US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 4, NUMBER 42, OCTOBER 18, 1993
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:

1.  U.S. Military Involvement In Somalia--President Clinton
2.  Achieving a Political Settlement In Somalia--Secretary
Christopher, Defense Secretary Aspin, Admiral Jeremiah 
3.  Reimposing Sanctions On Haiti--President Clinton 
4.  U.S. Response to Events In Haiti--Secretary Christopher 
5.  Remaking American Diplomacy In the Post-Cold War
World--Secretary Christopher
6.  Feature:  Building Bridges to the Future at the National
Foreign Affairs Training Center
7.  U.S. Policy on Support for Reform In the New Independent
States--Strobe Talbott 
8.  The New Centrality of Economics:  The U.S. and the
Asia-Pacific Region--Joan E. Spero
9.  Audiovisual Services and Products Under GATT--President
Clinton
10.  U.S. Policy on Japan and the New Japanese
Government--Winston Lord 
11.  Status of Bosnian Peace Negotiations--Stephen A. Oxman
12.  The Vital Task of Lebanon's Reconstruction--Edward P.
Djerejian  
13.  Treaty Actions 


ARTICLE 1

U.S. Military Involvement in Somalia
President Clinton
Address to the Nation, Washington, DC, October 7, 1993

Today I want to talk with you about our nation's military
involvement in Somalia.  A year ago, we all watched with horror
as Somali children and their families lay dying by the tens of
thousands--dying the slow, agonizing death of starvation, of
starvation brought on not only by drought, but also by the
anarchy that then prevailed in that country.

This past weekend we all reacted with anger and horror as an
armed Somali gang desecrated the bodies of our American soldiers
and displayed a captured American pilot--all of them soldiers
who were taking part in an international effort to end the
starvation of the Somali people themselves.  These tragic events
raise hard questions about our effort in Somalia.  Why are we
still there?  What are we trying to accomplish?  How did a
humanitarian mission turn violent?  And when will our people
come home?

These questions deserve straight answers.  Let's start by
remembering why our troops went into Somalia in the first place.
 We went because only the United States could help stop 
one of the great human tragedies of this time.  A third of a
million people had died of starvation and disease.  Twice that
many more were at risk of dying.  Meanwhile, tons of relief
supplies piled up in the capital of Mogadishu because a small
number of Somalis stopped food from reaching their own
countrymen.

Our consciences said, enough.  In our nation's best tradition,
we took action with bipartisan support.  President Bush sent in
28,000 American troops as part of a United Nations humanitarian
mission.  Our troops created a secure environment so that food
and medicine could get through.  We saved close to 1 million
lives.  And throughout most of Somalia--everywhere but in
Mogadishu--life began returning to normal.  Crops are growing,
markets are reopening; so are schools and hospitals.  Nearly 1
million Somalis still depend completely on relief supplies, but
at least the starvation is gone.  And none of this would have
happened without American leadership and America's troops.

Until June, things went well, with little violence.  The United
States reduced our troop presence from 28,000 down to less than
5,000, with other nations picking up where we left off.  But
then in June, the people who caused much of the problem in the
beginning started attacking American, Pakistani, and other
troops who were there just to keep the peace.  Rather than
participate in building the peace with others, these people
sought to fight and to disrupt, even if it meant returning
Somalia to anarchy and mass famine.  And make no mistake about
it:  If we were to leave Somalia tomorrow, other nations would
leave too.  Chaos would resume, the relief effort would stop,
and starvation soon would return.

That knowledge has led us to continue our mission.  It is not
our job to rebuild Somalia's society, or even to create a
political process that can allow Somalia's clans to live and
work in peace; the Somalis must do that for themselves.  The
United Nations and many African states are more than willing to
help.  But we--we in the United States--must decide whether we
will give them enough time to have a reasonable chance to
succeed.

We started this mission for the right reasons, and we're going
to finish it in the right way.  In a sense, we came to Somalia
to rescue innocent people in a burning house.  We've nearly put
the fire out, but some smoldering embers remain.  If we leave
them now, those embers will re-ignite into flames, and people
will die again.  If we stay a short while longer and do the
right things, we've got a reasonable chance of cooling off the
embers and getting other firefighters to take our place.

We also have to recognize that we cannot leave now and still
have all our troops present and accounted for.  And I want you
to know that I am determined to work for the security of those
Americans missing or held captive.  Anyone holding an American
right now should understand, above all else, that we will hold 
them strictly responsible for our soldiers' well-being.  We
expect them to be well-treated, and we expect them to be
released.

So now we face a choice.  Do we leave when the job gets tough,
or when the job is well done?  Do we invite a return of mass
suffering, or do we leave in a way that gives the Somalis a
decent chance to survive?

Recently, General Colin Powell said this about our choices in
Somalia:  

Because things get difficult, you don't cut and run;  you work
the problem and try to find a correct solution.

I want to bring our troops home from Somalia.  Before the events
of this week, as I said, we had already reduced the number of
our troops there from 28,000 to less than 5,000.  We must
complete that withdrawal soon, and I will.  But we must also
leave on our terms.  We must do it right.  And here is what I
intend to do.

This past week's events make it clear that even as we prepare to
withdraw from Somalia, we need more strength there.  We need
more armor, more air power, to ensure that our people are safe
and that we can do our job.  Today, I have ordered 1,700
additional Army troops and 104 additional armored vehicles to
Somalia to protect our troops and to complete our mission.  I
have also ordered an aircraft carrier and two amphibious groups
with 3,600 combat Marines to be stationed offshore.  These
forces will be under American command.  Their mission, what I am
asking these young Americans to do, is the following:

First, they are there to protect our troops and our bases.  We
did not go to Somalia with a military purpose.  We never wanted
to kill anyone.  But those who attack our soldiers must know
they will pay a very heavy price.

Second, they are there to keep open and secure the roads, the
port, and the lines of communication that are essential for the
United Nations and the relief workers to keep the flow of food,
supplies, and people moving freely throughout the country so
that starvation and anarchy do not return.

Third, they are there to keep the pressure on those who cut off
relief supplies and attacked our people.  Not to personalize the
conflict, but to prevent a return to anarchy.

Fourth, through their pressure and their presence, our troops
will help to make it possible for the Somali people, working
with others, to reach agreements among themselves so that they
can solve their problems and survive when we leave.  That is our
mission.

I am proposing this plan because it will let us finish leaving
Somalia on our own terms and without destroying all that two
administrations have accomplished there.  For, if we were to
leave today, we know what would happen.  Within months, Somali
children again would be dying in the streets.  Our own
credibility with friends and allies would be severely damaged. 
Our leadership in world affairs would be undermined at the very
time when people are looking to America to help promote peace
and freedom in the post-Cold War world.  And all around the
world, aggressors, thugs, and terrorists will conclude that the
best way to get us to change our policies is to kill our
people.It would be open season on Americans.

That is why I am committed to getting this job done in Somalia,
not only quickly, but also effectively.  To do that, I am taking
steps to ensure troops from other nations are ready to take the
place of our own soldiers.  We have already withdrawn some
20,000 troops, and more than that number have replaced them from
over two dozen other nations.  Now we will intensify efforts to
have other countries deploy more troops to Somalia to assure
that security will remain when we are gone.  And we will
complete the replacement of U.S. military logistics personnel
with civilian contractors who can provide the same support to
the United Nations.  While we are taking military steps to
protect our own people and to help the UN maintain a secure
environment, we must pursue new diplomatic efforts to help the
Somalis find a political solution to their problems.  That is
the only kind of outcome that can endure.

Fundamentally, the solution to Somalia's problems is not a
military one.  It is political.  Leaders of the neighboring
African states, such as Ethiopia and Eritrea, have offered to
take the lead in efforts to build a settlement among the Somali
people that can preserve order and security.  I have directed my
representatives to pursue such efforts vigorously.  I have asked
Ambassador Bob Oakley, who served effectively in two
administrations as our representative in Somalia, to travel
again to the region immediately to advance this process.

Obviously, even then there is no guarantee that Somalia will rid
itself of violence and suffering.  But at least we will have
given Somalia a reasonable chance.  This week some 15,000
Somalis took to the streets to express sympathy for our losses,
to thank us for our effort.  Most Somalis are not hostile to us,
but grateful.  They want to use this opportunity to rebuild
their country.

It is my judgment--and that of my military advisors--that we may
need up to 6 months to complete these steps and to conduct an
orderly withdrawal.  We will do what we can to complete the
mission before then.  All American troops will be out of Somalia
no later than March 31, except for a few hundred support
personnel in noncombat roles.  If we take these steps--if we
take the time to do the job right--I am convinced we will have
lived up to the responsibilities of American 
leadership in the world.  And we will have proved that we are
committed to addressing the new problems of a new era.

When our troops in Somalia came under fire this last weekend, we
witnessed a dramatic example of the heroic ethic of our American
military.  When the first Black Hawk helicopter was downed this
weekend, the other American troops didn't retreat, although they
could have.  Some 90 of them formed a perimeter around the
helicopter, and they held that ground under intensely heavy
fire.  They stayed with their comrades.  That's the kind of
soldiers they are.  That's the kind of people we are.

So let us finish the work we set out to do.  Let us demonstrate
to the world, as generations of Americans have done before us,
that when Americans take on a challenge, they do the job right.

Let me express my thanks and my gratitude and my profound
sympathy to the families of the young Americans who were killed
in Somalia.  My message to you is, your country is grateful, and
so is the rest of the world, and so are the vast majority of the
Somali people.  Our mission from this day forward is to increase
our strength, do our job, bring our soldiers out, and bring them
home.  Thank you, and God bless America.  (###)



ARTICLE 2

Achieving a Political Settlement in Somalia
Secretary Christopher, Defense Secretary Aspin, Admiral Jeremiah
Remarks at White House press briefing, Washington, DC, October
7, 1993

Secretary Christopher.  Good afternoon.  You have just heard the
President explain the reasons why American forces went to
Somalia, what they have accomplished, and the reasons why the
forces will remain there.  

From the standpoint of American foreign policy, the steadiness
of purpose that the President showed is absolutely essential for
the effective conduct of a foreign policy.  Any less resolute a
course would certainly have been damaging, and I am very pleased
that this determined course has been set. 

In a few minutes, Secretary Aspin will describe the military
aspects, and Admiral Jeremiah will speak to an aspect of that as
well.  But first, I would like to discuss our diplomatic
strategy under the policy that the President laid down today.

We have been pressing the United Nations to refocus the Somalia
operation on the political process of national reconciliation. 
Secretary General Boutros-Ghali will travel to the region later
this month, and he has indicated that the UN will pursue rapid
progress on the political track.  At the same time, we're 
sending messages to 30 countries that contribute various kinds
of support to the UNOSOM effort, asking that they remain in the
country until it is secure. 

The United States has carried the heaviest part of the load in
Somalia.  We are now asking certain other countries to increase
the number of their troops there to finish the job.  We have
also asked Ambassador Oakley, who served as Special Envoy to
Somalia from December through March, to meet with leaders in the
region to obtain their support for the political strategy.  He
is leaving for the region tonight.  We have sent a message to
President Meles of Ethiopia, asking him to help bring about an
early cease-fire.  We will be working with President Meles to
establish an independent international commission to investigate
and resolve the issues stemming from the attacks on UNOSOM, and
from the other acts of violence in Somalia. 

We are also sending messages to the leaders of Eritrea, Kenya,
and Djibouti, asking for their help in achieving a political
settlement in Somalia.  We are asking the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) to take an active role in bringing together
the different factions in Somalia.  We have solicited the
support of Egyptian President Mubarak, who is this year
President of the OAU.  We'll be sending a similar message to the
OAU Secretary General Salim Salim.

The United States intends to work particularly closely with
President Meles, the OAU, and the Somalis to try to arrange a
Somali leadership conference as soon as possible.  Almost a year
ago the United States responded heroically to the question of
mass starvation in Somalia; now, we, together with the United
Nations, neighboring countries, and the OAU must work urgently
to help the Somalis find a settlement to the problem and to
mobilize the humanitarian rescue. 

We are looking to the African leaders to help us find an African
solution to an African problem.  We are going to be relying
heavily on such leaders as President Meles, President Issaias,
and others in the region to help fashion a solution to the
problem, which goes along with the military track that Secretary
Aspin and General Jeremiah will be talking about.  As I look
back, one of the things that happened over the last several
months is that we focused very heavily on the military track,
and we lost focus on the political track.  We are now asking the
UN to refocus on the political track and to try to seek a
national reconciliation in Somalia so that that country can get
on with its life and well-being.  Secretary Aspin.


Secretary Aspin.  Thank you, Chris.  Let me just do a brief
statement, and then let me talk a little bit about the military
deployments, and then turn it over to Admiral Jeremiah, who also
has some information on the deployments.  

First, I want to say that the American men and women that we
have sent to Somalia have performed their mission with unmatched
distinction.  They represent the very best this nation has to
offer.  There are no words to describe our pride in the bravery
they demonstrated under fire, our agony over the loss of their
precious lives, and the suffering of our wounded and detained. 
There are, however, words available to send a clear message to
those who are illegally detaining an American serviceman.  The
message to Mr. Aideed is this:  Do not underestimate American
resolve.  Do not think that any harm you do to our servicemen
will be forgotten by me, the President, or by the American
people.  We intend to have our man back.  And we hold you
personally responsible for his safety.

Besides that statement, let me just say a few words about the
situation as far as the military deployments goes.  First, the
numbers.  After this deployment has been completed, and
including the people that are already in country, the total
number of American servicemen in Somalia will be on the order of
7,100 people.  In addition, there will be an offshore marine
presence which will total 3,600.  So these are the numbers that
are relevant.  There is an on-shore presence that will go
from--roughly, what is it now, 4,500, 4,800--up to 7,100, and
the number will be augmented by an offshore marine presence
which may be added to the number in country of another 3,600. 

In addition to that, there will, of course, be a naval presence
in the area, but none of them will be on shore in Somalia.  In
particular, of course, there is the aircraft carrier Abraham
Lincoln coming into the area, and that adds about 6,000 people
on board that ship alone. 

What this added capability will allow is three things:  

First, it will allow moving the QRF to its old mission.  The
QRF, as you remember, was essentially designed to be a
quick-reaction force if somebody got in trouble somewhere in the
fighting within all of Somalia.  The QRF was a quick-reaction
force to reinforce somebody, somewhere in Somalia.  What
happened, though, unfortunately, was the drawdown of the U.S.
forces--the QRF got involved in day-to-day operations in
Mogadishu.  This added military presence will allow the QRF to
go back to its originally designed mission as a quick-reaction
force.  

Second, we will be adding almost a second QRF in the offshore
marines.  The marines will add another capability that can be
inserted at a particular time with a particular mission, and
that would add to the capability.  So there's almost a second
QRF available on the offshore.

The final thing that it does is, it allows--this capability here
includes some air power that we did not have before.  In
particular, there are going to be four AC-130 gunships, and
there are going to be the aircraft off the carrier Abraham
Lincoln, which are available for air strikes in the area. 

Those are the capabilities.  It will allow the United States
military to conduct the mission as described in the President's
speech. It will allow a greater presence.  It is thought that it
will be a force multiplier, because with more American presence
and more American activity, we believe the allies will also show
more activity.  So I think it will be a force multiplier.  It
will, I think, have an impact on the security situation in
Mogadishu.  And the hope which is behind all of this, is
essentially to bring about the political agenda which we are
laying out. 

The military mission here is in support of the political agenda.
 The military mission is in support of the political agenda.  To
carry out a military solution to this problem would require a
number of people and an  amount of time and an amount of
commitment of money, which is beyond all reasonable
expectations.  We are putting our efforts into a political
solution here, but we have military components which support
that political process.

