US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 4, NUMBER 47, NOVEMBER 22, 1993
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1.  The Strategic Priorities Of American Foreign Policy -- Secretary 
Christopher
2.  Agenda for Dignity -- Madeleine K. Albright
3.  Russia's Radioactive Waste Disposal:  A Matter of Grave Concern -- 
David A. Colson
4.  UN Security Council Resolution 883 on Libya
5.  UN Security Council Resolution 885 on Somalia
6.  What's in Print:  Foreign Relations of the United States


ARTICLE 1:

The Strategic Priorities Of American Foreign Policy
Secretary Christopher
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 
November 4, 1993

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee:  I am pleased to have the chance 
to talk to you today about the strategic priorities of America's foreign 
policy.

The world is moving away from one of the most dangerous confrontations 
in history, and in that fact lies tremendous opportunity for the United 
States.  In the Cold War world, stability was based on confrontation.  
In the new world, stability will be based on common interests and shared 
values.

We stand on the brink of shaping a new world of extraordinary hope and 
possibility.  While I relish the challenge of what lies before us, I am 
also mindful that the new world we seek will not emerge on its own.  We 
must shape the transformation that is under way in a time of great 
fluidity.  My job as Secretary of State is to help the President guide 
the country through this transition.

At the same time, I understand that we must accomplish this 
transformation at a time when the definitions, certainties, and ground 
rules of the Cold War have disappeared.  I hasten to add that I have no 
regrets about the passing of the Cold War.  Nostalgia for its rigidities 
can only stem from amnesia.  But its demise does mean that we must 
develop a new domestic consensus to sustain our active engagement in a 
more complex and interdependent world.

During this period, the United States must maintain a tough-minded sense 
of our enduring interests:  ensuring the security of our nation; the 
prosperity of our people; and the advancement, where possible, of our 
democratic values.  And it is with these core interests in mind that the 
Clinton Administration has defined and is pursuing the overarching 
priorities of America's foreign policy.

We are renewing and updating our key security alliances, while also 
building on the historically unique situation that the major powers can 
be partners cooperating for peace--not competitors locked in conflict.  
We are reaching out to former adversaries to transform them into 
partners.  We are working to contain and resolve regional conflicts, 
particularly where the threat of expansion or the risk of proliferation 
poses a very direct danger to the United States.  And we are working to 
expand trade, spur growth, and enhance the economic security of each and 
every American.

We can shape the future knowing that the United States is more secure 
now than at any time since early in this century.  Democracy is 
ascendant from Central America to Central Asia, from South Africa to 
Cambodia.  Free markets are being established in places where they were 
long forbidden.  Millions of people, for the first time in their lives, 
have the chance to enjoy political freedom and economic opportunity.  
The United States is working relentlessly to ensure that an ever-
increasing number of people know the benefits of democratic 
institutions, human rights, and free markets.

At the same time, new threats to peace and stability have emerged.  The 
unholy marriage of ethnic violence and aggressive nationalism is 
shattering fragile states, creating humanitarian tragedies, and raising 
the possibility of wider regional strife.  And the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction multiplies the danger of every conflict.

In this period of transition, crises and even setbacks are inevitable.  
We will work to prevent and manage them.  But we will stay on the steady 
and responsible course we have set.  Television is a wonderful 
phenomenon and sometimes even an instrument of freedom.  But television 
images cannot be the North Star of America's foreign policy.

As I travel the world, I see that virtually every nation wants to define 
its foreign policy in terms relative to the United States, whether 
seeking security assurances or expanding trade and investment links with 
us.  They look to us as the fulcrum for global security and, in many 
cases, for regional security.  They know that American international 
leadership is in their interest.  This gives us unparalleled 
opportunities to influence their conduct.  I am here today to say that 
American engagement and leadership in the world--an activist American 
foreign policy--is most fundamentally in our interest.

PRIORITIES
Today I would like to discuss with this committee our efforts with 
respect to several major issues of enduring national interest.  These 
are not the exclusive areas of concern for this Administration.  My 
speeches last spring to the Council of the Americas and the African-
American Institute described our policy objectives toward Latin America 
and Africa, respectively.  Today I want to discuss in my testimony some 
of our current top priorities--priorities that address the great 
challenges in this era of change.  Let me begin with the new centrality 
of economic policy in our foreign policy.

1.  Economic Security
Security in the post-Cold War era will depend as much on strong 
economies as on strong arsenals.  This Administration understands that 
America's strength at home and its strength abroad are interlocking and 
mutually reinforcing.  That is why President Clinton and I have placed 
economic policy at the heart of our foreign policy.  And I believe that 
this new emphasis is already yielding results.

The President's approach was apparent at the successful July summit 
meeting of the G-7 nations in Tokyo.  For more than a decade, our major 
industrial allies and trading partners complained that we were not 
serious about reducing the growth of our budget deficit.  By working 
with the Congress to enact a historic deficit reduction program, 
President Clinton sent a clear message to the world:  America is back as 
a responsible manager of its own economy and as a dependable leader for 
global economic cooperation and growth.

Armed with that new credibility in Tokyo, President Clinton won a market 
access agreement to move the Uruguay Round forward.  He was also able to 
win new pledges for multilateral assistance to Russia and an agreement 
to negotiate a new economic framework to correct our unacceptable trade 
imbalance with Japan.  This Administration attaches as high a priority 
to improving our economic and trade ties with Japan as it does to 
maintaining our important security and political links.

Let me briefly turn your attention to three events--all occurring within 
the next 40 days--that together will help determine the strength of our 
economy and the standard of living of our people as we enter the 21st 
century:  the vote on NAFTA, the deadline for GATT, and the meeting of 
the APEC forum.  Each event is also a foreign policy challenge with 
enormous consequences for our global leadership.  I have been making the 
case for NAFTA repeatedly in recent weeks, and I believe that there is 
increasing recognition that NAFTA is one of the great foreign policy 
opportunities of this generation.  For the United States, Canada, and 
Mexico, NAFTA is about more than tariffs and trade, growth, and jobs.  
It will also build a new, cooperative relationship with Mexico.  
Approval of NAFTA will increase Mexico's capacity to cooperate with us 
on a wide range of vital issues such as illegal immigration, cross-
border pollution, and narco-trafficking.

NAFTA will also mark a turning point in the history of our relations 
throughout the hemisphere at a time when democracy is on the march, 
markets are opening, and conflicts are being resolved peacefully.  By 
approving NAFTA, the United States will send a powerful signal that we 
support these developments.  Rejecting NAFTA, on the other hand, would 
send a chilling signal about our willingness to engage in Latin America 
at a time when so many of our neighbors--including Mexico--are genuinely 
receptive to closer cooperation with us.

There is no good time to defeat NAFTA--but there could be no worse time 
than when the GATT negotiations are in their final, crucial days leading 
up to the December 15 deadline.  At this delicate, decisive stage of the 
Uruguay Round, the United States must maintain maximum leverage--and 
exercise maximum leadership.  A setback on NAFTA would compromise both.  
Rejecting NAFTA would create the perception that America is not prepared 
to act on behalf of its global economic interests at a time when those 
interests are so clearly at stake.

NAFTA is now in our hands, but the United States cannot conclude the 
Uruguay Round on its own.  The EC, Japan, the ASEAN nations, and others 
must also move.  None of the remaining trade-offs in goods, services, or 
agriculture will be easy for any nation--but they must be made.  I want 
to remind our allies and trading partners in Europe once again that 
advancing transatlantic security requires us not only to focus on 
renewing the NATO alliance but also on successfully concluding the GATT 
negotiations.  The Uruguay Round is critically important to the revival 
of the world economy, not only to our major industrial allies but to 
developing countries in Africa, Latin America, and Asia that are seeking 
sustained growth and sustainable development.

