US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH VOLUME 4, NUMBER 34, AUGUST 23, 1993 PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE: 1. NAFTA Supplemental Agreements -- Secretary Christopher, USTR Fact Sheets, Parties' Summaries 2. Declaration on Libyan Terrorism 3. Nigeria: Which Way Forward? -- George E. Moose 4. Sudan Is Placed on U.S. Terrorism List ARTICLE 1: NAFTA Supplemental Agreements Secretary Christopher, USTR Fact Sheets, Parties' Summaries Secretary Christopher Statement released by the Office of the Spokesman, Washington, DC, August 13, 1993. I am very pleased that the United States, Canada, and Mexico have completed negotiations on supplemental agreements to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and that President Clinton's objectives on entering into these negotiations have been accomplished. NAFTA, with supplemental agreements on the environment and worker standards, is a historic step forward in expanding trade, promoting growth, and strengthening democracy. NAFTA provides the framework for cooperation between the three countries on a wide range of issues important to our prosperity, our health, and our security. Passage of NAFTA will bring together 370 million people to create the world's largest free trade area and will usher in a new era of cooperation between the United States and our neighbors across a broad range of issues. Here at home, NAFTA will bolster President Clinton's efforts to increase exports; create high-wage, high-skill jobs for Americans; and strengthen our economy. In providing for economic strength at home, we ensure our strength abroad. Passage of NAFTA will be good economic policy and good foreign policy. It will promote prosperity and democracy throughout the Western Hemisphere. I look forward to working with Congress as it considers this important agreement. NAFTA Supplemental: Agreement on Labor Cooperation Fact sheet released by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Washington, DC, August 13, 1993. Historic Undertaking. This is the first labor agreement negotiated specifically to accompany and build on a trade agreement. NAFTA will create the largest market in the world, grow jobs in America, and enhance the region's competitiveness. The Agreement on Labor Cooperation will promote improved labor conditions and strong enforcement of national labor laws in all three countries of North America. Labor Commission. The Agreement creates a new Commission on Labor Cooperation, with each country represented on a Council by its top, cabinet-level labor official. -- The Council has a broad mandate to work cooperatively on labor issues, including occupational health and safety, child labor, benefits for workers, minimum wages, industrial relations, legislation on formation and operation of unions and the resolution of labor disputes, and many others. -- The Council will be able to obtain public advice and assistance in these activities. -- An independent International Coordinating Secretariat (ICS) will provide technical support to the Council, and will itself report periodically to the Council on a wide range of labor issues, including labor laws and their enforcement, labor market conditions such as average wages and labor productivity, and training and adjustment programs in the three countries. The ICS will be headed by an Executive Director appointed by consensus of the parties for a fixed term, and the Executive Director will appoint the staff. -- Each country will also appoint a National Administrative Office (NAO) that will be a point of contact between other Commission entities and national governments and that can also consult with the other NAO's to seek and exchange information on labor matters. Each country has a right to determine how its own NAO is staffed, and what powers and functions it will have beyond the minimum requirements to serve as a point of contact for public input and unit for gathering and disseminating information on labor matters. Labor Principles and Objectives. The objectives of the agreement include promotion of improved labor laws and standards, effective enforcement of these laws, encouraging competition based on rising productivity and quality, and the promotion of key labor principles that will be set out in an annex. These principles include such vital issues as protection against child labor, the right to strike and to bargain collectively, freedom of association, minimum employment standards, including minimum wages, elimination of employment discrimination, and prevention of occupational accidents and diseases. Transparency and Domestic Enforcement. Each country undertakes to ensure transparency of its laws and to enforce those laws through several means: -- Publication of laws, regulations and procedures and promotion of public awareness of these laws and regulations, so that workers and employers will know their rights and responsibilities; -- Promotion of compliance with laws and enforcement through appropriate tools, including: --appointment and training of inspectors; --monitoring and on-site inspections; --encouragement of voluntary compliance; --mandatory reporting; and --enforcement actions. Access to Fair Domestic Procedures. The Agreement establishes detailed requirements, consistent with U.S. law and process, to assure fair administrative and judicial review, including commitments to: -- Provide effective means for binding domestic enforcement of rights granted under its labor laws (including collective bargaining rights) for all groups with a legally recognized interest under that country's laws; -- Maintain domestic administrative and judicial processes that are independent and impartial, comply with due process, allow parties to be heard and present evidence, and normally are open to the public; -- Providing for a right to seek independent review as appropriate of administrative determinations; -- Providing a right for those who are parties to a proceeding to seek remedies for the enforcement of labor rights, including remedies, as appropriate, from compliance agreements to penalties, fines or injunctions. Encouraging Effective Enforcement by Governments. The Agreement has several avenues to encourage effective national enforcement of labor laws. -- The ICS will be reporting periodically on labor laws and their enforcement in each country. -- The NAO's can also consult and exchange information on enforcement, as well as providing information to the Council and the ICS. -- The Council can consult on any labor matter, including enforcement questions on any labor law. -- An Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECE), composed of independent experts, will be convened at the request of any party to examine a matter involving a pattern of practice; the ECE will report and make recommendations on the matter as it is treated in each of the member countries. -- Dispute Settlement Panels, backed ultimately by fines and trade sanctions, can be invoked if a party believes that another is demonstrating a persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce labor laws. The intent of these many processes is to encourage voluntary improvement of enforcement through exposure of problems. Trade sanctions are truly a last resort, since the intent is to encourage parties to enforce their law, not to