US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 4, NUMBER 43, OCTOBER 25, 1993
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1.  Widening the Circle of Peace In the Middle East -- Secretary
Christopher
2.  Recent Developments and Next Steps In the Middle East Peace
Process -- Edward P. Djerejian
3.  Report on U.S. Military Operations in Somalia Transmitted to
Congress -- President Clinton
4.  A Strategy of Enlargement and the Developing World --
Anthony Lake
5.  Focus on Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation:  Upcoming
Seattle Ministerial and Results of Honolulu Senior Officials
Meeting
6.  U.S. Policy Toward Nicaragua -- Alexander F. Watson
7.  UN Security Council Adopts Resolution 873 on Haiti --
Madeleine K. Albright, UNSC Resolution


ARTICLE 1:

Widening the Circle of Peace In the Middle East
Secretary Christopher
Address at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
Washington, DC, October 15, 1993

I would like to thank Barbi Weinberg, Mike Stein, and Robert
Satloff for inviting me to speak this evening.  It is a pleasure
to meet with such an informed and distinguished group.

The Peace Process:  The First Nine Months
It was with great personal satisfaction that I witnessed the
signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles
last month.  That moment, captured indelibly by a handshake
between old adversaries, showed us that the impossible is within
reach--that the bright promise of a better future can chase out
the dark specters of a bitter past.

The world correctly focused on that historic handshake that
shook the world.  Yet anyone watching the event on the White
House lawn saw something equally moving in the words and
demeanor of my friend, the Israeli Prime Minister.  Choked with
emotion, the former IDF Chief of Staff voiced his hopes for, but
also his concerns about, this new start.

I can understand, at least partly, the Prime Minister's strong
feelings.  In my 9 months as Secretary of State--on top of my
earlier tenure in the Department--I have felt the tragedy and
the hope of Arab-Israeli relations.  I am moved by the promise
of peace for Israel and its Arab neighbors.  And I know that
promise is unlikely to be fulfilled if we do not play our part. 
American leadership is required.  And that is in our interest,
in Israel's interest, and in the region's interest.

Every American President since Harry Truman has understood the
strategic importance of pursuing peace in the Middle East. 
Although the bipolar world of the past complicated the pursuit
of peace, it did not prevent American efforts.  The
disengagement agreements in the mid-1970s and Camp David
provided essential building blocks.

With the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War,
the Middle East was no longer beset by the rivalry of
superpowers.  The flow of arms was reduced, and the military
option against Israel was clearly diminished.  And with Saddam
Hussein's radical challenge decisively turned back in the Gulf
War, the region's balance of power was tilted toward moderation
and the chance for reconciliation.  The Madrid conference broke
the taboo on direct talks and launched a process that sought to 
 From the beginning of his Administration, President Clinton
understood that in this new political landscape, the context for
peace-making was dramatically improved.  But he also understood
that peace-making would succeed only with active American
engagement--and only if Israel felt strong and secure enough to
take risks for peace.

We have made clear our unyielding commitment to Israel's
security and our willingness to be a full partner for peace. 
Let me reaffirm to you, as I have to Arab leaders and diplomats,
that our commitment to Israel--to its security and its
qualitative edge--remains a cornerstone of our policy in the
Middle East.  Indeed, for me, it is an article of faith and a
fundamental principle that guides our policy.

From my first days as Secretary, I became immersed in the peace
process, not only to solve immediate problems but to let all the
parties know that America would be actively engaged.  The
Clinton Administration accepted the wisdom of the Madrid
framework and entered office fully committed to move it forward.
 We understood that direct negotiations, based on UN Security
Council Resolutions 242 and 338, were the surest way to achieve
a comprehensive peace.  We understood, too, that this peace must
take account of Israel's security concerns and the legitimate
rights of the Palestinians.

Yet we faced a problem.  In the wake of Israel's temporary
expulsion of more than 400 Hamas activists--following a series
of violent attacks on Israeli soldiers and civilians--the
parties were unable to agree on returning to the peace talks. 
Working closely with Prime Minister Rabin, we crafted a proposal
with a timetable for the return of the deportees.  As a result
of our efforts--including a February trip to the region, my
first abroad as Secretary--we brought the parties back to the
table in the spring.

This was not the only time that we had to intervene strenuously
to salvage and energize the process.  Tension in southern
Lebanon erupted in July, as Katyushas rained down on Israeli
towns in northern Galilee and as the IDF responded with a 
sustained aerial and artillery bombardment.  We consulted
closely with regional parties.  Many late-night calls were made.
 And we brokered a cease-fire that, to date, has held.

That is what is required:  the ability to sustain the talks and
insulate them from inevitable pressures.  This we have done. 
Indeed, had we not, the spectacular breakthrough in the secret
talks in Oslo would have been hard to imagine.

For almost 2 years, under a Republican and a Democratic
President, America's sustained diplomatic involvement--whether
in presenting a draft declaration of principles or in constantly
pushing to define the parameters of the possible--set the stage
for decision-making in the secret Oslo channel.  On the
Israeli-Palestinian track, we created a channel for serious
discussion.  In the end, they did what only they could do:  They
created a decision-making channel.  Their creativity and courage
enabled them to leap over old fears and to break new ground on
the path to a peaceful and prosperous Middle East.

Yet their achievement is only the first step of the journey. 
Now we need to make this turning point irreversible as we work
with regional parties and the international community to make
the benefits of peace irresistible.  We must do our part.  We
must help the Israelis and the Palestinians implement the
agreement.  We must help make it work.  We must also build on
it--and cement it--by playing an active role in the other
bilateral talks to ensure progress on all fronts.

The Donors' Conference
We recognized that implementing the Israeli-Palestinian
agreement would require resources to change the reality on the
ground.  We moved quickly.  Together with our Russian
co-sponsors, we organized a successful donors' conference. 
Forty-six countries and international organizations gathered to
send the message that the peace talks must not fail.  They
agreed that to help transform the Declaration of Principles into
an enduring agreement, the Palestinians needed to see the
tangible benefits of peace.  Living standards must be boosted,
housing and infrastructure built, and the basis for sustained
long-term growth established.

Conference participants pledged more than $600 million in aid
for the first year covered by the Declaration of Principles, $1
billion for the first 2 years, and almost $2 billion for the
5-year period covered by the agreement.

That was an exceptional day's work.  But our task is far from
complete.  The donors must now put in place the structure agreed
to at the conference for disbursing the aid and targeting it
effectively.  Palestinians and Israelis must create suitable
mechanisms for absorbing this aid efficiently and for using it
credibly.  This is essential.  And trade and private investment
must be encouraged through export-financing programs and
investment incentives.

The Negotiations:  An Update
Through the donors' conference, the international community is
doing its part for Israeli-Palestinian peace.  But the lion's
share of responsibility--as with the credit for the
breakthrough--rests with the parties themselves.  The
Declaration of Principles established an ambitious set of
objectives toward which the parties must work.  Prime Minister
Rabin and Chairman Arafat took up this work in an October 6
meeting in Cairo.  Two days ago, on the day the Declaration of
Principles entered into force, Shimon Peres and Abu Mazen met,
and the work of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee
got off to a very good start.  The Gaza-Jericho committee,
meeting in Taba, also had very serious and practical
discussions.

The Declaration of Principles must be transformed into an
enduring agreement and the realities on the ground changed.  We
have been asked by the Israelis and the Palestinians to help as
they move down this path of cooperation, and we will continue to
do our part.  We will continue to play an active role on the
other tracks as well.  We expected that the Israeli-Palestinian
breakthrough would stimulate progress elsewhere in the
bilaterals.  We were not disappointed.  Within 24 hours of the
signing of the Declaration of Principles, the Israelis and the
Jordanians initiated a substantive agenda for their
negotiations.

Jordanian Crown Prince Hassan and Israeli Foreign Minister Peres
met with President Clinton on October 1 to announce the creation
of a joint economic committee.  In addition, the President
proposed and the parties agreed to create a
U.S.-Israeli-Jordanian working group to identify and promote
economic projects that would benefit both Israel and Jordan. 
This is another first--a trilateral working group that will make
cooperation and joint economic projects a normal part of the
landscape.

Now we hope to make tangible progress on the other bilateral
tracks.  We recognize that there are complex issues on the
Israeli-Syria track.  The parties continue to differ over key
questions such as withdrawal, peace, and security.  While they
are working on a declaration of principles, they still have some
distance to travel to overcome the gaps that separate them.  In
my recent talks with Foreign Minister Shara', he made it clear
that he and President Asad remain firmly committed to the talks
and to the process.  He also made it clear that Syria, like
Israel, welcomes our assistance in the talks.  We will work to
bridge the gaps.

Similarly, Lebanon and Israel are trying to reach agreement on a
negotiating frame of reference that would enable them to make
arrangements for security talks.  We are encouraging them to
agree to a joint security committee.  We believe that would be
an important step forward.

The Clinton Administration will do all we can to help implement
the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles.  We will work
very actively to promote progress in the other bilateral and
multilateral negotiations.  That is why I am dispatching Dennis
Ross to the region this weekend--and why I expect to return to
the region in the near future.  As I said, we must make the
breakthrough irreversible.  That is the central challenge for
the Israelis and the Palestinians--and for those of us committed
to making Middle East peace a reality.

The Challenges Ahead
We have no illusions about the difficulties we will continue to
face.  We must widen the circle of peace.  We must isolate the
forces of violence and hatred--whether they are trying to
disrupt the search for peace in the region, to destabilize their
neighbors through aggression, or to destroy innocent lives
through terrorism.

Containing and diminishing the influence of political
extremism--secular and religious--is essential.  To do so, we
must address the social and economic conditions that spawn
extremist movements.  And we must also take vigorous action to
punish and isolate terrorist groups and those states that
support terrorism.  The UN embargo on Libya for its role in the
bombing of Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 is a clear reminder of the
strong stance taken by the United States and the international
community against state-sponsored terrorism.

A related challenge stems from the flow of weapons into the
area.  The place to start is containing the rogue regimes in
Iran, Iraq, and Libya--to make certain that they cannot obtain
sensitive technology.

Yet not all the tasks ahead place us in a defensive posture,
seeking to limit or roll back regional dangers.  Clearly, there
are extraordinary opportunities to expand the horizon for
productive and creative interaction--breaking old taboos--among
the peoples of the Middle East.

