US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH 
VOLUME 4, NUMBER 40, OCTOBER 4, 1993
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1.  NAFTA Will Increase Environmental Protection and Enforcement
-- Secretary Christopher, U.S. Trade Representative Kantor 
2.  U.S.-Italian Ties:  Creating a Common Understanding of
Common Objectives -- President Clinton,  Italian Prime Minister
Ciampi
3.  U.S. Supports President Yeltsin's Call for New Elections in
Russia -- President Clinton 
4.  FY 1994 Refugee Admissions -- Secretary Christopher 
5.  Letter to Congress on Iraqi Compliance With UN Security
Council Resolutions -- President Clinton
6.  Fact Sheet:  Non-Proliferation  and Export Control Policy
7.  U.S. Economic Policy in the Middle East:  Challenges and
Opportunities -- Edward P. Djerejian 
8.  Chinese Compliance With MOU Governing Prison Labor Exports
-- Winston Lord
9.  UN Security Council Adopts Resolution 864 on Angola 
10.  UN Security Council Adopts Resolution 865 on Somalia
11.  White House Statements
     South African Parliament Establishes Transitional Executive
Council
      President Clinton Meets With Baltic Presidents


ARTICLE 1:

NAFTA Will Increase Environmental Protection and Enforcement
Secretary Christopher, U.S. Trade Representative Kantor


Secretary Christopher
Remarks at meeting of non-governmental organizations on NAFTA,
Washington, DC, September 24, 1993.

We are committed--that is, President Clinton and Vice President
Gore and all of us here at the State Department team--to making
America a leader, not a laggard, in environmental matters.  We
are trying to move ahead on environmental issues, generally,
especially population growth, to put America at the forefront of
the efforts around the globe.  These issues cut across national
boundaries, so it is so appropriate for us to have an Under
Secretary for Global Affairs leading the way on this.

We believe that the environmental side agreements to NAFTA--and
the efforts to find substantial funds for border environmental
cleanup--are very important issues in elevating the environment
as a whole to public attention and, really, in the lexicon of
issues that is so vital to our national future.

I think I would be, probably, preaching to the converted if I
said that NAFTA is a good environmental policy.  It is an
environmental agreement almost unique--or perhaps even
unique--in the history of trade negotiations.  I don't think
there has ever before been a trade treaty which has embodied as
much environmental protection as NAFTA does.  The word
"breakthrough" is perhaps overused in our business, but this is
a breakthrough that is worth preserving.

NAFTA--in our judgment, in my judgment--will expand cooperation
between the United States and Mexico along the border in a way
that will increase environmental protection and enforcement. 
Moreover, it's clear enough to me that a strong and prosperous
Mexico will have more resources, more energy to face and deal
with the cross-border problems that affect so many Americans and
so importantly affect the environment.

NAFTA, in my judgment, is very good economic policy.  It will
bring jobs to the United States as it creates the world's
largest trading community.  Sometimes I think we're asking the
wrong question about NAFTA.  If you ask the question whether
NAFTA will solve all the problems of the past--that is, all the
jobs that have moved out of this country in the past or all the
immigration that has occurred in the past--of course NAFTA
won't.

But the right question to ask is whether or not NAFTA will be
useful in the future, and on that issue I think the result has
to be a resounding "yes." It will produce jobs for the United
States.  It will create a Mexico less likely to have the
immigration push that causes their people to want to move here. 
In short, it's very good economic policy.  But if I'm wrong
about that--and I don't think that I am, but I'm not an
economist--I assure you that NAFTA is good foreign policy.

It will strengthen our ties--not only with Mexico but throughout
the entire hemisphere--in a way that is critical for the United
States.  You know, Latin America has been one of the bright
spots around the globe in recent years.  We don't pay much
attention to bright spots--it's only the trouble spots that
cause us trouble--but the emerging of democracy throughout the
hemisphere, the opening of markets throughout the hemisphere,
the increased trade throughout the hemisphere have been, really,
a beacon all around the world; and we need to accelerate that
trend--grasp it and take advantage of it, as we would through
NAFTA.

You can see the importance of NAFTA for foreign policy if you
just look at the other side of things.  In the job I have, I
always, day in and day out, have to look at the alternative and
the consequences of the alternative.  The consequences of NAFTA
being turned down are really very grave from the standpoint of
foreign policy.  It would set back our relations with Mexico a
long, long time.  I think it would plunge us back into the days
when there was so much tension between the two countries rather
than cooperation.

It would certainly set us back with the countries around the
hemisphere and around the world that expect us to live up to our
agreements.  The rest of this hemisphere can hardly wait to have
a similar kind of treaty that we are talking about with Mexico
and that we now have with Canada.

NAFTA is, from a foreign policy standpoint, a real test of
American leadership.  It tests our ability to cooperate across a
broad range of diverse issues, including, importantly, the
environment.  It tests our ability to work with our closest
neighbor.

As I close, I just want to thank you all for the constructive
work that all of you have done.  Many of you have provided a
large amount of time in consulting on the environmental side
agreements, helping us make them better.  I think that you have
helped us achieve the breakthrough that these environmental side
agreements constitute.  I thank you for coming.  I hope that you
will decide to come out in favor of the NAFTA package.  In the
months ahead, I hope that we can work together to try to address
any questions that remain, to talk it through together, and then
to create a more productive North America by the approval here
in the United States 
of NAFTA.


U.S. Trade Representative Kantor
Opening statement at news conference, Washington, DC, September
24, 1993.

As you know, NAFTA is about changing unfair rules that Mexico
has had for years which have hurt American workers.  It's about
jobs and creating them in this country, which it does.  It's
about making America more competitive.  But it's also about
cleaning up the environment.

And this morning, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit announced its unanimous decision that the
National Environmental Policy Act--known as NEPA--does not
require the Administration to prepare an environmental impact
statement in connection with NAFTA, or the North American Free
Trade Agreement.  This decision reverses the June 30 decision by
Judge Richey.  The Administration is gratified by this decision.

It was established law that NEPA and the EIS--or environmental
impact statement--requirement applied to actions of federal
agencies and not to actions of the President himself.  We
believed and argued strongly that the negotiation of the NAFTA
and the submission of implementing legislation to Congress were
the essence of Presidential action and that, therefore, the EIS
requirement and NEPA did not apply.

By today's decision, the Court of Appeals erases those
uncertainties.  We want to recognize the Department of Justice 
and my General Counsel, Ira Shapiro--the Justice Department led
by Associate Attorney General Webb Hubbell, who did such a
wonderful job on this.

We recognize that the Richey decision raised in the minds of
many the feeling that NAFTA could have an adverse effect on the
environment.  Nothing could be further from the truth.  NAFTA
will be good for the environment.

The issue in this case never was whether this Administration was
committed to assuring the protection of the environment in the
NAFTA.  The issue was how, and we have answered that.  The
Administration believes that NAFTA will enhance environmental
protection at the U.S.-Mexico border and throughout North
America.  Our view is shared by six environmental organizations
representing 7.5 million people--or about 80% of Americans who
belong to environmental organizations.

The environmental issue is the basis of the supplemental
agreement we have negotiated.  By focusing on environmental
concerns and using trade as a catalyst for innovative steps to
enhance environmental protection, NAFTA breaks new ground for an
international trade agreement, as I mentioned to you earlier.

The supplemental agreement on the environment commits each of
the NAFTA countries to provide high levels of environmental
protection and to continue to improve their laws in this area. 
In addition, it provides for the first time in Mexico access to
administrative agencies and to the courts for environmental laws
and the enforcement of those laws and, of course, sets up two
commissions--of which most of you are aware--two commissions to
ensure that Mexico, the United States, and Canada all enforce
their own laws in terms of protecting the environment.

The border cleanup plan that we are negotiating with Mexico will
commit the two countries to an unprecedented cleanup effort of
an area where there has been serious environmental degradation. 
And let me say this and say it, once again, for the 500th time: 
Without NAFTA, we cannot--cannot--clean up that border.  Now, on
Tuesday, the World Bank will announce that they are committing
$3 billion--$3 billion--for the cleanup of that border area
because of the NAFTA.

The Administration is committed to ensuring that Congress and
the public have as much understanding as possible of the
environmental issues that arise in connection with NAFTA.  We
want the Congress and the public to have confidence that these
issues have been seriously considered and are being effectively
addressed.  USTR has  had a review of the environmental issues
involved in NAFTA and the supplemental agreement underway, along
with the EPA and other agencies, which we intend to issue as
soon as it is completed.  (###)


ARTICLE 2:

U.S.-Italian Ties:  Creating a Common Understanding of Common
Objectives
President Clinton, Italian Prime Minister Ciampi
Opening statement at news conference, Washington, DC, September
17, 1993

President Clinton.  Good afternoon.  It is a great pleasure for
me to welcome Prime Minister Ciampi to the White House and to
see him again after our very successful meeting in Tokyo this
summer.  I deeply value the opportunity to exchange thoughts on
all the challenges that we face today with one of Europe's most
respected figures.  

The domestic reforms which have been undertaken during the Prime
Minister's tenure are truly impressive, and I salute him for
that.  And I congratulate the people of Italy on achieving
greater financial stability and laying the foundations for
future growth.  Our two nations share a wealth of cultural,
historical, and personal ties.  From the voyage of Columbus to
the contributions that millions of Italian-Americans make today
to our nation, those ties form a foundation for a common
understanding of common objectives.

I salute, too, the Prime Minister for the contributions Italy is
making around the world.  No country has stood more solidly for
NATO or is doing more now to ensure the health and the vitality
of our transatlantic alliance.  Italy is in the forefront of
efforts to build an integrated Europe--also a goal the United
States strongly supports--and to draw Europe's many nations,
East and West, closer together.  

