US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 4, NUMBER 46, NOVEMBER 15, 1993
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1.  NAFTA:  In the Overriding Interest Of the United
States--Secretary Christopher 
2.  NAFTA Implementing Legislation And Related
Documents--President Clinton
3.  Building a Consensus on International
Peace-keeping--Madeleine K. Albright  
4.  Open Skies Treaty Ratified 
5.  Treaty Actions 
6.  New Ambassadors 


ARTICLE 1 

NAFTA:  In the Overriding Interest Of the United States
Secretary Christopher

Address to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council and Town Hall
of California, Los Angeles, California, November 2, 1993

It is wonderful to return to the City of Angels from the City of
Angles.  It is even better to be back home and among friends.

The last time I spoke to an audience at this hotel was June 2,
1992, the night the voters of Los Angeles approved the reform
measures recommended by the Independent Commission on the Los
Angeles Police Department.  What has happened in the life of
America in the intervening 17 months has been quite remarkable. 
The country has elected a new President, has seen him craft a
striking new domestic agenda, and has watched as he helped
orchestrate one of the most wished-for handshakes in recent
history.  Certainly this has been a time of dramatic change in
my life as well.  My journey over these 17 months has not been
calm, but it has given me challenges and an opportunity to
serve, for which I am deeply grateful.

It is a great pleasure to serve as the catalyst for a joint
meeting of two strong and independent forces in the Los Angeles
community.  The World Affairs Council makes a vital educational
link between the people of Southern California and the
practitioners of our foreign policy.  Town Hall and its
thousands of members have been sharing food for body and food
for thought for more than 50 years, and I am honored to stand
before the members of these two groups today.

My presence here is intended to underscore that there is no
longer a bright line separating our foreign and domestic policy
interests.  For America to be strong abroad, we must be strong
at home.  And to be strong at home, to achieve the domestic
renewal that our nation needs, we must reject the voices of
isolationism; we must be engaged internationally.

No issue more clearly illustrates the links between foreign and
domestic policy than the North American Free Trade Agreement. 
Winning approval of NAFTA is among the Administration's highest
priorities.  In fact, just a week ago at a Cabinet meeting, our
Treasury Secretary, Lloyd Bentsen, turned to me and said, "Young
man, you're going to have to go out on the road for NAFTA."   So
here I am.  Today, I want to speak both as Secretary of State
and as someone from this community who cares deeply about its
future.

NAFTA is in the best interest of California and Los Angeles--and
it is in the overriding interest of the United States of
America.  That is the message today.  And that is the message
the President and a distinguished group of Americans are
underscoring today at the White House.

NAFTA is an essential part of the Administration's strategy to
promote prosperity through trade expansion.  That strategy has
other elements crucial to America's economic renewal:  first,
concluding the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations by December 15;
second, negotiating a new economic framework with Japan to
correct our trade imbalance; and third, developing the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum as an important
mechanism for spurring growth and creating jobs around the
dynamic Pacific Rim.  A vote for NAFTA on November 17 in the
Congress will move this entire strategy forward.

This agreement will allow us to take command of our economic
future and strengthen our security.  It will give our exporters
the opportunity to sell without barriers in what will be the
world's largest free trade area, a unified market of 370 million
consumers.  Mexico is America's fastest-growing major export
market, and we have a vital stake in its future growth and
openness.  NAFTA will enhance the trade opportunities that have
lifted our exports to Mexico more than 200% since 1986, creating
more than 400,000 American jobs in the process.  NAFTA will
create even more high-wage, high-skill American jobs--and it
will boost our ability to compete globally.

The European nations and Japan leave no stone unturned to
compete in their regional markets, where they have a natural
geographic advantage.  America's economic self-interest demands
that we compete in every region around the world.  But, like the
European Community and Japan, we must have a trade strategy
tailored to our region--and NAFTA is absolutely crucial to that
strategy.

Almost 90,000 jobs in this state are supported by exports to
Mexico.  NAFTA will prove particularly beneficial to California.
 For example, California's high-tech firms will see their sales
rise dramatically.  Our vast agricultural industry also stands
to gain substantially from NAFTA.  For California, increased
trade offers a logical avenue to economic recovery and renewed
prosperity.

I have not forgotten that border states like California endure
burdens even as they enjoy benefits.  But I am convinced that
NAFTA gives us the chance to multiply the benefits and to better
manage the burdens.

For the United States and Mexico, NAFTA is about much more than
tariffs and trade, growth and jobs.  It is the symbol of a new
relationship and a new structure of cooperation.  Approval of
NAFTA and the side agreements accompanying it will increase
Mexico's capacity to cooperate with us on a wide range of vital
issues that affect our security in direct and tangible ways. 
Let me discuss three of them:  illegal immigration, the
environment, and narcotics.

California and all of America will continue to find strength in
diversity.  Indeed, one reason Los Angeles is a world-class city
is that people from all over the world have chosen to live here
and to contribute to its enormous vitality.  At the same time,
the Clinton Administration is committed to reducing illegal
immigration, and NAFTA is critical to that effort.  My
colleague, Attorney General Janet Reno, said in San Diego a few
weeks ago that the passage of NAFTA will help her protect our
borders.  She said, "NAFTA is the best hope for reducing illegal
immigration in the long haul."  And she warned that if NAFTA
fails, "stopping the flow of illegal immigrants will be much,
much more difficult, if not impossible."

NAFTA also addresses another issue that transcends political
boundaries--the problem of pollution.  This Administration has
made the environment a foreign policy priority because we can
address environmental concerns only with the cooperation from
other countries, especially our neighbors.

Mexico recognizes its pollution problems and is addressing them,
both on its own and in cooperation with the United States. 
NAFTA reinforces that cooperation.  Unlike any previous trade
agreement, NAFTA explicitly links trade with the environment. 
With the NAFTA side agreement on the environment, and with our
efforts to find innovative and reliable funding for border
environmental cleanup, we are taking steps to fight pollution
along the border.

NAFTA will also help us make progress in combating narcotics. 
Mexico recognizes that illegal narcotics is a shared problem
that can be solved only through cross-border cooperation. 
President Salinas has tripled Mexico's counter-narcotics budget
and has shown real resolve to attack corrupt government
officials and drug barons.  Some of Mexico's most notorious drug
traffickers are now behind bars.  This is breakthrough
progress--and it must be sustained.

As you well know, the United States and Mexico for many years
were, as one observer put it, "distant neighbors."  Until recent
times, Mexicans saw the United States as a source of pressure
and even danger, while Americans saw Mexican poverty as a source
of instability and concern.

But Mexico has been growing and changing, modernizing and
developing a middle class.  In the last few years, Mexico has
made unprecedented efforts to open its economy and reform its
political institutions, including the judiciary and its
electoral system.  Mexico's attitudes about the United States
and the world have also changed dramatically for the better.