Let me now call upon Dave Jeremiah and ask him--we will  have
some questions in a minute.  Let me ask Dave Jeremiah for his
statement.


Admiral Jeremiah, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.   
Thank you, Mr. Secretary.  I thought it would be useful to put
some texture on some of these terms that we have thrown
around--the logistic support group and the QRF.  When the
American forces went into Somalia last December, marines went
ashore, were subsequently joined by soldiers from the 10th
Mountain Division in Mogadishu, and fanned out across the depth
and range of Somalia--southern Somalia--with the objective of
restoring order and of permitting the transportation of food to
famished people throughout this country.  That was done. 

At the same time, we had allies who came in and supported that
effort under UNITAF.  Over time, we stabilized the situation in
Somalia, and it came in time with the introduction of additional
troops, and with a stable situation and a secure situation, and
to move out and bring back American soldiers, the 20,000 that
the President referred to earlier--20,000 soldiers and marines. 
They were replaced by soldiers from other countries.  Those
countries are listed up here in the boxes:  Koreans, Nigerians,
Kuwaitis, people from the UAE, Botswana, Norway--a host of
nations.  Many of those nations do not have the ability to
handle the logistics to supply them in places like Jalalaqsi and
Beled Weyne and Oddur.  In order to do that, the United States
came out as part of the continuing effort that the President
referred to, to give the Somali people a chance.  We agreed to
provide the logistics network to support these folks.

I have been in Oddur.  It is a long way from nowhere.  It is a
pretty scary place if you are out there all by yourself and a 
bunch of folks come running up to you with a technical--a bunch
of these teenage thugs come up and start to overrun a 20- or
30-man outpost.  Thus, the quick-reaction force allowed us to
fly helicopter-borne American troops quickly to the scene and
reinforce a post or an outpost in the event that we had that
kind of thuggery going on.  We have not had the occasion to do
it.  Our allies who are in that area have been very successful
in carrying it out.  But the requirement remains in the logistic
support force--the logistic command to support this whole United
Nations effort:  Those two elements were our contribution to the
United Nations mission to continue the effort in Somalia to let
this nation have a chance to survive as a nation.

Now, let me turn to the other chart and simply show you the
range of forces and how we draw forces into a particular
situation around the globe.  Every day that we have dealt with
crises over the last 31/2 years that I have been the Vice
Chairman, we have brought to bear the men and women of the armed
forces of the United States:  the 10th Mountain Division from
New York, the 24th Mechanized Division from Georgia.  We brought
some forces in from the Mediterranean, where we had the marines
deployed on navy amphibious ships.  We brought in some air force
AC-130s, and you can see the composition, the numbers of people,
and the organizations that they represent.  We brought the
nuclear powered carrier Lincoln down from the Persian Gulf in
order to provide the firepower that the Secretary mentioned. 
And we brought the amphibious forces--the marine amphibious
forces embarked on amphibious ships just off Malaysia, they are
en route as well.

So we have drawn a total force of about 20,000 people together
to carry out this mission in Somalia to support the political
objectives that Secretary Christopher and Secretary Aspin
mentioned, and that the President of the United States placed
upon us as we discussed this current problem.  Thank you.  (###)



ARTICLE 3

Reimposing Sanctions on Haiti 
President ClintonRemarks made in Washington, DC, upon departure
for Chapel Hill, NC, October 12, 1993

First of all, the objective of the United States is to restore
democracy and President Aristide to Haiti.  The instrument of
that was the sanctions.  We never intended, and we have no
intention now, of interfering in the internal affairs of the
Haitians, except to say that we want democracy and the will of
two-thirds of the Haitian people to be honored.

Now, the Governors Island agreement, which all the parties
signed, invited the international community to come to
Haiti--French-speaking forces, advisers to come in and help to 
train the police; the Canadians and the Americans to come and
help to train the army, particularly for civilian purposes.  One
of the reasons we have so many seabees going in, for example, is
to help the military people change their mission so they can
rebuild their own country.

This is different from the other missions we have been
discussing.  This is not peace-keeping.  This is not
peace-making.  This is an agreement that has been made that, if
honored, would enable our people to come in and simply serve as
trainers--600 of them.  So I have no intention of sending our
people there until the agreement is honored.

What I intend to do now is to press to reimpose the sanctions. 
I will not have our forces deposited on Haiti when they cannot
serve as advisers, when they cannot do what they were asked to
do.  So we are going to press 
for the reimposition of sanctions.  

Mr. Cedras is supposed to resign his post as soon as the
parliament can pass a bill separating the military from the
police.  Mr. Francois is supposed to leave his post.  And they
are going to have to go through with this if they expect to have
a normal existence;  otherwise the United States is going to
press to reimpose the sanctions.  (###)



ARTICLE 4:

U.S. Response to Events in Haiti
Statement by Secretary Christopher, released by the Office of
the Spokesman, Washington, DC,  October 11, 1993.

President Clinton, from the outset of his Administration, has
strongly supported efforts of the United Nations and the
Organization of American States to bring about a return to
constitutional government and President Aristide to his duly
elected position in Haiti.

On July 3 at Governors Island, President Aristide and General
Cedras agreed to a transition process that would culminate in
the return of President Aristide on October 30, 1993.  Part of
that agreement extended an invitation to the international
community to deploy a contingent to assist with the
professionalization of the military and police, and to encourage
them to support the duly constituted government.

Part of this international presence is to include U.S. and
Canadian military engineers and their logistical support.  They
are going to Haiti to help professionalize the Haitian military
by training in basic military skills and by civic action, such
as assistance on construction projects.  They are not going to
perform a peace-keeping mission.

By agreement of all the parties to the Governors Island accords,
this international contingent was to be offered a peaceful
environment with the full support of the local police and
military organizations they would be training and assisting.

Those promises have not been kept.  Elaborate arrangements for
the berthing of an American landing craft, the USS Harland
County, were not in place when it arrived today off Port au
Prince.  The appropriate officials were not on hand to greet the
LST, and there have been provocative demonstrations in the port
area that were not restrained by the police or the military.  We
believe the current situation does not justify docking the ship
at this time.

There are signs throughout Haiti that those who wish to thwart
the return of democracy are testing the government of Prime
Minister Malval and, as important, the will of the international
community.  They are willing to put self-interest in the way of
history and of changes that will benefit all the Haitian people.
 We believe the people of Haiti will find their behavior
unacceptable.

We insist that the Haitian military and police authorities
create a permissive environment and permit the peaceful entry
into Haiti of the military engineers, trainers, and support
staff that are there to help the people of Haiti.  In the view
of the United States, failure to do so would violate the
Governors Island accords to which they are parties.

Moreover, in light of these disturbing developments in Haiti,
the United States will move today in the United Nations Security
Council, to ask the Secretary-General for an urgent report on
the situation in Haiti, and for prompt consideration of
appropriate consequences for a failure to comply with the
Governors Island accords, including the possible reimposition of
economic sanctions which would focus heavily on those most
responsible.  Our Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine
Albright, will raise these points at a meeting of the Security
Council this afternoon.

The UN mission in Haiti, assisted by the U.S., is a mission of
peace.  That mission requires the support of Haitian
authorities.  If they do not meet their responsibilities to the
international community and to the people of Haiti that will
benefit from this work, then they will bear the burden of the
consequences that will follow.  (###)



ARTICLE  5

Remaking American Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World
Secretary Christopher
Address at the inauguration of the National Foreign Affairs
Training Center, Arlington, Virginia, October 13, 1993

Secretary Rogers, Secretary Vance, Secretary Shultz, Secretary
Eagleburger, Congressman Moran, Congressman Wolf, colleagues: 
This new center stands as a proud symbol of the bipartisan
cooperation that has served America so well.  The plans for
these buildings were conceived more than a decade ago.  Every
subsequent Secretary of State has supported this project, and
they have had the vital aid of people like Congressman Moran and
Congressman Wolf.  Support for this facility across the
political spectrum reflects the broad consensus that sustains
American leadership.

This exceptional center will train 15,000 students annually,
using 250 classrooms and 600 rooms in all.  Students will come
from 47 U.S. Government agencies, and they will study 300
courses, including 63 languages.  As far I can tell, the center
will have everything but a football team.

This ceremony has been billed as a public event, but I cannot
resist the feeling that it is more like a family reunion.  We
are a diverse group by any measure, yet we share a bond that is
unique and powerful--lives dedicated in whole or in part to
advancing America's foreign policy interests.

But we share more than a common experience.  We are bound by a
common dedication to the basic goals of American foreign policy:
 to ensure the security of our nation, to enhance its economic
prosperity, and to promote its democratic values.  Advancing the
ideals and the interests of the American people has always been
at the heart of American diplomacy.

It is easy to make light of professional diplomats.  Cartoonists
have been putting them in funny-looking striped pants for years.
 They dress us up--so they can dress us down.  But when the
nation gets in a tight spot, it turns to people like Chip
Bohlen, Ellsworth Bunker, and Phil Habib.  It turns to people
like those whose names are listed on the walls of the "C" Street
entrance to the State Department--people who gave their lives in
the service of this country.  And it turns to people like Bob
Oakley, whom we have asked to invigorate our diplomatic efforts
to end the bloodshed in Somalia.

We are fortunate that the United States has had such
distinguished foreign policy leadership.  I salute the four
Secretaries of State here today, who honor us by their presence.
 Bill Rogers was at the helm when we made historic changes in
our relations with the Soviet Union.  He promoted a cease-fire
in the Middle East.  And he began a restructuring of the State
Department that we are still using and building on today.

I had the honor of serving as Cy Vance's Deputy.  Cy had a key
role in securing the Panama Canal Treaty and normalizing
relations with China.  By playing a pivotal part in negotiating
the Camp David Accords, he helped set the stage for the historic
agreement between Israel and the PLO last month--indeed a month
ago today.

One look at the table of contents of George Shultz's
memoirs--though I assure you, George, I've read far more than
that--tells you about his era:  the Middle East; the Soviet
Union; Central America; the INF Treaty.  What George Shultz
brought to these issues was integrity and candor.  George Shultz
was also a great advocate for the men and women who work in
foreign affairs--as demonstrated by this center, which grew from
a seed he planted.

Larry Eagleburger, an alumnus of the Foreign Service Institute,
has been one of America's most gifted, experienced, and
no-nonsense career diplomats.  Larry clearly understood the
priorities of the post-Cold War era.  His "Bill of Rights" for
business is helping the Department to promote American commerce
overseas.  He also knew how to draw the best from the Foreign
Service and how to encourage and nurture excellence.

The efforts of these four distinguished men--and those of the
dedicated women and men who supported them--created the
foundation on which we will build the foreign policy of the
future.

The Clinton Administration is the first to take office since the
end of the Cold War.  We have an opportunity-- indeed, a
responsibility--to remake American diplomacy in a new world that
is unburdened by superpower confrontation.

This historic moment requires a new diplomacy that advances the
priorities reflecting the possibilities and the perils of the
post-Cold War era.  That is why President Clinton has placed
economic policy at the center of our foreign policy; why he has
made non-proliferation the arms control agenda of the 1990s; why
he has committed America to enlarge the sway of democratic
values around the world; and why he has moved global issues into
the mainstream of American foreign policy--issues such as
protecting the environment and reducing population growth.

These new priorities reflect a broader definition of our
national security--and they will require an expanded role for
American diplomacy--a role that can be cultivated in these
wonderful new quarters.

For more than two centuries, diplomacy has been a vital
instrument of our national security.  But security during the
Cold War was largely based upon our military's ability to
contain Soviet power and to deter war.  Now is the time when
diplomacy--supported by a credible military force--can assume a
new potency on behalf of a strong and secure America.

Here at this splendid new facility, I want to offer some plain
talk about the value of diplomacy.  Our nation does not spend
much on diplomacy--not much when measured against the returns it
generates and not much when compared to other expenditures.  We
dedicate only 1% of federal spending to international affairs,
which includes not only the operations of the State 
Department, but also foreign aid and our contributions to the
United Nations as well.

Those of us who carry out America's foreign policy do not
usually trumpet the value of what the nation gets for its money.
 We think about saving lives, and we are somewhat uncomfortable
equating our diplomatic successes to dollars saved. 
Nevertheless, we have useful ways to express how cost-effective
diplomacy can be.  Consider for a moment several striking
cost-benefit comparisons.

First, compare a contribution to concrete improvements in Gaza
and Jericho to the price of continued conflict in the Middle
East.  That vast difference is one reason the United States
stands today as a full partner for peace--and why 2 weeks ago we
hosted a successful donors' conference to support reconciliation
and reconstruction in the Middle East region.

While credit for the recent breakthrough clearly belongs to the
Israelis and the PLO, that historic agreement also rewards two
decades of sustained, bipartisan investment by the United States
carried out by each of the former Secretaries behind me.  Now we
need to make that turning point irreversible, as we work with
regional parties and the international community to make the
benefits of peace in the Middle East absolutely irresistible.

We seek to widen the circle of peace in the Middle East and
around the world--and to isolate the forces of violence and
hatred--whether they are trying to disrupt the search for peace
in the Middle East, to destabilize their neighbors through
aggression, or to destroy innocent lives through terrorism.

A second comparison:  Compare the costs of support for reform in
Russia to the price we would pay if Russia were to revert to
dictatorship.  That is why President Clinton's strategic
partnership with Russia and with President Yeltsin is the
wisest--and, indeed, the least expensive--investment we can make
in our security.

Our savings in defense spending--and the increase in our exports
as we gain access to the vast Russian market--can be quantified.
 But what we cannot place a number on is equally valuable:  the
security brought to us by the end of superpower confrontation
and what that means to our people; and our new ability to work
with Russia to address issues of importance to both nations.  

Next week, I will travel to Russia and to other states in the
region to reinforce our support for continued democratic and
market reform.  In Russia, as elsewhere, promoting democracy is
perhaps the best preventive diplomacy that there is.  From the
Baltics to Ukraine and Central Asia, the United States is
prepared to use its good offices and its diplomacy to help
reduce tensions and resolve disputes.  We are also working with 
Russia and the other nuclear states to help dismantle strategic
nuclear arsenals and to encourage non-proliferation.

Take another cost-benefit comparison.  Compare the expense of
diplomatic action to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons with
the potential for blackmail by rogue states.  That is why the
United States is determined to stop Iran from acquiring or
developing nuclear weapons.  In the same vein, we are working
with the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy
Agency to prevent Iraq from regaining weapons of mass
destruction.  We are also leading the effort to pressure North
Korea to remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty--and to comply with nuclear safeguard obligations.  And
it is also why we imposed sanctions on China and Pakistan after
the transfer of ballistic missile components.

Take another quite different example.  Compare the price of
population and environmental programs with the miseries of
unsustainable development--or with the scourge of starvation or
the costs of refugees.  If we ignore these issues, they will
return--compounded, more costly, and sometimes deeply
threatening to our security.

That is why we are working to reduce population growth and why
the United States is a leader--not a laggard--on global
environmental issues.  As part of that commitment, we have
signed the biodiversity and global warming treaties.  I deeply
hope that my tenure as Secretary of State will be marked by an
unmistakable emphasis on these pressing global issues.

All of these cost-benefit comparisons demonstrate the value of
preventive diplomacy.  We certainly cannot foresee every crisis.
 But vigorous preventive diplomacy can anticipate and resolve
problems--or defuse regional conflicts--before they ignite into
crises.  Successful preventive diplomacy can free us to dedicate
more resources to the urgent challenges of domestic renewal.

The requirements of preventive diplomacy place new demands on
foreign affairs professionals.  The men and women who come to
the National Foreign Affairs Training Center will gain new
skills; they will also focus on the new priorities for this new
era.

