US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 4, NUMBER 33, AUGUST 16, 1993
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1. Cuba: Current Assessment and U.S. Policy -- Robert S. Gelbard
2. Fact Sheet: Russia
3. Air Strikes in Bosnia-Herzegovina -- Secretary Christopher
4. Rwanda Peace Agreement
5. Treaty Actions
6. New Ambassadors
7. What's in Print: Foreign Relations of the United States
ARTICLE 1:
Cuba: Current Assessment And U.S. Policy
Robert S. Gelbard, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
Statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC, July 29, 1993
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to review with you the
current situation in Cuba, U.S. policy toward that country, and the very
real concern we have that the Cuban Government's refusal to enact
fundamental political and economic change will lead to further suffering
and deprivation for the Cuban people.
To begin with the dire economic situation on the island today, it is
apparent to us, to the world at large, and, most poignantly, to the
Cuban people that Cuba's experiment with state socialism has been an
abject failure. Cuba's economy has proven unable to recover from the
loss of the massive Soviet subsidy, which, in some years, amounted to
one-fourth of Cuba's national income. Over the past 2 years, the Cuban
economy has shrunk by over 50%. Electrical power outages have become
the norm, not the exception. Across the island, major factories stand
idle for want of fuel and spare parts. Public transportation between
and within major cities has been drastically reduced. The Cuban
people's diet has suffered dramatically. Basic foods are severely
rationed, and supplies are often so low that people cannot redeem their
ration cards. There is a growing black market for food; there are even
reports of clandestine restaurants where people go for meals, just as
speakeasies operated during the Prohibition era. The gains that Cuba
has made in health care and education are declining.
Sadly, there is no end to this down-ward trend in sight. The underlying
cause of Cuba's problems has been and remains the lack of political and
economic freedom. The Cuban people are certainly capable of working to
provide themselves a decent standard of living. But living under a
command economy coupled with the strongest police state ever to exist in
Latin America, they are unable to exercise the private initiative which
is required to drive a viable economy.
The Cuban Government has made some moves to try to attenuate the
economic crisis. To attract foreign investment in the tourism sector
and to earn foreign exchange, the government allows foreign companies to
participate in a number of joint ventures and to repatriate significant
profits. To attract increased remittances from Cuban exiles and to
capture some of the foreign exchange now in the black market, the
government is apparently planning to legalize the use of foreign
currency--U.S. dollars--as a medium of exchange in the domestic economy.
These are noteworthy moves. They reflect a decision to set aside
socialist dogma and even some nationalist pride in order to earn some
foreign currency.
But, in our view, they do not constitute fundamental reform. The key
question is whether the Cuban Government will decentralize economic
decision-making and allow individual citizens some freedom to exercise
private initiative to own and manage private property, to set prices, to
freely determine where they work and what they consume. We often hear
word from Havana that farmers' markets may be legalized--allowing
individuals to price and sell their produce in public--but that reform
never seems to come about. That would represent one step toward real
economic reform and real freedom.
Our policy toward Cuba remains consistent with our worldwide policy of
support for democracy and human rights. Specifically, we believe we can
best foster an environment for peaceful change in Cuba by continuing to
isolate the Cuban Government diplomatically, politically, and
economically until basic human rights are respected and democratic
reforms enacted. As it has been for 30 years and through 8
Administrations, the cornerstone of our policy continues to be our
comprehensive trade embargo. Throughout the years, this embargo has
helped diminish Cuban support for insurgency abroad and offset the
subsidies the island received from the former Soviet Union. Today, we
believe the embargo plays a critical role in keeping pressure on the
Cuban regime to dismantle its military machine, still the second-largest
in Latin America; to reform its economy; and to refrain from the
grossest human rights violations.
At the same time, we do not wish to see the Cuban people isolated. Last
week, we released guidelines to make possible a major improvement in
phone service between the U.S. and Cuba, as provided in the Cuba
Democracy Act. Radio and TV Marti continue to give the Cuban people
information about Cuba and the world which they cannot obtain through
the controlled state media. The Cuban Democracy Act has also expanded
the possibilities for humanitarian donations to non-government
organizations in Cuba, and a number of those donations have proceeded.
This committee has asked us to assess the issues related to a transition
in Cuba. We cannot make predictions as to what might cause a transition
and how it might unfold. However, it is important to assess the many
and important United States interests in the future of Cuba.