In places as far-flung as Somalia, Mozambique, Albania,
Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Middle East, Italy shoulders major
responsibilities.  Over the coming year, Italy will have an even
more important role to play as the chairman of the G-7.  Italy
will host the 1994 G-7 summit in July and will soon assume the
chairmanship also of the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe.  I welcome the opportunity to work with Italy to
promote our common values and interests while Italy upholds
these important leadership positions.

Of the issues we discussed today, I'd like to underscore one in
particular:  the need to stimulate global economic growth and
create jobs in all of our countries by concluding by year's end
the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations.  I emphasized to the
Prime Minister and asked him to convey the message to his
partners in Europe that the European Community must uphold the
Blair House accord on agricultural trade.  When the EC meets in
a few days' time, it must resist reopening this hard-struck
bargain and avoid standing in the way of efforts to bring the
round to a rapid and successful conclusion.

The Prime Minister and I pledged that our nations will continue
to work closely together to enhance trade, as well as to enhance
peace, stability, and democracy.  In particular, we agreed on
the critical need for a peace settlement, in Bosnia and
discussed plans for the implementation of such a settlement
should it be achieved.  I expressed our appreciation for the
important role Italy has played in our efforts to secure a just
peace in Bosnia, especially the role of its air bases.  

We also discussed the prospects for peace in the Middle East
following the historic events of last Monday.  We agreed on the
need to help all parties in the Middle East make steady progress
toward a comprehensive peace settlement, and I discussed with
the Prime Minister the possibility of having a donors'
conference among the major nations who will be asked to
contribute to implementing the details of the peace accord.

Italy and the United States will work together to raise the
resources to assist Palestinian self-government, while in
Somalia and Mozambique we cooperate with the United Nations to
assist peace-keeping and to promote civil society.  We also
discussed Iran and Libya, and I stressed the need to continue to
press these nations to abide by international law.

I want to say a few words, if I might, on the subject with which
I began--the profound political changes now underway in Italy. 
America has historically been in the forefront of such change
and has supported it.  As a people, we have always believed our
nation had only one direction--forward.  Change, a vigorous and
healthy process, is now at work to an astonishing degree in
Italy.  I want to again commend the Prime Minister for
successfully guiding Italy's impressive electoral and financial
reforms, and I stressed that between democracies such as ours,
change can never be a source of concern but, instead, always
should be a source of reassurance that democratic renewal is at
work.  

I wish Prime Minister Ciampi, his government, and the Italian
people success in their own endeavors at self-renewal.  My
nominee as ambassador to Italy, Reginald Bartholomew, one of our
finest professional diplomats, will help to maintain strong ties
between our countries during this critical period.  I want to
assure the Italian people that as both our countries undergo
domestic transformations, a key bond endures:  the abiding
friendship between our nations and our peoples. 


Prime Minister Ciampi.  Thank you, Mr. President.  First of all,
I wanted to thank President Clinton for giving me the
possibility to be here today.  And the discussions with
President Clinton will fully confirm the atmosphere of a deep
and intense trust that emerged during our meeting in Tokyo last
July.  They were given new momentum by this event's taking place
just a few days after the historic event that, on these very
grounds, opened a new chapter of dialogue and hope in the 
relations between the people of Israel and Palestine, which
Italy--as a Mediterranean country--has always advocated. 
Europe, too, stands ready to make its contribution to
consolidating this position through political support and
through an economic effort toward a reconstruction of the
territories and development of the region.  

During the course of our discussions, I briefed President
Clinton on the deep process of transformation underway in Italy.
 I stressed that this process is taking place in an atmosphere
of democratic order and a wide public consensus.  The priority
of the Italian Government is economic recovery and job creation.
 Our actions will range from reducing the public debt and the
public deficit and keeping inflation under control to reshaping
the industrial system, also, by means of privatization.  Results
have already been achieved.  They are confirmed by the renewed
confidence of domestic and international financial markets. 
While we are aware that this renewed confidence doesn't mean
that our problems have been solved, it does indicate that we are
on the right road.  We must persevere.  It is a long journey;
this we know.

The Italian Government's strong commitment to its domestic
affairs is sped forward also by its awareness that the changes
in the international arena following the end of the Cold War
require it to play an operative role in the new set of common
responsibilities of the largest industrialized economies of the
Western world.

Italy intends to proceed on the road toward European--for the
creation of the Community that is a strong partner in an open
system of international trade and in a new system of
international security.  There is excitement at the prospect for
revolution of transatlantic relations in the area of security
and of economic collaboration.  

We brought one another up to date on our perspectives on the
situations in the former Yugoslavia and in Somalia.  On this
last topic, my government and the Italian people harbor a
legitimate and special concern heightened by the most recent
tragic developments. 

President Clinton and I recognize the problems of operating in a
completely devastated institutional, social, and economic
context, as is the case in Somalia.  This very reality,
unacceptable as it is, was the source of our common
participation in Restore Hope.  From the experience of these
past months, let's ask today to recommend 
a concrete program to be proposed jointly to the United Nations
for the revival of a political initiative in Somalia.  It is a
matter, in particular, of supporting the humanitarian and the
security mission on the ground with  more decisive management of
the process of national reconciliation among so many factions. 
This is the precondition for an effort to reconstruct the
country institutionally and materially.

I confirmed to President Clinton Italy's determination that the
Uruguay Round be brought to a global and equitable solution by
December 15.  The GATT agreement is indispensable, not only
because of its merits but also as a message of confidence.  We
both attach the utmost importance to the Atlantic summit of next
January.  We hope that this alliance, which has proved so
effective against the threats of the Cold War, will be capable
of expressing a renewed vitality in this phase of the transition
of a post-communist system to democracy and to a worldwide
market economy.  

At the doorway to Italy, and that of Europe, the dramatic events
in the former Yugoslavia stand as an insult to our civil
conscience and as a challenge to the leadership ability of the
international community.

In this framework, President Clinton and I both agreed that
Atlantic solidarity must play a central role under the aegis of
the United Nations.  On my part, I confirmed to President
Clinton that Italy is strongly committed to ensuring that the
summit of the seven most industrialized nations --which will be
hosted by Italy in July of next year in Naples--regain its
driving force toward partnership on the broad themes of economic
growth and international collaboration. 

In closing, I would like to express the hope that, even before
this event takes place, President Clinton will be able to visit
Italy.  And to this end, I was happy to convey a letter of
invitation addressed to him from the President of the Italian
Republic.  (###)


ARTICLE  3:

U.S. Supports President Yeltsin's Call for New Elections in
Russia
Statement by President Clinton, Washington, DC, September 21,
1993.

From the beginning of my Administration, I have given my full
backing to the historic process of political and economic reform
now underway in Russia.  I remain convinced that democratic
reforms and the transition to a market economy hold the best
hope for a better future for the people of Russia.

The actions announced today by President Yeltsin in his address
to the Russian people underscore the complexity of the reform
process that he is leading.  There is no question that President
Yeltsin acted in response to a constitutional crisis that had
reached a critical impasse and had paralyzed the political
process.  

As the democratically elected leader of Russia, President
Yeltsin has chosen to allow the people of Russia themselves to
resolve this impasse.  I believe that the path to elections for 
a new legislature is, ultimately, consistent with the democratic
and reform course that he has charted. 

I called President Yeltsin this afternoon to seek assurances
that the difficult choices that he faces will be made in a way
that ensures peace, stability, and an open political process
this autumn.  He told me that it is of the utmost importance
that the elections he has called for be organized and held on a
democratic and free basis.

In a democracy, the people should finally decide the issues that
are at the heart of political and social debate.  President
Yeltsin has made this choice, and I support him fully.  I have
confidence in the abiding wisdom of the Russian people to make
the right decision regarding their own future. (###)


ARTICLE 4:

FY 1994 Refugee Admissions
Secretary Christopher
Statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Washington, DC,
September 23, 1993

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee:  I am very pleased to
appear before the committee today to outline the President's
proposal for the admission of 120,000 refugees to the United
States in FY 1994.  The committee has already received a report
that provides detailed information about refugee admissions as
required by the Refugee Act.  It is our hope that the 1994
refugee admissions program will receive the broad bipartisan
support from the Congress that it has received in the past.

Before turning specifically to the refugee admissions program,
however, I would like to comment briefly on the past year's
worldwide refugee situation and the future direction of U.S.
refugee policy.  Positive political changes in several parts of
the world have reduced the "push" factor--the conditions that
impel people to leave their countries--and increased the "pull"
factor--the conditions that cause people to return home.

In Cambodia, a major repatriation effort directed by the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) resulted in the return of 
370,000 persons from camps along the Thai-Cambodian border.  An
internationally sanctioned election in May of this year will
enable repatriated refugees to rebuild their society.  In
Afghanistan and Central America, refugees continue to return
home.  Following a political settlement in Mozambique, upwards
of 200,000 refugees have returned home in the past year.

For the first time in almost 2 years, there is hope that respect
for human rights and democracy will be restored to Haiti.  When
implemented, the Governor's Island accords, 
together with the resumption of economic development, will help
put an end to the despair that has caused so many Haitians to
leave their country.

The prospects for peace in the Middle East have never been
brighter.  The agreement signed in Washington on September 13 is
a major step in a process that will address the needs of the
Palestinian refugees.  We are only at the beginning and much
work will have to be done, but the foundations have been laid. 
It is the responsibility of the United States and the rest of
the international community to help the Palestinians and the
Israelis continue the peace process.  On the other hand, genuine
human tragedies in the former Yugoslavia and the Horn of Africa
are creating hundreds of thousands of refugees.  

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, we continue our efforts to assist the
more than 4 million displaced persons and refugees in the area. 
The United States has contributed over $350 million to the
relief effort.  We continue to look for ways and means to
increase assistance.  We are very concerned about the shortage
of both funding and food for the UN agencies working in the
former Yugoslavia.  Under almost any scenario, the problems of
food and shelter will be a major challenge to the international
community this winter.  We are encouraging action by other
nations, especially the European countries which we believe have
a special responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance
to the region.