Nowhere is economic growth faster--or the export opportunities for 
American business greater--than in the dynamic Asia-Pacific region.  In 
two weeks, I will go to Seattle to host a meeting of the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation forum.  The APEC conference--and the historic 
gathering of leaders that President Clinton has called at its 
conclusion--will enable us to establish a framework for regional 
economic integration and trade liberalization among 15 economies that 
now account for nearly half the world's GNP.  It will expand America's 
economic presence in a region to which our future is increasingly 
linked.

These are 40 days that can shake the economic world and shape America's 
future position in it.  With NAFTA, GATT, and APEC, there is an 
extraordinary convergence of opportunities for the United States.  I 
view each of these challenges, along with the President's deficit 
reduction program and successes in Tokyo last summer, as integral 
elements of the most ambitious international economic agenda that any 
President has undertaken in almost half a century.  And as Secretary of 
State, I see each as a foreign policy as well as an economic policy 
opportunity--because in the post-Cold War world, our national security 
is inseparable from our economic security.

2.  Support for Reform In Russia and the NIS
This Administration is placing special emphasis on our support for 
political and economic reform in Russia and in the other states of the 
former Soviet Union.  Helping ensure the success of this process is our 
highest foreign policy priority.  That is the reason President Clinton 
is seeking to build a strategic alliance with post-communist reformers 
throughout the area.

If the people of Russia succeed in their heroic struggle to build a free 
society and a market economy, the payoffs for the United States will be 
transforming:  a permanently diminished threat of nuclear war, lower 
defense budgets, vast new markets, and cooperation on the global and 
regional issues that once divided us.  Helping democracy prevail in 
Russia remains the wisest--and least expensive--investment that we can 
make in America's security.

Mr. Chairman, the House and Senate have recognized the value of this 
investment.  With the support of Congress, the United States initially 
pledged $1.6 billion in bilateral assistance programs to Russia and the 
new independent states.  In Tokyo last July, we proposed a $3-billion 
special privatization and restructuring program, which our G-7 partners 
have joined.  And in late September, as the crisis in Moscow between 
reform and reaction was approaching its climax, this Congress approved 
the Administration's request for $2.5 billion in additional technical 
and humanitarian assistance.

As you know, I went to Moscow two weeks ago to reaffirm, on behalf of 
President Clinton, our steadfast support for reform in the wake of the 
early October crisis.  I made the case that the credibility of 
December's parliamentary elections--and the prospects for Russian 
democracy--depend on open dissent and a free press.  President Yeltsin 
and Foreign Minister Kozyrev reiterated their commitment to reform and 
their determination to hold free and fair elections--and to allow press 
freedom.

Despite the hardships inevitably associated with a transformation of 
this magnitude, the Russian people have chosen reform over reaction.  My 
visit gave me renewed confidence that reform will win their support once 
again.  We now look forward to a January summit between President 
Clinton and President Yeltsin in Moscow--a summit that we expect will 
broaden and deepen the new, cooperative relationship we are forging.

3.  Europe and NATO
The trip I completed last week was designed not only to reinforce our 
partnership with Russia but to help renew the NATO alliance at a time of 
new and different security challenges in Europe.  The United States has 
an enduring political, military, economic, and cultural link to Europe 
that must be preserved.  The European Community is our largest single 
trading partner, and we have a powerful stake in the collective security 
guaranteed by NATO.  This alliance of democracies--the most successful 
in history--can lay the foundation of an undivided continent rooted in 
the principles of political liberty and economic freedom.

To meet the new challenges in Europe, the alliance must embrace 
innovation or risk irrelevance.  Accordingly, the United States is 
proposing to transform NATO's relationship with the new democracies of 
the East.

The January summit should formally open the door to an evolutionary 
process of NATO expansion.  This process should be non-discriminatory 
and inclusive.  It should not be tied to a specific timetable or 
criteria for membership.

The summit should also initiate practical military cooperation between 
NATO forces and those to the East.  To that end, we have proposed a 
Partnership for Peace.  The partnership would be open to all members of 
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council as well as others.  It excludes 
no nations and forms no new blocs.

Our idea is to build the Partnership for Peace over time, at a pace 
geared to each partner's interest and capabilities.  The partnership 
would involve tangible cooperation and would channel members' defense 
efforts toward the ability to participate with NATO in a range of 
multinational missions.  This partnership would play an important role 
in the evolutionary process of NATO expansion, creating an evolving 
security relationship that could culminate in NATO membership.

This Partnership for Peace is a first step by the alliance to help fill 
the vacuum of insecurity and instability that was created in Central and 
Eastern Europe by the demise of the Soviet empire.  It reflects our 
strong belief that the reform movements in Eastern Europe must be 
bolstered by the prospect of security cooperation with the West.  
Reaction to this proposal has been positive--from allies, from NATO 
Secretary General Woerner, from Central and East European countries 
(including the Baltic states), and from Russia and the new independent 
states.

4.  Asia and the Pacific
No area of the world will be more important for American interests than 
the Asia-Pacific region.  This region contains the world's most dynamic 
economies, and it is the most lucrative terrain for American exports and 
jobs.  It is thus crucial to the President's domestic agenda.  We have 
vital security stakes in an area where we have fought three wars in the 
past half-century and where major powers intersect.  And we seek to 
promote our values in the world's most populous region, where democracy 
is on the move yet repressive regimes remain.

The stakes in Asia are, therefore, high for America.  That is why 
President Clinton traveled there on his first trip overseas.  That is 
why I have been there three times as Secretary.

The upcoming APEC meeting will elaborate the President's vision of a New 
Pacific Community which he set forth in July in his statements in Tokyo 
and Seoul.  The basic outlines are already clear:

--  A more prosperous community through open markets and open societies;
--  A more secure community through maintenance of our alliances and 
forward military presence, non-proliferation policies, and engagement in 
regional dialogues;
--  A freer community through advocacy of open societies that contribute 
both to development and peace; and
--  Regional cooperation on global issues such as the environment, 
narcotics, refugees, and health.

The Clinton Administration is placing special emphasis on developing 
regional approaches so as to construct--with others--a New Pacific 
Community.  But, clearly, bilateral ties are also part of this vision.  
Let me briefly mention two that are central to our concerns.

The cornerstone of our Asia-Pacific policy remains our relationship with 
Japan.  The President seeks to shape a durable and comprehensive 
partnership as we head toward the next century.  As I have emphasized, 
we need to place our economic ties on as sound and cooperative a basis 
as we have established on security, political, and global issues.

We are working out a comprehensive relationship with China that permits 
resolution of differences in a broad, strategic context.  As I have made 
clear on previous occasions, we have continuing concerns with China, 
including human rights, proliferation, and market access.  We are 
actively working to make strides in each area and share with the 
Congress the need to make measurable progress.  The clock is ticking on 
a decision next spring on MFN renewal.  Unless there is overall, 
significant progress on human rights, the President will not be in a 
position to recommend extension.

5.  The Middle East
The Middle East is a region where the United States has both vital 
interests and the influence to protect those interests.  This fact was 
powerfully demonstrated in our successful leadership in stemming 
aggression in the Persian Gulf.  Nowhere is the intersection between our 
interests and our influence more apparent than in the Arab-Israeli peace 
process.  For four decades, we have been involved in the search for 
Middle East peace not only because it is the right thing to do but 
because our interests and those of our friends demand it.  The pursuit 
of peace cannot guarantee stability in the region.  But it can reduce 
the dangers of war and enhance the well-being of our allies--Israeli and 
Arab alike.  This in turn will help preserve our political and economic 
stake in one of the world's most important strategic regions.

In the Middle East, the recent breakthrough between Israelis and 
Palestinians has fundamentally changed the landscape of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict.  There is much work to be done to transform the Declaration of 
Principles into an enduring agreement and changed realities on the 
ground.

The challenge now is to reinforce this breakthrough and broaden it to 
achieve a comprehensive settlement that will last.  We will continue to 
work very closely with the parties themselves in pursuit of three goals.