We and the entire free world have a profound humanitarian interest in
seeing an end to the suffering of the Cuban people. Ten million of our
neighbors have withstood three decades of a one-man, one-party state,
and now they face material deprivations unknown in their nation's
history. That is a tragedy which must end. We call once again for a
peaceful transition to democracy so that the Cuban people can begin to
rebuild their economy, live in freedom, and rejoin this hemisphere's
democratic community. The people who govern Cuba and all the Cuban
people should know that the United States poses no threat to Cuba and
has no hostile intentions. We have warned anyone who would undertake
attacks against Cuba from U.S. territory that such actions are against
U.S. law, and we intend to enforce that law. The Cuban nation is not an
enemy of the United States; its government is an enemy of the Cuban
people's freedom and progress. The United States would welcome a
transition to democracy; and we would work with our neighbors, as we
have throughout this hemisphere, to help such a transition succeed.
It is vital to U.S. interests that Cuba's transition to democracy be
peaceful. A violent transition would carry severe risks.
First, the Cuban people have suffered enough, and they are entitled to
win their freedom through a process which does not add to that
suffering.
Second, from the U.S. point of view, convulsive change in Cuba carries
the risk of a second Mariel boatlift or a similar migration. We don't
anticipate such an event now. However, were such an event to take
place, we would act according to contingency plans to prevent it from
taking place.
Third, Cuba needs a peaceful transition so that its next government can
function quickly and effectively. Democratic Cuba will face the
daunting array of problems faced by every post-communist society: a
massive tangle of property claims; the need to get an economic plan in
place to attract aid and induce investment; the need to build the modern
democratic institutions which the one-party state didn't permit; the
need to get the entire nation working together, including exiles; and
the need to address past human rights violations. As experience from
Europe to Nicaragua has shown, this is a tall order even for the ideal
government operating under ideal conditions. If Cuba has to face these
tasks in the emotionally charged, unsettled atmosphere which would
surely follow a civil conflict, its work will be immeasurably more
difficult, and its national recovery that much harder to attain.
That, Mr. Chairman, is our assessment of the situation in Cuba and our
interest in Cuba's transition. With you, the Administration looks
forward to the day when we can meet to discuss a brighter picture in
Cuba and when we and the entire democratic community can work together
to help Cubans make their democratic transition succeed. (###)
ARTICLE 2:
Fact Sheet: Russia
U.S.-Russian Relations
During the summit meeting in Vancouver, Canada, April 3-4, 1993,
President Clinton and President Yeltsin declared their firm commitment
to a dynamic and effective U.S.-Russian partnership that strengthens
international stability. The two Presidents approved a comprehensive
strategy of cooperation to promote democracy, security, and peace. They
also agreed on a new package of bilateral economic programs to address
Russia's immediate humanitarian needs and contribute to its successful
transition to a market economy. The economic package announced at the
Vancouver summit totals $1.6 billion for Russia, including $690 million
in grant assistance (in already appropriated FY 1993 resources), $700
million in concessional food sales, and $230 mil-lion in Export-Import
Bank credits. The package includes a $50-million Russian-American
Enterprise Fund to support private sector development, $95 million to
assist privatization efforts, a $6-million initiative for Russian
officer resettlement, $215 mil-lion toward denuclearization, and
$48 million to establish a "Democracy Corps," a coalition of American
people and institutions which will be mobilized to support
democratization.
During the summit meeting of the Group of Seven (G-7) industrialized
countries in Tokyo in July 1993, the U.S. announced an additional $1.8
billion bilateral package for Russia and the other new independent
states (NIS). The package includes:
-- Up to $375 million for private sector development. Of this amount,
the U.S. will contribute $125 million in grant assistance and $250
million in export credits to a new multilateral Special Privatization
and Restructuring Program to support the privatization of state
enterprises in Russia. The $3 billion in funding will be drawn half
from G-7 countries and half from international financial institutions;
-- $510 million in grant bilateral technical assistance focusing on key
areas of democracy support and exchanges ($220 million), housing ($165
million), and energy and environment ($125 million);
-- $490 million in export and investment grants and credits (leveraging
more than $1 billion);
-- $135 million in medical and humanitarian assistance (including
transportation costs); and
-- $300 million for grant bilateral assistance to the other NIS.
The accomplishments of the Vancouver and Tokyo summits built upon the
wide range of specific agreements on political, security, and economic
issues reached during the June 1992 U.S.-Russia summit in Washington, DC
(see Dispatch, Vol. 3, No. 25, June 22, 1992). These included a trade
agreement extending most-favored-nation status, a bilateral investment
treaty, a treaty for the avoidance of double taxation, and an agreement
allowing the Overseas Private Investment Corporation to make its
programs available to U.S. businesses investing in Russia. In the area
of arms control, the two sides agreed on specific limits for further
reductions in strategic offensive arms far beyond those called for in
the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). These lower limits were
codified in the START II Treaty in January 1993.