Migration
In addition to these widely publicized conflicts, there is also
overall migration of persons around the world as the result of
population pressures, poverty, environmental degradation, and
other factors.  While seeking to aid refugees, we must be
resolute in our efforts to improve conditions so as to make it
possible for would-be migrants to opt to remain at home.  This
Administration's determination to spur world economic
growth--through efforts such as NAFTA and the Uruguay
Round--will help.  So will our work on global issues such as
population and the environment.

While legal immigration enriches our country, it is important to
reduce illegal immigration.  The President has already taken
significant steps and has placed proposals before the Congress
to address illegal immigration to the United States in a more
effective manner.  Improvements include increasing border
control resources, improving visa issuance procedures,
repatriating illegal and criminal aliens, and increasing
criminal penalties for alien smuggling.  At the same time, we
will seek to ensure protection for genuine refugees who are
fleeing persecution.

New Approaches to Refugee Assistance
Ten years ago, there were approximately 8 million refugees
worldwide; now there are an estimated 18 million.  Ten years
ago, most of those assisted had crossed an international border 
to become refugees; now, many populations receiving assistance
are displaced persons still within their national borders.  This
complicates relief efforts and also creates security problems
for the UN and non-governmental personnel engaged in relief
efforts, as we have seen all too often in Bosnia and Somalia.

The UN system has begun to move more effectively to coordinate
its emergency relief activities in complex emergencies.  UNHCR,
the World Food Program, UNICEF, and the World Health
Organization have taken measures to improve their emergency
response capabilities.  All have played an important role in
Bosnia.  Further work is needed, in particular the coordination
of humanitarian activities with peace-keeping and political
affairs at UN Headquarters.  Enhancing such coordination is an
important foreign policy objective for the Clinton
Administration.  We have also moved to streamline our own
refugee programs; I will have more to say on that in a moment.

In responding to large-scale refugee emergencies, we believe
that two objectives must be pursued simultaneously:  (1)
humanitarian assistance and protection for those in need, and
(2) durable solutions, especially conflict resolution and
repatriation when conditions permit.  We must recognize that
third-country resettlement, while an appropriate option in many
cases, is not a realistic alternative for the large majority of
the world's nearly 18 million refugees.

Refugee Admissions
As reported before this committee last year, current trends
indicate that the number of persons requiring permanent
resettlement in the United States should decline significantly
in the next few years.  By year's end, we will have met our
commitment to resettle in the United States all known and
eligible Amerasian children and their families from Vietnam. 
Within the next 2 years, we anticipate that all eligible
Vietnamese re-education camp prisoners, that is, those interned
for more than 3 years because of their association with the
United States, will have entered the United States.  We also
expect that within the next 2 years, we will need to bring the
Soviet refugee admissions program into conformity with emerging
realities in the former Soviet Union.  In the future, the United
States will continue--although on a smaller scale--to resettle
our fair share of those refugees who have no alternative to
resettlement.

I would like to address for a moment the recent expressions of
concern in the Congress and the press about the resettlement of
Iraqi refugees in the United States.  Contrary to some press
reports, no one is resettled in the United States without
demonstrating a well-founded fear of persecution.  Many of these
Iraqi refugees have credible accounts of torture and abuse. 
Many of the Iraqi draftees held little enthusiasm for the war
and fled their country early on--sometimes at the behest of the
allied forces.  These deserters actively opposed 
the regime and formed the corps of freedom fighters who refused
to participate in the invasion of Kuwait and who fought to
overthrow Saddam in March of 1991.  Many were themselves members
of persecuted ethnic or religious minority groups.

We fully recognize that Members of Congress want to be reassured
that our government will not resettle Iraqi soldiers who took up
arms against our country.  We are prepared to explore additional
safeguards to ensure against U.S. entry of those whose
activities might have been inimical to U.S. interests.  However,
all available evidence, including a just-completed review of
several hundred recent cases, indicates that all accepted
applicants were deserving beneficiaries of our humanitarian
effort.  Those who fail to meet our rigorous criteria are not
admitted for resettlement.  It is an honorable policy in full
accord with the American tradition.

The President's proposal for FY 1994 permits the funded
admission of 120,000 refugees--a reduction of 2,000 from the
current fiscal year.  I am pleased to report that as part of
this year's consultation process, improved high-level 
coordination between State and the Department of Health and
Human Services has permitted us to ensure that sufficient funds
will be available to cover the costs of resettlement of up to
120,000 refugees.

Since 1990, separate regional ceilings have been used for the
former Soviet Union and for Eastern Europe.  However, given the
crisis in the former Yugoslavia and the need for maximum
flexibility in refugee admissions processing, we propose to
recombine these two ceilings for FY 1994.

We propose that the 120,000 admissions numbers be divided as
follows:

--  East Asia--45,000;
--  Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe--55,000;
--  Near East/South Asia--6,000;
--  Africa--7,000; and 
--  Latin America/Caribbean--4,000.

In addition, we have included an unallocated reserve of 3,000
numbers, up from 1,000 numbers last year.  This reserve, after
consultation with Congress, could be used in regions where
allocated numbers prove to be insufficient.

In connection with next year's program, we note that last year
we initiated or improved several refugee admission programs,
most notably for Haitians and Bosnians.  The week after
President Clinton's inauguration, a technical team composed of
State Department, INS, and congressional staff traveled to Haiti
to determine ways to enhance in-country refugee processing. 
That effort was in support of the President's commitment to
expand viable  alternatives to perilous boat departures.  Based
upon the team's recommendations, significant improvements to the
program were made.  We doubled processing capacity, streamlined
processing procedures, opened two new refugee processing
facilities, and expanded access to those Haitians interdicted by
the Coast Guard.  Our policy toward Haitian migrants and
refugees is under continual review, and we will consult with
Congress on this important issue as political developments
unfold.

As I stated earlier, the United States has committed a
significant amount of money and materiel to help Bosnians who
are displaced within Bosnia or have become refugees beyond its
borders.  We continue to believe that assistance in place should
be the primary focus of our efforts.   However, we do believe
that it is necessary to admit certain groups of special
humanitarian concern.  Moreover, while we hope there will be a
peace agreement that will allow Bosnians to return home, we also
recognize that with little warning this program may have to be
expanded further.

Conclusion 
The U.S. refugee program has enjoyed broad bipartisan support
over the years.  There is a great American tradition of
providing refuge to the persecuted.  This tradition goes back to
the founding of our nation.  It links generations of Americans
to one another.  It reinforces our democratic values.  Indeed,
it is part of our national identity.  Under President Clinton's
leadership, this noble tradition will continue. (###)


ARTICLE 5:

Letter to Congress on Iraqi Compliance With UN Security Council
Resolutions 

President Clinton
Text of a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, September 23, 1993.

Dear Mr.  Speaker:
(Dear Mr.  President:)

Consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force
Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1), and as part of my
effort to keep the Congress fully informed, I am reporting on
the status of efforts to obtain Iraq's compliance with the
resolutions adopted by the U.N. Security Council.

Since my last report, Iraq has informed Rolf Ekeus, Chairman of
the   U.N. Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), that it is ready
to comply with U.N. Security Council Resolution 715, which
requires Iraq to implement plans for long-term monitoring and
verification of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs,
provide new data about the suppliers of its program, and accept
inspections.  I appreciate Chairman Ekeus' efforts to obtain
Iraq's acknowledgement of its international obligation.

We must recognize, however, that important issues remain
unresolved.  Although Iraq accepted the immediate installation
of monitoring cameras on rocket test stands, it has not
permitted the cameras to be turned on.  Iraq has failed to
provide a complete list of critical supplies of its WMD programs
and continues to delay inspection activities, for example, by
refusing flight clearance for an upcoming inspection. Saddam
Hussein is committed to rebuilding his WMD capability,
especially nuclear weapons, and his regime has thus far shown
that it will fail to act in good faith to comply with its
international obligations.  Our continued vigilance is
necessary.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and UNSCOM
conducted four nuclear, chemical, and missile-related
inspections since my last report.  A chemical destruction group 
remains at Al Muthanna to monitor the destruction of thousands
of chemical munitions, and a helicopter inspection team also
remains in Iraq.  Along with damage inflicted in combat,
UNSCOM/IAEA inspections have effectively put the Iraqi nuclear
weapons program out of business in the near-term and have
substantially impaired Iraq's other WMD programs.  Their efforts
have contributed markedly to the stability of the region.

The "no-fly zones" over northern and southern Iraq permit the
monitoring of Iraq's compliance with Security Council
Resolutions 687 and 688.  Over the last 2 years, the northern
no-fly zone has deterred Iraq from a major military offensive in
the region.  Since the no-fly zone was established in southern
Iraq, Iraq's use of aircraft against its population in the
region has stopped, as have large-scale troop movements.  On
July 29, two Coalition aircraft in the southern no-fly zone
fired on Iraqi anti-aircraft installations after detecting
target acquisition radars.  On August 19, aircraft sup porting
Operation Provide Comfort in the northern no-fly zone were fired
on by an Iraqi anti-aircraft installation.   In response,
Coalition aircraft fired on and hit the installation, which has
not displayed hostile intentions subsequently.

The United States is working closely with the United Nations and
other organizations to provide humanitarian relief to the people
of northern Iraq, in the face of Iraqi government efforts to
disrupt this assistance.   Since early August, the Iraqi
government has cut off electricity to northern Iraq, interfering
with potable water supplies, impairing medical facilities, and
contributing to at least 50 deaths.  We are working with the
United Nations to provide temporary generators and spare parts. 
We continue to support new U.N. efforts to mount a relief
program for persons in Baghdad and the south and will ensure
that the United Nations will be able to prevent the Iraqi
government from diverting supplies.  We are continuing to work
toward the placement of human rights monitors throughout Iraq as
proposed by Max van der Stoel, Special Rapporteur of the U.N.
Human Rights Commission, and to work for the establishment of a
United Nations Commission to investigate and publicize Iraqi war
crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law.