First, it is essential that Israelis and Palestinians implement their 
Declaration of Principles in a timely manner.  Implementing the accord 
will build the strength of the peace constituencies.  It will show that 
negotiations work and demonstrate that extremists cannot stop the march 
toward peace.  This accord must succeed.  This means that Israelis and 
Palestinians need to be flexible and patient as they work through the 
complicated issues on the table.  It also means that the international 
community needs to lend its support.  That effort began with the October 
1 Conference to Support Middle East Peace, which we organized.  It will 
continue this week in Paris, when the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee meets to 
coordinate assistance to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.  We 
must work to make the recent turning point for peace irreversible as we 
work to make the benefits of peace irresistible.

Second, it is also essential that we continue our efforts to move toward 
a comprehensive settlement.  This means ensuring that progress is 
achieved on the other tracks and that progress on the Israeli-
Palestinian negotiations facilitates rather than impedes movement on the 
others.  On the Israeli-Syrian track, there are complex issues relating 
to peace, withdrawal, and security that continue to separate the 
parties.  These issues should be amenable to a negotiated settlement, 
and we are prepared to play our role as a peace partner with both Israel 
and Syria.  Israel and Lebanon are focused on trying to find a way to 
meet their respective needs on the same three issues.  And Jordan and 
Israel, having concluded a historic agenda in Washington, are in the 
process of organizing their negotiations in a practical manner on key 
issues.

We are committed to a comprehensive settlement, and we believe the 
parties are, too.  Our Special Middle East Coordinator, Dennis Ross, 
came back from his recent trip to the region with the strong view that 
all parties are committed to this process and to working with us to find 
ways to overcome the gaps that separate them.  And we will be unflagging 
in this effort.

Third, we are trying to create the proper environment for peace in the 
region.  As the implementation of the Declaration of Principles moves 
forward, we are encouraging Israelis and Palestinians to reach out 
toward one another and create an atmosphere on the ground that 
facilitates their work at the negotiating table.  At the same time, we 
are asking the Arab states to do their share.  Tunisia's decision to 
host the refugee working group last month was significant, as was the 
Qatari Foreign Minister's meeting with Israeli Foreign Minister Peres.  
Oman has offered to host the next working group meeting on water.  Egypt 
will host the next working group meeting on the environment.  Morocco 
hosted Prime Minister Rabin on his return from the September 13 signing 
ceremony in Washington.  Arab and Israeli business people are talking 
about translating the potential for regional economic growth into 
reality.

But more needs to be done.  Anachronisms such as the Arab boycott of 
Israel must end, and anti-Israeli UN resolutions that have been on the 
books for too long must be removed.  There has been some movement on 
both of these issues, and we will work to build greater momentum.

Working at times as a catalyst, as a facilitator, or as a source of 
reassurance--and, when needed, as an intermediary--the United States is 
committed to doing everything it can to help secure what has been 
achieved and push for breakthroughs on other fronts.  The President and 
I will stay actively involved.  I will travel to the region when 
appropriate to promote the sustained progress that I believe is within 
reach.  There is much work to be done, but I am very hopeful about the 
prospects for a comprehensive peace.

6.  Non-Proliferation and Other Global Issues
Nuclear weapons give rogue states disproportionate power, destabilize 
entire regions, and threaten human and environmental disasters.  They 
can turn local conflicts into serious threats to our security.  In this 
era, weapons of mass destruction are more readily available--and there 
are fewer inhibitions on their use.

This Administration is working for global enforcement of  non-
proliferation standards.  We are also pursuing specific strategies in 
each region where there is a real potential for proliferation.  We lead 
the international effort to persuade North Korea to adhere to the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to its nuclear safeguards 
obligations.  We are working to ensure that Iran does not acquire 
nuclear weapons, and that Iraq does not restore its former capabilities.  
We have sanctioned China and Pakistan for China's transfer of ballistic 
missile components to Pakistan.

Let me describe the progress made on non-proliferation and 
denuclearization during my trip to Russia and the NIS.  I visited 
Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus, where hundreds of old Soviet nuclear 
weapons remain.  In 1992, these former Soviet states committed 
themselves to ratify the START I Treaty and adhere to the NPT as non-
nuclear states.  We have taken significant steps forward.  Belarus has 
already fulfilled its commitments.  In Kazakhstan, which has ratified 
START I, President Nazarbayev for the first time set a deadline for 
accession to the NPT--the end of this year.

Ukraine reaffirmed its commitments and their applicability to all 
strategic offensive arms on Ukrainian soil.  President Kravchuk has 
pledged to press the Ukrainian parliament to ratify START I during its 
November session.  We still have hard work ahead with Ukraine, where 
opposition remains to that nation becoming "non-nuclear."

The United States is prepared to help Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus 
destroy or dismantle their nuclear weapons.  But we have made it clear 
that action on these matters is a pre-requisite to longer-term economic 
cooperation and security partnerships.

We are also bringing transnational issues such as the environment, 
population growth, refugees, terrorism, and narcotics where they belong-
-into the mainstream of American foreign policy.  If we ignore these 
issues, they will return--compounded, more costly, and sometimes 
threatening to our security.  That is why the United States is a leader, 
not a laggard, on global environmental issues.  As part of this 
commitment, we have signed the biodiversity and climate change treaties.  
This Administration is placing an unmistakable emphasis on these 
pressing global concerns.

REGIONAL CONFLICTS
Earlier I noted that the end of the Cold War, while lifting the lid that 
had smothered freedom for much of the world, also lifted the lid on 
regional conflicts--especially along the periphery of the former Soviet 
Union.  Troublesome conflicts, often spilling across borders, have 
persisted in Africa.  In these conflicts, preventive diplomacy can be 
employed to great success.

Realism must guide U.S. policies toward these conflicts.  Some touch our 
interests--or will, if they are not checked.  But we must accept that 
other conflicts may not.

In testifying before the committee, Madeleine Albright addressed the 
importance of taking stock together with the Congress as we look at 
regional conflicts and the ever-increasing demands on peace-keeping.  
Ambassador Albright spoke eloquently of the need to preserve a 
bipartisan consensus as we address our role in UN peace-keeping 
operations.  I completely agree.

Clearly, we will need to consider new mechanisms for conflict resolution 
and conflict avoidance.  The UN structure may have to be supplemented by 
regional mechanisms.  Organizations such as the OAU and the OAS can be 
more effective in conflict prevention, peace-keeping, and disaster 
relief.  Institutions like NATO may need to assume more of a peace-
keeping mission, at least in Europe.  Our own role and involvement will 
need to be informed by a strict assessment of our interests and the 
interests of others.  We must examine every case--asking rigorous 
questions and giving measured answers--to find the course commensurate 
with our interests.

That is what we are doing today in Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia.  In each 
of these places, things have not always gone exactly as we had planned 
or hoped.  These are difficult situations, and some setbacks, 
unfortunately, are inevitable.  We should learn from them.  But we 
should not overreact, for that may mean either losing possible 
opportunities for success or damaging our interests elsewhere.

Haiti
Haiti demonstrates that temporary setbacks must not prevent us from 
pursuing our interests.  If democracy is not restored, repression, 
violence, and suffering will continue.  More instability may cause large 
numbers of Haitians to flee, at great risk to themselves and to Haiti's 
neighbors--including the United States.

Haiti's problems can be addressed only through democratic institutions 
and economic development.  We have supported a political process, 
culminating in the Governors Island accord, that provides for the 
restoration of democracy.  But now Haiti's military leadership refuses 
to adhere to the accord.

We are staying on course.  We remain committed to the restoration of 
democracy and the return of President Aristide.  The sanctions imposed 
in June brought the Haitian military to the negotiating table.  We have 
now re-imposed sanctions on oil and arms and a freeze on assets of 
targeted individuals.  These are selective sanctions, designed to compel 
the military leadership to fulfill its obligations, while sparing, as 
much as possible, the people of Haiti.  We are prepared to increase the 
pressures on the Haitian military, if that is necessary.  Once the 
accord is implemented, we want to make it possible for Haiti to sustain 
democracy.