The exciting fact is that taboos are being broken every week. 
In the multilateral working groups, Israelis and their
counterparts from 12 Arab countries are taking on issues of
mutual interest regarding arms control, the environment,
economic development, water, and refugees.  The arms control
working group can and should be a forum where a new basis for
regional security is developed.  Confidence-building measures
can reduce suspicions and create a basis for far more meaningful
arms control steps.  The refugee working group met this week in
Tunis and helped establish another important milestone--the
first time a working group has convened right in the region.  We
must create other such milestones and make them normal and
routine.

We must overcome and remove continuing barriers to
reconciliation and cooperation.  First and foremost, the scope 
of economic interaction must expand in the region.  That is why
the President and I felt so strongly about establishing the
U.S.-Jordan-Israel working group.  The countries of the Middle
East share many problems and advantages; all would gain from
economic integration.

A critical step toward this must be an end to the Arab boycott. 
The Israelis have made a major gesture.  The Arab world must now
reciprocate.  In light of the latest advances in the peace
process, the boycott is an anachronism.  It punishes
Palestinians and Israelis alike.  As I have said repeatedly, in
public and in private, the boycott is a relic of the past.  It
should be relegated to the dustbin of history--now.

In light of the breakthrough last month, we are already seeing
reports of contacts between Arab and Israeli businessmen and
-women--and even the establishment of joint ventures that will
accompany the achievement of peace.  These are the kinds of
cooperation that will cement the peace and make it last.

We have a full agenda for the Middle East, an agenda with
peace-making and peace-building at its core.  With the historic
agreement last month, there is no excuse for a Middle East mired
in the past.  The excuses that have stood in the way of peace
and have robbed the region of a better future are gone.

Now we must work with the optimism that these historic
circumstances inspire and with the urgency that they demand. 
The developments of the last few weeks in Israel's negotiations
with the Palestinians and the Jordanians are both a cause for
hope and a spur to action.  Those developments have enabled us
to catch a glimpse of a new Middle East--enjoying peace,
reconciliation, real cooperation, and prosperity.

As we look to a new century, we can see a very different
future--a far brighter future--for the Middle East.  As
President Clinton said:

Together let us imagine what can be accomplished if all the
energy and the ability the Israelis and Palestinians have
invested into . . . struggle can now be channeled into
cultivating the land and freshening the water, into ending the
boycotts and creating new industry, into building a land as
bountiful and peaceful as it is holy.

Working with the parties, we will do our best to make that
vision a reality.  (###)



ARTICLE 2:

Recent Developments and Next Steps In the Middle East Peace
Process
Edward P. Djerejian, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern
Affairs 
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, DC, October 15, 1993

Mr. Chairman and other distinguished members of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, it is a pleasure to appear before
you, particularly at this propitious moment in the search for
Middle East peace.  My testimony today will focus on the recent,
dramatic developments on the bilateral side of the peace
process, touch briefly on the multilateral track, and then
describe our thoughts about next steps.  Following that, I will
be happy to take your questions about the peace process or any
aspect of our Middle East policy. 

The Donors' Conference 
Barely a month ago, on the South Lawn of the White House, a new
era in Middle East politics took shape--an era that, as
President Clinton noted, gives the children of the Middle East
the chance to know a season of peace.  The President made clear
that he wanted to move quickly to help turn the historic
agreement into reality.  Together with our Russian co-sponsors,
we organized the October 1 meeting of the Conference to Support
Middle East Peace.  It was no small success.

Forty-six countries and international organizations gathered to
send the message that the peace talks must not fail.  They
agreed on the importance of buttressing the Declaration of
Principles by offering the Palestinians the material benefits of
peace.  We all know that it is essential for the Palestinians to
see soon that their daily lives are taking a turn for the better
and that peace makes a difference.  

The conferees reconfirmed their commitment to improve
immediately the conditions of daily life for the Palestinians
and, at the same time, to build a structure for long-term
economic growth.  To meet these objectives, conference
participants pledged over $600 million in aid for the first year
covered by the Declaration of Principles and $1 billion for the
first 2 years.  For the 5-year period covered by the agreement,
pledges of support approached $2 billion. 

Several countries made pledges for only the first year or two. 
If their contributions for later years match their pledge for
the first 2, the total donors' support will jump to $2.4
billion--which meets World Bank estimates for the Palestinians'
needs.  Let me add that our 5-year contribution to this effort
is $500 million.

Conference results were superb, but much remains to be done. 
For the donors, the first task is to put in place the structure
agreed to at the conference for disbursing the aid.  Within the
Madrid framework, overall coordination among the major donors
will take place in an ad hoc liaison committee.  This committee
will be run at the sub-cabinet level and should meet every 3 to
6 months.  It will work to ensure coordination and cooperation
among the donors.  Members will include the United States, 
Russia, Japan, Canada, the European Community, and Saudi Arabia.
 Israel, the Palestinians, Egypt, and Jordan will participate as
associate members.

The World Bank will also play a leading role in this process. 
It will establish and manage a trust fund to finance technical
assistance, training, and feasibility studies.  These efforts
are designed to assist the Palestinians in creating institutions
that will help them manage their political, economic, and
humanitarian affairs.  UN agencies, including the UN Development
Program, will provide both technical and financial assistance to
support this effort.  The World Bank will also take the lead in
developing programs to support public investment in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip.  And it will serve as the Secretariat for
the ad hoc liaison committee.

There is an important role for the private sector in promoting
economic growth in the West Bank and Gaza.  The Palestinians
understand the need to create a business-friendly environment. 
Conference participants intend to encourage private investment
through export-financing programs and investment incentives. 
Part of the U.S. assistance package includes $125 million in
OPIC investment guarantees.

I would like to underscore one point here.  In putting together
this aid package and working on its implementation, we have
sought to ensure that it is managed efficiently--that there is
transparency and accountability so that the recipients reap its
full benefits.  We will be working in close consultation with
other donors and the World Bank and other institutions to
achieve this goal.  In these tight budget times, we must do no
less.

Israeli-Palestinian Talks 
Through the donors' conference, the international community is
doing its part on behalf of Israeli-Palestinian peace.  But we
must keep our eye on the ball--the major responsibility for
advancing the process remains with the parties.

The Declaration of Principles established an ambitious set of
objectives toward which Israel and the Palestinians must work. 
Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat did not waste time,
taking up this work in an October 6 meeting in Cairo.  On
October 13, the day the declaration entered into force, Israeli
Foreign Minister Peres and Abu Mazen convened the first meeting
of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee in Cairo. 
That meeting got the liaison committee off to an excellent
start.  The Gaza-Jericho and military committees also began
their deliberations October 13 in Taba.  There, too, the
discussions were pragmatic and focused.

The two sides also have established an Israeli-Palestinian
Continuing Committee for Economic Cooperation to consider joint
ventures in such areas as water, electricity, and trade
promotion.  Negotiations on a detailed plan for the transfer of 
authority in education, culture, health, social welfare, direct
taxation, and tourism will take place in yet another forum in
Washington.  The declaration also calls for: 

By December 13:
-- Concluding the agreement on Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and
Jericho and beginning the withdrawal;

By April 13:
--Completing the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho; 
--Transferring to the Palestinians authority for education,
culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism; 
--Starting the clock on the 5-year transitional period; 
--Starting to build a Palestinian police force; 

By July 13:
--Establishment of the Palestinian police force; 
--Completing Israel Defense Force redeployment in the West Bank
and Gaza outside of populated areas; and
--As a goal, holding general elections for the Palestinian
Interim Self-Government Authority Council.

The Other Bilaterals
The Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles was, of
course, a historic breakthrough.  We expected it to serve as a
catalyst elsewhere in the peace process.  We have not been
disappointed.  The day after the signing of the Declaration of
Principles, the Israelis and the Jordanians initialed a
substantive agenda for their negotiations.  This agenda codifies
the progress made thus far in their talks and provides the
framework for further discussion.

On October 1, the day of the donors' conference,
Israeli-Jordanian relations took an even more significant step
forward.  Jordanian Crown Prince Hassan and Israeli Foreign
Minister Peres appeared with President Clinton at the White
House to announce the creation of a joint economic committee. 
It was also agreed at that time to create a trilateral
U.S.-Israeli-Jordanian working group to look at next steps for
economic development in those two Middle East countries and how
their economic interaction is and can be related to the
Palestinian dimension.

Whereas the Palestinian issue represents the political core of
the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Israeli-Syrian negotiations
represent the geopolitical or strategic core of the conflict. 
Therefore, it is essential that every effort be made to
encourage tangible progress in the Israeli-Syrian track.  While
the parties continue to differ over key questions such as land,
peace, and security, they remain committed to these negotiations
with the aim of reaching agreement on their own declaration of
principles.  The two sides have sought and welcomed active U.S.
assistance in the talks.  President Clinton and Secretary
Christopher have been actively involved in helping move this
track forward.

The President has communicated directly with Syrian President
Hafiz al-Asad, and Secretary Christopher has been asked by both
Prime Minister Rabin and President Asad to be an active
intermediary to help the two sides narrow their substantive
differences, especially on the key issues of withdrawal and
peace.  The Administration is determined to do its part.  We
recognize that much hard work lies ahead.

Lebanon and Israel are continuing their effort to reach
agreement on a political frame of reference dealing with the key
issues of land, peace, and security which could then enable them
to establish a military committee to discuss the pressing issue
of security, especially in southern Lebanon.  It is worth noting
that those negotiations continued despite the violence on the
ground last summer.  We are in close contact with both the
Israelis and the Lebanese to help facilitate forward movement in
the talks, and President Clinton and Secretary Christopher had
an extensive discussion on the issue with Lebanese Prime
Minister Hariri in New York at the UNGA earlier this month.

We remain active in the bilaterals, seeking ways to bring the
parties closer together.  Our commitment to a just and lasting,
comprehensive peace is as firm as ever.  And a comprehensive
peace means peace on all fronts.

The Multilaterals 
Complementing the bilateral track is a separate set of
multilateral negotiations.  These negotiations were designed at
the Madrid conference to address key problems which affect the
entire Middle East.  The multilateral track was meant to be an
essential complement to the bilaterals--to tackle those regional
problems that are themselves a source of tension and
instability.  These talks tend to attract less media attention,
but they literally have the potential to change the face of the
Middle East. 