The U.S. and Russia signed additional accords in June 1992 in the
following areas:
-- Cooperation in space exploration and the use of space technology;
-- Efforts to achieve the global elimination of chemical weapons;
-- Expansion of contacts between the scientific and technological
communities;
-- Abolition of diplomatic travel restrictions;
-- Establishment of a U.S.-Russian Defense Conversion Committee to
facilitate defense conversion through expanded trade and investment;
-- Joint exploration of the benefits of a global protection system
against potential ballistic missile attacks;
-- Establishment of a Peace Corps program with a focus on small
enterprise development; and
-- Financial assistance to expedite the transport, safeguarding, and
destruction of Russia's nuclear and chemical weapons stockpile.
The United States has pledged active American support for the Russian
people as they pursue their course toward democratic institutions and a
free market economy. In January 1992, the U.S. initiated the
Coordinating Conference on Assistance to the New Independent States in
response to the humanitarian emergencies facing these states. The
resulting Operation Provide Hope provided desperately needed food, fuel,
medicine, and shelter. To continue this coordinated effort, two
additional international coordinating conferences were held in 1992: in
Lisbon in May 1992 and in Tokyo in October 1992.
The cornerstone of the continuing U.S. partnership with Russia and the
other NIS is the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies
and Open Markets (FREEDOM) Support Act, enacted in October 1992, which
directly addresses their political, economic, and military
transformation. It strengthens democratization and people-to-people
programs. It encourages free markets through technical assistance,
trade and investment promotion, and macroeconomic stabilization. And it
supports threat reduction, defense conversion, non-proliferation, and
nuclear safety.
Humanitarian Cooperation.
Through Operation Provide Hope, launched in February 1992, the United
States has delivered about $49 million worth of food and $33 million
worth of medicines and medical supplies throughout Russia to meet
critical shortages. Under Phase III of Operation Provide Hope, which is
ongoing, the U.S. is delivering 600 sea containers of processed foods
made into family food packages and about 4 million ready-to-eat-meals
(valued at $17 mil-lion) to 19 locations in Russia. The Russian Far
East has received excess Department of Defense medical supplies worth
$10 million and more than 30,000 cases of nutritional drink supplement
(valued at $1 million). Under a FREEDOM Support Act earmark, mothers
and children in the Far East will receive nutritionally enriched food
products worth an additional $10 million.
The Medical Assistance Initiative (formerly known as the President's
Medical Initiative), administered by Project HOPE, a private voluntary
organization, has provided about $54 million in pharmaceuticals and
medical supplies. Airlifts to St. Petersburg and Barnaul are
tentatively scheduled for summer 1993.
In addition, using Department of Defense funds the U.S. has transported
to Russia 10,600 metric tons of privately donated food, medicine, and
medical supplies worth more than $47 million.
Since 1991, the U.S. has made available more than $5 billion in
agricultural credit guarantees to the former Soviet Union. In September
1992, the Department of Agriculture (USDA) announced $900 million in new
credit guarantees, under the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) program,
to purchase U.S. agricultural products. Of this amount, $100 million
was made available for FY 1992 and $800 million for FY 1993. In FY
1992, a total of $745 million was provided to the Russian Federation.
The FY 1993 program was suspended in November 1992 when the Russian
Federation defaulted on payments owed for CCC debt contracted by the
Soviet Union. Some arrears on debts contracted by the Soviet Union were
included in the debt rescheduling approved by official creditors on
April 2, 1993. Payment on those arrears will be part of the bilateral
debt rescheduling agreements which will be subject to negotiation. In
addition, some arrears on debts contracted by the Soviet Union are not
covered by the rescheduling and remain due. The Russians are in default
on payments on the portion of the CCC debt contracted by Russia after
the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
USDA will provide $250 million in grant food aid to Russia in FY 1993
for a variety of commodities, including rice, corn, wheat, wheat flour,
lentils, red beans, butter, butter oil, vegetable oil, peanuts, peanut
butter, whole dry milk, infant formula, baby food, pork, and poultry. A
portion of these donations will be sold, with the proceeds used to
support social services and agricultural development. The U.S. also has
provided donations of 300,000 metric tons of corn, valued at $29
million, and 125,000 metric tons of feed wheat, valued at about $18.1
million, to Russia this fiscal year.
In 1992, USDA provided Russia with 63,485 metric tons of commodities
worth $52.5 million under the Food for Progress program and 39,365
metric tons of food worth approximately $75 million under the Section
416(b) program. (Transportation costs were included.)
