US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH VOLUME 4, NUMBER 47, NOVEMBER 22, 1993 PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE: 1. The Strategic Priorities Of American Foreign Policy -- Secretary Christopher 2. Agenda for Dignity -- Madeleine K. Albright 3. Russia's Radioactive Waste Disposal: A Matter of Grave Concern -- David A. Colson 4. UN Security Council Resolution 883 on Libya 5. UN Security Council Resolution 885 on Somalia 6. What's in Print: Foreign Relations of the United States ARTICLE 1: The Strategic Priorities Of American Foreign Policy Secretary Christopher Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, November 4, 1993 Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: I am pleased to have the chance to talk to you today about the strategic priorities of America's foreign policy. The world is moving away from one of the most dangerous confrontations in history, and in that fact lies tremendous opportunity for the United States. In the Cold War world, stability was based on confrontation. In the new world, stability will be based on common interests and shared values. We stand on the brink of shaping a new world of extraordinary hope and possibility. While I relish the challenge of what lies before us, I am also mindful that the new world we seek will not emerge on its own. We must shape the transformation that is under way in a time of great fluidity. My job as Secretary of State is to help the President guide the country through this transition. At the same time, I understand that we must accomplish this transformation at a time when the definitions, certainties, and ground rules of the Cold War have disappeared. I hasten to add that I have no regrets about the passing of the Cold War. Nostalgia for its rigidities can only stem from amnesia. But its demise does mean that we must develop a new domestic consensus to sustain our active engagement in a more complex and interdependent world. During this period, the United States must maintain a tough-minded sense of our enduring interests: ensuring the security of our nation; the prosperity of our people; and the advancement, where possible, of our democratic values. And it is with these core interests in mind that the Clinton Administration has defined and is pursuing the overarching priorities of America's foreign policy. We are renewing and updating our key security alliances, while also building on the historically unique situation that the major powers can be partners cooperating for peace--not competitors locked in conflict. We are reaching out to former adversaries to transform them into partners. We are working to contain and resolve regional conflicts, particularly where the threat of expansion or the risk of proliferation poses a very direct danger to the United States. And we are working to expand trade, spur growth, and enhance the economic security of each and every American. We can shape the future knowing that the United States is more secure now than at any time since early in this century. Democracy is ascendant from Central America to Central Asia, from South Africa to Cambodia. Free markets are being established in places where they were long forbidden. Millions of people, for the first time in their lives, have the chance to enjoy political freedom and economic opportunity. The United States is working relentlessly to ensure that an ever- increasing number of people know the benefits of democratic institutions, human rights, and free markets. At the same time, new threats to peace and stability have emerged. The unholy marriage of ethnic violence and aggressive nationalism is shattering fragile states, creating humanitarian tragedies, and raising the possibility of wider regional strife. And the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction multiplies the danger of every conflict. In this period of transition, crises and even setbacks are inevitable. We will work to prevent and manage them. But we will stay on the steady and responsible course we have set. Television is a wonderful phenomenon and sometimes even an instrument of freedom. But television images cannot be the North Star of America's foreign policy. As I travel the world, I see that virtually every nation wants to define its foreign policy in terms relative to the United States, whether seeking security assurances or expanding trade and investment links with us. They look to us as the fulcrum for global security and, in many cases, for regional security. They know that American international leadership is in their interest. This gives us unparalleled opportunities to influence their conduct. I am here today to say that American engagement and leadership in the world--an activist American foreign policy--is most fundamentally in our interest. PRIORITIES Today I would like to discuss with this committee our efforts with respect to several major issues of enduring national interest. These are not the exclusive areas of concern for this Administration. My speeches last spring to the Council of the Americas and the African- American Institute described our policy objectives toward Latin America and Africa, respectively. Today I want to discuss in my testimony some of our current top priorities--priorities that address the great challenges in this era of change. Let me begin with the new centrality of economic policy in our foreign policy. 1. Economic Security Security in the post-Cold War era will depend as much on strong economies as on strong arsenals. This Administration understands that America's strength at home and its strength abroad are interlocking and mutually reinforcing. That is why President Clinton and I have placed economic policy at the heart of our foreign policy. And I believe that this new emphasis is already yielding results. The President's approach was apparent at the successful July summit meeting of the G-7 nations in Tokyo. For more than a decade, our major industrial allies and trading partners complained that we were not serious about reducing the growth of our budget deficit. By working with the Congress to enact a historic deficit reduction program, President Clinton sent a clear message to the world: America is back as a responsible manager of its own economy and as a dependable leader for global economic cooperation and growth. Armed with that new credibility in Tokyo, President Clinton won a market access agreement to move the Uruguay Round forward. He was also able to win new pledges for multilateral assistance to Russia and an agreement to negotiate a new economic framework to correct our unacceptable trade imbalance with Japan. This Administration attaches as high a priority to improving our economic and trade ties with Japan as it does to maintaining our important security and political links. Let me briefly turn your attention to three events--all occurring within the next 40 days--that together will help determine the strength of our economy and the standard of living of our people as we enter the 21st century: the vote on NAFTA, the deadline for GATT, and the meeting of the APEC forum. Each event is also a foreign policy challenge with enormous consequences for our global leadership. I have been making the case for NAFTA repeatedly in recent weeks, and I believe that there is increasing recognition that NAFTA is one of the great foreign policy opportunities of this generation. For the United States, Canada, and Mexico, NAFTA is about more than tariffs and trade, growth, and jobs. It will also build a new, cooperative relationship with Mexico. Approval of NAFTA will increase Mexico's capacity to cooperate with us on a wide range of vital issues such as illegal immigration, cross- border pollution, and narco-trafficking. NAFTA will also mark a turning point in the history of our relations throughout the hemisphere at a time when democracy is on the march, markets are opening, and conflicts are being resolved peacefully. By approving NAFTA, the United States will send a powerful signal that we support these developments. Rejecting NAFTA, on the other hand, would send a chilling signal about our willingness to engage in Latin America at a time when so many of our neighbors--including Mexico--are genuinely receptive to closer cooperation with us. There is no good time to defeat NAFTA--but there could be no worse time than when the GATT negotiations are in their final, crucial days leading up to the December 15 deadline. At this delicate, decisive stage of the Uruguay Round, the United States must maintain maximum leverage--and exercise maximum leadership. A setback on NAFTA would compromise both. Rejecting NAFTA would create the perception that America is not prepared to act on behalf of its global economic interests at a time when those interests are so clearly at stake. NAFTA is now in our hands, but the United States cannot conclude the Uruguay Round on its own. The EC, Japan, the ASEAN nations, and others must also move. None of the remaining trade-offs in goods, services, or agriculture will be easy for any nation--but they must be made. I want to remind our allies and trading partners in Europe once again that advancing transatlantic security requires us not only to focus on renewing the NATO alliance but also on successfully concluding the GATT negotiations. The Uruguay Round is critically important to the revival of the world economy, not only to our major industrial allies but to developing countries in Africa, Latin America, and Asia that are seeking sustained growth and sustainable development. Nowhere is economic growth faster--or the export opportunities for American business greater--than in the dynamic Asia-Pacific region. In two weeks, I will go to Seattle to host a meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. The APEC conference--and the historic gathering of leaders that President Clinton has called at its conclusion--will enable us to establish a framework for regional economic integration and trade liberalization among 15 economies that now account for nearly half the world's GNP. It will expand America's economic presence in a region to which our future is increasingly linked. These are 40 days that can shake the economic world and shape America's future position in it. With NAFTA, GATT, and APEC, there is an extraordinary convergence of opportunities for the United States. I view each of these challenges, along with the President's deficit reduction program and successes in Tokyo last summer, as integral elements of the most ambitious international economic agenda that any President has undertaken in almost half a century. And as Secretary of State, I see each as a foreign policy as well as an economic policy opportunity--because in the post-Cold War world, our national security is inseparable from our economic security. 