The U.N. sanctions regime exempts medicine and, in the case of
foodstuffs, requires only that the U.N. sanctions Committee be
notified of food shipments.  In accordance with paragraph 20 of
Resolution 687, the committee received notices of 20 million
tons of foodstuffs to be shipped to Iraq through June 1993.  The
Sanctions Committee also continues to consider and, when
appropriate, approve requests to send to Iraq materials and
supplies for essential civilian needs.  The Iraqi government, in
contrast, has maintained a full embargo against its northern
provinces and has acted to distribute humanitarian supplies only
to its supporters and to the military.

The Iraqi government has so far refused to sell $1.6 billion in
oil as previously authorized by the Security Council in
Resolutions 706 and 712.   Talks between Iraq and the United 
Nations on implementing these resolutions resumed briefly in
July but concluded without results when the Iraqi delegation
left the talks.  Iraq could use proceeds from such sales to
purchase foodstuffs, medicines, materials, and supplies for
essential civilian needs of its population, subject to U.N.
monitoring of sales and the equitable distribution of
humanitarian supplies (including to its northern provinces).  
Iraqi authorities bear full responsibility for any suffering in
Iraq that results from their refusal to implement Resolutions
706 and 712.

Proceeds from oil sales also would be used to compensate persons
injured by Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. 
The U.N. Compensation Commission has received about 900,000
claims so far, with a total of roughly two million expected. 
The U.S. Government is preparing to file a sixth set of
individual claims with the Commission, bringing U.S. claims
filed to roughly 2,700.  The Commission's efforts will
facilitate the compensation of those injured by Iraq once
sufficient funds become available.

Security Council Resolution 778 permits the use of a portion of
frozen Iraqi oil assets to fund crucial UN activities concerning
Iraq, including humanitarian relief, UNSCOM, and the
Compensation Commission.  (The funds will be repaid, with
interest, from Iraqi oil revenues as soon as Iraqi oil exports
resume.)  The United States is prepared to transfer up to $200
million in frozen Iraqi oil assets held in U.S. financial
institutions, provided that U.S. contributions do not exceed 50
percent of the total amount contributed.  We have arranged a
total of over $100 million in such matching contributions thus
far.

Iraq still has not met its obligations concerning Kuwaitis and
third-country nationals it detained during the war.   Iraq has
taken no substantive steps to cooperate fully with the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), as required by
Security Council Resolution 687, although it has received over
600 files on missing individuals.  Iraq refused to participate
in a July 29 meeting under the auspices of the ICRC to consider
further steps with regard to these missing persons.  We continue
to work for Iraqi compliance.

Iraq can rejoin the community of civilized nations only through
democratic processes, respect for human rights, equal treatment
of its people, and adherence to basic norms of international
behavior.  A government representing all the people of Iraq,
which is committed to the territorial integrity and unity of
Iraq, would be a stabilizing force in the Gulf region.  The
Iraqi National Congress (INC) espouses these goals.  In August,
Iraq's ambassadors to Tunisia and Canada fled to Britain and
announced their support for the INC.

I am grateful for the support by the Congress of our efforts.

Sincerely,
William J. Clinton   (###)


ARTICLE 6:

Fact Sheet:  Non-Proliferation and Export Control Policy
Fact sheet released by the White House, Office of the Press
Secretary, Washington, DC, September 27, 1993.

The President today established a framework for U.S. efforts to
prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the
missiles that deliver them.  He outlined three major principles
to guide our non-proliferation and export control policy.


--  Our national security requires us to accord higher priority
to non-proliferation and to make it an integral element of our
relations with other countries.

--  To strengthen U.S. economic growth, democratization abroad,
and international stability, we actively seek expanded trade and
technology exchange with nations, including former adversaries,
that abide by global non-proliferation norms.

--  We need to build a new consensus--embracing the executive
and legislative branches, industry and the public, and friends
abroad--to promote effective non-proliferation efforts and
integrate our non-proliferation and economic goals.

The President reaffirmed U.S. support for a strong, effective
non-proliferation regime that enjoys broad multilateral support
and employs all of the means at our disposal to advance our
objectives.  Key elements of the policy follow.

Fissile Material
The U.S. will undertake a comprehensive approach to the growing
accumulation of fissile material from dismantled nuclear weapons
and within civil nuclear programs.  Under this approach, the
U.S. will:

--  Seek to eliminate where possible the accumulation of
stockpiles of highly enriched uranium or plutonium and to ensure
that, where these materials already exist, they are subject to
the highest standards of safety, security, and international
accountability;

--  Propose a multilateral convention prohibiting the production
of highly enriched uranium or plutonium for nuclear explosives
purposes or outside of international safeguards;

--  Encourage more restrictive regional arrangements to
constrain fissile material production in regions of instability
and high proliferation risk;

--  Submit U.S. fissile material no longer needed for our
deterrent to inspection by the International Atomic Energy
Agency;

--  Pursue the purchase of highly enriched uranium from the
former Soviet Union and other countries and its conversion to
peaceful use as reactor fuel;

--  Explore means to limit the stockpiling of plutonium from
civil nuclear programs and seek to minimize the civil use of
highly enriched uranium; and

--  Initiate a comprehensive review of long-term options for
plutonium disposition, taking into account technical,
non-proliferation, environmental, budgetary, and economic
considerations.  Russia and other nations with relevant
interests and experience will be invited to participate in this
study.

The United States does not encourage the civil use of plutonium
and, accordingly, does not itself engage in plutonium
reprocessing for either nuclear power or nuclear explosive
purposes.  The United States, however, will maintain its
existing commitments regarding the use of plutonium in civil
nuclear programs in Western Europe and Japan.

Export Controls
To be truly effective, export controls should be applied
uniformly by all suppliers.  The United States will harmonize
domestic and multilateral controls to the greatest extent
possible.  At the same time, the need to lead the international
community or overriding national security or foreign policy
interests may justify unilateral export controls in specific
cases.  We will review our unilateral dual-use export controls
and policies and eliminate them unless such controls are
essential to national security and foreign policy interests.

We will streamline the implementation of U.S. non-proliferation
export controls.  Our system must be more responsive and
efficient and not inhibit legitimate exports that play a key
role in American economic strength, while preventing exports
that would make a material contribution to the  proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that deliver them.

Nuclear Proliferation
The U.S. will make every effort to secure the indefinite
extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995.  We will seek
to ensure that the International Atomic Energy Agency has the
resources needed to implement its vital safeguards
responsibilities and will work to strengthen the IAEA's ability
to detect clandestine nuclear activities.

Missile Proliferation
We will maintain our strong support for the Missile Technology
Control Regime.  We will promote the principles of the MTCR
Guidelines as a global missile non-proliferation norm and seek
to use the MTCR as a mechanism for taking joint action to combat
missile proliferation.  We will support prudent expansion of the
MTCR's membership to include additional countries that subscribe
to international non-proliferation standards, enforce effective
export controls, and abandon offensive ballistic missile
programs.  The United States will also promote regional efforts
to reduce the demand for missile capabilities.

The United States will continue to oppose missile programs of
proliferation concern and will exercise particular restraint in
missile-related cooperation.  We will continue to retain a
strong presumption of denial against exports to any country of
complete space launch vehicles or major components.

The United States will not support the development or
acquisition of space launch vehicles in countries outside the
MTCR.

For MTCR member countries, we will not encourage new space
launch vehicle programs which raise questions on both
non-proliferation and economic viability grounds.  The United
States will, however, consider exports of MTCR-controlled items
to MTCR member countries for peaceful space launch programs on a
case-by-case basis.  We will review whether additional
constraints or safeguards could reduce the risk of misuse of
space launch technology.  We will seek adoption by all MTCR
partners of policies as vigilant as our own.

Chemical and Biological Weapons
To help deter violations of the Biological Weapons Convention,
we will promote new measures to provide increased transparency
of activities and facilities that could have biological weapons
applications.  We call on all nations--including our own--to
ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention quickly so that it may
enter into force by January 13, 1995.  We will work with others
to support the international Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons created by the Convention.

Regional Non-proliferation Initiatives
Non-proliferation will receive greater priority in our diplomacy
and will be taken into account in our relations with countries
around the world.  We will make special efforts to address the
proliferation threat in regions of tension such as the Korean
Peninsula, the Middle East, and South Asia, including efforts to
address the underlying motivations for weapons acquisition and
to promote regional confidence-building steps. 

In Korea, our goal remains a non-nuclear peninsula. We will make
every effort to secure North Korea's full compliance with 
its non-proliferation commitments and effective implementation
of the North-South denuclearization agreement.

In parallel with our efforts to obtain a secure, just, and
lasting peace in the Middle East, we will promote dialogue and
confidence-building steps to create the basis for a Middle East
free of weapons of mass destruction.  In the Persian Gulf, we
will work with other suppliers to contain Iran's nuclear,
missile, and CBW ambitions, while preventing reconstruction of
Iraq's activities in these areas.  In South Asia, we will
encourage India and Pakistan to proceed with multilateral
discussions of non-proliferation and security issues, with the
goal of capping and eventually rolling back their nuclear and
missile capabilities.

In developing our overall approach to Latin America and South
Africa, we will take account of the significant
non-proliferation progress made in these regions in recent
years.  We will intensify efforts to ensure that the former
Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China do not contribute to the
spread of weapons of mass destruction and missiles.

Military Planning and Doctrine
We will give proliferation a higher profile in our intelligence
collection and analysis and defense planning and ensure that our
own force structure and military planning address the potential
threat from weapons of mass destruction and missiles around the
world.