Technical Cooperation. USDA is establishing a model farm community near
St. Petersburg and is working to establish private wholesale markets in
Moscow. Under the U.S. Agency for International Development's Farmer-
to-Farmer Program, 800 volunteers will be placed in private
agribusinesses or farms in Russia over the next 3 years. American
agribusiness executives also will work with newly privatized food
industries under USDA's loaned executives program. About 80 Russians
have been selected to participate in USDA's Cochran Fellowship Program
for training in agribusiness so far this year.
The U.S. has funded several programs through the International Finance
Corporation to assist in the privatization of the trucking sector in
Nizhny Novgorod and small and medium-sized retail enterprises in
Volgograd oblast (province) and Tomsk.
Initiatives designed to support political and economic reform include a
Russian-American Enterprise Fund which will provide capital to small and
medium-sized private enterprises; exchange programs of students,
business managers, journalists, doctors, and parliamentarians; and
programs on environmental management, financial sector reform, judicial
restructuring, constitution and legislative drafting, and public
administration. More than 100 Peace Corps volunteers are working to
assist small business development.
The U.S. also has sent advisers in energy efficiency, coal mine safety,
defense conversion, agriculture, law, housing, health care, education,
local government, and political party development.
Multilateral Cooperation. On April 2, 1993, the U.S. and Russia's other
bilateral creditors signed an agreement to reschedule about $15 billion
of Russia's debt service payments that are now due or will come due
during 1993. The agreement obliges Russia to pay its official bilateral
creditors about $2 billion during 1993. This debt rescheduling is a
major development because it regularizes Russia's arrearages with the
U.S. and other official creditors. The agreement is generous by normal
international standards and is intended to provide the Russian
Government with breathing space during which it can implement economic
reforms.
At the 1992 Munich summit, the U.S. and other members of the G-7
announced a $24-billion package to support Russia's macroeconomic
reforms. The package included $11 billion in bilateral financing, $4.5
billion in International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank loans, $2.5
billion in debt deferral, and a $6-billion currency stabilization fund.
The G-7 has provided more than $12 billion in bilateral financing, and
the World Bank granted Russia a credit of $600 million as a
"rehabilitation loan" to finance critical imports in the consumer sector
and a $70-million loan to improve social services. In August 1992, the
IMF approved a first tranche arrangement of $1 billion for Russia for
the last 5 months of 1992, but Russia was unable to meet its fiscal and
monetary commitments under the arrangement. Russia's access to much of
the $24-billion package, including the fund to help stabilize the ruble,
depended on the conclusion of a full-scale IMF standby program, which
Russia and the IMF were unable to conclude.
Bilateral Economic Issues. Current U.S. bilateral trade with Russia is
only about $3 billion. Although American companies are the largest
investors in Russia, total U.S. investment is estimated at only $400
million. At Vancouver, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin made bilateral
trade and investment growth a major priority. Implementation centered
in the U.S.-Russia Business Development Committee (BDC), which was
established at the June 1992 summit and is now co-chaired by U.S.
Commerce Secretary Brown and Russian Deputy Prime Minister Shokhin. The
BDC will be the primary vehicle to help identify and remove impediments
to trade and investment. President Clinton also is seeking to extend
the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) to Russia to provide
duty-free treatment for a broad range of Russian exports. More than
$440 million of Russian goods will benefit from GSP. The U.S. will
support Russia's application to become a member of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and will help build the institutions
necessary for Russia to become a full GATT member.
The Export-Import Bank has finalized an $82-million loan to finance the
sale of Caterpillar pipeline construction machinery to Russia. It also
has approved $240 million in loan guarantees and insurance for 12
transactions in Russia. The Trade and Development Agency and the
Commerce Department's Special American Business Internship Training
Program also have programs in Russia. The U.S. will open four American
business centers in Russia this year to help U.S. and Russian companies
do business with each other.
In addition, the U.S. and Russia signed an agreement at the June 1992
summit which grants reciprocal most-favored-nation status and offers
strong intellectual property rights protection. At the same time, the
two countries signed two other treaties, which are not yet in force.
The Treaty for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, when approved by
Congress, will provide relief from double taxation, assurance of non-
discriminatory tax treatment, cooperative efforts between officials to
resolve potential problems, and the exchange of information between tax
authorities to improve compliance with tax laws. The Bilateral
Investment Treaty, when ratified by the Russian Supreme Soviet, will
guarantee the right to repatriate ruble profits in hard currency, non-
discriminatory treatment for U.S. investments, effective compensation in
case of expropriation, and international arbitration in the event of a
dispute between the U.S. investor and the Russian Government.
