US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 4, NUMBER 39, SEPTEMBER 27, 1993
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1.  Confronting the Challenges Of a Broader World -- President
Clinton
2.  Building Peace in the Middle East -- Secretary Christopher
3.  From Containment to Enlargement -- Anthony Lake
4.  Use of Force in a Post-Cold War World -- Madeleine K.
Albright


ARTICLE 1:

Confronting the Challenges Of a Broader World
President Clinton
Address to the UN General Assembly, New York City, September 27,
1993

Mr. Secretary General, distinguished delegates and guests:  It
is a great honor for me to address you and to stand in this
great chamber which symbolizes so much of the 20th century--its
darkest crises and its brightest aspirations.

I come before you as the first American President born after the
founding of the United Nations.  Like most of the people in the
world today, I was not even alive during the convulsive World
War that convinced humankind of the need for this organization,
nor during the San Francisco Conference that led to its birth. 
Yet I have followed the work of the United Nations throughout my
life, with admiration for its accomplishments, with sadness for
its failures, and with conviction that through common effort our
generation can take the bold steps needed to redeem the mission
entrusted to the UN 48 years ago.

I pledge to you that my nation remains committed to helping make
the UN's vision a reality.  The start of this General Assembly
offers us an opportunity to take stock of where we are as common
shareholders in the progress of humankind and in the
preservation of our planet.

It is clear that we live at a turning point in human history. 
Immense and promising changes seem to wash over us every day. 
The Cold War is over.  The world is no longer divided into two
armed and angry camps.  Dozens of new democracies have been
born.

It is a moment of miracles.  We see Nelson Mandela stand side by
side with President de Klerk, proclaiming a date for South
Africa's first nonracial election.  We see Russia's first
popularly elected President, Boris Yeltsin, leading his nation
on its bold democratic journey.  We have seen decades of
deadlock shattered in the Middle East, as the Prime Minister of 
Israel and the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization
reached past enmity and suspicion to shake each other's hands
and exhilarate the entire world with the hope of peace.

We have begun to see the doomsday weapons of nuclear
annihilation dismantled and destroyed.  Thirty-two years ago,
President Kennedy warned this chamber that humanity lived under
a nuclear sword of Damocles that hung by the slenderest of
threads.  Now, the United States is working with Russia,
Ukraine, Belarus, and others to take that sword down and to lock
it away in a secure vault where we hope and pray it will remain
forever.

It is a new era in this hall as well.  The superpower standoff
that for so long stymied the United Nations' work almost from
its first day has now yielded to a new promise of practical
cooperation.  Yet today we must all admit that there are two
powerful tendencies working from opposite directions to
challenge the authority of nation states everywhere and to
undermine the authority of nation states to work together.

From beyond nations, economic and technological forces all over
the globe are compelling the world toward integration.  These
forces are fueling a welcome explosion of entrepreneurship and
political liberalization.  But they also threaten to destroy the
insularity and independence of national economies, quickening
the pace of change and making many of our people feel more
insecure.  At the same time, from within nations, the resurgent
aspirations of ethnic and religious groups challenge governments
on terms that traditional nation states cannot easily
accommodate.

These twin forces lie at the heart of the challenges not only to
our national governments but also to all our international
institutions.  They require all of us in this room to find new
ways to work together more effectively in pursuit of our
national interests and to think anew about whether our
institutions of international cooperation are adequate to this
moment.

Thus, as we marvel at this era's promise of new peace, we must
also recognize that serious threats remain.   Bloody ethnic,
religious, and civil wars rage from Angola to the Caucasus to
Kashmir.  As weapons of mass destruction fall into more hands,
even small conflicts can threaten to take on murderous
proportions.  Hunger and disease continue to take a tragic toll,
especially among the world's children.  The malignant neglect of
our global environment threatens our children's health and their
very security.

The repression of conscience continues in too many nations. And
terrorism, which has taken so many innocent lives, assumed a
horrifying immediacy for us here when militant fanatics bombed
the World Trade Center and planned to attack even this very 
hall of peace.  Let me assure you:  Whether the fathers of those
crimes or the mass murderers who bombed Pan Am Flight 103, my
government is determined to see that such terrorists are brought
to justice.

At this moment of panoramic change, of vast opportunities and
troubling threats, we must all ask ourselves what we can do and
what we should do as a community of nations.  We must once again
dare to dream of what might be, for our dreams may be within our
reach.  For that to happen, we must all be willing to honestly
confront the challenges of the broader world.  That has never
been easy.

When this organization was founded 48 years ago, the world's
nations stood devastated by war or exhausted by its expense. 
There was little appetite for cooperative efforts among nations.
Most people simply wanted to get on with their lives.  But a
farsighted generation of leaders from the United States and
elsewhere rallied the world.  Their efforts built the
institutions of postwar security and prosperity.

We are at a similar moment today.  The momentum of the Cold War
no longer propels us in our daily actions.  And with daunting
economic and political pressures upon almost every nation
represented in this room, many of us are turning to focus
greater attention and energy on our domestic needs and problems.
 And we must.  But putting each of our economic houses in order
cannot mean that we shut our windows to the world.  The pursuit
of self-renewal in many of the world's largest and most powerful
economies--in Europe, in Japan, in North America--is absolutely
crucial, because unless the great industrial nations can
recapture their robust economic growth, the global economy will
languish.

Yet the industrial nations also need growth elsewhere in order
to lift their own.  Indeed, prosperity in each of our nations
and regions also depends upon active and responsible engagement
in a host of shared concerns.

For example, a thriving and democratic Russia not only makes the
world safer, it also can help to expand the world's economy.  A
strong GATT agreement will create millions of jobs worldwide. 
Peace in the Middle East, buttressed, as it should be, by the
repeal of outdated UN resolutions, can help to unleash that
region's great economic potential and calm a perpetual source of
tension in global affairs.  And the growing economic power of
China, coupled with greater political openness, could bring
enormous benefits to all of Asia and to the rest of the world.

We must help our publics to understand this distinction: 
Domestic renewal is an overdue tonic.  But isolationism and
protectionism are still poison.  We must inspire our people to
look beyond their immediate fears toward a broader horizon.

Let me start by being clear about where the United States
stands.  The United States occupies a unique position in world
affairs today.  We recognize that, and we welcome it.  Yet with
the Cold War over, I know many people ask whether the United
States plans to retreat or remain active in the world and, if
active, to what end.  Many people are asking that in our own
country as well.  Let me answer that question as clearly and
plainly as I can.

The United States intends to remain engaged and to lead.  We
cannot solve every problem, but we must and will serve as a
fulcrum for change and a pivot point for peace.

In a new era of peril and opportunity, our overriding purpose
must be to expand and strengthen the world's community of
market-based democracies.  During the Cold War, we sought to
contain a threat to survival of free institutions.  Now we seek
to enlarge the circle of nations that live under those free
institutions, for our dream is of a day when the opinions and
energies of every person in the world will be given full
expression in a world of thriving democracies that cooperate
with each other and live in peace.

With this statement, I do not mean to announce some crusade to
force our way of life and doing things on others or to replicate
our institutions, but we now know clearly that throughout the
world, from Poland to Eritrea, from Guatemala to South Korea,
there is an enormous yearning among people who wish to be the
masters of their own economic and political lives.  Where it
matters most and where we can make the greatest difference, we
will patiently and firmly align ourselves with that yearning.

Today, there are still those who claim that democracy is simply
not applicable to many cultures and that its recent expansion is
an aberration--an accident--in history that will soon fade away.
 But I agree with President Roosevelt, who once said, "The
democratic aspiration is no mere recent phase of human history. 
It is human history."

We will work to strengthen the free market democracies by
revitalizing our economy here at home; by opening world trade
through the GATT, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and
other accords; and by updating our shared institutions, asking
with you and answering the hard questions about whether they are
adequate to the present challenges.

We will support the consolidation of market democracy where it
is taking new root, as in the states of the former Soviet Union
and all over Latin America.  And we seek to foster the practices
of good government that distribute the benefits of democracy and
economic growth fairly to all people.  We will work to reduce
the threat from regimes that are hostile to democracies and to
support liberalization of nondemocratic states when they are
willing to live in peace with the rest of us.

As a country that has over 150 different racial, ethnic, and
religious groups within our borders, our policy is and must be
rooted in a profound respect for all the world's religions and
cultures.  But we must oppose everywhere extremism that produces
terrorism and hate.  And we must pursue our humanitarian goal of
reducing suffering, fostering sustainable development, and
improving health and living conditions, particularly for our
world's children.

On efforts from export control to trade agreements to
peace-keeping, we will often work in partnership with others and
through multilateral institutions such as the United Nations. It
is in our national interest to do so.  But we must not hesitate
to act unilaterally when there is a threat to our core interests
or to those of our allies.

The United States believes that an expanded community of market
democracies not only serves our own security interests, it also
advances the goals enshrined in this body's charter and its
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  For broadly based
prosperity is clearly the strongest form of preventive
diplomacy, and the habits of democracy are the habits of peace.

Democracy is rooted in compromise, not conquest.  It rewards
tolerance, not hatred.  Democracies rarely wage war on one
another.  They make more reliable partners in trade, in
diplomacy, and in the stewardship of our global environment. 
And democracies, with the rule of law and respect for political,
religious, and cultural minorities, are more responsive to their
own people and to the protection of human rights.

But as we work toward this vision, we must confront the storm
clouds that may overwhelm our work and darken the march toward
freedom.  If we do not stem the proliferation of the world's
deadliest weapons, no democracy can feel secure.  If we do not
strengthen the capacity to resolve conflict among and within
nations, those conflicts will smother the birth of free
institutions, threaten the development of entire regions, and
continue to take innocent lives.  If we do not nurture our
people and our planet through sustainable development, we will
deepen conflict and waste the very wonders that make our efforts
worth doing.  Let me talk more about what I believe we must do
in each of these three categories:  non-proliferation, conflict
resolution, and sustainable development.

One of our most urgent priorities must be attacking the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction--whether they are
nuclear, chemical, or biological--and the ballistic missiles
that can rain them down on populations hundreds of miles away. 
We know this is not an idle problem.  All of us are still
haunted by the pictures of Kurdish women and children cut down
by poison gas.  We saw Scud missiles dropped during the Gulf war
that would have been far graver in their consequences if they
had carried nuclear weapons.  And we know that many 
nations still believe it is in their interest to develop weapons
of mass destruction or to sell them or the necessary
technologies to others for financial gain.

More than a score of nations likely possess such weapons, and
their number threatens to grow.  These weapons destabilize
entire regions.  They could turn a local conflict into a global
human and environmental catastrophe.  We simply have got to find
ways to control these weapons and to reduce the number of states
that possess them by supporting and strengthening the IAEA and
by taking other necessary measures.

I have made non-proliferation one of our nation's highest
priorities.  We intend to weave it more deeply into the fabric
of all of our relationships with the world's nations and
institutions.  We seek to build a world of increasing pressures
for non-proliferation but increasingly open trade and technology
for those states that live by accepted international rules.