Our training and our policy initiatives will reflect a new focus
on economic issues in particular.  Diplomacy for global
competitiveness will translate at the training center into
courses and private sector partnerships that deepen our
understanding of the global economy.  The men and women trained
on this campus will emerge as export advocates.  They will learn
to help promote not just our values, but our exports; to protect
not only our physical security, but our intellectual property.

Training at the center will be structured to reinforce the
Clinton Administration's emphasis on cross-cutting global
issues.  The environment, population, refugees, as well as
narcotics, international crime, and terrorism will all be an
integral part of the curriculum.  Confronting these global
issues will test our capacity to work with diverse international
institutions and cultures--and it will test our ability to work
in disciplines not always associated with foreign affairs
professionals.

This center represents an important new investment in the people
who carry out our diplomacy.  For two centuries, Americans have
chosen this form of public service because they have been deeply
committed to the enduring purposes of our nation's foreign
policy.  We cannot assign an exact monetary value to their work.
 But we can say with great confidence that the commitment, the
competence, the judgment, and the courage of American diplomats
testify to--and add to--America's strength.

Whether they are in Washington or in Warsaw, they serve a
foreign policy that reinforces our interests and reflects our
values.  With the benefit of this marvelous new facility, we
will ensure that America continues to have the finest diplomats
in the world.

I am very fortunate to be here today as new members of America's
foreign affairs team take their oaths of office.  This oath will
be administered by Molly Raiser, the State Department's Chief of
Protocol, to members of several foreign affairs agencies.  These
new employees are America's country teams of the future.  It is
quite significant that we have brought people from various
agencies, not just from the State Department but from agencies
all across the federal government.  This is indeed a National
Foreign Affairs Training Center. 

[Remarks following the swearings in.]  

I have the very distinct honor to present the American flag to
the Director of this center, Larry Taylor.  This flag has
completed a 'round-the-world transit in the care of the State
Department's Diplomatic Courier Service.  That voyage symbolizes
the link between this center and Americans working around the
world, just as the center will serve as a link between the
American people and their representatives abroad.

So I present this flag to Larry with a great deal of honor and
satisfaction that I am putting it in his hands as an indication
of our confidence in the future of this center.   (###)



ARTICLE 6

Feature:  Building Bridges To the Future at the National Foreign
Affairs Training Center

The National Foreign Affairs Training Center will be a key part
of the foundation for advancing American diplomacy and
strengthening American leadership in the post-Cold War era.  As
the Department of State reshapes U.S. foreign policy for this
new era, the Foreign Service Institute--which is being recast as
the National Foreign Affairs Training Center--has launched an
"Agenda for Change"  in the way that foreign policy
professionals are trained to deal with post-Cold War realities. 
The development of this training strategy was timed to coincide
with a move to a new facility in Arlington, Virginia, in October
1993.  As Lawrence Taylor, Director of FSI, sums it up, "This is
a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to use the psychology of a
physical move to make an associated qualitative move in
curriculum and training toward excellence and greater relevance,
particularly in global issues and in promoting American economic
security."

Innovative training addressing the Administration's global
issues agenda--cleaning up the environment, addressing
population issues, building democracy, and fighting
narco-trafficking--is already underway.  The center's new
curriculum-wide focus on these issues provides students with a
unique perspective on global problems--and the opportunities to
resolve them.    

To make its curriculum more relevant to the expanding global
marketplace, the center is focusing on training to strengthen
America's international economic competitiveness.  As Secretary
Christopher has said, we must "harness our diplomacy to the
needs and opportunities of American industries and workers." 
Instilling in students the tenets of "diplomacy for global
competitiveness" means teaching them how to aggressively promote
U.S. exporters, protect intellectual property rights, or
dissuade foreign countries from imposing new trade barriers.  It
also involves increasing cooperation with the private sector to
better understand and respond to the needs of U.S. businesses. 
The key, according to Director Taylor, is to develop "activists
who will understand and act upon the reality that America's
competitive excellence and American diplomacy will go far in
determining the standards of living at home and our power
abroad."

Area studies courses already include in-depth studies of foreign
business cultures far beyond just the  "nuts and bolts" of doing
business abroad.  Through these and other courses, students
become attuned to the subtleties of particular business
cultures, enabling them to assess markets, to analyze and
anticipate market trends, and to evaluate changes in attitudes
in the society as a whole that can affect U.S. businesses.

To perform these functions effectively, foreign affairs
professionals will need to use foreign languages with greater
effectiveness.  Training everyone to general proficiency levels
may no longer be affordable or meet the needs of the Department.
 According to Gary Crawford, Associate Dean of the School of
Language Studies, "a 3/3 [speaking and reading level] is too
much for everyone and not enough for some.  Since we're asking
Foreign Service officers to be more aggressively involved in
day-to-day activities to promote U.S. interests, we must provide
the necessary language training.  At the same time, we know from
feedback from posts that they want first-tour employees to have
more task-oriented language skills--say for reviewing visa
applications--but without taking longer to train them."  To
accomplish these seemingly conflicting goals, the language staff
at FSI is developing a two-track program to demonstrate that
diversified, tailored programs would better meet employees'--and
the Department's--needs.  Instructors will use focused,
computer-assisted training for first-tour employees to free time
and resources to provide broader, more extensive training to
subsequent-tour employees slated for a wider range of job
responsibilities.  This training will enable foreign affairs
professionals to work effectively to restore American
competitiveness to the cutting edge.

Technology is another crucial component of competition in
today's world.  NFATC is incorporating technology into its
training programs--as a tool and as a subject--to ensure that
foreign affairs professionals use technology effectively. 
Interactive software that helps students learn foreign languages
is but one tool; FSI instructors envision using technology at
NFATC to take training to remote work sites via computers and
satellites, and to pioneer "just in time" training to deliver
training and information to end users literally as needed.  

Technological and linguistic proficiency alone are not enough,
however, to meet the new challenges facing foreign affairs
professionals.  In the end, it is leadership that determines the
success of any venture.  NFATC is reinforcing leadership in all
training, to enable foreign affairs professionals to set
priorities effectively and marshal resources productively.  Most
importantly, they will be able to build lasting partnerships
with other agencies, non-governmental organizations, and the
private sector to build a solid foundation to meet the
challenges of new global realities, whether political,
environmental, or economic.

The entire FSI staff knows the importance of
partnership-building:  The development of the new training
strategy at NFATC is an on-going success story.  As John Sprott,
Deputy Director of FSI describes it, "Developing the agenda for
change was a team effort, and a team is putting it into effect
and making it work."  The curriculum changes, the spirit of
cooperation, and the dedication of the staff and 
students to making it all work are what Director Taylor calls a
"bridge to the future that will be a key part of the effort to
ensure that NFATC continues to be the world's finest foreign
affairs training institution and an agent of constructive change
for the Department of State and the U.S. foreign affairs
community."    

--Christina Macdonald, Dispatch Staff (###)


ARTICLE 7

U.S. Policy on Support for Reform In the New Independent States
Strobe Talbott, Ambassador-at-Large and Special Adviser to the
Secretary on the New Independent States
Statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
Washington DC, October 6, 1993

Mr. Chairman, my last appearance before you and your colleagues,
on September 21, ended in something of a flurry.  You and I were
both passed notes by our staffs informing us that President
Yeltsin had just announced that he was suspending the Russian
Parliament and calling elections in December.  The 2 weeks that
have passed since then have been the most suspenseful and
significant in the drama of Russian politics since August 1991,
when Boris Yeltsin himself was under siege in the "White House."
 Let me begin my testimony with the Administration's analysis of
this latest episode and how it relates to our policy of support
for reform.

Before the current crisis, the Russian body politic was in a
state of near paralysis.  The executive and legislative branches
were unable to resolve a crisis of governance and legitimacy. 
The Parliament had fallen into a pattern of passing laws and
resolutions that seemed designed to thwart the ability of the
Yeltsin government to govern, exacerbate the problems afflicting
the Russian economy, and confirm the worst fears of Russia's
neighbors.  Moreover, there seemed to be little chance of
President Yeltsin and the Parliament coming to terms on a new
constitution to replace the one that dates from Leonid
Brezhnev's time or on elections for a new legislature to replace
the one that came into office 19 months before the end of the
Soviet Union.  During the course of my last appearance here, Mr.
Chairman, several of your colleagues expressed deep concern over
this state of affairs; they wondered whether reform--which is
the object of American support--could go forward. President
Yeltsin was clearly worried about the same thing, and that is
essentially why he acted as he did to break the impasse with
Parliament.

Let me now address the question of why President Clinton reacted
as he did with a strong statement of support for Mr. Yeltsin. 
That statement came quickly, within a few hours after the news
broke in Moscow--but it did not come automatically or
reflexively.  President Clinton, Secretary Christopher, and 
other members of the Administration considered the matter
carefully.  Americans, after all, are not in the habit of
applauding the suspension of parliaments or constitutions.  The
President and Secretary concluded that the circumstances in this
case were exceptional:  first, because of the origins and nature
of the parliament and constitution in question (they are
vestiges of the Soviet communist past); and, second, because
President Yeltsin had once again, as he had last spring, found a
way of taking the matter to the Russian people and letting them
deter-mine their future.

On September 21, we were asked to comment on whether President
Yeltsin's move was "constitutional," "legal," and "legitimate." 
We had been asked the same thing on March 20, when he went over
the heads of the Parliament through the April 25 referendum.  In
both cases, we answered that constitutionality, legality, and
legitimacy are precisely what is at issue in Russia today; we
believe that it is up to the Russian people themselves to decide
those issues.  For us, the relevant question--the answer to
which would determine the degree of our support--was whether
President Yeltsin was resorting to democratic means in his
effort to resolve the   crisis.  The answer, once again in both
cases--last March and 2 weeks ago yesterday--was yes.

It seemed to us especially relevant that in the April 25
referendum a substantial majority of those voting expressed a
desire for early parliamentary elections.  President Yeltsin has
put those on the calendar for December 11; he has also agreed to
presidential elections about 6 months later.

There was, in our minds, one more criterion to be fulfilled
before this Administration could support President Yeltsin's
move of September 21.  We had to be sure that he would do
everything in his power to keep the next stage of this drama
peaceful and, to the greatest extent possible, avoid the use of
force; we also wanted to be confident that the elections
themselves would be open, free, and fair.  It was largely to
seek assurances on this score that President Clinton telephoned
President Yeltsin the afternoon of September 21.  Mr. Yeltsin
provided those assurances, and he did so with obvious conviction
and determination.  It was against that backdrop that President
Clinton released his own statement of support.

During the 12 days between September 21 and this past Sunday,
President Yeltsin was as good as his word.  He and his
government repeatedly demonstrated that they were looking for a
peaceful resolution to the standoff.  They entered into
negotiations with the parliamentary leaders under the auspices
of the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia; they made clear that
they would, if possible, rely not on force but on legal
sanctions against those who remained in the Parliament building
after the expiration of this past Monday's deadline.

However, throughout this period, the Russian Government
reiterated that it would be restrained in its threat or use of
force only as long as there was no major provocation, causing
bloodshed, from the other side.  American official
statements--both in public and in diplomatic channels--reflected
that same condition.  We hoped President Yeltsin could resolve
the crisis peacefully, but we knew his ability to do so depended
on the restraint--and a degree of civilized behavior--on the
part of his opponents, many of whom we all knew to be well armed
and in an increasingly ugly mood within the Parliament.

Then, of course, came Bloody Sunday, October 3.  The eruption of
violence caught the world--and, to be sure, the Russian
authorities--very much by surprise.  That was in large measure
because few realized how vicious and flagrant Messrs. Rutskoi
and Khasbulatov were prepared to be in their worse-is-better
strategy.  For all of us, it was a day of sadness and anxiety. 
However, it became apparent in the late hours of Sunday that the
Yeltsin government was determined to restore order and that he
was, once again, also determined to minimize the use of force. 
He issued orders to his troops taking up positions around the
Parliament and the TV station that they should fire only if
fired upon.  On Secretary Christopher's behalf, Ambassador
Pickering and I were in touch with Russian officials during the
early hours of Monday morning as the troops began to move in. 
We were told that President Yeltsin had two options:  one, quick
and dirty, to rush in like gangbusters with guns blazing; the
other, a slow, phased, piecemeal retaking of the building,
giving those inside maximum chance to surrender.  Even though
the loss of life was still substantial, we find it
significant--and heartening--that President Yeltsin opted for
No. 2.

In a way, Mr. Chairman, this whole tragic episode underscores
the great struggle that we have witnessed in Russia over the
past few days.  On the one side were the forces of the past, of
the old Soviet Union and the old Soviet system, which relied on
terror and on the threat and use of force.  In exhorting the
armed mobs to attack the Kremlin and the TV station, Mr. Rutskoi
was showing his true colors and those of his more fanatical
followers.  On the other side were the forces of the new Russia,
personified by President Yeltsin, committed to democracy,
reform, respect for human life, and civic peace, which is a
necessary condition for the building of a civil society and
respect for civil and human rights.

While these past several weeks have, despite the best efforts of
the Yeltsin government, included a sustained moment of tragedy,
we feel confident it will prove cathartic and, in the way it
ended, help usher in a period of renewed commitment on the part
of the Russian people to the process of democratization.  They
have been subjected to a stark reminder of what the
Rutskoi-Khasbulatov forces really represented; and they have
also seen a reassertion of their President's 
leadership.  As President Clinton and Secretary Christopher both
stressed in their public comments on Monday, we hope that the
election period now underway will be part of a process of
healing and national reconciliation.

Main Themes of U.S. Policy
Let me now, Mr. Chairman, expand on the overall basis for our
policy.  From the beginning of his presidency, Bill Clinton made
clear that support for reform in the NIS would be the No. 1
foreign policy priority of his Administration.  He understood
that the collapse of the Soviet system and the Soviet empire
constituted a historic transformation of our world,
overwhelmingly for the better.  But he also understood that in
the new, post-Cold War era, there were sure to be new
uncertainties, new troubles, and new challenges to American
leadership.  Only with international help, marshaled by the
United States, could Russia, Ukraine, and the other former
republics of the U.S.S.R. make the transition from
totalitarianism to democracy and from a centralized command
economy to the market.

Initially, many Americans saw the stakes primarily in terms of
what we do not want to happen:  We don't want the economic
distress and political turmoil to trigger a civil war that could
rage across 11 time zones; we don't want a nuclear Yugoslavia in
the heart of Eurasia; we don't want to see the rise of a new
dictatorship that represses its own subjects, threatens its
neighbors, and requires the United States and its allies to
return to a Cold War footing.

But there was, in President Clinton's mind, a more positive
vision underlying our policy as well:  In Russia, Ukraine, and
several of the other new independent states, national rebirth
has begun.  Great nations and good people are finally trying to
join the political and economic culture of the industrialized
democracies.

As I stressed when I appeared before you on September 21, while
events in the former Soviet Union are confused and sometimes
disturbing--including, as it turned out, on that very day--there
is a pattern to them nonetheless.  That pattern points in the
right direction--toward the evolution of a community of modern
states:  at peace with themselves and with each other;
productively and prosperously integrated into the international
economy, a source of raw materials and manufactured products and
a market for American goods and services; and a partner for
American diplomacy in ensuring regional and, indeed, global
peace. 

So, Mr. Chairman, the premise of our policy from the beginning
has been that reform in the NIS is a long-term proposition,
requiring a long view and steadiness on our part.  I believe we
have proved our ability to maintain such steadiness in the last
few weeks.

