US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 4, NUMBER 34, AUGUST 23, 1993
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1.  NAFTA Supplemental Agreements -- Secretary Christopher, USTR Fact 
Sheets, Parties' Summaries
2.  Declaration on Libyan Terrorism
3.  Nigeria:  Which Way Forward? -- George E. Moose
4.  Sudan Is Placed on U.S. Terrorism List

ARTICLE 1:

NAFTA Supplemental Agreements
Secretary Christopher, USTR Fact Sheets, Parties' Summaries

Secretary Christopher
Statement released by the Office of the Spokesman, Washington, DC, 
August 13, 1993.

I am very pleased that the United States, Canada, and Mexico have 
completed negotiations on supplemental agreements to the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and that President Clinton's objectives on 
entering into these negotiations have been accomplished.

NAFTA, with supplemental agreements on the environment and worker 
standards, is a historic step forward in expanding trade, promoting 
growth, and strengthening democracy.  NAFTA provides the framework for 
cooperation between the three countries on a wide range of issues 
important to our prosperity, our health, and our security.  Passage of 
NAFTA will bring together 370 million people to create the world's 
largest free trade area and will usher in a new era of cooperation 
between the United States and our neighbors across a broad range of 
issues.

Here at home, NAFTA will bolster President Clinton's efforts to increase 
exports; create high-wage, high-skill jobs for Americans; and strengthen 
our economy.  In providing for economic strength at home, we ensure our 
strength abroad.

Passage of NAFTA will be good economic policy and good foreign policy.  
It will promote prosperity and democracy throughout the Western 
Hemisphere.  I look forward to working with Congress as it considers 
this important agreement.


NAFTA Supplemental:  Agreement on Labor Cooperation
Fact sheet released by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 
Washington, DC, August 13, 1993.

Historic Undertaking.  This is the first labor agreement negotiated 
specifically to accompany and build on a trade agreement.  NAFTA will 
create the largest market in the world, grow jobs in America, and 
enhance the region's competitiveness.  The Agreement on Labor 
Cooperation will promote improved labor conditions and strong 
enforcement of national labor laws in all three countries of North 
America.

Labor Commission.  The Agreement creates a new Commission on Labor 
Cooperation, with each country represented on a Council by its top, 
cabinet-level labor official.  

--  The Council has a broad mandate to work cooperatively on labor 
issues, including occupational health and safety, child labor, benefits 
for workers, minimum wages, industrial relations, legislation on 
formation and operation of unions and the resolution of labor disputes, 
and many others.

--  The Council will be able to obtain public advice and assistance in 
these activities.

--  An independent International Coordinating Secretariat (ICS) will 
provide technical support to the Council, and will itself report 
periodically to the Council on a wide range of labor issues, including 
labor laws and their enforcement, labor market conditions such as 
average wages and labor productivity, and training and adjustment 
programs in the three countries.  The ICS will be headed by an Executive 
Director appointed by consensus of the parties for a fixed term, and the 
Executive Director will appoint the staff.

--  Each country will also appoint a National Administrative Office 
(NAO) that will be a point of contact between other Commission entities 
and national governments and that can also consult with the other NAO's 
to seek and exchange information on labor matters.  Each country has a 
right to determine how its own NAO is staffed, and what powers and 
functions it will have beyond the minimum requirements to serve as a 
point of contact for public input and unit for gathering and 
disseminating information on labor matters.

Labor Principles and Objectives.  The objectives of the agreement 
include promotion of improved labor laws and standards, effective 
enforcement of these laws, encouraging competition based on rising 
productivity and quality, and the promotion of key labor principles that 
will be set out in an annex.

These principles include such vital issues as protection against child 
labor, the right to strike and to bargain collectively, freedom of 
association, minimum employment standards, including minimum wages, 
elimination of employment discrimination, and prevention of occupational 
accidents and diseases.

Transparency and Domestic Enforcement.  Each country undertakes to 
ensure transparency of its laws and to enforce those laws through 
several means: 

--  Publication of laws, regulations and procedures and promotion of 
public awareness of these laws and regulations, so that workers and 
employers will know their rights and responsibilities;

--  Promotion of compliance with laws and enforcement through 
appropriate tools, including:

--appointment and training of inspectors;
--monitoring and on-site inspections;
--encouragement of voluntary compliance;
--mandatory reporting; and 
--enforcement actions.

Access to Fair Domestic Procedures.  The Agreement establishes detailed 
requirements, consistent with U.S. law and process, to assure fair 
administrative and judicial review, including commitments to:

--  Provide effective means for binding domestic enforcement of rights 
granted under its labor laws (including collective bargaining rights) 
for all groups with a legally recognized interest under that country's 
laws;

--  Maintain domestic administrative and judicial processes that are 
independent and impartial, comply with due process, allow parties to be 
heard and present evidence, and normally are open to the public;

--  Providing for a right to seek independent review as appropriate of 
administrative determinations;

--  Providing a right for those who are parties to a proceeding to seek 
remedies for the enforcement of labor rights, including remedies, as 
appropriate, from compliance agreements to penalties, fines or 
injunctions.

Encouraging Effective Enforcement by Governments.  The Agreement has 
several avenues to encourage effective national enforcement of labor 
laws.

--  The ICS will be reporting periodically on labor laws and their 
enforcement in each country.

--  The NAO's can also consult and exchange information on enforcement, 
as well as providing information to the Council and the ICS.

--  The Council can consult on any labor matter, including enforcement 
questions on any labor law.

--  An Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECE), composed of independent 
experts, will be convened at the request of any party to examine a 
matter involving a pattern of practice; the ECE will report and make 
recommendations on the matter as it is treated in each of the member 
countries.

--  Dispute Settlement Panels, backed ultimately by fines and trade 
sanctions, can be invoked if a party believes that another is 
demonstrating a persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce 
labor laws.