Today, let me describe several new policies that our government
will pursue to stem proliferation.  We will pursue new steps to
control the materials for nuclear weapons.  Growing global
stockpiles of plutonium and highly enriched uranium are raising
the danger of nuclear terrorism for all nations.  We will press
for an international agreement that would ban production of
these materials for weapons forever.

As we reduce our nuclear stockpiles, the United States has also
begun negotiations toward a comprehensive ban on nuclear
testing.  This summer, I declared that to facilitate these
negotiations, our nation would suspend our testing if all other
nuclear states would do the same.  Today, in the face of
disturbing signs, I renew my call on the nuclear states to abide
by that moratorium as we negotiate to stop nuclear testing for
all time.

I am also proposing new efforts to fight the proliferation of
biological and chemical weapons.  Today, only a handful of
nations has ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention.  I call on
all nations, including my own, to ratify this accord quickly, so
that it may enter into force by January 13, 1995.  We will also
seek to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention by making
every nation's biological activities and facilities open to more
international studies.

I am proposing, as well, new steps to thwart the proliferation
of ballistic missiles.  Recently, working with Russia,
Argentina, Hungary, and South Africa, we have made significant
progress toward that goal.  Now, we will seek to strengthen the
principles of the Missile Technology Control Regime by
transforming it from an agreement on technology transfer among
just 23 nations to a set of rules that can command universal
adherence.

We will also reform our own system of export controls in the
United States to reflect the realities of the post-Cold War
world, where we seek to enlist the support of our former
adversaries in the battle against proliferation.  At the same
time that we stop deadly technologies from falling into the
wrong hands, we will work with our partners to remove outdated
controls that unfairly burden legitimate commerce and unduly
restrain growth and opportunity all over the world.

As we work to keep the world's most destructive weapons out of
conflict, we must also strengthen the international community's
ability to address those conflicts themselves.  For as we all
now know so painfully, the end of the Cold War did not bring us
to the millennium of peace.  Indeed, it simply removed the lid
from many cauldrons of ethnic, religious, and territorial
animosity.

The philosopher Isaiah Berlin has said that a wounded
nationalism is like a bent twig forced down so severely that
when released it lashes back with fury.  The world today is
thick with both bent and recoiling twigs of wounded communal
identities.

This scourge of bitter conflict has placed high demands on
United Nations peace-keeping forces.  Frequently the blue
helmets have worked wonders.  In Namibia, El Salvador, the Golan
Heights, and elsewhere, UN peace-keepers have helped to stop the
fighting, restore civil authority, and enable free elections.

In Bosnia, UN peace-keepers, against the danger and frustration
of that continuing tragedy, have maintained a valiant
humanitarian effort.  And if the parties of that conflict take
the hard steps needed to make a real peace, the international
community, including the United States, must be ready to help in
its effective implementation.

In Somalia, the United States and the United Nations have worked
together to achieve a stunning humanitarian rescue, saving
literally hundreds of thousands of lives and restoring the
conditions of security for almost the entire country.  UN
peace-keepers from over two dozen nations remain in Somalia
today.  And some, including brave Americans, have lost their
lives to ensure that we complete our mission and to ensure that
anarchy and starvation do not return just as quickly as they
were abolished.

Many still criticize UN peace-keeping, but those who do should
talk to the people of Cambodia, where the UN's operations have
helped to turn the killing fields into fertile soil through
reconciliation.  Last May's elections in Cambodia marked a proud
accomplishment for that war-weary nation and for the United
Nations.  And I am pleased to announce that the United States
has recognized Cambodia's new government.

UN peace-keeping holds the promise to resolve many of this era's
conflicts.  The reason we have supported such missions is not,
as some critics in the United States have charged, to
subcontract American foreign policy but to strengthen our
security, to protect our interests, and to share among nations
the costs and effort of pursuing peace.  Peace-keeping cannot be
a substitute for our own national defense efforts, but it can
strongly supplement them.

Today, there is wide recognition that the UN peace-keeping
ability has not kept pace with the rising responsibilities and
challenges.  Just 6 years ago, about 10,000 UN peace-keepers
were stationed around the world.  Today, the UN has some 80,000
deployed in 17 operations on 4 continents.  Yet until recently,
if a peace-keeping commander called in from across the globe
when it was nighttime here in New York, there was no one in the
peace-keeping office even to answer the call.  When lives are on
the line, you cannot let the reach of the UN exceed its grasp.

As the Secretary General and others have argued, if UN
peace-keeping is to be a sound security investment for our
nation and for other UN members, it must adapt to new times. 
Together we must prepare UN peace-keeping for the 21st century. 
We need to begin by bringing the rigors of military and
political analysis to every UN peace mission.

In recent weeks in the Security Council, our nation has begun
asking harder questions about proposals for new peace-keeping
missions:  Is there a real threat to international peace?  Does
the proposed mission have clear objectives?  Can an end point be
identified for those who will be asked to participate?  How much
will the mission cost?  From now on, the United Nations should
address these and other hard questions for every proposed
mission before we vote and before the mission begins.

The United Nations simply cannot become engaged in every one of
the world's conflicts.  If the American people are to say yes to
UN peace-keeping, the United Nations must know when to say no. 
The United Nations must also have the technical means to run a
modern, world-class peace-keeping operation.  We support the
creation of a genuine UN peace-keeping headquarters with a
planning staff, with access to timely intelligence, with a
logistics unit that can be deployed on a moment's notice, and
with a modern operations center with global communications.

And the UN's operations must not only be adequately funded but
also fairly funded.  Within the next few weeks, the United
States will be current in our peace-keeping bills.  I have
worked hard with the Congress to get this done.  I believe the
United States should lead the way in being timely in its
payments, and I will work to continue to see that we pay our
bills in full.  But I am also committed to work with the United
Nations to reduce our nation's assessment for these missions.

The assessment system has not been changed since 1973.  And
everyone in our country knows that our percentage of the world's
economic pie is not as great as it was then.  Therefore, I
believe our rates should be reduced to reflect the rise of other
nations that can now bear more of the financial burden.  That
will make it easier for me as President to make sure we pay in a
timely and full fashion.

Changes in the UN's peace-keeping operations must be part of an
even broader program of United Nations reform.  I say that,
again, not to criticize the United Nations but to help to
improve it.  As our ambassador, Madeleine Albright, has
suggested, the United States has always played a twin role to
the UN--first friend and first critic.

Today, corporations all around the world are finding ways to
move from the Industrial Age to the Information Age, improving
service, reducing bureaucracy, and cutting costs.  Here in the
United States, Vice President Al Gore and I have launched an
effort to literally reinvent how our government operates.  We
see this going on in other governments around the world.  Now
the time has come to reinvent the way the United Nations
operates as well.

I applaud the initial steps the Secretary General has taken to
reduce and to reform the United Nations bureaucracy.  Now we
must all do even more to root out waste.  Before this General
Assembly is over, let us establish a strong mandate for an
Office of Inspector General so that it can attain a reputation
for toughness, for integrity, for effectiveness.  Let us build
new confidence among our people that the United Nations is
changing with the needs of our times.

Ultimately, the key for reforming the United Nations, as in
reforming our own government, is to remember why we are here and
whom we serve.  It is wise to recall that the first words of the
UN Charter are not "We, the government," but, "We, the people of
the United Nations."  That means in every country the teachers,
the workers, the farmers, the professionals, the fathers, the
mothers, the children--from the most remote village in the world
to the largest metropolis--they are why we gather in this great
hall.  It is their futures that are at risk when we act or fail
to act.  It is they who ultimately pay our bills.

As we dream new dreams in this age when miracles now seem
possible, let us focus on the lives of those people--and
especially on the children who will inherit this world.  Let us
work with a new urgency and imagine what kind of world we could
create for them in the coming generations.

Let us work with new energy to protect the world's people from
torture and repression.  As Secretary of State Christopher
stressed at the recent Vienna Conference, human rights are not
something conditional, founded by culture, but rather something 
universal granted by God.  This General Assembly should create,
at long last, a High Commissioner for Human Rights.  I hope you
will do it soon and with vigor and energy and conviction.

Let us also work far more ambitiously to fulfill our obligations
as custodians of this planet, not only to improve the quality of
life for our citizens and the quality of our air and water and
the earth itself but also because the roots of conflict are so
often entangled with the roots of environmental neglect and the
calamity of famine and disease.  During the course of our
campaign in the United States last year, Vice President Gore and
I promised the American people major changes in our nation's
policy toward the global environment.  Those were promises to
keep, and today the United States is doing so.

Today we are working with other nations to build on the
promising work of the UN's Commission on Sustainable
Development.  We are working to make sure that all nations meet
their commitments under the Global Climate Convention.  We are
seeking to complete negotiations on an accord to prevent the
world's deserts from further expansion.  And we seek to
strengthen the World Health Organization's efforts to combat the
plague of AIDS, which is not only killing millions but also
exhausting the resources of nations that can least afford it.

Let us make a new commitment to the world's children.  It is
tragic enough that 1.5 million children died as a result of wars
over the past decade.  But it is far more unforgivable that, in
that same period, 40 million children died from diseases
completely preventable with simple vaccines or medicine.  Every
day--this day, as we meet here--over 30,000 of the world's
children will die of malnutrition and disease.

Our UNICEF Director, Jim Grant, has reminded me that each of
those children has a name and a nationality, a family, a
personality, and a potential.  We are compelled to do better by
the world's children.  Just as our own nation has launched new
reforms to ensure that every child has adequate health care, we
must do more to get basic vaccines and other treatment for
curable diseases to children all over the world.  It's the best
investment we'll ever make.

We can find new ways to ensure that every child grows up with
clean, drinkable water, that most precious commodity of life
itself.  And the UN can work even harder to ensure that each
child has at least a full primary education--and I mean that
opportunity for girls as well as boys.

And to ensure a healthier and more abundant world, we simply
must slow the world's explosive growth in population.  We cannot
afford to see the human race doubled by the middle of the next
century.  Our nation has, at last, renewed its commitment to
work with the United Nations to expand the availability of the
world's family planning education and services.  We must ensure
that there is a place at the table for every one of our world's
children.  And we can do it.

At the birth of this organization 48 years ago, another time of
both victory and danger, a generation of gifted leaders from
many nations stepped forward to organize the world's efforts on
behalf of security and prosperity.  One American leader during
that period said this:  "It is time we steered by the stars
rather than by the light of each passing ship."  His generation
picked peace, human dignity, and freedom.  Those are good stars;
they should remain the highest in our own firmament.

Now history has granted to us a moment of even greater
opportunity, when old dangers and old walls are crumbling. 
Future generations will judge us, every one of us, above all by
what we make of this magic moment.  Let us resolve that we will
dream larger--that we will work harder so that they can conclude
that we did not merely turn walls to rubble but, instead, laid
the foundation for great things to come.