establish new trade barriers. Canada in fact has agreed to make dispute settlement panel judgements on fines and remedial actions automatically enforceable in its domestic court, which obviates any need for trade sanctions vis-a-vis Canada. NAFTA Supplemental: Agreement on Environmental Cooperation Fact sheet released by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Washington, DC, August 13, 1993. Historic Undertaking. This is the first environmental agreement negotiated specifically to accompany and build on a trade agreement. NAFTA will establish the largest market in the world, create jobs in America, and enhance the region's competitiveness. The Agreement on Environmental Cooperation will ensure that economic growth is consistent with goals of sustainable development. New Independent Organization. The Agreement creates a new Commission on Environmental Cooperation. The three countries' top environmental officials (the EPA Administrator for the United States) will comprise the Commission's Council. -- A Joint Advisory Committee made up of nongovernmental organizations from all three countries will advise the Council in its deliberations. -- The heart of the Commission is its Secretariat, housed in a single location and operating under the direction of an Executive Director. He will take broad direction from the Council, but maintain a high degree of independence. Environmental Obligations. The NAFTA partners commit themselves to undertake important environmental policies regarding the development, implementation, and enforcement of their environmental laws. -- Countries guarantee their citizens access to national courts to petition governments to undertake enforcement actions and to seek redress of harm. -- Countries will ensure the openness of judicial and administrative proceedings and transparent procedures for the creation of environmental laws and regulations. -- Canada, Mexico and the United States pledged to ensure that their laws and standards continue to provide high levels of environmental protection and to work cooperatively in enhancing protections. -- They have committed to effectively enforce those laws, a commitment backed up by a dispute settlement process. -- The agreement does not affect the rights of states and provinces under the NAFTA to maintain standards at levels higher than the federal governments. -- Countries are obligated to report on the state of their environments, and to promote environmental education, scientific research, and technological development. -- They will work toward limiting trade in toxic substances that they have banned domestically. The Commission's Agenda. A major goal of the Commission is to broaden cooperative activities among the NAFTA partners. The Commission will have an aggressive and important workplan. -- It will consider the environmental implications of process and production methods, or, as the agreement states, "environmental implications of products throughout their lifecycles." -- It will promote greater public access to information about hazardous substances (what we call "community right-to-know"). -- It will consider ways to promote the assessment and mitigation of transboundary environmental problems. -- The Commission will serve as a point of enquiry for public concerns about NAFTA's effect on the environment, and be an avenue for NAFTA dispute settlement panels to obtain environmental expertise when faced with environmental issues. Public Participation and Dispute Settlement. Transparency is the hallmark of the agreement, and citizens of all three countries will be free to make submissions to the Commission on their concerns related to the full range of environmental issues. -- The Commission's secretariat will act on submissions appropriately to develop fact-finding reports. The reports will be made public if two of three Parties concur (i.e., the complained against Party cannot bar publication). -- The agreement creates a consultative process for the Council to discuss issues, including those brought to light through the public submission process and the Secretariat's fact-finding activities. -- Special attention is given to matters involving non-enforcement of a nation's environmental law when consultations fail to resolve the matter. -- In the event that one Party considers that another Party has persistently failed to effectively enforce its environmental laws (affecting a sector involving traded goods or services), the matter may be referred to a dispute settlement panel. -- The dispute settlement process provides, in the end, for sanctions if countries have failed to correct problems of nonenforcement. Scope. The Agreement has a broad, inclusive scope. -- Any environmental or natural resource issue may be addressed through the work program, and any environmental concern or obligation of the agreement may be the subject of consultations between parties. -- Understandably, the realm of issues subject to dispute settlement panels and possible sanctions is more circumscribed, focused on whether the Parties are effectively enforcing their environmental laws, and whether that nonenforcement is related to trade or competition among the Parties. Funding Environmental Infrastructure Projects in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region Fact sheet released by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Washington, DC, August 13, 1993. New Institutional Developments. Although negotiators have not yet begun work on the language of a text, basic agreement was reached on a new institutional structure to promote effective coordination of infrastructure projects. -- A hallmark of the institution will be a transparent process which incorporates the views of local residents and non-government organizations. -- Initially, the institution will focus on projects addressing the serious wastewater treatment and water pollution problems along the border. -- The institution will provide assistance on both the technical and financial aspects of the projects. Financing Options. Though the institution will not itself offer bonds initially, it will work to mobilize multiple sources of financing, depending on the nature of the individual project. -- As appropriate, it could turn to the private sector, direct government support (loans, grants or guarantees at the federal, state and local level), and a border environmental financing facility. -- Subject to future agreement, the institution could raise capital directly. Border Environmental Financing Facility. The United States and Mexico are exploring capitalization of a new financing mechanism to serve the border institution as one source of direct loans and partial guarantees. U.S. and Mexican officials will hold further discussion in coming weeks, including discussions on the important question of the required levels of funding. NAFTA Supplemental: Agreement on Import Surges Fact sheet released by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Washington, DC, August 13, 1993. "Early Warning System". The understanding on import surges establishes a new mechanism for consultations among the NAFTA countries and for examining economic factors, including employment, in the region. It is meant to anticipate national trade measures, authorized under the NAFTA, to respond to increased imports. For example, a