Somalia
The United States is pursuing a noble objective in Somalia, consistent 
with its finest values and traditions.  We have saved literally hundreds 
of thousands of lives.  After the attack on Pakistani peace-keepers in 
June, significant efforts and resources were dedicated to the military 
and security aspects of the mission.  Not enough attention was given to 
efforts to achieve political reconciliation, which is essential to 
prevent Somalia from returning to famine and anarchy.  We are now set 
firmly on the political track and are encouraged by the progress being 
made.  In order to give this process a chance to succeed, American 
forces will remain until next March and will, as President Clinton 
stated on October 7, work with UN forces to keep open lines of 
communication and keep pressure on those who would seek to cut off 
relief supplies.

To be sure, we could have taken the easy, and perhaps popular, way out: 
simply abandon the effort in Somalia after the tragic deaths of American 
servicemen on October 3.  The President chose another path, one that 
seeks to protect the real gains made in Somalia while improving the 
prospects for further progress.  This will give the Somalis a reasonable 
chance to sort out their differences and also permit the United Nations 
to prepare for our departure.

Bosnia
American policy toward the terrible conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
responds to our strategic interest in preventing the conflict from 
spreading to neighboring countries and our humanitarian interest in 
helping to relieve the suffering of the people of Bosnia.

Negotiations offer the only way to a practical solution.  Although the 
Geneva talks have not been able to produce an acceptable agreement, they 
have made some progress and remain alive.  The negotiators have also 
explored the option of a "global solution" that would embrace Croatia, 
Kosovo, and other areas of conflict in the region.  The United States 
has played an active role in support of these diplomatic efforts and 
will continue to do so.

Unfortunately, none of these efforts provides any assurance that an 
agreement can be reached this winter.  We will continue to press the 
negotiating track, but with the Bosnian people again at serious risk, we 
must focus attention on humanitarian relief.  The United States has 
worked very hard to respond to humanitarian needs.  We are the single 
largest country donor of humanitarian aid--more than $370 million since 
1991.  With 6,000 flights over 500 days, the Sarajevo airlift has gone 
on longer than the Berlin airlift of 45 years ago.  Air drops of 
humanitarian relief to the enclaves have delivered more than 10 million 
meals since February.  American planes have made 80% of airdrop flights.  
We remain committed to the relief effort, both by air and overland, 
where we are working with the UN and EC on ways to resolve immediate 
problems of secure land access for relief convoys, now suspended because 
of intense fighting in central Bosnia.

We strongly support the work of the UN's War Crimes Tribunal and 
continued economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro.  We are 
determined to prevent the conflict from spreading, and we have deployed 
U.S. forces to Macedonia as part of an international effort to deter a 
wider conflict.

At the same time, the President has made it clear that the United States 
will not attempt to force a settlement on Bosnia militarily.  No imposed 
settlement would endure.  Before committing American troops anywhere in 
the world, we must ask a series of rigorous and searching questions.  If 
we are satisfied with the conditions for our participation, we would be 
prepared to participate in a NATO implementation of a Bosnian 
settlement.  Those conditions would include good-faith agreement to a 
settlement by all the parties and evidence of good-faith implementation.  
Any such action by the United States would require the fullest 
consultation with Congress.

I want to assure the members of this committee that our policy toward 
any regional conflict will undergo constant and rigorous reevaluation.  
We will constantly reassess our own assumptions to be sure they are 
truly validated by events.  And any situation in which American men and 
women may be put in harm's way will always hold the highest priority for 
me and for every member of this Administration.

CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATIONS
Mr. Chairman, this Administration is committed to frequent and 
comprehensive consultations with the Congress.  When congressional 
hearings begin on the relationship between the legislative and the 
executive branches on foreign policy, we will be responsive.

It is in that spirit, Mr. Chairman--a spirit of cooperation and 
steadfastness about enduring American interests in a fast-changing 
world--that I have come here today.  Now I would be pleased to respond 
to your questions and hear your views.  (###)



ARTICLE 2:

Agenda for Dignity
Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations
Address to the International Rescue Committee, New York City, November 
2, 1993

It is said that you can search all the public parks without finding a 
monument to a committee.  But the memorials to the International Rescue 
Committee are not stone but flesh and blood.  The value of the 
committee's work is tallied in the hope-filled eyes of once-despairing 
children and in the grateful handclasps of those who have fled 
repression and found freedom.

Sixty years ago, Albert Einstein first asked Americans to help Jews and 
others at risk in Hitler's Germany.  Soon after, the Emergency Rescue 
Committee in Marseilles began finding ways for those on the Gestapo hit 
list to get across the Pyrenees and through Spain to freedom.  Later 
still, the Iron Curtain Refugee Campaign aided the victims of Stalinism.

From then to now--from the Cuban revolution to the brutal repression of 
"Prague Spring," from starvation in Bangladesh to famine in Somalia, 
from tyranny in Pinochet's Chile to villainy in the Balkans--the IRC has 
offered a helping hand to the victims of despots, aggressors, drought, 
and war.

With that proud history in mind, tonight I join you in honoring the work 
of George Soros.  His foundations have led the way in transforming the 
once-closed societies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  I 
would also like to mention the IRC's own Fred Cuny who--like George 
Soros--has been on the front lines of the daunting struggle against 
deprivation and despair in Bosnia.  Gentlemen, you are carrying on a 
noble tradition of commitment and caring, and I salute you both.

From the beginning, the IRC's work has been characterized not only by 
rigorous efficiency but by certain core principles:  a deep belief in 
liberty;  faith in the resilience of the human spirit; understanding 
that the refugee story does not end with freedom but with what one does 
after freedom has been gained; and a conviction that the full potential 
of humanity resides in each of us--no matter what our station, no matter 
what our background--and that, because each of us has something to 
contribute, each of us is worth the time and trouble to save.

Today, these core beliefs are being tested.  Ethnic conflict and civil 
strife have provoked humanitarian crises around the globe.  The task of 
delivering emergency assistance is becoming more dangerous and complex.  
The international relief system is under severe strain and faces 
burgeoning demands.  Progress in repatriating refugees in Central 
America, Cambodia, and Mozambique may be overwhelmed by new influxes 
elsewhere.  Our government's estimates are sobering indeed.  And many of 
the most tragic stories will not be seen on CNN.

Africa, alone, will continue to generate humanitarian emergencies on an 
unparalleled scale.  It is home today to a dozen ongoing insurgencies, 6 
million refugees, and a rampaging AIDS epidemic.  In Somalia, most of 
the 1.3 million refugees and displaced persons remain dependent on 
outside assistance.  The civil war in Sudan is creating humanitarian 
conditions as severe as those in Somalia last year.  The fate of 2 
million homeless and displaced people in Liberia and Rwanda depends on 
whether fragile cease-fires hold.

In Central Eurasia, conditions are bad, getting worse, and getting more 
dangerous.  War in the Caucasus has prompted Iran to set up refugee 
camps inside the borders of Azerbaijan.  Armenia faces a second harsh 
winter cut off from adequate outside supplies of food, water, and power.  
Winter also threatens hundreds of thousands in Georgia and Tajikistan.  
And in Iraq, the number of Kurds in need has now surpassed 1 million.

In these and other areas, hostile environments impede and, too often, 
prevent the delivery of assistance.  Attacks on relief convoys, theft of 
supplies, and murders of relief workers frustrate us all.  Combined with 
the failure to alleviate bureaucratic bungling and overlap, these trends 
threaten to transform donor fatigue into donor collapse.

Abroad, American leadership is sought.  While American contributions do 
remain high, the temptation to look inward is also strong.  Many 
Americans have grown weary of worrying about problems abroad; some have 
grown angry at floods of immigrants--including some terrorists--who have 
reached our shores; and all of us know that the roots of many of today's 
foreign conflicts run so deep as to defy obvious solution.