The multilateral track consists of a steering group and five
working groups which reflect issues affecting the lives of
ordinary people.  There are separate groups for economic
development, water resources, the environment, refugees, and
arms control and security.

In addition to Israel and the Palestinians, a broad range of
Arab countries--12 in all--participate in these groups:  the
Gulf Cooperation Council countries, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco,
Algeria, Tunisia, and Yemen.  I draw your attention to the
number of Arab participants.  The bilaterals established
negotiations between Israel and four Arab parties; the
multilaterals brought Israel into contact with eight additional
Arab states.  This demonstrates that one of the underlying
principles of the multilaterals--to normalize Israeli-Arab
contact--is sound.

To deal comprehensively with the problems of the region, we have
included key extra-regional parties.  Delegations from the UN,
Canada, Japan, and various European countries add their
expertise, resources, and energy to addressing the regional
problems of the Middle East.  As was evident at the October 1
meeting of the Conference to Support Middle East Peace, when
given a meaningful role, these countries are more than willing
to help share the burden of funding peace in the region.

The multilateral discussions have proven highly successful. 
They began in almost seminar form, considering problems on a
theoretical plane.  But in a number of areas they have since
moved to concrete actions:  feasibility studies, training
projects, building data bases.  And a major threshold was
recently crossed when it was agreed to convene two of these
groups in Arab countries for the first time.  The refugee
working group met in Tunis this week, and the environment group
will meet in Egypt later this fall.  Moving the venue to these
Arab countries is an important example of how these negotiations
are brushing aside long-standing barriers to regional
normalization.

As originally conceived, the multi-laterals were designed not
just to complement but also to facilitate the bilateral talks. 
And recent developments have underscored the importance of this
second function.

Some observers have wondered how we were able to organize, so
quickly after the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration
of Principles, the Conference to Support Middle East Peace.  Let
me give you some insight into this development.  We understood,
long before the breakthrough, that one key element of
Israeli-Palestinian peace required improving the living
conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  So we started to
prepare ourselves for work toward this end.

Last July--2 months before the signing of the Declaration of
Principles--I co-chaired a meeting of the Multilateral Steering
Group in Moscow.  At that meeting, I negotiated, with Faisal
Husseini, Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin, and
other members of the group, language for the final statement of
the session.  That statement "recognized the particular needs of
the Palestinians as they moved toward interim self-government
arrangements" and expressed the hope that "additional funds will
be made available to the Palestinians to meet their current
pressing needs and responsibilities."  This was the framework
which formed the basis of the donors' conference efforts.

I have also referred to a World Bank estimate of Palestinian
needs in the territories.  The study on which this estimate was
made was commissioned many months before within the multilateral
framework.  In short, the multilaterals provided the structure
and much of the preliminary work that enabled us to put together
a major, successful international conference in a matter of
days.

The robust activities of the multilateral working groups are
establishing a pattern of interaction between Israelis and
Arabs--at the personal and professional levels--that has
transcended political differences.  It is an essential
cornerstone for normalizing Arab-Israeli relations.  We attach
great importance to further progress in this track.  And we
anticipate, as a consequence of the breakthrough on the
bilateral track, advancing the multilaterals in the fourth round
of working groups that began with the convening of the session
on refugees last week in Tunisia.

The Road Ahead 
The progress that we have made in recent months on both the
bilateral and multilateral tracks is encouraging.  But now is
not the time to rest.  That progress is a summons to action.

We will look at every opportunity to expand the horizon for
productive and creative interaction--transcending old
taboos--among the peoples of the region.  In this regard, one of
our principal tasks is to broaden participation in the peace
process and expand Arab-Israeli interaction.

We are urging our Arab interlocutors throughout the Middle East
to develop and broaden, outside of the multilateral context,
their contact with the Israelis.  In the wake of last month's
breakthrough, we are seeing some indications of Arab willingness
to do just that.  The most dramatic instance of this came the
day after the signing of the Declaration of Principles.  On the
way back to Israel, Prime Minister Rabin touched down in Morocco
for a well-publicized meeting with King Hassan.

We would also like to broaden regional participation in the
multilateral talks.  Syria and Lebanon have, to date, declined
to join the multilateral process until there is what they
perceive to be concrete progress in the bilateral negotiations. 
We believe recent developments are sufficient to prompt Syria
and Lebanon to take part in this important effort.  We are once
again encouraging them to join the multilateral process.

Another challenge is to broaden the scope of economic
interaction in the region.  The countries of the Middle East
share many problems and advantages; all would gain from economic
cooperation.  The first step toward this must be an end to the
Arab boycott.  In the past month, the President, the Vice
President, and the Secretary have publicly called for an end to
the boycott.

This is our message to boycotting countries, publicly and in
diplomatic channels:  The boycott is an anachronism completely
out of step with recent developments in the peace process.  We
also continue to remind our Arab counterparts that the secondary
and tertiary aspects of the boycott hurt us directly; these
aspects discriminate against U.S. and other countries' 
firms that wish to do business in the Middle East.  We are
urging our trading partners to join us in our efforts to
persuade the Arab states to begin dismantling the boycott.

But our aim is not just to remove barriers to trade.  We would
like to see economic cooperation across old political
barricades.  In light of last month's breakthrough, we are
already seeing reports of contacts between Arab and Israeli
business executives and, even, the establishment of joint
ventures.  We expect and encourage more of this.  Regional
entrepreneurs understand the business opportunities that will
accompany the achievement of peace.

I have been involved in the Middle East for most of my
diplomatic career--over 30 years.  It has been exciting--boredom
is not a characteristic of the Middle East--but the excitement
has been that of tragedy marked by wars and terrorism.  Standing
on the same podium with Chairman Arafat on the White House lawn
on September 13, Prime Minister Rabin stated it eloquently when
he said:

Enough!  Let us pray that a day will come when we all will say
farewell to arms.  We wish to open a new chapter in the sad book
of our lives together, a chapter of mutual recognition, of good
neighborliness, of mutual respect, of understanding.  We hope to
embark on a new era in the history of the Middle East.

Today, the prospects for a comprehensive Middle East peace have
never been stronger.  The Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of
Principles, the mutual recognition of Israel and the PLO, the
sustained engagement of all the major regional parties in the
peace process, and our own role as a full partner in the process
started at Madrid with the support of the international
community; all point us in the right direction.  All help make a
dream a reality--Israel and each of its Arab neighbors living
together in peace.  We will do our utmost to achieve this
long-sought objective.  (###)



ARTICLE 3:

Report on U.S. Military Operations in Somalia Transmitted to
Congress
President Clinton
Text of a letter to the Congress, October 13, 1993.

To the Congress of the United States:
In response to the request made by the House and Senate for
certain information on our military operations in Somalia, I am
pleased to forward the attached report.

In transmitting this report, I want to reiterate the points that
I made on October 6 and to the American people in remarks on
October 7.  We went to Somalia on a humanitarian mission.  
We saved approximately a million lives that were at risk of
starvation brought on by civil war that had degenerated into
anarchy.  We acted after 350,000 already had died.

Ours was a gesture of a great nation, carried out by thousands
of American citizens, both military and  civilian.  We did not
then, nor do we now plan to stay in that country.  The United
Nations agreed to assume our military mission and take on the
additional political and rehabilitation activities required so
that the famine and anarchy do not resume when the international
presence departs.

For our part, we agreed with the United Nations to participate
militarily with a much smaller U.S. force for a period of time,
to help the United Nations create a secure environment in which
it could ensure the free flow of humanitarian relief.  At the
request of the United Nations and the United States,
approximately 30 nations deployed over 20,000 troops as we
reduced our military presence.

With the recent tragic casualties to American forces in Somalia,
the American people want to know why we are there, what we are
doing, why we cannot come home immediately, and when we will
come home.  Although the report answers those questions in
detail, I want to repeat concisely my answers:

--  We went to Somalia because without us a million people would
have died.  We, uniquely, were in a position to save them, and
other nations were ready to share the burden after our initial
action.

--  What the United States is doing there is providing, for a
limited period of time, logistics support and security so that
the humanitarian and political efforts of the United Nations,
relief organizations, and others can have a reasonable chance of
success.  The United Nations, in turn, has a longer term
political, security, and relief mission designed to minimize the
likelihood that famine and anarchy will return when the United
Nations leaves.  The U.S. military mission is not now nor was it
ever one of "nation building."

--  We cannot leave immediately because the United Nations has
not had an adequate chance to replace us, nor have the Somalis
had a reasonable opportunity to end their strife.  We want other
nations to assume more of the burden of international peace.  To
have them do so, they must think that they can rely on our
commitments when we make them.  Moreover, having been brutally
attacked, were American forces to leave now we would send a
message to terrorists and other potential adversaries around the
world that they can change our policies by killing our people. 
It would be open season on Americans.

--  We will, however, leave no later than March 31, 1994, except
for a few hundred support troops.  That amount of time will
permit the Somali people to make progress toward political 
reconciliation and allow the United States to fulfill our
obligations properly, including the return of any Americans
being detained.  We went there for the right reasons and we will
finish the job in the right way.

While U.S. forces are there, they will be fully protected with
appropriate American military capability.

Any Americans detained will be  the subject of the most complete
and thorough efforts of which this Government is capable, with
the unrelenting goal of returning them home and returning them
to health.

I want to thank all those who have expressed their support for
this approach during the last week.  At difficult times such as
these, when we face international challenges, bipartisan unity
among our two branches of government is vital.

William J. Clinton  (###)



ARTICLE 4:

A Strategy of Enlargement And the Developing World
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Address to the Overseas Development Council, Washington, DC,
October 13, 1993

It is a great pleasure to join John Sewell and many old and new
friends at the Overseas Development Council this evening.  As a
former ODC board member, this is a homecoming.  I remember well
attending ODC board meetings during the 1970s and 1980s.  Now
events force me to spend less time with my ODC colleagues;
nonetheless, I know we are confronting many of the same issues,
such as reform in the former Soviet Union, the challenges of
ethnic conflict and failed states, or the imperative of
sustainable development.