Let us ensure that the tide of freedom and democracy is not
pushed back by the fierce winds of ethnic hatred.  Let us ensure
that the world's most dangerous weapons are safely reduced and
denied to dangerous hands.  Let us ensure that the world we pass
to our children is healthier, safer, and more abundant than the
one we inhabit today.  I believe--I know--that together we can
extend this moment of miracles into an age of great work and new
wonders.  (###)



ARTICLE 2:

Building Peace in the Middle East
Secretary Christopher
Address at Columbia University, co-sponsored by the Council on
Foreign Relations, New York City, September 20, 1993

President Rupp, ladies and gentlemen:  Thank you, Les Gelb, for
that generous and insightful introduction.  The Council on
Foreign Relations is very fortunate to have Les Gelb as its new
president.  As many of you know, I had the pleasure of working
with Les during our last tour in government.  He is one of the
nation's leading foreign policy thinkers and writers.  His
advice is valued by me, in New York, and around the world.

Thank you, also, President Rupp, for co-sponsoring our
get-together today in this very elegant setting.  Columbia
University is one of this country's oldest and most prestigious
institutions of learning.  From the schoolroom on Lower Broadway
where Samuel Johnson taught eight students in 1754 to this
magnificent campus on Morningside Heights, Columbia has
represented the spirit of inquiry and intellectual freedom that
has made America strong.

Columbia has certainly contributed to the strength of the State
Department.  In addition to Madeleine Albright, two of our Under
Secretaries, Joan Spero and Lynn Davis, have studied here 
and taught here.  They carry on Columbia's great tradition of
sending women and men into public life with a strongly
internationalist outlook.

My visit here today is one of several I have made and plan to
make around the country to talk about our foreign policy.  It
happens to be my view that Secretaries of State should spend
more time explaining foreign policy to the audience that really
counts--the American people.  And I intend to do so.

A week ago, from a small platform on the south lawn of the White
House, the world took a very big step toward a peaceful future. 
That simple handshake between implacable foes extends a mighty,
redemptive power that can help heal the wounds of this
too-often-violent century.

Like the collapse of communism before it, the beginning of the
historic reconciliation between the Israelis and the
Palestinians confirms our belief that hope can eventually
replace despair, cooperation can overcome conflict, and peace
and freedom can triumph over war and tyranny.

Today, I will share with you my thoughts on last week's historic
developments in the Arab-Israeli peace process.  I will try to
place the events of last Monday in historical context and
describe to you the steps we must take to ensure that this
chance for peace does not slip from our grasp.

For more than 45 years, Democratic and Republican
administrations have worked tirelessly to break the cycle of
violence between Israel and its Arab neighbors.  They did so
because they understood that the United States has enduring
interests in this strategic and historic crossroads; enduring
interests in a region where conflict always seems to threaten
world peace; enduring interests in the security and well-being
of Israel and in cooperative relations with the Arab world from
one end to the other; and enduring interests in the region's oil
resources, which serve as the lifeblood of so much of the
world's economy.

These durable interests have made Middle East peace a constant
and essential goal of U.S. foreign policy.  For decades, that
goal eluded us.  The region remained a tinderbox, threatening to
embroil us and the rest of the world in its deadly wars.  This
volatility was due in no small part to the existence of a Soviet
Union determined to fuel the forces of radicalism and conflict. 
While the Soviets were by no means the only cause of the
Arab-Israeli dispute, they did everything in their power to see
that the region remained at a constant boil.  Their policies
emboldened radicals, intimidated moderates, and left
Israel--save for its friendship with the United States--in a
lonely state of siege.

Throughout the long struggle of the Cold War, only one Arab
country--Egypt--managed to breach the wall of conflict that 
Moscow had helped to erect.  Egypt braved ostracism to make
peace with Israel.  For 14 long years, that heroic achievement
stood strong.  It also stood alone--until last Monday.  The
Israeli-Palestinian agreement--in which Egypt's President
Mubarak played such a strong, critical role--is a powerful
vindication of that nation's courage and vision.

It was not until the Cold War began to wane that new
opportunities arose to combat rejectionism in the Middle East
and to promote peace.  This was most dramatically demonstrated
during the Gulf war.  With the United States and the Soviet
Union working together, Saddam Hussein's radical challenge was
decisively turned back.  Without Moscow's patronage, Saddam's
"war option" proved to be no option at all for him.  America's
overwhelming display of power, principle, and leadership helped
to tilt the Middle East's balance of power toward moderation and
toward the opportunity for reconciliation that has been seized.

Had the United States let it rest there--had we left to others
the job of turning opportunity into reality--last Monday's
dramatic event might never have taken place.  Only America could
have provided the Arabs and the Israelis with the assurances
they needed to go to Madrid and risk breaking the taboo on
direct negotiations.

Upon his election, President Clinton immediately reaffirmed
America's historic role and enduring strategic interest in the
Middle East and in Arab-Israeli peace.  President Clinton saw
the opportunity for a historic breakthrough.  On the morning
after his election, he vowed to make the pursuit of Middle East
peace a top priority.  That is why he moved so quickly to gain
the trust of key regional parties and to reaffirm America's
unstinting support for Israel's security.  And that is why, for
my first official trip abroad, he sent me to the Middle East. 
His message was clear:  The United States was irrevocably
committed to advancing the peace-making process, to
reinvigorating the negotiations, and to elevating America's role
to that of full partner.

The President's efforts built upon the hard work of his
predecessors.  Our victories in the Cold War and in the Gulf
created an environment in which peace-making became possible. 
Our Administration's intervention at key moments this year, to
resolve crises over Palestinian deportees and over the violence
in Lebanon, salvaged the peace process when it teetered on the
brink of collapse.  Throughout the last 22 months, under both
Republican and Democratic Presidents, America's sustained
political involvement--whether in presenting a draft declaration
of principles or in constantly pushing to define the parameters
of the possible--set the stage for decision-making in the secret
Oslo channel, for which we owe so much to the Norwegians and,
particularly, to Foreign Minister Holst.

In the end, of course, last Monday's triumph belongs to the
parties themselves--to the Israeli and the Palestinian
people--who reached out to each other.  And that is exactly as
it should be.  Indeed, the basic premise of the Madrid process
has been that face-to-face negotiation between the parties is
essential.  From the beginning, the United States has encouraged
communications in as many different channels as possible--both
formal and informal, public and private--with the understanding
that the most durable solution would be one forged in direct
negotiations.

It certainly would be a great mistake if the United States were
now to withdraw or shrink from its full and long-standing
partnership that it has undertaken in the peace process.  Our
leadership is essential if this historic agreement is to realize
its full potential.

Today, on behalf of President Clinton, I announce our intention
to lead a wide-ranging effort not simply to give peace a chance
but to ensure that it will not fail.  Just as the United States
organized a successful international coalition to wage war in
the Gulf, we will now organize a new coalition--a coalition to
breathe life into the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration.

As a first step, the United States will convene the Conference
to Support Middle East Peace, building on the Madrid framework. 
Secretary Bentsen and I, together with our Russian counterparts,
will invite foreign and finance ministers representing the
European countries, Japan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states,
Canada, the Nordic countries, and many others--and, of course,
the Israelis and the Palestinians.  The World Bank will also be
present, and it will play a major role in coordinating and
providing this assistance.

The purpose of this Conference will be to mobilize resources
needed to make the agreement work.  The international community
must move immediately to see that the agreement produces
tangible improvements in the security and daily lives of the
Palestinians and the Israelis.  If peace is to be achieved, the
agreement must be translated into results quickly and vividly.

There are varying estimates of the resources required to start
building an economic base in Gaza and the West Bank.  The World
Bank's initial estimate is that $3 billion will be needed over
the next 10 years.  An important portion of this sum will be
needed for a quick-start effort over the next year, beginning in
the next few months.  All agree that we must take immediate
steps to address the high rate of unemployment that robs
families of hope and fuels extremism.  Housing, roads, and other
permanent improvements must be developed quickly.  We must also
act now to provide assistance in public administration, tax
collection, and social services.

Given the number and the commitment of our international
partners, we are confident these needs can be met.  And we will 
stimulate these supporters by our own example.  Working with the
Congress, we expect to assemble an initial 2-year package worth
$250 million to dedicate to this cause.

In this vital effort, we must also involve the private sector. 
A significant part of the initial U.S. package will include OPIC
loans and guarantees to spur private sector involvement and
economic growth in the region.

There is another resource that America can and should provide
for this effort.  At the White House last Monday, immediately
after the signing ceremony, the President, the Vice President,
and I met with a group of Jewish- and Arab-Americans.  This was
truly a unique and special event, the first time in my
experience that they have met jointly at the White House.  We
were moved by their shared sense of hope and by their spirit of
reconciliation from that magnificent day.

The President decided that we must draw on their talent,
ingenuity, and goodwill.  In that spirit, the President will
appoint a task force of Jewish- and Arab-Americans to help us
develop joint projects and private investment in the region. 
The United States will name a senior coordinator for U.S.
assistance--much as we have done in the case of the former
Soviet Union.

Ladies and gentlemen:  The real barrier to peace between the
Israelis and Palestinians--the psychological barrier--has
already been breached.  Compared to that obstacle, the resource
challenge we face can surely be met.  I am convinced that,
working with our international partners, we can and will
succeed.

The implementation of the Israeli-Palestinian agreement
represents only part of a larger task in the Middle East.  We
must nurture a comprehensive reconciliation between Israel and
the rest of the Arab world.  We must achieve a peace between the
people of Israel and the peoples of Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. 
In the recent round of bilateral negotiations between their
governments in Washington, the discussions--I'm glad to
say--were serious and constructive.  Later this month, at the UN
General Assembly, I will meet with my counterparts from Syria,
Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel to try to keep these negotiations
moving and to discuss further steps ahead.  We will work
tirelessly to ensure that all the children of the region can
come to know, in President Clinton's words, "a season of peace."

Another aspect of our effort to promote comprehensive
reconciliation is working to encourage other Arab friends to act
boldly in support of peace.  The core antagonists in this
conflict have courageously opted for mutual recognition and an
end to their state of war.  This bold step demands an equally
bold response from their regional counterparts.  There have been
some good signs already.  Jordan's decision to sign a 
substantive agenda with Israel last Tuesday is a prime example. 
Another good example is the meeting that same day in Morocco
between Prime Minister Rabin and King Hassan, which was also a
promising first step that the United States applauds.  Other
nations must also seize this vital moment for reconciliation.

Now that Israelis and Palestinians have agreed to work together
to promote their economic well-being, it is certainly illogical
for Arab nations to continue their boycott of Israel.  Every
moment the boycott remains in force, those responsible are
punishing Palestinians as well as Israelis.  The boycott is a
relic of the past.  It should be relegated to history--right
now.

There is more to peace than the signing of agreements and the
gathering of resources.  There is a need for a fundamental
change in the hearts of the former antagonists.  The leaders of
the region must exhort those who have used violence as a
political tool to renounce it without reservation or exception.