Now, with NAFTA, we can move beyond old suspicions and outdated
assumptions.  NAFTA will mark a turning point in the history of
our relations throughout Latin America.  It will encourage
democratic governments throughout the hemisphere that have
opened their economies to American trade and investment. 

In many respects, Latin America is pointing the way toward a new
and better future in the post-Cold War era.  In this hemisphere,
democracy is ascendant.  Markets are opening.  Conflicts are
being resolved peacefully.  By approving NAFTA, the United
States sends a powerful signal that we support these favorable
developments throughout our hemisphere.

For more than half a century, every American President--Democrat
and Republican--has stood for closer cooperation with Mexico. 
NAFTA represents a bipartisan commitment to widening and
improving America's ties to our Latin American neighbors,
beginning with Mexico.  Today, NAFTA has the support of all five
living former Presidents of the United States--an unusual
display of bipartisan unity.

I believe that the vote on NAFTA on the 17th of November will be
one of the most vital decisions that the Members of Congress
will make in this decade.  To recognize fully what is at stake,
we have to consider not only the economic and diplomatic gains
we will realize if NAFTA goes into effect, but what America--and
Americans--stand to lose if it is defeated.

One of my most important duties as Secretary of State is to
consider the downside of alternate courses of action--and I can
tell you that the downside of rejecting NAFTA could be enormous.

First, defeat of NAFTA would seriously damage our relations with
Mexico.  Our carefully nurtured efforts to improve relations
would be scuttled as a sense of rejection sets in across the
border.  For the United States, that would be a self-inflicted
setback of historic proportions.  The defeat of NAFTA would
undermine Mexico's capacity to cooperate with us on the vital
cross-border issues such as illegal immigration and pollution
that affect millions of Americans.

Second, rejection of NAFTA would hand our major economic
competitors in Europe and East Asia a gilt-edged invitation to
go after what should be a natural market for our goods and
services.  If we reject NAFTA, investors and merchants from
Japan, Taiwan, and Germany will be on the phone--or on the next
plane--to Mexico City immediately after the vote.  They will not
hesitate to gain a foothold where we feared to tread.

Third, a defeat of NAFTA would send a chilling signal about our
willingness to engage in Latin America at a time when so many of
our neighbors are genuinely receptive to closer cooperation with
the United States.  It would complicate our efforts to find
diplomatic solutions to regional crises that threaten peace and
stability in the hemisphere.

Fourth, there is no good time--but there could not be a worse
time than now--to turn our backs on NAFTA.  The Uruguay Round of
the GATT negotiations is in its climactic stage.  Between now
and December 15, the President must be in a position to exercise
maximum leverage to conclude that Round successfully.  Rejecting
NAFTA would create the perception that America is not prepared
to act on behalf of its global economic interests at a time when
those interests are so clearly at stake.

Fifth and finally, NAFTA's rejection would undermine our
commitment to open markets and a liberal world trading order. 
Opposing an agreement that eliminates tariff barriers is really
an argument for protectionism.  It is only a short intellectual
walk from opposing the lowering of tariffs to favoring the
erection of even higher trade barriers.

That very simply is the wrong course.  We have seen the
consequences of protectionism once in this century, in the late
1920s and the early 1930s--and once was certainly enough for
those of us who grew up in the Depression.  Make no mistake
about it:  To oppose NAFTA is to reject the principles of free
trade that have helped to make the last half century in America
the most prosperous time in our history.

Beyond all the specific points that can be marshaled for NAFTA,
a broader, more overriding principle is at stake.  America
cannot and will not thrive if we withdraw from the world.

The defeat of NAFTA would not only forfeit an opportunity to
strengthen our economy.  It would also constitute a profoundly
disturbing move toward isolationism--toward the abdication of
the role America must assert to protect our interests and
promote our values.  It would weaken our position not only on
international economic issues but on foreign policy issues as a
whole.  The vote on NAFTA will determine whether we choose to
engage or retreat from the global economy; whether we will
enable our workers, the most productive in the world, to compete
and win or whether we will try in vain to insulate ourselves
from rapid worldwide economic change.  NAFTA is a
once-in-a-generation opportunity that must not be lost.  It is
nothing less than a test of American leadership and America's
sense of purpose in the post-Cold War world.  Whether we like it
or not, the vote on NAFTA will reveal how we see our-selves and
will be reflected in how the world sees us.

I do not believe that Congress will choose to shrink from a
natural and growing market for our goods and services.  I do not
believe that Congress will decide to undercut the President 
at a time when negotiations on the Uruguay Round are at their
critical stage.  I do not believe that Congress will endorse the
kind of economic isolation that squanders the chance to create
American jobs and surrenders a part of America's global
leadership.

Let me tell you what I do believe.  I believe that Congress will
vote to approve NAFTA--and I believe that vote for American
engagement will echo throughout the hemisphere and across the
world.  I believe that Congress will choose a course that
expands political freedom and free markets throughout our
hemisphere and extends cooperation between the United States and
the countries of Latin America.  I believe that Congress will
reinforce the foundation of free trade that will be a platform
for global prosperity in the next century.  I believe that the
vote to approve NAFTA will represent a defining moment for
American principle and power.

I believe--in fact, I know--that approval of NAFTA will signal
our confidence in ourselves at home and strengthen our
credibility abroad.  With NAFTA, we are building an economic
future and a foreign policy worthy of our great nation.

Thank you very much.  (###)



ARTICLE 2:

NAFTA Implementing Legislation And Related Documents  
President Clinton

NAFTA Implementing Legislation And Required Documents
Text of letter to Congress, November 3, 1993.

To the Congress of the United States:

I am pleased to transmit today legislation to implement the
North American Free Trade Agreement, an agreement vital to the
national interest and to our ability to compete in the global
economy.  I also am transmitting a number of related documents
required for the implementation of NAFTA.

For decades, the United States has enjoyed a bipartisan
consensus on behalf of a free and open trading system. 
Administrations of both parties have negotiated, and Congresses
have approved, agreements that lower tariffs and expand
opportunities for American workers and American firms to export
their products overseas.  The result has been bigger profits and
more jobs here at home.

Our commitment to more free and more fair world trade has
encouraged democracy and human rights in nations that trade with
us.  With the end of the Cold War, and the growing significance
of the global economy, trade agreements that lower barriers to
American exports rise in importance.

The North American Free Trade Agreement is the first trade
expansion measure of this new era, and it is in the national
interest that the Congress vote its approval.

Not only will passage of NAFTA reduce tariff barriers to
American goods, but it also will operate in an unprecedented
manner--to improve environmental conditions on the shared border
between the United States and Mexico, to raise the wages and
living standards of Mexican workers, and to protect our workers
from the effects of unexpected surges in Mexican imports into
the United States.

This pro-growth, pro-jobs, pro-exports agreement--if adopted by
the Congress--will vastly improve the status quo with regard to
trade, the environment, labor rights, and the creation and
protection of American jobs.