The intent of these many processes is to encourage voluntary improvement 
of enforcement through exposure of problems.  Trade sanctions are truly 
a last resort, since the intent is to encourage parties to enforce their 
law, not to establish new trade barriers.  Canada in fact has agreed to 
make dispute settlement panel judgements on fines and remedial actions 
automatically enforceable in its domestic court, which obviates any need 
for trade sanctions vis-a-vis Canada. 


NAFTA Supplemental:   Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
Fact sheet released by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 
Washington, DC, August 13, 1993.

Historic Undertaking.  This is the first environmental agreement 
negotiated specifically to accompany and build on a trade agreement.  
NAFTA will establish the largest market in the world, create jobs in 
America, and enhance the region's competitiveness.  The Agreement on 
Environmental Cooperation will ensure that economic growth is consistent 
with goals of sustainable development.

New Independent Organization.  The Agreement creates a new Commission on 
Environmental Cooperation.  The three countries' top environmental 
officials (the EPA Administrator for the United States) will comprise 
the Commission's Council.

--  A Joint Advisory Committee made up of nongovernmental organizations 
from all three countries will advise the Council in its deliberations.

--  The heart of the Commission is its Secretariat, housed in a single 
location and operating under the direction of an Executive Director.  He 
will take broad direction from the Council, but maintain a high degree 
of independence. 

Environmental Obligations.  The NAFTA partners commit themselves to 
undertake important environmental policies regarding the development, 
implementation, and enforcement of their environmental laws.

--  Countries guarantee their citizens access to national courts to 
petition governments to undertake enforcement actions and to seek 
redress of harm.

--  Countries will ensure the openness of judicial and administrative 
proceedings and transparent procedures for the creation of environmental 
laws and regulations.

--  Canada, Mexico and the United States pledged to ensure that their 
laws and standards continue to provide high levels of environmental 
protection and to work cooperatively in enhancing protections.

--  They have committed to effectively enforce those laws, a commitment 
backed up by a dispute settlement process.

--  The agreement does not affect the rights of states and provinces 
under the NAFTA to maintain standards at levels higher than the federal 
governments.

--  Countries are obligated to report on the state of their 
environments, and to promote environmental education, scientific 
research, and technological development.

--  They will work toward limiting trade in toxic substances that they 
have banned domestically.

The Commission's Agenda.  A major goal of the Commission is to broaden 
cooperative activities among the NAFTA partners.  The Commission will 
have an aggressive and important workplan.

--  It will consider the environmental implications of process and 
production methods, or, as the agreement states, "environmental 
implications of products throughout their lifecycles."

--  It will promote greater public access to information about hazardous 
substances (what we call "community right-to-know").

--  It will consider ways to promote the assessment and mitigation of 
transboundary environmental problems.

--  The Commission will serve as a point of enquiry for public concerns 
about NAFTA's effect on the environment, and be an avenue for NAFTA 
dispute settlement panels to obtain environmental expertise when faced 
with environmental issues.

Public Participation and Dispute Settlement.  Transparency is the 
hallmark of the agreement, and citizens of all three countries will be 
free to make submissions to the Commission on their concerns related to 
the full range of environmental issues.

--  The Commission's secretariat will act on submissions appropriately 
to develop fact-finding reports.  The reports will be made public if two 
of three Parties concur (i.e., the complained against Party cannot bar 
publication).

--  The agreement creates a consultative process for the Council to 
discuss issues, including those brought to light through the public 
submission process and the Secretariat's fact-finding activities.

--  Special attention is given to matters involving non-enforcement of  
a nation's environmental law when consultations fail to resolve the 
matter.

--  In the event that one Party considers that another Party has 
persistently failed to effectively enforce its environmental laws 
(affecting a sector involving traded goods or services), the matter may 
be referred to a dispute settlement panel.

--  The dispute settlement process provides, in the end, for sanctions 
if countries have failed to correct problems of nonenforcement.

Scope.  The Agreement has a broad, inclusive scope.

--  Any environmental or natural resource issue may be addressed through 
the work program, and any environmental concern or obligation    of the 
agreement may be the subject of consultations between parties.

--  Understandably, the realm of issues subject to dispute settlement 
panels and possible sanctions is more circumscribed, focused on whether 
the Parties are effectively enforcing their environmental laws, and 
whether that nonenforcement is related to trade or competition among the 
Parties.


Funding Environmental Infrastructure Projects in the U.S.-Mexico Border 
Region
Fact sheet released by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 
Washington, DC, August 13, 1993.

New Institutional Developments.  Although negotiators have not yet begun 
work on the language of a text, basic agreement was reached on a new 
institutional structure to promote effective coordination of 
infrastructure projects.

--  A hallmark of the institution will be a transparent process which 
incorporates the views of local residents and non-government 
organizations.

--  Initially, the institution will focus on projects addressing the 
serious wastewater treatment and water pollution problems along the 
border. 

--  The institution will provide assistance on both the technical and 
financial aspects of the projects.

Financing Options.  Though the institution will not itself offer bonds 
initially, it will work to mobilize multiple sources of financing, 
depending on the nature of the individual project.

--  As appropriate, it could turn to the private sector, direct 
government support (loans, grants or guarantees at the federal, state 
and local level), and   a border environmental financing facility.

--  Subject to future agreement, the institution could raise capital 
directly.

Border Environmental Financing Facility.  The United States and Mexico 
are exploring capitalization of a new financing mechanism to serve the 
border institution as one source of direct loans and partial guarantees.

U.S. and Mexican officials will hold further discussion in coming weeks, 
including discussions on the important question of the required levels 
of funding.


NAFTA Supplemental:  Agreement on Import Surges
Fact sheet released by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 
Washington, DC, August 13, 1993.

"Early Warning System".  The understanding on import surges establishes 
a new mechanism for consultations among the NAFTA countries and for 
examining economic factors, including employment, in the region.  It is 
meant to anticipate national trade measures, authorized under the NAFTA, 
to respond to increased imports.