It is also imperative that quick action be taken to remove other
vestiges of a bygone era.  This means revoking, at the upcoming
session of the UN General Assembly, those UN resolutions that
challenge Israel's very right to exist.  It also means acting to
approve, unanimously this time, Israel's credentials at this
year's UN General Assembly.  And it also means, in the U.S.
Congress, amending statutes that inhibit dealing with the PLO.

I reiterate a simple but profound truth:  Only an Israel that is
strong, confident, and secure can make peace.  Only an Israel
that is certain of its strategic partnership with the United
States can take the necessary risks.

On behalf of President Clinton and the American people, I
restate a long-standing pledge to the Israeli public:  As you
and your leaders continue down the courageous path you have
chosen, you should know that America's commitment to Israel's
security and well-being will remain unshakable.

It is quite revealing that at this time of great hope, when the
entire world is praising last Monday's events, they are being
denounced in places like Tehran, Baghdad, and Tripoli.  In
response to such intemperate words, let me make clear that we
are committed to seeing that the forces of moderation in the
region are stronger than the forces of extremism.

To all who are prepared to work with us in building a new Middle
East of peace, security, and prosperity, I say:  You have a
reliable and committed partner in the United States.  To those
who would sow dissension, intolerance, and violence, I say this:
 The United States, its friends, and its allies will take the
necessary steps to ensure that you fail.

Reflections on America's Role
This remarkable week for peace in the Middle East reminds us of
the necessity for, and the importance of, American leadership in
the world--especially in regions of vital interest to us.

My colleague Tony Lake will speak tomorrow at the Johns Hopkins
School of Advanced International Studies.  He will address the
broad outlines of our foreign policy.  His speech will reflect
broad policy discussions within our Administration, and I
commend it to your attention.

Before concluding today, I want to comment briefly on two issues
that have been the subject of a good deal of public debate.  The
first is whether America should pursue an activist foreign
policy.  The second is whether America should act alone or
together with other nations to protect our vital interests
abroad.

The first issue is really the latest round in a century-old
debate between engagement and isolationism.  I want to assure
you that the United States chooses engagement.  The
alternative--neo-isolationism--can be reduced to a simple
syllogism:  The Cold War is over; we won; let's go home and
attend to our problems.  We must reject isolationism for the
dangerous argument that it is.  We must renew our commitment to
internationalism, which has served us so well for the last 50
years.

The pied pipers of isolationism misread the history of this
century.  They mistake the future of our economy.  They minimize
the threats to our security.  And they misjudge the character of
our people.

The end of the Cold War has not ended history.  Nor has it
severed the links between America and the world.  But it has
left the United States with a continuing responsibility--and a
unique capacity--to provide leadership.

Why, you may ask, should we remain engaged?  First, because it
is strongly in our economic interest to do so.  We live in a
technologically interconnected age.  Vast amounts of information
and vast numbers of dollars can be transmitted around the world
at the speed of light.  In such a world, how will we enhance our
prosperity if we do not work to open up and expand international
markets?  How will we possibly promote the global growth that is
necessary to our prosperity if we do not successfully complete
the Uruguay Round negotiations of the GATT?  And how will we
create high-paying jobs for Americans if we are not willing to
create export opportunities through international agreements
such as NAFTA?

Second, we must remain active and assertive for the sake of our
security.  Were it not for sustained American involvement over
the last four decades, we would not be on the road to peace in
the Middle East.  American engagement is also essential in 
other regions where our vital interests are at stake.  Indeed,
in key regions, the United States is the fulcrum on which peace
and security rest.

If democracy reverts to dictatorship in the former Soviet Union,
Americans are likely to pay a very severe price in a revived
nuclear threat and increased defense budgets.  If ethnic
conflict in Europe widens, if our security is threatened again
in Asia, if terrorism spreads, if the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction is not checked--if any of these things comes
to pass--then our own security and our ability to focus on
domestic renewal will be directly put at risk.

In short, we must remain engaged not out of altruism, not out of
what one scholar has called the "imperial temptation" but
because there are real American interests that will suffer if we
are seduced by the isolationist myth.

The second issue under recent debate is whether America should
exercise its power alone or with others--to use the customary
jargon, unilaterally or multilaterally.  That issue, as framed,
creates a false polarity.  It is not an "either-or" proposition.

The central purpose of our foreign policy is to ensure the
security of our nation and to ensure its economic prosperity as
well--and to promote democratic values.

In protecting those interests, the United States must maintain
its military strength and reinvigorate its economy so that we
can retain the option to act alone when that is best for us. 
Let no one doubt the resolve of the United States to protect its
vital interests.

Yet in protecting our vital interests, we should not ignore the
value of working with other nations.  From the Gulf war to the
international campaign to aid democracy in Russia, we have seen
how collective action can advance American foreign policy
interests.  It can bolster our efforts to stem the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, to knock down barriers to global
trade, and to protect the environment.  We have also seen that
collective action requires--and cannot replace--American
leadership.

No other nation possesses our military might, economic strength,
or moral authority.  These assets give us the ability to act
alone when necessary.  When appropriate, though, we can also
leverage our might by sharing the burden with other nations. 
But we should remember that our ability to generate effective
multilateral responses will often depend upon our willingness to
act alone.

Let me be clear:  Multilateralism is a means, not an end.  It is
one of the many foreign policy tools at our disposal.  And it is
warranted only when it serves the central purpose of American
foreign policy:  to protect American interests.  This 
country will never subcontract its foreign policy to another
power or another person.

While this largely tactical debate on the means of American
engagement has proceeded, President Clinton has been meeting the
key foreign policy tests and challenges:  recognizing that
domestic economic renewal is fundamental to America's foreign
policy interests, mobilizing critical and timely support for
Russian democracy as an essential investment in our national
security, calling for a NATO summit to adapt the alliance to
meet the new security challenges of a vastly changed Europe,
advancing a New Pacific Community while negotiating a new
framework for our economic and trade relations with Japan, and
leading the global effort to curb the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction.

Conclusion
In concluding, I will suggest to you another and different
measure of our leadership--and that is how the world sees us. 
Last week in Washington, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres
paid our country an unusual tribute.  In the history books, he
said:

Nobody will understand the United States, really:  You have so
much force, and you didn't conquer the land of anybody; you have
so much power, and you didn't dominate another people; you have
problems of your own, and you have never turned your back on the
problems of others.

And Shimon Peres then turned and said:  "Thank you so much for
being what you are."

To those who question the need for American engagement, I say,
ask Shimon Peres.

Let these indelible events of the last few years--the handshake
at the White House; the Berlin Wall falling; the Soviet Union
crumbling; Nelson Mandela walking out of prison to build a new
South Africa--let all these point us toward asserting and not
abdicating our international role.

Let that shining moment last week on the White House lawn light
the way for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East--and
illuminate the need for America's continued leadership in the
world.

Thank you very much.  (###)



Recent documents on the Middle East peace process will be
printed in Dispatch Supplement Vol. 4, No. 4.  (###)



ARTICLE 3:

From Containment to Enlargement
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Address at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns
Hopkins University, Washington, DC, September 21, 1993

I have come to speak with you today because I believe our
nation's policies toward the world stand at a historic
crossroads.  For half a century, America's engagement in the
world revolved around containment of a hostile Soviet Union. 
Our efforts helped block Soviet expansionism, topple communist
repression, and secure a great victory for human freedom. 
Clearly, the Soviet Union's collapse enhances our security.  But
it also requires us to think anew because the world is new.

In particular, with the end of the Cold War, there is no longer
a consensus among the American people about why, and even
whether, our nation should remain actively engaged in the world.
 Geography and history always have made Americans wary of
foreign entanglements.  Now, economic anxiety fans that
wariness.  Calls from the left and right to stay at home rather
than engage abroad are reinforced by the rhetoric of
Neo-Know-Nothings.

Those of us who believe in the imperative of our international
engagement must push back.  For that reason, as President
Clinton sought the presidency, he not only pledged a domestic
renaissance but also vowed to engage actively in the world in
order to increase our prosperity, update our security
arrangements, and promote democracy abroad.

Pursuing American Interests Abroad
In the 8 months since he took office, President Clinton has
pursued those goals vigorously.  We have completed a sweeping
review of our military strategy and forces.  We have led a
global effort to support the historic reforms in Russia and the
other new states.  We have helped defend democracy in Haiti and
Guatemala and secured important side agreements that pave the
way for enactment of the North American Free Trade Agreement. 
We have facilitated major advances in the Mideast peace process,
working with our Arab partners while strengthening our bonds
with Israel.  We have pursued steps with our G-7 partners to
stimulate world economic growth.  We have placed our relations
with Japan on a new foundation and set a vision of a New Pacific
Community.  We are putting in place practical policies to
preserve the environment and to limit the spread of weapons of
mass destruction.  We have proceeded with sweeping reductions in
nuclear arms and declared a moratorium on testing as we move
toward a comprehensive test ban.  We have struggled with the
complex tragedy in Bosnia.  And we have worked to complete our
mission of ensuring lasting relief from starvation in Somalia.

But engagement itself is not enough.  We also need to
communicate anew why that engagement is essential.  If we do
not, our government's reactions to foreign events can seem
disconnected; individual setbacks may appear to define the
whole; public support for our engagement likely would wane; and
America could be harmed by a rise in protectionism, unwise cuts
to our military force structure or readiness, a loss of the
resources necessary for our diplomacy--and thus the erosion of
U.S. influence abroad.

Stating our purpose is neither academic nor rhetorical.  What we
do outside our borders has immediate and lasting consequences
for all Americans.  As the President often notes, the line
between foreign and domestic policy has evaporated.  Our choices
about America's foreign policy will help determine: 

--  Whether Americans' real incomes double every 26 years, as
they did in the 1960s, or every 36 years, as they did during the
late 1970s and 1980s;

--  Whether the 25 nations with weapons of mass destruction grow
in number or decline;

--  Whether the next quarter-century will see terrorism, which
injured or killed more than 2,000 Americans during the last
quarter-century, expand or recede as a threat; and

--  Whether the nations of the world will be more able or less
able to address regional disputes, humanitarian needs, and the
threat of environmental degradation.

I do not presume today to define the Administration's entire
foreign policy vision.  But following on Secretary Christopher's
speech yesterday and anticipating the address the President will
make to the United Nations General Assembly on Monday, I want to
suggest some broad principles as a contribution to an essential
national dialogue about our purpose in the world.

America's Core Concepts:  Democracy and Market Economics
Let us begin by taking stock of our new era.  Four facts are
salient.  

First, America's core concepts--democracy and market
economics--are more broadly accepted than ever.  Over the past
10 years, the number of democracies has nearly doubled.  Since
1970, the number of significant command economies dropped from
10 to 3.

This victory of freedom is practical, not ideological:  Billions
of people on every continent are simply concluding, based on
decades of their own hard experience, that democracy and markets
are the most productive and liberating ways to organize their
lives.