As the ODC approaches a quarter-century of service, many of its
projects have changed, yet the importance of its work has not. 
I have always admired the ODC's creativity and energy, and I
still do.  We have never been in greater need of that
creativity--of new thinking and policies toward the developing
nations.  I want to discuss some of the steps the Clinton
Administration is taking to ensure the U.S. is vigorously
engaged there and in the wider world.

New Opportunities and Continuing Needs in the Developing World
The end of the Cold War forces us to look anew on the developing
world.  American policymakers no longer can imagine these
nations as an interchangeable clump of squares on the superpower
chessboard.  We need a new lens and even a new vocabulary. 
Terms such as "Third World" and "developing world" 
are increasingly meaningless.  Affluence and poverty are not
cleanly demarcated by North and South.  The developing world is
highly differentiated.

The past generation has seen tremendous changes within what we
once described as the Third World.  Many nations, particularly
in Latin America and Asia, have raced ahead, as they tapped into
the dynamism of global trade.  A generation ago, Indonesia's GDP
was lower than Nigeria's; today, it is three times as high. 
Waves of democratic reform in Africa and Latin America have
enabled others--such as Namibia, Burundi, and Argentina--to make
great gains toward political or economic justice.  And from
South Africa to the Mideast, we see great opportunities for
breakthroughs that could have vast benefits for regional
development.

Yet despite such encouraging scenes, billions of people in the
poorest nations continue to live in appalling conditions.  The
percentage of the world's income, trade, and investment
associated with its poorest nations actually has fallen since
the 1960s.  A large bloc of nations is in danger of becoming
both economically and politically marginalized from the broader
world's progress.

Today nearly one-half the planet's people live on less than $500
per year.  That kind of poverty doesn't simply mean "relative
economic deprivation," as some used to say.  It means waking up
without enough food to eat; it is part of why over 30,000 of the
world's children die each day from malnutrition and disease. 
The developing world's resources are strained as populations
grow at a rate that will cause humankind to double by the middle
of the next century.  And the developing world has seen some of
the most savage recent conflicts--such as in Angola, where a
bloody civil war has been killing as many as 1,000 people each
day.

The developing world touches more than our consciences.  Its
conditions and actions directly affect our security, as well. 
For example, six of the seven countries we list as state
sponsors of terrorism have per capita annual incomes of less
than $2,500.  Of the 25 nations pursuing programs to produce 
weapons of mass destruction, 15 have incomes of less than
$3,200.  And by the year 2025, greenhouse gas emissions from the
developing world likely will overtake those from developed
countries.

Yet, new domestic pressures in the U.S. and elsewhere resist our
engagement on such problems.  Without the geostrategic rationale
that the Cold War once cast over the Third World, many Americans
now see these nations only in terms of the problems they seem to
generate:  narcotics from Latin America, terrorism from militant
states, immigrants from Haiti, U.S. casualties in Somalia, job
competition from the Asian dragons.  The onset of a global
recession has fueled a turning inward within virtually all major
nations.  From the U.S. to Germany 
to Japan, more attention is going to domestic needs, as it must;
but that often leaves tight budgets for international efforts. 
And in many leading powers, there is a disquieting rise in
nativist, protectionist, and isolationist voices--those I have
called the Neo-Know-Nothings.

Thus, at a time of vast, new opportunities but also great,
continuing needs in the developing world, all of us who are
eager to see progress in those nations face new challenges.  We
must fashion new policies that reflect the immense changes that
have come with the end of the Cold War.

Framework for U.S. Engagement:  A Strategy of Enlargement
Last month, the President spoke to the UN and described a
framework for our engagement in the world.  The week before,
other senior officials and I laid out some of our own thoughts. 
Those speeches argue that the successor to a doctrine of
containment should be a strategy of enlargement--a strategy of
American efforts to enlarge the community of market democracies.

A strategy of enlargement is based on a belief that our most
fundamental security interest lies in the expansion and
consolidation of democratic and market reform.  While that goal
was implicit in U.S. foreign policy throughout most of this
century, several dynamics of the post-Cold War era make it more
likely that we can enlarge the circle of market democracies.

For one, there has been a wave of market and democratic reform,
from the former Soviet Union to Africa to Latin America.  That
wave filled the conceptual void left by the collapse of Marxist
illusions--illusions that were dispelled in part by the Soviet
Union's collapse but even more by the abject practical failure
of efforts to manage economies through stultifying
bureaucracies.  As a result, the ideas of democracy and market
economics may not be triumphant, but they are certainly
ascendant.

In addition, the U.S. now stands as the world's dominant power. 
That dominance does not enable us to impose Jeffersonian
democracy in places it has not existed, but it does strengthen
our ability to facilitate negotiations--as in the Mideast peace
process--or to lead coalitions in support of reform--as we have
done toward Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union. 
And the world's accelerated pace of communications and commerce
gives us new opportunities to encourage other nations in the
direction of democracy and market economics.

All this means that we stand at a moment of immense democratic
and entrepreneurial opportunities--the opportunity to
consolidate democracy's recent gains, the opportunity to see
democracy take root in new nations throughout the developing
world, and the opportunity for Americans to prosper along with
other peoples as more nations are drawn into the global 
economy.  But realizing those opportunities requires active
American engagement.  A strategy of enlargement suggests four
components to that engagement.

First, it argues for strengthening the core of major market
democracies--including our own--for these nations fuel the
global economy, anchor the expansion of democracy, and are the
major donors for international aid efforts.

Second, enlargement requires that we work to expand the circle
of democracy and market economics, especially to countries such
as Russia that are significant to us for geo-strategic,
economic, or other reasons.

Third, enlargement requires that we reduce the threat from
leaders and regimes that are hostile to democracy.

Finally, a strategy of enlargement involves engagement on behalf
of humanitarian concerns to reduce suffering; help resolve
regional conflicts; and foster democratic, sustainable
development.

The reaction to the announcement of this strategy has been
interesting.  Some on the right suggest it smacks of
one-worldism, simply because it foresees some use of
multilateral institutions when it is in our interest to do so. 
Some on the left suggest the strategy smacks of
neo-isolationism, simply because it says we will ask hard
questions before deciding to support UN peace-keeping and other
multilateral ventures.

Both sets of criticism imply a kind of absolutism.  One side
suggests we should never act through multilateral
institutions--so much for NATO.  The other suggests that we
should never ask rigorous questions before signing up for
multilateral efforts--so much for good sense and the support of
the American people.

Application in The Developing World
A strategy of enlargement does not provide a pre-ordained answer
for every problem we may face--in the developing world or
elsewhere.  But it does establish a strategic framework and a
set of priorities.  In the developing world, it focuses us on
the goals of democracy and a form of market development that is
both politically and environmentally sustainable.

Those goals are mutually supportive.  We have many institutions
that can help advance our goals of social justice, such as the
World Health Organization, special windows at the multilateral
development banks, or a new emphasis on "bottom-up" development
planning.  But the ultimate underwriter of social justice is
democracy--for with democracy come demands for education, health
care, just taxation, and other efforts to promote expanded
opportunity and empowerment.  At the same time, democratic
institutions support market growth and can protect 
people from the winds of creative destruction that markets
generate.

Traditionally, the international financial institutions and many
economists overdrew the distinction between economics and
politics.  Today, the World Bank and the Inter-American
Development Bank recognize that efficient, accountable public
institutions are key components of development.  They also
recognize that political legitimacy is a precondition for robust
economic development.  It has long  been said that good
economics is good politics; in the developing world, it is
becoming equally clear that good government is good economics.

The Administration has reviewed its approach to the developing
world.  Several conclusions emerge.  We have concluded that
while aid is important, trade must play a much larger role in
our development strategy, particularly toward the newly
industrialized countries of Asia and Latin America.  We have
concluded that existing foreign assistance programs are
incoherent and outmoded and must be reformed.  We also have
concluded that a humanitarian agenda toward the poorest nations
will remain important and that conflict resolution needs to be a
part of that agenda.  Let me discuss each of these briefly.

Trade, Not Just Aid
First, a strategy of enlargement suggests that trade--and not
just aid--must form the basis for much of our effort toward the
developing world.  Access to global markets--particularly our
own market--is more valuable to many developing and newly
industrialized nations than all the taxpayer dollars we might
shower upon them.  That is one reason the President has devoted
so much time to market-opening arrangements such as GATT and
APEC--the organization for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.

The most important test of that proposition over the coming
months will be enactment of the North American Free Trade
Agreement.  The President has made passage of NAFTA one of his
highest priorities, and it should be a priority as well for all
who are concerned about progress in the developing world.

As the President has often stressed, Americans should support
NAFTA because it will boost our own economic well-being.  It
will create the world's largest free trade zone, stretching from
the Arctic to the tropics--a $6.5-trillion market with 370
million people--with the U.S. right in the center.  By
eliminating Mexican tariffs and non-tariff barriers on our
manufactured goods, farm products, and service exports, passage
of NAFTA will help create 200,000 additional higher-wage
American jobs by 1995.

But NAFTA is also a vital component in our development and
national security policies.  I remember from a decade ago,
during meetings at the ODC, the concern we felt for Mexico's
course of development--its immense debt, its highly
oil-dependent economy, and its preponderance of state-owned 
enterprises.  But recent reforms undertaken by the Salinas
government have pointed Mexico in a different direction.  Now,
over 1,000 of Mexico's 1,200 state-owned firms have been
privatized.  Oil now represents only 30% of Mexico's exports,
compared to 70% when President Salinas took office.  And
Mexico's debt burden has been restructured to ensure long-term
serviceability.

Mexico's economic reforms have been part of a program that has
also included political reforms and a new, more outward-looking
foreign policy that has helped make Mexico an increasingly
friendly and important hemispheric force.  For example, Mexico
played a central role as President Clinton worked with our
hemispheric neighbors to reverse the recent coup in Guatemala.

A key question posed by NAFTA is whether our nation will stand
by those nations, such as Mexico, which have opted for the path
of democratic and market reform.  If we can secure the passage
of NAFTA, it will strengthen the bonds between our two nations
on many efforts that are vital to both of our peoples--from
labor standards to environmental protection to the pursuit of
good governance.  Moreover, passage of NAFTA will help pave the
way for economic and political liberalization throughout the
Western Hemisphere in pursuit of the goal President Clinton has
described--a Western Hemispheric community of democracies.