For example, a country might call for consultations and a joint 
examination in the committee as a result of declining employment in a 
particular industry.

NAFTA Safeguard Provisions.  The NAFTA itself contains several important 
provisions to safeguard a country's industry and workers against import 
surges.

--  A bilateral safeguard mechanism permits the "snap-back" to pre-NAFTA 
or MFN tariff rates for up to three years--or four years for extremely 
sensitive products--if increased imports from Mexico are a substantial 
cause of or threaten serious injury to a domestic industry.

--  A global safeguard mechanism allows the imposition of tariffs or 
quotas on imports from Mexico and/or Canada as part of a multilateral 
safeguard action when imports from either or both countries are a 
substantial cause of or threaten serious injury to a domestic industry.

--  Sensitive agriculture products are handled specially in the form of 
tariff-rate quotas, where high MFN tariffs kick in above a specified 
quantity of imports.

--  Sensitive textile and apparel products also have special safeguard 
provisions to respond to those industries' needs.

Changing NAFTA's Provisions.  The Working Group established under the 
agreement will consider how well NAFTA's safeguard provisions are 
working and make recommendations for revisions, as appropriate.

Access to Courts and Due Process
Fact sheet released by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 
Washington, DC, August 13, 1993.

The labor and environmental side agreements fulfill President Clinton's 
goal that all three countries should commit to providing their citizens 
with access to fair, transparent and equitable court proceedings for the 
redress of harms and for enforcement of their country's environmental 
and labor laws.

In each agreement, the NAFTA partners undertake vital commitments 
regarding public access to remedies and the structure of their judicial 
systems.  The Agreements establish detailed requirements, consistent 
with U.S. law and process, to assure fair administrative and judicial 
review, including commitments to:

--  Ensuring that anyone with a legally recognized interest have access 
to administrative or judicial procedures for the enforcement of that 
country's environmental or labor laws;

--  Maintaining domestic administrative and judicial processes that are 
independent and impartial, comply with due process, allow parties to be 
heard and present evidence, and normally are open to the public;

--  Providing for a right to seek independent review as appropriate of 
administrative determinations; and

--  Providing a right for those who are parties to a proceeding to seek 
remedies for the enforcement of labor rights or environmental laws, 
including, as appropriate, compliance agreements, penalties, damages, 
fines or injunctions.

In addition, each Party guarantees its citizens the right to ask the 
authorities to investigate alleged violations of its environmental or 
labor laws, and will give those requests due consideration.


Summary of the Understanding on Emergency Action (as agreed upon by the 
three parties)
Text of summary released by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 
Washington, DC, August 13, 1993.

This document describes the Understanding between the Parties to the 
North American Free Trade Agreement concerning Chapter Eight--Emergency 
Action.  This description does not itself constitute an agreement 
between the three countries and is not intended as an interpretation of 
the final text.

The Understanding confirms the commitment of the Parties to facilitate 
the effective use of Chapter Eight of the NAFTA.  Under Chapter Eight, a 
Party can impose trade restrictions if increased imports cause or 
threaten serious injury to a domestic industry.  The Understanding 
establishes a Working Group on Emergency Action comprising 
representatives of each country.  The Working Group reports to the Free 
Trade Commission established under the NAFTA.  The NAFTA Secretariat 
will provide technical support.

The Working Group will meet at least annually, and also upon the request 
of any Party.  The Working Group may consider any issue relating to the 
use of Chapter Eight, and may make recommendations to the Free Trade 
Commission.  It may also review the recourse of any NAFTA Party to 
Article XIX of the GATT (the emergency action provision of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).

At the request of any Party, the Parties may consult in the Working 
Group where a Party considers that goods originating in the territory of 
another Party are being imported in such increased quantities as to 
constitute a substantial cause of, or con- tribute importantly to, 
serious injury, or threat thereof, to its domestic industry.

Subject to the rights and obligations of the Parties under the NAFTA, 
the Working Group may also serve as a forum for examining, at the 
request of any Party and with the agreement of two-thirds of the 
Parties, trade, productivity, employment, and other economic factors 
with respect to any good.  For example, a Party might call for joint 
examination in the committee of the employment situation in a particular 
industry.  In addition, the Working Group may make recommendations to 
the Commission on any improvements to Chapter Eight that it deems 
appropriate.


Summary of the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (as agreed 
upon by the three parties)
Text of summary released by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 
Washington, DC, August 13, 1993.

Introduction
The Canadian Minister for International Trade Thomas Hockin, Mexican 
Secretary of Trade and Industrial Development Jaime Serra and United 
States Trade Representative Mickey Kantor reached agreement on the North 
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation on August 13, 1993.  They have 
directed officials of the three Governments to complete legal and 
technical corrections to the Agreement text as soon as possible.  The 
following description of the Agreement does not itself constitute an 
agreement between the three Governments and is not intended as an 
interpretation of the Agreement.

The intention of the Parties in the Agreement on Labor Cooperation is to 
pursue a set of general objectives which aim at complementing the NAFTA 
by promoting the improvement of working conditions and living standards 
in all three countries.  The agreement reflects the shared recognition 
of the United States, Mexico, and Canada that their mutual prosperity 
depends on the promotion of fair and open competition based on 
innovation and rising levels of productivity and quality with due regard 
for the importance of labor laws and principles.

The Agreement:  increases cooperation and promotes greater under- 
standing among the Parties in a broad range of labor areas; establishes 
the obligation of each Party to ensure the enforcement of its domestic 
labor laws; provides mechanisms to permit problem-solving consultations; 
enables the Parties to initiate evaluations of patterns of practice by 
independent committees of experts; and, in certain cases, allows for 
dispute settlement procedures.

Preamble and Principles
The Preamble reaffirms relevant provisions of the NAFTA preamble and 
adds further shared goals related to labor matters.