Conventional Arms Transfers
We will actively seek greater transparency in the area of
conventional arms transfers and promote regional
confidence-building measures to encourage restraint on such
transfers to regions of instability.  The U.S. will undertake a
comprehensive review of conventional arms transfer policy,
taking into account national security, arms control, trade,
budgetary and economic competitiveness considerations. (###)


ARTICLE 7:

U.S. Economic Policy in the Middle East:  Challenges and
Opportunities
Edward P. Djerejian, Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs
Address before the Arab-American Business and Professional
Association, Washington, DC, September 16, 1993

In the wake of the momentous events on Monday involving the
signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles, it
is timely for us to discuss the Administration's economic and
commercial policy toward the Middle East.

As we reflect on the historic, new situation created in the
Middle East by this reconciliation of old enemies, we are
confronted with the tremendous challenge of making peace 
work--of assuring that the words on the paper are translated
into facts on the ground which lead to improvements in the lives
of the Palestinian and Israeli people and of the region as a
whole.  No longer can the peace process be considered a subject
only for political leaders and diplomats engaged in high-level
negotiations.  The moment has come for all of us-- diplomat,
businessman, teacher, and farmer--to roll up our sleeves and get
down to the hard work of improving the quality of life in the
Middle East.

I will return to the special challenges we face in making the
recent Israeli-Palestinian agreements achieve their full
potential.  But, because this audience contains so many who have
long devoted themselves to commerce and industry, I want to
first give you a broad perspective on the economic policy goals
of the Clinton Administration and how they affect the Near East.

From the very first speech President Clinton made on foreign
policy, it was clear that economics would be at the top of our
policy priority list.  We in the Administration have a strong
mandate to promote U.S. business, investment, and commercial
interests abroad.  You might ask how this mandate touches the
work of the Near East bureau.  After all, I sit in an office
better known for shepherding the Middle East peace process along
or for managing the diplomatic dimensions of Desert Storm and
our relations from Morocco across to Iran.

Whatever the perception may be, a simple truism makes that
mandate as relevant to me as to an assistant secretary of
commerce.  And that is that America's international position
depends, in part, on the strength of its economy and--a
corollary--that the health of that economy is greatly affected
by events abroad.  Put another way, in a world where business
across borders is growing exponentially, foreign and domestic
policy are two sides of the same coin.

Consider these facts.  Our gross national product tops $6
trillion, and our annual exports are approximately $700
billion--or 11% of GNP.  Yet since 1987, 55% of our economic
growth is directly attributable to exports.  The Clinton
Administration has recognized the connection between our
domestic interests and foreign policy from the start.  That's
why Secretary Christopher has said:

At the State Department we have a desk responsible for every
foreign country, or virtually every foreign country--the China
desk, an Argentine desk, a Russia desk.  As Secretary of State,
I'm determined that the State Department will also have an
"American desk"--and I want to be sitting behind that desk.

Economics and American Interests in the Middle East
The importance of foreign markets to our prosperity makes
economic issues a primary concern of American diplomats.  Yet
there are also some connections of particular concern to my 
bureau.  For instance, one of our foremost foreign policy
interests is to maintain unimpeded commercial access to critical
natural resources like oil and natural gas.  The two oil shocks
of the 1970s drove up our inflation rate in that  decade, just
as steady and then declining oil prices contributed to the low
inflation that accompanied an economic expansion in the 1980s.

A second principal foreign policy objective--advancing the
Arab-Israeli peace process and achieving a comprehensive,
durable, and just peace on all fronts--likewise underscores the
close ties between our political, security, and economic
interests.  Our overriding motivation in pursuing this process
is to help bring peace and stability to a long-troubled and
strategically significant part of the world.  Yet, if
successful, the process will also bring major economic benefits
to the region.

The history of conflict in the Middle East has acted as a brake
on economic growth.  It has also introduced, in ways noted by
Adam Smith, irrationalities into the regional trading system. 
For instance, many U.S. firms operate only in part of the
region, or they supply different markets from different sources.
 With the real potential of a resolution to the conflict and
with an end to the Arab economic boycott of Israel, we expect
significant changes in the way business is conducted in the
region.  Indeed, in the wake of the historic signing of the
Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles and the mutual
recognition of Israel and the PLO, we are already seeing reports
about investors taking a new look at the region.

With peace, trade flows will expand--within the region and with
extra-regional states like the U.S.  New transportation,
communications, and energy links will also be needed.  In short,
there will be a substantial peace dividend, which will include
the removal of political obstacles to commerce.  With strong
ties throughout the region, U.S. firms will be in a position to
take advantage of the new opportunities that appear.

The events of Monday were a breakthrough, but they were also
only a beginning.  At the White House, the State Department, and
other agencies of the U.S. Government, we have, since Monday's
signing, begun an intensive effort to assess the needs which
must be addressed to assure that the Israeli-Palestinian
agreements lead to a durable peace.  It is quite clear that many
in the international community recognize how crucial these
efforts will be and are willing to provide the necessary
support.

As President Clinton has pledged, the United States will assume
a very heavy role in making the implementation of the agreements
successful.  The President has already been in touch with a
number of heads of government, both in the Middle East and
elsewhere.  His message to states in the region:  Support 
the agreement; end the boycott of Israel; begin the process of
normalizing relations with Israel.

We are seeing broad, bipartisan support for the United States to
do its part in contributing to the success of the agreements. 
The United States will do its part in material terms and will
use its unique leadership role to facilitate and coordinate
assistance for Gaza and Jericho.  I can tell you that over the
last few days, little has occupied more of my and my colleagues
waking hours than establishing a realistic plan of action for
this endeavor.

But this task is not simply one of governments and international
aid agencies.  Bringing prosperity to areas of unemployment and
poverty depends just as much on your efforts as it does on
official assistance.  We all have a stake in this process.  I
urge Arab-Americans, Jewish Americans, and all other Americans
to look for ways they can contribute.  Many of you here tonight
have the skill and experience in entrepreneurship that needs to
be fully exploited in this new environment.

I know that we have some business leaders with us tonight from
Gaza and the West Bank.  I would certainly hope that their visit
to the United States at this particular historical moment has
revealed to them the interest of American business people in
joining them in the task of investing for the future.  And I
would also hope that they have communicated to their American
counterparts the special needs and the practical information
necessary to do business in their communities.

In a diplomatic career as well as in the life of business, there
are normally only a very few moments when one can make a genuine
difference in the course of history.  It is not too much to say
that such a moment is before us in the Middle East.

I would now like to turn back to the broader role of the U.S.
Government and, in particular, the State Department in the
pursuit of U.S. economic interests in the Middle East.

Promoting Our Commercial Interests in the Region:  State's Role

Global Initiatives.  We constantly and at high levels promote
global initiatives designed to reduce barriers to trade and
investment and to ensure that the rights of American business
people are not infringed.  In conjunction with the U.S. Trade
Representative and other agencies, we seek to promote trade by
completing the North American Free Trade Agreement--which will
soon go to Congress--and to bring to a successful conclusion the
GATT's Uruguay Round.  Growth in trade means more jobs at home. 
We believe NAFTA would generate thousands of additional jobs in
the U.S. in the next 2 years alone.  We have also worked to
protect the integrity of American patents and copyrights by
seeking to persuade all non-members to join the international
conventions protecting intellectual property rights.

Boycott.  The State Department has led the official effort to
persuade Arab governments to eliminate the economic boycott of
Israel and of those companies doing business with Israel.  As
part of this effort, we persuaded our partners at the G-7 summit
in Tokyo last July to include a call for an end to the boycott
in the Political Declaration.  We continue to press our trading
partners to take more forceful action against the boycott,
especially the secondary and tertiary aspects, which
discriminate against firms that wish to do business with both
Israel and Arab states.  Quite frankly, and given the role of
the United States in the Middle East, it is simply incongruous
for U.S. businesses to continue to be discriminated against.

Export Promotion.  No less important than our efforts to remove
trade barriers have been our export promotion programs.  Given
the causal relationship between exports and economic growth,
these programs are all about "jobs, jobs, jobs."

Under the direction of President Clinton and Secretary
Christopher, our ambassadors overseas view promotion of trade
and investment as a key part of their work.  Recent reports
indicating Saudi interest in purchasing McDonnell Douglas and
Boeing airframes and engines to replace their aging fleet of
civilian aircraft demonstrate how our partnership with U.S.
firms can translate into large orders for goods produced by
American workers.  When necessary, the highest levels of the
Administration stand ready to intervene on behalf of U.S.
business.  And our embassies around the world are prepared to do
so as well.

Export promotion abroad is coordinated by the ambassador but
involves many elements of our diplomatic missions.  The economic
and commercial sections of our embassies and consulates provide
information on a country's economy, commercial culture, and
discrete business opportunities.  Political officers can
contribute a risk assessment.  Consular officers provide basic
information on living or traveling in the country.

I am proud to report that our diplomatic posts led by our
ambassadors in the Near East have thrown themselves actively and
effectively into this task.  For example, our embassy in Kuwait
began export promotion efforts even before coalition forces
liberated the country in March 1991, by exploring future trade
opportunities for U.S. business.  The embassy met with both
Kuwaiti decision-makers and representatives of U.S.
construction, oil firefighting, and environmental cleanup firms
and helped establish critical, initial contacts between the two
groups.  These trade promotion efforts have resulted in the
awarding of over 500 construction contracts worth approximately
$5 billion--and comprising about one-half of Kuwaiti
reconstruction contracts--to U.S. firms between November 1990
and December 1992.  The embassy also organized the first trade
fair in Kuwait after liberation, entitled "Direct from the USA,"
that produced $49 million of "off-the-floor" sales and as much
as $120 million of follow-up purchases.

Our other missions are also doing a splendid job of assisting
American business in the region.  To take just four recent
examples:

--  In Qatar this past summer, the intervention of our
ambassador was essential in nailing down a $98-million contract
for a U.S. firm to dredge a channel in Doha port;

--  In Israel, our embassy worked hard to overcome trade
restrictions so that McDonald's would be able to open a series
of restaurants, beginning in October;

--  In Saudi Arabia, our ambassador and his staff worked
diligently on be half of a U.S. firm, helping it secure a
multibillion-dollar contract to expand a major oil production
and refining facility; and

--  In Abu Dhabi, our charge d'affaires played a major role in
convincing the Government of the United Arab Emirates to choose
an American firm to install a cellular mobile telephone system. 
The contract was worth $23 million and, of course, the American
firm will have the inside track for later expansions in the
system. 