Without NAFTA, American business will continue to face high
tariff rates and restrictive nontariff barriers that inhibit
their ability to export to Mexico.  Without NAFTA, incentives
will continue to encourage American firms to relocate their
operations and take American jobs to Mexico.  Without NAFTA, we
face continued degradation of the natural environment with no
strategy for clean-up.  Most of all, without NAFTA, Mexico will
have every incentive to make arrangements with Europe and Japan
that operate to our disadvantage.

Today, Mexican tariffs are two and a half times greater than
U.S. tariffs.  This agreement will create the world's largest
tariff-free zone, from the Canadian Arctic to the Mexican
tropics--more than 370 million consumers and over $6.5 trillion
of production, led by the United States.  As tariff walls come
down and exports go up, the United States will create 200,000
new jobs by 1995.  American goods will enter this market at
lower tariff rates than goods made by our competitors.

Mexico is a rapidly growing country with a rapidly expanding
middle class and a large pent-up demand for goods--especially
American goods.  Key U.S. companies are poised to take advantage
of this market of 90 million people.  NAFTA ensures that
Mexico's reforms will take root, and then flower.

Moreover, NAFTA is a critical step toward building a new
post-Cold War community of free markets and free nations
throughout the Western Hemisphere.  Our neighbors--not just in
Mexico but throughout Latin America--are waiting to see whether
the United States will lead the way toward a more open, hopeful,
and prosperous future or will instead hunker down behind
protective, but self-defeating walls.  This Nation--and this
Congress--has never turned away from the challenge of
international leadership.  This is no time to start.

The North American Free Trade Agreement is accompanied by
supplemental agreements, which will help ensure that increased
trade does not come at the cost of our workers or the border 
environment.  Never before has a trade agreement provided for
such comprehensive arrangements to raise the living standards of
workers or to improve the environmental quality of an entire
region.  This makes NAFTA not only a stimulus for economic
growth, but a force for social good.

Finally, NAFTA will also provide strong incentives for
cooperation on illegal immigration and drug interdiction.

The implementing legislation for NAFTA I forward to the Congress
today completes a process that has been accomplished in the best
spirit of bipartisan teamwork.  NAFTA was negotiated by two
Presidents of both parties and is supported by all living former
Presidents of the United States as well as by distinguished
Americans from many walks of life--government, civil rights, and
business.

They recognize what trade expanding agreements have meant for
America's economic greatness in the past, and what this
agreement will mean for America's economic and international
leadership in the years to come.  The North American Free Trade
Agreement is an essential part of the economic strategy of this
country:  expanding markets abroad and providing a level playing
field for American workers to compete and win in the global
economy.

America is a Nation built on hope and renewal.  If the Congress
honors this tradition and approves this agreement, it will help
lead our country into the new era of prosperity and leadership
that awaits us.

William J. Clinton


Other Documents Regarding NAFTA
Text of letter to Congress, November 3, 1993.

To the Congress of the United States:

By separate message, I have transmitted to the Congress a bill
to approve and implement the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA).  In fulfillment of legal requirements of our trade
laws, that message also transmitted a statement of
administrative action, the NAFTA itself, and certain supporting
information required by law.

Beyond the legally required documents conveyed with that
message, I want to provide you with the following important
documents:

--  The supplemental agreements on labor, the environment, and
import surges;

--  Agreements concluded with Mexico relating to citrus products
and to sugar and sweeteners;

--  The border funding agreement with Mexico;

--  Letters agreeing to further negotiations to accelerate duty
reductions;

--  An environmental report on the NAFTA and side agreements;

--  A list of more technical letters related to NAFTA that have
previously been provided to the Congress and that are already on
file with relevant congressional committees.

These additional documents are not subject to formal
congressional approval under fast-track procedures.  However,
the additional agreements provide significant benefits for the
United States that will be obtained only if the Congress
approves the NAFTA.  In that sense, these additional agreements,
as well as the other documents conveyed, warrant the careful
consideration of each Member of Congress.  The documents I have
transmitted in these two messages constitute the entire NAFTA
package.

I strongly believe that the NAFTA and the other agreements will
mark a significant step forward for our country, our economy,
our environment, and our relations with our neighbors on this
continent.  I urge the Congress to seize this historic
opportunity by approving the legislation I have transmitted.

William J. Clinton  (###)



ARTICLE 3:  

Building a Consensus on International Peace-keeping
Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Permanent  Representative to the
United Nations
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, DC, October 20, 1993

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.  It is
a pleasure to be here today to discuss international peace
operations and America's role in them.  A vigorous debate has
arisen in recent weeks surrounding these issues, and it is vital
not only that the executive branch and the Congress conduct a
substantive dialogue but that the American people be engaged as
well.

Yesterday, Under Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff testified
before you concerning U.S. policy toward Somalia.  Although the
focus of my testimony today will be on our overall approach to
UN peace-keeping, there are a few things that need to be said
right up front about the U.S., the UN, and decision-making
concerning Somalia.

Somalia:  A Corrected Course
President Kennedy once observed that in Washington a successful
policy has a thousand parents, while an unsuccessful policy is
an orphan.  The recent finger-pointing regarding Somalia is a
fine example of that. 

The fact is that it is illogical for anyone to say that they
favor the humanitarian mission of feeding starving children but
not the mission of preventing it from happening again.  From the
time President Bush ordered U.S. troops into Somalia last
December, it was understood that there would be a division of
labor on this.  The U.S. would guarantee a secure environment
for the delivery of relief, and then the UN would work with the
local population to create a civic structure within Somalia that
would make relapse into famine and anarchy unlikely. 

The handoff of primary responsibility and the resulting
modification of mission was authorized in March with the
adoption of Security Council Resolution 814.  I should emphasize
that this step was designed not to increase American involvement
in Somalia but, rather, the reverse.  It allowed us to reduce
the number of American troops from 25,000 to 4,500.

Significant problems did not arise until after the murder of 24
Pakistani peace-keepers on June 5 set back efforts to maintain a
secure climate within Mogadishu.  The UN's decision to authorize
the arrest of those responsible for the murders was strongly
supported by the United States and by me.  Security Council
Resolution 837 was approved unanimously.  It would have been
extraordinary if we had not responded to the ambush of UN
peace-keepers this way.  There remains nothing wrong with the
principles set forth in the resolution.  Unfortunately, some
serious problems did arise in the course of its implementation.

Clearly, the difficulty of apprehending those thought
responsible for killing the Pakistanis was under-estimated. 
Further, while the UN was increasing military pressure, the
targets of that pressure were gaining strength.  Meanwhile, more
and more resources were devoted to the military components of
the mission at the expense of other aspects.  As a result,
top-level officials in our government and some at the UN and in
other governments came to the conclusion that a far greater
emphasis on the track of political reconciliation was needed. 
Although the policy was moving in the right direction by late
September, it took the shock of October 3 to turn the train
completely around.  We are now firmly embarked on a corrected
course, and encouraging progress is being made.