Each Party is committed, in accordance with its domestic laws, to 
promote the following labor principles:  the freedom of association, the 
right to bargain collectively, the right to strike, prohibition of 
forced labor, restrictions on labor by children and young people, 
minimum employment standards, elimination of employment discrimination, 
equal pay for men and women, prevention of occupational accidents and 
diseases, compensation in cases of work accidents or occupational 
diseases, and protection of migrant workers.

General Provisions and Objectives
The Agreement sets forth the following general objectives:  improving 
working conditions and living standards, promoting compliance with and 
effective enforcement of labor laws, promoting the Agreement's 
principles through cooperation and coordination, and promoting 
publication and exchange of information to enhance mutual understanding 
of Parties' laws, institutions and legal systems.

Obligations
The general obligation of each Party is to ensure the effective 
enforcement of its own labor law.  Specific obligations refer to 
publication of labor laws and related regulations, procedures, etc., and 
to promoting awareness of and compliance with them.  Parties will also 
ensure availability of public information related to its labor law and 
enforcement and compliance procedures.

Other obligations include government enforcement actions for promoting 
compliance and effective enforcement of its labor law, covering such 
matters as:  appointment and training of inspectors; monitoring 
compliance and examining suspected violations, including inspections, 
mandatory reporting and record keeping; encouraging worker-management 
committees; providing mediation, conciliation, or arbitration services; 
and initiating in a timely manner enforcement actions seeking 
appropriate remedies.

Each Party is committed to ensuring access by persons with a legally 
recognized interest to administrative, judicial, and related tribunals, 
including recourse to procedures by which labor rights can be enforced 
in a binding fashion.  The Agreement also provides that such tribunals 
and proceedings before them would be fair and comply with due process.

Structure and Functions of the Labor Commission
A trinational Labor Commission is created to facilitate the achievement 
of the objectives of the Agreement and to deal with labor issues in a 
cooperative, and consultative manner that duly respects each nation's 
sovereignty.

The Labor Commission consists of a Ministerial Council, an International 
Coordinating Secretariat, and three National Administrative Offices.

--  The Ministerial Council consists of the Labor Ministers from the 
three signatory countries.  They supervise the implementation of the 
Agreement, including the work of the International Coordinating 
Secretariat.  They are also empowered to create working groups and 
committees they deem appropriate to further the objectives  of the 
Agreement;

--  An International Coordinating Secretariat (ICS) that acts under the 
direction of the Ministerial Council.  Established as a central office, 
the ICS will carry out the day-to-day work of the Commission.  It is 
responsible for assisting the Council in its work, for gathering and 
periodically publishing information on labor matters in Canada, Mexico 
and the United States, for planning and coordinating cooperative 
activities, and for supporting any working groups or evaluation 
committees established by the Ministerial Council; and 

--  National Administrative Offices (NAOs) established by each Party.  
The NAOs would serve as a point of contact for other Parties and 
facilitate the provision of information to other Parties on domestic law 
and practice; receive public communications; conduct preliminary 
reviews; and promote the exchange of information relevant to this 
Agreement.  Each of the three NAOs will carry out these functions, and 
each Party will have autonomy to design its own NAO.

Cooperative Consultations And Evaluation
With regard to questions related to the enforcement of labor laws, the 
Agreement provides for:  channels for public communications, exchanges 
of information, discussion of issues and resolution of problems through 
various levels of consultation.  Mechanisms established to accomplish 
this include:

--  NAO consultations--NAOs may engage in cooperative consultations to 
exchange data and information, clarify or explain Parties' labor laws, 
and communicate regarding labor market conditions;

--  Ministerial consultations--Each Party may request cooperative 
consultations at the Ministerial level regarding issues related to the 
obligations of the Agreement; and

--  Evaluation Committees of Experts--When Ministers believe that it 
would be useful to call on independent, outside experts, they may create 
an ad-hoc Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECEs).  To enhance mutual 
understanding and facilitate consultations by Ministers, ECEs would 
provide objective, comparative analyses of how matters referred to them 
are treated in all three countries, provided comparable legislation 
exists.  ECE reports may include problem-solving recommendations to the 
Ministerial Council.

Resolution of Disputes
If following an ECE report and consultations, the Council cannot resolve 
a dispute involving a Party's alleged persistent pattern of failure to 
effectively enforce labor laws with respect to health and safety, child 
labor and minimum wage, relating to a situation involving mutually 
recognized labor laws and the production of goods or services traded 
between the Parties, any Party may request an arbitral panel.  A panel 
will be established on a two-thirds vote of the Council.

Panelists will normally be chosen from a previously agreed roster of 
experts, including experts on labor matters.  With the approval of the 
disputing Parties a panel may seek information and technical advice from 
any person or body that it deems appropriate.  The report of the panel 
will be made publicly available five days after it is transmitted to the 
Parties.

If a panel makes a finding that a Party has engaged in a persistent 
pattern of failure to effectively enforce its labor laws with respect to 
health and safety, child labor and minimum wage, relating to a situation 
involving mutually recognized labor laws and related to trade, the 
Parties may, within 60 days, agree on a mutually satisfactory action 
plan to remedy the non-enforcement.

If there is no agreed action plan, then between 60 and 120 days after 
the final panel report, the panel may be reconvened to evaluate an 
action plan proposed by the Party complained against or to set out an 
action plan in its stead.  The panel would also make a determination on 
the imposition of monetary enforcement assessments on the Party 
complained against.

The panel may be reconvened at any time to determine if an action plan 
is being fully implemented.  If it is not being fully implemented, the 
panel is  to impose a monetary enforcement assessment on the Party 
complained against.

In the event that a Party complained against fails to pay a monetary 
enforcement assessment or continues in its failure to enforce its labor 
law with respect to health and safety, child labor and minimum wage, the 
Party is liable to ongoing enforcement actions.  In the case of Canada, 
the Commission, on the request of a complaining Party, collects the 
monetary enforcement assessment and enforces an action plan in summary 
proceedings before a Canadian court of competent jurisdiction.  In the 
case of Mexico and the United States, the complaining Party or Parties 
may suspend NAFTA benefits based on the amount of the assessment.