country might call for consultations and a joint examination in the committee as a result of declining employment in a particular industry. NAFTA Safeguard Provisions. The NAFTA itself contains several important provisions to safeguard a country's industry and workers against import surges. -- A bilateral safeguard mechanism permits the "snap-back" to pre-NAFTA or MFN tariff rates for up to three years--or four years for extremely sensitive products--if increased imports from Mexico are a substantial cause of or threaten serious injury to a domestic industry. -- A global safeguard mechanism allows the imposition of tariffs or quotas on imports from Mexico and/or Canada as part of a multilateral safeguard action when imports from either or both countries are a substantial cause of or threaten serious injury to a domestic industry. -- Sensitive agriculture products are handled specially in the form of tariff-rate quotas, where high MFN tariffs kick in above a specified quantity of imports. -- Sensitive textile and apparel products also have special safeguard provisions to respond to those industries' needs. Changing NAFTA's Provisions. The Working Group established under the agreement will consider how well NAFTA's safeguard provisions are working and make recommendations for revisions, as appropriate. Access to Courts and Due Process Fact sheet released by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Washington, DC, August 13, 1993. The labor and environmental side agreements fulfill President Clinton's goal that all three countries should commit to providing their citizens with access to fair, transparent and equitable court proceedings for the redress of harms and for enforcement of their country's environmental and labor laws. In each agreement, the NAFTA partners undertake vital commitments regarding public access to remedies and the structure of their judicial systems. The Agreements establish detailed requirements, consistent with U.S. law and process, to assure fair administrative and judicial review, including commitments to: -- Ensuring that anyone with a legally recognized interest have access to administrative or judicial procedures for the enforcement of that country's environmental or labor laws; -- Maintaining domestic administrative and judicial processes that are independent and impartial, comply with due process, allow parties to be heard and present evidence, and normally are open to the public; -- Providing for a right to seek independent review as appropriate of administrative determinations; and -- Providing a right for those who are parties to a proceeding to seek remedies for the enforcement of labor rights or environmental laws, including, as appropriate, compliance agreements, penalties, damages, fines or injunctions. In addition, each Party guarantees its citizens the right to ask the authorities to investigate alleged violations of its environmental or labor laws, and will give those requests due consideration. Summary of the Understanding on Emergency Action (as agreed upon by the three parties) Text of summary released by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Washington, DC, August 13, 1993. This document describes the Understanding between the Parties to the North American Free Trade Agreement concerning Chapter Eight--Emergency Action. This description does not itself constitute an agreement between the three countries and is not intended as an interpretation of the final text. The Understanding confirms the commitment of the Parties to facilitate the effective use of Chapter Eight of the NAFTA. Under Chapter Eight, a Party can impose trade restrictions if increased imports cause or threaten serious injury to a domestic industry. The Understanding establishes a Working Group on Emergency Action comprising representatives of each country. The Working Group reports to the Free Trade Commission established under the NAFTA. The NAFTA Secretariat will provide technical support. The Working Group will meet at least annually, and also upon the request of any Party. The Working Group may consider any issue relating to the use of Chapter Eight, and may make recommendations to the Free Trade Commission. It may also review the recourse of any NAFTA Party to Article XIX of the GATT (the emergency action provision of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). At the request of any Party, the Parties may consult in the Working Group where a Party considers that goods originating in the territory of another Party are being imported in such increased quantities as to constitute a substantial cause of, or con- tribute importantly to, serious injury, or threat thereof, to its domestic industry. Subject to the rights and obligations of the Parties under the NAFTA, the Working Group may also serve as a forum for examining, at the request of any Party and with the agreement of two-thirds of the Parties, trade, productivity, employment, and other economic factors with respect to any good. For example, a Party might call for joint examination in the committee of the employment situation in a particular industry. In addition, the Working Group may make recommendations to the Commission on any improvements to Chapter Eight that it deems appropriate. Summary of the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (as agreed upon by the three parties) Text of summary released by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Washington, DC, August 13, 1993. Introduction The Canadian Minister for International Trade Thomas Hockin, Mexican Secretary of Trade and Industrial Development Jaime Serra and United States Trade Representative Mickey Kantor reached agreement on the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation on August 13, 1993. They have directed officials of the three Governments to complete legal and technical corrections to the Agreement text as soon as possible. The following description of the Agreement does not itself constitute an agreement between the three Governments and is not intended as an interpretation of the Agreement. The intention of the Parties in the Agreement on Labor Cooperation is to pursue a set of general objectives which aim at complementing the NAFTA by promoting the improvement of working conditions and living standards in all three countries. The agreement reflects the shared recognition of the United States, Mexico, and Canada that their mutual prosperity depends on the promotion of fair and open competition based on innovation and rising levels of productivity and quality with due regard for the importance of labor laws and principles. The Agreement: increases cooperation and promotes greater under- standing among the Parties in a broad range of labor areas; establishes the obligation of each Party to ensure the enforcement of its domestic labor laws; provides mechanisms to permit problem-solving consultations; enables the Parties to initiate evaluations of patterns of practice by independent committees of experts; and, in certain cases, allows for dispute settlement procedures. Preamble and Principles The Preamble reaffirms relevant provisions of the NAFTA preamble and adds further shared goals related to labor matters. Each Party is committed, in accordance with its domestic laws, to promote the following labor principles: the freedom of