Their conclusion resonates with America's core values.  We see
individuals as equally created, with a God-given right to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.  So we trust in the equal
wisdom of free individuals to protect those rights:  through
democracy--as the process for best meeting shared needs in the
face of competing desires--and through markets--as the process
for best meeting private needs in a way that expands
opportunity.  Both processes strengthen each other:  Democracy
alone can produce justice but not the material goods necessary
for individuals to thrive; markets alone can expand wealth but
not that sense of justice without which civilized societies
perish.

Democracy and market economics are ascendant in this new era,
but they are not everywhere triumphant.  There remain vast areas
in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere where democracy
and market economics are at best new arrivals--most likely
unfamiliar, sometimes vilified, often fragile.  But it is wrong
to assume these ideas will be embraced only by the West and
rejected by the rest.  Culture does shape politics and
economics.  But the idea of freedom has universal appeal.  Thus,
we have arrived at neither the end of history nor a clash of
civilizations but a moment of immense democratic and
entrepreneurial opportunity.  We must not waste it.  

The second feature of this era is that we are its dominant
power.  Those who say otherwise sell America short.  The fact
is, we have the world's strong-est military, its largest
economy, and its most dynamic, multi-ethnic society.  We are
setting a global example in our efforts to reinvent our
democratic and market institutions.  Our leadership is sought
and respected in every corner of the world.  As Secretary
Christopher noted yesterday, that is why the parties to last
week's dramatic events chose to shake hands in Washington. 
Around the world, America's power, authority, and example
provide unparalleled opportunities to lead.

Moreover, absent a reversal in Russia, there is now no credible
near-term threat to America's existence.  Serious threats
remain:  terrorism, proliferating weapons of mass destruction,
ethnic conflicts, and the degradation of our global environment.
 Above all, we are threatened by sluggish economic growth, which
undermines the security of our people as well as that of allies
and friends abroad.  Yet none of these threats holds the same
immediate dangers for us as did Nazi conquest or Soviet
expansionism.  America's challenge today is to lead on the basis
of opportunity more than fear.

The third notable aspect of this era is an explosion of ethnic
conflicts.  As Senator Moynihan and others have noted, the end
of the Cold War and the collapse of various repressive regimes
have removed the lid from numerous cauldrons of ethnic,
religious, or factional hatreds.  In many states of the former
Soviet Union and elsewhere, there is a tension between the
desire for ethnic separatism and the creation of liberal 
democracy, which alone can safely accommodate and even celebrate
differences among citizens.  A major challenge to our thinking,
our policies, and our international institutions in this era is
the fact that most conflicts are taking place within rather than
among nations.  These conflicts are typically highly complex; at
the same time, their brutality will tug at our consciences.  We
need a healthy wariness about our ability to shape solutions for
such disputes, yet at times our interests or humanitarian
concerns will impel our unilateral or multilateral engagement.

The fourth feature of this new era is that the pulse of the
planet has accelerated dramatically--and with it the pace of
change in human events.  Computers, faxes, fiber-optic cables,
and satellites all speed the flow of information.  The
measurement of wealth, and increasingly wealth itself, consists
in bytes of data that move at the speed of light.  The
accelerated pace of events is neither bad nor good.  Its sharp
consequences can cut either way.  It means both doctors and
terrorists can more quickly share their technical secrets.  Both
pro-democracy activists and skinhead anarchists can more broadly
spread their views.  Ultimately, the world's acceleration
creates new and diverse ways for us to exert our influence if we
choose to do so--but increases the likelihood that if we do not,
rapid events, instantly reported, may overwhelm us.  As the
President has suggested, we must decide whether to make change
our ally or allow ourselves to become its victims.

From Containment to Enlargement
In such a world, our interests and ideals compel us not only to
be engaged but to lead.  And in a real-time world of change and
information, it is all the more important that our leadership be
steadied around our central purpose.  That purpose can be found
in the underlying rationale for our engagement throughout this
century.  As we fought aggressors and contained communism, our
engagement abroad was animated both by calculations of power and
by this belief:  To the extent democracy and market economics
hold sway in other nations, our own nation will be more secure,
prosperous, and influential, while the broader world will be
more humane and peaceful.

The expansion of market-based economics abroad helps expand our
exports and create American jobs, while it also improves living
conditions and fuels demands for political liberalization
abroad.  The addition of new democracies makes us more secure,
because democracies tend not to wage war on each other or
sponsor terrorism.  They are more trustworthy in diplomacy and
do a better job of respecting the human rights of their people. 
These dynamics lay at the heart of Woodrow Wilson's most
profound insights; although his moralism sometimes weakened his
argument, he understood that our own security is shaped by the
character of foreign regimes.  Indeed, most Presidents who
followed, Republicans and Democrats alike, understood we must
promote democracy and market economics in 
the world--because it protects our interests and security and
because it reflects values that are both American and universal.

Throughout the Cold War, we contained a global threat to market
democracies; now we should seek to enlarge their reach,
particularly in places of special significance to us.  The
successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of
enlargement--enlargement of the world's free community of market
democracies.

During the Cold War, even children understood America's security
mission. As they looked at those maps on their schoolroom walls,
they knew we were trying to contain the creeping expansion of
that big, red blob.  Today, at great risk of oversimplification,
we might visualize our security mission as promoting the
enlargement of the "blue areas" of market democracies.  The
difference, of course, is that we do not seek to expand the
reach of our institutions by force, subversion, or repression.

We must not allow this overarching goal to drive us into
overreaching actions.  To be successful, a strategy of
enlargement must provide distinctions and set priorities.  It
must combine our broad goals of fostering democracy and markets
with our more traditional geo-strategic interests.  And it must
suggest how best to expend our large but, nonetheless, limited
national security resources--financial, diplomatic, and
military.

In recent years, discussions about when to use force have turned
on a set of vital questions, such as whether our forces match
our objectives, whether we can fight and win in a time that is
acceptable, whether we have a reasonable exit if we can not, and
whether there is public and congressional support.  But we have
overlooked a prior, strategic question--the question of
"where"--which sets the context for such military judgments.

I see four components to a strategy of enlargement.

--  First, we should strengthen the community of major market
democracies--including our own--which constitutes the core from
which enlargement is proceeding.

--  Second, we should help foster and consolidate new
democracies and market economies, where possible, especially in
states of special significance and opportunity.

--  Third, we must counter the aggression--and support the
liberalization--of states hostile to democracy and markets.

--  Fourth, we need to pursue our humanitarian agenda not only
by providing aid but also by working to help democracy and
market economics take root in regions of greatest humanitarian
concern.

A host of caveats must accompany a strategy of enlargement.  For
one, we must be patient.  As scholars observe, waves of
democratic advance are often followed by reverse waves of
democratic setback.  We must be ready for uneven progress, even
outright reversals. 

Our strategy must be pragmatic.  Our interests in democracy and
markets do not stand alone.  Other American interests at times
will require us to befriend and even defend non-democratic
states for mutually beneficial reasons.  Our strategy must view
democracy broadly--it must envision a system that includes not
only elections but also such features as an independent
judiciary and protections of human rights.  Our strategy must
also respect diversity.  Democracy and markets can come in many
legitimate variants.  Freedom has many faces.  Let me review
each of the four components of this strategy in greater detail.

Strengthening the Community of Major Market Democracies
It is axiomatic in electoral campaigns that you start by firming
up your political base.  The same is true in international
politics.  Thus, the highest priority in a strategy of
enlargement must be to strengthen the core of major market
democracies, the bonds among them, and their sense of common
interest.

That renewal starts at home.  Our efforts to empower our people,
revive our economy, reduce our deficit, and reinvent our
government have profound implications for our global strength
and the attractiveness of democracy and markets around the
world.  Our domestic revival will also influence how much of
their hard-earned money Americans will commit to our engagement
abroad.

The imperative of strengthening the democratic core also
underscores the importance of renewing the bonds among our key
democratic allies.  Today, our relations with Europe, Canada,
and Japan are basically sound.  But they suffer from an economic
problem and a military problem.

The economic problem is shared sluggish growth and the political
cost it exacts on democratic governments.  For example, over the
past decade, many West European nations have not created a
single net job.  Partly as a result, most of our key allies are
now sitting atop thin treasuries and thin political majorities. 
Economic stagnation and its political consequences undermine the
ability of the major democratic powers to act decisively on our
many common challenges, from the GATT to Bosnia.  Fortunately,
many of our democratic allies are undertaking searching
re-examinations of government processes and domestic policies,
just as we are.  These efforts should proceed boldly--not only
for the sake of justice and prosperity in each of our nations
but also so that our democratic community once again can act
with vigor and resolve.

That is why we are leading the effort to secure a successful 
GATT agreement by year's end.  And it is why enactment of NAFTA
is one of the President's top priorities.  But while these
specific agreements are of enormous importance, this need for
economic renewal goes even further.  We are in the early stages
of as great a change in the global economy as we faced at the
end of World War II.  And with hard times in all our nations, we
face the possibility of creating vicious rather than virtuous
circles of international economic action.  

Unless the major market democracies act together--updating
international economic institutions, coordinating macro-economic
policies, and striking hard but fair bargains on the ground
rules of open trade--the fierce competition of the new global
economy, coupled with the end of our common purpose from the
Cold War, could drive us into prolonged stagnation or even
economic disaster.

The military problem involves NATO.  For half a century, NATO
has proved itself the most effective military alliance in human
history.  If NATO is to remain an anchor for European and
Atlantic stability, as the President believes it must, its
members must commit themselves to updating NATO's role in this
new era.  Unless NATO is willing over time to assume a broader
role, then it will lose public support, and all our nations will
lose a vital bond of trans-Atlantic and European security.  That
is why, at the NATO summit that the President has called for
this January, we will seek to update NATO--so that there
continues, behind the enlargement of market democracies, an
essential collective security. 

Fostering New Democracies And Market Economies
Beyond seeing to our base, the second imperative for our
strategy must be to help democracy and markets expand and
survive in other places where we have the strongest security
concerns and where we can make the greatest difference.  This is
not a democratic crusade; it is a pragmatic commitment to see
freedom take hold where that will help us most.  Thus, we must
target our efforts to assist states that affect our strategic
interests, such as those with large economies, critical
locations, nuclear weapons, or the potential to generate refugee
flows into our own nation or into key friends and allies.  We
must focus our efforts where we have the most leverage.  And our
efforts must be demand-driven--they must focus on nations whose
people are pushing for reform or have already secured it.

The most important example is the former Soviet Union--and it
fits the criteria I just noted.  If we can support and help
consolidate democratic and market reforms in Russia and the
other new independent states, we can help turn a former threat
into a region of valued diplomatic and economic partners.  

In addition, our efforts in Russia, Ukraine, and the other
states raise the likelihood of continued reductions in nuclear
arms and compliance with international non-proliferation 
accords.  The new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe are
another clear example, given their proximity to the great
democratic powers of Western Europe.  And since our ties across
the Pacific are no less important than those across the
Atlantic, pursuing enlargement in the Asian Pacific is a third
example.  In July, the President underscored that point in Japan
and Korea with his descriptions of a New Pacific Community.

