US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH VOLUME 4, NUMBER 43, OCTOBER 25, 1993 PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE: 1. Widening the Circle of Peace In the Middle East -- Secretary Christopher 2. Recent Developments and Next Steps In the Middle East Peace Process -- Edward P. Djerejian 3. Report on U.S. Military Operations in Somalia Transmitted to Congress -- President Clinton 4. A Strategy of Enlargement and the Developing World -- Anthony Lake 5. Focus on Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation: Upcoming Seattle Ministerial and Results of Honolulu Senior Officials Meeting 6. U.S. Policy Toward Nicaragua -- Alexander F. Watson 7. UN Security Council Adopts Resolution 873 on Haiti -- Madeleine K. Albright, UNSC Resolution ARTICLE 1: Widening the Circle of Peace In the Middle East Secretary Christopher Address at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, DC, October 15, 1993 I would like to thank Barbi Weinberg, Mike Stein, and Robert Satloff for inviting me to speak this evening. It is a pleasure to meet with such an informed and distinguished group. The Peace Process: The First Nine Months It was with great personal satisfaction that I witnessed the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles last month. That moment, captured indelibly by a handshake between old adversaries, showed us that the impossible is within reach--that the bright promise of a better future can chase out the dark specters of a bitter past. The world correctly focused on that historic handshake that shook the world. Yet anyone watching the event on the White House lawn saw something equally moving in the words and demeanor of my friend, the Israeli Prime Minister. Choked with emotion, the former IDF Chief of Staff voiced his hopes for, but also his concerns about, this new start. I can understand, at least partly, the Prime Minister's strong feelings. In my 9 months as Secretary of State--on top of my earlier tenure in the Department--I have felt the tragedy and the hope of Arab-Israeli relations. I am moved by the promise of peace for Israel and its Arab neighbors. And I know that promise is unlikely to be fulfilled if we do not play our part. American leadership is required. And that is in our interest, in Israel's interest, and in the region's interest. Every American President since Harry Truman has understood the strategic importance of pursuing peace in the Middle East. Although the bipolar world of the past complicated the pursuit of peace, it did not prevent American efforts. The disengagement agreements in the mid-1970s and Camp David provided essential building blocks. With the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the Middle East was no longer beset by the rivalry of superpowers. The flow of arms was reduced, and the military option against Israel was clearly diminished. And with Saddam Hussein's radical challenge decisively turned back in the Gulf War, the region's balance of power was tilted toward moderation and the chance for reconciliation. The Madrid conference broke the taboo on direct talks and launched a process that sought to From the beginning of his Administration, President Clinton understood that in this new political landscape, the context for peace-making was dramatically improved. But he also understood that peace-making would succeed only with active American engagement--and only if Israel felt strong and secure enough to take risks for peace. We have made clear our unyielding commitment to Israel's security and our willingness to be a full partner for peace. Let me reaffirm to you, as I have to Arab leaders and diplomats, that our commitment to Israel--to its security and its qualitative edge--remains a cornerstone of our policy in the Middle East. Indeed, for me, it is an article of faith and a fundamental principle that guides our policy. From my first days as Secretary, I became immersed in the peace process, not only to solve immediate problems but to let all the parties know that America would be actively engaged. The Clinton Administration accepted the wisdom of the Madrid framework and entered office fully committed to move it forward. We understood that direct negotiations, based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, were the surest way to achieve a comprehensive peace. We understood, too, that this peace must take account of Israel's security concerns and the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. Yet we faced a problem. In the wake of Israel's temporary expulsion of more than 400 Hamas activists--following a series of violent attacks on Israeli soldiers and civilians--the parties were unable to agree on returning to the peace talks. Working closely with Prime Minister Rabin, we crafted a proposal with a timetable for the return of the deportees. As a result of our efforts--including a February trip to the region, my first abroad as Secretary--we brought the parties back to the table in the spring. This was not the only time that we had to intervene strenuously to salvage and energize the process. Tension in southern Lebanon erupted in July, as Katyushas rained down on Israeli towns in northern Galilee and as the IDF responded with a sustained aerial and artillery bombardment. We consulted closely with regional parties. Many late-night calls were made. And we brokered a cease-fire that, to date, has held. That is what is required: the ability to sustain the talks and insulate them from inevitable pressures. This we have done. Indeed, had we not, the spectacular breakthrough in the secret talks in Oslo would have been hard to imagine. For almost 2 years, under a Republican and a Democratic President, America's sustained diplomatic involvement--whether in presenting a draft declaration of principles or in constantly pushing to define the parameters of the possible--set the stage for decision-making in the secret Oslo channel. On the Israeli-Palestinian track, we created a channel for serious discussion. In the end, they did what only they could do: They created a decision-making channel. Their creativity and courage enabled them to leap over old fears and to break new ground on the path to a peaceful and prosperous Middle East. Yet their achievement is only the first step of the journey. Now we need to make this turning point irreversible as we work with regional parties and the international community to make the benefits of peace irresistible. We must do our part. We must help the Israelis and the Palestinians implement the agreement. We must help make it work. We must also build on it--and cement it--by playing an active role in the other bilateral talks to ensure progress on all fronts. The Donors' Conference We recognized that implementing the Israeli-Palestinian agreement would require resources to change the reality on the ground. We moved quickly. Together with our Russian co-sponsors, we organized a successful donors' conference. Forty-six countries and international organizations gathered to send the message that the peace talks must not fail. They agreed that to help transform the Declaration of Principles into an enduring agreement, the Palestinians needed to see the tangible benefits of peace. Living standards must be boosted, housing and infrastructure built, and the basis for sustained long-term growth established. Conference participants pledged more than $600 million in aid for the first year covered by the Declaration of Principles, $1 billion for the first 2 years, and almost $2 billion for the 5-year period covered by the agreement. That was an exceptional day's work. But our task is far from complete. The donors must now put in place the structure agreed to at the conference for disbursing the aid and targeting it effectively. Palestinians and Israelis must create suitable mechanisms for absorbing this aid efficiently and for using it credibly. This is essential. And trade and private investment must be encouraged through export-financing programs and investment incentives. The Negotiations: An Update Through the donors' conference, the international community is doing its part for Israeli-Palestinian peace. But the lion's share of responsibility--as with the credit for the breakthrough--rests with the parties themselves. The Declaration of Principles established an ambitious set of objectives toward which the parties must work. Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat took up this work in an October 6 meeting in Cairo. Two days ago, on the day the Declaration of Principles entered into force, Shimon Peres and Abu Mazen met, and the work of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee got off to a very good start. The Gaza-Jericho committee, meeting in Taba, also had very serious and practical discussions. The Declaration of Principles must be transformed into an enduring agreement and the realities on the ground changed. We have been asked by the Israelis and the Palestinians to help as they move down this path of cooperation, and we will continue to do our part. We will continue to play an active role on the other tracks as well. We expected that the Israeli-Palestinian breakthrough would stimulate progress elsewhere in the bilaterals. We were not disappointed. Within 24 hours of the signing of the Declaration of Principles, the Israelis and the Jordanians initiated a substantive agenda for their negotiations. Jordanian Crown Prince Hassan and Israeli Foreign Minister Peres met with President Clinton on October 1 to announce the creation of a joint economic committee. In addition, the President proposed and the parties agreed to create a U.S.-Israeli-Jordanian working group to identify and promote economic projects that would benefit both Israel and Jordan. This is another first--a trilateral working group that will make cooperation and joint economic projects a normal part of the landscape. Now we hope to make tangible progress on the other bilateral tracks. We recognize that there are complex issues on the Israeli-Syria track. The parties continue to differ over key questions such as withdrawal, peace, and security. While they are working on a declaration of principles, they still have some distance to travel to overcome the gaps that separate them. In my recent talks with Foreign Minister Shara', he made it clear that he and President Asad remain firmly committed to the talks and to the process. He also made it clear that Syria, like Israel, welcomes our assistance in the talks. We will work to bridge the gaps. Similarly, Lebanon and Israel are trying to reach agreement on a negotiating frame of reference that would enable them to make arrangements for security talks. We are encouraging them to agree to a joint security committee. We believe that would be an important step forward. The Clinton Administration will do all we can to help implement the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles. We will work very actively to promote progress in the other bilateral and multilateral negotiations. That is why I am dispatching Dennis Ross to the region this weekend--and why I expect to return to the region in the near future. As I said, we must make the breakthrough irreversible. That is the central challenge for the Israelis and the Palestinians--and for those of us committed to making Middle East peace a reality. The Challenges Ahead We have no illusions about the difficulties we will continue to face. We must widen the circle of peace. We must isolate the forces of violence and hatred--whether they are trying to disrupt the search for peace in the region, to destabilize their neighbors through aggression, or to destroy innocent lives through terrorism. Containing and diminishing the influence of political extremism--secular and religious--is essential. To do so, we must address the social and economic conditions that spawn extremist movements. And we must also take vigorous action to punish and isolate terrorist groups and those states that support terrorism. The UN embargo on Libya for its role in the bombing of Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 is a clear reminder of the strong stance taken by the United States and the international community against state-sponsored terrorism. A related challenge stems from the flow of weapons into the area. The place to start is containing the rogue regimes in Iran, Iraq, and Libya--to make certain that they cannot obtain sensitive technology. Yet not all the tasks ahead place us in a defensive posture, seeking to limit or roll back regional dangers. Clearly, there are extraordinary opportunities to expand the horizon for productive and creative interaction--breaking old taboos--among the peoples of the Middle East. The exciting fact is that taboos are being broken every week. In the multilateral working groups, Israelis and their counterparts from 12 Arab countries are taking on issues of mutual interest regarding arms control, the environment, economic development, water, and refugees. The arms control working group can and should be a forum where a new basis for regional security is developed. Confidence-building measures can reduce suspicions and create a basis for far more meaningful arms control steps. The refugee working group met this week in Tunis and helped establish another important milestone--the first time a working group has convened right in the region. We must create other such milestones and make them normal and routine. We must overcome and remove continuing barriers to reconciliation and cooperation. First and foremost, the scope of economic interaction must expand in the region. That is why the President and I felt so strongly about establishing the U.S.