We are active not just in promoting American sales but in
protecting American companies when they run into trouble.  For
example, since early 1992, the State Department has taken a
leading role in resolving approximately 20 long-standing
commercial disputes between U.S. businesses and the Saudi
Government.  Nearly all of these claims--with a total value of
more than $500 million--have now been settled.  We continue to
work to resolve the few remaining cases.

Political and Security Factors.  I hope that you and your
colleagues take advantage of and use the resources of the State
Department in seeking business abroad.  But I hope, too, that
you come to understand our other responsibilities that may color
the commercial environment.

Thomas Jefferson said that money, not morality, is the principle
of commercial nations.  That certainly is an accurate
description of "commercial nations," but the United States is
different.  We adhere to both our commercial interests and basic
values in pursuing our policies.  This is evident as the
Administration implements anti-boycott, sanctions, and export
control legislation and policy--measures that speak both to our
national interest and higher principles.

Regarding the Arab boycott of Israel, firms are enjoined from
taking any steps consistent with it--e.g., signing a letter
stating that a firm has no business dealings with or in Israel. 
We support American business and political interests in the area
by seeking to end the boycott.  And we have had some successes.

--  In June, Kuwait publicly announced that it would no longer
discriminate against firms that do business with Israel.

--  Saudi Arabia has reportedly revised its public works
contracts; the government will no longer discriminate against
firms that do business with Israel. 

--  Several other Arab countries have advised us of steps they
are taking toward dismantling the boycott.

President Clinton called for an end to the boycott at the
signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles.

Sanctions are another consideration in our trade policy.  We
must convince Iraq, Libya, and others who defy the will of the
international community as expressed by the United Nations that
the world community will impose severe costs for their
unacceptable behavior.  We believe that the UN sanctions remain
an effective instrument of pressure on these regimes to compel
their compliance with Security Council resolutions.

Export controls on high-technology products with dual
military/civilian uses are another factor.  We keep a close
watch on these exports and must be sure that proposed exports
are consistent with our national security objectives and include
appropriate safeguards before approving the sale.  I don't think
it would be sensible for us to permit a U.S. firm to sell
silicon chip manufacturing technology to a European firm without
some assurance that the technology wouldn't be resold to, for
example, a Libyan or Iranian concern.  Nor would we want to
allow U.S. firms the unimpeded ability to sell chemicals that
could be used to manufacture chemical weapons.  The Department
of Commerce has the lead on dual-use export controls, and we in
the State Department work closely with Commerce.

The Middle East Market
I also want to draw attention to various governments' efforts to
liberalize and "modernize" their economies, often with U.S.
assistance.  These efforts are reducing many of the barriers
that have impeded growth in trade between the U.S. and the
Middle East.

--  In Morocco, the Agency for International Development is
providing technical advice to government officials overseeing
the sale of 112 public sector firms to private investors.

--  The Egyptian Government has eliminated most import and
investment restrictions, substantially reduced tariffs, and
implemented full currency convertibility and a floating exchange
rate.

--  Israel has made significant strides in economic reform as
well, removing restrictions on its capital markets, cutting
tariffs, and drastically reducing government involvement in the
housing sector.

--  Stock exchanges and free trade zones are becoming more
common features of the economic landscape in the region.

All these are "internal" changes arising from a growing
recognition that the free market works better than state
direction of the economy--changes that will make these countries
better markets for U.S. goods and services.  But there have been
"external" changes as well--changes that have enhanced the role
of the United States in the region and, with it, the
opportunities for U.S. business.  In the wake of Desert Storm,
the end of the Cold War, and our role in the Arab-Israeli peace
process, many U.S. firms are finding Near East markets more
receptive to American products.  This is particularly true in
the Gulf, where both the public and private sectors are
increasingly inclined to "buy American."

In short, while most people are focusing on the dramatic
political changes now taking place in the Middle East, the
economic changes underway in the region deserve our attention as
well.  This economic transformation presents new opportunities
for both the people of the Middle East and for the United
States.  Peace and economic expansion will not only improve the
lives of those who live there but our own welfare as well.  As
taboos and trade barriers fall, I expect the U.S. private sector
to be ideally placed to reap its share of the resulting "peace
dividend."  (###)


ARTICLE 8:

Chinese Compliance With MOU Governing Prison Labor Exports

Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary 
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Statement before the Subcommittee on International Economic
Policy and Trade of the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
Washington, DC, September 9, 1993 

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee:  I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before this committee to provide an update
on the problem of Chinese prison labor exports to the United
States.

With certain exceptions, U.S. law prohibits the importation of
"all goods mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part in
any foreign country by convict labor or/and forced labor or/and
indentured labor under penal sanctions."  The U.S. Government
has devoted great efforts to prevent products produced by prison
labor from being imported into this country.  We at the State
Department work closely with the U.S. Customs Service all over
the world to support law enforcement both at our borders and
overseas.

Specifically regarding China, we have striven to identify and
report on the export of prison labor products to the United
States since the beginning of this decade.  It is no mistake or
quirk of bureaucratic policy-making that linked labor with our
MFN process for China.  Along with other areas of human rights,
we are deeply concerned about this issue.

I must say, Mr. Chairman, that, without stealing the podium from
Commissioner Weise, I share his concern with the current state
of implementation of the Memorandum of Under standing (MOU) that
we signed with the Chinese.  This Administration has a
commitment to human rights and enforcement of the prison labor
MOU.  China's MFN status is conditioned on it.  It will not be
extended if there is not satisfactory implementation of the MOU
and overall progress on human rights.

At this point, there is reason for concern.  Recent human rights
problems have overtaken positive gestures by the Chinese
Government.  The overall implementation of the prison 
labor agreement has, generally, been characterized by poor
communications, slow and cursory responses to investigation
questions, and stonewalling or rejections of requests for
visits.
Early U.S. Efforts

Early efforts by the U.S. Government to learn about prison labor
exports were not successful.  Increasing information from
sources like Harry Wu, Asia Watch, and others, coupled with
interest on the part of the Congress, raised the level of public
and governmental attention to these issues.

In October 1991, partly in response, the Chinese issued a
regulation prohibiting the export of products made with prison
labor.  However, there was still the need to ensure that these
exports did not reach our shores.  Concern in the previous
Administration and the Congress prompted the U.S. to seek a
Memorandum of Understanding on procedures for prompt
investigation of allegations that specific imports from China
were produced by prison labor.

We did not wait, however, for the prison labor MOU to be signed
before we took action.  U.S. law provides that Customs may issue
detention orders when information reasonably, but not
conclusively, indicates that merchandise produced by forced
labor is being, or is likely to be, imported.  Detention orders
do not necessarily imply that goods have, in fact, been seized,
but they prohibit the import of goods from subject facilities
into the United States.  The detention order cannot be lifted
until Customs makes a clear determination that the facility in
question does not utilize prison labor on the production line.

The detention order on Bliss Machine Tools, which resulted in
effective prosecution and prohibition of imports of machine
tools made by prison labor, is one example.  I am sure
Commissioner Weise has many more.  We hoped that an MOU would 
assist Customs in making these determinations with regard to
Chinese facilities.

Thus, after a long, laborious negotiation in which we were ably
assisted by our colleagues in the Customs Service, the U.S. and
China signed a Memorandum of Understanding on trade in prison
labor products in August 1992.  This was a significant step
forward in strengthening compliance with both American and
Chinese laws and regulations prohibiting trade in prison labor
products.  Effective implementation is an important U.S.
priority in our bilateral relations with China.

The Memorandum of Understanding provides for:

--  Prompt investigation of suspected violations of the laws and
regulations of each side relating to trade in prison labor
products;

--  Exchanges of information; 

--  Meetings between officials and experts of the two sides; 

--  Furnishing of evidence that can be used in judicial or
administrative proceedings against violators; and

--  Prompt facilitation of visits to relevant facilities upon
the request of either party.

Almost immediately after the signing, the U.S. Customs Service
assigned a U.S.-based officer to the embassy to facilitate
implementation of the MOU.  Since then, Customs Officers have
traveled frequently to China on temporary assignment to conduct
investigations.  This month, the U.S. will assign two full-time
officers to staff its new office in Beijing.  One of these will
be responsible primarily for prison labor issues.  This will
substantially boost  our efforts to work with our Chinese
counterparts to carry out the MOU.

Procedures for Investigations
Let me briefly review the procedure we follow in investigating
cases.  I would note that we have had problems at almost every
stage of this process.  First, we request the Chinese to
investigate facilities which we have reason to believe use
prison labor to produce goods for export.  At this time, we
present the Chinese with whatever hard evidence we have that a
firm is engaging in prison labor trade.  Depending on the
results of the Chinese Ministry of Justice investigation, we may
ask to make a verification visit to the site.

Since the signing of the MOU, we have presented 31 cases of
suspected prison labor violations to the Chinese for
investigation.  Until yesterday, the Chinese had provided
reports on 16 of these cases, and we were awaiting responses to
another 15 which were presented to the Chinese in June.  Mr.
Chairman, I am pleased to report today that our embassy in 
Beijing has just received the results of the 15 outstanding
cases.  The results of these investigations could have a bearing
on our ability to implement the MOU in the short term.  Both
State and Customs officials will be following up on these cases
shortly in meetings with the Chinese in Beijing.  That the
Chinese have concluded these investigations despite their
concerns about other outstanding cases may signal an increased
willingness to work with us to implement the MOU.  Let us hope
so. 

While we have not had a chance to evaluate the contents of the
new Chinese reports, I can give you a brief summary of their
findings.