Cooperative Activities
An important dimension of the Agreement provides for the establishment 
of joint cooperative programs in a broad range of labor areas.  These 
would enable the United States, Mexico, and Canada to undertake major 
new forms of mutual collaboration on labor issues.  This will make 
possible a common focus on these issues in the context of a free trade 
agreement among the parties as they cope with the economic and labor 
market pressures of entering a global economy.

The Funding of Environmental Infrastructure Projects in the   U.S.-
Mexico Border Region (as agreed upon by the two parties)
Text of summary released by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 
Washington, DC, August 13, 1993.

Mexican Secretary of Trade and Industrial Development Jaime Serra and 
United States Trade Representative Mickey Kantor met to discuss the 
funding of border environmental infrastructure projects in their border 
region as an important component of the ongoing discussions regarding 
the Agreement on Environmental Cooperation.  They agreed that there is a 
serious need to achieve effective coordination and fund environmental 
infrastructure projects designed to address wastewater treatment, water 
pollution, municipal solid waste and related matters in the U.S.-Mexico 
border region.  They recognized that many environmental problems in the 
border region are not confined to either jurisdiction but must be 
addressed jointly by the United States and Mexico.  They emphasized the 
importance of collaborating with the affected state, local communities 
and governments, and non-governmental organizations in developing 
solutions to environmental problems in the border region.  Finally, they 
noted that substantial financial resources must be marshalled over the 
next decade from all sources, both public and private, to solve the 
environmental problems of the border region.

Secretary Serra and Ambassador Kantor suggested that negotiations on an 
agreement to establish coordinating and financing mechanisms for 
environmental infrastructure projects in the border region be governed 
by the following principles:

--  The functions of a border environment institution would be, for 
environmental infrastructure projects for which it provides technical 
and/or financial assistance:

--to coordinate environmental infrastructure projects in the region;
--to review and approve environmental infrastructure projects;
--to assess the technical and financial feasibility of environmental 
infrastructure projects;
--to oversee the financing, construction and operation of environ- 
mental infrastructure projects; and
--to ensure a transparent process which incorporates the views of 
affected states, local communities, and non-government organizations.

--  This institution could mobilize sources of financing for 
environmental infrastructure projects:

--a border environment financing facility;
--direct government support, such as grants, loans, and guarantees from 
federal, state and local governments;
--the private sector; and
--subject to future agreement by the United States and Mexico, capital 
raised directly by the institution.

--  The principles governing the provision of financial support 
mobilized by this institution should be to:

--provide secure sources of financing for environmental infrastructure 
projects;
--leverage government financing;
--encourage maximum participation of private capital; and
--encourage maximum reliance on fees paid by those causing pollution and 
those benefitting from the improved environment in order to ensure 
payment of debt service.

--  A border environmental financing facility would be established, 
capitalized, and governed by the United States and Mexico.  The 
possibility of a link with the Inter-American Development Bank should be 
explored.  The financing facility would serve the border environment 
institution as one source of direct loans and partial guarantees for 
environmental infrastructure projects approved by the institution.  The 
agreement establishing the facility could contain provisions for 
amendment that would enable the role of the facility to be expanded in 
the future, if the two governments agreed.

Secretary Serra and Ambassador Kantor agreed that officials would pursue 
further discussions on these issues in coming weeks.


Summary of the Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (as agreed upon by 
the three parties)
Text of summary released by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 
Washington, DC, August 13, 1993.

Introduction
On August 13, 1993, Canadian Minister for International Trade Thomas 
Hockin, Mexican Secretary of Trade and Industrial Development Jaime 
Serra and United States Trade Representative Mickey Kantor completed 
negotiations on a proposed North American Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation.  Officials of the three governments have been directed to 
complete the legal drafting of the Agreement as soon as possible.  The 
final text will be made public when completed.

By strengthening environmental cooperation and the effective enforcement 
of domestic environmental laws and regulations, the environmental 
agreement will support the achievement of the economic, trade and 
environmental goals and objectives of the NAFTA.  The two agreements 
will work in a complementary manner to promote sustainable development, 
to create jobs, and to make the region more competitive.

The following description does not itself constitute an agreement 
between the three countries and is not intended as an interpretation of 
the text.

Preamble and Objectives
The Preamble sets out the goals, principles and aspirations on which the 
Agreement is based.  It recognizes a tradition of cooperation on the 
environment, and expresses a commitment to support and build on 
international environmental agreements and on existing institutions.  
The Objectives of the Agreement include the promotion of sustainable 
development, cooperation on the conservation, protection and enhancement 
of the environment and the effective enforcement of and compliance with 
domestic environmental laws.  The Agreement promotes transparency and 
public participation in the development and improvement of environmental 
laws and policies.

Obligations
While affirming the right of each Party to establish its own levels of 
protection, policies, and priorities, the Agreement requires that each 
Party ensure that its laws provide for high levels of environmental 
protection and strive to continue to improve those laws.  This agreement 
also protects the rights of states and provinces to set high levels of 
protection, consistent with the NAFTA.

To achieve high levels of environmental protection and compliance, each 
Party agrees to effectively enforce its environmental law through 
appropriate government actions such as:  appointment and training of 
inspectors; monitoring compliance and examining suspected violations of 
law; seeking voluntary compliance agreements; and, using legal 
proceedings to sanction, or to seek appropriate remedies for, violations 
of its environmental law.  The Agreement does not empower   one Party's 
authorities to undertake environmental law enforcement activities within 
the territory of another Party. 

Each Party undertakes, with respect to its territory, to:

--  report on the state of the environment;
--  develop environmental emergency preparedness measures;
--  promote environmental education, scientific research and 
technological development;
--  assess, as appropriate, environmental impacts; and
--  promote the use of economic instruments for the efficient 
achievement of environmental goals.