Looking back, I would caution against drawing sweeping
conclusions about the institutions involved in these events
based on what were, in fact, differences in individual judgments
about tactics.  Based on my own visit to Somalia in early July,
I think the better lesson--which I will discuss later in my
testimony--is that the more comprehensive the approach to a
peace operation, the more likely it is that it 
will succeed.  If UNOSOM had had more robust military
capabilities last summer, better military results might have
been achieved.  A stronger political and communications staff at
UN headquarters in Mogadishu would have helped.  And greater
international support for the training and development aspects
of the peace operation would have brought closer the day that
Somali affairs could be returned entirely to Somali hands.

We should also not forget what has been accomplished in Somalia
since Operation Restore Hope began 10 months ago.  American
servicemen   and -women have abundant grounds for pride. 
Because of their efforts and their sacrifice, thousands of
children are alive, crops are being planted, and political
development at the district level is underway.  Our commitment
to humanitarian goals in Somalia continues, although, as the
President has made clear, it is not open-ended.  In some
respects, the same applies to our commitment to UN peace-keeping
in general.

UN Peace-keeping
In that connection, let me recall for you where the issue of UN
peace-keeping stood only nine months ago, when I first came
before this committee.  Consider the Bush Administration's
assessment in January 1993 that with the paralyzing divisions of
the Cold War now over, the UN had been given a new lease on
life--emerging as a central instrument for the prevention and
resolution of conflicts and the preservation of peace--and that
in concert with others, the U.S. must renew its efforts to
improve the recent effectiveness of the UN; as had been
demonstrated in the Gulf War and in subsequent crises, there was
now the opportunity to make the UN a key instrument of
collective security.

President Bush's views were widely shared.  His predecessor,
President Reagan, went even further, calling in a speech in
December 1992 for a standing UN force--an army of
conscience--that would be fully equipped and prepared to carve
out humanitarian sanctuaries through force if necessary.

At the UN itself, the end of Soviet obstructionism had produced
an explosion in the demand for help in preventing, containing,
or ending conflicts.  The results were more peace-keeping
operations in the last 5 years than in the previous 43; a 7-fold
increase in troops and a 10-fold increase in cost; and, as we
have been reminded so tragically in recent days, a dramatic rise
in complexity and danger.

The Clinton Administration took office intending to provide
strong support for UN peace operations but concerned about the
potential for problems.  For example, in my testimony to this
committee at my confirmation hearing one day after the
President's inauguration, I noted that:

If more and more nations are inclined to say, "Let the UN do
it," and, at the same time, do not push for comprehensive 
reform and build a sound financial base, then the United Nations
stands in peril of collapsing under the weight of the new
burdens placed upon it.

In the months since, it has been increasingly apparent that the
rapid rise in peace-keeping activity has caused great stress
within the UN.  Events in Somalia and, to some extent, Bosnia
and Haiti over the last few months have also caused dramatic
swings in American public opinion.  Depending on the month or
the place, the UN is accused of attempting to do too much or of
not doing enough; of relying too heavily on force or of reacting
passively to the use of force by others; of trying to run things
or of failing to be assertive enough.

It is both necessary and appropriate, in the wake of the tragic
death of American servicemen in Somalia, that we who make policy
take stock.  Clearly, the bipartisan consensus that so recently
guided our approach to UN peace-keeping has broken down.  It is
essential that we--the executive branch and Congress--work
together to re-establish that consensus so that we may have a
clear and politically sustainable policy governing America's
role in UN peace operations.  This is necessary to maintain the
credibility of American leadership; to minimize the likelihood
of harmful miscalculations abroad; and to keep faith with the
American people, particularly those who serve in our armed
forces.

This morning, I will outline the broad elements of what I
believe could be the basis of a consensus on UN peace-keeping. 
This outline has two guiding principles:

--  Realism about what the UN can and cannot be expected to do,
especially in the short term; and

--  Concern that we not overreact to setbacks and, thereby,
forfeit opportunities for enhanced international cooperation
that have been a long time coming and may not soon come again.

The Elements of Consensus
The first element of consensus should be the easiest.  I think
most of us can agree that both American character and American
interests dictate that we remain active and engaged on the world
stage--not as global policeman but as consistent and persistent
proponents of free markets, democratic values, and adherence to
international law.

Second, I would hope that we would all agree that although
multilateral peace-keeping is a potentially valuable foreign
policy tool, it cannot serve as a guarantor of our own vital
interests, nor should it lessen our resolve to maintain vigorous
regional alliances and a strong national defense.  We want a
stronger UN, but we are not about to substitute elusive notions
of global collective security for battle-proven and time-tested
concepts of unilateral and allied defense.

Third, we should recognize that current UN peace-keeping
capacities and decision-making procedures are not adequate and
must be strengthened.  Unfortunately, the UN emerged from 40
years of Cold War paralysis overweight and out of shape.  And
since the fall of the Berlin Wall, its responsibilities have
grown far faster than its capabilities.  Today, UN peace-keepers
need reformed budget procedures, more dependable sources of
military and civilian personnel, better training, better
intelligence, better command and control, better equipment, and
more adequate resources.  In his speech to the General Assembly
last month, President Clinton called for:  the creation of a
genuine UN peace-keeping headquarters with a planning staff,
with access to timely intelligence, with a logistics unit that
can be deployed on a moment's notice, and with a modern
operations center with global communications.

The Administration is also insisting that the UN decision-making
process on peace-keeping be overhauled.  We are seeing to it
that the fundamental questions are asked before, not after, new
obligations are undertaken.

--  Does there exist a real threat to international peace?
--  Does the proposed mission have clear objectives?
--  Can an end point be identified?
--  What are the projected costs?
--  If it is a peace-keeping--as opposed to a peace
enforcement--operation, is there a cease-fire in place?  Have
the parties to the conflict agreed to a UN presence?

These criteria are not intended as rigid guidelines, but they
are the questions that must be asked whenever new peace-keeping
missions are considered.

Fourth, the U.S. should provide appropriate levels of personnel,
technical assistance, and equipment--credited against our
assessment--to improve the management and improve the
effectiveness of UN peace-keeping capabilities.

Territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars, and
the total collapse of governmental authority in some states are
now among the principal threats to international peace and
security.  Although many of these conflicts may not impinge
directly on the national security interests of America or its
allies, the cumulative effects of continuing conflict include
economic dislocation, humanitarian disaster, terrorism and other
forms of international lawlessness, regional political
instability, and the rise of leaders and societies that do not
share our values.

These problems can and do affect us and concern us.  If we do
not wish to assume responsibility for containing these conflicts
ourselves, we must either enhance the UN's capability to do so
or accept a future ruled not by the law of nations but by no law
at all.

Fifth, the U.S. share of UN peace-keeping expenses should be
reduced.  We now pay more than 30% under a scale of assessments
that has not changed in 20 years.  Fairness dictates that our
portion should go down and that the amount owed by nations whose
economic power has increased dramatically over the past two
decades should go up.