association, the right to bargain collectively, the right to strike, prohibition of forced labor, restrictions on labor by children and young people, minimum employment standards, elimination of employment discrimination, equal pay for men and women, prevention of occupational accidents and diseases, compensation in cases of work accidents or occupational diseases, and protection of migrant workers. General Provisions and Objectives The Agreement sets forth the following general objectives: improving working conditions and living standards, promoting compliance with and effective enforcement of labor laws, promoting the Agreement's principles through cooperation and coordination, and promoting publication and exchange of information to enhance mutual understanding of Parties' laws, institutions and legal systems. Obligations The general obligation of each Party is to ensure the effective enforcement of its own labor law. Specific obligations refer to publication of labor laws and related regulations, procedures, etc., and to promoting awareness of and compliance with them. Parties will also ensure availability of public information related to its labor law and enforcement and compliance procedures. Other obligations include government enforcement actions for promoting compliance and effective enforcement of its labor law, covering such matters as: appointment and training of inspectors; monitoring compliance and examining suspected violations, including inspections, mandatory reporting and record keeping; encouraging worker-management committees; providing mediation, conciliation, or arbitration services; and initiating in a timely manner enforcement actions seeking appropriate remedies. Each Party is committed to ensuring access by persons with a legally recognized interest to administrative, judicial, and related tribunals, including recourse to procedures by which labor rights can be enforced in a binding fashion. The Agreement also provides that such tribunals and proceedings before them would be fair and comply with due process. Structure and Functions of the Labor Commission A trinational Labor Commission is created to facilitate the achievement of the objectives of the Agreement and to deal with labor issues in a cooperative, and consultative manner that duly respects each nation's sovereignty. The Labor Commission consists of a Ministerial Council, an International Coordinating Secretariat, and three National Administrative Offices. -- The Ministerial Council consists of the Labor Ministers from the three signatory countries. They supervise the implementation of the Agreement, including the work of the International Coordinating Secretariat. They are also empowered to create working groups and committees they deem appropriate to further the objectives of the Agreement; -- An International Coordinating Secretariat (ICS) that acts under the direction of the Ministerial Council. Established as a central office, the ICS will carry out the day-to-day work of the Commission. It is responsible for assisting the Council in its work, for gathering and periodically publishing information on labor matters in Canada, Mexico and the United States, for planning and coordinating cooperative activities, and for supporting any working groups or evaluation committees established by the Ministerial Council; and -- National Administrative Offices (NAOs) established by each Party. The NAOs would serve as a point of contact for other Parties and facilitate the provision of information to other Parties on domestic law and practice; receive public communications; conduct preliminary reviews; and promote the exchange of information relevant to this Agreement. Each of the three NAOs will carry out these functions, and each Party will have autonomy to design its own NAO. Cooperative Consultations And Evaluation With regard to questions related to the enforcement of labor laws, the Agreement provides for: channels for public communications, exchanges of information, discussion of issues and resolution of problems through various levels of consultation. Mechanisms established to accomplish this include: -- NAO consultations--NAOs may engage in cooperative consultations to exchange data and information, clarify or explain Parties' labor laws, and communicate regarding labor market conditions; -- Ministerial consultations--Each Party may request cooperative consultations at the Ministerial level regarding issues related to the obligations of the Agreement; and -- Evaluation Committees of Experts--When Ministers believe that it would be useful to call on independent, outside experts, they may create an ad-hoc Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECEs). To enhance mutual understanding and facilitate consultations by Ministers, ECEs would provide objective, comparative analyses of how matters referred to them are treated in all three countries, provided comparable legislation exists. ECE reports may include problem-solving recommendations to the Ministerial Council. Resolution of Disputes If following an ECE report and consultations, the Council cannot resolve a dispute involving a Party's alleged persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce labor laws with respect to health and safety, child labor and minimum wage, relating to a situation involving mutually recognized labor laws and the production of goods or services traded between the Parties, any Party may request an arbitral panel. A panel will be established on a two-thirds vote of the Council. Panelists will normally be chosen from a previously agreed roster of experts, including experts on labor matters. With the approval of the disputing Parties a panel may seek information and technical advice from any person or body that it deems appropriate. The report of the panel will be made publicly available five days after it is transmitted to the Parties. If a panel makes a finding that a Party has engaged in a persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce its labor laws with respect to health and safety, child labor and minimum wage, relating to a situation involving mutually recognized labor laws and related to trade, the Parties may, within 60 days, agree on a mutually satisfactory action plan to remedy the non-enforcement. If there is no agreed action plan, then between 60 and 120 days after the final panel report, the panel may be reconvened to evaluate an action plan proposed by the Party complained against or to set out an action plan in its stead. The panel would also make a determination on the imposition of monetary enforcement assessments on the Party complained against. The panel may be reconvened at any time to determine if an action plan is being fully implemented. If it is not being fully implemented, the panel is to impose a monetary enforcement assessment on the Party complained against. In the event that a Party complained against fails to pay a monetary enforcement assessment or continues in its failure to enforce its labor law with respect to health and safety, child labor and minimum wage, the Party is liable to ongoing enforcement actions. In the case of Canada, the Commission, on the request of a complaining Party, collects the monetary enforcement assessment and enforces an action plan in summary proceedings before a Canadian court of competent jurisdiction. In the case of Mexico and the United States, the complaining Party or Parties may suspend NAFTA benefits based on the amount of the assessment. Cooperative Activities An important dimension of the Agreement provides for the establishment of joint cooperative programs in a broad range of labor areas. These would enable the United States, Mexico, and Canada to undertake major new forms of mutual collaboration on labor issues. This will make possible a common focus on these issues in the context of a free trade agreement among the parties as they cope with the economic and labor market pressures of entering a global economy. The Funding of Environmental Infrastructure Projects in the U.S.