On the other hand, if Congress defeats NAFTA, it will send
dangerous shockwaves into Mexico and throughout our hemisphere. 
It could suppress the growth of Mexico's economy, which would
increase pressures for illegal immigration into the U.S.  It
would shake the confidence of money managers in their Latin
portfolios--and those investments have helped drive the region's
recent growth.  It would make it harder for us to secure new
market-opening agreements in GATT and other contexts--agreements
that are important for American workers and consumers and also
for developing countries that depend on hard currency from
exports to escape debt burdens and to invest in growth.

I know that many in the development community may not view NAFTA
as a high priority.  But it should be.  Trade is one of the keys
to development in this new era, and NAFTA will be an immediate
test of our commitment to an expansion of trade.

Reforming Our Foreign Assistance Efforts
Second, to promote democracy and sustainable development in an
era of scarce resources, we need efficient, highly targeted
programs that can command public support.  Yet, our foreign
assistance efforts long have been like sedimentary stone--layer
upon layer of programs and bureaucracies, each representing a
different era in our foreign policy and each pushing down on the
others until the whole became impenetrable and ossified.

Today virtually every federal agency is engaged in pursuing some
international programs, yet there is virtually no 
coordination among them.  The U.S. Agency for International
Development has been burdened with no fewer than 33 different
goals for its development programs.

Our foreign assistance programs are broken.  Now, as the
President and Vice President work to reinvent the federal
government, it is time to re-invent our foreign assistance
programs as well.

Brian Atwood, our new USAID Administrator, already has begun to
reinvent his agency.  He is cutting back layers of bureaucracy,
consolidating overseas posts, and providing a new strategic
vision.  In those efforts, he has the White House's full
support.

Over the past decade--often in the face of official
indifference--many in Congress, such as Congressman Lee Hamilton
and Senator Paul Sarbanes, argued for a sweeping rewrite of our
foreign assistance programs.  Since President Clinton took
office, many in his Administration--such as Deputy Secretary of
State Clifton Wharton and Brian Atwood--have been working
closely with these and other Members of Congress as well as with
outside groups to review the full range of foreign assistance
programs.  In early November, we plan to unveil the results of
that review.  We will work closely with both parties in Congress
and with outside advocates to pass legislation to make our
foreign assistance programs more efficient, effective, and
targeted.

I will not go into all the details of that review tonight.  But
I do want to stress a few conclusions.  We will base our reforms
on the principle of democratic, sustainable development. 
Development must be environmentally as well as economically
sound; and that is why we are working with others to build on
the promising work of the UN's Commission on Sustainable
Development and seeking to negotiate an accord to prevent the
spread of the world's deserts.  Development must be politically
sustainable as well, since politically empowered communities can
do more to protect and sustain their cultures, economies, and
ways of life.

We will recommend that our foreign assistance be targeted less
on a country basis and more to meet our functional goals, such
as enlarging democracy and markets, pursuing non-proliferation,
and promoting sustainable development.

And we will recommend a major reform of U.S. security
assistance.  During the Cold War, we relied on security
assistance to bolster friendly Third World regimes against
communist influence.  With that imperative gone, we will seek to
use security assistance to meet other goals, such as promoting
democracy, non-proliferation, and regional security.

These reforms will be the most far-reaching since the Foreign
Assistance Act first was written at the beginning of the 
Kennedy Administration.  They represent our determination to
think anew and to act anew as the world is new.

Humanitarian Efforts and Conflict Resolution
A third aspect of our policies toward the developing world must
be continued efforts to help the poorest nations and peoples. 
Our humanitarian concerns--and at times other interests--dictate
that we support efforts where we can to help poor countries
escape marginalization and move toward sustainable development
and toward political liberalization.  Despite the events in
Somalia in recent weeks, we must never forget that we saved the
lives of perhaps a million human beings.  Even America cannot
solve every humanitarian crisis, but neither can we close our
eyes and our hearts to the starvation, poverty, disease, and
suffering that afflict far too much of the world's population.

Many of our efforts toward such countries will be conducted
through our reformed bilateral foreign assistance programs, as
well as through the World Bank and other multilateral
development agencies.  But helping the poorest of the poor
increasingly will involve another element:  conflict resolution.

Nations cannot pursue development amid bloodshed.  War can
produce famine as well as fatalities.  The end of the Cold War
lifted the lid on many ancient cauldrons of animosity--ethnic
tensions, virulent nationalism, religious bigotry, passionate
irredentism.  Addressing such conflicts--sometimes for
humanitarian reasons, sometimes because direct interests are
affected--has become one of the defining challenges for our own
nation and for many others, in Europe and elsewhere.

Recent images from Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Angola, Georgia, and
a host of other nations make clear there are no easy or tested
answers for such conflicts.  In peace-keeping and other efforts
at conflict resolution, we are literally making case law every
day.

President Clinton understands that neither we, nor the UN, nor
any other body can help solve all of the world's conflicts. 
That is why he has insisted that we begin asking hard questions
of proposed UN peace-keeping missions.  But he also understands
that when we act, we must be able to do the job right.  And that
is why he has proposed steps to reform the UN and its
peace-keeping efforts.

Some critics suggest we should never engage in these efforts,
simply because they are new and hard.  A half-century ago,
Franklin Roosevelt encountered that same argument as he battled
the Great Depression with the unprecedented innovations of the
New Deal.  What he said then applies to those who would turn
America's back on every conflict in the developing world.  He
said:

Governments can err.  Presidents do make mistakes.  But the
immortal Dante tells us that divine justice weighs the sins of
the cold-blooded and the sins of the warm-hearted on different
scales.  Better the occasional faults of a government that lives
in charity than the consistent omissions of a government frozen
in the ice of its own indifference.

Will we perform flawlessly in this largely uncharted terrain? 
Probably not.  Should we keep trying and learning?  Absolutely.

Advocates for World Engagement
Finally, a strategy of enlargement has another meaning that is
relevant to this assembly.  In this era when ideas are
increasingly important, we can and must enlarge the circle of
individuals and organizations that help advance our ideas,
ideals, and goals in the world.  For example, private firms are
natural allies in our efforts to strengthen market economies,
such as in the dynamic, middle-income regions of Asia and Latin
America.  And our goal of strengthening democracy and civil
society has natural allies in labor unions, human rights groups,
environmental advocates, and the full range of non-governmental
organizations and private voluntary organizations represented
here.

Yet there is a danger here as well.  In the face of constrained
resources, it is important for groups who care about the
developing world not to turn against each other.  We cannot
afford to see human rights groups battling democracy advocates,
for Africanists to be at odds with Latin Americanists, and for
each group to believe that "mine is the one gate to the kingdom
of heaven."  Instead, these communities must recognize how their
individual goals are linked.  For example, democracy helps
protect human rights and ensures the broad distribution of
resources that makes economic growth politically sustainable.

The ODC and many of you in this room are well suited to act as
bridges among the various communities of non-governmental
organizations.  I am delighted that next month the ODC will
convene a diverse array of non-governmental organizations to
explore the common ground for their efforts in this new era. 
And we should all challenge ourselves to put new effort into
exploring these linkages, both intellectually and
politically--for if we do not hang together, then at budget time
we shall certainly hang apart.

Ultimately, the ODC and similar groups are on the front lines of
a battle we must all wage against pressures for the U.S. to
withdraw from the world.  For such retreat, like the fog, comes
in on little cat feet--it comes in small increments.  There must
be vocal advocates for the benefits of international leadership
if the American public is to accept the necessary costs and
risks.

I look forward to working with the ODC and many of you here in
the months to come--to keep our nation deeply engaged in the 
world, to work for passage of NAFTA and other measures to draw
the developing world into the global economy, to reform our
foreign assistance programs, to work on new efforts toward those
most in need, and to ensure that we realize the great potential
of American leadership at this unique moment.  (###)



ARTICLE 5:

Focus on Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation:  Upcoming Seattle
Ministerial and Results of Honolulu Senior Officials Meeting

U.S. To Host APEC Ministerial In November
U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher will chair APEC's
fifth ministerial meeting November 17-19, 1993, in Seattle,
Washington.

APEC ministers will focus on trade and investment liberalization
in the region at the request of ministers attending the fourth
ministerial in Bangkok, Thailand, last year.  The United States,
which currently chairs the forum, hopes to advance APEC's work
in this area through adoption of a declaration on a Trade and
Investment Framework and the initial work program for
market-oriented policies.

In addition to the trade and investment discussions, ministers
will consider a greater role for the private sector within APEC,
search for ways to strengthen APEC as an institution, and focus
on expanding economic cooperation in the region.  Ministers will
consider the action plans of APEC's 10 working groups and an ad
hoc group on economic trends and issues.  A non-governmental
"Eminent Persons Group" (EPG) will present its report on APEC's
medium- and long-term role in enhancing trade and economic
activity in the region.

Honolulu Senior Officials Meeting Results
Chaired by Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord, the APEC
senior officials met in Honolulu on September 22-24, 1993, to
finalize preparations for the November ministerial.  Prior to
assuming the chair of APEC at the end of the 1992 Bangkok
ministerial, the United States, with the support of its APEC
colleagues, had indicated that it wanted to make trade and
investment the central theme of the U.S. ministerial.  To that
end, APEC senior officials worked throughout the year to produce
an APEC Trade and Investment Framework declaration to serve as a
centerpiece for the fifth ministerial in Seattle.

The "Declaration on an APEC Trade and Investment Framework,"
endorsed by the APEC senior officials in Honolulu, lays out for
the ministers' approval a set of non-binding principles that the
officials agreed should operate in the conduct of trade and
investment relations among APEC's member economies.  The
declaration, once approved, would establish an APEC Trade and
Investment Committee (TIC) within APEC, where the 15 APEC 
member economies can discuss trade and investment issues.  Each
year, the APEC ministers would review the work of the committee
and provide additional guidance on issues they want to be
addressed.

The Honolulu senior officials meeting also recommended that the
APEC ministers issue free-standing declarations on
telecommunications, marine resource conservation, and tourism. 
Telecommunications, in particular, has been broadly supported by
the private sector, and APEC is beginning to look at ways to
harmonize telecommunications practices.