Sixth, where it is in our interests, the U.S. should support and
sometimes participate in well-planned UN peace operations.  I
anticipate that the U.S. contribution to such operations will
most often be in areas such as logistics, intelligence, public
affairs, and communications, rather than combat.

Seventh, under no circumstances should American servicemen or
-women be sent into situations where involvement in hostilities
is likely in the absence of competent command and control.  Nor,
under this Administration--nor under prior Administrations to my
knowledge--have they ever done so.

The issues of command and operational control will always be
central.  As General Shalikashvili put it during his
confirmation hearing for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, we should
reserve the right, on a case-by-case basis, to decide whether we
should get involved in any particular operation; and one of
those considerations should be just how robust the command and
control arrangement is and even who the commander is--whether,
in fact, we consider the commander to be competent to lead our
soldiers in that operation.

As a practical matter, this means that when large-scale or
high-risk operations are contemplated and American involvement
is necessary, we will be unlikely to accept UN leadership. 
Rather, we will ordinarily rely on our own resources or those of
a regional alliance--such as NATO--or an appropriate
coalition--such as that assembled during Operation Desert Storm.

I should note here, for purposes of precision, that the
President will never relinquish command authority over U.S.
forces.  Even if the President should determine that U.S. forces
can be placed temporarily under the operational control of a UN
commander, fundamental elements of U.S. command will always
apply.  The chain of command from the President to the lowest
U.S. commander in the field will remain inviolate.

The Eighth Element:  Consultations
Eighth, consultations between the executive branch and Congress
on UN peace operations must be conducted on a far more routine
basis than in the past.  There are several reasons why ad hoc or
crisis-driven consultations are not sufficient.

--  The changing nature of UN peace operations has led us into
uncharted territory.  Traditional peace-keeping was a
dispute-resolving mechanism conducted between nations, with the
clear consent of the parties concerned, with neutrality rigidly
observed, and with minimum use of force.  Recent and current 
operations in places like Cambodia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Somalia
are far riskier and far more complicated.  The ways and means of
each are unique to that mission.  We are all in the process of
being educated about what will work and what won't.

--  Television's ability to bring graphic images of pain and
outrage into our living rooms has heightened the pressure both
for immediate engagement in areas of international crisis and
immediate disengagement when events do not go according to plan.
 Because we live in a democratic society, none of us can be
oblivious to those pressures.  But regular consultations between
us can, nevertheless, contribute to steadiness of policy and
purpose.

--  The relationship of the United States to the United Nations
is in the process of being redefined.  The outcome of this
process--which involves issues of financing, reform, priorities,
and approach--will be determined by decisions made not only at
the White House but on Capitol Hill.  The better the working
relationship we have, the better the outcome will be.

--  Finally, the fluidity of world events dictates that we
continually examine and re-examine our assumptions and policies.
 If lines of communication are clear, this will produce needed
flexibility.  If they are not, it will produce confusion.

I can tell you that either I or my office are ready to come to
the Hill on a monthly basis to consult with you concerning the
Security Council's agenda for that month and any or all of the
peace-keeping and other issues before the UN.

The Ninth Element:  Lessons Learned in Somalia and Elsewhere
The ninth and last element of this proposed outline for
consensus on international peace-keeping is simply that we must
be honest about and must continually learn from past successes
and past setbacks.  Recent difficulties should not obscure the
fact that multilateral peace-keeping has made a significant
contribution to international peace and security.  Historically,
UN peace-keeping operations have separated combatants and
preserved cease-fires in such areas as South Asia, the Middle
East, and Cyprus.

More recently, in Cambodia, a landmark election has been held
under UN supervision; a new government has been formed; hundreds
of thousands of refugees have returned to their homes; and
fields that were once red with blood are now green with crops. 
One reason for success may have been the decision of UNTAC
officials to avoid being drawn into violent confrontations,
despite repeated provocations by the Khmer Rouge.  Another
reason was that the magnitude of the challenges in Cambodia was
matched by the magnitude of the UN's most expensive and
far-reaching operation ever.

Another success story is Namibia, where the UN helped to manage
a transition from guerrilla war to independence.  The changeover
was remarkably peaceful, and Namibia has become a stable
democracy.  In El Salvador, we are seeing the value of
confidence-building measures and a step-by-step approach to
demobilization and reconciliation following a bitter civil war.

The difficulties of peace operations in Angola, Somalia, Bosnia,
and Haiti demonstrate that traditional approaches are not
adequate where government and civil society have broken down or
where one or more of the parties is not prepared to end the
conflict.  It is not only the United States but officials at the
UN and from other states, large and small, that are now
grappling with such questions as when to use force, how to
structure multilateral coalitions, and how to guarantee strong
command and control.

In these areas, there are many opinions but few established
experts; no immutable guidelines; and a multitude of partial
precedents which, like the Bible, can be cited to "prove" just
about anything you want.  The complexity of modern peace-keeping
missions underlines the importance of being very clear about
what the mission is and how the mission is to be accomplished.

Today, we have a mission in Somalia that is clear:

--  To provide logistical support to UN forces so they can
maintain order;
--  To supplement the ability of UN forces to deal with
emergencies;
--  To help the UN accelerate the process of political
reconciliation; and
--  To ensure that our own troops are protected.

The goals of that mission are worthy.  They protect the gains
made in Somalia so far, they maximize the prospects for further
progress, and they serve our interests by preserving American
leadership.

Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, America under President Clinton is being called
upon to develop a new framework for protecting our territory,
our citizens, and our interests in a dramatically altered world.
 In devising that framework, we will depend for the most part on
our own reserves of military and economic power.  We will look
for help from old friends and new.  And we will need a consensus
that includes you and members of this committee for according an
appropriate role to the United Nations--an institution which has
accomplished much despite a turbulent past and which, if
streamlined and strengthened, can contribute greatly in the
future to interests that we share with other states.

Certainly, UN peace-keeping is not a panacea.  It is one tool
among many, and it cannot operate in isolation from a political
process.  But we cannot afford to abandon either peace-keeping
or a multilateral approach to solving difficult problems.  As
much as we would wish otherwise, conflicts are going to
continue.  The world is going to look to the United States for
leadership.  It will be in our interests to provide that
leadership, but we cannot and should not bear the full burden
alone.

America will be stronger and more secure if the United Nations
becomes more capable and effective at preventing, containing,
and ending inter- national conflict.  I hope that we, as members
of different branches of the same government, will continue to
work together to find the common ground that will enable us, in
cooperation with friends and allies, to get that job done. 
(###)



ARTICLE 4:

Open Skies Treaty Ratified

Statement released by the White House Press Secretary,
Washington, DC, November 3, 1993.