Military Issues. The U.S. and Russia have begun to define a new
security partnership emphasizing the need for nuclear safety, the
dismantlement of nuclear weapons, and the prevention of the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.
In Lisbon on May 23, 1992, the United States signed a protocol to the
START Treaty with Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine--those states
on whose territory strategic nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union
are located--making the four states party to the treaty and committing
all signatories to reductions in strategic nuclear weapons within the 7-
year period provided by the treaty.
On November 4, 1992, Russia ratified START but stipulated that it would
not exchange its instrument of ratification until the other three states
accede to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapons
states. On January 3, 1993, the U.S. and Russia signed the Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on
Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II),
which reduces overall deployments of strategic nuclear weapons on each
side by more than two-thirds from current levels and will eliminate the
most destabilizing strategic weapons--heavy intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs) and all other deployed multiple-warhead ICBMs.
Following ratification by Russia and the other NIS, the Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe Treaty entered into force on November 9, 1992.
This treaty establishes comprehensive limits on key categories of
military equipment--such as tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles,
combat aircraft, and combat helicopters--and provides for the
destruction of weaponry in excess of these limits.
On April 10, 1992, the Deputy Secretary of State certified that the
Russian Federation had met the criteria required under the Soviet
Nuclear Threat Reduction Act for financial assistance to dismantle and
destroy nuclear and chemical weapons and to develop a retraining program
for scientists. The United States and Russia are engaged in discussions
on safety, security, and dismantlement of nuclear weapons. In January
1993, the U.S. delivered the first set of emergency response equipment
for use in the transport, storage, and dismantlement of nuclear weapons.
The U.S. also will provide protective clothing, radiation detection
gear, and communications equipment.
The United States has committed $25 million to establish an
international science and technology center in Moscow to assist Russian
and other NIS scientists and engineers in re-directing their talents to
non-military activities.
Political Conditions
In free elections in June 1991, Boris Yeltsin was elected President of
the Russian Federation. Political influence in Russia's Parliament is
split among the pro-reform bloc, the conservative bloc, and an
uncommitted centrist group serving as a swing vote. Dozens of small
political parties representing a wide range of viewpoints exist in
Russia.
The President governs in conjunction with the Russian Parliament, which
functions as an independent body. The Parliament consists of the
Congress of People's Deputies, which generally meets twice a year, and
the smaller Supreme Soviet, which is in permanent session. An
independent Constitutional Court, created in 1991, rules on the
constitutionality of acts of the President and the Parliament. The
Congress of People's Deputies amended the existing 1978 Russian
Federation Constitution in April 1992 to strengthen its political and
human rights provisions. An effort to adopt a new constitution is
underway.
A leader among the new independent states in moving toward market
reforms and democratic principles, Russia has introduced freedom of
speech, press, and religion and has pledged full protection for
individual human rights, including those of minorities. Domestic and
international human rights organizations are allowed to operate freely.
Restrictions on freedom of travel are being lifted. In December 1992,
the Parliament adopted constitutional amendments establishing trial by
jury and lifetime appointments for judges. The KGB, once the official
secret police organization of the Soviet Union, has been split into two
organizations: the Ministry of Security, which took over the KGB's
domestic functions, and the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. Both
agencies are banned from monitoring domestic political activity.
Foreign Relations
On December 27, 1991, Russia assumed the seat formerly held by the
Soviet Union in the UN Security Council. Russia also is a member of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the North
Atlantic Cooperation Council.
Russia has played a constructive role in mediating international
conflicts through its participation in the Middle East peace talks and
its support of UN and multilateral initiatives in the Persian Gulf,
Cambodia, Angola, and the former Yugoslavia. Russia has respected
international law and CSCE principles. It has welcomed CSCE involvement
in instances of regional conflict on its borders, including the
dispatch of observers to Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Nagorno-
Karabakh.
Economic Outlook
The Russian Federation comprises roughly three-quarters of the territory
of the former U.S.S.R. and more than one-half of its population. Its
agricultural production includes grain and potatoes, with its output
accounting for more than one-half of the former U.S.S.R.'s production.
It is rich in energy sources, including coal, oil, and natural gas.
Two-thirds of its oil production and two-thirds of its natural gas
production come from Siberia. Russia accounts for more than 60% of GNP
of the former U.S.S.R.