Beyond the occasional turmoil in Moscow itself, we can all see
the many other difficulties that beset Russia, Ukraine, and the
other new independent states.  We know that tensions have
erupted within and between them, and we are dealing with strains
and disagreements that have arisen between them and us. 
Nonetheless, Mr. Chairman, it is the working conviction of the
Clinton Administration that the overall trend in that vast part
of the world remains favorable and, therefore, that the
underpinnings of our policy remain sound.

Indeed, many of today's grim or ominous headlines advertise what
might be called the downside of one of history's great upturns. 
Age-old national and ethnic tensions and conflicts have flared
precisely because the Soviet prison house of nations has
collapsed.  There are noisy squabbles between presidents and
parliaments precisely because real politics, with open elections
and secret ballots, has replaced autocracy and terror.  Does
anyone really long for the days of perfect harmony between the
Kremlin and the Supreme Soviet, when the former was the seat of
absolute power and the latter a rubber stamp?

Knotty economic problems, such as how to control inflation and
budget deficits, confront governments precisely because they
have thrown off the straitjacket of the command economy. While
the citizens of the former Soviet Union have a long way to go in
their trial-and-error experiment with market economics, they
have already come a vast distance by breaking with the old
system, which impoverished nations, despoiled the environment,
and fueled limitless military buildups.  The ruble is still a
long way from being a stable convertible currency, but it has
also come a long way from the Soviet-era funny money, with a
totally artificial value assigned by the state and of little use
in empty stores.

My point, Mr. Chairman, is that, if kept in perspective, events
in the former Soviet Union should not discourage us and
certainly should not tempt us to pull back or slow down; on the
contrary, they should sustain our hope, our engagement, and our
support.

Russian Politics:   A Critical Period Ahead
Mr. Chairman, let me concentrate for a moment on Russia, the
largest and most powerful of the new independent states.  What
happens there will have a major, perhaps decisive, effect on the
future of reform in all the other former republics.

If President Yeltsin succeeds in giving Russia both its first
post-communist constitution and its first post-communist
parliament, he will still face opposition, and Russia's
increasingly assertive regions will probably continue to demand
greatly increased autonomy from Moscow as the price of their
backing for constitutional change.  This saga will take time to
play itself out.  That is hardly surprising.  It took our own
Founding Fathers a decade to hammer out their vision of a more
perfect union.

As Russian politics continue to evolve, we must have open
channels of communication at all levels across the political
spectrum.  Right up to the present crisis, Ambassador Pickering
and our embassy in Moscow have maintained frequent contacts with
key figures on both sides of the executive-legislative divide in
Moscow, as have Members of Congress on their visits to Russia. 
Our special efforts to broaden and deepen contacts with Russia's
regions are symbolized by the superb work being done by our
consulates in St. Petersburg and Vladivostok and our initiative
to open a new consulate in Ekaterinburg.  We are determined to
maintain lines of communication to all legitimate and
responsible groups and factions.

That said, Mr. Chairman, the developments of the past 2 weeks in
no way diminish our strong support for President Yeltsin.  Quite
the contrary:  That support is, if anything, all the more
appropriate.  He is Russia's only President.  He is Russia's
first elected leader in a thousand years.  The Russian people
reaffirmed their confidence in him at the polls in April.  And
he is pushing ahead with policies that will, if they take root,
assure Russia's transformation into a strong, democratic,
prosperous country, with a government that reflects the
greatness of the Russian people chosen through a free and fair
election.

The Russian Economy:  Good News As Well As Bad
The economic picture in Russia has, especially in the past few
months, been neither clear nor pretty.  That is partly because
of the stalemate between the government and the Parliament. 
President Yeltsin will not be able to push through his full
economic reform program unless and until he has a legislature he
can work with.  In the meantime, the Russian economy suffers
from the inevitable growing pains that accompany the transition
from a command to market economy.  

Still, there was a period during the spring and early summer
when the government was able to pull Russia back from the brink
of hyperinflation and impose some basic discipline on the budget
and on the emission of credits to inefficient state-run
enterprises.  In response, the International Monetary Fund was
able to release the first half of a $3-billion facility aimed at
helping Russia achieve macroeconomic stabilization.

Since then, however, there was backsliding on both fiscal and
monetary policy.  Another blow came when the Central Bank
announced it would confiscate pre-1993 rubles, a move that
undercut confidence of both Russian consumers and the
international financial institutions.

These developments--a resurgence of inflation and the ruble
debacle--got most of the attention, contributing to the
misimpression of an economy in meltdown.  That's not the whole
picture, by any means.  Just as important, in our view, was the
government's success to date in weathering a parliamentary
attack on its all-important privatization effort.

We recognize, of course, that privatization alone is not enough;
it must be accompanied by the right macroeconomic policies to
work.  Still, privatization goes to the heart of the
de-communization of the old system.  We believe that, along with
democratization, privatization is one of the two most important
manifestations of reform.  Hence it is one of the two most
important targets of our own assistance programs.  In fact, we
believe that privatization and democratization are mutually
reinforcing.  There is a synergy between the two:  The more that
people work in private enterprise, the more they are likely to
participate in the democratic process--and vote for candidates
who will support economic, as well as political, freedom.

While the ruble has fluctuated wildly and fallen precipitously,
privatization has remained steady.  There will be between 16,000
and 20,000 private retail trade establishments created in Russia
by the end of this year.  Since December, over 2,300
medium-sized firms have been privatized through voucher
auctions.  More than 4 million workers are now employed in
privatized enterprises in Russia.  That is one in ten.  Thus,
the transfer of state-controlled property to individual
shareholders is clearly on the rise and is becoming a way of
life.

There is other good news as well.  The decline in industrial
output has slowed significantly over the past 12 months. 
Subsidies on key foodstuffs and other agricultural products are
being further reduced, and there is some evidence of an
improvement in Russian living standards. 

America can encourage these positive developments in two
interacting ways:  first, through our bilateral reform support
program; and, second, through the package of multilateral,
macroeconomic measures which we have set up through the Group of
Seven major industrialized democracies.  President Clinton has
emphasized that we will do all we can to help, but we will not
do it alone.  We will show our leadership by taking the
initiative, but we will do so largely in order to leverage much
greater amounts of money from the international financial
institutions and from the other industrialized democracies.

Meanwhile, we are working with our Russian partners to expand
the flow of trade and investment between the two countries. 
That means lowering barriers on both sides, including ours:  We
must do much more to open Western markets to the NIS.  A
milestone in this essential effort came in August with the
highly successful initial session of the U.S.-Russian Commission
on Economic and Technological Cooperation, co-chaired by Vice
President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin.  We and the
Russian Government see the Gore-Chernomyrdin commission as proof
of our determination to give meaning and substance to the new
watchword in U.S.-Russian relations:  partnership.

In this connection, it is significant, I think, that Energy
Secretary O'Leary and NASA Administrator Goldin--who chair
subgroups under the Gore-Chernomyrdin commission--have both led
delegations to Moscow during the recent time of troubles.  They
were able to conduct important negotiations and to demonstrate
the determination of our government to continue with business as
usual.

As Treasury Under Secretary Summers told you on September 21
when he and I appeared before you, Mr. Chairman, the Russians
are making some headway in combating their macroeconomic
problems, but more must be done.  Although the Central Bank has
stood on the side of President Yeltsin, there still remain
questions about its desire and ability to control the expansion
of the money supply.  After several months of exchange rate
stability, the present crisis has touched off a drop of about
20% in the value of the ruble against the dollar.  Furthermore,
President Yeltsin has raised salaries for a variety of
government employees.  Politically, this is no doubt justified,
but it is unlikely to contribute to the important objective of
reining in inflation.  We continue to urge the Russians to get
control over their burgeoning budget deficit.  

The second $1.5-billion tranche of the International Monetary
Fund's Systemic Transformation Facility (STF) for Russia should,
in principle, be disbursed in the near future.  That is only
possible, however, if Russia continues to make progress,
including recovering lost ground, in restraining inflation and
controlling subsidies and credits to otherwise bankrupt
industries and otherwise acting forthrightly to resolve the
macroeconomic crisis.  But I am reassured that Russia will be
making those efforts.  Just before this present political
crisis, President Yeltsin sent a clear signal of his own
intentions when he asked former Prime Minister Yegor Gaydar, the
architect of the reforms, to rejoin his government as Deputy
Prime Minister with oversight over the economy.

Ukraine:  Broadening the Agenda
Earlier this year, Mr. Chairman, the Administration recommended
that the United States do more to help strengthen Ukraine's
fragile democracy and stimulate its faltering economic reform
effort.  That is still our goal.  Indeed, Secretary Christopher
and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Zlenko had good discussions in
New York on ways to broaden, intensify, and accelerate our
political and economic cooperation with Ukraine.

On the question of Soviet nuclear weapons still on the territory
of Ukraine, the Kravchuk government has repeatedly assured us of
its intention to seek ratification of START I and accession to
the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state as a
single package.  As long as that vital question remains
unresolved, it will be an obstacle not just to U.S.-Ukrainian
relations but to Ukraine's relations with the international
community as a whole.

We recognize the political complexity of the nuclear question in
Ukraine.  Indeed, we recognize how serious the political crisis
there is more generally.  The stalemate between the executive
and legislative branches has been blocking implementation of
effective measures on economic reform as well as arms control. 
We can only hope that the stalemate may be broken now that the
Parliament has voted to support early parliamentary and
presidential elections next year.

Helping Ukraine address its tough economic problems is important
to American interests.  We have an opportunity to influence
positively the reform path Ukraine chooses by proceeding with
our policy of broad engagement--particularly with the provision
of targeted technical assistance in areas, such as
privatization, that support reform.

Kazakhstan:  Increasing Cooperation
The reform process in Kazakhstan is encouraging.  For example,
in January of this year Kazakhstan adopted a constitution that
provides substantial guarantees of the civil rights of its
citizens.  More importantly, the Kazakhstani Government appears
to be engaged in a sincere effort to implement this provision of
its constitution.

Economic reform in Kazakhstan offers opportunities for American
companies.  Chevron, Mobil, and Philip Morris are just a few of
the American firms that have launched major ventures in
Kazakhstan.  More than 50 American companies have offices in
Almaty, the capital of Kazakhstan.  That number is growing at
the rate of one per week.  We are working hard to give American
companies the support they need to do business in Kazakhstan.

We are optimistic that if Kazakhstan continues on its path of
political and economic reform--the parliamentary elections
scheduled for late 1994 are an important step in that
direction--Kazakhstan will be able to create a free, prosperous,
and secure future for its multiethnic society.

Non-Proliferation:  A Global Objective
Mr. Chairman, as you know, we believe it is essential to world
peace that the disintegration of the Soviet Union should not
result in any increase in the number of nuclear weapons states. 
We are convinced that proliferation of nuclear weapons in the
former U.S.S.R. would increase the risks and potential costs of
conflict among the new independent states.  We should not lose
sight of the fact--even in these dramatic and important
days--that prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and their delivery vehicles remains one of the most
important foreign policy objectives of our time.

It was, therefore, a welcome development when the Governments of
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan agreed in May 1992, at a
meeting in Lisbon, to sign and ratify the START I Treaty and
accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as
non-nuclear-weapon states.  Belarus was the first of the three 
states to fulfill its Lisbon commitments.  In July of this year
Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich presented
President Clinton with Belarus' instrument of accession to the
NPT.  Kazakhstan, which has already ratified START I, has
assured us that it will accede to the NPT this fall; the
Kazakhstani Foreign Minister repeated this to me in New York
just last week.  Ukraine has yet to take either of these steps,
although its leadership has reiterated its commitment to do so.

The status of nuclear weapons outside of Russia is a piece of
old but essential business left over from the Cold War.  It must
be laid to rest, in accord with the Lisbon agreements, before we
can devote ourselves fully to the new business of building broad
and productive relationships with Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

Our policy in this regard reflects the high priority that the
Clinton Administration attaches to worldwide efforts to prevent
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic
missiles.  Indeed, President Clinton has sought to give fresh
impetus to our global non-proliferation policy by enlisting
Russia and the other NIS in that cause.  In this connection,
President Clinton proposed last week at the United Nations
General Assembly an international agreement that would
permanently ban production of plutonium and highly enriched
uranium for nuclear weapons purposes.

Another high priority of our non-proliferation policy is the
completion of a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT), a goal
which the President announced this summer.  I am happy to say
that Russia's views on the framework of a CTBT are very similar
to our own.  

Additionally, new steps to thwart the proliferation of ballistic
missiles were finalized in an agreement signed several weeks ago
by Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin.  This
agreement broadens and bolsters the multinational Missile
Technology Control Regime, which is very much in Russia's
interests as well as our own.

Regional Stability and Security
The months since we last met, Mr. Chairman, have been a
particularly difficult period in the Caucasus.  In Georgia,
civil war has threatened to thwart the efforts of a brave people
to consolidate the gains of independence and to undermine the
leadership of a great statesman, Eduard Shevardnadze.  

On October 2, Zviadist forces supporting the former President of
Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, overran the port city of Poti on
the Black Sea and perhaps the cities of Khoni and Vani as well. 
These attacks--following on the Abkhaz victories at Sukhumi,
Ochamchira, and Gali--have caused massive dislocations of ethnic
Georgians.  The total number of refugees may exceed 100,000.

To respond to this tragedy, the Clinton Administration has taken
several immediate steps.  Ambassador Brown declared the
situation a disaster on September 30 and has been granted
authority to immediately disburse the $25,000 available to him
to respond to this crisis.  These funds will be used locally to
purchase food and blankets.  In addition, food already provided
by us to private voluntary organizations is being redirected to
Georgia.  We also have scheduled flights to Tbilisi to bring in
medical supplies--exceeding $1 million, initially--and emergency
food rations--25,000 meals immediately with another 195,000 on
line.  Finally, we have sent a six-person emergency assessment
team to look at the situation on the ground and assess the needs
firsthand.

Azerbaijan, on the other hand, offers a particularly stark
example of the four-way connection among democratization,
political stability, economic development, and regional peace: 
Remove the last ingredient and the other three are all but
impossible.

In June, Azerbaijan's democratically elected President, Abulfez
Elchibey, was forced from power as troops under a dissident
military commander, Surat Huseynov, marched on Baku.  In the
political maneuvering touched off by Huseynov's rebellion, the
former Communist Party First Secretary of Azerbaijan, Haydar
Aliyev, returned to power as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet. 
Although a national referendum on August 29 produced an
overwhelming vote of no confidence in President Elchibey, the
voting took place under conditions that did not allow the people
of Azerbaijan a free and fair choice.  Preliminary results from
the October 3 presidential elections indicate a big victory for
Aliyev, who was the only serious candidate.  Major opposition
groups boycotted the election.

Despite this clear setback, we hope democracy will ultimately
prevail in Azerbaijan.  We will continue to press Aliyev and
other Azerbaijani leaders to restore freedom of speech and
assembly, to release those who remain illegally detained, and to
restore democracy through genuinely free and fair elections.

Azerbaijan is a potentially rich country, with oil reserves of
great interest to American companies.  We would like our
business community to participate in the development of these
resources to the benefit of both countries.  But the leadership
in Baku must know that relations between our countries will
remain severely burdened as long as democracy is denied in
Azerbaijan.

That is a point I stressed personally during a visit to
Azerbaijan last month.  But the point I want to stress here, Mr.
Chairman, is that the process of democratization in the former
Soviet Union will be severely impeded wherever peace is denied. 
President Elchibey's government lost the confidence of the
Azerbaijani people in large measure because of its battlefield
reverses at the hands of the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians.