- Mexico Border Region (as agreed upon by the two parties) Text of summary released by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Washington, DC, August 13, 1993. Mexican Secretary of Trade and Industrial Development Jaime Serra and United States Trade Representative Mickey Kantor met to discuss the funding of border environmental infrastructure projects in their border region as an important component of the ongoing discussions regarding the Agreement on Environmental Cooperation. They agreed that there is a serious need to achieve effective coordination and fund environmental infrastructure projects designed to address wastewater treatment, water pollution, municipal solid waste and related matters in the U.S.-Mexico border region. They recognized that many environmental problems in the border region are not confined to either jurisdiction but must be addressed jointly by the United States and Mexico. They emphasized the importance of collaborating with the affected state, local communities and governments, and non-governmental organizations in developing solutions to environmental problems in the border region. Finally, they noted that substantial financial resources must be marshalled over the next decade from all sources, both public and private, to solve the environmental problems of the border region. Secretary Serra and Ambassador Kantor suggested that negotiations on an agreement to establish coordinating and financing mechanisms for environmental infrastructure projects in the border region be governed by the following principles: -- The functions of a border environment institution would be, for environmental infrastructure projects for which it provides technical and/or financial assistance: --to coordinate environmental infrastructure projects in the region; --to review and approve environmental infrastructure projects; --to assess the technical and financial feasibility of environmental infrastructure projects; --to oversee the financing, construction and operation of environ- mental infrastructure projects; and --to ensure a transparent process which incorporates the views of affected states, local communities, and non-government organizations. -- This institution could mobilize sources of financing for environmental infrastructure projects: --a border environment financing facility; --direct government support, such as grants, loans, and guarantees from federal, state and local governments; --the private sector; and --subject to future agreement by the United States and Mexico, capital raised directly by the institution. -- The principles governing the provision of financial support mobilized by this institution should be to: --provide secure sources of financing for environmental infrastructure projects; --leverage government financing; --encourage maximum participation of private capital; and --encourage maximum reliance on fees paid by those causing pollution and those benefitting from the improved environment in order to ensure payment of debt service. -- A border environmental financing facility would be established, capitalized, and governed by the United States and Mexico. The possibility of a link with the Inter-American Development Bank should be explored. The financing facility would serve the border environment institution as one source of direct loans and partial guarantees for environmental infrastructure projects approved by the institution. The agreement establishing the facility could contain provisions for amendment that would enable the role of the facility to be expanded in the future, if the two governments agreed. Secretary Serra and Ambassador Kantor agreed that officials would pursue further discussions on these issues in coming weeks. Summary of the Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (as agreed upon by the three parties) Text of summary released by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Washington, DC, August 13, 1993. Introduction On August 13, 1993, Canadian Minister for International Trade Thomas Hockin, Mexican Secretary of Trade and Industrial Development Jaime Serra and United States Trade Representative Mickey Kantor completed negotiations on a proposed North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation. Officials of the three governments have been directed to complete the legal drafting of the Agreement as soon as possible. The final text will be made public when completed. By strengthening environmental cooperation and the effective enforcement of domestic environmental laws and regulations, the environmental agreement will support the achievement of the economic, trade and environmental goals and objectives of the NAFTA. The two agreements will work in a complementary manner to promote sustainable development, to create jobs, and to make the region more competitive. The following description does not itself constitute an agreement between the three countries and is not intended as an interpretation of the text. Preamble and Objectives The Preamble sets out the goals, principles and aspirations on which the Agreement is based. It recognizes a tradition of cooperation on the environment, and expresses a commitment to support and build on international environmental agreements and on existing institutions. The Objectives of the Agreement include the promotion of sustainable development, cooperation on the conservation, protection and enhancement of the environment and the effective enforcement of and compliance with domestic environmental laws. The Agreement promotes transparency and public participation in the development and improvement of environmental laws and policies. Obligations While affirming the right of each Party to establish its own levels of protection, policies, and priorities, the Agreement requires that each Party ensure that its laws provide for high levels of environmental protection and strive to continue to improve those laws. This agreement also protects the rights of states and provinces to set high levels of protection, consistent with the NAFTA. To achieve high levels of environmental protection and compliance, each Party agrees to effectively enforce its environmental law through appropriate government actions such as: appointment and training of inspectors; monitoring compliance and examining suspected violations of law; seeking voluntary compliance agreements; and, using legal proceedings to sanction, or to seek appropriate remedies for, violations of its environmental law. The Agreement does not empower one Party's authorities to undertake environmental law enforcement activities within the territory of another