My father was a government official and diplomat during the final days 
of free Czechoslovakia nearly one half-century ago.  He concluded sadly 
of those years that too many good men failed to act against the tide of 
events and the current of conventional wisdom--that too many were 
willing to let go of core principles and substitute the principles of 
convenience.  We live today, as he did, in a period of historical 
transition, when old assumptions are obsolete, the content of new truths 
is in dispute, and deadening complacency competes with serious-minded 
action and thought.  As a Czech patriot, my father would have been 
pleased to know that the "Great Twilight Struggle" against Soviet 
communism is over.  But as a refugee whose family found sanctuary in 
America, he would also have warned us that the struggle to shape the new 
dawn will not be easy and that success is not assured.

America today, under President Clinton's leadership, is being called 
upon to develop--not overnight but over time--a new framework for 
protecting our territory, our citizens, and our interests in a 
dramatically altered world.  In devising that framework, we will depend, 
for the most part, on our own reserves of military and economic power.  
We will look for help from old friends and new.  We will look beyond the 
horizon of the short term, recognizing that even seemingly distant 
problems and conflicts may, one day, come home to America.  And we will 
work to develop a consensus within our own country--within the Congress 
and the public at large--for maintaining American engagement and 
leadership in the world.

At its best, American foreign policy has married our interests and our 
values.  We promote peace because we have no designs on the territory of 
others.  We promote international law because a nation inclined to 
observe the law will do better in a world where legal standards are 
respected and enforced.  We promote democracy because democratic 
governments rarely initiate aggression and because free economies 
provide the best opportunities for trade and shared growth.  These are 
policies of enlightened self-interest.

It was this proud American tradition that led Israeli Foreign Minister 
Shimon Peres to say, during the recent Middle East peace ceremonies, 
that when the history books are written:

Nobody will understand the United States, really:  You have so much 
force, and you didn't conquer the land of anybody; you have so much 
power, and you didn't dominate another people;  you have problems of 
your own, and you have never turned your  back on the problems of 
others.

Obviously, neither we, nor the United Nations, nor anyone else can right 
every wrong.  Nor should we try to do so.  But it is in our interests, 
and in our character, to do all that we reasonably can do to defend 
freedom, to help the deserving who need help, and to promote respect for 
enduring principles of international decency and law.

It is in that spirit, and with the beliefs that have for so long 
inspired the IRC in mind, that tonight I will put forward five goals for 
improving our ability to respond to international disasters--and to 
relieve human suffering.

First, we must strengthen our capacity to ensure that when the 
international community attempts to deliver emergency relief, we are 
able to make good on that promise.

As events in Bosnia, Somalia, and other locales indicate, it has grown 
increasingly difficult to separate the humanitarian from other 
components of a peace-keeping or disaster assistance mission.  But there 
is a difference.  A combatant force may well refuse to disarm or 
demobilize out of a legitimate concern for survival.  But there is 
nothing legitimate about using force to starve others into surrender or 
death.  There is nothing legitimate about denying medical aid so that 
children lie screaming as legs are amputated without anesthesia.  There 
is nothing legitimate about extorting 10% and 20% and 50% of the cargo 
from relief caravans.  These are not lawful acts, and they should not be 
permissible tactics of war.

This coming winter in Bosnia, access is going to make the difference 
between hardship and disaster.  The people of Sarajevo and Mostar and 
Srebrenica are weaker today than they were last year; their capacity to 
endure hardship has been sapped; they have fewer reserves of materiel, 
body, and mind.  If fighting continues, the number of Bosnians in need 
will probably be double that of last winter--about 2.8 million people--
more than one-half of the population.  Total relief requirements for the 
next six months will be 390,000 metric tons--about 80% of which will be 
food--more than three times the amount delivered during the first half 
of this year.

We all know the Bosnia crisis has so far defied solution.  But neither 
America, nor the community of nations, nor the non-governmental 
community has failed to respond to the humanitarian tragedy.  The Bosnia 
airlift has now gone on longer than the Berlin airlift 45 years ago.  
Pilots from more than 20 countries have braved bullets, mortars, and 
anti-aircraft fire to deliver relief goods on almost 6,000 flights over 
almost 500 days.  Eighty percent of the airdrops in Bosnia have been 
from American planes.

I know the IRC is making plans for this winter.  We are all prepared and 
preparing to do more.  But the Bosnian Serbs continue at times to deny 
passage to eastern Muslim enclaves.  Both the Bosnian Croats and the 
Bosnian Government forces have blocked or harassed convoys in the 
central part of the country.  And the Tuzla airport--which could be 
critical to resupply efforts this winter--remains closed.

We must learn the lesson of our effort to provide humanitarian relief to 
Bosnia.  We must--and we are--working to reform, streamline, and 
modernize UN peace-keeping and humanitarian relief capabilities.  We 
must work together to establish and re-establish the principle of 
nonviolability of emergency help.

Last December, President Bush ordered American forces into Somalia for 
the express purpose of enforcing the delivery of humanitarian aid.  
President Clinton has persevered in that effort.  That is the kind of 
goal the American people can believe in.  That is an objective the 
community of nations should insist on.  And that, alone, is sufficient 
reason to renew our resolve--despite recent setbacks--to improve our 
planning, develop our skills, and enhance our capacity to provide relief 
to those in desperate need.

This leads directly to the second goal:  We must reform the  management 
of the UN's emergency and development assistance programs.

Many of the unsung heroes of the UN are found in its relief agencies--
the UNHCR, the UNDP, the World Food Program, and UNICEF.  We must all be 
grateful for their efforts.  We must all admire the many individual 
examples of dedication, courage, and just plain hard work.  But just as 
we should be the first to support UN emergency relief efforts, so should 
we be the first to acknowledge the need for change.  As first friend and 
first critic of the UN, I must tell you that in the area of humanitarian 
assistance, "UN coordination" is all too often an oxymoron.  UN agencies 
are not supposed to compete with each other, but they do.  UN officials 
are supposed to be accountable, but they are not.  Creation last year of 
the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) was supposed to put someone 
clearly in charge, but it hasn't.

The DHA has a mission but no authority.  It neither controls the purse 
strings nor the personnel of the offices which actually do the work.

Lack of coordination in the delivery of emergency aid is not simply a 
bureaucratic concern; it is often a matter of life and death.  On the 
ground, in an emergency, there is simply no time to debate who is in 
charge of what or whose list of priorities should be paramount.  It is 
too late to begin only then to compare inventory lists of what relief is 
available.  It is too late to start asking questions that should have 
long since been answered about the willingness of individual donors to 
meet contingency needs.

The Clinton Administration believes that the best bet for improving 
coordination is to make good on the promise of DHA.  That means, first, 
that DHA must be reformed internally.  It must improve its working 
arrangements with partner agencies and find a way to attract more 
qualified personnel with particular experience in administering 
humanitarian assistance in complex emergencies.  As the reform process 
goes forward, we believe DHA should be given four things it does not now 
have:

--  First, recognition by all parties of DHA's leading role in the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance;
--  Second, a modern information center that will catalogue available 
resources, assess probable needs, track financing, provide data, and 
give early warning of humanitarian crises;
--  Third, sufficient resources to organize a rapid response to 
emergencies; and
--  Finally, the ability, where necessary, to organize and coordinate 
responses in the field.

We are also working through the UN to see that the DHA is involved in  
planning and implementing peace-keeping missions where a humanitarian 
element is present.  And we want to guarantee that the views, the 
expertise, and the concerns of prominent non-governmental organizations 
are taken into account at every stage of the process.

The third goal I will discuss tonight relates solely to human-caused 
tragedies.  We must act to reduce the threat posed to human life by the 
indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines.