Another aspect of the ministerial addressed in Honolulu was the
report of the non-governmental Eminent Persons Group.  Group
chair Dr. Fred Bergsten gave a preview of the group's
recommendations on steps that could be taken by APEC's member
economies to support global trade liberalization and to move the
organization toward the long-term goal of free trade in the
Asia-Pacific region.  Some of the short-term steps included
items that APEC already is working on, such as investment or
facilitation, while others cover areas such as standards, where
APEC is only beginning to consider doing work.  The Eminent
Persons Group will present its final report to ministers in
Seattle.

APEC Trade and Investment Committee Work Program
The APEC Trade and Investment Committee and its work program
will strive to create a consistent APEC perspective and voice on
global trade and investment issues and to increase cooperation
among members on those issues.  As a policy committee, the TIC
will pursue opportunities to liberalize and expand trade; to
promote a more open environment for investment; and to develop
initiatives to improve the flow of goods, services, capital, and
technology within the region--all in a manner consistent with
GATT principles.

The TIC work program proposed by the APEC senior officials in
Honolulu is designed, first, to garner member economy support
for APEC's trade and investment role and, second, to meet the
anticipated demand for resources required to implement the
results of a successful Uruguay Round.  The senior officials who
drafted the framework agreement suggested 10 subject areas for
the work program which they believe will deal with those
concerns and move APEC forward.

Trade Policy Dialogue.  The TIC will foster a continuing trade
policy dialogue to address developments in the multilateral
trading system, regional trade initiatives, globalization, and
other relevant issues.

Customs.  The TIC will pursue efforts to simplify and harmonize
customs procedures among APEC member economies.

Investment.  The TIC will examine APEC's investment environment,
with an eye toward enhancing the flow of investment to and
within the region.

Tariff Database Manual.  The TIC will assist regional businesses
and APEC decision-makers by undertaking a pilot study for a
regional, electronic database of members' tariffs and
transparency of regimes.

Administrative Aspects of Market Access.  The TIC will examine
administrative measures affecting trade in the region, the
impact of the Uruguay Round disciplines on those measures, and
means to address outstanding issues within the region.

Standards and Conformance.  The TIC will define APEC's role in
standards, mutual recognition of certification arrangements, and
harmonization based upon international standards.

Small-Medium Enterprises.  The TIC will examine the APEC
environment for small and medium enterprises and means to
enhance their trade and investment activity in the region.

Uruguay Round.  The TIC will review the results of the Uruguay
Round and its implications for the region and provide assistance
within APEC on implementation of Uruguay Round results.

Eminent Persons Group Topics.  The TIC will address, with
guidance from the ministers, topics selected by the Eminent
Persons Group.

Additional Issues.  The TIC will devise procedures for
evaluating member economies' proposals for consideration of new
issues.

EPG Report:  The Challenge of Expanding Regional Economic
Cooperation
Dr. Fred Bergsten--chair of the group charged by the Bangkok
ministerial with the task of developing a long-term vision for
APEC--briefed the senior officials in Honolulu on the EPG's
findings concerning the region's economic outlook and its
recommendations for meeting future economic challenges.

The EPG members were unanimous in recommending that APEC move
forward by taking the first steps toward creating an
Asia-Pacific economic community, with the vision of eventual
free trade and investment in the region.  No date was
recommended for reaching this objective, but the EPG feels
APEC's progress toward the goal should be reviewed after several
years, after which an outside date for completion should be
established by the ministers.

The EPG is developing a strategy to achieve this vision which
calls for initiatives in three areas:

Trade liberalization--including proposals for further
multilateral liberalization and support for global
liberalization;

Trade facilitation--including development of an Asia-Pacific
investment code and settlement process for trade disputes,
macroeconomic and monetary policy cooperation, mutual
recognition and testing of product standards, coordination of
competition policies, cooperation on environmental policies, and
revision in rules of origin; and

Technical cooperation--including promotion of student exchanges
for human resource development and future cooperation in finance
and physical investments.

Background:  The Formation and Evolution of APEC
By 1989, increasing integration around the Pacific Rim led to a
number of proposals for an organization to promote cooperation
among the economies of the region.  The U.S. supported the 1989
initiative by Australian Prime Minister Hawke which led to the
November 6-7 meeting that year in Canberra of foreign and
economic ministers and the formation of Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC).  Annual ministerial meetings have been held
in Singapore, Seoul, and Bangkok.  The U.S. will host the fifth
APEC ministerial meeting in Seattle on November 17-19, 1993.

The November 1989 APEC ministerial meeting in Canberra was
attended by the six nations of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN)--Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore, and Thailand--and by Australia, Canada, Japan, South
Korea, New Zealand, and the United States.  Its major
accomplishment was to focus attention on regional economic
issues, particularly the need for a successful Uruguay Round. 
Ministers also set the process of continued cooperation in
motion by agreeing to meet again in 1990 and 1991 and by tasking
their senior officials to begin preparations for future
meetings.  There was no consensus on the structure of regional
economic cooperation.  To provide continuity, it became APEC
practice for senior officials to meet regularly between annual
ministerial meetings, with the host of the upcoming ministerial
meeting acting as chair and providing secretariat and other
services for 1 year.

The second APEC ministerial meeting took place in Singapore in
July 1990.  At that meeting, ministers endorsed seven areas of
cooperation, which became APEC's first work projects: 

--  Trade and investment data; 
--  Trade promotion; 
--  Investment and technology transfer; 
--  Human resources development; 
--  Energy; 
--  Marine resources conservation; and 
--  Telecommunications. 

With the meetings of these work projects, APEC was becoming a
very active, if informal, organization.  Ministers identified
regional trade liberalization, consistent with the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, as a central theme of APEC and 
instructed senior officials to explore the possibilities in the
area.  As in the first and all subsequent ministerials, the
ministers emphasized the need for a successful conclusion to the
Uruguay Round and sought to provide a political impetus to the
negotiations by issuing a statement on the round.  The ministers
also welcomed Canada's offer to host a meeting of APEC trade
ministers, which was held in Vancouver in September 1990.  The
continuity of APEC was firmly established with the agreement
that future ministerial meetings would take place in Thailand in
1992 and in the U.S. in 1993.

After a year of active Korean diplomacy, the November 1991 APEC
ministerial in Seoul saw the entry of China, Hong Kong, and
Chinese Taipei into the organization.  APEC then included all
the major economies of the Asia-Pacific region.  Ministers
deferred decisions on other economies which had expressed
interest in joining APEC, in favor of consolidating the
organization and further defining its role.  There was a growing
consensus that APEC should move beyond an annual forum for
ministers to become a formal international organization, but
full agreement was not yet possible.  Ministers adopted the
Seoul APEC declaration, which sets forth the objectives,
activities, and broad organization of the group.  Ministers
approved three additional work projects covering transportation,
tourism, and fisheries.  It was informally agreed to cap the
number of work projects at 10.  Ministers directed that work
continue on regional economic trends and issues and regional
trade liberalization, but these are pursued in informal working
groups.

Work on the formal organization of APEC continued under the Thai
chairmanship.  In September 1992, ministers adopted the Bangkok
Declaration on APEC Institutional Arrangements--which formally
established APEC as an international organization, provided for
a permanent Secretariat in Singapore, and established a budget
and financial procedures.  The scale of contributions to the
APEC budget was established, ranging from 2.5% for smaller
economies to 18% for Japan and the United States.

The Bangkok ministerial agreed to establish an Eminent Persons
Group to enunciate a vision for trade in the Asia-Pacific region
to the year 2000 and identify constraints and issues that should
be considered by APEC.  Proposals to establish an electronic
tariff database, customs harmonization procedures,
administrative aspects of market access, and a survey of
investment regulations in APEC were endorsed to move regional
trade liberalization ahead in the near term.  Requests to join
APEC were considered, but ministers again deferred decisions,
while asking senior officials to examine the case for
participation by Mexico and others.

Indonesia will assume the APEC chair in 1994, followed by Japan
(1995), Philippines (1996), and Canada (1997).  It has become
practice in APEC that an ASEAN country holds the chair every
other year.   (###)


APEC Meetings in Seattle, November 1993
November 14-17, APEC senior officials meeting
November 17-19, APEC ministerial meeting hosted and chaired by
Secretary of State Warren Christopher
November 19-20, APEC economic leaders meeting hosted by
President Clinton  (###)


Senior Officials Meetings During the U.S. Chair, 1992-93
Washington, December 1992
Williamsburg, March 1993
Seattle, June 1993
Honolulu, September 1993
Seattle, November 1993   (###)


Participating Economies
Australia, Brunei, Canada, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan,
South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore,
Chinese Taipei, Thailand, United States  (###)


For More Information
For additional information on APEC, write or call:

Public Information Service
Bureau of Public Affairs
U.S. Department of State 
2201 C St., NW 
Washington, DC  20520-6810
Tel:  (202) 647-6575

Titles of interest include:

--  "Building a New Pacific Community," President Clinton's
speech at Waseda University, Japan, July 7, 1993;
--  "Fundamentals of Security for a New Pacific Community,"
President Clinton's speech before the South Korean National
Assembly, July 10, 1993;
--  "The United States:  A Full Partner in a New Pacific
Community," Secretary Christopher's statement at the ASEAN
post-ministerial conference in Singapore, July 26, 1993; and
--  "A New Pacific Community:  Ten Goals for American Policy,"
Assistant Secretary Winston Lord's confirmation hearing
statement, March 31, 1993.  (###)



ARTICLE 6:

U.S. Policy Toward Nicaragua
Alexander F. Watson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American
Affairs
Statement before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, October
6, 1993

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee:  Thank you for giving
me this opportunity to join you for a discussion of the
situation in Nicaragua and the policies that this Administration
is implementing to advance democracy and human rights, encourage
economic development, protect property rights, and ensure
regional security.

Since this is the first of what I hope will be many appearances
before you and the subcommittee, I would like to take a few
moments to tell you about the opportunities we see before us in
advancing U.S. interests in Nicaragua and throughout the
hemisphere.

A principal goal of President Clinton in Latin America is to
strengthen the prevalence of civilian, elected governments
throughout the region and to promote their evolution toward full
and vibrant democratic societies with dynamic, market-oriented
economies.  For the first time in its history, U.S. interests
and influence in this hemisphere face no threats from external
powers.  Moreover, U.S. values are shared to an unprecedented
degree by nearly every country in the region.  It is vital that
the United States avail itself of this unique historic
opportunity to enhance and deepen the commitment of all nations
of the hemisphere to the core values of U.S. foreign policy.