Both Armenia and Azerbaijan are paying a terrible price for the
ongoing dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh, the region of Azerbaijan
populated overwhelmingly by ethnic Armenians.  The United States
has been in the forefront of efforts to resolve this conflict
under the aegis of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe.  For more than a year, Ambassador Jack Maresca has
worked tirelessly and skillfully as our Special Representative
to the CSCE Nagorno-Karabakh peace process.  We are hopeful that
a peaceful solution will emerge from these complex negotiations.
 However, the recent offensives of the Nagorno-Karabakh
Armenians have dimmed that prospect.  We have called for an end
to this aggression.  A settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh
dispute would alleviate human suffering throughout the region,
and it would open the way for regional cooperation to rebuild
the war-ravaged economies of both Azerbaijan and Armenia.  In
parallel with our diplomatic efforts, we are working to assist
refugees of the recent fighting in Azerbaijan, in accordance
with the restrictions in the FREEDOM Support Act.  We are also
helping Armenia, whose economy has been devastated by war and
economic blockade, prepare for another difficult winter.

The United States has a number of reasons for involvement in the
international effort to foster peace and stability in the former
Soviet Union.  Our objective throughout the new independent
states is to support reform in all its dimensions; and, as the
Nagorno-Karabakh tragedy demonstrates, reform is one of the
first victims of conflict.  Indeed, Russian reform is vulnerable
to the consequences of trouble around the periphery.  The
presence of ethnic Russians in neighboring states and the
likelihood that, one way or another, they will be caught up in
fighting there will divide and inflame political sentiment in
Russia itself--and not to the advantage of the reformers. 
Moreover, if unchecked, conflicts in the new independent states
could spread, drawing in other states beyond the borders of the
old U.S.S.R.

Let me be clear about the principles that govern our approach to
this challenge.  We begin from firm and unwavering support for
the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all
the new independent states, including the Russian Federation
itself.  We do not support secession through armed struggle or
the breakup of any of these states, nor do we seek to pit any
state in the region against any other.  In accordance with the
United Nations Charter and the CSCE Final Act, the United States
can accept changes of borders only if they are achieved by
peaceful means and mutual consent.

Much has appeared in the public media recently about our view of
Russia's role in conflicts in the former Soviet Union.  Let me
be precise on this point.  We want to see a democratic Russia
that is a great power and a global partner of the United States.
 We understand Russia's concerns for stability on her borders
and for the well-being of millions of ethnic Russians in
neighboring states.  It is crucial, however, that Russia 
neither assert nor exercise any special role or prerogatives
that would be inconsistent with the independence, sovereignty,
and territorial integrity of any other state.  We have made our
position on this question clear in dialogue at all levels with
Russia, as well as with the other new independent states.

The United States does not presume to prescribe detailed
blueprints for the settlement of conflicts in the former Soviet
Union, many of which are fueled by ancient ethnic hatreds.  Nor
do we seek a formal role as mediator among the independent and
sovereign states of the region.  At the same time, the United
States will continue to lead international efforts to assist the
parties to these conflicts in finding peaceful solutions--if
they want our help and are prepared to work for peace. 
America's role will often be as an active participant in
multilateral efforts through international bodies-- such as the
UN, CSCE, or the NATO coordinating council--in which all the new
independent states are members.  The United States will also
continue to use bilateral contacts with each of the new
independent states whenever our diplomacy can help resolve or
prevent conflict.  We will not act unilaterally, nor will we
take sides.  Our efforts will be undertaken openly and in close
consultation with all the states of the region.

To help us with this priority of our policy, Secretary
Christopher has appointed James Collins, currently our deputy
chief of mission in Moscow, to head a new office in the State
Department as Coordinator of Regional Affairs for the New
Independent States.  Working closely with me, Mr. Collins' task
will be to advise Secretary Christopher on how we can best use
our diplomatic resources and good offices.  He will also
coordinate the efforts of other executive branch offices,
agencies, and departments to this end.

Mr. Collins' office is new, but his task is not.  We have all
along been actively involved in this work in a variety of forms
and places.  American Foreign Service officers have served as
members of CSCE peace missions to Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, and
Azerbaijan.  A team of experts from the State Department
recently visited Russia and Tajikistan to consult with those
governments on the ways to move the conflict in that country
toward a solution.  Mr. Collins' appointment will enable us to
bring greater focus and effectiveness to this vital task.

Conclusion:  An Investment In Our Future
Mr. Chairman, let me summarize the rationale and strategy for
our policy--and explain how that strategy will be served by the
program we are asking you to fund.

Our policy is based on four principles:  

1.  Firm support for political reform and the building of
durable institutions to promote democracy, the rule of law, and
the protection of human rights;

2.  Readiness to work with all the new independent states to
build market economies and to promote private enterprise, trade,
and investment;

3.  Commitment to full implementation of the Lisbon
Protocol--ratification of START I and accession to the NPT--as
the only acceptable approach to resolving the nuclear dilemmas
created by the collapse of the U.S.S.R.; and

4.  Willingness to participate in international efforts to
resolve conflicts and build regional security on the foundation
of the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act.

Mr. Chairman, building democracy and market economies, working
for non-proliferation, and helping to promote regional peace are
our goals.  If we can advance them across the new independent
states, we will have considerably increased the chances that
these same goals will prevail throughout the world.

At the beginning of my statement, I argued that there is a
pattern and direction of events in the former Soviet Union that
should give us hope and keep us engaged.  It was with that
belief in mind that President Clinton proclaimed, on April 1,
the goal of developing over time a "strategic alliance with
post-communist reform."  Strategic alliances are, by definition,
intended to last.  They are intended to withstand the buffeting
of adverse and contradictory developments, and they require the
investment of national resources.

That is why President Clinton committed $1.6 billion to the
support of reform during his first meeting with Mr. Yeltsin in
Vancouver on April 3-4.  The Vancouver initiative included
pioneering concepts, such as a Russian-American Enterprise Fund,
support for Russia's privatization efforts, and a program for
resettlement of Russian officers returning from postings abroad.
 Reflecting President Clinton's firm commitment to rapid and
effective implementation, over 90% of the funds included in the
Vancouver package have already been obligated.

After Vancouver, the President determined that more needed to be
done.  The second stage of President Clinton's plan to support
reform in the new independent states was the $2.5-billion dollar
assistance package for the NIS recently passed by Congress as
part of the foreign operations appropriations bill.  These
programs will build on the foundation laid at Vancouver and
reflect an emphasis on rapid support for private sector
development, trade and investment, democracy building,
humanitarian assistance, and energy and environment.

Our assistance package for the NIS has been carefully
constructed to ensure that our support for reform proceeds on a
broad front and that it is not dependent on the success or
failure of any particular policy on the part of Russia or any of
the other NIS.  Given the unpredictable twists and turns of 
the reform process, this flexible, broad-gauge, grass
roots-oriented approach is essential.

Moreover, the programs that we propose are designed to be
mutually reinforcing and cumulative in their impact.  For
instance, private sector development depends importantly on
development of trade and investment, so that privatized firms
have markets for their products and services.  Expanded
exchanges, humanitarian assistance, and officer resettlement are
investments in human resources that will stimulate the growth of
the private sector and trade and investment.  Programs for the
non-Russian new independent states will enable us to promote
democracy and markets among Russia's neighbors, making it less
likely that instability in those countries will impede reform in
Russia itself.

Mr. Chairman, it has been hard for the President and his
Administration to propose this package in an era of severe
budgetary constraints.  We realize that it is no easier for you
and your colleagues to vote for it.  The President is determined
to see that each dollar we spend on support for reform has a
clear and positive impact on the ground in the new independent
states.  Finally, I can assure you that aid of this
magnitude--aid with these goals in mind--could come at no more
critical time for the continued development of democracy and the
free enterprise system in Russia and the other new independent
states.  (###)



ARTICLE 8

The New Centrality of Economics:  The U.S. and the Asia-Pacific
Region
Joan E. Spero, Under Secretary For Economic and Agricultural
Affairs
Address to the Council on Foreign Relations, New York City,
October 5, 1993

Ladies and gentlemen, it is a great pleasure to be back with you
tonight at the Council on Foreign Relations.

With the end of the Cold War, the world has changed
fundamentally.  We see images of that change on TV:  the
crumbling of the Berlin Wall; people walking out of the killing
fields to vote in free elections in Cambodia; Nelson Mandela
released from prison after nearly 30 years and 3 years later
calling for an end to economic sanctions against South Africa. 
Perhaps nothing better illustrates just how different things are
than the improbable picture, just a few short weeks ago, of
Prime Minister Rabin and PLO Chairman Arafat on the White House
lawn with President Clinton, Secretary Christopher, and Russian
Foreign Minister Kozyrev for the signing of the mideast peace
agreement.

To respond to this new era, President Clinton has charted a
foreign policy course based on three goals:  

1.  Stimulating economic renewal in the U.S.; 
2.  Ensuring national security; and 
3.  Promoting democracy and human rights around the world.  

Ensuring national security and promoting democracy are familiar
canons of U.S. foreign policy.  Stimulating economic revival in
the U.S. is not.

But in looking at the world today, it is clear that domestic
economic strength is the base upon which we build our
international credibility and capabilities.  At the same time,
more than ever before, our prosperity depends on our engagement
in the global economy.  That is why President Clinton has placed
so much emphasis on integrating foreign and domestic economic
policy and on building sound economic relationships with our
trading partners.  That is why our economic interests are
increasingly dominant in our international relations.  Tonight,
I would like to outline for you the implications of the new
centrality of economics in U.S. foreign policy and what it means
for our global interests--with particular reference to our
interests in the Asia-Pacific region, the most economically
dynamic region in the world.

Domestic Economic Strength:   Key to International
Leadership
Early in the Administration, there was concern both at home and
abroad that the President's intention to "focus like a laser
beam" on the economy would lead the Administration to be
inward-looking.  Those concerns were mis- placed.  One of the
central insights of the Clinton presidency is that there is a
clear linkage between rebuilding the domestic economy and
ensuring our strength in the world.  And that is, that to be
strong and self-confident in world affairs, we must first be
strong and self-confident at home.

The importance of domestic economic revival to international
power and respect made a vivid impression on me first at the
economic summit in Tokyo.  For more than a decade, our principal
economic partners have been asking when we would begin to get
our own economic house in order.  It was apparent to them, if
not to all of us, that the massive federal budget deficit and
the trade deficit could not continue and that the solutions we
were advancing all those years were not adequate to the task.  

But in Tokyo, the change in atmosphere was palpable.  The
imminent passage of President Clinton's budget plan earned us a
new credibility.  By taking the tough steps to get our own house
in order, we demonstrated that "America is back" as a
responsible manager of its own economy and a dependable leader
on behalf of global economic cooperation and growth.  Agreement
on the G-7 Uruguay Round market access package and aid for
Russia--the most substantive summit outcome in recent 
memory--were the results.  The G-7 economic summit in Tokyo
marked the re-emergence of confidence in the U.S. as a global
economic leader.

Renewed U.S. influence on global economic issues comes not a
moment too soon--not only for promoting our economic goals at
home but also for advancing broad U.S. objectives of peace and
democracy in the post-Cold War world.

Not since the creation of Bretton Woods, the GATT, and the
Marshall Plan has economics been more central to the success of
our major foreign policy goals.  This is evident in Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union, where the success of the
democratic revolution depends on these nations' ability to build
market economies.  That is why the U.S. is contributing to a
multilateral effort to support Russian reform.

The Administration is committed  to supporting President Yeltsin
as the best hope for democratic reform in Russia.  We have
pledged, since the beginning of the year, close to $4.5 billion
in various types of assistance guarantees, credit, and
humanitarian aid to Russia and other new independent states
(NIS).  Late last week, Congress approved the Administration's
request for another $2.5 billion in technical and humanitarian
assistance to the NIS, as well as funds for increasing Eximbank
and Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) support.  The
U.S. is leading the effort to establish a $3-billion Special
Privatization and Restructuring Program (SPRP) for Russia to
help state companies become private.  Russia will enjoy
generalized system  of preferences privileges effective October
18, and last week we reached agreement to reschedule over $1
billion in bilateral debt.  This will contribute to the current
Paris Club rescheduling effort.  

As in the case of Russia, the historic agreement between the
Israelis and the Palestinians is another clear example that the
achievement of our political goals requires successful economic
intervention.  The ability to achieve economic prosperity and
development for the Palestinian and Israeli people will be
critical to achieving peace in the years ahead.  And in the
short term, there is a clear need to demonstrate that the
agreement has produced tangible improvements in the security and
daily lives of Palestinians and Israelis.  

Last Friday, less than 3 weeks after that historic handshake on
the White House lawn and only 10 days after the conference was
announced, delegations from 48 countries and organizations
gathered at the State Department to pledge support for peace in
the Middle East.  The donors assembled in Washington pledged
over $600 million in assistance for the first year alone, and we
are confident that the world community will continue to meet
fully the needs of the Palestinians over the next 5 years.  

Global Economic Engagement:  Key to Domestic Economic Vitality
If a strong economy is the key to our credibility and 
capability overseas, it is equally true that global economic
engagement is key to our economic vitality at home.  In today's
global market, the best opportunities may be half a world away,
in economies growing far faster than our own.  Strong markets
for U.S. exports are essential for job creation and economic
renewal at home.  Every $1 billion in U.S. exports creates about
20,000 good American jobs--jobs that pay about 17% more than the
average wage.  Between 1988 and 1992, almost 60% of real growth
in the U.S. economy came from export expansion.

In the next 3 months, the U.S. faces two crucial decisions that
will help shape its future in the post-Cold War world--two
decisions that will determine whether we look outward to a world
of opportunity and economic growth or whether we turn inward and
lay the seeds for economic decline.  One decision is ours alone.
 The other is for Europe and the rest of the world.  I am
speaking, of course, of the Uruguay Round and NAFTA.

Uruguay Round and NAFTA:  Critical Turning Points
For far too long, we have been trying to bring the GATT Uruguay
Round to a successful conclusion.  Time is running out.  The
negotiations today are in a crucial stage, with only 69 days
left to find solutions.  For us, the December 15 deadline is
final.  For our part, the Clinton Administration is committed to
achieving a successful conclusion to the round this year.  The
United States is prepared to shoulder its responsibilities for
the growth of world trade and the strengthening of the world
trading system.  Indeed, the U.S. took a leadership role in
convincing our G-7 partners to come up with a significant market
access package at the time of the Tokyo summit.

But we cannot do it alone.  Those in the European Community who
expect the U.S. to renegotiate the Blair House Accords are
mistaken.  A deal is a deal.  And right now a good deal for both
the United States and the world is within reach.  The time has
come for the EC to move.  Other countries which have been
hanging back, such as Japan and Korea, must now step forward
with real offers in goods, services, and agriculture.  India,
Pakistan, ASEAN, and Latin American countries must improve goods
and services offers as well.  None of the remaining trade-offs
will be easy for any nation.  But without a successful round, we
will be robbing our own future.  We must make the hard choices
now to secure the certain benefits of more open trade tomorrow.

Passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement is another
vital element in the Administration's strategy to make the U.S.
stronger at home and abroad.  Our positive decision on NAFTA
will confirm to the world that the U.S. is prepared to lead and
compete in the changing global economy.  

NAFTA's economic benefits are clear:  It gives our exporters
access to what will be the world's largest free trade area,
comprising about 370 million people.  It will secure the 
advantages that have boosted U.S.  exports to Mexico by more
than 200% since 1986, creating 400,000 jobs.  It will create
even more high-wage, high-skill jobs and enhance our ability to
compete globally.  