In many parts of the world, anti-personnel mines have become the 
coward's weapon of choice.  They are simple to lay but difficult to 
destroy or detect.  Increasingly, they are being used not as a 
controlled and well-mapped means of limiting the movements of an 
opposing army but as weapons of terror and economic war.  Mines go on 
killing long after a conflict ends.  We estimate that 85 million remain 
in place, scattered in more than 60 countries.  Each week, more than 150 
people--most of them civilians--are killed or maimed.  The need to clear 
mines slows and disrupts efforts to repatriate refugees and to resume 
normal economic life in societies seeking to recover from the ravages of 
war.

This past summer, I visited Cambodia, where most of the news is good.  
Thanks to the UN and to a heroic act of popular will, a government 
legitimized by free elections has been installed.  The Khmer Rouge has 
been staggered.  But still the mines explode.  You can't walk down a 
street in Phnom Penh without seeing a child using a makeshift crutch or 
wagon to get from place to place.

We should do all we can to bring this form of indiscriminate warfare to 
an end.  The Clinton Administration has allocated $20 million to work 
with other governments on mine removal training, techniques, and 
technology.  We are working to ensure full support for the Cambodian 
Mine Action Center.  We hope soon to submit the Convention on 
Conventional Weapons, which includes a protocol on land mines, to the 
Senate for its advice and consent.

At the UN, we are calling upon all states to cooperate in clearing mines 
already laid, to strengthen international law governing the use of 
mines, and to join with us in a moratorium on the export of anti-
personnel mines that pose grave dangers to civilian populations.

Fourth, we should, at long last, create a UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights.  Earlier this year, in Vienna, the world community reaffirmed 
its commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  But some 
still say certain societies are not well-suited to democracy and should 
not be expected to live up to global standards on human rights.  I find 
this patronizing.  I agree that democracy must find its roots 
internally.  But the Universal Declaration is called universal for a 
reason--because it reflects something due to every human being,  because 
it speaks to a common yearning to be treated according to certain 
standards of respect and worth.  There are no grounds of economy, 
politics, ideology, religion, or culture that justify torture, murder, 
rape, or other assaults on basic human dignity.

A UN High Commissioner for Human Rights would not be able to wave any 
magic wands, but he or she would be able to elevate, legitimize, 
publicize, and coordinate the response of the international community to 
crises affecting basic human rights.  We strongly support passage of a 
resolution by the General Assembly this year that would establish a 
commissioner with authority over all UN human rights programs, a 
commissioner empowered to provide needed assistance to states willing to 
accept help and to call the world's attention to significant human 
rights violations wherever and whenever they occur.

Fifth, finally, and on a matter also related to human rights, we must 
make the newly created War Crimes Tribunal on Former Yugoslavia an 
effective instrument of truth.

I do not need to spell out for those in this room the magnitude of the 
human suffering that has been inflicted in the former Yugoslavia over 
the past two years.  The images are seared in our brains:  the orphan's 
terror; the grandparent who after a lifetime of work has lost family and 
home; young girls sobbing as they bear witness to the outrages committed 
against them; the cemeteries that have run out of room in towns that 
have run out of wood for coffins; and, this past week, the charred 
corpses in Stupni Do.

Much of this cannot be attributed simply to the heat of battle.  Ethnic 
cleansing, mass rape, the denial of food and medicine, the murder of 
civilians, and torture are components of a calculated strategy of 
military and political leaders.

At the UN, we have now selected a panel of judges for the war crimes 
tribunal, and we have named a prosecutor.  I have no illusions about the 
obstacles that the tribunal will face.  This is not Nuremberg.  The 
accused will not be the surrendered leaders of a broken power.  It will 
be very difficult to gain access to evidence, including mass grave 
sites, especially in areas under Serb control.  It will be difficult and 
often impossible to gain custody over the accused.

But realism about the tribunal's prospects must not lead to cynicism 
about its importance.  Although there will be no trials in absentia, 
there will be investigations and findings of fact.  The tribunal is 
empowered to deliver indictments and issue arrest orders.  Governments 
will be obliged to hand over for trial those indicted who are within 
their jurisdiction.  If they refuse, the states may be subject to 
sanctions, and the indicted will become international pariahs, trapped 
within the borders of their countries.

The U.S. Government is actively engaged.  We are searching out and 
interviewing refugees.  We are compiling and declassifying documents.  
We have already provided eight reports and are preparing more.  We are 
footing the bill for much of the international fact-finding effort.  We 
are determined to provide the prosecutors with as much legally usable 
evidence as we possibly can.

Tonight, let me also make it clear to the skeptics that the United 
States will not recognize--and we do not believe the international 
community will recognize--any deal or effort to immunize the accused 
from culpability for their crimes.

The five goals I have outlined tonight are all achievable and all 
worthwhile.  Together, they reflect a philosophy that finds a broad, 
common ground between American interests and those of other peoples in 
the areas of humanitarian relief and respect for human dignity.

Beneath it all is the simple view that every individual counts.  That is 
the philosophy of America at its best; that has been the driving force 
for six decades behind the IRC; that is written in George Soros' heart.  
This view is not based on any illusions about the perfectibility of 
human character.  Rescue workers, especially, have seen far too much of 
life and death to indulge in sentimentalism.  But we live in a nation 
and a world that has been immeasurably enriched by the survivors, by 
those who have escaped repression to rebuild their lives, by those who 
have an especially profound understanding of the meaning and obligations 
of freedom because their experience forbids them from taking freedom for 
granted.

It has been said that all work that is worth anything is done in faith.  
Let us all keep the faith that each child saved, each refugee housed, 
each prisoner of conscience freed, each barrier to justice brought down 
will inspire others and explode outward the boundaries of what is 
achievable on this earth.

Thank you very much.  (###)



ARTICLE 3:

Russia's Radioactive Waste Disposal:  A Matter of Grave Concern
David A. Colson, U.S. Representative to the London Convention on Dumping 
of Hazardous Wastes at Sea
Address to the parties to the London Convention, London, United Kingdom, 
November 10, 1993

This set of issues relating to the ocean dumping of radioactive waste by 
the Soviet Union and, more recently, by the Russian Federation is a 
matter of grave and growing concern in the United States.  I can attest 
to the growing concern in our country regarding this matter, having just 
recently testified before our Congress.  It is fundamentally a matter of 
obligation and responsibility on the one hand and a matter of setting 
priorities on the other.

We can express sympathy for those in Russia who must now deal with this 
problem, but that does not absolve them of their responsibility, their 
obligations, and the need for Russia to make the right choice in setting 
their priorities.

This matter not only raises concerns about the degradation of the marine 
environment; corresponding concerns are raised regarding the 
effectiveness of our international institutions.  And, particularly, 
this matter raises questions of trust and credibility.

The international community was deliberately misled by the U.S.S.R.  
Those responsible did no credit to themselves, and they did a disservice 
to the marine environment, the international community and its 
institutions, their country, and its people.

Those past actions cannot be explained away, as some have tried to do.  
There was--and is--no emergency except what has been self-induced.  
Principles of force majeure and sovereign immunity do not provide a 
basis for excusing those actions.

Those that would use nuclear power--be it for civilian or military 
purposes--bear a special responsibility of extraordinary care.  Those 
that do so must understand that it is their responsibility to deal 
adequately and safely with waste and other materials associated with 
this use.  It is a cost of doing business, and if you cannot bear the 
cost, you should not be in the business.  We cannot accept that it is 
for others to bear the cost, either in terms of risks and costs of 
environmental degradation or in terms of the financial costs associated 
with storage, clean-up, and monitoring.

We recognize that Russia has severe economic difficulties, but the 
Russian navy maintains and operates its nuclear fleet at substantial 
cost--and there is money to do this.  The Russian Government chooses to 
spend enormous sums of money on new nuclear vessels--and there is money 
to do this.  To then say there is no money for adequate storage and 
processing facilities--this cannot be so.

Russia is a great country.  Its people have great skills.  They are 
great engineers and technicians.  They have the technical capability.  
You will not convince me--and you will not convince the American people-
-that if the Russian Government so chose, it could not reallocate its 
priorities and immediately build and quickly have in place adequate 
storage and processing facilities.  It is a simple issue of what comes 
first--where are the priorities?