-Jordan-Israel working group. The countries of the Middle East share many problems and advantages; all would gain from economic integration. A critical step toward this must be an end to the Arab boycott. The Israelis have made a major gesture. The Arab world must now reciprocate. In light of the latest advances in the peace process, the boycott is an anachronism. It punishes Palestinians and Israelis alike. As I have said repeatedly, in public and in private, the boycott is a relic of the past. It should be relegated to the dustbin of history--now. In light of the breakthrough last month, we are already seeing reports of contacts between Arab and Israeli businessmen and -women--and even the establishment of joint ventures that will accompany the achievement of peace. These are the kinds of cooperation that will cement the peace and make it last. We have a full agenda for the Middle East, an agenda with peace-making and peace-building at its core. With the historic agreement last month, there is no excuse for a Middle East mired in the past. The excuses that have stood in the way of peace and have robbed the region of a better future are gone. Now we must work with the optimism that these historic circumstances inspire and with the urgency that they demand. The developments of the last few weeks in Israel's negotiations with the Palestinians and the Jordanians are both a cause for hope and a spur to action. Those developments have enabled us to catch a glimpse of a new Middle East--enjoying peace, reconciliation, real cooperation, and prosperity. As we look to a new century, we can see a very different future--a far brighter future--for the Middle East. As President Clinton said: Together let us imagine what can be accomplished if all the energy and the ability the Israelis and Palestinians have invested into . . . struggle can now be channeled into cultivating the land and freshening the water, into ending the boycotts and creating new industry, into building a land as bountiful and peaceful as it is holy. Working with the parties, we will do our best to make that vision a reality. (###) ARTICLE 2: Recent Developments and Next Steps In the Middle East Peace Process Edward P. Djerejian, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, October 15, 1993 Mr. Chairman and other distinguished members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it is a pleasure to appear before you, particularly at this propitious moment in the search for Middle East peace. My testimony today will focus on the recent, dramatic developments on the bilateral side of the peace process, touch briefly on the multilateral track, and then describe our thoughts about next steps. Following that, I will be happy to take your questions about the peace process or any aspect of our Middle East policy. The Donors' Conference Barely a month ago, on the South Lawn of the White House, a new era in Middle East politics took shape--an era that, as President Clinton noted, gives the children of the Middle East the chance to know a season of peace. The President made clear that he wanted to move quickly to help turn the historic agreement into reality. Together with our Russian co-sponsors, we organized the October 1 meeting of the Conference to Support Middle East Peace. It was no small success. Forty-six countries and international organizations gathered to send the message that the peace talks must not fail. They agreed on the importance of buttressing the Declaration of Principles by offering the Palestinians the material benefits of peace. We all know that it is essential for the Palestinians to see soon that their daily lives are taking a turn for the better and that peace makes a difference. The conferees reconfirmed their commitment to improve immediately the conditions of daily life for the Palestinians and, at the same time, to build a structure for long-term economic growth. To meet these objectives, conference participants pledged over $600 million in aid for the first year covered by the Declaration of Principles and $1 billion for the first 2 years. For the 5-year period covered by the agreement, pledges of support approached $2 billion. Several countries made pledges for only the first year or two. If their contributions for later years match their pledge for the first 2, the total donors' support will jump to $2.4 billion--which meets World Bank estimates for the Palestinians' needs. Let me add that our 5-year contribution to this effort is $500 million. Conference results were superb, but much remains to be done. For the donors, the first task is to put in place the structure agreed to at the conference for disbursing the aid. Within the Madrid framework, overall coordination among the major donors will take place in an ad hoc liaison committee. This committee will be run at the sub-cabinet level and should meet every 3 to 6 months. It will work to ensure coordination and cooperation among the donors. Members will include the United States, Russia, Japan, Canada, the European Community, and Saudi Arabia. Israel, the Palestinians, Egypt, and Jordan will participate as associate members. The World Bank will also play a leading role in this process. It will establish and manage a trust fund to finance technical assistance, training, and feasibility studies. These efforts are designed to assist the Palestinians in creating institutions that will help them manage their political, economic, and humanitarian affairs. UN agencies, including the UN Development Program, will provide both technical and financial assistance to support this effort. The World Bank will also take the lead in developing programs to support public investment in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. And it will serve as the Secretariat for the ad hoc liaison committee. There is an important role for the private sector in promoting economic growth in the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinians understand the need to create a business-friendly environment. Conference participants intend to encourage private investment through export-financing programs and investment incentives. Part of the U.S. assistance package includes $125 million in OPIC investment guarantees. I would like to underscore one point here. In putting together this aid package and working on its implementation, we have sought to ensure that it is managed efficiently--that there is transparency and accountability so that the recipients reap its full benefits. We will be working in close consultation with other donors and the World Bank and other institutions to achieve this goal. In these tight budget times, we must do no less. Israeli-Palestinian Talks Through the donors' conference, the international community is doing its part on behalf of Israeli-Palestinian peace. But we must keep our eye on the ball--the major responsibility for advancing the process remains with the parties. The Declaration of Principles established an ambitious set of objectives toward which Israel and the Palestinians must work. Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat did not waste time, taking up this work in an October 6 meeting in Cairo. On October 13, the day the declaration entered into force, Israeli Foreign Minister Peres and Abu Mazen convened the first meeting of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee in Cairo. That meeting got the liaison committee off to an excellent start. The Gaza-Jericho and military committees also began their deliberations October 13 in Taba. There, too, the discussions were pragmatic and focused. The two sides also have established an Israeli-Palestinian Continuing Committee for Economic Cooperation to consider joint ventures in such areas as water, electricity, and trade promotion. Negotiations on a detailed plan for the transfer of authority in education, culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism will take place in yet another forum in Washington. The declaration also calls for: By December 13: -- Concluding the agreement on Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho and beginning the withdrawal; By April 13: --Completing the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho; --Transferring to the Palestinians authority for education, culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism; --Starting the clock on the 5-year transitional period; --Starting to build a Palestinian police force; By July 13: --Establishment of the Palestinian police force; --Completing Israel Defense Force redeployment in the West Bank and Gaza outside of populated areas; and --As a goal, holding general elections for the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority Council. The Other Bilaterals The Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles was, of course, a historic breakthrough. We expected it to serve as a catalyst elsewhere in the peace process. We have not been disappointed. The day after the signing of the Declaration of Principles, the Israelis and the Jordanians initialed a substantive agenda for their negotiations. This agenda codifies the progress made thus far in their talks and provides the framework for further discussion. On October 1, the day of the donors' conference, Israeli-Jordanian relations took an even more significant step forward. Jordanian Crown Prince Hassan and Israeli Foreign Minister Peres appeared with President Clinton at the White House to announce the creation of a joint economic committee. It was also agreed at that time to create a trilateral U.S.-Israeli-Jordanian working group to look at next steps for economic development in those two Middle East countries and how their economic interaction is and can be related to the Palestinian dimension. Whereas the Palestinian issue represents the political core of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Israeli-Syrian negotiations represent the geopolitical or strategic core of the conflict. Therefore, it is essential that every effort be made to encourage tangible progress in the Israeli-Syrian track. While the parties continue to differ over key questions such as land, peace, and security, they remain committed to these negotiations with the aim of reaching agreement on their own declaration of principles. The two sides have sought and welcomed active U.S. assistance in the talks. President Clinton and Secretary Christopher have been actively involved in helping move this track forward. The President has communicated directly with Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad, and Secretary Christopher has been asked by both Prime Minister Rabin and President Asad to be an active intermediary to help the two sides narrow their substantive differences, especially on the key issues of withdrawal and peace. The Administration is determined to do its part. We recognize that much hard work lies ahead. Lebanon and Israel are continuing their effort to reach agreement on a political frame of reference dealing with the key issues of land, peace, and security which could then enable them to establish a military committee to discuss the pressing issue of security, especially in southern Lebanon. It is worth noting that those negotiations continued despite the violence on the ground last summer. We are in close contact with both the Israelis and the Lebanese to help facilitate forward movement in the talks, and President Clinton and Secretary Christopher had an extensive discussion on the issue with Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri in New York at the UNGA earlier this month. We remain active in the bilaterals, seeking ways to bring the parties closer together. Our commitment to a just and lasting, comprehensive peace is as firm as ever. And a comprehensive peace means peace on all fronts. The Multilaterals Complementing the bilateral track is a separate set of multilateral negotiations. These negotiations were designed at the Madrid conference to address key problems which affect the entire Middle East. The multilateral track was meant