Party. Each Party undertakes, with respect to its territory, to: -- report on the state of the environment; -- develop environmental emergency preparedness measures; -- promote environmental education, scientific research and technological development; -- assess, as appropriate, environmental impacts; and -- promote the use of economic instruments for the efficient achievement of environmental goals. Each Party will notify the other Parties of a decision to ban or severely restrict a pesticide or chemical and will consider banning the export to another Party of toxic substances, the use of which is banned within its own territory. Parties agree to ensure that their procedures for the enforcement of environmental law are fair, open and equitable. Each Party undertakes to ensure appropriate public access to procedures for the enforcement of their environmental law. Such access includes the right to: -- request action for the enforcement of domestic environmental law; and -- sue another person under that Party's jurisdiction for damages. Commission for Environmental Cooperation The Agreement establishes a Commission for Environmental Cooperation, comprising a governing Council, a central Secretariat, and a Joint Public Advisory Committee. The Council. The Council, the governing institution of the Commission, will be composed of cabinet-level officers or equivalent representatives of the Parties. It will oversee the implementation of the Agreement, serve as a forum for discussion of environmental matters, promote and facilitate cooperation, oversee the Secretariat and address questions and disputes that may arise regarding the interpretation or application of the Agreement. The Council has key responsibilities related to the Agreement's dispute settlement provisions concerning persistent patterns of failure by any Party to enforce its environmental laws. The Council will strengthen cooperation on the development and continuing improvement of environmental laws and regulations, by: -- promoting the exchange of information on criteria and methodologies used in establishing domestic environmental standards; and -- without reducing the level of environmental protection, developing recommendations on greater compatibility of environmental standards. The Council will cooperate with the Free Trade Commission to achieve the environmental goals and objectives of the NAFTA, by: -- contributing to the prevention or resolution of environment-related trade disputes; and -- maintaining a list of experts who could provide information or technical advice to NAFTA institutions. The Council will consider and develop recommendations with respect to assessing the environmental impact of proposed projects likely to cause significant adverse transboundary effects. It will also consider and may develop recommendations on: -- public access to information, including information on hazardous materials and activities; -- appropriate limits for specific pollutants, taking into account differences in ecosystems; and -- reciprocal access to rights and remedies for damage or injury resulting from transboundary pollution. The Council may develop recommendations on a wide variety of environmental issues, including: -- pollution prevention techniques and strategies; -- the environmental implications of goods throughout their life- cycles; -- transboundary and border environmental issues; -- protection of endangered and threatened species; and -- approaches to compliance and enforcement. The Council will meet at least once a year. There will be public meetings at all regular sessions. The Secretariat. The Agreement establishes a central Secretariat responsible for providing technical, administrative and operational support to the Council and to committees and groups established by the Council. The Secretariat will prepare an annual budget and program, including proposed cooperative activities. The Secretariat will also prepare reports on matters within the scope of the annual program. The Secretariat will consider submissions from any person or non- governmental organization or association alleging a Party's failure to effectively enforce its environmental law. Provided the submission meets criteria set out in the Agreement, the Secretariat may propose that a factual record be developed. In developing this record the Secretariat can seek information from a variety of sources, including submissions from interested persons and information developed by independent experts. The size and location of the Secretariat will be determined by the Parties. The Joint Public Advisory Committee. The Joint Public Advisory Committee will include five members of the public from each country. It will meet at least once a year, concurrent with the regular session of the Council. The Joint Committee will advise the Council and provide technical, scientific or other information to the Secretariat. It will also provide input to the annual program and budget of the Council as well as the annual and other reports. Consultations A Party may request consultations regarding any matter that affects the operation of the Agreement. Should the consultations fail to resolve the matter, any Party may call a meeting of the Council. In seeking a resolution, the Council may consult technical advisors or create working groups or expert groups and make recommendations. Resolution of Disputes If the Council cannot resolve a dispute involving a Party's alleged persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce an environmental law relating to a situation involving the production of goods or services traded between the Parties, any Party may request an arbitral panel. A panel will be established on a two-thirds vote of the Council. Panelists will normally be chosen from a previously agreed roster of experts, including experts on environmental matters. With the approval of the disputing Parties a panel may seek information and technical advice from any person or body that it deems appropriate. The report of the panel will be made publicly available five days after it is transmitted to the Parties. If a panel makes a finding that a Party has engaged in a persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce its environmental law, the Parties may, within 60 days, agree on a mutually satisfactory action plan to remedy the non-enforcement. If there is no agreed action plan, then between 60 and 120 days after the final panel report, the panel may be reconvened to evaluate an action plan proposed by the Party complained against or to set out an action plan in its stead. The panel would also make a determination on the imposition of monetary enforcement assessments on the Party complained against. The panel may be reconvened at any time to determine if an action plan is being fully implemented. If it is not being fully implemented, the panel is to impose a monetary enforcement assessment on the Party complained against. In the event that a Party complained against fails to pay a monetary enforcement assessment or continues in its failure to enforce its environmental law, the Party is liable to ongoing enforcement actions. In the case of Canada, the Commission, on the request of a complaining Party, collects the monetary enforcement assessment and enforces an action plan in summary proceedings before a Canadian