Some will say that in Russia today there are many issues of high 
importance that must be addressed and that this problem does not have 
weight in that balance.  I agree that there are many issues of 
importance.  Let me tell you why this does weigh in the balance.

Very simply, it goes to trust and credibility.  Trust and credibility 
are important in our personal and professional lives, and it is so for 
nations as well.  The recent event in the Sea of Japan has not only 
reminded us of past abuses but has raised new questions regarding 
reliability.  While we all support the reforms that have occurred and 
that continue in Russia today, if there is to be the kind of cooperation 
that Russia seeks, it will only come about if there is confidence and 
trust in the relationship.  So let us go forward.

Frankly, Mr. Chairman, the translation of the remarks by the Russian 
Minister of the Environment was not always clear.  However, we welcome 
his openness and willingness to face up to the issues.  But, while there 
may have been a few new points, the bottom line remains that they 
believe that, for at least a few more years, there will be a need for 
ocean dumping.  We urge Russia not to do so.  Let us find different 
solutions.  In my view, Russia at this time needs to make additional 
efforts in three important areas.

First--full disclosure.  We congratulate those who have brought forward 
information, who had the courage to do so.  But there is more to be 
known--more to be known about past dumping and much more to be known 
about present needs, particularly precisely what is the need, what are 
Russia's plans to deal with the need, and what are the alternatives?  
Full disclosure--it will be hard to help if we believe we do not have 
the full picture.

Second--verification.  It also will be hard to help if we have doubts 
and cannot verify what we are told.  This point goes for everything from 
access to past ocean-dumping sites to access to present land-based 
storage facilities, including those that were once started and never 
completed and those in the planning stages.  It will be hard to help if 
we cannot make our own judgments about the feasible options for dealing 
with the problem.

Third--commitment.  It also will be hard to help if we do not see a 
Russian commitment--not just for the future but also a reallocation of 
policy and budget priorities within Russia to address this issue.

Mr. Chairman, these are our thoughts.  I say these things not to 
embarrass our Russian colleagues but to challenge them.  I applaud their 
courage and urge them to continue to move the Russian Government as a 
whole toward responsible environmental policies and practices.  (###)



ARTICLE 4:

UN Security Council Resolution 883 on Libya

Resolution 883 (November 11, 1993)

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 731 (1992) of 21 January 1992 and 748 (1992) 
of 31 March 1992,

Deeply concerned that after more than twenty months the Libyan 
Government has not fully complied with these resolutions,

Determined to eliminate international terrorism,

Convinced that those responsible for acts of  international terrorism 
must be brought to justice,

Convinced also that the suppression of acts of international terrorism, 
including those in which States are directly or indirectly involved, is 
essential for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Determining, in this context, that the continued failure by the Libyan 
Government to demonstrate by concrete actions its renunciation of 
terrorism, and in particular its continued failure to respond fully and 
effectively to the requests and decisions in resolutions 731 (1992) and 
748 (1992), constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Taking note of the letters to the Secretary-General dated 29 September 
and 1 October 1993 from the Secretary of the General People's Committee 
for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation of Libya (S/26523) and 
his speech in the General Debate at the forty-eighth session of the 
General Assembly (A/48/PV.20) in which Libya stated its intention to 
encourage those charged with the bombing of Pan Am 103 to appear for 
trial in Scotland and its willingness to cooperate with the competent 
French authorities in the case of the bombing of UTA 772,

Expressing its gratitude to the Secretary-General for the efforts he has 
made pursuant to paragraph 4 of resolution 731 (1992),

Recalling the right of States, under Article 50 of the Charter, to 
consult the Security Council where they find themselves confronted with 
special economic problems arising from the carrying out of preventive or 
enforcement measures,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,

1.  Demands once again that the Libyan Government comply without any 
further delay with resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 (1992);

2.  Decides, in order to secure compliance by the Libyan Government with 
the decisions of the Council, to take the following measures, which 
shall come into force at 00.01 EST on 1 December 1993 unless the 
Secretary-General has reported to the Council in the terms set out in 
paragraph 16 below;

3.  Decides that all States in which there are funds or other financial 
resources (including funds derived or generated from property) owned or 
controlled, directly or indirectly, by:

(a)  the Government or public authorities of Libya, or

(b)  any Libyan undertaking,

shall freeze such funds and financial resources and ensure that neither 
they nor any other funds and financial resources are made available, by 
their nationals or by any persons within their territory, directly or 
indirectly, to or for the benefit of the Government or public 
authorities of Libya or any Libyan undertaking, which for the purposes 
of this paragraph, means any commercial, industrial or public utility 
undertaking which is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by

(i)  the Government or public authorities of Libya,
(ii)  any entity, wherever located or organized, owned or controlled by 
(i), or
(iii)  any person identified by States as acting on behalf of (i) or 
(ii) for the  purposes of this resolution;

4.  Further decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 3 above do 
not apply to funds or other financial resources derived from the sale or 
supply of any petroleum or petroleum products, including natural gas and 
natural gas products, or agricultural products or commodities, 
originating in Libya and exported therefrom after the time specified in 
paragraph 2 above, provided that any such funds are paid into separate 
bank accounts exclusively for these funds;

5.  Decides that all States shall prohibit any provision to Libya by 
their nationals or from their territory of the items listed in the annex 
to this resolution, as well as the provision of any types of equipment, 
supplies and grants of licensing arrangements for the manufacture or 
maintenance of such items;

6.  Further decides that, in order to make fully effective the 
provisions of resolution 748 (1992), all States shall:

(a)  require the immediate and complete closure of all Libyan Arab 
Airlines offices within their territories;

(b)  prohibit any commercial transactions with Libyan Arab Airlines by 
their nationals or from their territory, including the honouring or 
endorsement of any tickets or other documents issued by that airline;

c)  prohibit, by their nationals or from their territory, the entering 
into or renewal of arrangements for:

(i)  the making available, for operation within Libya, of any aircraft 
or aircraft components, or
(ii)  the provision of engineering or maintenance servicing of any 
aircraft or aircraft components within Libya;

(d)  prohibit, by their nationals or from their territory, the supply of 
any materials destined for the construction, improvement or maintenance 
of Libyan civilian or military airfields and associated facilities and 
equipment, or of any engineering or other services or components 
destined for the maintenance of any Libyan civil or military airfields 
or associated facilities and  equipment, except emergency equipment and 
equipment and services directly related to civilian air traffic control;

(e)  prohibit, by their nationals or from their territory, any provision 
of advice, assistance, or training to Libyan pilots, flight engineers, 
or aircraft and ground maintenance personnel associated with the 
operation of aircraft and airfields within Libya;

(f)  prohibit, by their nationals or from their territory, any renewal 
of any direct insurance for Libyan aircraft;

7.  Confirms that the decision taken in resolution 748 (1992) that all 
States shall significantly reduce the level of the staff at Libyan 
diplomatic missions and consular posts includes all missions and posts 
established since that decision or after the coming into force of this 
resolution;

8.  Decides that all States, and the Government of Libya, shall take the 
necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of 
the Government or public authorities of Libya, or of any Libyan 
national, or of any Libyan undertaking as defined in paragraph 3 of this 
resolution, or of any person claiming through or for the benefit of any 
such person or undertaking, in connection with any contract or other 
transaction or commercial operation where its performance was affected 
by reason of the measures imposed by or pursuant to this resolution or 
related resolutions;

9.  Instructs the Committee established by resolution 748 (1992) to draw 
up expeditiously guidelines for the implementation of paragraphs 3 to 7 
of this resolution, and to amend and supplement, as appropriate, the 
guidelines for the implementation of resolution 748 (1992), especially 
its paragraph 5 (a);

10.  Entrusts the Committee established by resolution 748 (1992) with 
the task of examining possible requests for assistance under the 
provisions of Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations and making 
recommendations to the President of the Security Council for appropriate 
action;