2. Support for Reform In Russia and the NIS This Administration is placing special emphasis on our support for political and economic reform in Russia and in the other states of the former Soviet Union. Helping ensure the success of this process is our highest foreign policy priority. That is the reason President Clinton is seeking to build a strategic alliance with post-communist reformers throughout the area. If the people of Russia succeed in their heroic struggle to build a free society and a market economy, the payoffs for the United States will be transforming: a permanently diminished threat of nuclear war, lower defense budgets, vast new markets, and cooperation on the global and regional issues that once divided us. Helping democracy prevail in Russia remains the wisest--and least expensive--investment that we can make in America's security. Mr. Chairman, the House and Senate have recognized the value of this investment. With the support of Congress, the United States initially pledged $1.6 billion in bilateral assistance programs to Russia and the new independent states. In Tokyo last July, we proposed a $3-billion special privatization and restructuring program, which our G-7 partners have joined. And in late September, as the crisis in Moscow between reform and reaction was approaching its climax, this Congress approved the Administration's request for $2.5 billion in additional technical and humanitarian assistance. As you know, I went to Moscow two weeks ago to reaffirm, on behalf of President Clinton, our steadfast support for reform in the wake of the early October crisis. I made the case that the credibility of December's parliamentary elections--and the prospects for Russian democracy--depend on open dissent and a free press. President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev reiterated their commitment to reform and their determination to hold free and fair elections--and to allow press freedom. Despite the hardships inevitably associated with a transformation of this magnitude, the Russian people have chosen reform over reaction. My visit gave me renewed confidence that reform will win their support once again. We now look forward to a January summit between President Clinton and President Yeltsin in Moscow--a summit that we expect will broaden and deepen the new, cooperative relationship we are forging. 3. Europe and NATO The trip I completed last week was designed not only to reinforce our partnership with Russia but to help renew the NATO alliance at a time of new and different security challenges in Europe. The United States has an enduring political, military, economic, and cultural link to Europe that must be preserved. The European Community is our largest single trading partner, and we have a powerful stake in the collective security guaranteed by NATO. This alliance of democracies--the most successful in history--can lay the foundation of an undivided continent rooted in the principles of political liberty and economic freedom. To meet the new challenges in Europe, the alliance must embrace innovation or risk irrelevance. Accordingly, the United States is proposing to transform NATO's relationship with the new democracies of the East. The January summit should formally open the door to an evolutionary process of NATO expansion. This process should be non-discriminatory and inclusive. It should not be tied to a specific timetable or criteria for membership. The summit should also initiate practical military cooperation between NATO forces and those to the East. To that end, we have proposed a Partnership for Peace. The partnership would be open to all members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council as well as others. It excludes no nations and forms no new blocs. Our idea is to build the Partnership for Peace over time, at a pace geared to each partner's interest and capabilities. The partnership would involve tangible cooperation and would channel members' defense efforts toward the ability to participate with NATO in a range of multinational missions. This partnership would play an important role in the evolutionary process of NATO expansion, creating an evolving security relationship that could culminate in NATO membership. This Partnership for Peace is a first step by the alliance to help fill the vacuum of insecurity and instability that was created in Central and Eastern Europe by the demise of the Soviet empire. It reflects our strong belief that the reform movements in Eastern Europe must be bolstered by the prospect of security cooperation with the West. Reaction to this proposal has been positive--from allies, from NATO Secretary General Woerner, from Central and East European countries (including the Baltic states), and from Russia and the new independent states. 4. Asia and the Pacific No area of the world will be more important for American interests than the Asia-Pacific region. This region contains the world's most dynamic economies, and it is the most lucrative terrain for American exports and jobs. It is thus crucial to the President's domestic agenda. We have vital security stakes in an area where we have fought three wars in the past half-century and where major powers intersect. And we seek to promote our values in the world's most populous region, where democracy is on the move yet repressive regimes remain. The stakes in Asia are, therefore, high for America. That is why President Clinton traveled there on his first trip overseas. That is why I have been there three times as Secretary. The upcoming APEC meeting will elaborate the President's vision of a New Pacific Community which he set forth in July in his statements in Tokyo and Seoul. The basic outlines are already clear: -- A more prosperous community through open markets and open societies; -- A more secure community through maintenance of our alliances and forward military presence, non-proliferation policies, and engagement in regional dialogues; -- A freer community through advocacy of open societies that contribute both to development and peace; and -- Regional cooperation on global issues such as the environment, narcotics, refugees, and health. The Clinton Administration is placing special emphasis on developing regional approaches so as to construct--with others--a New Pacific Community. But, clearly, bilateral ties are also part of this vision. Let me briefly mention two that are central to our concerns. The cornerstone of our Asia-Pacific policy remains our relationship with Japan. The President seeks to shape a durable and comprehensive partnership as we head toward the next century. As I have emphasized, we need to place our economic ties on as sound and cooperative a basis as we have established on security, political, and global issues. We are working out a comprehensive relationship with China that permits resolution of differences in a broad, strategic context. As I have made clear on previous occasions, we have continuing concerns with China, including human rights, proliferation, and market access. We are actively working to make strides in each area and share with the Congress the need to make measurable progress. The clock is ticking on a decision next spring on MFN renewal. Unless there is overall, significant progress on human rights, the President will not be in a position to recommend extension. 