court of competent jurisdiction. In the case of Mexico and the United States, the complaining Party or Parties may suspend NAFTA benefits based on the amount of the assessment. (###) ARTICLE 2: Declaration on Libyan Terrorism Following is the text of a tripartite declaration issued by the Governments of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America on Libyan terrorism, to the United Nations Security Council, August 13, 1993. Over 16 months have passed since the Security Council imposed sanctions on the Libyan Government for failure to comply with its demands as set forth in United Nations Security Council resolution 731 (1992) that Libya commit itself concretely and definitively to cease all forms of terrorist action and all assistance to terrorist groups, agree to surrender the two accused of bombing Pan Am flight 103 for trial in Scotland or the United States, respond fully to the requests put forward by the French judge investigating the bombing of UTA flight 772, and provide evidence or information about the bombings of Pan Am flight 103 and UTA flight 772. Today, for the fourth time, the Council has reviewed Libyan compliance with sanctions as called for in Security Council resolution 748 (1992) and found Libya once again to be in defiance of the will of the international community. Instead of seeking ways to cooperate with the Council and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Libya has consistently sought ways to avoid full compliance. The United States, the United Kingdom and France have observed with diminishing patience that the envoys of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to Tripoli repeatedly come back empty-handed, without indications of compliance although with many assurances of Libya's cooperation. We have waited the four months requested by the Secretary- General of the League of Arab States, who wished to serve as an intermediary between the international community and the Libyans. We have repeatedly rejected Libyan efforts to distract the international community from its lack of compliance with empty offers to surrender the Lockerbie suspects and to comply with the requirements of French justice and to prove their partial compliance with the Security Council's demands. However, our three Governments, in the interests of giving Libya one last chance, have asked the Secretary-General of the United Nations to look into the matter and take the necessary steps to achieve the full implementation by the Libyan Government of resolution 731 (1992) within 40 to 45 days. If, by October first, the Libyan Government has failed to comply with resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 (1992), including the transfer to United States or United Kingdom jurisdiction of the Lockerbie suspects and compliance with the requests of French Justice on UTA flight 772, we will table a resolution strengthening the sanctions in key oil-related, financial and technological areas. Once more, our three Governments reiterate that they have no hidden agenda and that, on the contrary, upon full implementation by Libya of Security Council resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 (1992), the conditions would be met for the lifting of sanctions by the Security Council. (###) ARTICLE 3: Nigeria: Which Way Forward? George E. Moose, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, August 4, 1993 Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to describe U.S. policy toward Nigeria in the wake of the military regime's recent anti-democratic actions. As you know, Nigeria has long been hailed as Africa's preeminent nation. In political, economic, and military terms, its influence is felt throughout Africa. Consequently, when Nigeria is in turmoil, the rest of Africa and the entire world watch with great interest. It is essential, therefore, to understand what is happening in Nigeria today if we are to comprehend where Nigeria's place in the world will be tomorrow. A Recent History of Democratization Since Gen. Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida came to power in a 1985 military coup, his regime has repeatedly promised to restore elected, civilian government. Unable to resist the tide of democracy in Africa, the regime eventually held elections for state and local officials and national legislators in 1991 and 1992. After several delays, voters went to the polls on June 12, 1993, to elect a president. State-by- state returns showed that the Social Democratic Party's candidate obtained significant support in all regions of the country and a clear majority of the votes cast nationwide. The National Republican Convention--the other legal political party--seemed ready to accept the results, and impartial election observers judged the election generally free and fair. In essence, the elections seemed to herald the return to democratic politics so long promised by the Nigerian military. Yet on June 23, Nigeria's military arbitrarily annulled the June 12 election. General Babangida claimed that his action was somehow in the best interest of the nation. He decreed to the political parties that another election must be held. Otherwise, he would abolish Nigeria's democratic institutions, dismiss elected officials, and appoint an interim government. He said further that neither the Social Democratic candidate nor his National Republican Convention opponent in the June 12 contest would be permitted to run in the new election. The Social Democratic Party immediately opposed the plan and called for release of the June 12 results. Violence broke out in some areas of the country. With each passing day, more leaders of Nigerian civil society voiced support for validating the June 12 results. The two legal parties eventually offered a compromise proposal of an interim government, stipulating that elected institutions remain in place. However, on July 12, General Babangida rejected the parties' offer, demanding that a new election be held on August 14. He threatened that if the parties did not participate, the transition to civilian rule might not occur on August 27 as promised. U.S. Response The United States swiftly demonstrated its disapproval of the regime's anti-democratic behavior. Within a day of the June 23 annulment, a meeting was held with Nigeria's ambassador, during which he was informed of steps the United States would take in response. After General Babangida rejected the parties' offer to participate in an interim government and the regime cracked down on those who spoke out, the United States amended its response with additional measures. A number of other countries subsequently issued statements of condemnation, with some taking their own punitive steps. Among the actions the U.S. has taken to date are: -- Suspending aid under the Foreign Assistance Act, except for 1) humanitarian assistance, 2) aid for democratization and social sector programming, and 3) assistance provided through NGOs; -- Sharply reducing the level of military-to-military relations, including withdrawing our security assistance officer from Lagos, postponing the travel plans of our new defense attache, asking the Nigerian defense attache to leave the United States, and suspending the International Military Education and Training program with Nigeria; -- Reviewing all new applications for