The President has signed the United States instrument of
ratification of the Treaty on Open Skies.  This multilateral
aerial observation regime represents the broadest and most
flexible effort to date to promote openness and transparency of
military forces and activities.

The treaty responds to the new demands of the post-Cold War
world and the desire of many states to find innovative means of
strengthening confidence and predictability.  It will give all
participants an agreed way to obtain information about foreign
military forces and activities of concern to them.  Under the
treaty, each participating state may conduct a certain number of
unarmed flights anywhere over the territory of the other
participants, using approved observation techniques.  The data
collected during these flights will be available to all
participants.  This combination of breadth of coverage,
flexibility of use, and availability of information enables the
Open Skies regime to make a unique contribution to building
confidence and enhancing stability.

Present signatories include all NATO allies, the East European
members of the former Warsaw Pact, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus,
Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan.  The states of the former Soviet Union
and all CSCE states are eligible to join on an accelerated
basis.  The treaty is open to any nation by consensus approval. 
The model developed in the treaty could also be important to the
reduction of local tensions and the prevention of conflict in
regions beyond the scope of current signatories.

The Open Skies concept was first put forward by President
Eisenhower in 1955, and then revived in a treaty proposal by
President Bush in 1989.  It was signed on March 24, 1992, and
received the unanimous advice and consent of the U.S. Senate on
August 6, 1993.  Ratification in several countries has been
completed and in others is underway.  The United States looks
forward to ratification soon by all signatories and the treaty's
early entry into force.  (###)



ARTICLE 5:

Treaty Actions

Multilateral

Arbitration
Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards.  Done at New York June 10, 1958.  Entered into
force June 7, 1959; for the U.S. Dec. 29, 1970.  TIAS 6997; 21
UST 2517.
Accessions:  Barbados, Mar. 16, 1993; Estonia, Aug. 30, 1993.
Successions:  Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sept. 1, 1993; Croatia, July
26, 1993; Slovakia, May 28, 1993.

Chemical Weapons
Convention on the prohibition of the development, production,
stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and on their
destruction, with annexes.  Done at Paris  Jan. 13, 1993.(1) 
Signatures:  Latvia, May 6, 1993; Liechtenstein, July 21, 1993;
Panama, June 16, 1993; Rwanda, May 17, 1993.
Ratification:  Sweden, June 17, 1993. 

Consular Relations
Convention on consular relations.  Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963.
 Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 1969. 
TIAS 6820; 21 UST 77.
Accession deposited:  Georgia, July 12, 1993.

Cultural Relations
Agreement for facilitating the international circulation of
visual and auditory materials of an educational, scientific, and
cultural character and protocol.  Done at Lake Success July 15,
1949.  Entered into force Aug. 12, 1954; for the U.S. Jan. 12,
1967.  TIAS 6116; 17 UST 1578.
Succession deposited:  Croatia, July 26, 1993.

Agreement on the importation of educational, scientific, and
cultural materials and protocol.  Done at Lake Success Nov. 22,
1950.  Entered into force May 21, 1952; for the U.S. Nov. 2,
1966.  TIAS 6129; 17 UST 1835.
Successions deposited:  Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sept. 1, 1993;
Croatia, July 26, 1993.

Protocol to the agreement on the importation of educational,
scientific, and cultural materials of Nov. 22, 1950.  Done at
Nairobi Nov. 26, 1976.  Entered into force Jan. 2, 1982; for the
U.S. Nov. 15, 1980.  [Senate] Treaty Doc. 97-2. 
Successions deposited:  Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sept. 1, 1993;
Croatia, July 26, 1993.

Environmental Modification
Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile
use of environmental modification techniques, with annex.  Done
at Geneva May 18, 1977.  Entered into force Oct. 5, 1978; for
the U.S. Jan. 17, 1980.  TIAS 9614; 31 UST 333.
Accessions:  Mauritius, Dec. 9, 1992; Niger, Feb. 17, 1993.
Successions:  Czech Republic, Feb. 22, 1993; Dominica, Nov. 9,
1992; Saint Lucia, May 27, 1993; Uzbekistan, May 26, 1993.

Genocide
Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of
genocide.  Adopted by UN General Assembly at Paris Dec. 9, 1948.
 Entered into force Jan. 12, 1951; for the U.S. Feb. 23, 1989.
Accessions:  Armenia, June 23, 1993; Moldova, Jan. 26, 1993.
Succession:  Czech Republic, Feb. 22, 1993.

Human Rights
International covenant on civil and political rights.  Adopted
by the UN General Assembly Dec. 16, 1966.  Entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976; for the U.S. Sept. 8, 1992.
Accessions:  Armenia, June 23, 1993; Cape Verde, Aug. 6, 1993;
Ethiopia, June 11, 1993; Moldova, Jan. 26, 1993; Mozambique,
July 21, 1993.
Succession:  Czech Republic, Feb. 22, 1993.(2)
Territorial Application:  Extended to Macau, Apr. 27, 1993.

Optional protocol to the international covenant on civil and
political rights.  Adopted by the UN General Assembly Dec. 16,
1966.  Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.
Accessions:  Armenia, June 23, 1993; Czech Republic, Feb. 22,
1993.

International covenant on economic, social, and cultural rights.
 Adopted by the UN General Assembly Dec. 16, 1966.  Entered into
force Jan. 3, 1976.(3)
Accessions:  Cape Verde, Aug. 6, 1993; Ethiopia, June 11, 1993.
Succession:  Czech Republic, Feb. 22, 1993.(2)
Territorial Application:  Extended to Macau, Apr. 27, 1993.

Law, Private International
Statute of The Hague conference on private international law. 
Done at The Hague Oct. 9-31, 1951.  Entered into force July 15,
1955; for the U.S. Oct. 15, 1964.  TIAS 5710; 15 UST 2228.
Acceptances:  Czech Republic, Apr. 1, 1993, effective Jan. 28,
1993; Latvia, Aug. 11, 1992; Morocco, Sept. 6, 1993; Slovakia,
June 1, 1993, effective Apr. 26, 1993.

Narcotics
Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961.  Done at New York
Mar. 30, 1961.  Entered into force Dec. 13, 1964; for the U.S.
June 24, 1967.  TIAS 6298; 18 UST 1407.
Accessions:  Antigua and Barbuda, Apr. 5, 1993; Burkina Faso,
June 2, 1992; Burundi, Feb. 18, 1993; Latvia, July 16, 1993.

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961.
 Done at Geneva Mar. 25, 1972.  Entered into force Aug. 8, 1975.
 TIAS 8118; 26 UST 1439.
Accessions:  Antigua and Barbuda, Apr. 5, 1993; Burkina Faso,
June 2, 1992; Burundi, Feb. 18, 1993; Dominican Rep., Sept. 21,
1993; Latvia, July 16, 1993; Poland, June 9, 1993.