The Russian economy is experiencing a wrenching contraction as it moves
from a command to market system. The macroeconomic situation is
characterized by declining production and rising inflation. GDP in 1992
dropped by about 20% from that in 1991, but seasonally adjusted data for
the first quarter of 1993 indicate the rate of decline in production has
leveled off. Oil production dropped by 15% in 1992 and continues to
decline; gas production is stable. Energy exports--Russia's primary
hard currency earner--have held steady because of diversion of domestic
and NIS deliveries to foreign buyers. Despite the production slump,
unemployment is hovering around 4%, largely because of state subsidies
to industrial enterprises. The monthly rate of inflation ranges from
20% to 30%, fueled by enterprise credits, increased wages and pensions,
and a sizable budget deficit estimated at about 30% of GDP for 1992.
Living standards have deteriorated, with about one-third of the
population living below the poverty line. Russia's balance of payments
has worsened, limiting its ability to import goods and to service its
debts.
The Russian Government recognizes that stabilization of the economy will
not be possible until it moves to control inflation. Deputy Prime
Minister Fyodorov has proposed a program to sharply limit credit
issuance and control the budget deficit. Austerity measures aim, by the
end of 1993, to reduce inflation to 5% a month from about 30% and to
reduce the budget deficit to 5% of GDP from almost 30%.
The government's privatization program is moving forward, and the
private sector is growing. Privatization of retail businesses increased
this year, and 16% are now in private hands. Consumers are making about
one-fifth of their purchases from private shops and street vendors.
Moreover, hundreds of thousands of small, private farms and countless
garden plots account for more than 25% of the value of agricultural
production. Since January, about 10% of targeted industrial enterprises
have been privatized, and the rest are in various stages of the process.
Almost all citizens have now received vouchers to buy shares in these
plants, and more than 60 privatization auctions have been held so far
this year.
This emerging private sector--estimated to produce more than 20% of GDP
and to employ about 15% of the work force--is one of the major Russian
accomplishments of the last 2 years. Others include the freeing of
domestic trade from the state monopoly, loosening foreign trade
regulations, liberalizing most prices, unifying the ruble-dollar
exchange rate, and enactment of the bankruptcy law.
Environmental Issues
The Russian Government has inherited serious environmental problems.
Air pollution and inadequate supplies of uncontaminated water have
affected the health of the population and contributed to increased
infant mortality rates. Radioactive pollution generated by military
nuclear testing, unsafe nuclear production plants, institutes, and
laboratories is especially dangerous.
At the April 1993 Vancouver summit, the U.S. and Russia announced their
intention to expand and improve their joint work in the area of
environmental protection. They agreed to coordinate on joint ecological
measures to be taken and research to be done and on support for
financing these programs.
In cooperation with the international community, Russia works to develop
sound environmental policies. It has established a Ministry of
Environment and has introduced a pollution fee system by which taxes are
levied on air and water emissions and solid waste disposal, with the
resulting revenues channeled to environmental protection activities.
Russia also is attempting to develop regional cooperation among the NIS
on transborder environmental problems. (###)
U.S. Support for Democracy In Russia
Statement released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary,
Washington, DC, March 20, 1993.
The United States supports the historic movement toward democracy and
free markets in Russia. Russian President Boris Yeltsin is the leader
of that process. As Russia's only democratically elected national
leader, he has our support, as do his reform government and all
reformers throughout the Russian Federation.
President Yeltsin proposes to break the political impasse in Russia by
letting the Russian people decide their future. We were encouraged to
hear him say that civil liberties will be respected.
We also welcome President Yeltsin's assurance of continuity in Russia's
foreign policy. We will work to maintain the close relations between
our two countries. The President looks forward to his summit meeting
with President Yeltsin in Vancouver on April 3-4. And we will continue
to work in concert with our allies to support those in Russia who wish
to further reform.
What matters most is that Russia is, and must remain, a democratic
country moving toward a market economy. That is the basis for a
continued U.S.-Russian partnership and for a better and more prosperous
future for the Russian people. (###)
Russia at a Glance
Many ethnically diverse peoples migrated into the East European plain,
but the East Slavs remained and gradually became dominant. Predecessors
of the modern Russians, the East Slavs first appeared in the steppe
region north of the Black Sea. Kievan Rus', the first East Slavic
state, emerged in the late 9th century AD, coinciding with the arrival
of Scandinavian traders and warriors, the Varangians. According to
tradition, a Varangian named Rurik first established himself peaceably
at Novgorod by 860 and founded a dynasty. Kievan Rus' was not able to
maintain its position as a powerful and prosperous state. Nevertheless,
it left a strong legacy, and its traditions were adapted to form the
Russian state.
When the Mongols invaded Kievan Rus' in the 13th century, Moscow was an
insignificant trading outpost in the principality of Vladimir-Suzdal'.
