel is to support both the 
letter and the spirit of the embargo.   

The other major travel-related issue eliciting significant interest has 
been the ongoing, inter-agency review of the free flow of information as 
it relates to all economic sanctions programs which Secretary 
Christopher told Congressman Berman we would undertake.  We seek to 
strike a balance between the U.S. interest in promoting democracy 
through enhanced information exchange, including by travel, and our 
pursuit of other U.S. foreign policy and security goals.  On Cuba, the 
President's dual commitment is to enforce a strong economic embargo 
against the Cuban regime, while reaching out to the people of Cuba.

In conclusion, I wish to emphasize the importance of both tracks of our 
policy and how closely they are intertwined one with the other.  Without 
the embargo--and vigorous enforcement of its provisions--our leverage to 
promote peaceful change would dissipate overnight.  Without humanitarian 
assistance and information-sharing, our policy would be needlessly harsh 
and could add to the suffering of the Cuban people.

Taken as a whole, we have a comprehensive, well-reasoned program--the 
result of close collaboration between Congress and the executive branch-
-and one which enjoys bipartisan support.  We are saying "no" to a 
dictatorial government as we give an emphatic "yes" to the people who 
suffer under it.  And we look forward to the day when the Cuban people 
regain their freedom, their economic security, and the bright future 
they have been denied for so long.  (###)


UN Security Council Resolution 878 on Somalia
Resolution 878
(October 29, 1993)

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 746 (1992) of 
17 March 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992, 
775 (1992) of 28 August 1992, 794 (1992) of  3 December 1992, 814 (1993) 
of 26 March 1993, 837 (1993) of 6 June 1993 and 865 (1993) of 22 
September 1993,

Having considered the letter of the Secretary-General (S/26663) of 28 
October 1993,

Stressing the need for all the parties in Somalia to exercise maximum 
restraint and to work towards national reconciliation,

Expressing once again its commitment to a future concerted strategy for 
UNOSOM II in Somalia and, in that context, to undertake an in-depth 
consideration of its humanitarian, political and security activities on 
the basis of the concrete suggestions to be submitted by the Secretary-
General as requested in resolution 865 (1993),

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1.  Decides to extend UNOSOM II's mandate for an interim period 
terminating on 18 November 1993;

2.  Requests the Secretary-General, in his report to the Security 
Council concerning the further extension of UNOSOM II's mandate which 
should be submitted in good time before 18 November 1993, to report also 
on recent developments in Somalia in order to enable the Council to take 
appropriate decisions;

3.  Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

VOTE:  Unanimous (15-0).  (###)


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