to be an essential complement to the bilaterals--to tackle those regional problems that are themselves a source of tension and instability. These talks tend to attract less media attention, but they literally have the potential to change the face of the Middle East. The multilateral track consists of a steering group and five working groups which reflect issues affecting the lives of ordinary people. There are separate groups for economic development, water resources, the environment, refugees, and arms control and security. In addition to Israel and the Palestinians, a broad range of Arab countries--12 in all--participate in these groups: the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Yemen. I draw your attention to the number of Arab participants. The bilaterals established negotiations between Israel and four Arab parties; the multilaterals brought Israel into contact with eight additional Arab states. This demonstrates that one of the underlying principles of the multilaterals--to normalize Israeli-Arab contact--is sound. To deal comprehensively with the problems of the region, we have included key extra-regional parties. Delegations from the UN, Canada, Japan, and various European countries add their expertise, resources, and energy to addressing the regional problems of the Middle East. As was evident at the October 1 meeting of the Conference to Support Middle East Peace, when given a meaningful role, these countries are more than willing to help share the burden of funding peace in the region. The multilateral discussions have proven highly successful. They began in almost seminar form, considering problems on a theoretical plane. But in a number of areas they have since moved to concrete actions: feasibility studies, training projects, building data bases. And a major threshold was recently crossed when it was agreed to convene two of these groups in Arab countries for the first time. The refugee working group met in Tunis this week, and the environment group will meet in Egypt later this fall. Moving the venue to these Arab countries is an important example of how these negotiations are brushing aside long-standing barriers to regional normalization. As originally conceived, the multi-laterals were designed not just to complement but also to facilitate the bilateral talks. And recent developments have underscored the importance of this second function. Some observers have wondered how we were able to organize, so quickly after the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles, the Conference to Support Middle East Peace. Let me give you some insight into this development. We understood, long before the breakthrough, that one key element of Israeli-Palestinian peace required improving the living conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. So we started to prepare ourselves for work toward this end. Last July--2 months before the signing of the Declaration of Principles--I co-chaired a meeting of the Multilateral Steering Group in Moscow. At that meeting, I negotiated, with Faisal Husseini, Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin, and other members of the group, language for the final statement of the session. That statement "recognized the particular needs of the Palestinians as they moved toward interim self-government arrangements" and expressed the hope that "additional funds will be made available to the Palestinians to meet their current pressing needs and responsibilities." This was the framework which formed the basis of the donors' conference efforts. I have also referred to a World Bank estimate of Palestinian needs in the territories. The study on which this estimate was made was commissioned many months before within the multilateral framework. In short, the multilaterals provided the structure and much of the preliminary work that enabled us to put together a major, successful international conference in a matter of days. The robust activities of the multilateral working groups are establishing a pattern of interaction between Israelis and Arabs--at the personal and professional levels--that has transcended political differences. It is an essential cornerstone for normalizing Arab-Israeli relations. We attach great importance to further progress in this track. And we anticipate, as a consequence of the breakthrough on the bilateral track, advancing the multilaterals in the fourth round of working groups that began with the convening of the session on refugees last week in Tunisia. The Road Ahead The progress that we have made in recent months on both the bilateral and multilateral tracks is encouraging. But now is not the time to rest. That progress is a summons to action. We will look at every opportunity to expand the horizon for productive and creative interaction--transcending old taboos--among the peoples of the region. In this regard, one of our principal tasks is to broaden participation in the peace process and expand Arab-Israeli interaction. We are urging our Arab interlocutors throughout the Middle East to develop and broaden, outside of the multilateral context, their contact with the Israelis. In the wake of last month's breakthrough, we are seeing some indications of Arab willingness to do just that. The most dramatic instance of this came the day after the signing of the Declaration of Principles. On the way back to Israel, Prime Minister Rabin touched down in Morocco for a well-publicized meeting with King Hassan. We would also like to broaden regional participation in the multilateral talks. Syria and Lebanon have, to date, declined to join the multilateral process until there is what they perceive to be concrete progress in the bilateral negotiations. We believe recent developments are sufficient to prompt Syria and Lebanon to take part in this important effort. We are once again encouraging them to join the multilateral process. Another challenge is to broaden the scope of economic interaction in the region. The countries of the Middle East share many problems and advantages; all would gain from economic cooperation. The first step toward this must be an end to the Arab boycott. In the past month, the President, the Vice President, and the Secretary have publicly called for an end to the boycott. This is our message to boycotting countries, publicly and in diplomatic channels: The boycott is an anachronism completely out of step with recent developments in the peace process. We also continue to remind our Arab counterparts that the secondary and tertiary aspects of the boycott hurt us directly; these aspects discriminate against U.S. and other countries' firms that wish to do business in the Middle East. We are urging our trading partners to join us in our efforts to persuade the Arab states to begin dismantling the boycott. But our aim is not just to remove barriers to trade. We would like to see economic cooperation across old political barricades. In light of last month's breakthrough, we are already seeing reports of contacts between Arab and Israeli business executives and, even, the establishment of joint ventures. We expect and encourage more of this. Regional entrepreneurs understand the business opportunities that will accompany the achievement of peace. I have been involved in the Middle East for most of my diplomatic career--over 30 years. It has been exciting--boredom is not a characteristic of the Middle East--but the excitement has been that of tragedy marked by wars and terrorism. Standing on the same podium with Chairman Arafat on the White House lawn on September 13, Prime Minister Rabin stated it eloquently when he said: Enough! Let us pray that a day will come when we all will say farewell to arms. We wish to open a new chapter in the sad book of our lives together, a chapter of mutual recognition, of good neighborliness, of mutual respect, of understanding. We hope to embark on a new era in the history of the Middle East. Today, the prospects for a comprehensive Middle East peace have never been stronger. The Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles, the mutual recognition of Israel and the PLO, the sustained engagement of all the major regional parties in the peace process, and our own role as a full partner in the process started at Madrid with the support of the international community; all point us in the right direction. All help make a dream a reality--Israel and each of its Arab neighbors living together in peace. We will do our utmost to achieve this long-sought objective. (###) ARTICLE 3: Report on U.S. Military Operations in Somalia Transmitted to Congress President Clinton Text of a letter to the Congress, October 13, 1993. To the Congress of the United States: In response to the request made by the House and Senate for certain information on our military operations in Somalia, I am pleased to forward the attached report. In transmitting this report, I want to reiterate the points that I made on October 6 and to the American people in remarks on October 7. We went to Somalia on a humanitarian mission. We saved approximately a million lives that were at risk of starvation brought on by civil war that had degenerated into anarchy. We acted after 350,000 already had died. Ours was a gesture of a great nation, carried out by thousands of American citizens, both military and civilian. We did not then, nor do we now plan to stay in that country. The United Nations agreed to assume our military mission and take on the additional political and rehabilitation activities required so that the famine and anarchy do not resume when the international presence departs. For our part, we agreed with the United Nations to participate militarily with a much smaller U.S. force for a period of time, to help the United Nations create a secure environment in which it could ensure the free flow of humanitarian relief. At the request of the United Nations and the United States, approximately 30 nations deployed over 20,000 troops as we reduced our military presence. With the recent tragic casualties to American forces in Somalia, the American people want to know why we are there, what we are doing, why we cannot come home immediately, and when we will come home. Although the report answers those questions in detail, I want to repeat concisely my answers: -- We went to Somalia because without us a million people would have died. We, uniquely, were in a position to save them, and other nations were ready to share the burden after our initial action. -- What the United States is doing there is providing, for a limited period of time, logistics support and security so that the humanitarian and political efforts of the United Nations, relief organizations, and others can have a reasonable chance of success. The United Nations, in turn, has a longer term political, security, and relief mission designed to minimize the likelihood that famine and anarchy will return when the United Nations leaves. The U.S. military mission is not now nor was it ever one of "nation building." -- We cannot leave immediately because the United Nations has not had an adequate chance to replace us, nor have the Somalis had a reasonable opportunity to end their strife. We want other nations to assume more of the burden of international peace. To have them do so, they must think that they can rely on our commitments when we make them. Moreover, having been brutally attacked, were American forces to leave now we would send a message to terrorists and other potential adversaries around the world that they can change our policies by killing our people. It would be open season on Americans. -- We will, however, leave no later than March 31, 1994, except for a few hundred support troops. That amount of time will permit the Somali people to make progress toward political reconciliation and allow the United States to fulfill our obligations properly, including the return of any Americans being detained. We went there for the right reasons and we will finish the job in the right way. While U.S. forces are there, they will be fully protected with appropriate American military capability. Any Americans detained will be the subject of the most complete and thorough efforts of which this Government is capable, with the unrelenting goal of returning them home and returning them to health. I want to thank all those who have expressed their support for this approach during the last week. At difficult times such as these, when we face international challenges, bipartisan unity among our two branches of government is vital. William J. Clinton (###) ARTICLE 4: A Strategy of Enlargement And the Developing World Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Address to the Overseas Development Council, Washington, DC, October 13, 1993 It is a great pleasure to join John Sewell and many old and new friends at the Overseas Development