The greatest expansion of the principality of Muscovy took place under
the rule of Ivan III (1461-1505), who took the title of Czar and "Ruler
of all Rus'." By the beginning of the 16th century, Muscovy had united
virtually all ethnically Russian lands. Under the guidance of two
Western-looking monarchs, Peter the Great (1682-1725) and Catherine the
Great (1762-96), Muscovy was transformed from an isolated, traditional
state into the dynamic, powerful Russian Empire which played an
increasingly active role in the affairs of Europe. In 1917, the
Bolsheviks overthrew the czarist regime, ending three centuries of
Romanov rule. On December 30, 1922, Bolshevik leaders established the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on territory generally corresponding
to that of the old Russian Empire. With the breakup of the Soviet Union
in December 1991, Russia became a sovereign, independent country.
According to 1991 estimates, Russia's population was about 148 million,
of whom 81.5% are ethnic Russians. The territory of Russia is about 17
million square kilometers, making it the world's largest country. (###)
Principal Government Officials
President: Boris Yeltsin
Prime Minister: Viktor Chernomyrdin
Foreign Minister: Andrei Kozyrev (###)
ARTICLE 3:
Air Strikes in Bosnia-Herzegovina
Statement by Secretary Christopher, released by the Office of the
Spokesman, Washington, DC, August 9, 1993.
The United States is pleased by the important actions taken today by the
North Atlantic Council. These steps significantly further the United
States initiative to make air power available to lift the strangulation
of Sarajevo and other areas, stop interference with humanitarian relief
operations, and promote a viable political settlement in the
negotiations at Geneva. At the North Atlantic Council meeting last
Monday, NATO unanimously made the policy decision to prepare for air
strikes and laid down a clear warning to those responsible for the
strangulation of Sarajevo and other civilian areas. Today, the alliance
unanimously approved a thorough and detailed operational plan for air
strikes prepared by the NATO military committee over the last week in
conjunction with UNPROFOR. The plan is sound and comprehensive. It
sets forth the targeting identification process and the command and
control arrangements for air strikes.
With today's decision, the alliance now has in place all the means
necessary to take forceful action against the Serbs should they not
cease their intolerable behavior. The unanimous decision today signals
that the international community will not accept the laying siege of
cities and the continued bombardment of civilians, the denial of
humanitarian assistance to people in need, or empty promises as a cover
for aggression. The Serbs are on notice, and whether air power is used
depends on their deeds. (###)
ARTICLE 4:
Rwanda Peace Agreement
Statement released by the Office of the Spokesman, Washington, DC,
August 4, 1993.
We are deeply gratified by the signing of a peace agreement between the
Government of Rwanda and the Rwandan Patriotic Front in Arusha,
Tanzania, on August 4. This historic agreement addresses one of
Africa's most dangerous and persistent conflicts. The Rwandan war,
rooted in ethnic friction, has generated hundreds of thousands of
refugees and repeated outbreaks of ethnic violence over many years. The
accords signed at Arusha will make possible the voluntary return of the
refugees whose plight helped fuel this civil war, and almost 1 million
people displaced by the conflict within Rwanda will also be able to
return to their farms. It will greatly enhance the prospects for both
economic development and a stable, democratic government in Rwanda and
will allow the country to move forward on respect for human rights.
Many people and governments share credit and deserve congratulations for
this achievement. The Tanzanian Government, led by President Mwinyi,
played a major role in facilitating often difficult, year-long
negotiations. President Museveni of Uganda lent his crucial support on
cross-border issues. President Habyarimana and the interim government
of Rwanda negotiated on a wide range of contentious issues with Colonel
Kanyarengwe and the other leaders of the Rwandan Patriotic Front. The
two sides demonstrated good faith and both are to be commended for the
outcome. Rwanda's friends and supporters in the West, including the
United States, encouraged the process. Not least, the Organization of
African Unity has provided troops to monitor the cease-fire. The United
States is pleased to support this effort, which we hope will be a model
for future OAU involvement in conflict resolution.
Much remains to be done. The Arusha accords require establishment of a
transition government leading to free and fair elections. The parties
have asked that a neutral, international force be deployed to provide
security during the transition period. Until Rwandan democracy is
firmly established, the peace just achieved will not be secured. A
complex process of integrating and reducing the size of the two armed
forces remains to be accomplished. We hope that all parties will
complete this historic task in the same pragmatic spirit which has
guided them up to now. The United States congratulates the peacemakers
and will continue to support the Rwandan peace process. (###)
ARTICLE 5:
Treaty Actions
Multilateral
Consular Relations
Convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963.
Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS
6820; 21 UST 77. Accession deposited: Armenia, June 23, 1993.