5. The Middle East The Middle East is a region where the United States has both vital interests and the influence to protect those interests. This fact was powerfully demonstrated in our successful leadership in stemming aggression in the Persian Gulf. Nowhere is the intersection between our interests and our influence more apparent than in the Arab-Israeli peace process. For four decades, we have been involved in the search for Middle East peace not only because it is the right thing to do but because our interests and those of our friends demand it. The pursuit of peace cannot guarantee stability in the region. But it can reduce the dangers of war and enhance the well-being of our allies--Israeli and Arab alike. This in turn will help preserve our political and economic stake in one of the world's most important strategic regions. In the Middle East, the recent breakthrough between Israelis and Palestinians has fundamentally changed the landscape of the Arab-Israeli conflict. There is much work to be done to transform the Declaration of Principles into an enduring agreement and changed realities on the ground. The challenge now is to reinforce this breakthrough and broaden it to achieve a comprehensive settlement that will last. We will continue to work very closely with the parties themselves in pursuit of three goals. First, it is essential that Israelis and Palestinians implement their Declaration of Principles in a timely manner. Implementing the accord will build the strength of the peace constituencies. It will show that negotiations work and demonstrate that extremists cannot stop the march toward peace. This accord must succeed. This means that Israelis and Palestinians need to be flexible and patient as they work through the complicated issues on the table. It also means that the international community needs to lend its support. That effort began with the October 1 Conference to Support Middle East Peace, which we organized. It will continue this week in Paris, when the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee meets to coordinate assistance to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. We must work to make the recent turning point for peace irreversible as we work to make the benefits of peace irresistible. Second, it is also essential that we continue our efforts to move toward a comprehensive settlement. This means ensuring that progress is achieved on the other tracks and that progress on the Israeli- Palestinian negotiations facilitates rather than impedes movement on the others. On the Israeli-Syrian track, there are complex issues relating to peace, withdrawal, and security that continue to separate the parties. These issues should be amenable to a negotiated settlement, and we are prepared to play our role as a peace partner with both Israel and Syria. Israel and Lebanon are focused on trying to find a way to meet their respective needs on the same three issues. And Jordan and Israel, having concluded a historic agenda in Washington, are in the process of organizing their negotiations in a practical manner on key issues. We are committed to a comprehensive settlement, and we believe the parties are, too. Our Special Middle East Coordinator, Dennis Ross, came back from his recent trip to the region with the strong view that all parties are committed to this process and to working with us to find ways to overcome the gaps that separate them. And we will be unflagging in this effort. Third, we are trying to create the proper environment for peace in the region. As the implementation of the Declaration of Principles moves forward, we are encouraging Israelis and Palestinians to reach out toward one another and create an atmosphere on the ground that facilitates their work at the negotiating table. At the same time, we are asking the Arab states to do their share. Tunisia's decision to host the refugee working group last month was significant, as was the Qatari Foreign Minister's meeting with Israeli Foreign Minister Peres. Oman has offered to host the next working group meeting on water. Egypt will host the next working group meeting on the environment. Morocco hosted Prime Minister Rabin on his return from the September 13 signing ceremony in Washington. Arab and Israeli business people are talking about translating the potential for regional economic growth into reality. But more needs to be done. Anachronisms such as the Arab boycott of Israel must end, and anti-Israeli UN resolutions that have been on the books for too long must be removed. There has been some movement on both of these issues, and we will work to build greater momentum. Working at times as a catalyst, as a facilitator, or as a source of reassurance--and, when needed, as an intermediary--the United States is committed to doing everything it can to help secure what has been achieved and push for breakthroughs on other fronts. The President and I will stay actively involved. I will travel to the region when appropriate to promote the sustained progress that I believe is within reach. There is much work to be done, but I am very hopeful about the prospects for a comprehensive peace. 6. Non-Proliferation and Other Global Issues Nuclear weapons give rogue states disproportionate power, destabilize entire regions, and threaten human and environmental disasters. They can turn local conflicts into serious threats to our security. In this era, weapons of mass destruction are more readily available--and there are fewer inhibitions on their use. This Administration is working for global enforcement of non- proliferation standards. We are also pursuing specific strategies in each region where there is a real potential for proliferation. We lead the international effort to persuade North Korea to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to its nuclear safeguards obligations. We are working to ensure that Iran does not acquire nuclear weapons, and that Iraq does not restore its former capabilities. We have sanctioned China and Pakistan for China's transfer of ballistic missile components to Pakistan. Let me describe the progress made on non-proliferation and denuclearization during my trip to Russia and the NIS. I visited Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus, where hundreds of old Soviet nuclear weapons remain. In 1992, these former Soviet states committed themselves to ratify the START I Treaty and adhere to the NPT as non- nuclear states. We have taken significant steps forward. Belarus has already fulfilled its commitments. In Kazakhstan, which has ratified START I, President Nazarbayev for the first time set a deadline for accession to the NPT--the end of this year. Ukraine reaffirmed its commitments and their applicability to all strategic offensive arms on Ukrainian soil. President Kravchuk has pledged to press the Ukrainian parliament to ratify START I during its November session. We still have hard work ahead with Ukraine, where opposition remains to that nation becoming "non-nuclear." The United States is prepared to help Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus destroy or dismantle their nuclear weapons. But we have made it clear that action on these matters is a pre-requisite to longer-term economic cooperation and security partnerships. We are also bringing transnational issues such as the environment, population growth, refugees, terrorism, and narcotics where they belong- -into the mainstream of American foreign policy. If we ignore these issues, they will return--compounded, more costly, and sometimes threatening to our security. That is why the United States is a leader, not a laggard, on global environmental issues. As part of this commitment, we have signed the biodiversity and climate change treaties. This Administration is placing an unmistakable emphasis on these pressing global concerns. REGIONAL CONFLICTS Earlier I noted that the end of the Cold War, while lifting the lid that had smothered freedom for much of the world, also lifted the lid on regional conflicts--especially along the periphery of the former Soviet Union. Troublesome conflicts, often spilling across borders, have persisted in Africa. In these conflicts, preventive diplomacy can be employed to great success. Realism must guide U.S. policies toward these conflicts. Some touch our interests--or will, if they are not checked. But we must accept that other conflicts may not. In testifying before the committee, Madeleine Albright addressed the importance of taking stock together with the Congress as we look at regional conflicts and the ever-increasing demands on peace-keeping. Ambassador Albright spoke eloquently of the need to preserve a bipartisan consensus as we address our role in UN peace-keeping operations. I completely agree. Clearly, we will need to consider new mechanisms for conflict resolution and conflict avoidance. The UN structure may have to be supplemented by regional mechanisms. Organizations such as the OAU and the OAS can be more effective in conflict prevention, peace-keeping, and disaster relief. Institutions like NATO may need to assume more of a peace- keeping mission, at least in Europe. Our own role and involvement will need to be informed by a strict assessment of our interests and the interests of others. We must examine every case--asking rigorous questions and giving measured answers--to find the course commensurate with our interests. That is what we are doing today in Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia. In each of these places, things have not always gone exactly as we had planned or hoped. These are difficult situations, and some setbacks, unfortunately, are inevitable. We should learn from them. But we should not overreact, for that may mean either losing possible opportunities for success or damaging our interests elsewhere. Haiti Haiti demonstrates that temporary setbacks must not prevent us from pursuing our interests. If democracy is not restored, repression, violence, and suffering will continue. More instability may cause large numbers of Haitians to flee, at great risk to themselves and to Haiti's neighbors--including the United States. Haiti's problems can be addressed only through democratic institutions and economic development. We have supported a political process, culminating in the Governors Island accord, that provides for the restoration of democracy. But now Haiti's military leadership refuses to adhere to the accord. We are staying on course. We remain committed to the restoration of democracy and the return of President Aristide. The sanctions imposed in June brought the Haitian military to the negotiating table. We have now re-imposed sanctions on oil and arms and a freeze on assets of targeted individuals. These are selective sanctions, designed to compel the military