New Chinese Reports
The Chinese indicated that 11 of the 15 firms either do not
export their products or do not export to the U.S.  On August
25, 1992, we requested visits to five sites.  We have visited
only one of these facilities, the Jinma Diesel Factory, while
our repeated requests to see the others have been rejected.  For
example, the Chinese responded that, since consulate officers
had seen several of the other sites prior to the signing of the
MOU, visits to these facilities were unnecessary.  On the other
hand, we have visited two sites which we did not ask to see but
on which we had requested investigations.

In response to the first five cases submitted, the Chinese
stated that they found no evidence that prison labor had been
used to produce exports.  The Chinese, subsequently, reported
the results of 11 other cases.  Of these 11, they claim that 6
facilities are prisons which do not produce goods for export,
and that another one is a workers' collective which also does
not export.  The Chinese maintain that in many cases, factories
employ family members of prison system employees but not
prisoners themselves. 

In the remaining four cases, the Chinese found that prison labor
has been used for export production in the past.  However, they
maintain that these factories--the Sichuan Zigong Machine Tool
Factory, the Sichuan Miaoxi Tea Plantation, the Shandong Dezhou
Shengjian Machinery Factory, and the Hubei Xiangyang Machine
Tool Factory--either have ceased exporting or have removed
prisoners from the production line.  Sichuan Zigong Machine Tool
Factory was found to have exported prison labor-produced goods
to Southeast Asia.  Destinations of past exports from the other
facilities were not reported.

As I noted above, inspection teams, comprising both State and
Customs officials, have visited three suspected prison labor
facilities, and we have long-standing requests to see five
others.  This includes one in Yunnan, the Jinma Diesel Engine
Factory, where the first visit was inconclusive because local
authorities denied the inspection team access to three areas of
the factory compound.  Up to now, requests for a revisit have 
been denied.  Accordingly, the detention order on products from
the Yunnan facility remains in effect, pending receipt of more
definitive information, for which we continue to press. 

In two cases, the Qinghe Farm and Beijing Number One Prison
(Qinghe Hosiery Factory), examination of prison records and
facilities produced no evidence that these facilities were
exporting any of their products.  As a result, the joint
Customs-State investigation team, in June, recommended the
closure of these two cases.  Customs is currently studying
evidence obtained from visits to these two sites to make a final
determination on them.  Commissioner Weise can address their
status in greater detail.

Chinese Cooperation Following U.S. Trip
Implementation of the MOU has been slow from the start, but the
Chinese exhibited greater willingness to work with us following
the March visit here of a Chinese delegation of officials from
the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and
the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation.  The
trip, which both American and Chinese officials termed
successful, allowed Chinese officials to hear first-hand the
concerns of Congress and U.S. business on this important issue. 
In addition to seeing you and your staff, Mr. Chairman, the
Chinese delegation met with officials at State, Customs, and the
NSC, as well as with business groups.

While in the U.S., the Chinese also toured three U.S. federal
prisons, including their industry facilities.  The Chinese
returned home with a greater appreciation of U.S. policy. 

We have registered complaints many times with the Chinese. 
Perhaps predictably, the Chinese have some complaints of their
own.  They have recently expressed frustration at our failure,
thus far, to close any of the outstanding cases.  Chinese
Ministry of Justice officials have suggested that we should
reach final determinations on facilities already seen before
requesting any more site visits.  The Chinese emphasize that
U.S. Customs has not yet resolved any cases despite several
visits to facilities.  They have recently indicated that they
may withhold results of ongoing investigations until some
outstanding cases, notably those involving the Qinghe Farm and
the Beijing Number One Prison, are closed.

Chinese authorities have also repeatedly questioned the adequacy
and timeliness of our evidence.  Most information we have comes
from Chinese publications, in some cases government ones which
are 5 years old or more.  Other evidence comes from company
brochures, again many years old, which may include exaggerated
or misleading claims about a company's activities.  The lack of
hard, recent evidence hampers our ability to work with Chinese
justice officials and makes implementation of the MOU all the
more difficult.

For our part, we have repeatedly encountered Chinese delays in
providing responses to our requests for visits, and their
investigation reports often lack detail.  Prompt investigation
of suspected facilities is in the interest of both the U.S. and
China.  Yet we have been granted access to only one facility for
which we asked a visit.

As in many other issues in Sino-U.S. relations, the
decentralization of authority within China, which accelerates
the economic changes beneficial to a freer environment, also
hampers prompt enforcement of our agreement.  Conversely, the
visits to Qinghe Farm and the Beijing Number One Prison--both in
the Beijing area--were efficiently arranged and provided broad
access both to facilities and, perhaps more importantly, to
records.

Chinese MOJ officials have repeatedly blamed the stonewalling of
 provincial and local officials at sites further from central
control for the lack of more rapid progress on investigations
and visits.  However, this is no excuse for footdragging on a
bilateral agreement of such importance.  We must continue to
press the Chinese for more, better, and faster responses and
cooperation.

Perhaps even more than in prison labor, the MOU has encouraged
Chinese cooperation in several other Customs-related areas. 
Customs sponsored a series of highly successful trade fairs
which outlined for Chinese attendees how our Customs procedures
and regulations apply to Chinese businesses.  We have encouraged
the Chinese to consider a similar program in the U.S. to
acquaint U.S. businesses with Chinese laws.  At the same time,
Customs is currently negotiating a mutual assistance agreement
with China.

Conclusion
There are encouraging signs, but much more remains to be done. 
I have already mentioned the increase in staff at the embassy. 
Although we have a number of Customs-related issues with the
Chinese, the impetus behind setting up an office and a major
part of its workload will be prison labor.  Even with increased
involvement on the ground, it is difficult to estimate whether,
or how many, prison labor-made goods enter the U.S. through
export to a third country and subsequent re-export here. 
Similarly, it can be hard to determine the origin of goods
shipped to local trading companies and then exported to the U.S.

U.S. business can assist U.S. officials in these efforts.  We
should urge American businesspeople who travel frequently to
China to consult with Chinese trading partners and encourage
them to watch for possible violations of our regulations
governing imports of prison labor products.  Obviously, any
suspicions should be brought to the attention of U.S. officials.

In addition, we welcome information from other organizations
which might identify violations.  For example, the Laogai 
Research Foundation and its head, Harry Wu, have researched
numerous Chinese facilities in an effort to identify prison
labor-produced exports, sometimes at great personal risk.

The good faith of both parties, the United States and China, is
critical to the successful implementation of the MOU.  We have
repeatedly underscored the importance we attach to this issue. 
This year China's progress in stemming exports of prison
labor-produced goods through implementation of the MOU, together
with freedom of emigration and other human rights concerns, will
be scrutinized in determining our recommendations on
most-favored-nation trade treatment for China.  (###)


ARTICLE 9:

UN Security Council Adopts Resolution 864 on Angola
Robert Grey, UNSC Resolution

Robert Grey
Statement by the U.S. Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs
to the United Nations before the UN Security Council, New York
City, September 15, 1993.

The adoption of today's resolution is a critical step in the
international community's continuing efforts to restore peace to
the devastated people and country of Angola.  We condemn the
military actions of UNITA, which have wreaked such havoc on the
Angolan people.  The leadership of UNITA must understand that
the international community holds it responsible and will not
tolerate its continued attempts to wage war on its own people in
an effort to conquer militarily what it could not win in a
democratic election.

The action we took today is a trumpet call for peace to UNITA,
the people of Angola, and the world.  But it is more.  It puts
UNITA and any who stand in the way of peace on notice that the
international community will take strong action to bring about a
just and lasting peace.

We are deeply touched by the wretched humanitarian condition
this conflict has created in Angola.  We will not stand by while
innocent people are slaughtered, whether by bullets or slowly by
starvation.  The efforts of the international community to
assist the poor and afflicted is of deep importance to us.  The
people of Angola should know that the nations of the world stand
behind their yearning for peace and will persevere in efforts to
obtain it. 

The road to peace in Angola has been a long and tortuous one. 
This resolution, hopefully, will be the final step in clearing
that road.  But there must be no mistake.  UNITA's leadership
must understand that we are ready to impose additional sanctions
on UNITA unless it engages fully and without 
reservation in implementing the Acordos de Paz and the relevant
resolutions of this Council.  This is our last warning.

Resolution 864
(Sept. 15, 1993)

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991, 747
(1992) of 24 March 1992, 785 (1992) of 30 October 1992, 793
(1992) of 30 November 1992, 804 (1993) of 29 January 1993, 811
(1993) of 12 March 1993, 823 (1993) of 30 April 1993, 834 (1993)
of 1 June 1993 and 851 (1993) of 15 July 1993,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General (S/26434
and Add. 1) dated 13 September 1993,

Expressing grave concern at the continuing deterioration of the
political and military situation, and noting with consternation
the further deterioration of an already grave humanitarian
situation,

Deeply concerned that, despite its previous resolutions and the
efforts undertaken by the Secretary-General and his Special
Representative, the peace talks remain suspended and a
cease-fire has not been established,

Welcoming the joint statement issued in Lisbon on 10 September
1993 by the representatives of Portugal, the Russian Federation
and the United States of America, the three observer States to
the Angolan peace process (S/26488),

Welcoming also and supporting to that end the efforts of the
Secretary-General and his Special Representative aimed at the
earliest resolution of the Angolan crisis through negotiations,
and stressing the importance it attaches thereto,

Welcoming further the efforts of the Ad Hoc Committee on
Southern Africa of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and
of Heads of State of neighbouring countries to facilitate the
resumption of the peace process in Angola,

Emphasizing the importance of a continued and effective United
Nations presence in Angola with a view to fostering the peace
process and advancing the full implementation of the "Acordos de
Paz",

Reaffirming its commitment to preserve the unity and territorial
integrity of Angola,

A

1.  Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General (S/26434) dated
13 September 1993 and decides to extend the existing mandate of
the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) for a
period of three months until 15 December 1993;