It was the lure of this vision of democratic states pursuing
economic well-being through open markets that drew Nicaragua
back to the hemispheric community in 1990, when Mrs. Violeta
Chamorro was freely elected as President of Nicaragua. 
President Chamorro faced a daunting array of problems when she
took office in April 1990, and her government has made progress
in a number of areas.  But Nicaragua--and the United States as
well--is still confronting the debilitating inheritance of
decades of dictatorship, war, revolution, and economic
mismanagement.

The United States and nascent Central American democracies will
pay a very high cost should the democratically elected
government of President Chamorro fail.  That is why this
Administration emphasizes both strong support for her government
and energetic efforts to foster internationally facilitated
political reconciliation among all parties.  We recognize that
accomplishing our objectives regarding democracy, human rights,
property, and the economy depends on Nicaraguans establishing
the necessary political conditions for these changes.

Nicaragua currently faces simultaneous political, military, and
economic crises.  The three main political forces--the
government of President Chamorro, the Sandinista National
Liberation Front (FSLN), and the National Opposition Union
(UNO)--have become mutually antagonistic, to the point of
national paralysis.  Restoration of a basic consensus on how to
continue the country's democratic process is urgently needed.  
The Clinton Administration believes that here in Washington we
must also reach a new consensus to restore a bipartisan approach
to Nicaragua if we are to support democratic progress there.  I
hope that my appearance before you today will begin the process
of forging this bipartisan approach.

Assessment of the Situation in Nicaragua
At the inception of her administration, President Chamorro made
the very personal decision to break with the traditions of
victors and vanquished in Nicaragua and to establish the
principle that her government would seek national reconciliation
among all sectors of Nicaraguan society.  This was neither an
easy nor a popular decision but was based on Mrs. Chamorro's
conviction that cycles of partisan recrimination had to be
ended.  In practical terms, this meant that the UNO coalition
which had supported her candidacy would rule not over the
powerful Sandinista minority but with it.

In retrospect, an undesirable consequence of this policy of
reconciliation was to leave control of the military, police, and
intelligence functions in the hands of Sandinistas, some of whom
were unwilling to abide by the new, democratic rules of
Nicaragua.  There is little doubt that Sandinista leadership of
the military contributed to the necessary reduction in the size
of the Sandinista Popular Army (EPS) and to the disarming of
thousands of former combatants.  Over the last 3 years, the
Sandinista Popular Army demobilized to about 13,000 from 85,000
troops.  Hundreds of thousands of lethal weapons were collected
from irregular forces and destroyed under international
supervision.  I would like to make special mention of the work
of the OAS in Nicaragua.  The OAS civilian mission, the CIAV,
has contributed much to disarmament and the protection of human
rights.  And the Jurists Commission, an initiative promoted by
Congressmen Smith and Livingston, is also engaged in a valuable
review of several legal issues in Nicaragua.

However, many Sandinista officers have failed to demonstrate the
respect and subservience to civilian control which is a
requirement of democratic government.  Significant violations of
human rights have occurred in Nicaragua, and investigations by
independent observers and by a tripartite commission composed of
the government, the OAS/CIAV, and the Catholic Church have
linked many of these abuses to current members of the police,
army, and intelligence services.  In addition, the recent
discoveries of clandestine arms caches have raised profound
concerns in Nicaragua and abroad over the possibility that past
links between the Sandinista-controlled security forces and
international terrorism may have continued to the present.

President Chamorro has recognized the corrosive effects of
security forces out of control, and in a courageous speech on
September 2--delivered on Army Day before the assembled officer
corps--she announced her intention to establish civilian
government control over the security apparatus.  Her legal, 
constitutional, and legitimate action initially provoked
defiance from the senior command of the Sandinista Popular Army
and the FSLN.

This dangerous conflict with the security forces is compounded
by other developments which have contributed to further erosion
of the fragile political consensus supporting Mrs. Chamorro's
government.  The loose coalition of parties in the UNO have
ceased supporting the Government of Nicaragua and are in
increasingly strident opposition.  Groups of former national
resistance fighters--recontras--and former EPS
members--recompas--continue to resort to armed force to exact
concessions from the government.  As the occupation of the town
of Esteli in July and the two hostage crises of August
demonstrate, law and order is tenuous, and further deterioration
in the political situation could trigger an escalation of
violence.

Inheriting from the Sandinistas an economy in chaos, President
Chamorro has successfully pursued a courageous macroeconomic
stabilization program, dramatically reducing inflation and
stabilizing the value of the Nicaraguan currency.  Yet the
political disarray has provoked a worsening situation in an
already resource-poor economy devastated by years of conflict. 
GNP is declining, there is little new investment, foreign
exchange reserves are critically low, and the prospect for
inflows of external assistance is uncertain.  The economic
crisis is profound and acute.

The Need for Reconciliation
The Administration believes that the only way solutions to these
crises will be found is through political reconciliation between
the Government of Nicaragua, the FSLN, and UNO.  The Government
of Nicaragua shares this perspective and launched an initiative
to begin talks on a national accord among these political
actors.  The parties are in basic agreement on the agenda for
the talks, which includes reviving the National Assembly and
reforming the constitution.  The government has held bilateral
meetings with UNO and the FSLN, and the FSLN and UNO have met,
but trilateral negotiations are yet to begin.  The consequences
of continued political paralysis and deterioration--increased
civil unrest, a renewed cycle of violence, and economic
chaos--are so undesirable for Nicaragua, the rest of Central
America, and the region that we believe that all friends of
Nicaragua must support, in every way possible, further progress
in these talks.

A New Approach to Nicaragua
The Administration's new approach to Nicaragua emphasizes strong
support for the legitimately elected government of President
Chamorro, with energetic efforts to foster internationally
facilitated political reconciliation among all parties. 
Accomplishing our objectives regarding democracy, protection of
human and property rights, and the economy depends on
Nicaraguans establishing the necessary political 
conditions for these changes.

Some Nicaraguans expect the U.S. to solve their problems for
them and, consequently, do not strive for solutions locally. 
Others use opposition to us as a disguise for an inability to
develop their own constructive solutions.

This Administration has one simple message to the parties in
contention in Nicaragua:  Seek a national accord through
dialogue and compromise among yourselves; do not seek the
answers to your problems in Washington.  In order for us to help
create the conditions under which political reconciliation can
succeed, we must convince all participants--UNO and the FSLN as
well as the government--of the need for compromise.  Ultimately,
Nicaraguans--and only Nicaraguans--can solve their country's
problems.  But to do so, political rivals must accept that they
bear joint and equal responsibility for this; they must be
prepared to moderate their personal and political differences
and labor patiently to establish a consensus on Nicaragua's
democratic future.

To the Chamorro government, we offer our strong support and
encouragement.  Yet we are also pressing it to take actions
within its authority on key issues, particularly civilian
control over the security forces, human rights, expropriated
property, and national reconciliation.

To the UNO, we have communicated our strong support for dialogue
with the freely elected government of Nicaragua.  UNO's
insistence on what they would regard as a perfect national
accord could result in failure to obtain a good accord.  They
are mistaken if they hope that, instead of working with the
Chamorro government, they can get U.S. support for themselves
through intransigence.

With the FSLN, we have opened new channels of
communication--including with Daniel and Humberto Ortega, party
leader and army commander, respectively.  Our message to the
FSLN is that we will accept the Sandinistas as a legitimate
political force to the extent that they follow the democratic
rules of the game.  A fundamental tenet of democracy is civilian
control of the army and the intelligence service.  We believe
that this is a critical moment for the Sandinista party, when it
must choose between its authoritarian past and a democratic
future.  Concretely, this means that it must comply with the
bold decisions announced by President Chamorro on September 2 to
establish civilian control over the security forces.  These
decisions include a law setting term limits for senior military
officers, including Gen. Humberto Ortega;  transferring the
intelligence service to the presidency and naming a civilian
head; and ending military and police impunity by eliminating
military jurisdiction over crimes against civilians.

Mrs. Chamorro has indicated her intention to announce her new 
choice as army commander next year.  We agree with President
Chamorro's judgment that General Ortega's replacement as army
commander is desirable--the sooner the better--so that civilian
control over the military can be achieved.  Our policy goes
beyond specific personalities, however, and focuses on the need
for broader, more profound, and durable institutional change. 
In this regard, Mrs. Chamorro assured me personally last week at
the United Nations that she intends to keep what she calls "the
commitments to the Nicaraguan people" she made on  September 2
and that steps toward their implementation will be taken very
soon.

We have made it clear that we have absolutely no sympathy for
renewed recourse to violence by any group.  We are aware of
allegations that recontra organizations may be trying to obtain
illegal support from U.S.-based sympathizers.  We issued a
public statement in June warning that the United States is fully
prepared to prosecute those who violate U.S. neutrality and
related laws.  I reiterate that pledge today.

International efforts can make an important contribution to the
process of reconciliation by helping to reduce mistrust and
hostility among the Nicaraguan participants.  The Central
American Presidents, as well as the Governments of Spain,
Mexico, Colombia, Chile, and Venezuela, along with OAS Secretary
General Baena Soares, have been playing a most constructive
role.  The United Nations Development Program has also worked
tirelessly to convince the Nicaraguan parties to solve their
conflicts through dialogue and negotiation.  We are encouraging
all of these influential actors to seek ways to make their
participation even more effective, working in close
coordination--particularly with the OAS--to persuade the
Nicaraguan parties to cooperate for the sake of their country's
future.

Nicaragua's Possible Links to International Terrorism
Members of Congress and the American public were justifiably
alarmed by the suggestion, in some news coverage of the May 23
arms cache explosion in Santa Rosa, that the Government of
Nicaragua or elements of it may have been connected to a
terrorist attack on the World Trade Center or to a ring of
terrorist kidnapings based in Nicaragua.  Based on preliminary
reports and evidence available to date, we are reasonably
assured that the current Government of Nicaragua is not involved
in such activities, and we are encouraged by the investigation
it is carrying out with assistance from a U.S. interagency team
and investigators from Mexico, Venezuela, and Spain.  The
Nicaraguan Government has given broad cooperation to the team of
international investigators and is following up leads uncovered
in the investigation.  The FPL, a component of the Salvadoran
FMLN, admitted that the Santa Rosa weapons cache belonged to
them.  The investigation also led to the discovery of other arms
caches, including one belonging to a Guatemalan guerrilla group,
the URNG.