leadership to fulfill its obligations, while sparing, as much as possible, the people of Haiti. We are prepared to increase the pressures on the Haitian military, if that is necessary. Once the accord is implemented, we want to make it possible for Haiti to sustain democracy. Somalia The United States is pursuing a noble objective in Somalia, consistent with its finest values and traditions. We have saved literally hundreds of thousands of lives. After the attack on Pakistani peace-keepers in June, significant efforts and resources were dedicated to the military and security aspects of the mission. Not enough attention was given to efforts to achieve political reconciliation, which is essential to prevent Somalia from returning to famine and anarchy. We are now set firmly on the political track and are encouraged by the progress being made. In order to give this process a chance to succeed, American forces will remain until next March and will, as President Clinton stated on October 7, work with UN forces to keep open lines of communication and keep pressure on those who would seek to cut off relief supplies. To be sure, we could have taken the easy, and perhaps popular, way out: simply abandon the effort in Somalia after the tragic deaths of American servicemen on October 3. The President chose another path, one that seeks to protect the real gains made in Somalia while improving the prospects for further progress. This will give the Somalis a reasonable chance to sort out their differences and also permit the United Nations to prepare for our departure. Bosnia American policy toward the terrible conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina responds to our strategic interest in preventing the conflict from spreading to neighboring countries and our humanitarian interest in helping to relieve the suffering of the people of Bosnia. Negotiations offer the only way to a practical solution. Although the Geneva talks have not been able to produce an acceptable agreement, they have made some progress and remain alive. The negotiators have also explored the option of a "global solution" that would embrace Croatia, Kosovo, and other areas of conflict in the region. The United States has played an active role in support of these diplomatic efforts and will continue to do so. Unfortunately, none of these efforts provides any assurance that an agreement can be reached this winter. We will continue to press the negotiating track, but with the Bosnian people again at serious risk, we must focus attention on humanitarian relief. The United States has worked very hard to respond to humanitarian needs. We are the single largest country donor of humanitarian aid--more than $370 million since 1991. With 6,000 flights over 500 days, the Sarajevo airlift has gone on longer than the Berlin airlift of 45 years ago. Air drops of humanitarian relief to the enclaves have delivered more than 10 million meals since February. American planes have made 80% of airdrop flights. We remain committed to the relief effort, both by air and overland, where we are working with the UN and EC on ways to resolve immediate problems of secure land access for relief convoys, now suspended because of intense fighting in central Bosnia. We strongly support the work of the UN's War Crimes Tribunal and continued economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. We are determined to prevent the conflict from spreading, and we have deployed U.S. forces to Macedonia as part of an international effort to deter a wider conflict. At the same time, the President has made it clear that the United States will not attempt to force a settlement on Bosnia militarily. No imposed settlement would endure. Before committing American troops anywhere in the world, we must ask a series of rigorous and searching questions. If we are satisfied with the conditions for our participation, we would be prepared to participate in a NATO implementation of a Bosnian settlement. Those conditions would include good-faith agreement to a settlement by all the parties and evidence of good-faith implementation. Any such action by the United States would require the fullest consultation with Congress. I want to assure the members of this committee that our policy toward any regional conflict will undergo constant and rigorous reevaluation. We will constantly reassess our own assumptions to be sure they are truly validated by events. And any situation in which American men and women may be put in harm's way will always hold the highest priority for me and for every member of this Administration. CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATIONS Mr. Chairman, this Administration is committed to frequent and comprehensive consultations with the Congress. When congressional hearings begin on the relationship between the legislative and the executive branches on foreign policy, we will be responsive. It is in that spirit, Mr. Chairman--a spirit of cooperation and steadfastness about enduring American interests in a fast-changing world--that I have come here today. Now I would be pleased to respond to your questions and hear your views. (###) ARTICLE 2: Agenda for Dignity Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Address to the International Rescue Committee, New York City, November 2, 1993 It is said that you can search all the public parks without finding a monument to a committee. But the memorials to the International Rescue Committee are not stone but flesh and blood. The value of the committee's work is tallied in the hope-filled eyes of once-despairing children and in the grateful handclasps of those who have fled repression and found freedom. Sixty years ago, Albert Einstein first asked Americans to help Jews and others at risk in Hitler's Germany. Soon after, the Emergency Rescue Committee in Marseilles began finding ways for those on the Gestapo hit list to get across the Pyrenees and through Spain to freedom. Later still, the Iron Curtain Refugee Campaign aided the victims of Stalinism. From then to now--from the Cuban revolution to the brutal repression of "Prague Spring," from starvation in Bangladesh to famine in Somalia, from tyranny in Pinochet's Chile to villainy in the Balkans--the IRC has offered a helping hand to the victims of despots, aggressors, drought, and war. With that proud history in mind, tonight I join you in honoring the work of George Soros. His foundations have led the way in transforming the once-closed societies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. I would also like to mention the IRC's own Fred Cuny who--like George Soros--has been on the front lines of the daunting struggle against deprivation and despair in Bosnia. Gentlemen, you are carrying on a noble tradition of commitment and caring, and I salute you both. From the beginning, the IRC's work has been characterized not only by rigorous efficiency but by certain core principles: a deep belief in liberty; faith in the resilience of the human spirit; understanding that the refugee story does not end with freedom but with what one does after freedom has been gained; and a conviction that the full potential of humanity resides in each of us--no matter what our station, no matter what our background--and that, because each of us has something to contribute, each of us is worth the time and trouble to save. Today, these core beliefs are being tested. Ethnic conflict and civil strife have provoked humanitarian crises around the globe. The task of delivering emergency assistance is becoming more dangerous and complex. The international relief system is under severe strain and faces burgeoning demands. Progress in repatriating refugees in Central America, Cambodia, and Mozambique may be overwhelmed by new influxes elsewhere. Our government's estimates are sobering indeed. And many of the most tragic stories will not be seen on CNN. Africa, alone, will continue to generate humanitarian emergencies on an unparalleled scale. It is home today to a dozen ongoing insurgencies, 6 million refugees, and a rampaging AIDS epidemic. In Somalia, most of the 1.3 million refugees and displaced persons remain dependent on outside assistance. The civil war in Sudan is creating humanitarian conditions as severe as those in Somalia last year. The fate of 2 million homeless and displaced people in Liberia and Rwanda depends on whether fragile cease-fires hold. In Central Eurasia, conditions are bad, getting worse, and getting more dangerous. War in the Caucasus has prompted Iran to set up refugee camps inside the borders of Azerbaijan. Armenia faces a second harsh winter cut off from adequate outside supplies of food, water, and power. Winter also threatens hundreds of thousands in Georgia and Tajikistan. And in Iraq, the number of Kurds in need has now surpassed 1 million. In these and other areas, hostile environments impede and, too often, prevent the delivery of assistance. Attacks on relief convoys, theft of supplies, and murders of relief workers frustrate us all. Combined with the failure to alleviate bureaucratic bungling and overlap, these trends threaten to transform donor fatigue into donor collapse. Abroad, American leadership is sought. While American contributions do remain high, the temptation to look inward is also strong. Many Americans have grown weary of worrying about problems abroad; some have grown angry at floods of immigrants--including some terrorists--who have reached our shores; and all of us know that the roots of many of today's foreign conflicts run so deep as to defy obvious solution. My father was a government official and diplomat during the final days of free