2.  Reiterates its readiness to consider taking action promptly,
at any time within the period of the mandate authorized by this
resolution, on the recommendation of the Secretary-General, to
expand substantially the United Nations presence in Angola in
the event of significant progress in the peace process;

3.  Reaffirms the importance of the functions of good offices
and mediation by UNAVEM II and the Special Representative, with
the goal of restoring a cease-fire and reinstating the peace
process for the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz";

4.  Welcomes the continued disposition of the Government of
Angola to reach a peaceful settlement of the conflict in
conformity with the "Acordos de Paz" and relevant resolutions of
the Security Council;

5.  Reaffirms its recognition of the legitimate rights of the
Government of Angola and in this regard welcomes the provision
of assistance to the Government of Angola in support of the
democratic process;

6.  Reiterates once again its demand that UNITA accept
unreservedly the results of the democratic elections of 30
September 1992 and abide fully by the "Acordos de Paz";

7.  Condemns UNITA for continuing military actions, which are
resulting in increased suffering to the civilian population of
Angola and damage to the Angolan economy and again demands that
UNITA immediately cease such actions;

8.  Also condemns UNITA's repeated attempts to seize additional
territory and its failure to withdraw its troops from the
locations which it has occupied since the resumption of the
hostilities, and demands once again that it immediately do so
and agree without delay to return its troops to United
Nations-monitored areas as a transitional measure pending full
implementation of the "Acordos de Paz";

9.  Reaffirms that such occupation is a grave violation of the
"Acordos de Paz" and is incompatible with the goal of peace
through agreements and reconciliation;

10.  Stresses once again the fundamental need to reinitiate
without delay the peace talks under United Nations auspices with
a view to the immediate establishment of a cease-fire throughout
the country and the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz"
and resolutions of the Security Council;

11.  Takes note of statements by UNITA that it is prepared to
resume peace negotiations and demands that UNITA act
accordingly;

12.  Welcomes the further steps taken by the Secretary-General
to implement the emergency humanitarian assistance plan;

13.  Strongly condemns the repeated attacks carried out by UNITA
against United Nations personnel working to provide humanitarian
assistance and reaffirms that such attacks are clear violations
of international humanitarian law;

14.  Takes note of statements by UNITA that it will cooperate in
ensuring the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to
all Angolans and demands that UNITA act accordingly;

15.  Reiterates its appeal to both parties to take all necessary
measures to ensure the security and safety of UNAVEM II
personnel as well as of the personnel involved in humanitarian
relief operations, and strictly to abide by applicable rules of
international humanitarian law;

16.  Demands that UNITA  proceed immediately to the release of
all foreign citizens held against their will and to abstain from
any action which might cause damage to foreign property;

B

Strongly condemning UNITA and holding its leadership responsible
for not having taken the necessary measures to comply with the
demands made by the Council in its previous resolutions,
Determined to ensure respect for its resolutions and the full
implementation of the "Acordos de Paz",

Urging all States to refrain from providing any form of direct
or indirect assistance, support or encouragement to UNITA,

Determining that, as a result of UNITA's military actions, the
situation in Angola constitutes a threat to international peace
and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

17.  Decides that the provisions set forth in paragraphs 19 to
25 below shall come into force ten days after the date of
adoption of the present resolution unless the Secretary-General
notifies the Council that an effective cease-fire has been
established and that agreement has been reached on the
implementation of the "Acordos de Paz" and relevant resolutions
of the Security Council;

18.  Decides further that if, at any time after the submission
of the above-mentioned report of the Secretary-General, the
Secretary-General reports to the Council that UNITA has broken
the cease-fire or ceased to participate constructively in the
implementation of the "Acordos de Paz" and the relevant
resolutions of the Security Council, the provisions set forth in
paragraphs 19 to 25 below shall come into force immediately;

19.  Decides, with a view to prohibiting all sale or supply to
UNITA of arms and related materiel and military assistance, as 
well as petroleum and petroleum products, that all States shall
prevent the sale or supply, by their nationals or from their
territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and
related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition,
military vehicles and equipment and spare parts for the
afore-mentioned, as well as of petroleum and petroleum products,
whether or not originating in their territory, to the territory
of Angola other than through named points of entry on a list to
be supplied by the Government of Angola to the
Secretary-General, who shall promptly notify the Member States
of the United Nations;

20.  Calls upon all States, and all international organizations,
to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the present
resolution, notwithstanding the existence of any rights or
obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement
or any contract entered into or any licence or permit granted
prior to the date of adoption of this resolution;

21.  Calls upon States to bring proceedings against persons and
entities violating the measures imposed by this resolution and
to impose appropriate penalties;

22.  Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its
provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security
Council consisting of all the members of the Council to
undertake the following tasks and to report on its work to the
Council with its observations and recommendations:

(a)  To examine the reports submitted pursuant to paragraph 24
below;

(b)  To seek from all States further information regarding the
action taken by them with a view to effectively implementing the
measures imposed by paragraph 19 above;

(c)  To consider information brought to its attention by States
concerning violations of the measures imposed by paragraph 19
above and to recommend appropriate measures in response thereto;

(d)  To make periodic reports to the Security Council on
information submitted to it regarding alleged violations of the
measures imposed by paragraph 19 above, identifying where
possible persons or entities, including vessels, reported to be
engaged in such violations;

(e)  To promulgate guidelines that may be necessary to
facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed by
paragraph 19 above;

23.  Calls upon all States to cooperate fully with the Committee
established by paragraph 22 above in the fulfillment of its
tasks, including supplying such information as may be sought by
the Committee in pursuance of the present resolution;

24.  Requests all States to report to the Secretary-General by
15 October 1993 on the measures they have adopted in order to
meet the obligations set out in paragraph 19 above;

25.  Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary
assistance to the Committee established by paragraph 22 above
and to make the necessary arrangements in the Secretariat for
this purpose;

26.  Expresses its readiness to consider the imposition of
further measures under the Charter of the United Nations,
including, inter alia, trade measures against UNITA and
restrictions on the travel of UNITA personnel, unless by 1
November 1993 the Secretary-General has reported that an
effective cease-fire has been established and that agreement has
been reached on the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz"
and relevant resolutions of the Security Council;

C

27.  Expresses also its readiness to review the measures in the
present resolution if the Secretary-General reports to the
Council that an effective cease-fire has been established and
that substantial progress has been achieved towards the full
implementation of the "Acordos de Paz" and relevant resolutions
of the Security Council;

28.  Requests the Secretary-General to submit to it as soon as
the situation warrants, and in any case in good time before 1
November 1993 and again before 15 December 1993, a report on the
situation in Angola and the implementation of this resolution,
with his recommendation for the further role of the United
Nations in the peace process and, in the meantime, to keep the
Council regularly informed of developments;

29.  Decides to remain seized of the matter.

VOTE:  Unanimous (15-0).  (###)


ARTICLE 10:

White House Statements

South African Parliament Establishes Transitional Executive
Council
Statement released by the White House, Office of the Press
Secretary, Washington, DC, September 23, 1993.

Today, the South African Parliament took a historic step in
approving the establishment of a Transitional Executive Council
(TEC).  For the first time in its long history, South Africa
will create a nonracial body to oversee key government
functions.  We applaud this vital move forward in the transition
to democracy in South Africa, leading up to the country's first
democratic elections next April.

Credit for this momentous action goes to the many South Africans
who have shown the personal courage and leadership to chart
their nation's course into the community of democracies.  We
call again on all the parties in South Africa to join this
process of constructive change.

In support of this transition, we will enhance our assistance
for the election process through programs on voter education and
training for political parties.  We are preparing new avenues of
assistance for the TEC in order to create a "level playing
field" for all parties during the upcoming campaign.  We will
also look to new efforts to mitigate the violence that plagues
South Africa to supplement our assistance to the Goldstone
Commission and the National Peace Accord structures.

Today's step by the South African Parliament will also
facilitate the launching of a number of new initiatives to help
restore economic growth to South Africa and overcome the cruel
legacy of apartheid.  Working with Congress, we plan soon to
move ahead on measures to engage the resources of the American
private sector and the international financial and donor
community to assist South Africa.


President Clinton Meets With Baltic Presidents
Statement released by the White House, Office of the Press
Secretary, New York City, September 27, 1993.

The President met today jointly with President Lennart Meri of
Estonia, President Algirdas Brazauskas of Lithuania, and
President Guntis Ulmanis of Latvia.  It was the President's
first meeting with the heads of state of the Baltic countries.

The President expressed his admiration for the remarkable
progress the Baltic peoples have achieved during the last 2
years in establishing democratic institutions and promoting
economic reform.  The President assured them of the strong U.S.
interest in building close relations.  The President reaffirmed
U.S. support for reform and indicated that the U.S. would move
forward promptly on the new $50-million Baltic-American
Enterprise Fund.  The President also stated that the U.S.
intended to construct 5,000-7,000 housing units in Russia to
facilitate the withdrawal of Russian forces from Estonia and
Latvia.

The President welcomed the recent withdrawal of all Russian
military forces from Lithuania.  He also reiterated strong U.S.
support for the early, unconditional, and rapid withdrawal of
the remaining Russian forces from Latvia and Estonia.  The
President noted that he had raised this matter in a number of
recent discussions with Russian Federation leaders.  The United
States intends to be helpful to all parties concerned in
promoting an amicable resolution of the withdrawal issue.

The President also discussed concerns raised by the Russian
Government about the treatment of ethnic Russians in Latvia and
Estonia, while noting that international observers had found no
evidence of human rights violations in those countries.  The
President expressed the hope that practical solutions could be
achieved on this difficult issue.  In this regard, the U.S.
welcomes the constructive role played by the United Nations, the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the
Council of Europe in helping to promote a resolution of all
outstanding differences between Russia and the Baltic countries.
(###)

END OF DISPATCH VOL 4, NO 40

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