Council this evening. As a former ODC board member, this is a homecoming. I remember well attending ODC board meetings during the 1970s and 1980s. Now events force me to spend less time with my ODC colleagues; nonetheless, I know we are confronting many of the same issues, such as reform in the former Soviet Union, the challenges of ethnic conflict and failed states, or the imperative of sustainable development. As the ODC approaches a quarter-century of service, many of its projects have changed, yet the importance of its work has not. I have always admired the ODC's creativity and energy, and I still do. We have never been in greater need of that creativity--of new thinking and policies toward the developing nations. I want to discuss some of the steps the Clinton Administration is taking to ensure the U.S. is vigorously engaged there and in the wider world. New Opportunities and Continuing Needs in the Developing World The end of the Cold War forces us to look anew on the developing world. American policymakers no longer can imagine these nations as an interchangeable clump of squares on the superpower chessboard. We need a new lens and even a new vocabulary. Terms such as "Third World" and "developing world" are increasingly meaningless. Affluence and poverty are not cleanly demarcated by North and South. The developing world is highly differentiated. The past generation has seen tremendous changes within what we once described as the Third World. Many nations, particularly in Latin America and Asia, have raced ahead, as they tapped into the dynamism of global trade. A generation ago, Indonesia's GDP was lower than Nigeria's; today, it is three times as high. Waves of democratic reform in Africa and Latin America have enabled others--such as Namibia, Burundi, and Argentina--to make great gains toward political or economic justice. And from South Africa to the Mideast, we see great opportunities for breakthroughs that could have vast benefits for regional development. Yet despite such encouraging scenes, billions of people in the poorest nations continue to live in appalling conditions. The percentage of the world's income, trade, and investment associated with its poorest nations actually has fallen since the 1960s. A large bloc of nations is in danger of becoming both economically and politically marginalized from the broader world's progress. Today nearly one-half the planet's people live on less than $500 per year. That kind of poverty doesn't simply mean "relative economic deprivation," as some used to say. It means waking up without enough food to eat; it is part of why over 30,000 of the world's children die each day from malnutrition and disease. The developing world's resources are strained as populations grow at a rate that will cause humankind to double by the middle of the next century. And the developing world has seen some of the most savage recent conflicts--such as in Angola, where a bloody civil war has been killing as many as 1,000 people each day. The developing world touches more than our consciences. Its conditions and actions directly affect our security, as well. For example, six of the seven countries we list as state sponsors of terrorism have per capita annual incomes of less than $2,500. Of the 25 nations pursuing programs to produce weapons of mass destruction, 15 have incomes of less than $3,200. And by the year 2025, greenhouse gas emissions from the developing world likely will overtake those from developed countries. Yet, new domestic pressures in the U.S. and elsewhere resist our engagement on such problems. Without the geostrategic rationale that the Cold War once cast over the Third World, many Americans now see these nations only in terms of the problems they seem to generate: narcotics from Latin America, terrorism from militant states, immigrants from Haiti, U.S. casualties in Somalia, job competition from the Asian dragons. The onset of a global recession has fueled a turning inward within virtually all major nations. From the U.S. to Germany to Japan, more attention is going to domestic needs, as it must; but that often leaves tight budgets for international efforts. And in many leading powers, there is a disquieting rise in nativist, protectionist, and isolationist voices--those I have called the Neo-Know-Nothings. Thus, at a time of vast, new opportunities but also great, continuing needs in the developing world, all of us who are eager to see progress in those nations face new challenges. We must fashion new policies that reflect the immense changes that have come with the end of the Cold War. Framework for U.S. Engagement: A Strategy of Enlargement Last month, the President spoke to the UN and described a framework for our engagement in the world. The week before, other senior officials and I laid out some of our own thoughts. Those speeches argue that the successor to a doctrine of containment should be a strategy of enlargement--a strategy of American efforts to enlarge the community of market democracies. A strategy of enlargement is based on a belief that our most fundamental security interest lies in the expansion and consolidation of democratic and market reform. While that goal was implicit in U.S. foreign policy throughout most of this century, several dynamics of the post-Cold War era make it more likely that we can enlarge the circle of market democracies. For one, there has been a wave of market and democratic reform, from the former Soviet Union to Africa to Latin America. That wave filled the conceptual void left by the collapse of Marxist illusions--illusions that were dispelled in part by the Soviet Union's collapse but even more by the abject practical failure of efforts to manage economies through stultifying bureaucracies. As a result, the ideas of democracy and market economics may not be triumphant, but they are certainly ascendant. In addition, the U.S. now stands as the world's dominant power. That dominance does not enable us to impose Jeffersonian democracy in places it has not existed, but it does strengthen our ability to facilitate negotiations--as in the Mideast peace process--or to lead coalitions in support of reform--as we have done toward Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union. And the world's accelerated pace of communications and commerce gives us new opportunities to encourage other nations in the direction of democracy and market economics. All this means that we stand at a moment of immense democratic and entrepreneurial opportunities--the opportunity to consolidate democracy's recent gains, the opportunity to see democracy take root in new nations throughout the developing world, and the opportunity for Americans to prosper along with other peoples as more nations are drawn into the global economy. But realizing those opportunities requires active American engagement. A strategy of enlargement suggests four components to that engagement. First, it argues for strengthening the core of major market democracies--including our own--for these nations fuel the global economy, anchor the expansion of democracy, and are the major donors for international aid efforts. Second, enlargement requires that we work to expand the circle of democracy and market economics, especially to countries such as Russia that are significant to us for geo-strategic, economic, or other reasons. Third, enlargement requires that we reduce the threat from leaders and regimes that are hostile to democracy. Finally, a strategy of enlargement involves engagement on behalf of humanitarian concerns to reduce suffering; help resolve regional conflicts; and foster democratic, sustainable development. The reaction to the announcement of this strategy has been interesting. Some on the right suggest it smacks of one-worldism, simply because it foresees some use of multilateral institutions when it is in our interest to do so. Some on the left suggest the strategy smacks of neo-isolationism, simply because it says we will ask hard questions before deciding to support UN peace-keeping and other multilateral ventures. Both sets of criticism imply a kind of absolutism. One side suggests we should never act through multilateral institutions--so much for NATO. The other suggests that we should never ask rigorous questions before signing up for multilateral efforts--so much for good sense and the support of the American people. Application in The Developing World A strategy of enlargement does not provide a pre-ordained answer for every problem we may face--in the developing world or elsewhere. But it does establish a strategic framework and a set of priorities. In the developing world, it focuses us on the goals of democracy and a form of market development that is both politically and environmentally sustainable. Those goals are mutually supportive. We have many institutions that can help advance our goals of social justice, such as the World Health Organization, special windows at the multilateral development banks, or a new emphasis on "bottom-up" development planning. But the ultimate underwriter of social justice is democracy--for with democracy come demands for education, health care, just taxation, and other efforts to promote expanded opportunity and empowerment. At the same time, democratic institutions support market growth and can protect people from the winds of creative destruction that markets generate. Traditionally, the international financial institutions and many economists overdrew the distinction between economics and politics. Today, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank recognize that efficient, accountable public institutions are key components of development. They also recognize that political legitimacy is a precondition for robust economic development. It has long been said that good economics is good politics; in the developing world, it is becoming equally clear that good government is good economics. The Administration has reviewed its approach to the developing world. Several conclusions emerge. We have concluded that while aid is important, trade must play a much larger role in our development strategy, particularly toward the newly industrialized countries of Asia and Latin America. We have concluded that existing foreign assistance programs are incoherent and outmoded and must be reformed. We also have concluded that a humanitarian agenda toward the poorest nations will remain important and that conflict resolution needs to be a part of that agenda. Let me discuss each of these briefly. Trade, Not Just Aid First, a strategy of enlargement suggests that trade--and not just aid--must form the basis for much of our effort toward the developing world. Access to global markets--particularly our own market--is more valuable to many developing and newly industrialized nations than all the taxpayer dollars we might shower upon them. That is one reason the President has devoted so much time to market-opening arrangements such as GATT and APEC--the organization for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. The most important test of that proposition over the coming months will be enactment of the North American Free Trade Agreement. The President has made passage of NAFTA one of his highest priorities, and it should be a priority as well for all who are concerned about progress in the developing world. As the President has often stressed, Americans should support NAFTA because it will boost our own economic well-being. It will create the world's largest free trade zone, stretching from the Arctic to the tropics--a $6.5-trillion market with 370 million people--with the U.S. right in the center. By eliminating Mexican tariffs and non-tariff barriers on our manufactured goods, farm products, and service exports, passage of NAFTA will help create 200,000 additional higher-wage American jobs by 1995. But NAFTA is also a vital component in our development and national security policies. I remember from a decade ago, during meetings at the ODC, the concern we felt for Mexico's course of development--its immense debt, its highly oil-dependent economy, and its preponderance of state-owned enterprises. But recent reforms undertaken by the Salinas government have pointed Mexico in a different direction. Now, over 1,000 of Mexico's 1,200 state-owned firms have been privatized. Oil now represents only 30% of Mexico's exports, compared to 70% when President Salinas took office. And Mexico's debt burden has been restructured to ensure long-term serviceability. Mexico's economic reforms have been part of a program that has also included political reforms and a new, more outward-looking foreign policy that has helped make Mexico an increasingly friendly and important hemispheric force. For example, Mexico played a central role as President Clinton worked with our hemispheric neighbors to reverse the recent