Convention on psychotropic substances.  Done at Vienna Feb. 21,
1971.  Entered into force Aug. 16, 1976; for the U.S. July 15,
1980.  TIAS 9725; 32 UST 543.
Acessions:  Antigua and Barbuda, April 5, 1993; Fiji, Mar. 25,
1993; Burundi, Feb. 18, 1993; Israel, June 10, 1993; Latvia,
July 16, 1993; Romania, Jan. 21, 1993; Sri Lanka, Mar. 15, 1993;
Zambia, May 28, 1993.

United Nations convention against illicit traffic in narcotic
drugs and psychotropic substances, with annex and final act. 
Done at Vienna Dec. 20, 1988.  Entered into force Nov. 11, 1990.
 [Senate] Treaty Doc. 101-4.
Ratifications:  Argentina, June 28, 1993; Bulgaria, Sept. 24,
1992; Iran, Dec. 7, 1992; Malaysia, May 11, 1993; Mauritania,
July 1, 1993; Morocco, Oct. 28, 1992; Suriname, Oct. 28, 1992;
Zambia, May 28, 1993.
Accessions:  Antigua and Barbuda, Apr. 5, 1993; Burundi, Feb.
18, 1993; Dominica, June 30, 1993; El Salvador, May 21, 1993;
Fiji, Mar. 25, 1993; Guyana, Mar. 19, 1993; Kenya, Oct. 19,
1992; Romania, Jan. 21, 1993.

Nuclear Weapons--Non-Proliferation
Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.  Done at
Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968.  Entered into force
Mar. 5, 1970.  TIAS 6839.
Accessions deposited:  Guyana, Oct. 19, 1993; Mauritania, Oct.
26, 1993.

Patents
Patent cooperation treaty with regulations.  Done at Washington
June 19, 1970.  Entered into force Jan. 24, 1978.  TIAS 8733; 28
UST 7645.
Accession deposited:  China, Oct. 1, 1993.

Phonograms
Convention for the protection of producers of phonograms against
unauthorized duplication of their phonograms.  Done at Geneva
Oct. 29, 1971.  Entered into force Apr. 18, 1973; for the U.S.
Mar. 10, 1974.  TIAS 7808; 25 UST 309.
Accession deposited:  Jamaica, Oct. 7, 1993.
Succession deposited:  Czech Republic, Sept. 30, 1993.

Prisoner Transfers
Convention on the transfer of sentenced persons.  Done at
Strasbourg Mar. 21, 1983.  Entered into force July 1, 1985. 
TIAS 10824.
Signatures:  Bulgaria, Sept. 30, 1993(2); Hungary, Nov. 19,
1991; Iceland, Sept. 19, 1989; Portugal, Mar. 21, 1983;
Slovenia, May 14, 1993.
Ratifications:  Hungary, July 13, 1993; Iceland, Aug. 6,
1993(2); Portugal, June 28, 1993; Slovenia, Sept. 16, 1993.

Racial Discrimination
International convention on the elimination of all forms of
racial discrimination.  Adopted by the UN General Assembly Dec.
21, 1965.  Entered into force Jan. 4, 1969.(3)
Accession:  Armenia, June 23, 1993.
Succession:  Czech Republic, Feb. 22, 1993, effective Jan. 1,
1993.

Refugees
Convention relating to the status of refugees, with schedule and
annex.  Signed at Geneva July 28, 1951.  Entered into force Apr.
22, 1954.(3)  TIAS 6577.
Accessions:  Armenia, July 6, 1993; Azerbaijan, Feb. 12, 1993;
Bulgaria, May 12, 1993; Russian Federation, Feb. 2, 1993.
Successions:  Czech Republic, May 11, 1993; Slovakia, Feb. 4,
1993.

Protocol relating to the status of refugees.  Done at New York
Jan. 31, 1967.  Entered into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S.
Nov. 1, 1968.  TIAS 6577; 19 UST 6223.
Accessions:  Armenia, July 6, 1993; Azerbaijan, Feb. 12, 1993;
Bulgaria, May 12, 1993; Russian Federation, Feb. 2, 1993.
Successions:  Czech Republic, May 11, 1993; Slovakia, Feb. 4,
1993.

Slave Trade
Convention to suppress the slave trade and slavery.  Concluded
at Geneva Sept. 25, 1926.  Entered into force Mar. 9, 1927; for
the U.S. Mar. 21, 1929.  TS 778; 46 Stat. 2183.

Supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery, the slave
trade and institutions and practices similar to slavery.  Done
at Geneva Sept. 7, 1956.  Entered into force Apr. 30, 1957; for
the U.S. Dec. 6, 1967.  TIAS 6418; 18 UST 3201.
Succession:  Czech Republic, Feb. 22, 1993, effective Jan. 1,
1993.

Terrorism
Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against
internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. 
Adopted by the UN General Assembly Dec. 14, 1973.  Entered into
force Feb. 20, 1977.  TIAS 8532; 28 UST 1975.
Succession:  Czech Republic, Feb. 22, 1993, effective Jan. 1,
1993.

International convention against the taking of hostages. 
Adopted by the UN General Assembly Dec. 17, 1979.  Entered into
force June 3, 1983; for the U.S. Jan. 6, 1985. 
Successions:  Czech Republic, Feb. 22, 1993, effective Jan. 1,
1993; Slovenia, July 6, 1992.
Accession:  China, Jan. 26, 1993.(4)

Torture
Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment.  Adopted by the General
Assembly of the United Nations Dec. 10, 1984.  Entered into
force June 26, 1987.(3)  [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-20.
Signatures:  Ireland, Sept. 28, 1992; South Africa, Jan. 29,
1993.
Ratification:  Morocco, June 21, 1993.
Accessions:  Antigua and Barbuda, July 19, 1993; Burundi, Feb.
18, 1993; Mauritius, Dec. 9, 1992: Slovenia, July 15, 1993.
Succession:  Czech Republic, Feb. 22, 1993, effective Jan. 1,
1993.(2)
Territorial Application:  Extended to Bailiwick of Guernsey;
Bailiwick of Jersey, Isle of  Man, Bermuda, Hong Kong, Dec. 8,
1992.(2)

Treaties
Vienna convention on the law of treaties, with annex.  Done at
Vienna May 23, 1969.  Entered into force Jan. 27, 1990.(3)  
Accessions:  Latvia, May 4, 1993; Lithuania, Jan. 15, 1992;
Moldova, Jan. 26, 1993.
Successions:  Croatia, Oct. 12, 1992, effective Oct. 8, 1991;
Czech Republic, Feb. 22, 1993, effective Jan. 1, 1993.

Vienna convention on the law of treaties between states and
international organizations or between international
organizations, with annex.  Done at Vienna Mar. 21, 1986.(1)
Ratifications:  Belgium, Sept. 1, 1992(4); Cyprus, Nov. 5, 1991;
Greece, Jan. 28, 1992.
Accessions:  Australia, June 16, 1993; Moldova, Jan. 26, 1993.
Succession:  Czech Republic, Feb. 22, 1993, effective June 1,
1993.