Continuing the great strides toward democracy and markets in our
emerging Western Hemispheric community of democracies also must
be a key concern.  And we should be on the lookout for states
whose entry into the camp of market democracies may influence
the future direction of an entire region; South Africa and
Nigeria now hold that potential with regard to Sub-Saharan
Africa.

How should the United States help consolidate and enlarge
democracy and markets in these states?  The answers are as
varied as the nations involved, but there are common elements.
We must continue to help lead the effort to mobilize
international resources, as we have with Russia and the other
new states.  We must be willing to take immediate public
positions to help staunch democratic reversals, as we have in
Haiti, Guatemala, and Nigeria.  We must give democratic nations
the fullest benefits of integration into foreign markets, which
is part of why NAFTA and the GATT rank so high on our security
agenda.  We must link wider access to technology markets with
commitments to abide by non-proliferation norms.  And we must
help these nations strengthen the pillars of civil society,
improve their market institutions, and fight corruption and
political discontent through practices of good governance.

In all these efforts, a policy of enlargement should take on a
second meaning; we should pursue our goals through an enlarged
circle not only of government officials but also of private and
non-governmental groups.  Private firms are natural allies in
our efforts to strengthen market economies.  Similarly, our goal
of strengthening democracy and civil society has a natural ally
in labor unions, human rights groups, environmental advocates,
chambers of commerce, and election monitors.  Just as we rely on
force multipliers in defense, we should welcome these "diplomacy
multipliers," such as the National Endowment for Democracy.

The "Backlash" States
The third element of our strategy of enlargement should be to
minimize the ability of states outside the circle of democracy
and markets to threaten it.  Democracy and market economics have
always been subversive ideas to those who rule without consent. 
These ideas remain subversive today.  Every dictator, theocrat,
kleptocrat, or central planner in an unelected regime has reason
to fear their subjects will suddenly demand the freedom to make
their own decisions.

We should expect the advance of democracy and markets to trigger
forceful reactions from those whose power is not popularly
derived.  The rise of Burma's democracy movement led to the
jailing of its most vocal proponent, Aung San Suu Kyi.  Russia's
reforms have aroused the resistance of the nomenklatura.

Centralized power defends itself.  It not only wields tools of
state power such as military force, political imprisonment, and
torture but also exploits the intolerant energies of racism,
ethnic prejudice, religious persecution, xenophobia, and
irredentism.  Those whose power is threatened by the spread of
democracy and markets will always have a personal stake in
resisting those practices with passionate intensity.

When such leaders sit atop regional powers, such as Iran and
Iraq, they may engage in violence and lawlessness that threaten
the United States and other democracies.  Such reactionary,
"backlash" states are more likely to sponsor terrorism and
traffic in weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile
technologies.  They are more likely to suppress their own
people, foment ethnic rivalries, and threaten their neighbors.

In this world of multiplying democracies, expanding markets, and
accelerating commerce, the rulers of backlash states face an
unpleasant choice.  They can seek to isolate their people from
these liberating forces.  If they do, however, they cut
themselves off from the very forces that create wealth and
social dynamism.  Such states tend to rot from within, both
economically and spiritually.  But as they grow weaker, they
also may become more desperate and dangerous.

Our policy toward such states, so long as they act as they do,
must seek to isolate them diplomatically, militarily,
economically, and technologically.  It must stress intelligence,
counter-terrorism, and multilateral export controls.  It also
must apply global norms regarding weapons of mass destruction
and ensure their enforcement.  While some of these efforts will
be unilateral, international rules are necessary and may be
particularly effective in enforcing sanctions, transparency, and
export controls, as the work of the IAEA in Iraq demonstrates.

When the actions of such states directly threaten our people,
our forces, or our vital interests, we clearly must be prepared
to strike back decisively and unilaterally, as we did when Iraq
tried to assassinate former President Bush.  We must always
maintain the military power necessary to deter or, if necessary,
defeat aggression by these regimes.  Because the sources of such
threats will be diverse and unpredictable, we must seek to
ensure that our forces are increasingly ready, mobile, flexible,
and smart, as the President and Secretary Aspin have stressed.

Let me take a moment to illustrate what America's armed forces
are doing right now as we meet.  In South Korea, some 37,000
U.S. troops are on guard against aggression from the North.  In
the Persian Gulf, the Abraham Lincoln carrier battle group and
other forces remain stationed as a follow-up to Operation Desert
Storm.  And as we move toward new Middle East peace agreements,
some 1,000 U.S. soldiers continue to help keep the peace in the
Sinai Peninsula.  Such forces cost money.  Some people may
regret that our bottom-up review did not suggest a substantially
smaller or cheaper force.  But the fact is that these forces,
the world's very best, are part of the necessary price of
security and leadership in the world.

While some backlash states may seek to wall themselves off from
outside influence, other anti-democratic states will opt to
pursue greater wealth by liberalizing their economic rules.
Sooner or later, however, these states confront the need to
liberalize the flow of information into and within their nation
and to tolerate the rise of an entrepreneurial middle class. 
Both developments weaken despotic rule and lead, over time, to
rising demands for democracy.  Chile's experience under General
Pinochet proves market economies can thrive for a time without
democracy.  But both our instinct and recent history in Chile,
South Korea, and elsewhere tell us they cannot do so forever.

We cannot impose democracy on regimes that appear to be opting
for liberalization, but we may be able to help steer some of
them down that path while providing penalties that raise the
costs of repression and aggressive behavior.  These efforts have
special meaning for our relations with China.  That relationship
is one of the most important in the world, for China will
increasingly be a major world power; and, along with our ties to
Japan and Korea, our relationship with China will strongly shape
both our security and economic interests in Asia.  It is in the
interest of both our nations for China to continue its economic
liberalization while respecting the human rights of its people
and international norms regarding weapons sales.  That is why we
conditionally extended China's trading advantages, sanctioned
its missile exports, and proposed creation of a new Radio Free
Asia.  We seek a stronger relationship with China that reflects
both our values and our interests.

Our policies toward the Islamic world provide another example. 
Let me emphasize this point:  Our nation respects the many
contributions Islam has made to the world over the past 1,300
years, and we appreciate the close bonds of values and history
between Islam and the Judeo-Christian beliefs of most Americans.
 We will extend every expression of friendship to those of the
Islamic faith who abide in peace and tolerance.  But we will
provide every resistance to militants who distort Islamic
doctrines and seek to expand their influence by force.

The Humanitarian Agenda
The fourth part of a strategy of enlargement involves our 
humanitarian goals, which play an important supporting role in
our efforts to expand democracy and markets.  Our humanitarian
actions nurture the American public's support for our engagement
abroad.  Our humanitarian efforts also can stimulate democratic
and market development in many areas of the world.  Ultimately,
the world trusts our leadership in that broader effort in part
because it witnesses our humanitarian deeds.  It knows that our
responses to hunger and suffering, from Bangladesh to Somalia to
Chernobyl, are an expression of who we are as a nation.  Our
humanitarian efforts must continue to include a broad array of
programs--economic and military assistance, disaster relief, and
projects to assist education, nutrition, and health.  Over the
coming months, we plan to work with Congress to reform this
array of aid programs--to focus them more strategically and
efficiently on the promotion of democracy and markets,
environmentally sustainable development, and early responses to
social and economic chaos.

We face great challenges to our humanitarian instincts in this
era and far fewer barriers to action than there were during the
period of superpower competition.  Public pressure for our
humanitarian engagement increasingly may be driven by televised
images, which can depend, in turn, on such considerations as
where CNN sends its camera crews.  But we must bring other
considerations to bear as well:  cost, feasibility, the
permanence of the improvement our assistance will bring, the
willingness of regional and international bodies to do their
part, and the likelihood that our actions will generate broader
security benefits for the people and the region in question.

While there will be increasing calls on us to help stem
bloodshed and suffering in ethnic conflicts and while we will
always bring our diplomacy to bear, these criteria suggest there
will be relatively few intra-national ethnic conflicts that
justify our military intervention.  Ultimately, on these and
other humanitarian needs, we will have to pick and choose.

Where we can make a difference, as in Somalia and Northern Iraq,
we should not oppose using our military forces for humanitarian
purposes simply because these missions do not resemble major
wars for control of territory.  Such missions will never be
without risk, but, as in all other aspects of our security
policy, our military leadership is willing to accept reasonable
risks in the service of our national objectives.

Ultimately, it is through our support for democracy and
sustainable development that we best enhance the dramatic new
winds of change that are stirring much of the developing world.
In Africa, for example, we recently have seen the birth of
democracy in Namibia and multiparty elections in over a dozen
African countries.  These developments, combined with new
efforts at regional conflict resolution and a shift away from
planned economies, provide real hope that Sub-Saharan Africa
can, at long last, begin to realize its vast potential.  One key
to that progress will be South Africa, which has now begun 
its historic countdown toward a full non-racial democracy.  Just
as our strategy of enlargement focuses on key points of
leverage, so our strategy toward Africa must focus on providing
international leadership to help South Africa's transition
succeed.

Current Foreign Policy Debates In Perspective
What does a strategy of enlargement tell us about the major
foreign policy debates we hear today?  Above all, it suggests
many of those debates are overdrawn.  The headlines are
dominated by Bosnia, Somalia, and "multilateralism."  A strategy
of enlargement suggests our principal concerns should be
strengthening our democratic core in North America, Europe, and
Japan; consolidating and enlarging democracy and markets in key
places; and addressing backlash states such as Iran and Iraq. 
Our efforts in Somalia and Bosnia are important expressions of
our overall engagement, but they do not by themselves define our
broader strategy in the world.

The conflict in Bosnia deserves American engagement:  It is a
vast humanitarian tragedy; it is driven by ethnic barbarism; it
stemmed from aggression against an independent state; it lies
alongside the established and emerging market democracies of
Europe; and it can all too easily explode into a wider Balkan
conflict.

That is why this Administration supported lifting the arms
embargo against Bosnia, led a successful effort to enforce the
no-fly zone, initiated a large-scale humanitarian airlift, and
pushed NATO's pledge of air strikes to stop the strangulation of
Sarajevo and other Bosnian cities.  It is why we remain
committed to helping implement an acceptable and enforceable
peace accord and, through that commitment, encourage its
achievement.  But while we have clear reasons to engage and
persist, they do not obliterate other American interests
involving Europe and Russia, and they do not justify the extreme
costs of taking unilateral responsibility for imposing a
solution.

In Somalia, President Bush engaged our forces to help end a
murderous famine.  He correctly concluded that we could create a
secure military environment for humanitarian relief at a
reasonable cost and risk.  As a result, our nation helped save
hundreds of thousands of lives and restored order throughout
most of Somalia.  As we have approached our goals, we have
reduced our military presence by 80% and transferred lead
responsibility for peace-keeping and reconstruction to the UN. 
The withdrawal of our remaining combat troops is only a matter
of time, but it must not come in a way that undermines all the
gains made in the areas beyond Mogadishu and that leads, almost
inexorably, to the chaos which caused the human tragedy in the
first place.