coup in Guatemala. A key question posed by NAFTA is whether our nation will stand by those nations, such as Mexico, which have opted for the path of democratic and market reform. If we can secure the passage of NAFTA, it will strengthen the bonds between our two nations on many efforts that are vital to both of our peoples--from labor standards to environmental protection to the pursuit of good governance. Moreover, passage of NAFTA will help pave the way for economic and political liberalization throughout the Western Hemisphere in pursuit of the goal President Clinton has described--a Western Hemispheric community of democracies. On the other hand, if Congress defeats NAFTA, it will send dangerous shockwaves into Mexico and throughout our hemisphere. It could suppress the growth of Mexico's economy, which would increase pressures for illegal immigration into the U.S. It would shake the confidence of money managers in their Latin portfolios--and those investments have helped drive the region's recent growth. It would make it harder for us to secure new market-opening agreements in GATT and other contexts--agreements that are important for American workers and consumers and also for developing countries that depend on hard currency from exports to escape debt burdens and to invest in growth. I know that many in the development community may not view NAFTA as a high priority. But it should be. Trade is one of the keys to development in this new era, and NAFTA will be an immediate test of our commitment to an expansion of trade. Reforming Our Foreign Assistance Efforts Second, to promote democracy and sustainable development in an era of scarce resources, we need efficient, highly targeted programs that can command public support. Yet, our foreign assistance efforts long have been like sedimentary stone--layer upon layer of programs and bureaucracies, each representing a different era in our foreign policy and each pushing down on the others until the whole became impenetrable and ossified. Today virtually every federal agency is engaged in pursuing some international programs, yet there is virtually no coordination among them. The U.S. Agency for International Development has been burdened with no fewer than 33 different goals for its development programs. Our foreign assistance programs are broken. Now, as the President and Vice President work to reinvent the federal government, it is time to re-invent our foreign assistance programs as well. Brian Atwood, our new USAID Administrator, already has begun to reinvent his agency. He is cutting back layers of bureaucracy, consolidating overseas posts, and providing a new strategic vision. In those efforts, he has the White House's full support. Over the past decade--often in the face of official indifference--many in Congress, such as Congressman Lee Hamilton and Senator Paul Sarbanes, argued for a sweeping rewrite of our foreign assistance programs. Since President Clinton took office, many in his Administration--such as Deputy Secretary of State Clifton Wharton and Brian Atwood--have been working closely with these and other Members of Congress as well as with outside groups to review the full range of foreign assistance programs. In early November, we plan to unveil the results of that review. We will work closely with both parties in Congress and with outside advocates to pass legislation to make our foreign assistance programs more efficient, effective, and targeted. I will not go into all the details of that review tonight. But I do want to stress a few conclusions. We will base our reforms on the principle of democratic, sustainable development. Development must be environmentally as well as economically sound; and that is why we are working with others to build on the promising work of the UN's Commission on Sustainable Development and seeking to negotiate an accord to prevent the spread of the world's deserts. Development must be politically sustainable as well, since politically empowered communities can do more to protect and sustain their cultures, economies, and ways of life. We will recommend that our foreign assistance be targeted less on a country basis and more to meet our functional goals, such as enlarging democracy and markets, pursuing non-proliferation, and promoting sustainable development. And we will recommend a major reform of U.S. security assistance. During the Cold War, we relied on security assistance to bolster friendly Third World regimes against communist influence. With that imperative gone, we will seek to use security assistance to meet other goals, such as promoting democracy, non-proliferation, and regional security. These reforms will be the most far-reaching since the Foreign Assistance Act first was written at the beginning of the Kennedy Administration. They represent our determination to think anew and to act anew as the world is new. Humanitarian Efforts and Conflict Resolution A third aspect of our policies toward the developing world must be continued efforts to help the poorest nations and peoples. Our humanitarian concerns--and at times other interests--dictate that we support efforts where we can to help poor countries escape marginalization and move toward sustainable development and toward political liberalization. Despite the events in Somalia in recent weeks, we must never forget that we saved the lives of perhaps a million human beings. Even America cannot solve every humanitarian crisis, but neither can we close our eyes and our hearts to the starvation, poverty, disease, and suffering that afflict far too much of the world's population. Many of our efforts toward such countries will be conducted through our reformed bilateral foreign assistance programs, as well as through the World Bank and other multilateral development agencies. But helping the poorest of the poor increasingly will involve another element: conflict resolution. Nations cannot pursue development amid bloodshed. War can produce famine as well as fatalities. The end of the Cold War lifted the lid on many ancient cauldrons of animosity--ethnic tensions, virulent nationalism, religious bigotry, passionate irredentism. Addressing such conflicts--sometimes for humanitarian reasons, sometimes because direct interests are affected--has become one of the defining challenges for our own nation and for many others, in Europe and elsewhere. Recent images from Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Angola, Georgia, and a host of other nations make clear there are no easy or tested answers for such conflicts. In peace-keeping and other efforts at conflict resolution, we are literally making case law every day. President Clinton understands that neither we, nor the UN, nor any other body can help solve all of the world's conflicts. That is why he has insisted that we begin asking hard questions of proposed UN peace-keeping missions. But he also understands that when we act, we must be able to do the job right. And that is why he has proposed steps to reform the UN and its peace-keeping efforts. Some critics suggest we should never engage in these efforts, simply because they are new and hard. A half-century ago, Franklin Roosevelt encountered that same argument as he battled the Great Depression with the unprecedented innovations of the New Deal. What he said then applies to those who would turn America's back on every conflict in the developing world. He said: Governments can err. Presidents do make mistakes. But the immortal Dante tells us that divine justice weighs the sins of the cold-blooded and the sins of the warm-hearted on different scales. Better the occasional faults of a government that lives in charity than the consistent omissions of a government frozen in the ice of its own indifference. Will we perform flawlessly in this largely uncharted terrain? Probably not. Should we keep trying and learning? Absolutely. Advocates for World Engagement Finally, a strategy of enlargement has another meaning that is relevant to this assembly. In this era when ideas are increasingly important, we can and must enlarge the circle of individuals and organizations that help advance our ideas, ideals, and goals in the world. For example, private firms are natural allies in our efforts to strengthen market economies, such as in the dynamic, middle-income regions of Asia and Latin America. And our goal of strengthening democracy and civil society has natural allies in labor unions, human rights groups, environmental advocates, and the full range of non-governmental organizations and private voluntary organizations represented here. Yet there is a danger here as well. In the face of constrained resources, it is important for groups who care about the developing world not to turn against each other. We cannot afford to see human rights groups battling democracy advocates, for Africanists to be at odds with Latin Americanists, and for each group to believe that "mine is the one gate to the kingdom of heaven." Instead, these communities must recognize how their individual goals are linked. For example, democracy helps protect human rights and ensures the broad distribution of resources that makes economic growth politically sustainable. The ODC and many of you in this room are well suited to act as bridges among the various communities of non-governmental organizations. I am delighted that next month the ODC will convene a diverse array of non-governmental organizations to explore the common ground for their efforts in this new era. And we should all challenge ourselves to put new effort into exploring these linkages, both intellectually and politically--for if we do not hang together, then at budget time we shall certainly hang apart. Ultimately, the ODC and similar groups are on the front lines of a battle we must all wage against pressures for the U.S. to withdraw from the world. For such retreat, like the fog, comes in on little cat feet--it comes in small increments. There must be vocal advocates for the benefits of international leadership if the American public is to accept the necessary costs and risks. I look forward to working with the ODC and many of you here in the months to come--to keep our nation deeply engaged in the world, to work for passage of NAFTA and other measures to draw the developing world into the global economy, to reform our foreign assistance programs, to work on new efforts toward those most in need, and to ensure that we realize the great potential of American leadership at this unique moment. (###) ARTICLE 5: Focus on Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation: Upcoming Seattle Ministerial and Results of Honolulu Senior Officials Meeting U.S. To Host APEC Ministerial In November U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher will chair APEC's fifth ministerial meeting November 17-19, 1993, in Seattle, Washington. APEC ministers will focus on trade and investment liberalization in the region at the request of ministers attending the fourth ministerial in Bangkok, Thailand, last year. The United States, which currently chairs the forum, hopes to advance APEC's work in this area through adoption of a declaration on a Trade and Investment Framework and the initial work program for market-oriented policies. In addition to the trade and investment discussions, ministers will consider a greater role for the private sector within APEC, search for ways to strengthen APEC as an institution, and focus on expanding economic cooperation in the region. Ministers will consider the action plans of APEC's 10 working groups and an ad hoc group on economic trends and issues. A non-governmental "Eminent Persons Group" (EPG) will present its report on APEC's medium- and long-term role in enhancing trade and economic activity in the region. Honolulu Senior Officials Meeting Results Chaired by Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord, the APEC senior officials met in Honolulu on September 22-24, 1993, to finalize preparations for the November ministerial. Prior to assuming the chair of APEC at the end of the 1992 Bangkok ministerial, the United States, with the support of its APEC colleagues, had indicated that it wanted to make trade and investment the central theme of the U.S. ministerial. To that end, APEC senior officials worked throughout the year to produce an APEC Trade and Investment Framework declaration to serve as a centerpiece for the fifth ministerial in Seattle. The "Declaration on an APEC Trade and Investment Framework," endorsed by the APEC senior officials in Honolulu, lays out for the ministers' approval a set of non-binding principles that the officials agreed should operate in the conduct of trade and investment relations among APEC's member economies. The declaration, once approved, would establish an APEC Trade and Investment Committee (TIC) within APEC, where the 15 APEC