But the foreign policy implications of NAFTA make a compelling
economic case even stronger:  It is a symbol of a new
relationship and a new structure  of cooperation with our
closest neighbors--a real turning point in our relations.  In
Mexico, NAFTA will reinforce unprecedented political and
economic reform and increase Mexico's ability to cooperate on a
wide range of important issues that spill across our 2,000-mile
border--especially the environment, narcotics, and illegal
immigration.  NAFTA will demonstrate that economic reform and
liberalization pays, encouraging democratic governments from
Argentina to Venezuela that have opened their economies to trade
and investment with the U.S.

For more than half a century, every American President--Democrat
and Republican--has stood for closer cooperation throughout the
Western Hemisphere.  We, too, understand the stakes.  We know it
will be a tough fight.  But as the President has stressed, this
is a fight we must win--and we intend to win it.

Change and the U.S.Stake in the Pacific 
Our interests and responsibilities, as I touched on above, are
global.  But in the post-Cold War world, against the backdrop of
the new importance of economics to our interests both at home
and abroad, there is no region more important to the United
States than the Pacific Rim. 

The U.S. has a major economic stake in Asia.  In the past
decade, Asia has seen the most dynamic economic growth in the
world.  Foreign investment is pouring into Singapore, Indonesia,
Thailand, and Malaysia.  ASEAN economies are booming, growing
six times faster than world output in 1992.  China's southern
and coastal areas are enjoying a market-oriented manufacturing
boom and an explosion of Western joint ventures and are
increasingly integrated with the economies of Hong Kong and
Taiwan through informal trade and investment links.  Korea, one
of Asia's greatest success stories, has moved from subsistence
to advanced manufacturing in a few short decades.  Economic
growth has given rise to an Asian middle class and a large, new
consumer market.  Growth and global revolutions in technology,
transportation, and communication have fueled expectations of
greater political empowerment in this new Asian middle class.  

Reflecting this dynamism, over half of our total world trade is
with the Pacific region, half again as much as our trade with
Europe and three times our trade with Latin America.  More than
2.5 million U.S. jobs now depend on exports to the Asia-Pacific
region.  And those jobs pay a higher wage--almost $3,500 dollars
more per year than the average American job.  As the 
fastest-growing region in the world, the Pacific Rim holds
terrific promise for even more job-creating exports of U.S.
goods and services.  

The Pacific is also the region of our greatest economic
challenges and many of our toughest competitors.  Not only does
Asia export a lot to us, it is a growing center of technological
innovation and entrepreneurship.  How do we meet this challenge?
 As President Clinton has stated, we are confronted with the
choice of embracing change and creating the jobs of tomorrow or
resisting change, hoping we can preserve the economic structures
of yesterday.  Closing markets and resisting change is not an
option.  Rather, we need to export more.  We need to increase
our presence in these markets to know what competitors are
doing.

The U.S. Response:  The New Pacific Community
We have enormous stakes in the Pacific--economic, political, and
strategic.  Nowhere else in the world is the interdependence
and, sometimes, conflict of economic and security issues,
traditionally separate in our thinking, more apparent.  Nowhere
is the centrality of economics to our interests clearer.  How
will the U.S. respond? 

As President Clinton said in Tokyo and Seoul this summer, he
envisions "a new Pacific Community built on shared strength,
shared prosperity, and a shared commitment to democratic
values."  These three pillars are inseparable and intertwined. 
Economic progress spurred by trade and investment liberalization
is essential for stability in the Pacific Rim.  Economic growth,
rising standards of living, and integration with the world
economic system are powerful forces for democratic change and
respect for human rights.  A continued, strong U.S. commitment
to the region's security creates the environment for economic
development, growing markets, and flourishing trade.  Each of
these three pillars is necessary for an effective U.S. foreign
policy in Asia.  Each reinforces the other.  

To realize this vision, we must work to create a true sense of
community--shared interests, values, goals--among the highly
diverse nations of the Asia-Pacific.  The region is one of
enormous economic and political diversity, large cultural and
physical distances, and a legacy of conflict.  At the same time,
explosive economic growth is weaving the web of human and
commercial relationships that form the foundation of a
"community."  Significant and historically new trends,
especially the telecommunications revolution, are reducing
distances and spurring regional "networking."  There is a
growing awareness that transnational issues, such as the
environment, require regional cooperation.  

U.S. engagement--political, security, and economic--is required
to promote and direct these trends, serving as a catalyst for
the development of community.  We must build the architecture 
and intensify the network of relationships that create
"community."

Foundations of Pacific Community 
We see great promise in our growing economic interaction with
the nations of the Asia-Pacific region.  We aim, therefore, to
promote in the Pacific Rim continued rapid growth, sustainable
development, and market-oriented economies open to international
trade and investment.  Our approach will include vigorous and
essential efforts to convince trading partners to tear down
barriers to trade and investment.  But we also intend to seize
the tremendous opportunities for mutual benefit that exist. 
Thus, we are actively exploring possibilities for enhanced
economic cooperation.  We are working to ensure that U.S.
business enjoys the access it needs in dynamic Asian markets by
encouraging the market-oriented regulatory reform now underway
in many Asian economies.  Deregulation must accompany market
opening for U.S. business to thrive in these markets. 

Our framework for a new economic partnership with Japan,
announced in July and reaffirmed by the President and Prime
Minister Hosokawa at the UN General Assembly last week, is a
good example of this new approach.   The framework contains a
commitment by Japan to strive for a "highly significant
decrease" in its global current account surplus and outlines
five areas in which both governments should work together to
remove barriers that prevent U.S. firms from enjoying the
success in Japan's markets they achieve elsewhere in the world. 
They are:  

1.  Government procurement; 
2.  Regulatory reform and competitiveness; 
3.  Other major sectors (including autos and auto parts); 
4.  Implementation of existing arrangements and measures; and 
5.  Economic harmonization.  

Some of the negotiations, such as those on government
procurement and autos and parts, address market access issues. 
Others, such as deregulation, address more structural issues.  

In the negotiations on "economic harmonization," which I chair,
we are looking at ways to achieve greater foreign direct
investment in Japan, to allow U.S. firms to break into long-term
Japanese buyer-supplier relationships, to enhance intellectual
property protection, and to gain greater U.S. access to Japanese
technology.  Consistent with our interest in further expanding
U.S.-Japan cooperation on issues of shared interest, the
framework also contains a "common agenda for cooperation in
global perspective."  This effort includes programs for joint
efforts on 15 issues, including the environment, technology
cooperation, AIDS, and population growth.

We intend to go beyond simple agreements under the framework; we
are looking for results, and we will develop criteria to assess
progress.  This Administration attaches as high a priority to
our trade and economic relations with Japan as we do to our
political and security relations.  Reflecting this, progress
under the framework will be reviewed at twice- annual meetings
between the President and the Prime Minister of Japan. 

Our new Dialogue for Economic Cooperation with South Korea is
another good example of our approach.  As South Korea pursues
its ambitious economic reform and deregulation program, we will
work with the Koreans to improve the business climate for
American exporters and investors.  We are addressing key
regulatory problems faced by U.S. companies, such as onerous
procedures in investment, taxation, standards and testing, and
import clearance.  At the same time, we will explore with South
Korea ways in which we might work together to our mutual
economic benefit.

Regional economic cooperation--taking root in the promising
evolution of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, or
APEC--is another key to building community.  APEC began in 1989
as an "informal dialogue" of only 12 member economies.  Today,
the 15 members of APEC are collectively the most powerful
regional economy in the world, accounting for approximately half
the world's gross product and about 35% of world trade.  The 15
members of APEC have spelled out their common commitment to more
open trade and increased economic collaboration.  As APEC chair
in 1993, the United States has worked to advance the theme of
regional trade and investment liberalization.  At this year's
1993 ministerial, to be chaired by Secretary Christopher in
November in Seattle, we expect APEC ministers to approve a
declaration that will begin an effort in APEC to expand regional
trade and investment.

Following the APEC ministerial, President Clinton has proposed
an unprecedented meeting of Asia-Pacific leaders in Seattle. 
The meeting will be an historic opportunity for APEC's leaders
to begin developing a long-term vision for the region's future
and lay the foundation for a cooperative effort to address the
major economic challenges facing the region.  This meeting is a
clear reaffirmation of our role as a Pacific nation and of our
determination to remain actively engaged in the region.

Conflicts Among Policy Goals In the Post-Cold War Period
As we work to advance our political and economic interests in
Asia and elsewhere, we recognize that there are and will
continue to be conflicts in our pursuit of those goals.  These
conflicts become more acute as our economic and commercial
interests in the world increase and the interdependence between
our economic, political, and security interests deepens.  

In this new environment, we cannot avoid trade-offs.  China is a
key example--one of the world's most dynamic economies but
governed by a regime which is too often repressive.  We have 
strong trade, human rights, and non-proliferation concerns with
China.  We also have strong economic interests there.  We must
continue to engage China in order to advance our goals in all of
these areas.  For that reason, we will be joining with the
Chinese in a number of high-level exchanges to discuss these
matters.  In dealing with these competing goals, the May 28
executive order which extended China's MFN status also
recognized the existence of trade and non-proliferation issues
while acknowledging our concern over China's human rights
practices.

Given the growing importance of engagement in the world economy
for our domestic economic strength, we now must carefully
evaluate the costs and benefits in each case.  The President has
begun to take that much-
needed hard look at the economic and commercial costs of other
policies and to seek a better balance between them.  Just last
week, the Administration's Trade Promotion Coordinating
Committee, comprising 19 agencies, announced the first step in a
new national export strategy, the streamlining of U.S.
non-proliferation export controls.  These and other changes
contained in the TPCC report are aimed at clearing away
unnecessary obstacles to U.S. exports, complementing the
President's commitment to reform COCOM to reflect new realities
in national security and technology. 

We also cannot ignore that greater economic engagement abroad,
while bringing tremendous benefits to our domestic economy, also
will impose sometimes painful adjustments.  A key element of our
ability to pursue greater economic interaction abroad will be
our ability to manage related adjustments at home.

Conclusion
 In conclusion, let me return to the theme with which I opened: 
the centrality of economics to our foreign policy and the clear
linkage between our foreign policy and our own domestic economic
strength.  For the first time in decades, the major world powers
are not at war or locked in hostile, confrontational relations. 
This enormous, epochal change gives us a unique opportunity--and
a responsibility--to provide new leadership in a changed world. 
Our renewed influence as a world leader, based on economic
revitalization at home, will give us the means.  

The challenge of building a foreign policy adapted to the
post-Cold War era is daunting.  It requires a new vision based
on what we stand for as opposed to what we stand against.  It
requires explaining to the American people as well as to the
Council on Foreign Relations how that vision relates to our
domestic interests.  And it requires changing the way we in
Washington and in embassies around the world make and execute
our international strategies.  Central to this effort will be
the role of  foreign economic policy.  I believe we have made
important progress in defining our economic aims and in linking
them to our domestic interests.  In order to translate our 
vision and our strategy into reality, we must now turn our
foreign policy machinery in the right direction.  That means
giving new priority to economic issues within the State
Department, among Washington agencies, and in Congress.  It also
means reshaping our Cold War institutions and relationships to
the new era and the new priorities.  I believe we have made a
good start, but I also know that we have a long road ahead.  Let
me assure you that you have a team in Washington--at the White
House, the State Department, and throughout   the
government--that is committed    to taking us successfully down
that road.  (###)



ARTICLE 9

Audiovisual Services And Products Under GATT
Statement by President Clinton, released by the White House,
Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, October 14, 1993.

Audiovisual services must be included in any GATT accord.  The
United States does not want any special favors for American
audiovisual creative works, but we also cannot accept that
audiovisual products be singled out for unacceptable
restrictions.  The United States is ready to sign a GATT accord
that is fair and just for all.  But let me make it clear that
fairness and justice must apply to audiovisual works as well as
other elements in a final GATT deal.  This is a vital jobs issue
as well as a fairness issue for America.

Finally, let me say once again that the Uruguay Round is very
important to the restoration of global growth, and that is why
it is essential that we finish this agreement by December 15. 
That deadline is firm, and our trading partners must be prepared
to settle with us on the many outstanding issues if we are to
succeed.  (###)



ARTICLE 10

U.S. Policy on Japan and the  New Japanese Government

Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs
Statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
Washington, DC, October 5, 1993

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee:  I am pleased to have
this opportunity to share views with you on U.S. policy on Japan
and the new Japanese Government.

The elections in Japan on July 18 showed a strong desire for
change following a long series of political scandals.  The
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), in power in Japan for 38 years, 
lost its majority in the Lower House of the Diet.  On August 9,
Morihiro Hosokawa became the first non-LDP Prime Minister in
Japan since the 1950s.  The new Prime Minister heads a "reform
coalition" made up of seven parties, representing a wide range
of political views but in seeming agreement on the need for
reform of Japan's political system.

The mood of the country is running strongly in favor of "change"
and "reform"--political reform, especially, but also reform of
the economic and social structure.  Prime Minister Hosokawa so
far personifies the effort to bring about change in Japanese
society.  In his first weeks in office, he has garnered a 70%
support rating, an astonishing reversal in the Japanese public's
opinion of its political leadership.  If he is able to take
advantage of the mood for change, the result could be a
significant shift in Japanese political and economic practices.

Our first meetings with top officials of the Hosokawa
administration have been excellent.  President Clinton met with
the new Prime Minister in New York on September 27 and had a
very useful and cordial exchange of views with him.  Secretary
Christopher has had two meetings with Foreign Minister Hata, and
Secretary Aspin has met with Defense Agency Director General
Nakanishi.  Secretary Espy will be in Tokyo next week for
meetings with top Japanese officials.  Congressional delegations
have had productive meetings with Japan's new leadership in the
past several weeks.  The selection of former Vice President
Mondale as ambassador to Tokyo was very well received by the
Japanese, just as it was here at home.

As we have stated consistently, there are three pillars to our
relationship.  The economic pillar is under stress and needs
steadying so as not to affect our overall relationship. 
Therefore, the President and the Secretary have made clear that
the economic aspects of our ties with Japan need urgent
attention.  The Japanese global current account surplus,
combined with Japan's stagnant domestic economy, presents the
most serious potential problem in our bilateral relationship. 
Japan and the United States maintain one of the most important
economic relationships in the world.  We must work to right the
economic imbalances that are the source of the contentiousness
that has entered our relations.  Our economic ties must be
balanced and mutually beneficial and firmly rooted in the shared
interest and responsibility of the U.S. and Japan to promote
global growth, open markets, and a vital world trading system.

It is essential that the Japanese recognize that just as we are
making necessary and long-delayed adjustments in the U.S.
economy--bringing the budget deficit under control, improving
our competitiveness, and implementing comprehensive health care
reforms--Japan must also implement changes in its economy,
boosting domestic demand and adjusting its regulatory and
business practices to allow full access to Japanese markets.  
Additionally, it is crucial that Japan play an active role in
bringing the GATT Uruguay Round to a successful conclusion.  We,
therefore, look to Japan to undertake forward-looking
initiatives on the Uruguay Round talks, which must be completed
by December 15.

Our U.S.-Japan Framework for Economic Partnership, announced in
Tokyo in July, is intended to address the economic imbalances in
our relationship.  Under the framework, Japan has committed to
pursue policies to bring about a "highly significant decrease"
in its current account surplus, both by taking macroeconomic
steps to promote domestic demand-led growth and by increasing
market access for foreign goods.  The market access issues will
be addressed through five different "baskets," including
government procurement; autos/auto parts; regulatory reform;
economic harmonization, including issues of increasing foreign
business presence in Japan, foreign access to Japanese
technology and buyer-supplier networks, and increased
intellectual property protection; and implementation of existing
agreements.  The framework agreement also contains a "Common
Agenda for Cooperation in Global Perspective," which contains 15
programs for joint efforts on such issues as the environment,
AIDS, and population growth.