commercial exports of defense articles and services to Nigeria, with a presumption of denial; and -- Requiring all requests for diplomatic visas for Nigerian officials to be referred to the Department of State. The Administration wanted to ensure that its actions were directed at those most responsible for Nigeria's current political impasse--the Nigerian military. Our actions have been carefully targeted to strike at the influential officer corps, while not affecting average citizens. Meanwhile, our embassy continues to maintain regular and open communications with civilian politicians and leading human rights advocates. An Environment Hostile To Democracy We are very concerned by the regime's pattern of violating basic human rights. These repressive actions create a climate hostile to democracy by undermining the very institutions that are the foundation of democratic civil society. The regime has hit Nigeria's traditionally outspoken independent press particularly hard. Newspapers and magazines were being seized almost every other day, until the regime decided to shut down six media companies entirely. Human rights activists Beko Ransome-Kuti, Femi Falana, and Gani Fawahinmi have been detained under authority of a sweeping military decree that permits the regime to imprison someone incommunicado for up to 6 weeks. The United States has made its deep concerns about Nigeria's deplorable human rights record known to the regime. Unfortunately, the regime has not been forthcoming. We will continue to press on this front. Future U.S. Policy The current political crisis--visited on Nigeria by those self-styled guardians of national unity, the military--poses the greatest risk to Nigerian national integrity since the 1967-70 civil war. It is clear the military must leave power if that risk is to be diminished. If the military understands its interests will suffer if it tries to retain power, it may be possible to strengthen those in Nigeria seeking to persuade the military leadership to turn power over to duly elected civilians. We are hopeful, but not blindly optimistic, that Nigerians will find a way to resolve their differences and usher in the democratic government the regime had promised would result from the June 12 election. But it will be difficult. The cynicism, fear, and uncertainty the present military regime have engendered will not easily be dispelled. Many citizens believe that any electoral process would be just another attempt to buy time and soothe international opinion. Far from healing Nigeria's wounds, it would almost certainly widen and deepen them. Neither is there much real enthusiasm for an interim government, which many Nigerians fear would be nothing more than a stalking horse for continued military rule. The political parties' decision to agree in principle to an interim national government may reflect their desire to avoid the divisive contest the regime was intent upon visiting upon Nigeria. However, even the broad outlines of this proposed interim government are unclear, and the degree to which it might be acceptable to the majority of the Nigerian people cannot, therefore, be estimated at this time. What is clear is that the regime's so-called managed transition to democracy is dead, the victim of a military clique unwilling, in the final analysis, to let the people exercise their sovereignty. We are aware, as are Nigerians, of the urgent need for the greater governmental transparency that civilian rule eventually can bring. We are also cognizant of Nigeria's role as a model to many other aspiring peoples struggling to reach the ideal of democracy in their own nations. If Nigeria's military regime is able to perpetuate itself in spite of popular disaffection, the prospects for peaceful transfers of power to elected civilians in many of those other countries in the region and across the continent would rapidly dim. We will continue, therefore, to stress the overriding importance of the military leaving power to those elected by a free and fair democratic process. We have put the Nigerian regime on notice that, should a civilian government not be in place in Nigeria on August 27, the United States may be obliged to take additional steps. Nigeria's military regime must understand that any attempt to hold political power after August 27, 1993--no matter how it might be rationalized--would raise fundamental questions about the future character of our bilateral relations. The Administration is watching developments in Nigeria very closely and is daily examining its options to respond to further abuses of human rights and other anti-democratic actions. Public statements by friends of Africa, such as each of you, would help convince the military regime that there is no room to maneuver on these issues. The strong signals coming from Congress have already been very helpful and greatly appreciated. (###) ARTICLE 4: Sudan Is Placed on U.S. Terrorism List Statement by Department Spokesman Michael McCurry, Washington, DC, August 18, 1993. The Department of State and other U.S. Government agencies have recently concluded a systematic review to determine whether Sudan should be placed on the terrorism list. After a full assessment of the facts and the law, the Secretary has decided to designate Sudan a state sponsor of acts of international terrorism. U.S. law (section 6 (j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979) provides that the Secretary of State determine whether countries have "repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism." Countries found to have provided such support are placed on the U.S. terrorism list. The decision on Sudan was reached after carefully weighing all available information and U.S. law. Last December, the Secretary of State ordered a systematic 180-day review to determine whether Sudan should be designated a state sponsor of acts of international terrorism. That review is now completed, and the cumulative weight of the evidence establishes that Sudan is providing repeated support for international terrorism. This decision was made independent of events in New York. Evidence currently available indicates that Sudan allows the use of its territory as sanctuary for terrorists, including the Abu Nidal Organization and members of Hezbollah, and Palestine Islamic Jihad. We also believe safe houses and other facilities used to support radical groups are allowed to exist in Sudan with the apparent approval of the Sudanese Government's leadership. Further, we believe that reports of training in Sudan of militant extremists that commit acts of terrorism in neighboring countries are credible. The United States, both in Khartoum and in Washington, has been in frequent communication with the Government of Sudan for well over a year. The Government of Sudan has failed, to date, to respond positively to our concerns. Placement on the terrorism list disqualifies Sudan from virtually all U.S. foreign assistance. Current disaster, emergency, and certain other humanitarian assistance, however, may continue, notwithstanding Sudan's placement on the terrorism list. A Travel Warning for Sudan has been in effect for several years. We have no specific and credible threats against American citizens in Sudan. (###) END OF DISPATCH VOL 4, NO 34.
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