member economies can discuss trade and investment issues. Each year, the APEC ministers would review the work of the committee and provide additional guidance on issues they want to be addressed. The Honolulu senior officials meeting also recommended that the APEC ministers issue free-standing declarations on telecommunications, marine resource conservation, and tourism. Telecommunications, in particular, has been broadly supported by the private sector, and APEC is beginning to look at ways to harmonize telecommunications practices. Another aspect of the ministerial addressed in Honolulu was the report of the non-governmental Eminent Persons Group. Group chair Dr. Fred Bergsten gave a preview of the group's recommendations on steps that could be taken by APEC's member economies to support global trade liberalization and to move the organization toward the long-term goal of free trade in the Asia-Pacific region. Some of the short-term steps included items that APEC already is working on, such as investment or facilitation, while others cover areas such as standards, where APEC is only beginning to consider doing work. The Eminent Persons Group will present its final report to ministers in Seattle. APEC Trade and Investment Committee Work Program The APEC Trade and Investment Committee and its work program will strive to create a consistent APEC perspective and voice on global trade and investment issues and to increase cooperation among members on those issues. As a policy committee, the TIC will pursue opportunities to liberalize and expand trade; to promote a more open environment for investment; and to develop initiatives to improve the flow of goods, services, capital, and technology within the region--all in a manner consistent with GATT principles. The TIC work program proposed by the APEC senior officials in Honolulu is designed, first, to garner member economy support for APEC's trade and investment role and, second, to meet the anticipated demand for resources required to implement the results of a successful Uruguay Round. The senior officials who drafted the framework agreement suggested 10 subject areas for the work program which they believe will deal with those concerns and move APEC forward. Trade Policy Dialogue. The TIC will foster a continuing trade policy dialogue to address developments in the multilateral trading system, regional trade initiatives, globalization, and other relevant issues. Customs. The TIC will pursue efforts to simplify and harmonize customs procedures among APEC member economies. Investment. The TIC will examine APEC's investment environment, with an eye toward enhancing the flow of investment to and within the region. Tariff Database Manual. The TIC will assist regional businesses and APEC decision-makers by undertaking a pilot study for a regional, electronic database of members' tariffs and transparency of regimes. Administrative Aspects of Market Access. The TIC will examine administrative measures affecting trade in the region, the impact of the Uruguay Round disciplines on those measures, and means to address outstanding issues within the region. Standards and Conformance. The TIC will define APEC's role in standards, mutual recognition of certification arrangements, and harmonization based upon international standards. Small-Medium Enterprises. The TIC will examine the APEC environment for small and medium enterprises and means to enhance their trade and investment activity in the region. Uruguay Round. The TIC will review the results of the Uruguay Round and its implications for the region and provide assistance within APEC on implementation of Uruguay Round results. Eminent Persons Group Topics. The TIC will address, with guidance from the ministers, topics selected by the Eminent Persons Group. Additional Issues. The TIC will devise procedures for evaluating member economies' proposals for consideration of new issues. EPG Report: The Challenge of Expanding Regional Economic Cooperation Dr. Fred Bergsten--chair of the group charged by the Bangkok ministerial with the task of developing a long-term vision for APEC--briefed the senior officials in Honolulu on the EPG's findings concerning the region's economic outlook and its recommendations for meeting future economic challenges. The EPG members were unanimous in recommending that APEC move forward by taking the first steps toward creating an Asia-Pacific economic community, with the vision of eventual free trade and investment in the region. No date was recommended for reaching this objective, but the EPG feels APEC's progress toward the goal should be reviewed after several years, after which an outside date for completion should be established by the ministers. The EPG is developing a strategy to achieve this vision which calls for initiatives in three areas: Trade liberalization--including proposals for further multilateral liberalization and support for global liberalization; Trade facilitation--including development of an Asia-Pacific investment code and settlement process for trade disputes, macroeconomic and monetary policy cooperation, mutual recognition and testing of product standards, coordination of competition policies, cooperation on environmental policies, and revision in rules of origin; and Technical cooperation--including promotion of student exchanges for human resource development and future cooperation in finance and physical investments. Background: The Formation and Evolution of APEC By 1989, increasing integration around the Pacific Rim led to a number of proposals for an organization to promote cooperation among the economies of the region. The U.S. supported the 1989 initiative by Australian Prime Minister Hawke which led to the November 6-7 meeting that year in Canberra of foreign and economic ministers and the formation of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Annual ministerial meetings have been held in Singapore, Seoul, and Bangkok. The U.S. will host the fifth APEC ministerial meeting in Seattle on November 17-19, 1993. The November 1989 APEC ministerial meeting in Canberra was attended by the six nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)--Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand--and by Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and the United States. Its major accomplishment was to focus attention on regional economic issues, particularly the need for a successful Uruguay Round. Ministers also set the process of continued cooperation in motion by agreeing to meet again in 1990 and 1991 and by tasking their senior officials to begin preparations for future meetings. There was no consensus on the structure of regional economic cooperation. To provide continuity, it became APEC practice for senior officials to meet regularly between annual ministerial meetings, with the host of the upcoming ministerial meeting acting as chair and providing secretariat and other services for 1 year. The second APEC ministerial meeting took place in Singapore in July 1990. At that meeting, ministers endorsed seven areas of cooperation, which became APEC's first work projects: -- Trade and investment data; -- Trade promotion; -- Investment and technology transfer; -- Human resources development; -- Energy; -- Marine resources conservation; and -- Telecommunications. With the meetings of these work projects, APEC was becoming a very active, if informal, organization. Ministers identified regional trade liberalization, consistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, as a central theme of APEC and instructed senior officials to explore the possibilities in the area. As in the first and all subsequent ministerials, the ministers emphasized the need for a successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round and sought to provide a political impetus to the negotiations by issuing a statement on the round. The ministers also welcomed Canada's offer to host a meeting of APEC trade ministers, which was held in Vancouver in September 1990. The continuity of APEC was firmly established with the agreement that future ministerial meetings would take place in Thailand in 1992 and in the U.S. in 1993. After a year of active Korean diplomacy, the November 1991 APEC ministerial in Seoul saw the entry of China, Hong Kong, and Chinese Taipei into the organization. APEC then included all the major economies of the Asia-Pacific region. Ministers deferred decisions on other economies which had expressed interest in joining APEC, in favor of consolidating the organization and further defining its role. There was a growing consensus that APEC should move beyond an annual forum for ministers to become a formal international organization, but full agreement was not yet possible. Ministers adopted the Seoul APEC declaration, which sets forth the objectives, activities, and broad organization of the group. Ministers approved three additional work projects covering transportation, tourism, and fisheries. It was informally agreed to cap the number of work projects at 10. Ministers directed that work continue on regional economic trends and issues and regional trade liberalization, but these are pursued in informal working groups. Work on the formal organization of APEC continued under the Thai chairmanship. In September 1992, ministers adopted the Bangkok Declaration on APEC Institutional Arrangements--which formally established APEC as an international organization, provided for a permanent Secretariat in Singapore, and established a budget and financial procedures. The scale of contributions to the APEC budget was established, ranging from 2.5% for smaller economies to 18% for Japan and the United States. The Bangkok ministerial agreed to establish an Eminent Persons Group to enunciate a vision for trade in the Asia-Pacific region to the year 2000 and identify constraints and issues that should be considered by APEC. Proposals to establish an electronic tariff database, customs harmonization procedures, administrative aspects of market access, and a survey of investment regulations in APEC were endorsed to move regional trade liberalization ahead in the near term. Requests to join APEC were considered, but ministers again deferred decisions, while asking senior officials to examine the case for participation by Mexico and others. Indonesia will assume the APEC chair in 1994, followed by Japan (1995), Philippines (1996), and Canada (1997). It has become practice in APEC that an ASEAN country holds the chair every other year. (###) APEC Meetings in Seattle, November 1993 November 14-17, APEC senior officials meeting November 17-19, APEC ministerial meeting hosted and chaired by Secretary of State Warren Christopher November 19-20, APEC economic leaders meeting hosted by President Clinton (###) Senior Officials Meetings During the U.S. Chair, 1992-93 Washington, December 1992 Williamsburg, March 1993 Seattle, June 1993 Honolulu, September 1993 Seattle, November 1993 (###) Participating Economies Australia, Brunei, Canada, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, United States (###) For More Information For additional information on APEC, write or call: Public Information Service Bureau of Public Affairs U.S. Department of State 2201 C St., NW Washington, DC 20520-6810 Tel: (202) 647-6575 Titles of interest include: -- "Building a New Pacific Community," President Clinton's speech at Waseda University, Japan, July 7, 1993; -- "Fundamentals of Security for a New Pacific Community," President Clinton's speech before the South Korean National Assembly, July 10, 1993; -- "The United States: A Full Partner in a New Pacific Community," Secretary Christopher's statement at the ASEAN post-ministerial conference in Singapore, July 26, 1993; and -- "A New Pacific Community: Ten Goals for American Policy," Assistant Secretary Winston Lord's confirmation hearing statement, March 31, 1993. (###) ARTICLE 6: U.S. Policy Toward Nicaragua Alexander F. Watson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Statement before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, October 6, 1993 Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee: Thank you for giving me this opportunity to join you for a discussion of the situation in Nicaragua and the policies that this Administration is implementing to advance democracy and human rights, encourage economic development, protect property rights, and ensure regional security. Since this is the first of what I hope will be many appearances before you and the subcommittee, I would like to take a few moments to tell you about the opportunities we see before us in advancing U.S. interests in Nicaragua and throughout the hemisphere. A principal goal of President Clinton in Latin America is to strengthen the prevalence of civilian, elected governments throughout the region and to promote their