The "kick-off" meetings for most framework issues were held in
Hawaii on September 16-23.  Treasury began talks on the fifth
basket, deregulation, in Washington last week.  A "kick-off"
meeting of the common agenda for cooperation portion of the
economic framework was held on September 9.  The talks have been
organizational in nature and have laid out the basic elements of
our proposals in these areas.  At the next round of meetings,
scheduled for mid-October, we hope to propose draft agreements
in several sectors.  We will press for early
progress--particularly in the high-priority areas of autos/auto
parts, government procurement, and insurance for which the
framework calls for bilateral agreements by early 1994.  Prime
Minister Hosokawa and President Clinton are expected to meet to
review framework progress in January or February.  Deputy USTR
Ambassador Barshefsky will also want to share her firsthand
observations on this process.

We have a timetable in place.  We anticipate and expect
market-opening results because it is in both of our interests to
have them.  All members of the Administration have made it clear
that we look for concrete steps, and we will monitor
negotiations closely to ensure that progress is being made.

It is early to determine whether the momentum of Japan's
domestic reform outlined above will work to stimulate tangible
progress on our long-standing economic differences.  If so, that
will be to the benefit of the Japanese consumer as well as the
U.S. exporter.  Both the President and Secretary Christopher
have personally urged Prime Minister Hosokawa to undertake
forward-looking economic and trade initiatives in coming months
to defuse trade tensions.  Prime Minister 
Hosokawa has promised President Clinton that he will "redouble"
his efforts to make progress under the economic framework
agreement announced in July.  Consistent with this pledge, in
his maiden policy speech to the Diet on August 23, Hosokawa
promised to try to cut Japan's current account surplus
significantly through expansion of domestic demand, improved
market access for imports, and deregulation.  We certainly want
to work positively with a government pledging a number of
constructive economic steps.

The President and the Secretary have also underscored the great
value we attach to the security, political, and global
dimensions of our partnership with Japan.  These aspects of our
relationship are in sound condition.  The Japanese have
consistently been among our most important partners and
strongest supporters in the international arena.  The change in
government in Japan has not altered that.  We are in fundamental
agreement with the Hosokawa government on foreign and security
policy issues.  The new government is adhering closely to
Japan's long-standing basic foreign policy principles,
especially Japan's commitment to its security alliance with the
United States.

Our alliance with Japan is a mainstay of our international
security posture.  Japan is our most important ally in the
world's most dynamic economic region, serving as the host nation
for key U.S. military installations and providing billions of
dollars each year to support the roughly 47,000 American troops
based there.  Prime Minister Hosokawa has made it clear that
this alliance will continue to be the cornerstone of Japan's
foreign policy.

We consult closely with Japan and value Japan's support on a
wide range of political and security issues, including Russia,
the Korean Peninsula, Cambodia, Vietnam, China, and the Middle
East.  Japan is a key partner in our efforts to develop a
regional security dialogue in East Asia, both through the ASEAN
Post-Ministerial Conference process and also in Northeast Asia. 
Japan has played an important role in developing APEC--the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum--and will assume the
APEC chairmanship in late 1994.  The Hosokawa government has
announced that it will support an indefinite extension of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  Last week, Japan
pledged $200 million in financial support for the peace process
in the West Bank and Gaza.

We are increasingly looking to the Japanese to demonstrate
leadership on the world stage commensurate with Japan's status
as an economic superpower.  Prime Minister Hosokawa and key
members of his cabinet have stated their recognition of Japan's
international responsibilities and their intention to have Japan
play a prominent role in addressing the problems facing the
international community.

Whether the Hosokawa government can meet growing expectations at
home and abroad, by turning its initiatives into real policies,
remains to be seen.  But, as I stated in my confirmation
hearings--and I believe this now more than ever--our fortunes in
Asia and, indeed, the world will hinge on developing
comprehensive, durable ties with Japan.  This bilateral
relationship remains my highest priority.

Mr. Chairman, this Administration is determined to forge a more
equitable, positive partnership with Japan as we head toward the
next century.  To this end, we offer our Japanese friends both
reassurance about our intentions and a sense of urgency about
festering frictions.  We will maintain a substantial military
presence in Asia, cooperate intimately with Japan on regional
and global issues, and support its access to a permanent seat in
the United Nations Security Council.

In return, equity and reality require more vigorous Japanese
performance on economic issues and international
responsibilities.  What is good for our bilateral relations is
good for the Japanese citizen.  What is called for on the world
stage serves Japan's national interest.

America will listen more, lecture less.  In turn, Japan should
step forward, not in response to American entreaties or pressure
but in a spirit of enlightened self-interest and mutual benefit.
 As we strive to strengthen our relations with our most
important partner, we will work closely with the Congress. 
Today's hearing is an important step in that process.  (###)



ARTICLE 11

Status of Bosnian Peace Negotiations 
Stephen A. Oxman, Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian
Affairs
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
Washington, DC, October 5, 1993 

It is a pleasure to be back before you and your colleagues, and
I would like to make a few opening remarks and respond to some
of the points that you and Senator Lugar have made.  I am here
with Ambassador Vic Jackovich to bring you up to date on
developments in the former Yugoslavia and to hear your views on
American policy in the region.

I will begin by briefly describing the negotiations that led to
the tentative agreement among the parties, our role with respect
to those negotiations, and the Bosnian parliament's decision
concerning the agreement.  I will then discuss the direction of
American policy after this decision.

The proposed agreement emerged from the Geneva negotiations held
under the joint auspices of the United Nations and the European
Community.  In August, the parties reached a constitutional
agreement and a military agreement.  This, however, did not
produce an end to the fighting, as the parties still had not
agreed upon the territorial settlement that would be acceptable
to all sides.

Also in August, NATO decided at our initiative that it was
prepared to use air power if the Bosnian Serbs continued
strangling Sarajevo and other areas.  This demonstration of
resolve, I'm happy to say, helped to relieve the humanitarian
situation in Sarajevo and encouraged the parties to persist with
negotiations on territory.  Even then, the parties were unable,
at first, to reach a final agreement.  After the negotiations
were suspended on September 1, we urged the Bosnian Serbs and
the Bosnian Croats to show more flexibility in working on the
territorial adjustments sought by the Bosnian Government in its
efforts to achieve a more equitable settlement.

On September 20, the parties met on the HMS Invincible in the
Adriatic and, building upon the constitutional agreement, which
envisioned a con-federal state of Bosnia, containing three
autonomous republics, the parties made progress toward a
territorial settlement.  The Bosnian Serb republic was allotted
about 52% of the territory, the Bosnian Croat republic about
17%, and the Bosnian Government about 31%.  These figures
represented a significant rollback of the territory held by the
Bosnian Serbs but would still have left them in control of
territory they had taken through force and so-called ethnic
cleansing.

As previously agreed among the parties, the areas around
Sarajevo and Mostar would be under an international protectorate
for 2 years, during which negotiations as to their further
status would take place.  To encourage further territorial
concessions, the agreement also stated that referenda could be
held within 2 years to determine whether any of the republics
wished to secede from the Bosnian union, provided that further
mutually acceptable territorial adjustments had been reached.

In this final round of negotiations, the Bosnian Serbs agreed to
give up some additional territory around the eastern enclave of
Gorazde.  The Croatians and Bosnian Croats agreed that the
Bosnian Government could have internationally guaranteed access
to the seaport of Plice and a port in Bosnia on the Neretsa
River.  The Bosnian Government, however, was still faced with an
agreement providing no additional territory in the northwest and
considerably less territory in the east than it had sought.

The United States played a constructive role throughout the
recent negotiations.  As I mentioned above, NATO's decision on
the use of air power was instrumental in encouraging the 
parties to persist with the negotiations.  The negotiations were
also advanced by our reiteration of American willingness to
participate in implementation of a peace plan, provided certain
conditions were met, and our special envoy, Ambassador Chuck
Redmond, was present on the Invincible and had many private
meetings with the parties.  His role, which he carried out
energetically and effectively, was not to advocate any
particular solutions, but to encourage the parties to reach an
agreement among themselves.

As you know, the Bosnian parliament, last Wednesday, effectively
rejected the proposed agreement.  By an overwhelming vote, it
formally accepted the peace plan, but only upon the condition
that the Bosnian Government recover territory that had been
taken by force and ethnically cleansed, a condition that the
Bosnian Serbs had previously rejected.  We are very concerned
that the parties have not yet been able to reach an agreement
that is acceptable to all of them.  The price of failing to
reach an agreement may be another even more harrowing winter of
starvation and bloodshed.

Even after this latest rejection, American policy will continue
to be guided by the goals that have governed it so far:

First, to stop the killing and alleviate the suffering of the
Bosnian people through a negotiated settlement and, second, to
prevent the conflict from spreading.

Let me discuss briefly what we are doing to pursue each of these
goals. The most urgent goal we have is to help stop the fighting
and help bring about a viable peace.  We continue to believe
strongly that the only way to end this tragic conflict is at the
negotiating table, not on the battlefield.  Lord Owen and Mr.
Stoltenburg remain in daily contact with the parties.  The
United States is prepared to continue to assist the negotiations
as Ambassadors Redmond and, before him, Ambassador Bartholomew
have done.  But ultimately the killing will not stop until all
the parties are persuaded that it must stop.  We caution the
parties, particularly the Serbs and the Croats, not to take any
actions on the ground that would interfere with an early
resumption of negotiations or would increase the level of
violence.

We are also committed to maintaining economic pressure on Serbia
as a way of ending the fighting.  The sanctions have had a
devastating effect on the economy of Serbia, where inflation
runs at several billion percent a year and shortages are
widespread. Enforcement by the frontline has generally been good
and has particularly improved in the former Yugoslav republic of
Macedonia.  The Serbian people must understand that their
country will remain an international outcast until their
government changes its behavior.

At the same time, we are trying to relieve the suffering that
this war has already caused.  The U.S. is the largest 
single-country donor of humanitarian aid.  We have provided over
$370 million since 1991, and we remain committed to providing
continued airlift, airdrop, and other assistance to the needy in
Bosnia.  As winter approaches, the international relief effort
is better organized than it was last year, but the people of
Bosnia are weaker, have less food and fuel on hand, and cannot
count on a repeat of last winter's relatively mild weather.

Moreover, access for delivery of humanitarian aid is likely to
deteriorate, if the level of fighting increases. In short, the
humanitarian situation is grave.  However, and I want to
emphasize this point, NATO's commitment of August 9 remains in
full force. If there are renewed efforts to strangle Sarajevo
and other areas, NATO will use air power against those
responsible.

We are also committed to bringing to justice those who have been
responsible for the acts of savagery in the former Yugoslavia. 
As you know, the United States has been one of the most vigorous
advocates of the war crimes tribunal.  We have made eight
reports to the United Nations describing atrocities that have
been committed.  Judge Gabriel Kirk McDonald, a highly respected
former federal judge, was recently elected one of the judges of
the tribunal.  The tribunal will provide a forum in which those
responsible for the criminal acts committed in the former
Yugoslavia can be held accountable for their actions.

The United States also remains willing to participate in
implementation of a peace agreement if certain conditions are
met.  These conditions are:  

--  An agreement must be reached and accepted by all parties; 

--  It must be viable and contain adequate implementation
provisions and terms that all parties respect; 

--  To demonstrate their willingness to honor the agreement, the
parties must make a joint formal request that NATO, pursuant to
UN authorization, help to implement and enforce it;

--  Next, after an agreement is signed, there must be prompt
action by the parties to make substantial changes in their
behavior that indicate their seriousness, including a
substantial diminution of hostilities.  

Limited advance NATO deployments after the agreement takes
effect will help it get off the ground by demonstrating our
seriousness.  The phasing of subsequent deployments on a
schedule determined by practical considerations will provide us
the opportunity to assess the parties' intentions.  NATO must
exercise command and control over all military forces, including
those from non-NATO states.  NATO will develop the rules of
engagement, which will permit military commanders to 
use all necessary force for self-defense and to carry out their
mission.

Further, the operation must be under the political authority of
the United Nations, which must ask NATO to assume responsibility
for all military aspects of implementation and accept the
concept of operations and rules of engagement developed by NATO.

NATO commanders will work in close coordination with UN civilian
authorities, but NATO commanders will take their orders from the
NAC via the NATO chain of command, not from UN civilian
officials.

Further, other contributors must provide more than half of the
total force.  Funding arrangements acceptable to the U.S. must
be agreed upon. Finally, there must be a clear time limit to
NATO's responsibility and an understanding that at the end of
that time period, responsibility for the operation will revert
to the UN.

In addition, as the President has said, we will continue to
consult with the Congress, as we have to date, and we will not
commit American troops to the implementation operation without
congressional support.

Finally, we have a significant strategic interest in ensuring
that the conflict does not spill over and involve neighboring
countries.  As you know, we have sent approximately 320 troops
to the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia as part of the UN
monitoring force there.  The presence of this force will help
prevent spillover of the conflict to Macedonia.  We have also
warned Milosevic that we would respond in the event of conflict
in Kosovo caused by Serbian action.

We also believe it is important to prevent a wider conflict
developing between Croatian Serbs and the Croatian Government. 
In this regard, we welcome the UN's decision to renew the
UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia, and we urge the Croatian Government
to accept renewal of the mandate.

The principal obstacle to a resolution of the conflict in
Croatia has been the refusal of the Croatian Serbs to implement
the Vance plan.  We were very aware of the importance of the
current sanctions on Serbia in promoting a settlement to the
problem of the Serb-occupied Krajina as the UN resolution
recognized.  We have made clear to the Government of Croatia,
however, that our ability to be helpful in this regard will
depend on constructive Croatian behavior with respect to
achieving peace in Bosnia.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, we hope that the
parties are able to reach an agreement, and we will continue to
work toward that objective.  Now I'd be very pleased to answer
your questions.  (###)



ARTICLE 12

The Vital Task of Lebanon's Reconstruction
Edward P. Djerejian, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern
Affairs
Address before the American Task Force for Lebanon,  Washington,
DC, October 6, 1993

I am pleased to have the opportunity to be here today to discuss
with you the vital task of Lebanon's reconstruction.  I see many
friends here, all dedicated, as am I, to seeing Lebanon renewed.

As many of you know, for me Lebanon holds a special place,
having served there in my first overseas post as a young Foreign
Service officer a quarter-century ago.  In August, I was with
Secretary Christopher in the city of Zahle--the Secretary's
second visit to Lebanon within 5 months and my third over the
last 2 years since becoming Assistant Secretary.  These trips
underlined the importance of the  relationship that exists
between the United States and Lebanon.

The Secretary's visit was more than symbolism, however.  Let me
make it clear:  The United States Government is committed to the
territorial integrity, unity, sovereignty, and full independence
of Lebanon.  We want to see Lebanon once again stable and
prosperous--a cultural and commercial crossroads at peace with
itself and with its neighbors.

It has been over 18 months since I last spoke before the ATFL. 
In that period, Lebanon has continued its emergence from the
terrible nightmare of the civil war.  Many of you here know,
personally, of the pain which Lebanon endured over the course of
its long civil war.  To repeat here today the litany of misery
and desolation visited upon the Lebanese people would serve no
useful purpose.  I do not mean to suggest, however, that the
past can be ignored.  We must not forget the lessons learned
from suffering the ills of factionalization, fanaticism under
the guise of religion, and base self-interest.  But I believe
that those of us gathered here today are committed to looking
forward.

President Hrawi, Prime Minister Hariri, and Nabih Berri, the
President of the Chamber of Deputies, told us at Zahle that
they, too, remain firm in their determination to keep Lebanon
looking forward on the road out of the abyss wrought by 16 years
of civil war.  They asked for our help, a request Secretary
Christopher and President Clinton have pledged to honor.