Each Party will notify the other Parties of a decision to ban or 
severely restrict a pesticide or chemical and will consider banning the 
export to another Party of toxic substances, the use of which is banned 
within its own territory.

Parties agree to ensure that their procedures for the enforcement of 
environmental law are fair, open and equitable.  Each Party undertakes 
to ensure appropriate public access to procedures for the enforcement of 
their environmental law.  Such access includes the right to:

--  request action for the enforcement of domestic environmental law; 
and
--  sue another person under that Party's jurisdiction for damages.

Commission for Environmental Cooperation
The Agreement establishes a Commission for Environmental Cooperation, 
comprising a governing Council, a central Secretariat, and a Joint 
Public Advisory Committee.

The Council.  The Council, the governing institution of the Commission, 
will be composed of cabinet-level officers or equivalent representatives 
of the Parties.  It will oversee the implementation of the Agreement, 
serve as a forum for discussion of environmental matters, promote and 
facilitate cooperation, oversee the Secretariat and address questions 
and disputes that may arise regarding the interpretation or application 
of the Agreement.  The Council has key responsibilities related to the 
Agreement's dispute settlement provisions concerning persistent patterns 
of failure by any Party to enforce its environmental laws.

The Council will strengthen cooperation on the development and 
continuing improvement of environmental laws and regulations, by:

--  promoting the exchange of information on criteria and methodologies 
used in establishing domestic environmental standards; and
--  without reducing the level of environmental protection, developing 
recommendations on greater compatibility of environmental standards.

The Council will cooperate with the Free Trade Commission to achieve the 
environmental goals and objectives of the NAFTA, by:

--  contributing to the prevention or resolution of environment-related 
trade disputes; and
--  maintaining a list of experts who could provide information or 
technical advice to NAFTA institutions.

The Council will consider and develop recommendations with respect to 
assessing the environmental impact of proposed projects likely to cause 
significant adverse transboundary effects.  It will also consider and 
may develop recommendations on:

--  public access to information, including information on hazardous 
materials and activities;
--  appropriate limits for specific pollutants, taking into account 
differences in ecosystems; and
--  reciprocal access to rights and remedies for damage or injury 
resulting from transboundary pollution.

The Council may develop recommendations on a wide variety of 
environmental issues, including:

--  pollution prevention techniques and strategies;
--  the environmental implications of goods throughout their life-
cycles; 
--  transboundary and border environmental issues;
--  protection of endangered and threatened species; and
--  approaches to compliance and enforcement.

The Council will meet at least once a year.  There will be public 
meetings at all regular sessions.

The Secretariat.  The Agreement establishes a central Secretariat 
responsible for providing technical, administrative and operational 
support to the Council and to committees and groups established by the 
Council.  The Secretariat will prepare an annual budget and program, 
including proposed cooperative activities.  The Secretariat will also 
prepare reports on matters within the scope of the annual program.

The Secretariat will consider submissions from any person or non-
governmental organization or association alleging a Party's failure to 
effectively enforce its environmental law.  Provided the submission 
meets criteria set out in the Agreement, the Secretariat may propose 
that a factual record be developed.  In developing this record the 
Secretariat can seek information from a variety of sources, including 
submissions from interested persons and information developed by 
independent experts.

The size and location of the Secretariat will be determined by the 
Parties.

The Joint Public Advisory Committee.  The Joint Public Advisory 
Committee will include five members of the public from each country.  It 
will meet at least once a year, concurrent with the regular session of 
the Council.  The Joint Committee will advise the Council and provide 
technical, scientific or other information to the Secretariat.  It will 
also provide input to the annual program and budget of the Council as 
well as the annual and other reports.  

Consultations
A Party may request consultations regarding any matter that affects the 
operation of the Agreement.  Should the consultations fail to resolve 
the matter, any Party may call a meeting of the Council.  In seeking a 
resolution, the Council may consult technical advisors or create working 
groups or expert groups and make recommendations.

Resolution of Disputes
If the Council cannot resolve a dispute involving a Party's alleged 
persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce an environmental 
law relating to a situation involving the production of goods or 
services traded between the Parties, any Party may request an arbitral 
panel.  A panel will be established on a two-thirds vote of the Council.

Panelists will normally be chosen from a previously agreed roster of 
experts, including experts on environmental matters.  With the approval 
of the disputing Parties a panel may seek information and technical 
advice from any person or body that it deems appropriate.  The report of 
the panel will be made publicly available five days after it is 
transmitted to the Parties.

If a panel makes a finding that a Party has engaged in a persistent 
pattern of failure to effectively enforce its environmental law, the 
Parties may, within 60 days, agree on a mutually satisfactory action 
plan to remedy the non-enforcement.

If there is no agreed action plan, then between 60 and 120 days after 
the final panel report, the panel may be reconvened to evaluate an 
action plan proposed by the Party complained against or to set out an 
action plan in its stead.  The panel would also make a determination on 
the imposition of monetary enforcement assessments on the Party 
complained against.

The panel may be reconvened at any time to determine if an action plan 
is being fully implemented.  If it is not being fully implemented, the 
panel is  to impose a monetary enforcement assessment on the Party 
complained against.

In the event that a Party complained against fails to pay a monetary 
enforcement assessment or continues in its failure to enforce its 
environmental law, the Party is liable to ongoing enforcement actions.  
In the case of Canada, the Commission, on the request of a complaining 
Party, collects the monetary enforcement assessment and enforces an 
action plan in summary proceedings before a Canadian court of competent 
jurisdiction.  In the case of Mexico and the United States, the 
complaining Party or Parties may suspend NAFTA benefits based on the 
amount of the assessment.  (###)



ARTICLE 2:

Declaration on Libyan Terrorism
Following is the text of a tripartite declaration issued by the 
Governments of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, and the United States of America on Libyan terrorism, to the 
United Nations Security Council, August 13, 1993.