evolution toward full and vibrant democratic societies with dynamic, market-oriented economies. For the first time in its history, U.S. interests and influence in this hemisphere face no threats from external powers. Moreover, U.S. values are shared to an unprecedented degree by nearly every country in the region. It is vital that the United States avail itself of this unique historic opportunity to enhance and deepen the commitment of all nations of the hemisphere to the core values of U.S. foreign policy. It was the lure of this vision of democratic states pursuing economic well-being through open markets that drew Nicaragua back to the hemispheric community in 1990, when Mrs. Violeta Chamorro was freely elected as President of Nicaragua. President Chamorro faced a daunting array of problems when she took office in April 1990, and her government has made progress in a number of areas. But Nicaragua--and the United States as well--is still confronting the debilitating inheritance of decades of dictatorship, war, revolution, and economic mismanagement. The United States and nascent Central American democracies will pay a very high cost should the democratically elected government of President Chamorro fail. That is why this Administration emphasizes both strong support for her government and energetic efforts to foster internationally facilitated political reconciliation among all parties. We recognize that accomplishing our objectives regarding democracy, human rights, property, and the economy depends on Nicaraguans establishing the necessary political conditions for these changes. Nicaragua currently faces simultaneous political, military, and economic crises. The three main political forces--the government of President Chamorro, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), and the National Opposition Union (UNO)--have become mutually antagonistic, to the point of national paralysis. Restoration of a basic consensus on how to continue the country's democratic process is urgently needed. The Clinton Administration believes that here in Washington we must also reach a new consensus to restore a bipartisan approach to Nicaragua if we are to support democratic progress there. I hope that my appearance before you today will begin the process of forging this bipartisan approach. Assessment of the Situation in Nicaragua At the inception of her administration, President Chamorro made the very personal decision to break with the traditions of victors and vanquished in Nicaragua and to establish the principle that her government would seek national reconciliation among all sectors of Nicaraguan society. This was neither an easy nor a popular decision but was based on Mrs. Chamorro's conviction that cycles of partisan recrimination had to be ended. In practical terms, this meant that the UNO coalition which had supported her candidacy would rule not over the powerful Sandinista minority but with it. In retrospect, an undesirable consequence of this policy of reconciliation was to leave control of the military, police, and intelligence functions in the hands of Sandinistas, some of whom were unwilling to abide by the new, democratic rules of Nicaragua. There is little doubt that Sandinista leadership of the military contributed to the necessary reduction in the size of the Sandinista Popular Army (EPS) and to the disarming of thousands of former combatants. Over the last 3 years, the Sandinista Popular Army demobilized to about 13,000 from 85,000 troops. Hundreds of thousands of lethal weapons were collected from irregular forces and destroyed under international supervision. I would like to make special mention of the work of the OAS in Nicaragua. The OAS civilian mission, the CIAV, has contributed much to disarmament and the protection of human rights. And the Jurists Commission, an initiative promoted by Congressmen Smith and Livingston, is also engaged in a valuable review of several legal issues in Nicaragua. However, many Sandinista officers have failed to demonstrate the respect and subservience to civilian control which is a requirement of democratic government. Significant violations of human rights have occurred in Nicaragua, and investigations by independent observers and by a tripartite commission composed of the government, the OAS/CIAV, and the Catholic Church have linked many of these abuses to current members of the police, army, and intelligence services. In addition, the recent discoveries of clandestine arms caches have raised profound concerns in Nicaragua and abroad over the possibility that past links between the Sandinista-controlled security forces and international terrorism may have continued to the present. President Chamorro has recognized the corrosive effects of security forces out of control, and in a courageous speech on September 2--delivered on Army Day before the assembled officer corps--she announced her intention to establish civilian government control over the security apparatus. Her legal, constitutional, and legitimate action initially provoked defiance from the senior command of the Sandinista Popular Army and the FSLN. This dangerous conflict with the security forces is compounded by other developments which have contributed to further erosion of the fragile political consensus supporting Mrs. Chamorro's government. The loose coalition of parties in the UNO have ceased supporting the Government of Nicaragua and are in increasingly strident opposition. Groups of former national resistance fighters--recontras--and former EPS members--recompas--continue to resort to armed force to exact concessions from the government. As the occupation of the town of Esteli in July and the two hostage crises of August demonstrate, law and order is tenuous, and further deterioration in the political situation could trigger an escalation of violence. Inheriting from the Sandinistas an economy in chaos, President Chamorro has successfully pursued a courageous macroeconomic stabilization program, dramatically reducing inflation and stabilizing the value of the Nicaraguan currency. Yet the political disarray has provoked a worsening situation in an already resource-poor economy devastated by years of conflict. GNP is declining, there is little new investment, foreign exchange reserves are critically low, and the prospect for inflows of external assistance is uncertain. The economic crisis is profound and acute. The Need for Reconciliation The Administration believes that the only way solutions to these crises will be found is through political reconciliation between the Government of Nicaragua, the FSLN, and UNO. The Government of Nicaragua shares this perspective and launched an initiative to begin talks on a national accord among these political actors. The parties are in basic agreement on the agenda for the talks, which includes reviving the National Assembly and reforming the constitution. The government has held bilateral meetings with UNO and the FSLN, and the FSLN and UNO have met, but trilateral negotiations are yet to begin. The consequences of continued political paralysis and deterioration--increased civil unrest, a renewed cycle of violence, and economic chaos--are so undesirable for Nicaragua, the rest of Central America, and the region that we believe that all friends of Nicaragua must support, in every way possible, further progress in these talks. A New Approach to Nicaragua The Administration's new approach to Nicaragua emphasizes strong support for the legitimately elected government of President Chamorro, with energetic efforts to foster internationally facilitated political reconciliation among all parties. Accomplishing our objectives regarding democracy, protection of human and property rights, and the economy depends on Nicaraguans establishing the necessary political conditions for these changes. Some Nicaraguans expect the U.S. to solve their problems for them and, consequently, do not strive for solutions locally. Others use opposition to us as a disguise for an inability to develop their own constructive solutions. This Administration has one simple message to the parties in contention in Nicaragua: Seek a national accord through dialogue and compromise among yourselves; do not seek the answers to your problems in Washington. In order for us to help create the conditions under which political reconciliation can succeed, we must convince all participants--UNO and the FSLN as well as the government--of the need for compromise. Ultimately, Nicaraguans--and only Nicaraguans--can solve their country's problems. But to do so, political rivals must accept that they bear joint and equal responsibility for this; they must be prepared to moderate their personal and political differences and labor patiently to establish a consensus on Nicaragua's democratic future. To the Chamorro government, we offer our strong support and encouragement. Yet we are also pressing it to take actions within its authority on key issues, particularly civilian control over the security forces, human rights, expropriated property, and national reconciliation. To the UNO, we have communicated our strong support for dialogue with the freely elected government of Nicaragua. UNO's insistence on what they would regard as a perfect national accord could result in failure to obtain a good accord. They are mistaken if they hope that, instead of working with the Chamorro government, they can get U.S. support for themselves through intransigence. With the FSLN, we have opened new channels of communication--including with Daniel and Humberto Ortega, party leader and army commander, respectively. Our message to the FSLN is that we will accept the Sandinistas as a legitimate political force to the extent that they follow the democratic rules of the game. A fundamental tenet of democracy is civilian control of the army and the intelligence service. We believe that this is a critical moment for the Sandinista party, when it must choose between its authoritarian past and a democratic future. Concretely, this means that it must comply with the bold decisions announced by President Chamorro on September 2 to establish civilian control over the security forces. These decisions include a law setting term limits for senior military officers, including Gen. Humberto Ortega; transferring the intelligence service to the presidency and naming a civilian head; and ending military and police impunity by eliminating military jurisdiction over crimes against civilians. Mrs. Chamorro has indicated her intention to announce her new choice as army commander next year. We agree with President Chamorro's judgment that General Ortega's replacement as army commander is desirable--the sooner the better--so that civilian control over the military can be achieved. Our policy goes beyond specific personalities, however, and focuses on the need for broader, more profound, and durable institutional change. In this regard, Mrs. Chamorro assured me personally last week at the United Nations that she intends to keep what she calls "the commitments to the Nicaraguan people" she made on September 2 and that steps toward their implementation will be taken very soon. We have made it clear that we have absolutely no sympathy for renewed recourse to violence by any group. We are aware of allegations that recontra organizations may be trying to obtain illegal support from U.S.