Czechoslovakia nearly one half-century ago. He concluded sadly of those years that too many good men failed to act against the tide of events and the current of conventional wisdom--that too many were willing to let go of core principles and substitute the principles of convenience. We live today, as he did, in a period of historical transition, when old assumptions are obsolete, the content of new truths is in dispute, and deadening complacency competes with serious-minded action and thought. As a Czech patriot, my father would have been pleased to know that the "Great Twilight Struggle" against Soviet communism is over. But as a refugee whose family found sanctuary in America, he would also have warned us that the struggle to shape the new dawn will not be easy and that success is not assured. America today, under President Clinton's leadership, is being called upon to develop--not overnight but over time--a new framework for protecting our territory, our citizens, and our interests in a dramatically altered world. In devising that framework, we will depend, for the most part, on our own reserves of military and economic power. We will look for help from old friends and new. We will look beyond the horizon of the short term, recognizing that even seemingly distant problems and conflicts may, one day, come home to America. And we will work to develop a consensus within our own country--within the Congress and the public at large--for maintaining American engagement and leadership in the world. At its best, American foreign policy has married our interests and our values. We promote peace because we have no designs on the territory of others. We promote international law because a nation inclined to observe the law will do better in a world where legal standards are respected and enforced. We promote democracy because democratic governments rarely initiate aggression and because free economies provide the best opportunities for trade and shared growth. These are policies of enlightened self-interest. It was this proud American tradition that led Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres to say, during the recent Middle East peace ceremonies, that when the history books are written: Nobody will understand the United States, really: You have so much force, and you didn't conquer the land of anybody; you have so much power, and you didn't dominate another people; you have problems of your own, and you have never turned your back on the problems of others. Obviously, neither we, nor the United Nations, nor anyone else can right every wrong. Nor should we try to do so. But it is in our interests, and in our character, to do all that we reasonably can do to defend freedom, to help the deserving who need help, and to promote respect for enduring principles of international decency and law. It is in that spirit, and with the beliefs that have for so long inspired the IRC in mind, that tonight I will put forward five goals for improving our ability to respond to international disasters--and to relieve human suffering. First, we must strengthen our capacity to ensure that when the international community attempts to deliver emergency relief, we are able to make good on that promise. As events in Bosnia, Somalia, and other locales indicate, it has grown increasingly difficult to separate the humanitarian from other components of a peace-keeping or disaster assistance mission. But there is a difference. A combatant force may well refuse to disarm or demobilize out of a legitimate concern for survival. But there is nothing legitimate about using force to starve others into surrender or death. There is nothing legitimate about denying medical aid so that children lie screaming as legs are amputated without anesthesia. There is nothing legitimate about extorting 10% and 20% and 50% of the cargo from relief caravans. These are not lawful acts, and they should not be permissible tactics of war. This coming winter in Bosnia, access is going to make the difference between hardship and disaster. The people of Sarajevo and Mostar and Srebrenica are weaker today than they were last year; their capacity to endure hardship has been sapped; they have fewer reserves of materiel, body, and mind. If fighting continues, the number of Bosnians in need will probably be double that of last winter--about 2.8 million people-- more than one-half of the population. Total relief requirements for the next six months will be 390,000 metric tons--about 80% of which will be food--more than three times the amount delivered during the first half of this year. We all know the Bosnia crisis has so far defied solution. But neither America, nor the community of nations, nor the non-governmental community has failed to respond to the humanitarian tragedy. The Bosnia airlift has now gone on longer than the Berlin airlift 45 years ago. Pilots from more than 20 countries have braved bullets, mortars, and anti-aircraft fire to deliver relief goods on almost 6,000 flights over almost 500 days. Eighty percent of the airdrops in Bosnia have been from American planes. I know the IRC is making plans for this winter. We are all prepared and preparing to do more. But the Bosnian Serbs continue at times to deny passage to eastern Muslim enclaves. Both the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Government forces have blocked or harassed convoys in the central part of the country. And the Tuzla airport--which could be critical to resupply efforts this winter--remains closed. We must learn the lesson of our effort to provide humanitarian relief to Bosnia. We must--and we are--working to reform, streamline, and modernize UN peace-keeping and humanitarian relief capabilities. We must work together to establish and re-establish the principle of nonviolability of emergency help. Last December, President Bush ordered American forces into Somalia for the express purpose of enforcing the delivery of humanitarian aid. President Clinton has persevered in that effort. That is the kind of goal the American people can believe in. That is an objective the community of nations should insist on. And that, alone, is sufficient reason to renew our resolve--despite recent setbacks--to improve our planning, develop our skills, and enhance our capacity to provide relief to those in desperate need. This leads directly to the second goal: We must reform the management of the UN's emergency and development assistance programs. Many of the unsung heroes of the UN are found in its relief agencies-- the UNHCR, the UNDP, the World Food Program, and UNICEF. We must all be grateful for their efforts. We must all admire the many individual examples of dedication, courage, and just plain hard work. But just as we should be the first to support UN emergency relief efforts, so should we be the first to acknowledge the need for change. As first friend and first critic of the UN, I must tell you that in the area of humanitarian assistance, "UN coordination" is all too often an oxymoron. UN agencies are not supposed to compete with each other, but they do. UN officials are supposed to be accountable, but they are not. Creation last year of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) was supposed to put someone clearly in charge, but it hasn't. The DHA has a mission but no authority. It neither controls the purse strings nor the personnel of the offices which actually do the work. Lack of coordination in the delivery of emergency aid is not simply a bureaucratic concern; it is often a matter of life and death. On the ground, in an emergency, there is simply no time to debate who is in charge of what or whose list of priorities should be paramount. It is too late to begin only then to compare inventory lists of what relief is available. It is too late to start asking questions that should have long since been answered about the willingness of individual donors to meet contingency needs. The Clinton Administration believes that the best bet for improving coordination is to make good on the promise of DHA. That means, first, that DHA must be reformed internally. It must improve its working arrangements with partner agencies and find a way to attract more qualified personnel with particular experience in administering humanitarian assistance in complex emergencies. As the reform process goes forward, we believe DHA should be given four things it does not now have: -- First, recognition by all parties of DHA's leading role in the delivery of humanitarian assistance; -- Second, a modern information center that will catalogue available resources, assess probable needs, track financing, provide data, and give early warning of humanitarian crises; -- Third, sufficient resources to organize a rapid response to emergencies; and -- Finally, the ability, where necessary, to organize and coordinate responses in the field. We are also working through the UN to see that the DHA is involved in planning and implementing peace-keeping missions where a humanitarian element is present. And we want to guarantee that the views, the expertise, and the concerns of prominent non-governmental organizations are taken into account at every stage of the process. The third goal I will discuss tonight relates solely to human-caused tragedies. We must act to reduce the threat posed to human life by the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines. In many parts of the world, anti-personnel mines have become the coward's weapon of choice. They are simple to lay but difficult to destroy or detect. Increasingly, they are being used not as a controlled and well-mapped means of limiting the movements of an opposing