Over 16 months have passed since the Security Council imposed sanctions 
on the Libyan Government for failure to comply with its demands as set 
forth in United Nations Security Council resolution 731 (1992) that 
Libya commit itself concretely and definitively to cease all forms of 
terrorist action and all assistance to terrorist groups, agree to 
surrender the two accused of bombing Pan Am flight 103 for trial in 
Scotland or the United States, respond fully to the requests put forward 
by the French judge investigating the bombing of UTA flight 772, and 
provide evidence or information about the bombings of Pan Am flight 103 
and UTA flight 772.

Today, for the fourth time, the Council has reviewed Libyan compliance 
with sanctions as called for in Security Council resolution 748 (1992) 
and found Libya once again to be in defiance of the will of the 
international community.  Instead of seeking ways to cooperate with the 
Council and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Libya has 
consistently sought ways to avoid full compliance.

The United States, the United Kingdom and France have observed with 
diminishing patience that the envoys of the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations to Tripoli repeatedly come back empty-handed, without 
indications of compliance although with many assurances of Libya's 
cooperation.  We have waited the four months requested by the Secretary-
General of the League of Arab States, who wished to serve as an 
intermediary between the international community and the Libyans.  We 
have repeatedly rejected Libyan efforts to distract the international 
community from its lack of compliance with empty offers to surrender the 
Lockerbie suspects and to comply with the requirements of French justice 
and to prove their partial compliance with the Security Council's 
demands.

However, our three Governments, in the interests of giving Libya one 
last chance, have asked the Secretary-General of the United Nations to 
look into the matter and take the necessary steps to achieve the full 
implementation by the Libyan Government of resolution 731 (1992) within 
40 to 45 days.

If, by October first, the Libyan Government has failed to comply with 
resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 (1992), including the transfer to United 
States or United Kingdom jurisdiction of the Lockerbie suspects and 
compliance with the requests of French Justice on UTA flight 772, we 
will table a resolution strengthening the sanctions in key oil-related, 
financial and technological areas.

Once more, our three Governments reiterate that they have no hidden 
agenda and that, on the contrary, upon full implementation by Libya of 
Security Council resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 (1992), the conditions 
would be met for the lifting of sanctions by the Security Council.  
(###)



ARTICLE 3:

Nigeria:  Which Way Forward?
George E. Moose, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, Washington, DC, August 4, 1993

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity 
to appear before you today to describe U.S. policy toward Nigeria in the 
wake of the military regime's recent anti-democratic actions.  As you 
know, Nigeria has long been hailed as Africa's preeminent nation.  In 
political, economic, and military terms, its influence is felt 
throughout Africa.  Consequently, when Nigeria is in turmoil, the rest 
of Africa and the entire world watch with great interest.  It is 
essential, therefore, to understand what is happening in Nigeria today 
if we are to comprehend where Nigeria's place in the world will be 
tomorrow.

A Recent History of Democratization
Since Gen. Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida came to power in a 1985 military 
coup, his regime has repeatedly promised to restore elected, civilian 
government.  Unable to resist the tide of democracy in Africa, the 
regime eventually held elections for state and local officials and 
national legislators in 1991 and 1992.  After several delays, voters 
went to the polls on June 12, 1993, to elect a president.  State-by-
state returns showed that the Social Democratic Party's candidate 
obtained significant support in all regions of the country and a clear 
majority of the votes cast nationwide.  The National Republican 
Convention--the other legal political party--seemed ready to accept the 
results, and impartial election observers judged the election generally 
free and fair.  In essence, the elections seemed to herald the return to 
democratic politics so long promised by the Nigerian military.

Yet on June 23, Nigeria's military arbitrarily annulled the June 12 
election.  General Babangida claimed that his action was somehow in the 
best interest of the nation.  He decreed to the political parties that 
another election must be held.  Otherwise, he would abolish Nigeria's 
democratic institutions, dismiss elected officials, and appoint an 
interim government.  He said further that neither the Social Democratic 
candidate nor his National Republican Convention opponent in the June 12 
contest would be permitted to run in the new election.

The Social Democratic Party immediately opposed the plan and called for 
release of the June 12 results.  Violence broke out in some areas of the 
country.  With each passing day, more leaders of Nigerian civil society 
voiced support for validating the June 12 results.  The two legal 
parties eventually offered a compromise proposal of an interim 
government, stipulating that elected institutions remain in place.  
However, on July 12, General Babangida rejected the parties' offer, 
demanding that a new election be held on August 14.  He threatened that 
if the parties did not participate, the transition to civilian rule 
might not occur on August 27 as promised.

U.S. Response
The United States swiftly demonstrated its disapproval of the regime's 
anti-democratic behavior.  Within a day of the June 23 annulment, a 
meeting was held with Nigeria's ambassador, during which he was informed 
of steps the United States would take in response.  After General 
Babangida rejected the parties' offer to participate in an interim 
government and the regime cracked down on those who spoke out, the 
United States amended its response with additional measures.  A number 
of other countries subsequently issued statements of condemnation, with 
some taking their own punitive steps.

Among the actions the U.S. has taken to date are:

--  Suspending aid under the Foreign Assistance Act, except for 1) 
humanitarian assistance, 2) aid for democratization and social sector 
programming, and 3) assistance provided through NGOs;

--  Sharply reducing the level of military-to-military relations, 
including withdrawing our security assistance officer from Lagos, 
postponing the travel plans of our new defense attache, asking the 
Nigerian defense attache to leave the United States, and suspending the 
International Military Education and Training program with Nigeria;

--  Reviewing all new applications for commercial exports of defense 
articles and services to Nigeria, with a presumption of denial; and

--  Requiring all requests for diplomatic visas for Nigerian officials 
to be referred to the Department of State.