More needs to be done, however, to make this investigation
comprehensive and credible.  For example, investigators have yet
to establish where the Salvadoran FPL obtained its weapons or
the identity of those responsible for the kidnaping-surveillance
documents found in the cache.  Over 7,000 separate documents
have been recovered and are undergoing detailed examination by
the Department of Defense and other investigative agencies here
in the United States.  Investigators also determined that 11 of
the 19 surface-to-air missiles found in the Santa Rosa cache
came from EPS stocks.  In addition, we are concerned about the
locations of over 100 surface-to-air missiles that were
originally in EPS stocks but are as yet unaccounted for.  We
will return to the Congress with a complete report on the arms
cache investigation when it has advanced further.

The Property Issue
The United States continues to press the Government of Nicaragua
to resolve U.S. citizens' property claims more expeditiously. 
We recently established a new, mid-level Foreign Service officer
position in the embassy dedicated exclusively to this issue. 
Nicaragua has also set up comprehensive, institutional
mechanisms for resolving property claims.  In the last 2 months,
the Finance Ministry assigned a new position to deal directly
with U.S. claims and opened an office to inform bond recipients
of how they can use their compensation bonds in government
auctions of properties.

To date, 119 U.S. citizen property claims have been fully or
substantially resolved out of 1,222 properties in dispute.  Five
American citizens have had all of their claims resolved
completely.  Eighteen U.S. citizens have accepted bond
compensation.  In addition to the Rosario Mining case, which
involved bond compensation of over $20 million, Nicaragua
recently settled with Mr. Richard Bell, a U.S. citizen with a
major property claim.  Mr. Bell accepted a 38-million-cordoba
(U.S. $6-million) bond settlement.

Assistance to Nicaragua
Mr. Chairman, Nicaragua has critical need of external assistance
to shore up its economy and to help consolidate its democracy. 
The Clinton Administration supports President Chamorro's goal of
national reconciliation and wants to see her government succeed.
 It is within such a framework of reconciliation and political
consensus that progress on key national issues is most likely to
be made.

At the same time, and while recognizing how difficult the
problems are, we look to the Chamorro administration for
decisive leadership in the areas I have discussed here today. 
External aid alone cannot sustain or ensure the success of the
Chamorro government.  There simply is not enough aid available
within the international donor community for that purpose.  As
you know, budgetary pressures and new demands for our foreign
aid make the near-term outlook for U.S. assistance especially 
bleak.  Therefore, Nicaragua must generate in those who would
invest there--Nicaraguans and foreign investors
alike--confidence that the country is on the right path
economically and politically.  This is one reason why in our
bilateral aid relationship we have placed such emphasis upon
resolution of property disputes, civilian control of security
forces, the rule of law, and respect for human rights.  That is
also why the Administration welcomed the bold decisions that
President Chamorro announced September 2.

As President Chamorro moves to implement her public commitments
to the Nicaraguan people, we will consult with the Congress
concerning any release of our FY 1993 economic support funds.  I
should note, however, that the bilateral assistance we can
offer, while highly important, is dwarfed by the approximately
$130 million in multilateral and other donor assistance which is
linked to the conclusion of an Enhanced Structural Adjustment
Facility for Nicaragua with the International Monetary Fund.  At
the April 1993 meeting of the World Bank Consultative Group in
Paris, Nicaragua's international donors expressed continued
support but underlined--as do we--the importance of national
political reconciliation as the prerequisite for effective use
of international assistance.

We hope and expect that the pending trilateral talks will
establish a new consensus among the government, the FSLN, and
UNO about the direction of Nicaraguan social and economic
policy.  We believe that such a policy should aim at
reactivating production in Nicaragua and address the dire
conditions now prevailing in rural areas.  We understand that
Mrs. Chamorro plans to invite grass-roots participation in the
national dialogue on economic reform.  Our own aid programs will
place greater emphasis on grass-roots participation in the
economic life of the nation.

Nicaragua's Choice
Nicaragua's leaders--of all political persuasions--need to
understand that two paths lie before them.  With a broad,
national consensus and the political will to advance Nicaragua's
commitments in the areas of democracy and human rights,
protection of property rights, civilian control of the military,
and economic reactivation, Nicaraguans will find the United
States and the international community ready to work in an
effective partnership to help their country succeed.

Absent consensus and political will, international engagement in
Nicaragua will be reduced, and that nation will postpone the day
when it truly completes its transition to democratic norms and
sets the foundation for long-term prosperity.  The
Administration appreciates the leadership this subcommittee has
shown in the public discussion of these issues, and we look
forward to working with you to help Nicaraguans build a
democratic society.  (###)



ARTICLE 7:

UN Security Council Adopts Resolution 873 on Haiti
Madeleine K. Albright, UNSC Resolution

Madeleine K. Albright
Statement by the U.S. Permanent  Representative to the United
Nations before the UN Security Council, New York City, October
13, 1993.

Mr. President, this past Monday, the military leaders of Haiti
violated a solemn agreement.  That agreement sought to resolve
peacefully the governmental crisis in their country.  Armed
demonstrators, acting with police and military support,
prevented U.S. troops on a UN mission from entering Haiti. 
These troops were invited into Haiti by Haiti's Prime Minister,
Robert Malval.  America's troops were not sent to confront the
military or police but to provide technical and training
assistance.  The Governors Island agreement of July 3, 1993,
called for this mission.

But my government has said from the outset that our
participation depended upon the willingness of the Haitian
military to provide, as promised, a cooperative and secure
environment.  We have never suggested or threatened an
intervention in Haiti over the opposition of the military, nor
has that course of action ever been endorsed or proposed by
Haiti's elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide.  This has
never been--nor should it be--some kind of gunboat diplomacy. 
The events in Port-au-Prince on Monday demonstrated a Haitian
military capability that has never been contested.  The force of
the mob was used to delay a mission that would never have been
undertaken without their consent.  Some in Haiti may think that
a great victory has been won, but this would be a dangerous
delusion.

Mr. President, the day will come when democratic rule is
restored to Haiti.  The Governors Island agreement sought to
ensure that the transition would be peaceful, that
recriminations would be minimal, and that amnesty would be given
to those who illegally ousted a democratically elected
president.  General Cedras and Police Chief Francois have chosen
a perilous, self-defeating, and dishonorable course.  They are
riding a tiger that may ultimately devour them.  We urge them to
reconsider their actions now.

Another blow has been struck against Haitian democracy.  To the
vast majority of the Haitian people, I say that the community of
nations remains with you.  The members of this Council are with
you.  The Organization of American States is with you, and the
Caribbean Community is with you.

Today, this Council votes to reimpose economic sanctions.  We
have not taken this decision lightly.  But we know that imposing
sanctions in New York has changed behavior in 
Port-au-Prince.  Tough economic sanctions brought the Haitian
military to the bargaining table last July.  Our hope is that
today's renewal of sanctions will provide another wake-up call
to those who seek to extinguish the democratic flame in Haiti. 
I want to thank my colleagues on this Council who have
cooperated in this quick action.

My government will take firm measures to enforce this
resolution.  We will direct travel and financial sanctions
against individuals obstructing the agreement.  We will maintain
the pressure for democratic change in every manner possible,
short of an armed intervention that no one wants.  We will
continue to explore every avenue for a peaceful solution.

In closing, let me say to this Council and the people of Haiti: 
The U.S. is committed to the return of Haitian democracy. 
Achieving this goal will not be easy.  Our preferred course is
not the stick of  sanctions but the carrot of economic and
technical assistance.  Today, the Haitian military left us no
choice.  But when the day comes that democracy dawns again in
Haiti, my government stands ready to begin with you, the people
of Haiti, the job of rebuilding and revitalizing your country.


Resolution 873
(October 13, 1993)

The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions 841 (1993) of 16 June 1993, 861 (1993)
of 27 August 1993, 862 (1993) of 31 August 1993 and 867 (1993)
of 23 September 1993,

Deeply disturbed by the continued obstruction of the arrival of
the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), dispatched pursuant
to resolution 867 (1993), and the failure of the Armed Forces of
Haiti to carry out their responsibilities to allow the Mission
to begin its work,

Having received the report of the Secretary-General (S/26573)
informing the Council that the military authorities of Haiti,
including the police, have not complied in good faith with the
Governors Island Agreement,

Determining that their failure to fulfil obligations under the
agreement constitutes a threat to peace and security in the
region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1.  Decides, in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 861
(1993), to terminate the suspension of the measures set out in
paragraphs 5 to 9 of resolution 841 (1993) as of 2359 hours
Eastern Standard Time on 18 October 1993 unless the
Secretary-General, having regard for the views of the 
Secretary-General of the Organization of American States,
reports to the Council that the parties to the Governors Island
Agreement and any other authorities in Haiti are implementing in
full the agreement to reinstate the legitimate Government of
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and have established the
necessary measures to enable UNMIH to carry out its mandate;

2.  Decides also that funds that are required to be frozen
pursuant to paragraph 8 of resolution 841 (1993) may be released
at the request of President Aristide or Prime Minister Malval of
Haiti;

3.  Decides further that the Committee established by paragraph
10 of resolution 841 (1993) shall have the authority, in
addition to that set forth in that paragraph, to grant
exceptions to the prohibitions (other than those referred to in
paragraph 2 above) referred to in paragraph 1 above on a
case-by-case basis under the no-objection procedure in response
to requests by President Aristide or Prime Minister Malval of
Haiti;

4.  Confirms its readiness to consider urgently the imposition
of additional measures if the Secretary-General informs the
Security Council that the parties to the Governors Island
Agreement or any other authorities in Haiti continue to impede
the activities of UNMIH or interfere with the freedom of
movement and communication of UNMIH and its members as well as
the other rights necessary for the performance of its mandate,
or have not complied in full with relevant Security Council
resolutions and the provisions of the Governors Island
Agreement;

5.  Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

VOTE:  Unanimous (15-0).  (###)

END OF DISPATCH VOL 4, NO 43.

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