11.  Affirms that nothing in this resolution affects Libya's duty 
scrupulously to adhere to all of its obligations concerning servicing 
and repayment of its foreign debt;

12.  Calls upon all States, including States not Members of the United 
Nations, and all international organizations, to act strictly in 
accordance with the provisions of the present resolution, 
notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or 
imposed by any international agreement or any contract entered into or 
any licence or permit granted prior to the effective time of this 
resolution;

13.  Requests all States to report to the Secretary-General by 15 
January 1994 on the measures they have instituted for meeting the 
obligations set out in paragraphs 3 to 7 above;

14.  Invites the Secretary-General to continue his role as set out in 
paragraph 4 of resolution 731 (1992);

15.  Calls again upon all Member States individually and collectively to 
encourage the Libyan Government to respond fully and effectively to the 
requests and decisions in resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 (1992);

16.  Expresses its readiness to review the measures set forth above and 
in resolution 748 (1992) with a view to suspending them immediately if 
the Secretary-General reports to the Council that the Libyan Government 
has ensured the appearance of those charged with the bombing of Pan Am 
103 for trial before the appropriate United Kingdom or United States 
court and has satisfied the French judicial authorities with respect to 
the bombing of UTA 772, and with a view to lifting them immediately when 
Libya complies fully with the requests and decisions in resolutions 731 
(1992) and 748 (1992); and requests the Secretary-General, within 90 
days of such suspension, to report to the Council on Libya's compliance 
with the remaining provisions of its resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 
(1992) and, in the case of non-compliance, expresses its resolve to 
terminate immediately the suspension of these measures;

17.  Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Annex

The following are the items referred to in paragraph 5 of this 
resolution:

I.  Pumps of medium or large capacity whose capacity is equal to or 
larger than 350 cubic metres per hour and drivers (gas turbines and 
electric motors) designed for use in the transportation of crude oil and 
natural gas

II.  Equipment designed for use in crude oil export terminals:

--  Loading buoys or single point moorings (spm)
--  Flexible hoses for connection between underwater manifolds (plem) 
and single point mooring and floating loading hoses of large sizes (from 
12" to 16")
--  Anchor chains

III.  Equipment not specially designed for use in crude oil export 
terminals but which because of their large capacity can be used for this 
purpose:

--  Loading pumps of large capacity (4,000 m3/h) and small head (10 
bars)
--  Boosting pumps within the same range of flow rates
--  Inline pipe line inspection tools and cleaning devices (i.e. pigging 
tools) (16" and above)
--  Metering equipment of large capacity (1,000 m3/h and above)

IV.  Refinery equipment:

--  Boilers meeting American Society of Mechanical Engineers 1 standards
--  Furnaces meeting American Society of Mechanical Engineers 8 
standards
--  Fractionation columns meeting American Society of Mechanical 
Engineers 8 standards
--  Pumps meeting American Petroleum Institute 610 standards
--  Catalytic reactors meeting American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
8 standards
--  Prepared catalysts, including the following:

--Catalysts containing platinum
--Catalysts containing molybdenum

V.  Spare parts destined for the items in I to IV above.

VOTE:  11-0-4 (China, Djibouti, Morocco, Pakistan abstaining).  (###)



ARTICLE 5:

UN Security Council Resolution 885 on Somalia

Resolution 885 (November 16, 1993)

The Security Council,

Reaffirming resolutions 733 (1992), 746 (1992), 751 (1992), 767 (1992), 
775 (1992), 794 (1992), 814 (1993), 837 (1993), 865 (1993), and 878 
(1993),

Also reaffirming resolution 865 (1993) on the need to ensure the safety 
and protection of United Nations personnel,

Recognizing the critical need for broadbased consultations among all 
parties and consensus on basic principles to achieve national 
reconciliation and the establishment of democratic institutions in 
Somalia,

Stressing that the people of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility 
for achieving these objectives and in this context noting in particular 
resolution 837 (1993) which condemned the 5 June 1993 attack on UNOSOM 
II personnel and called for an investigation,

Noting further proposals made by Member States, in particular from the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU), including those in document 
S/26627, which recommended the establishment of an impartial Commission 
of Inquiry to investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM II,

Having received and considered the reports of the Secretary-General 
(S/26022 and S/26351) on the implementation of resolution 837 (1993),

1.  Authorizes the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry, in further 
implementation of resolutions 814 (1993) and 837 (1993), to investigate 
armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel which led to casualties among them;

2.  Requests the Secretary-General, having conveyed his views to the 
Security Council, to appoint the Commission at the earliest possible 
time, and to report to the Council on the establishment of the 
Commission;

3.  Directs the Commission to determine procedures for carrying out its 
investigation taking into account standard United Nations procedures;

4.  Notes that members of the Commission will have the status of experts 
on mission within the meaning of the Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations, which shall apply to the Commission;

5.  Urges the Secretary-General to provide the Commission with all 
assistance necessary to facilitate its work;

6.  Calls on all parties in Somalia fully to cooperate with the 
Commission;

7.  Requests the Commission to report its findings through the 
Secretary-General to the Security Council as soon as possible, taking 
into consideration the need for a thorough inquiry;

8.  Requests that the Secretary-General, under his authority in 
resolutions 814 (1993) and 837 (1993), pending completion of the report 
of the Commission, suspend arrest actions against those individuals who 
might be implicated but are not currently detained pursuant to 
resolution 837 (1993), and make appropriate provision to deal with the 
situation of those already detained under the provisions of resolution 
837 (1993);

9.  Decides to remain seized of this matter.

VOTE:  Unanimous (15-0).  (###)



ARTICLE 6:

What's in Print Foreign Relations of the United States

The Department of State has released Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1958-1960, Volume VIII (Berlin Crisis, 1958-1959).  This volume 
focuses on U.S. policy toward Germany in the final years of the 
Eisenhower Administration, including the Berlin crisis during 1958-59 
and participation in the May-August 1959 Geneva foreign ministers 
conference.

Following a speech that month by Soviet Premier Khrushchev, the Soviet 
Union in November 1958 sent a note to the Western powers regarding the 
status of Berlin.  Khrushchev's speech had stated that the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and France had forfeited their right to 
remain in Berlin and that the Soviet Union would transfer its 
responsibilities in East Germany to the German Democratic Republic.

The followup Soviet note gave the Western powers six months to turn West 
Berlin into a free city.  The Western powers met in the following month 
and drafted a formal reply to the Soviets.

Their answer, delivered on December 31, 1958, reviewed the history of 
the four-power agreements on Berlin and stated that the city was only 
one aspect of the entire German question and that the Soviet ultimatum 
offered no reasonable basis for negotiation.  From January to March 
1959, further notes were exchanged, resulting in an agreement to hold a 
four-power foreign ministers meeting in Geneva in May.

The United States tried to develop contingency plans for Berlin in case 
the Soviet Union actually transferred its responsibilities to the East 
Germans, although President Eisenhower was concerned that the plans were 
inadequate for the situation.

The Geneva foreign ministers conference opened on May 10, 1959, to 
consider the German question.  After a number of proposals and counter-
proposals, the conference adjourned on August 5, 1959, having made no 
progress toward agreement.

This volume, prepared by the Office of the Historian, is 1 of more than 
70 volumes documenting the foreign policies of the Eisenhower 
Administration.

Volume VIII (GPO Stock No. 044-000-02353-9; ISBN 0-16-038052-9) may be 
purchased for $47 (add 25% for foreign orders) from:

Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
P.O. Box 371954
Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954

To FAX orders, call (202) 512-2250.  Checks payable to the 
Superintendent of Documents are accepted, as are VISA and MasterCard.

For further information, contact Glenn W. LaFantasie, General Editor
of the Foreign Relations series, at (202) 663-1133; FAX (202) 663-1289. 
(###)

END OF DISPATCH VOL 4, NO 47.

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