The Administration wanted to ensure that its actions were directed at 
those most responsible for Nigeria's current political impasse--the 
Nigerian military.  Our actions have been carefully targeted to strike 
at the influential officer corps, while not affecting average citizens.  
Meanwhile, our embassy continues to maintain regular and open 
communications with civilian politicians and leading human rights 
advocates.

An Environment Hostile To Democracy
We are very concerned by the regime's pattern of violating basic human 
rights.  These repressive actions create a climate hostile to democracy 
by undermining the very institutions that are the foundation of 
democratic civil society.  The regime has hit Nigeria's traditionally 
outspoken independent press particularly hard.  Newspapers and magazines 
were being seized almost every other day, until the regime decided to 
shut down six media companies entirely.

Human rights activists Beko Ransome-Kuti, Femi Falana, and Gani 
Fawahinmi have been detained under authority of a sweeping military 
decree that permits the regime to imprison someone incommunicado for up 
to 6 weeks.  The United States has made its deep concerns about 
Nigeria's deplorable human rights record known to the regime.  
Unfortunately, the regime has not been forthcoming.  We will continue to 
press on this front.

Future U.S. Policy
The current political crisis--visited on Nigeria by those self-styled 
guardians of national unity, the military--poses the greatest risk to 
Nigerian national integrity since the 1967-70 civil war.  It is clear 
the military must leave power if that risk is to be diminished.  If the 
military understands its interests will suffer if it tries to retain 
power, it may be possible to strengthen those in Nigeria seeking to 
persuade the military leadership to turn power over to duly elected 
civilians. 

We are hopeful, but not blindly optimistic, that Nigerians will find a 
way to resolve their differences and usher in the democratic government 
the regime had promised would result from the June 12 election.  But it 
will be difficult.  The cynicism, fear, and uncertainty the present 
military regime have engendered will not easily be dispelled.  Many 
citizens believe that any electoral process would be just another 
attempt to buy time and soothe international opinion.  Far from healing 
Nigeria's wounds, it would almost certainly widen and deepen them.  
Neither is there much real enthusiasm for an interim government, which 
many Nigerians fear would be nothing more than a stalking horse for 
continued military rule.

The political parties' decision to agree in principle to an interim 
national government may reflect their desire to avoid the divisive 
contest the regime was intent upon visiting upon Nigeria.  However, even 
the broad outlines of this proposed interim government are unclear, and 
the degree to which it might be acceptable to the majority of the 
Nigerian people cannot, therefore, be estimated at this time.  What is 
clear is that the regime's so-called managed transition to democracy is 
dead, the victim of a military clique unwilling, in the final analysis, 
to let the people exercise their sovereignty.

We are aware, as are Nigerians, of the urgent need for the greater 
governmental transparency that civilian rule eventually can bring.  We 
are also cognizant of Nigeria's role as a model to many other aspiring 
peoples struggling to reach the ideal of democracy in their own nations.  
If Nigeria's military regime is able to perpetuate itself in spite of 
popular disaffection, the prospects for peaceful transfers of power to 
elected civilians in many of those other countries in the region and 
across the continent would rapidly dim.

We will continue, therefore, to stress the overriding importance of the 
military leaving power to those elected by a free and fair democratic 
process.  We have put the Nigerian regime on notice that, should a 
civilian government not be in place in Nigeria on August 27, the United 
States may be obliged to take additional steps.  Nigeria's military 
regime must understand that any attempt to hold political power after 
August 27, 1993--no matter how it might be rationalized--would raise 
fundamental questions about the future character of our bilateral 
relations.

The Administration is watching developments in Nigeria very closely and 
is daily examining its options to respond to further abuses of human 
rights and other anti-democratic actions.  Public statements by friends 
of Africa, such as each of you, would help convince the military regime 
that there is no room to maneuver on these issues.  The strong signals 
coming from Congress have already been very helpful and greatly 
appreciated.  (###)



ARTICLE 4:

Sudan Is Placed on U.S. Terrorism List
Statement by Department Spokesman Michael McCurry, Washington, DC, 
August 18, 1993.

The Department of State and other U.S. Government agencies have recently 
concluded a systematic review to determine whether Sudan should be 
placed on the terrorism list.  After a full assessment of the facts and 
the law, the Secretary has decided to designate Sudan a state sponsor of 
acts of international terrorism.

U.S. law (section 6 (j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979) 
provides that the Secretary of State determine whether countries have 
"repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism."  
Countries found to have provided such support are placed on the U.S. 
terrorism list.  The decision on Sudan was reached after carefully 
weighing all available information and U.S. law.

Last December, the Secretary of State ordered a systematic 180-day 
review to determine whether Sudan should be designated a state sponsor 
of acts of international terrorism.  That review is now completed, and 
the cumulative weight of the evidence establishes that Sudan is 
providing repeated support for international terrorism.  This decision 
was made independent of events in New York.

Evidence currently available indicates that Sudan allows the use of its 
territory as sanctuary for terrorists, including the Abu Nidal 
Organization and members of Hezbollah, and Palestine Islamic Jihad.  We 
also believe safe houses and other facilities used to support radical 
groups are allowed to exist in Sudan with the apparent approval of the 
Sudanese Government's leadership.  Further, we believe that reports of 
training in Sudan of militant extremists that commit acts of terrorism 
in neighboring countries are credible.

The United States, both in Khartoum and in Washington, has been in 
frequent communication with the Government of Sudan for well over a 
year.  The Government of Sudan has failed, to date, to respond 
positively to our concerns.

Placement on the terrorism list disqualifies Sudan from virtually all 
U.S. foreign assistance.  Current disaster, emergency, and certain other 
humanitarian assistance, however, may continue, notwithstanding Sudan's 
placement on the terrorism list.

A Travel Warning for Sudan has been in effect for several years.  We 
have no specific and credible threats against American citizens in 
Sudan.  (###)

END OF DISPATCH VOL 4, NO 34.