army but as weapons of terror and economic war. Mines go on killing long after a conflict ends. We estimate that 85 million remain in place, scattered in more than 60 countries. Each week, more than 150 people--most of them civilians--are killed or maimed. The need to clear mines slows and disrupts efforts to repatriate refugees and to resume normal economic life in societies seeking to recover from the ravages of war. This past summer, I visited Cambodia, where most of the news is good. Thanks to the UN and to a heroic act of popular will, a government legitimized by free elections has been installed. The Khmer Rouge has been staggered. But still the mines explode. You can't walk down a street in Phnom Penh without seeing a child using a makeshift crutch or wagon to get from place to place. We should do all we can to bring this form of indiscriminate warfare to an end. The Clinton Administration has allocated $20 million to work with other governments on mine removal training, techniques, and technology. We are working to ensure full support for the Cambodian Mine Action Center. We hope soon to submit the Convention on Conventional Weapons, which includes a protocol on land mines, to the Senate for its advice and consent. At the UN, we are calling upon all states to cooperate in clearing mines already laid, to strengthen international law governing the use of mines, and to join with us in a moratorium on the export of anti- personnel mines that pose grave dangers to civilian populations. Fourth, we should, at long last, create a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Earlier this year, in Vienna, the world community reaffirmed its commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But some still say certain societies are not well-suited to democracy and should not be expected to live up to global standards on human rights. I find this patronizing. I agree that democracy must find its roots internally. But the Universal Declaration is called universal for a reason--because it reflects something due to every human being, because it speaks to a common yearning to be treated according to certain standards of respect and worth. There are no grounds of economy, politics, ideology, religion, or culture that justify torture, murder, rape, or other assaults on basic human dignity. A UN High Commissioner for Human Rights would not be able to wave any magic wands, but he or she would be able to elevate, legitimize, publicize, and coordinate the response of the international community to crises affecting basic human rights. We strongly support passage of a resolution by the General Assembly this year that would establish a commissioner with authority over all UN human rights programs, a commissioner empowered to provide needed assistance to states willing to accept help and to call the world's attention to significant human rights violations wherever and whenever they occur. Fifth, finally, and on a matter also related to human rights, we must make the newly created War Crimes Tribunal on Former Yugoslavia an effective instrument of truth. I do not need to spell out for those in this room the magnitude of the human suffering that has been inflicted in the former Yugoslavia over the past two years. The images are seared in our brains: the orphan's terror; the grandparent who after a lifetime of work has lost family and home; young girls sobbing as they bear witness to the outrages committed against them; the cemeteries that have run out of room in towns that have run out of wood for coffins; and, this past week, the charred corpses in Stupni Do. Much of this cannot be attributed simply to the heat of battle. Ethnic cleansing, mass rape, the denial of food and medicine, the murder of civilians, and torture are components of a calculated strategy of military and political leaders. At the UN, we have now selected a panel of judges for the war crimes tribunal, and we have named a prosecutor. I have no illusions about the obstacles that the tribunal will face. This is not Nuremberg. The accused will not be the surrendered leaders of a broken power. It will be very difficult to gain access to evidence, including mass grave sites, especially in areas under Serb control. It will be difficult and often impossible to gain custody over the accused. But realism about the tribunal's prospects must not lead to cynicism about its importance. Although there will be no trials in absentia, there will be investigations and findings of fact. The tribunal is empowered to deliver indictments and issue arrest orders. Governments will be obliged to hand over for trial those indicted who are within their jurisdiction. If they refuse, the states may be subject to sanctions, and the indicted will become international pariahs, trapped within the borders of their countries. The U.S. Government is actively engaged. We are searching out and interviewing refugees. We are compiling and declassifying documents. We have already provided eight reports and are preparing more. We are footing the bill for much of the international fact-finding effort. We are determined to provide the prosecutors with as much legally usable evidence as we possibly can. Tonight, let me also make it clear to the skeptics that the United States will not recognize--and we do not believe the international community will recognize--any deal or effort to immunize the accused from culpability for their crimes. The five goals I have outlined tonight are all achievable and all worthwhile. Together, they reflect a philosophy that finds a broad, common ground between American interests and those of other peoples in the areas of humanitarian relief and respect for human dignity. Beneath it all is the simple view that every individual counts. That is the philosophy of America at its best; that has been the driving force for six decades behind the IRC; that is written in George Soros' heart. This view is not based on any illusions about the perfectibility of human character. Rescue workers, especially, have seen far too much of life and death to indulge in sentimentalism. But we live in a nation and a world that has been immeasurably enriched by the survivors, by those who have escaped repression to rebuild their lives, by those who have an especially profound understanding of the meaning and obligations of freedom because their experience forbids them from taking freedom for granted. It has been said that all work that is worth anything is done in faith. Let us all keep the faith that each child saved, each refugee housed, each prisoner of conscience freed, each barrier to justice brought down will inspire others and explode outward the boundaries of what is achievable on this earth. Thank you very much. (###) ARTICLE 3: Russia's Radioactive Waste Disposal: A Matter of Grave Concern David A. Colson, U.S. Representative to the London Convention on Dumping of Hazardous Wastes at Sea Address to the parties to the London Convention, London, United Kingdom, November 10, 1993 This set of issues relating to the ocean dumping of radioactive waste by the Soviet Union and, more recently, by the Russian Federation is a matter of grave and growing concern in the United States. I can attest to the growing concern in our country regarding this matter, having just recently testified before our Congress. It is fundamentally a matter of obligation and responsibility on the one hand and a matter of setting priorities on the other. We can express sympathy for those in Russia who must now deal with this problem, but that does not absolve them of their responsibility, their obligations, and the need for Russia to make the right choice in setting their priorities. This matter not only raises concerns about the degradation of the marine environment; corresponding concerns are raised regarding the effectiveness of our international institutions. And, particularly, this matter raises questions of trust and credibility. The international community was deliberately misled by the U.S.S.R. Those responsible did no credit to themselves, and they did a disservice to the marine environment, the international community and its institutions, their country, and its people. Those past actions cannot be explained away, as some have tried to do. There was--and is--no emergency except what has been self-induced. Principles of force majeure and sovereign immunity do not provide a basis for excusing those actions. Those that would use nuclear power--be it for civilian or military purposes--bear a special responsibility of extraordinary care. Those that do so must understand that it is their responsibility to deal adequately and safely with waste and other materials associated with this use. It is a cost of doing business, and if you cannot bear the cost, you should not be in the business. We cannot accept that it is for others to bear the cost, either in terms of risks and costs of environmental degradation or in terms of the financial costs associated with storage, clean-up, and monitoring. We recognize that Russia has severe economic difficulties, but the Russian navy maintains and operates its nuclear fleet at substantial cost--and there is money to do this. The Russian Government chooses to spend enormous sums of money on new nuclear vessels--and there is money to do this. To then say there is no money for adequate storage and processing facilities--this cannot be so. Russia is a great country. Its people have great skills. They are great engineers and technicians. They have the technical capability. You will not convince me--and you will not convince the American people- -that if the Russian Government so chose, it could not