The United States has responded in a number of ways to Lebanon's
needs.  Most importantly, perhaps, is the help we 
have rendered to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).  The Lebanese
leadership regards the LAF as a key instrument for national
reconciliation.  The LAF has disarmed most of the militias which
plagued the land.  It has successfully eliminated the
confessionalism which formerly divided its ranks, an example the
Lebanese nation could well take to heart.  Most significantly,
the LAF has worked to extend the authority of the central
government throughout Lebanon's territory.  An institution of
national scope, the LAF, under the able leadership of Gen. Emile
Lahoud, is rightfully earning the respect of the Lebanese
people.

Respect for the military is founded on more than good
intentions, however.  An army must also be credible.  It depends
on the quality of its people and arms.  Our International
Military Education and Training program, funded this year at
$400,000, continues to bring Lebanese officers and enlisted men
to the United States for training.  We believe strongly that
this program helps reinforce the professionalism and the
commitment to civilian, elected authority which define a
military in a democratic state.

We believe so strongly in IMET that we are seeking an increase
in this year's funding for Lebanon by nearly 50%, to $592,000. 
Our commitment to the LAF's mission extends to equipment as
well.  Since October 1992, the LAF has received delivery from
U.S. stocks of over $1.4 million in non-lethal excess defense
articles (EDA).  The defense department has scheduled for
delivery another $3.6 million in EDA.

And we are going further.  After close consultations with the
Congress, the Administration has determined to end an 8-year
policy prohibiting the sale of lethal military equipment to
Lebanon.  The policy was instituted at the height of the civil
war, when there existed justifiable concern that such equipment
would fall into the hands of parties adverse to Lebanon's
national interest.  With the civil war at an end and the LAF
once again a truly national, professional force capable of
controlling and safeguarding its inventory, we believe a
carefully conceived and monitored program of lethal sales will
strengthen the LAF and further Lebanon's reconstruction.

The recent approval of $1.85 million in spare parts for M113
armored personnel carriers (APCs) already in the LAF's inventory
was an important step in our efforts to bolster the LAF.  Under
active consideration is the LAF's request for several hundred
APCs.  What we hope to provide to the LAF--after consultations
to determine realistic needs and affordability--is the means to
further its morale, mobility, visibility, and credibility.

These sales will not increase Lebanon's ability to wage war, an
outcome sought neither by the U.S. nor a war-weary Lebanese
people.  The goal is a stable Lebanon with a strong, confident
central government fully in control of its national territory 
and destiny.  From this, much that is desirable can flow--for
Lebanon, the Middle East, and, indeed, our own national
interest.

The benefits to Lebanon are self-evident.  With stability, the
Lebanese people can move to strengthen their democratic
institutions.  Last year's parliamentary elections were, despite
the inadequacies and the difficult political circumstances
surrounding the voting, a step in the right direction.  They
did, for example, address some imbalances founded in history
rather than demographic reality.  But it is important to take
the next step.  Adequate safeguards need be taken to ensure the
credibility of balloting.  International observers should be
welcomed.  Intimidation cannot be tolerated.  Most importantly,
all Lebanese must see participation as a right and obligation
inherent in the democratic process.

A confident, politically stable Lebanon, free of the
distractions of internal strife, can continue to pursue with
vigor the reconstruction of a once-vital economy and
infrastructure.  Prime Minister Hariri's government has embarked
on an energetic and needed program of economic reform which has
begun to show impressive results.  We support the Lebanese
Government's efforts; President Clinton told Prime Minister
Hariri, when they met in New York last week, that he was
impressed with the Lebanese Government's efforts to bring
progress to Lebanon.

According to one respected study, GDP rose by 17% in the second
quarter of 1993, as compared to the first quarter.  The rise
resulted chiefly from growth in private sector consumption and
investment.  Industrial and agricultural exports increased by
17% in the second quarter of 1993, compared to the first quarter
of 1992.  Construction flourished, with permit issuance
increasing by 95% from 1993's first quarter.

The ingenious scheme to rebuild the bombed-out center of Beirut
through privatization is making significant progress.  We
understand that "Solidere," the company formed to oversee the
reconstruction of downtown Beirut, has lined up $600 million in
capital investment, mostly from Gulf neighbors, to finance the
project.  The commercial heart of Beirut is a powerful symbol
for the Lebanese people, a place where, in the recent past,
cultures freely mixed.  Its rehabilitation will serve as an
important psychological marker on the road to recovery. 

The U.S. is doing its part in this respect.  This fiscal year,
we hope to provide $10 million in economic assistance to
Lebanon.  This is over and above the help we promised after the
fighting in southern Lebanon in late July.  The $11-million
mobile hospital promised by the Secretary arrived this past
month.  Another $8-million hospital will arrive in mid-November.
 In an era of shrinking resources, our aid to Lebanon remains a
tangible signal of our continuing commitment.

The contributions of Lebanon's Arab friends are very important. 
Most recently, the Arab foreign ministers, meeting at Damascus,
pledged $500 million to Lebanon's  reconstruction.  A
significant portion of that money--which we have urged be made
available immediately--will be targeted by the Lebanese
Government for relief and economic development.  Further,
President Clinton has personally communicated with a number of
Arab and European heads of state to encourage their support and
assistance in these efforts.

Ultimately, of course, the fate of Lebanon's reconstruction
rests with the Lebanese.  We can help.  Lebanon's neighbors can
help.  But unless those Lebanese living abroad are willing to
invest their confidence in the future of Lebanon--and to do so
with hard work and with capital repatriated from abroad and
invested in Lebanon's economic renewal--the phoenix will not
rise.  The IMF reports encouraging signs that the Lebanese are
starting to invest in Lebanon's future, a trend I hope will
continue.

With that said, American business can and should participate in
the Lebanese renewal.  Many will say that the passport
restrictions on American travel to Lebanon make participation
either impossible or not worth the trouble.  That is not the
case.  It is an unfortunate truth that, despite the real strides
made toward stability, Lebanon remains a dangerous place for
Americans.  We are still targeted by groups who see the
kidnaping or killing of an American as a means to further their
terrorist or obstructionist agendas.  As long as that threat is
there--and I assure you the matter is under continuing
review--there is a strong case for these restrictions remaining
in place. 

That does not mean that American business cannot compete for a
share of the reconstruction pie.  Today, there are at least 59
wholly or largely American-owned companies doing business in
Lebanon.  That includes giants such as IBM, Pepsi, and Merrill
Lynch and smaller firms such as Mephico, Overseas Trade Market,
and others.  They are making a profit, using innovative
techniques to accommodate the restrictions on the use of U.S.
passports.

For example, U.S. firms have devised joint ventures, used
non-American citizen employees for negotiations and customer
relations, signed contracts through delegated authority,
conducted negotiations offshore, and developed other such
"proxy" arrangements.  I am confident  that American business
will show the necessary ingenuity to participate in Lebanon's
economic recovery in anticipation of the day when American
business people and investors can involve themselves directly in
Lebanon.

Finally, the benefits envisioned by a Lebanon at peace extend
beyond its borders.  Despite its small size, Lebanon occupies an
important place in peace process calculations.

Today we are witnessing momentous change in the Middle East. 
The agreement signed September 13 between the Israelis and the
PLO was a breakthrough to which many have contributed.  Building
on the Madrid framework, Arabs and Israelis sat face-to-face in
Oslo, Norway, and elsewhere and hammered out an agreement which
put them, at long last, firmly on the road to peaceful
co-existence.  The very next day, the Jordanians and Israelis
initialed their joint agenda, and Prime Minister Rabin met with
King Hassan in Morocco.  Further, Crown Prince Hassan and
Israeli Foreign Minister Peres met together in the Oval Office
of the White House with President Clinton.  And in Cairo,
Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and PLO Chairman Arafat met again
to discuss the implementation of their agreement.  The donors'
conference [meeting] here in Washington on October 1 was proof
that the United States and the international community are
committed to the success of the peace process.

The momentum has swung toward those who seek peace.  Much hard
work remains to be done--especially in the near months to
come--and the potential pitfalls are undeniable.  But we are
making historic progress. 

While the Palestinian issue has been at the very political heart
of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the strategic aspect of the
conflict is centered on the Israeli-Syrian front.  For a real,
viable, and comprehensive peace to become a reality, there must
be progress in the Israeli-Syrian negotiations on the key issues
of land, peace, and security.

 President Clinton and Secretary Christopher are personally
engaged in this track and are determined that the U.S. play its
role as full partner and active intermediary in helping the
parties resolve their differences and make tangible progress as
soon as possible.  Syrian Foreign Minister Shara met yesterday
with Secretary Christopher to discuss next steps in the peace
process and bilateral relations.

Forward movement on the Israeli-Syrian track will also
facilitate the success of Israeli-Lebanese negotiations.  Here,
too, the United States has taken an active role in helping the
parties reconcile their differences:  President Clinton and
Prime Minister Hariri discussed the importance of forward
movement in the Lebanese-Israeli track at their meeting last
week.

The euphoria of recent events in the peace process has been
tempered by the realization that those opposed to peace will
inevitably seek to obstruct the process.  We all recognize the
vulnerability of Lebanon; those opposed to peace have used it in
the past as a staging ground.  A terrorist act there and the
resultant violence can threaten the foundation laid by those who
have labored tirelessly for peace.

The surest means to guarantee that the rejectionists and
terrorists will fail--as they have failed in the past--would be 
progress in the Lebanese-Israeli bilateral negotiations.  A
Lebanese-Israeli accord which leads to effective control by the
Lebanese Government over all of its territory, while ensuring
against cross-border threats to Israel, will undercut the
oppositionists.  We are urging the Lebanese and Israelis to
continue their efforts to narrow the substantive differences in
their positions at the negotiating table.  We are confident
that, with the necessary will on both sides, a political
framework can be found to accommodate each side's requirements
so that Lebanon and Israel can establish a joint military
committee in order to discuss the practical steps for building a
new security environment in southern Lebanon. 

I also urge again that Lebanon--and Syria as well--begin to
participate in the multilateral negotiations which complement
the bilateral talks.  The Palestinians and Jordanians--and a
host of other Arab nations--have found the talks valuable in
building the mutual confidence necessary to peace.  We are
building on the multilateral steering group to provide the
overall direction to the donors' conference for Middle East
peace.  Lebanon has much to gain in such an endeavor--which
seeks to realize the fruits of peace on all fronts--as does
Syria.

The peace process is one road toward the Lebanese national
reconciliation now within grasp.  The Taif accord brought
Lebanon out of civil war.  We continue to urge that it be fully
implemented, in both letter and spirit, by all the parties to
Taif.  We look to the day when--as called for by Taif--Lebanese
state authority extends over all of its territory through its
own forces.

Let me end on a personal note.  As I said at the beginning of my
remarks, I was privileged to serve as a young diplomat in
Lebanon before the civil war.  Lebanon was then full of promise
as a country where Christian, Muslim, and Jew lived side by side
in peace and pursued their economic livelihoods.  As a young
American, I was inspired by the diversity of the Lebanese
experiment.  Lebanon served as a cultural bridge between the
Arab world and the West.  It was a center of ideas and
education, represented by such great institutions such as the
American University of Beirut.

But we must be honest in our analysis.  The Lebanese system was
also fragile and did not address serious socioeconomic
inequities within the society as a whole.  When Lebanon became
the playing field for the region's conflicts, the system
strained, then cracked, and the tragedy began.

That period is, hopefully, over for good as Lebanon and the
region enter a new era of reconstruction, full of the promise of
peace and reconciliation amongst peoples.  Lebanon can aspire to
become, once again, a land of tolerance and cultural 
interaction between East and West and to do so on a more solid
footing than in the past.  This is not a dream but a reality
within our grasp.  Let us work together to make it so. (###)



ARTICLE 13

Treaty Actions

Multilateral

Atomic Energy
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.  Done at New
York Oct. 26, 1956.  Entered into force July 29, 1957.  TIAS
3873; 
8 UST 1093.
Acceptances deposited:  Armenia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Sept. 27, 1993.

Copyright
Universal copyright convention, as revised, with two protocols
annexed thereto.  Done at Paris July 24, 1971.  Entered into
force July 10, 1974.  TIAS 7868; 25 UST 1341.
Ratification deposited:  Switzerland, June 21, 1993.

Cultural Property
Statute of the International Centre for the Study of the
Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property.  Done at New
Delhi Nov.-Dec. 1956, and revised Apr. 24, 1963 and Apr. 14-17,
1969.  Entered into force May 10, 1958; for the U.S. Jan. 20,
1971.  TIAS 7038; 22 UST 19.
Accession deposited:  Hungary, June 7, 1993.

Labor
North American agreement on labor cooperation, with annexes. 
Signed at Mexico, Washington, and Ottawa Sept. 8, 9, 12, and 14,
1993.
Enters into force:  Jan. 1, 1994.

Satellite Communications Systems
Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications
Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with annexes.  Done at
Washington Aug. 20, 1971.  Entered into force Feb. 12, 1973. 
TIAS 7532; 23 UST 3813.
Accessions deposited:  Armenia, July 14, 1993; Bahrain, Aug. 23,
1993; Micronesia, Fed. States of, Sept. 8, 1993.

Operating agreement relating to the International
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with
annexes.  Done at Washington Aug. 20, 1971.  Entered into force
Feb. 12, 1973.  TIAS 7532; 23 UST 4091.
Signatures:  Armenia, July 14, 1993; Bahrain, Aug. 23, 1993;
Micronesia, Fed. States of, Sept. 8, 1993.

World Meteorological Organization
Convention of the World Meteorological Organization.  Done at
Washington Oct. 11, 1947.  Entered into force Mar. 23, 1950. 
TIAS 2052; 1 UST 281.
Accessions deposited:  Eritrea, July 8, 1993; Tajikistan, Aug.
10, 1993.


Bilateral

Bahrain
Agreement concerning trade in textiles and textile products,
with annexes.  Effected by exchange of notes at Manama Apr. 4
and June 6, 1993.  Entered into force June 6, 1993; effective
Jan. 1, 1993.

Brazil
Agreement extending the agreement of July 8, 1987, relating to
the employment of dependents of official government employees. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Brasilia May 25 and July 7,
1993.  Entered into force July 7, 1993; effective July 8, 1993.

Czech Republic
International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations.
 Signed at Prague and Washington June 29 and Sept. 1, 1993. 
Entered into force Sept. 1, 1993.

Indonesia
Agreement amending the agreement of May 8, 1992, concerning
trade in textiles and textile products.  Effected by exchange of
notes at Jakarta June 16 and July 21, 1993.  Entered into force
July 21, 1993.

Ireland
Agreement on social security, with administrative arrangement. 
Signed at Washington Apr. 14, 1992.  Entered into force Sept. 1,
1993.

Jamaica
Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 27, 1986, as amended
and extended, relating to trade in textiles.  Effected by
exchange of notes at Kingston May 10 and June 22, 1993.  Entered
into force June 22, 1993.

Japan
Agreement concerning cooperation in joint scientific balloon
launchings, with memorandum of understanding.  Effected by
exchange of notes at Washington June 2, 1993.  Entered into
force June 2, 1993.

Tajikistan
Agreement regarding cooperation to facilitate the provision of
humanitarian and technical economic assistance.  Signed at
Dushanbe Sept. 13, 1993.  Entered into force Sept. 13, 1993.

Zambia
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or
refinancing of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured
by the U.S. Government and its agencies, with annexes and
addendum.  Signed at Lusaka Mar. 23, 1993.  Entered into force
Aug. 11, 1993.  (###)

END OF DISPATCH VOL. 4, NO. 42

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