Unfortunately, debates over both Bosnia and Somalia have been
cast as doctrinal matters involving the role of 
multilateralism.  This focus is misplaced.  Certainly, in each
case--as in Cambodia and elsewhere--our actions are making
multilateral case law for the future.  But we should not let the
particular define the doctrinal.  So let me say a word about the
current doctrinal debate on multilateralism--a subject
Ambassador Albright will address more fully on Thursday.

I believe strongly that our foreign policies must marry
principle and pragmatism.  We should be principled about our
purposes but pragmatic about our means.

Today, some suggest that multilateralism should be our
presumptive mode of engagement.  Others suggest that it is
inherently flawed--dragging us into minor conflicts where we
have no interest and blocking us from acting decisively where we
do have an interest.

This debate is important but dangerous in the rigidity of the
doctrines that are asserted.  Few who bemoan multilateralism
today object to NATO, the IMF, or the GATT.  And it is beyond
debate that multilateral action has certain advantages:  It can
spread the costs of action, as in our efforts to support Russian
reform; it can foster global support, as with our coalition in
the Gulf war; it can ensure comprehensiveness, as in our export
control regimes; and it can succeed where no nation acting alone
could have done so, as in Cambodia.  I would go further and
state my personal hope that the habits of multilateralism may
one day enable the rule of law to play a far more civilizing
role in the conduct of nations, as envisioned by the founders of
the United Nations.

But for any official with responsibilities for our security
policies, only one overriding factor can determine whether the
U.S. should act multilaterally or unilaterally, and that is
America's interests.  We should act multilaterally where doing
so advances our interests, and we should act unilaterally when
that will serve our purpose.  The simple question in each
instance is this:  What works best?

The Case for Engagement
I believe there is a more fundamental foreign policy challenge
brewing for the United States.  It is a challenge over whether
we will be significantly engaged abroad at all.  As I suggested
at the outset, in many ways, we are returning to the divisions
and debates about our role in the world that are as old as our
Republic.  On one side is protectionism and limited foreign
engagement; on the other is active American engagement abroad on
behalf of democracy and expanded trade.

The last time our nation saw that classic division was just
after World War II.  It pitted those Democrats and Republicans
whose creativity produced the architectures of postwar
prosperity and security against those in both parties who would
have had us retreat within the isolated shell we occupied in the
1920s and 1930s.  The internationalists won those debates, 
in part, because they could point to a unitary threat to
America's interests and because the nation was entering a period
of economic security.

Today's supporters of engagement abroad have neither of those
advantages.  The threats and opportunities are diffuse, and our
people are deeply anxious about their economic fate. Rallying
Americans to bear the costs and burdens of international
engagement is no less important.  But it is much more difficult.

For this reason, those who recognize the value of our leadership
in the world should devote far more energy to making the case
for sustained engagement abroad and less energy to debates over
tactics.  To be sure, there will be disagreements over tactics: 
We expect to be held accountable for our policy decisions, and
our critics can expect us to respond where we disagree.  But all
of us who support engagement should be careful to debate tactics
in a way that does not prevent us from coming together in common
cause around the fundamental importance of that goal.

All of us have come out of the Cold War years having learned
distinct lessons about what not to do--don't go to war without a
way to win; don't underestimate the role of ideas; don't
minimize the power of nationalism.  Yet we have come into the
new era with relatively few ways to convince a skeptical public
that engagement abroad is a worthwhile investment.  That is why
a national dialogue over our fundamental purposes is so
important.

In a world of extraordinary complexity, it would be too easy for
us in the internationalist camp to become "neo-Marxists"--not
after Karl, but after Groucho, who once sang, "Whatever it is,
I'm against it."  It is time for those who see the value of
American engagement to steady our ranks, to define our purpose,
and to rally the American people.  In particular, at a time of
high deficits and pressing domestic needs, we need to make a
convincing case for our engagement or else see drastic
reductions in our military, intelligence, peace-keeping, and
other foreign policy accounts.

In his farewell address in January 1953, Harry Truman predicted
the collapse of communism.  "I have a deep and abiding faith in
the destiny of free men," he said.  "With patience and courage,
we shall some day move on into a new era."

Now that era is upon us.  It is a moment of unparalleled
opportunity.  We have the blessing of living in the world's most
powerful and respected nation at a time when the world is
embracing our ideals as never before.  We can let this moment
slip away.  Or we can mobilize our nation in order to enlarge
democracy, enlarge markets, and enlarge our future.  I am
confident that we will choose the road best traveled.  (###)



ARTICLE 4:

Use of Force in a Post-Cold War World
Madeleine K. Albright
Address at the National War College, National Defense
University, Fort McNair, Washington, DC, September 23, 1993

To me, this auditorium--this military institution--is the right
place to discuss the Clinton Administration's foreign policy
goals and address that most crucial of topics:  the use of
military force in the post-Cold War world.  I believe that our
national dialogue must ensure that this nation's foreign policy
is clearly understood by those who might be asked to risk their
lives in its behalf.  And policy-makers must not only explain
but listen--take the time to hear the concerns and answer the
questions of our military personnel.

For almost half a century, whenever we talked foreign policy, we
did so within a Cold War context.  A whole new vocabulary was
established of containment and deterrence, throw weights and
missile gaps, subversion and domino theories.  And U.S. military
action was almost always related--directly or indirectly--to the
Soviet threat.  The world was a chessboard, and the two
superpowers moved the pieces.

But then our chess rival left the table.  The game has changed
and the rules to the new one are still being written.  Most of
us do not for a minute mourn the Cold War era.  But now there
are those from all parts of the political spectrum for whom the
new world is more confusing than gratifying.  They can conceive
of no threats to America that are not Cold War threats.  They
look at that empty chair on the other side of the chess table
and counsel us to sit back, put our feet up, and lose interest
in the outside world.

Obviously, America is safer and more secure than it was.  Anyone
who feels nostalgia for the Cold War ought to have his or her
head examined.  But anyone who concludes that foreign
adversaries, conflicts, and disasters do not affect us misreads
the past, misunderstands the present, and will miss the boat in
the future.

Indeed, President Clinton has talked often about the similarity
between this historical moment and the early days of the Truman
Administration immediately following World War II.  Then, as
now, a new President saw a dramatically altered world, sought to
redefine America's interests in that new world, and acted to
protect those interests from a rising tide of isolationist
thinking.  And then, as now, the President's decisions were
based on an analysis of new threats, a recognition of our
enduring interests, and the imperative of engagement.  So what
are these new threats, and what should be America's response?

The Cold War is gone, but weapons of mass destruction are not. 
The possible aggressive use of such weapons remains perhaps the 
greatest threat to international peace and our security. 
Revelations about Iraq's weapons programs should have shocked
even the most complacent among us.  Besides Iraq, serious
proliferation threats exist from states that fear the future,
like North Korea; states that have fallen prey to the extremes
of intolerance, such as Iran; and states that are engulfed by
regional tension, such as in South Asia.

Beyond the destructive weapons, there are the destructive
hatreds.  Less than 2 months ago, the FBI apprehended a group
with apparent foreign connections planning to blow up the
building in which I work.  The recent Middle East agreement is
sure to enrage further those whose insecurities and extremism
have made them blind to the promise of peace and open to the use
of terror.  The terrorist threat is aggravated by advances in
technology and by the availability of weapons of every
description.  I know we remain vulnerable to terrorism, and I
know it can affect our most vital of interests--our fathers,
mothers, spouses, daughters, and sons.

We also face increasing ethnic and subnational violence. 
Wherever we turn, someone is fighting or threatening to fight
someone else.  These disputes may be far removed from our
borders, but in today's global village, chaos is an infectious
disease.  Although violence in a failed state such as Somalia
may seem trivial to some, when combined with unrest in Sudan,
Rwanda, Liberia, Bosnia, Georgia, and so on, our attention and
our interests--whether political or humanitarian--cannot help
but be engaged.

When a democratic government was ousted in Haiti, drug
trafficking skyrocketed, repression increased, and the risk of a
massive new influx of refugees to America grew.  In Somalia, we
have indications that a tactical alliance may be forming between
Aideed's faction, terrorists based in Sudan, and the Government
of Iran.  The current violence in Azerbaijan threatens to bring
Turkey, Iran, and Russia into conflict in ways that could well
threaten our interests directly.  And the possibility remains
that the war in former Yugoslavia will spread to neighboring
regions and nations, swelling further the flow of refugees,
straining the economic vigor of Europe, and threatening the
security of key European allies.

There is also a moral dimension to these conflicts, dramatized
most hauntingly by the brave people of Sarajevo and Mostar but
embodied, as well, by the millions of others who suffer the
depredations of violence off camera, out of sight, every day.

Obviously, neither we nor anyone else can right every wrong, nor
would it make sense for us to try.  But let us never become so
preoccupied with day-to-day concerns that we lose sight of our
own most basic interest, which is the preservation not simply of
American leadership but of American purpose.

Ten days ago, in Washington, I attended a lunch to celebrate 
the signing of an agreement between Israel and the PLO--a day I
will remember all my life.  I will remember, in particular, a
comment by Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres about America's
purpose.  When the history books are written, he said:

Nobody will understand the United States, really:  You have so
much force, and you didn't conquer the land of anybody; you have
so much power, and you didn't dominate another people; you have
problems of your own, and you have never turned your back on the
problems of others.

We should be proud that so much of the world sees America the
way Foreign Minister Peres sees America, for our leadership
today rests on the same solid foundation of principles and
values--the same enlightened self-interest--that has made
service to America from Valley Forge to Desert Storm a badge not
only of courage but of honor.

As Secretary Christopher and National Security Adviser Tony Lake
have said this week, American foreign policy has four
overarching goals:  first, to strengthen the bonds among those
countries that make up the growing community of major market
democracies; second, to help emerging democracies get on their
feet; third, to reform or isolate the rogue states that act to
undermine the stability and prosperity of the larger community;
and, fourth, to contain the chaos and ease the suffering in
regions of greatest humanitarian concern.  Taken together, our
strategy looks to the enlargement of democracy and markets
abroad.

To achieve these goals, some say we must make rigid choices
between unilateral and multilateral, global and regional, force
and diplomacy.  But that is not true.  We have the flexibility
in this new era to steer a reasoned course between the counsel
of those who would have us intervene everywhere and of those who
see no American purpose anywhere.  We have a full range of
foreign policy tools with which to work, and we will choose
those that will be most effective in each case.

As America's permanent representative to the United Nations, I
have made it clear that we remain committed to the cause of
peace and to the principle of resolving conflicts without
violence whenever that is possible.  The end of the Cold War has
provided us with new and important opportunities in this regard.
 Cooperation, not confrontation, is now the norm at the UN
Security Council.