reallocate its priorities and immediately build and quickly have in place adequate storage and processing facilities. It is a simple issue of what comes first--where are the priorities? Some will say that in Russia today there are many issues of high importance that must be addressed and that this problem does not have weight in that balance. I agree that there are many issues of importance. Let me tell you why this does weigh in the balance. Very simply, it goes to trust and credibility. Trust and credibility are important in our personal and professional lives, and it is so for nations as well. The recent event in the Sea of Japan has not only reminded us of past abuses but has raised new questions regarding reliability. While we all support the reforms that have occurred and that continue in Russia today, if there is to be the kind of cooperation that Russia seeks, it will only come about if there is confidence and trust in the relationship. So let us go forward. Frankly, Mr. Chairman, the translation of the remarks by the Russian Minister of the Environment was not always clear. However, we welcome his openness and willingness to face up to the issues. But, while there may have been a few new points, the bottom line remains that they believe that, for at least a few more years, there will be a need for ocean dumping. We urge Russia not to do so. Let us find different solutions. In my view, Russia at this time needs to make additional efforts in three important areas. First--full disclosure. We congratulate those who have brought forward information, who had the courage to do so. But there is more to be known--more to be known about past dumping and much more to be known about present needs, particularly precisely what is the need, what are Russia's plans to deal with the need, and what are the alternatives? Full disclosure--it will be hard to help if we believe we do not have the full picture. Second--verification. It also will be hard to help if we have doubts and cannot verify what we are told. This point goes for everything from access to past ocean-dumping sites to access to present land-based storage facilities, including those that were once started and never completed and those in the planning stages. It will be hard to help if we cannot make our own judgments about the feasible options for dealing with the problem. Third--commitment. It also will be hard to help if we do not see a Russian commitment--not just for the future but also a reallocation of policy and budget priorities within Russia to address this issue. Mr. Chairman, these are our thoughts. I say these things not to embarrass our Russian colleagues but to challenge them. I applaud their courage and urge them to continue to move the Russian Government as a whole toward responsible environmental policies and practices. (###) ARTICLE 4: UN Security Council Resolution 883 on Libya Resolution 883 (November 11, 1993) The Security Council, Reaffirming its resolutions 731 (1992) of 21 January 1992 and 748 (1992) of 31 March 1992, Deeply concerned that after more than twenty months the Libyan Government has not fully complied with these resolutions, Determined to eliminate international terrorism, Convinced that those responsible for acts of international terrorism must be brought to justice, Convinced also that the suppression of acts of international terrorism, including those in which States are directly or indirectly involved, is essential for the maintenance of international peace and security, Determining, in this context, that the continued failure by the Libyan Government to demonstrate by concrete actions its renunciation of terrorism, and in particular its continued failure to respond fully and effectively to the requests and decisions in resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 (1992), constitute a threat to international peace and security, Taking note of the letters to the Secretary-General dated 29 September and 1 October 1993 from the Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation of Libya (S/26523) and his speech in the General Debate at the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly (A/48/PV.20) in which Libya stated its intention to encourage those charged with the bombing of Pan Am 103 to appear for trial in Scotland and its willingness to cooperate with the competent French authorities in the case of the bombing of UTA 772, Expressing its gratitude to the Secretary-General for the efforts he has made pursuant to paragraph 4 of resolution 731 (1992), Recalling the right of States, under Article 50 of the Charter, to consult the Security Council where they find themselves confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of preventive or enforcement measures, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, 1. Demands once again that the Libyan Government comply without any further delay with resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 (1992); 2. Decides, in order to secure compliance by the Libyan Government with the decisions of the Council, to take the following measures, which shall come into force at 00.01 EST on 1 December 1993 unless the Secretary-General has reported to the Council in the terms set out in paragraph 16 below; 3. Decides that all States in which there are funds or other financial resources (including funds derived or generated from property) owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by: (a) the Government or public authorities of Libya, or (b) any Libyan undertaking, shall freeze such funds and financial resources and ensure that neither they nor any other funds and financial resources are made available, by their nationals or by any persons within their territory, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of the Government or public authorities of Libya or any Libyan undertaking, which for the purposes of this paragraph, means any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking which is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by (i) the Government or public authorities of Libya, (ii) any entity, wherever located or organized, owned or controlled by (i), or (iii) any person identified by States as acting on behalf of (i) or (ii) for the purposes of this resolution; 4. Further decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 3 above do not apply to funds or other financial resources derived from the sale or supply of any petroleum or petroleum products, including natural gas and natural gas products, or agricultural products or commodities, originating in Libya and exported therefrom after the time specified in paragraph 2 above, provided that any such funds are paid into separate bank accounts exclusively for these funds; 5. Decides that all States shall prohibit any provision to Libya by their nationals or from their territory of the items listed in the annex to this resolution, as well as the provision of any types of equipment, supplies and grants of licensing arrangements for the manufacture or maintenance of such items; 6. Further decides that, in order to make fully effective the provisions of resolution 748 (1992), all States shall: (a) require the immediate and complete closure of all Libyan Arab Airlines offices within their territories; (b) prohibit any commercial transactions with Libyan Arab Airlines by their nationals or from their territory, including the honouring or endorsement of any tickets or other documents issued by that airline; c) prohibit, by their nationals or from their territory, the entering into or renewal of arrangements for: (i) the making available, for operation within Libya, of any aircraft or aircraft components, or (ii) the provision of engineering or maintenance servicing of any aircraft or aircraft components within Libya; (d) prohibit, by their nationals or from their territory, the supply of any materials destined for the construction, improvement or maintenance of Libyan civilian or military airfields and associated facilities and equipment, or of any engineering or other services or components destined for the maintenance of any Libyan civil or military airfields or associated facilities and equipment, except emergency equipment and equipment and services directly related to civilian air traffic control; (e) prohibit, by their nationals or from their territory, any provision of advice, assistance, or training to Libyan pilots, flight engineers, or aircraft and ground maintenance personnel associated with the operation of aircraft and airfields within Libya; (f) prohibit, by their nationals or from their territory, any renewal of any direct insurance for Libyan aircraft; 7. Confirms that the decision taken in resolution 748 (1992) that all States shall significantly reduce the level of the staff at Libyan diplomatic missions and consular posts includes all missions and posts established since that decision or after the coming into force of this resolution; 8. Decides that all States, and the Government of Libya, shall take the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Government or public authorities of Libya, or of any Libyan national, or of any Libyan undertaking as defined in paragraph 3 of this resolution, or of any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or undertaking, in connection with any contract or other transaction or commercial operation where its performance was affected by reason of the measures imposed by or pursuant to this resolution or related resolutions; 9. Instructs the Committee established by resolution 748 (1992) to draw up expeditiously guidelines for the implementation of paragraphs 3 to 7 of this resolution, and to amend and