-based sympathizers. We issued a public statement in June warning that the United States is fully prepared to prosecute those who violate U.S. neutrality and related laws. I reiterate that pledge today. International efforts can make an important contribution to the process of reconciliation by helping to reduce mistrust and hostility among the Nicaraguan participants. The Central American Presidents, as well as the Governments of Spain, Mexico, Colombia, Chile, and Venezuela, along with OAS Secretary General Baena Soares, have been playing a most constructive role. The United Nations Development Program has also worked tirelessly to convince the Nicaraguan parties to solve their conflicts through dialogue and negotiation. We are encouraging all of these influential actors to seek ways to make their participation even more effective, working in close coordination--particularly with the OAS--to persuade the Nicaraguan parties to cooperate for the sake of their country's future. Nicaragua's Possible Links to International Terrorism Members of Congress and the American public were justifiably alarmed by the suggestion, in some news coverage of the May 23 arms cache explosion in Santa Rosa, that the Government of Nicaragua or elements of it may have been connected to a terrorist attack on the World Trade Center or to a ring of terrorist kidnapings based in Nicaragua. Based on preliminary reports and evidence available to date, we are reasonably assured that the current Government of Nicaragua is not involved in such activities, and we are encouraged by the investigation it is carrying out with assistance from a U.S. interagency team and investigators from Mexico, Venezuela, and Spain. The Nicaraguan Government has given broad cooperation to the team of international investigators and is following up leads uncovered in the investigation. The FPL, a component of the Salvadoran FMLN, admitted that the Santa Rosa weapons cache belonged to them. The investigation also led to the discovery of other arms caches, including one belonging to a Guatemalan guerrilla group, the URNG. More needs to be done, however, to make this investigation comprehensive and credible. For example, investigators have yet to establish where the Salvadoran FPL obtained its weapons or the identity of those responsible for the kidnaping-surveillance documents found in the cache. Over 7,000 separate documents have been recovered and are undergoing detailed examination by the Department of Defense and other investigative agencies here in the United States. Investigators also determined that 11 of the 19 surface-to-air missiles found in the Santa Rosa cache came from EPS stocks. In addition, we are concerned about the locations of over 100 surface-to-air missiles that were originally in EPS stocks but are as yet unaccounted for. We will return to the Congress with a complete report on the arms cache investigation when it has advanced further. The Property Issue The United States continues to press the Government of Nicaragua to resolve U.S. citizens' property claims more expeditiously. We recently established a new, mid-level Foreign Service officer position in the embassy dedicated exclusively to this issue. Nicaragua has also set up comprehensive, institutional mechanisms for resolving property claims. In the last 2 months, the Finance Ministry assigned a new position to deal directly with U.S. claims and opened an office to inform bond recipients of how they can use their compensation bonds in government auctions of properties. To date, 119 U.S. citizen property claims have been fully or substantially resolved out of 1,222 properties in dispute. Five American citizens have had all of their claims resolved completely. Eighteen U.S. citizens have accepted bond compensation. In addition to the Rosario Mining case, which involved bond compensation of over $20 million, Nicaragua recently settled with Mr. Richard Bell, a U.S. citizen with a major property claim. Mr. Bell accepted a 38-million-cordoba (U.S. $6-million) bond settlement. Assistance to Nicaragua Mr. Chairman, Nicaragua has critical need of external assistance to shore up its economy and to help consolidate its democracy. The Clinton Administration supports President Chamorro's goal of national reconciliation and wants to see her government succeed. It is within such a framework of reconciliation and political consensus that progress on key national issues is most likely to be made. At the same time, and while recognizing how difficult the problems are, we look to the Chamorro administration for decisive leadership in the areas I have discussed here today. External aid alone cannot sustain or ensure the success of the Chamorro government. There simply is not enough aid available within the international donor community for that purpose. As you know, budgetary pressures and new demands for our foreign aid make the near-term outlook for U.S. assistance especially bleak. Therefore, Nicaragua must generate in those who would invest there--Nicaraguans and foreign investors alike--confidence that the country is on the right path economically and politically. This is one reason why in our bilateral aid relationship we have placed such emphasis upon resolution of property disputes, civilian control of security forces, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. That is also why the Administration welcomed the bold decisions that President Chamorro announced September 2. As President Chamorro moves to implement her public commitments to the Nicaraguan people, we will consult with the Congress concerning any release of our FY 1993 economic support funds. I should note, however, that the bilateral assistance we can offer, while highly important, is dwarfed by the approximately $130 million in multilateral and other donor assistance which is linked to the conclusion of an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility for Nicaragua with the International Monetary Fund. At the April 1993 meeting of the World Bank Consultative Group in Paris, Nicaragua's international donors expressed continued support but underlined--as do we--the importance of national political reconciliation as the prerequisite for effective use of international assistance. We hope and expect that the pending trilateral talks will establish a new consensus among the government, the FSLN, and UNO about the direction of Nicaraguan social and economic policy. We believe that such a policy should aim at reactivating production in Nicaragua and address the dire conditions now prevailing in rural areas. We understand that Mrs. Chamorro plans to invite grass-roots participation in the national dialogue on economic reform. Our own aid programs will place greater emphasis on grass-roots participation in the economic life of the nation. Nicaragua's Choice Nicaragua's leaders--of all political persuasions--need to understand that two paths lie before them. With a broad, national consensus and the political will to advance Nicaragua's commitments in the areas of democracy and human rights, protection of property rights, civilian control of the military, and economic reactivation, Nicaraguans will find the United States and the international community ready to work in an effective partnership to help their country succeed. Absent consensus and political will, international engagement in Nicaragua will be reduced, and that nation will postpone the day when it truly completes its transition to democratic norms and sets the foundation for long-term prosperity. The Administration appreciates the leadership this subcommittee has shown in the public discussion of these issues, and we look forward to working with you to help Nicaraguans build a democratic society. (###) ARTICLE 7: UN Security Council Adopts Resolution 873 on Haiti Madeleine K. Albright, UNSC Resolution Madeleine K. Albright Statement by the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations before the UN Security Council, New York City, October 13, 1993. Mr. President, this past Monday, the military leaders of Haiti violated a solemn agreement. That agreement sought to resolve peacefully the governmental crisis in their country. Armed demonstrators, acting with police and military support, prevented U.S. troops on a UN mission from entering Haiti. These troops were invited into Haiti by Haiti's Prime Minister, Robert Malval. America's troops were not sent to confront the military or police but to provide technical and training assistance. The Governors Island agreement of July 3, 1993, called for this mission. But my government has said from the outset that our participation depended upon the willingness of the Haitian military to provide, as promised, a cooperative and secure environment. We have never suggested or threatened an intervention in Haiti over the opposition of the military, nor has that course of action ever been endorsed or proposed by Haiti's elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. This has never been--nor should it be--some kind of gunboat diplomacy. The events in Port-au-Prince on Monday demonstrated a Haitian military capability that has never been contested. The force of the mob was used to delay a mission that would never have been undertaken without their consent. Some in Haiti may think that a great victory has been won, but this would be a dangerous delusion. Mr. President, the day will come when democratic rule is restored to Haiti. The Governors Island agreement sought to ensure that the transition would be peaceful, that recriminations would be minimal, and that amnesty would be given to those who illegally ousted a democratically elected president. General Cedras and Police Chief Francois have chosen a perilous, self-defeating, and dishonorable course. They are riding a tiger that may ultimately devour them. We urge them to reconsider their actions now. Another blow has been struck against Haitian democracy. To the vast majority of the Haitian people, I say that the community of nations remains with you. The members of this Council are with you. The Organization of American States is with you, and the Caribbean Community is with you. Today, this Council votes to reimpose economic sanctions. We have not taken this decision lightly. But we know that imposing sanctions in New York has changed behavior in Port-au-Prince. Tough economic sanctions brought the Haitian military to the bargaining table last July. Our hope is that today's renewal of sanctions will provide another wake-up call to those who seek to extinguish the democratic flame in Haiti. I want to thank my colleagues on this Council who have cooperated in this quick action. My government will take firm measures to enforce this resolution. We will direct travel and financial sanctions against individuals obstructing the agreement. We will maintain the pressure for democratic change in every manner possible, short of an armed intervention that no one wants. We will continue to explore every avenue for a peaceful solution. In closing, let me say to this Council and the people of Haiti: The U.S. is committed to the return of Haitian democracy. Achieving this goal will not be easy. Our preferred course is not the stick of sanctions but the carrot of economic and technical assistance. Today, the Haitian military left us no choice. But when the day comes that democracy dawns again in Haiti, my government stands ready to begin with you, the people of Haiti, the job of rebuilding and revitalizing your country. Resolution 873 (October 13, 1993) The Security Council, Recalling its resolutions 841 (1993) of 16 June 1993, 861 (1993) of 27 August 1993, 862 (1993) of 31 August 1993 and 867 (1993) of 23 September 1993, Deeply disturbed by the continued obstruction of the arrival of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), dispatched pursuant to resolution 867 (1993), and the failure of the Armed Forces of Haiti to carry out their responsibilities to allow the Mission to begin its work, Having received the report of the Secretary-General (S/26573) informing the Council that the military authorities of Haiti, including the police, have not complied in good faith with the Governors Island Agreement, Determining that their failure to fulfil obligations under the agreement constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Decides, in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 861 (1993), to terminate the suspension of the measures set out in paragraphs 5 to 9 of resolution 841 (1993) as of 2359 hours Eastern Standard Time on 18 October 1993 unless the Secretary-General, having regard for the views of the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, reports to the Council that the parties to the Governors Island Agreement and any other authorities in Haiti are implementing in full the agreement to reinstate the legitimate Government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and have established the necessary measures to enable UNMIH to carry out its mandate; 2. Decides also that funds that are required to be frozen pursuant to paragraph 8 of resolution 841 (1993) may be released at the request of President Aristide or Prime Minister Malval of Haiti; 3. Decides further that the Committee established by paragraph 10 of resolution 841 (1993) shall have the authority, in addition to that set forth in that paragraph, to grant exceptions to the prohibitions (other than those referred to in paragraph 2 above) referred to in paragraph 1 above on a case-by-case basis under the no-objection procedure in response to requests by President Aristide or Prime Minister Malval of Haiti; 4. Confirms its readiness to consider urgently the imposition of additional measures if the Secretary-General informs the Security Council that the parties to the Governors Island Agreement or any other authorities in Haiti continue to impede the activities of UNMIH or interfere with the freedom of movement and communication of UNMIH and its members as well as the other rights necessary for the performance of its mandate, or have not complied in full with relevant Security Council resolutions and the provisions of the Governors Island Agreement; 5. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. VOTE: Unanimous (15-0). (###) END OF DISPATCH VOL 4, NO 43.
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