UNIDO
Constitution of the United Nations Industrial Development
Organization, with annexes.  Done at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. 
Entered into force June 21, 1985.
Accession deposited:  Moldova, June 1, 1993.

United Nations
Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International
Court of Justice.  Signed at San Francisco June 26, 1945. 
Entered into force Oct. 24, 1945.  TS 993; 59 Stat. 1031.  
Acceptances:  Czech Republic, Jan. 4, 1993; Eritrea, May 12,
1993; Monaco, May 17, 1993; Slovak Republic, Jan. 4, 1993.

Convention on the privileges and immunities of the United
Nations.  Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations 
on Feb. 13, 1946.  Entered into force Sept. 17, 1946; for the
U.S. Apr. 29, 1970.  TIAS 6900; 21 UST 1418.
Succession:  Czech Republic, Feb. 22, 1993.

War, Prevention of
Convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes.
 Signed at The Hague Oct. 18, 1907.  Entered into force Jan. 26,
1910.  TS 536; 36 Stat. 2199.
Accession:  Singapore, July 13, 1993.

Women
Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination
against women.  Adopted by the UN General Assembly Dec. 18,
1979.  Entered into force Sept. 3, 1981.(3)
Ratifications:  Gambia, Apr. 16, 1993; India, July 9, 1993.
Accessions:  Maldives, July 1, 1993; Morocco, June 21, 1993.
Succession:  Czech Republic, Feb. 22, 1993, effective Jan. 1,
1993.

Convention on the political rights of women.  Done at New York
Mar. 31, 1953.  Entered into force July 7, 1954; for the U.S.
July 7, 1976.  TIAS 8289; 27 UST 1909.
Signature:  South Africa, Jan. 29, 1993.
Accessions:  Burundi, Feb. 18, 1993; Moldova, Jan. 26, 1993.
Succession:  Czech Republic, Feb. 22, 1993, effective Jan. 1,
1993.


BILATERAL
Albania
Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official
government employees.  Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington Aug. 30 and Sept. 30, 1993.  Entered into force Sept.
30, 1993.

Argentina
Agreement concerning the establishment of an Americas Fund and
Administering Commission.  Signed at Buenos Aires Sept. 27,
1993.  Entered into force Sept. 27, 1993.

Czech Republic
Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official
government employees.  Effected by exchange of notes at Prague
Feb. 18 and Oct. 1, 1993.  Entered into force Oct. 1, 1993.

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and
capital.  Signed at Prague Sept. 16, 1993.  Enters into force
upon the exchange of instruments of ratification.  [Senate]
Treaty Doc. 103-17.

Ecuador
Agreement concerning the protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights.  Signed at Washington Oct. 15,
1993.  Entered into force Oct. 15, 1993.

Egypt
Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 24, 1992 for cash
transfer for sector policy reform.  Signed at Cairo Sept. 13,
1993.  Entered into force Sept. 13, 1993.

Germany
Memorandum of understanding concerning a cooperative program on
biological effects of ionizing radiation.  Signed at Bonn and
Washington Aug. 2 and 23, 1993.  Entered into force Aug. 23,
1993.

Hungary
Agreement on intellectual property, with protocol and exchanges
of letters.  Signed at Washington Sept. 24, 1993.  Enters into
force upon an exchange of notes.

Israel
Second protocol amending the convention with respect to taxes on
income of Nov. 20, 1975, as amended with exchange of notes. 
Signed at Jerusalem Jan. 26, 1993.  Enters into force 30 days
after the date of exchange of instruments of ratification.

Italy
Agreement amending and extending the agreement of Apr. 1, 1988,
for scientific and technological cooperation.  Signed at
Washington Oct. 4, 1993.  Entered into force Oct. 4, 1993.

Latvia
Postal money order agreement.  Signed at Washington and Riga
Aug. 16 and Sept. 8, 1993.  Enters into force Dec. 1, 1993.

Netherlands
Protocol amending the convention of Dec. 18, 1992, for the
avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal
evasion with respect to taxes on income, with exchange of notes.
 Signed at Washington Oct. 13, 1993.  Enters into force on the
later of the dates on which the respective governments have
notified each other that their constitutional formalities have
been complied with.

Russian Federation
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of
certain debts owed to or guaranteed by the U.S. Government, with
annexes.  Signed at Washington Sept. 30, 1993.  Enters into
force following signature and receipt by the Russian Federation
of written notice from the U.S. that all necessary U.S. domestic
legal requirements have been fulfilled.

Slovak Republic
Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and
capital.  Signed at Bratislava Oct. 8, 1993.  Enters into force
upon the exchange of instruments of ratification.  [Senate]
Treaty Doc. 103-18.

Sri Lanka
Investment incentive agreement.  Signed at Washington Oct. 19,
1993.  Enters into force on date on which Sri Lanka notifies the
U.S. that all legal requirements have been fulfilled.


1  Not in force.
2  With declaration(s).
3  Not in force for the U.S.
4  With reservation(s).  (###)



ARTICLE 6:

NEW AMBASSADORS

Botswana--Howard Franklin Jeter, August 5, 1993
Burkina Faso--Donald J. McConnell, September 16, 1993
Canada--James J. Blanchard, August 10, 1993
Chad--Laurence Everett Pope II, August 17, 1993
Congo--William Christie Ramsay, August 20, 1993
Cuba--Joseph Gerard Sullivan, July 28, 1993 (assigned Chief of
Mission)
El Salvador--Alan H. Flanigan, September 3, 1993
Gambia--Andrew J. Winter, August 19, 1993
Germany--Richard Holbrooke, September 24, 1993
Guinea--Joseph A. Saloom III, August 12, 1993
Holy See--Raymond Leo Flynn, July 9, 1993
Italy--Reginald Bartholomew, September 24, 1993
Japan--Walter J. Mondale, August 13, 1993
Kenya--Aurelia Erskine Brazeal, September 10, 1993
Mexico--James Robert Jones, August 20, 1993
Mongolia--Donald C. Johnson, August 23, 1993
Nicaragua--John Francis Maisto, August 20, 1993
Niger--John S. Davison, August 18, 1993
Nigeria--Walter C. Carrington, August 23, 1993
Uruguay--Thomas J. Dodd, August 5, 1993
Venezuela--Jeffrey Davidow, September 24, 1993
U.S. Mission to NATO--Robert E. Hunter, July 8, 1993
U.S. Mission to the OECD--David Laurence Aaron, August 24, 1993
U.S. Mission to the EC--Stuart E. Eizenstat, September 20, 1993 
(###)

END OF DISPATCH VOL. 4, NO. 46

To the top of this page


Index of Dispatch Magazine Archives 1993 Issues|| Index of Dispatch Magazine Archives|| Index of "Briefings and Statements"
Index of Electronic Research Collections ERC Reference Desk || Alphabetic Index || Sitemap || ERC Homepage
Last modified: Jun. 3, 1999