supplement, as appropriate, the guidelines for the implementation of resolution 748 (1992), especially its paragraph 5 (a); 10. Entrusts the Committee established by resolution 748 (1992) with the task of examining possible requests for assistance under the provisions of Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations and making recommendations to the President of the Security Council for appropriate action; 11. Affirms that nothing in this resolution affects Libya's duty scrupulously to adhere to all of its obligations concerning servicing and repayment of its foreign debt; 12. Calls upon all States, including States not Members of the United Nations, and all international organizations, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution, notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or any contract entered into or any licence or permit granted prior to the effective time of this resolution; 13. Requests all States to report to the Secretary-General by 15 January 1994 on the measures they have instituted for meeting the obligations set out in paragraphs 3 to 7 above; 14. Invites the Secretary-General to continue his role as set out in paragraph 4 of resolution 731 (1992); 15. Calls again upon all Member States individually and collectively to encourage the Libyan Government to respond fully and effectively to the requests and decisions in resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 (1992); 16. Expresses its readiness to review the measures set forth above and in resolution 748 (1992) with a view to suspending them immediately if the Secretary-General reports to the Council that the Libyan Government has ensured the appearance of those charged with the bombing of Pan Am 103 for trial before the appropriate United Kingdom or United States court and has satisfied the French judicial authorities with respect to the bombing of UTA 772, and with a view to lifting them immediately when Libya complies fully with the requests and decisions in resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 (1992); and requests the Secretary-General, within 90 days of such suspension, to report to the Council on Libya's compliance with the remaining provisions of its resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 (1992) and, in the case of non-compliance, expresses its resolve to terminate immediately the suspension of these measures; 17. Decides to remain seized of the matter. Annex The following are the items referred to in paragraph 5 of this resolution: I. Pumps of medium or large capacity whose capacity is equal to or larger than 350 cubic metres per hour and drivers (gas turbines and electric motors) designed for use in the transportation of crude oil and natural gas II. Equipment designed for use in crude oil export terminals: -- Loading buoys or single point moorings (spm) -- Flexible hoses for connection between underwater manifolds (plem) and single point mooring and floating loading hoses of large sizes (from 12" to 16") -- Anchor chains III. Equipment not specially designed for use in crude oil export terminals but which because of their large capacity can be used for this purpose: -- Loading pumps of large capacity (4,000 m3/h) and small head (10 bars) -- Boosting pumps within the same range of flow rates -- Inline pipe line inspection tools and cleaning devices (i.e. pigging tools) (16" and above) -- Metering equipment of large capacity (1,000 m3/h and above) IV. Refinery equipment: -- Boilers meeting American Society of Mechanical Engineers 1 standards -- Furnaces meeting American Society of Mechanical Engineers 8 standards -- Fractionation columns meeting American Society of Mechanical Engineers 8 standards -- Pumps meeting American Petroleum Institute 610 standards -- Catalytic reactors meeting American Society of Mechanical Engineers 8 standards -- Prepared catalysts, including the following: --Catalysts containing platinum --Catalysts containing molybdenum V. Spare parts destined for the items in I to IV above. VOTE: 11-0-4 (China, Djibouti, Morocco, Pakistan abstaining). (###) ARTICLE 5: UN Security Council Resolution 885 on Somalia Resolution 885 (November 16, 1993) The Security Council, Reaffirming resolutions 733 (1992), 746 (1992), 751 (1992), 767 (1992), 775 (1992), 794 (1992), 814 (1993), 837 (1993), 865 (1993), and 878 (1993), Also reaffirming resolution 865 (1993) on the need to ensure the safety and protection of United Nations personnel, Recognizing the critical need for broadbased consultations among all parties and consensus on basic principles to achieve national reconciliation and the establishment of democratic institutions in Somalia, Stressing that the people of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for achieving these objectives and in this context noting in particular resolution 837 (1993) which condemned the 5 June 1993 attack on UNOSOM II personnel and called for an investigation, Noting further proposals made by Member States, in particular from the Organization of African Unity (OAU), including those in document S/26627, which recommended the establishment of an impartial Commission of Inquiry to investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM II, Having received and considered the reports of the Secretary-General (S/26022 and S/26351) on the implementation of resolution 837 (1993), 1. Authorizes the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry, in further implementation of resolutions 814 (1993) and 837 (1993), to investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel which led to casualties among them; 2. Requests the Secretary-General, having conveyed his views to the Security Council, to appoint the Commission at the earliest possible time, and to report to the Council on the establishment of the Commission; 3. Directs the Commission to determine procedures for carrying out its investigation taking into account standard United Nations procedures; 4. Notes that members of the Commission will have the status of experts on mission within the meaning of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, which shall apply to the Commission; 5. Urges the Secretary-General to provide the Commission with all assistance necessary to facilitate its work; 6. Calls on all parties in Somalia fully to cooperate with the Commission; 7. Requests the Commission to report its findings through the Secretary-General to the Security Council as soon as possible, taking into consideration the need for a thorough inquiry; 8. Requests that the Secretary-General, under his authority in resolutions 814 (1993) and 837 (1993), pending completion of the report of the Commission, suspend arrest actions against those individuals who might be implicated but are not currently detained pursuant to resolution 837 (1993), and make appropriate provision to deal with the situation of those already detained under the provisions of resolution 837 (1993); 9. Decides to remain seized of this matter. VOTE: Unanimous (15-0). (###) ARTICLE 6: What's in Print Foreign Relations of the United States The Department of State has released Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume VIII (Berlin Crisis, 1958-1959). This volume focuses on U.S. policy toward Germany in the final years of the Eisenhower Administration, including the Berlin crisis during 1958-59 and participation in the May-August 1959 Geneva foreign ministers conference. Following a speech that month by Soviet Premier Khrushchev, the Soviet Union in November 1958 sent a note to the Western powers regarding the status of Berlin. Khrushchev's speech had stated that the United States, the United Kingdom, and France had forfeited their right to remain in Berlin and that the Soviet Union would transfer its responsibilities in East Germany to the German Democratic Republic. The followup Soviet note gave the Western powers six months to turn West Berlin into a free city. The Western powers met in the following month and drafted a formal reply to the Soviets. Their answer, delivered on December 31, 1958, reviewed the history of the four-power agreements on Berlin and stated that the city was only one aspect of the entire German question and that the Soviet ultimatum offered no reasonable basis for negotiation. From January to March 1959, further notes were exchanged, resulting in an agreement to hold a four-power foreign ministers meeting in Geneva in May. The United States tried to develop contingency plans for Berlin in case the Soviet Union actually transferred its responsibilities to the East Germans, although President Eisenhower was concerned that the plans were inadequate for the situation. The Geneva foreign ministers conference opened on May 10, 1959, to consider the German question. After a number of proposals and counter- proposals, the conference adjourned on August 5, 1959, having made no progress toward agreement. This volume, prepared by the Office of the Historian, is 1 of more than 70 volumes documenting the foreign policies of the Eisenhower Administration. Volume VIII (GPO Stock No. 044-000-02353-9; ISBN 0-16-038052-9) may be purchased for $47 (add 25% for foreign orders) from: Superintendent of Documents U.S. Government Printing Office P.O. Box 371954 Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954 To FAX orders, call (202) 512-2250. Checks payable to the Superintendent of Documents are accepted, as are VISA and MasterCard. For further information, contact Glenn W. LaFantasie, General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, at (202) 663-1133; FAX (202) 663-1289. (###) END OF DISPATCH VOL 4, NO 47.
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