As a result of our assertive diplomacy, we have been able to
muster global support for sanctions against Libya for shielding
the alleged saboteurs of Pan Am 103, against Iraq for its
continued failure to meet its obligations following the Persian
Gulf war, and against Haiti prior to the agreement reached
recently to restore democratic rule.  The use of sanctions has
also arisen in the case of Angola, where our goal is to
encourage an armed opposition group to abide by the results of 
a free election, and, of course, in Serbia, where they have
drastically weakened the economy of an aggressor state.

Diplomacy will always be America's first choice, and the
possibilities for diplomatic achievements today are ample.  But
history teaches us that there will always be times when words
are not enough, when sanctions are not enough, when diplomacy is
not enough.

The foremost mission of our government--its constitutional
duty--is to protect our nation's territory, people, and way of
life.  We cannot fulfill that mission unless we have both the
capacity to use force effectively and the will to do so when
necessary.  When neither our ability to fight nor our resolve to
fight are in doubt, we can be most certain not only of defeating
those who threaten us but of deterring those who are tempted to
take such action.

Under the leadership of Secretary Aspin, I am confident that we
will maintain military forces that are modern, versatile, ready,
and strong.  It is Department of Defense policy to maintain a
military capable enough, in concert with local allies, to fight
and win two major regional wars.  The existence of such a
force--and the credible threat to use it--is the surest way to
prevent our interests from being threatened in the first place.

For years, a debate has raged about whether it is necessary to
spell out a set of specific circumstances--a
checklist--describing when America will or will not contemplate
the use of military force.  This Administration has wisely
avoided the temptation to devise a precise list of the
circumstances under which military force might be used or of
repeating the State Department's mistake concerning Korea 43
years ago when it defined too narrowly the scope of America's
interests and concerns.  Too much precision in public, however
well-intentioned, can impinge on the flexibility of the
commander in chief or generate dangerous miscalculations abroad.
 But let no one doubt that this President is willing to use
force--unilaterally when necessary.

Last June, the President ordered a strike against Saddam
Hussein's military intelligence headquarters in response to
Iraq's plot to kill former President Bush.  We didn't seek
anyone's permission to carry out that raid.  We didn't ask
anyone's help.  We did it using our own forces exercising our
own right of self-defense.  The President said in his inaugural
speech that America would act militarily with others when
possible but "alone when we must."  That commitment was true
then; it is true today.

In the future, if America's vital economic interests are at
risk--as they were in the Gulf, or if the lives of American
citizens are in danger--as they were in Panama, or if terrorists
need to be tracked down--as when President Reagan 
ordered the use of force to apprehend the hijackers of the
Achille Lauro, President Clinton will not hesitate to act as a
commander in chief must act to protect America and Americans.

The President's inaugural statement also indicated that we
support the use of force on a multilateral basis when it is in
our interests to do so.  As Secretary Christopher put it, we see
"multilateralism as a means, not an end."  No one understands
the potential advantages of multilateralism better than the
United States.  That's why we proposed NATO and helped create
the United Nations.  The underlying thesis of the post-World War
II strategy of containment, the legacy of such leaders as
President Truman, General Marshall, and General Eisenhower, was
that American strength is made even greater when cemented by
strong alliances and joint endeavors with other nations in
pursuit of common objectives.

The history of the Persian Gulf over the past 3 years is a
classic modern example of this.  I know that some of you here
today helped to plan and execute operations during that war,
including perhaps the most decisive air operation in history,
along with the complex passage to the front lines of large
combat units from different countries with different languages. 
I salute you for your skill and professionalism in this most
effective coalition campaign.  In the Gulf, American leadership
benefited greatly from the support of other states before,
during, and after the war.  UN sanctions strengthened our cause
politically, allied support spread the burden militarily, and
contributions from Arab states, Germany, and Japan reduced the
costs of the war and its aftermath financially.

The end of the Cold War has opened up another avenue for
multilateral cooperation that had long been limited by the
U.S.-Soviet rivalry--and that is UN peace-keeping.  In recent
years, there has been a dramatic increase in requests for UN
assistance in resolving ethnic and other conflicts.  The
statistics by now are familiar:  more peace-keeping operations
in the past 5 years than in the previous 43; a sevenfold
increase in troops; a tenfold increase in budget; and a dramatic
but immeasurable increase in danger and complexity.

At their best, UN peace-keeping operations can be very
effective.  Obviously, they cannot be a substitute for fighting
or winning our own wars, nor should we allow the existence of a
collective peace-keeping capability to lessen our own military
strength.  But UN efforts have the potential to act as a "force
multiplier" in promoting the interests in peace and stability
that we share with other nations.

As I said earlier, territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts,
civil wars, and the total collapse of governmental authority in
some states are now among the principal threats to world peace. 
The UN is playing a constructive role in many such situations by
mediating disputes, obtaining cease-fires, 
and, in some cases, achieving comprehensive peace agreements. 
This often requires the presence of UN peace-keepers or
observers either to help arrange a peace or to help keep it.

Past UN peace missions have achieved important goals in places
as diverse as the Middle East, Namibia, El Salvador, and
Cambodia.  To the extent that future peace-keeping missions
succeed, they will lift from the shoulders of American
servicemen and servicewomen and the taxpayers a great share of
the burden of collective security operations around the globe.

Particularly when circumstances arise where there is a threat to
international peace that affects us but does not immediately
threaten our citizens or territory, it will be in our interests
to proceed in partnership with the UN or other appropriate
groupings to respond to the threat involved and, hopefully,
eliminate it.  In such cases, we will benefit not only from the
burden-sharing aspects but from the ability to invoke the voice
of the community of nations in behalf of a cause that we
support.

At the same time, as America's representative to the UN, I know
that UN capabilities have not kept pace with its
responsibilities--and I have discussed this problem on many
prior occasions.  Those who support the goals of the UN do it no
favors if they fail to speak out when its reach begins
repeatedly to exceed its grasp.  The UN emerged from 40 years of
Cold War rivalry overweight and out of shape.  Today, UN
peace-keepers need reformed budget procedures, more dependable
sources of military and civilian personnel, better training,
better intelligence, better command and control, better
equipment, and more money.  These limitations are not inherent;
they are correctable, and the Administration is doing its part
to see that they are corrected.

We believe, for example, that the UN decision-making process on
peace-keeping must be overhauled.  When deciding whether or not
to support a UN peace-keeping or peace-making resolution, we are
insisting that certain fundamental questions be asked before,
not after, new obligations are undertaken.  These questions
include the following:

--  Is there a real threat to international peace and
security--whether caused by international aggression; or by
humanitarian disaster accompanied by violence; or by the sudden,
unexpected, and violent interruption of an established
democracy?

--  Does the proposed peace-keeping mission have clear
objectives, and can its scope be clearly defined?

--  Is a cease-fire in place, and have the parties to the
conflict agreed to a UN presence?

--  Are the financial and human resources that will be needed to
accomplish the mission available to be used for that purpose?

--  Can an end point to UN participation be identified?

These questions illustrate the kind of consistent
criteria--which do not now exist--that we are proposing that the
UN take into account when contemplating new peace-keeping
operations.  And we are preparing guidelines for American
participation that will promise greatest assistance in
specialized areas such as logistics, training, intelligence,
communications, and public affairs.

And although the Administration has not yet fully completed its
review of our policy toward UN peace-keeping, I can assure you
of one thing:  This Administration believes that whether an
operation is multilateral or unilateral, whether the troops are
U.S. or foreign, young men and women should not be sent in
harm's way without a clear mission, competent commanders,
sensible rules of engagement, and the means required to get the
job done.  The credibility of UN peace operations should hinge
not on how many missions there are but on the quality of
planning, the degree of professionalism demonstrated, and the
extent to which mission objectives are achieved.

America under President Clinton will be a strong supporter of
the UN.  We take seriously President Truman's pledge to the
first UN General Assembly that America will work to help the UN
"not as a temporary expedient but as a permanent partnership."

At the same time, we understand that there are limits to what
that partnership can achieve for the United States.  Adlai
Stevenson used to refer to the UN as the "meeting house of the
family of man," which it is, but it is a very large family.  It
is the ultimate committee.  It reflects the broadest possible
diversity of viewpoints.  As Americans, we command enormous
influence there because of our power and the power of our
ideals.  But we cannot rely on the UN as a substitute guarantor
for the vital interests of the United States.  The Berlin Wall
would be upright today if we had relied on the UN to contain
communism.  That ceremony on the front lawn of the White House 2
weeks ago would never have taken place if America had
subcontracted to others the job of helping Israel to survive.

Sending American military forces into dangerous situations is
the most difficult decision any President can make.  History
teaches us that public support for such decisions is essential
and that in each such circumstance Americans are entitled to the
facts.

The Administration has welcomed and takes very seriously the
Senate's recent request to review our policy in Somalia.  We
have also begun, and will continue, a regular series of close
consultations with the Congress and a dialogue with the public
on our policy toward Bosnia.

I have spoken at length in public speeches and congressional
testimony about both issues, and both are about to enter a new 
phase.  Bosnia may be witness to a negotiated peace that will
present the international community with its most daunting
peace-keeping task ever.  Yesterday, the Security Council
approved a resolution setting out clearly that the UN's
principal goal in Somalia is to bring about the political
reconciliation of that long-suffering country, in part through
the establishment of basic civic institutions, such as a
functioning judiciary and police.  In the weeks ahead, we will
continue our consultations on Somalia, Bosnia, and the full
range of national security and peace-keeping issues.

Now, let me summarize my message here today.  The world has
changed, and the Cold War national security framework is now
obsolete.  The Clinton Administration is fashioning a new
framework that is more diverse and flexible than the old--a
framework that will advance American interests, promote American
values, and preserve American leadership.  We will choose the
means to implement this framework on a case-by-case basis,
relying on diplomacy whenever possible, on force when absolutely
necessary.  If American servicemen and servicewomen are sent
into combat, they will go with the training, the equipment, the
support, and the leadership they need to get the job done.

Recognizing that global solutions are required to global
problems, the tools that America will use to carry out its
foreign policy will be both unilateral and multilateral.  Other
nations and institutions can and should be asked to bear a
substantial part of the burden of advancing common interests. 
We have strong reason to help build a United Nations that is
increasingly able and effective.  But America will never entrust
its destiny to other than American hands.

Finally, in keeping with a bipartisan tradition that stretches
back a half-century, America will remain engaged in the world. 
It was 50 years ago this month that the Republican congressional
leadership, mindful of what America's periodic tendency toward
isolationism had done to the League of Nations, first went on
record in support of an international organization "to prevent
military aggression and attain permanent peace."  Senator Arthur
Vandenberg sponsored that resolution, in his words:

To end the miserable notion . . . that the Republican Party will
return to its foxhole when the last shot in this war has been
fired and will blindly let the world rot in its own anarchy.

Under the Clinton Administration, our nation will not retreat
into a post-Cold War foxhole.  Under the President's leadership,
we will be called upon to work together, Republican and
Democrat, civilian and military, public official and private
citizen, to protect America and build a better world. (###)

END OF DISPATCH, VOL 4, NO 39

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