Copyrights
Berne Convention for the protection of literary and artistic works.
Revised at Paris July 24, 1971, amended Sept. 28, 1979. Entered into
force for the U.S. Mar. 1, 1989. Accession deposited: Nigeria, June
10, 1993. Ratification deposited: Switzerland, June 25, 1993.
Diplomatic Relations
Convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961.
Entered into force Apr. 24, 1964; for the U.S. Dec. 13, 1972. TIAS
7502; 23 UST 3227. Accessions deposited: Armenia, June 23, 1993;
Georgia, July 12, 1993.
Labor
Instrument for the amendment of the constitution of the International
Labor Organization. Adopted at Montreal Oct. 9, 1946. Entered into
force Apr. 20, 1948. TIAS 1868; 62 Stat. 3485. Acceptances deposited:
Macedonia, May 28, 1993; Kazakhstan, May 31, 1993; Bosnia-Herzegovina,
June 2, 1993; Eritrea, June 7, 1993.
Nuclear Weapons
Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington,
London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force Mar. 5, 1970. TIAS
6839; 21 UST 483. Accessions deposited: Armenia, July 15, 1993;
Belarus, July 22, 1993.
Patents
Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations. Done at Washington June
19, 1970. Entered into force Jan. 24, 1978. TIAS 8733; 28 UST 7645.
Accession deposited: Latvia, June 7, 1993.
Budapest treaty on the international recognition of the deposit of
microorganisms for the purposes of patent procedure, with regulations.
Done at Budapest Apr. 28, 1977. Entered into force Aug. 19, 1980. TIAS
9768; 32 UST 1241. Accession deposited: Poland, June 22, 1993.
Phonograms
Convention for the protection of producers of phonograms against
unauthorized duplication of their phonograms. Done at Geneva Oct. 29,
1971. Entered into force Apr. 18, 1973; for the U.S. Mar. 10, 1974.
TIAS 7808; 25 UST 309. Succession deposited: Slovak Republic, May 28,
1993. Ratification deposited: Switzerland, June 24, 1993. Accessions
deposited: Cyprus, June 25, 1993; Netherlands, July 7, 1993.1
Property
Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization.
Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for
the U.S. Aug. 25, 1970. TIAS 6932; 21 UST 1749. Succession deposited:
Moldova, June 3, 1993.
Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of Mar.
20, 1883, as revised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into
force Apr. 26, 1970, and for the U.S. Sept. 5, 1970; except for Arts. 1-
12, which entered into force May 19, 1970, and for the U.S. Aug. 25,
1973. TIAS 6923, 7727; 24 UST 2140. Accession deposited: Latvia, June
7, 1993. Succession deposited: Moldova, June 3, 1993.
UNIDO
Constitution of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization,
with annexes. Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. Entered into force June
21, 1985. Accession deposited: Tajikistan, June 9, 1993.
Bilateral
Belarus
Agreement concerning the conversion of military technologies and
capabilities into civilian activities. Signed at Washington July 22,
1993. Entered into force July 22, 1993.
Agreement amending the agreement of Oct. 22, 1992, as amended,
concerning the provision of assistance related to the establishment of
export control systems to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction from the Republic of Belarus. Signed at Washington July 22,
1993. Entered into force July 22, 1993.
Agreement concerning the environmental restoration of former Strategic
Rocket Forces facilities and sites to promote the prevention of
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Signed at Washington July
22, 1993. Entered into force July 22, 1993.
Bhutan
International express mail agreement. Signed at Thimphu and Washington
June 3 and July 6, 1993. Entered into force Aug. 1, 1993.
Chile
Agreement concerning the establishment of an Americas Fund and
Administering Board. Signed at Santiago June 30, 1993. Entered into
force June 30, 1993.
Colombia
Agreement concerning the establishment of an Americas Account and
Administering Council. Signed at Bogota June 18, 1993. Entered into
force June 18, 1993.
Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 15, 1992, regarding the
reduction of certain debts related to foreign assistance owed to the
Government of the United States and its agencies. Effected by exchange
of notes at Washington June 1 and 30, 1993. Entered into force June 30,
1993.
Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 15, 1992, as amended, regarding
the reduction of certain debts related to foreign assistance owed to the
Government of the United States and its agencies. Effected by exchange
of notes at Washington July 2 and 19, 1993. Entered into force July 19,
1993; effective June 30, 1993.
Ecuador
Agreement amending the agreement of Mar. 28 and 29, 1955, as amended,
relating to investment guaranties. Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington, July 9, 1993. Entered into force July 9, 1993.
Egypt
Agreement regarding the transfer of forfeited assets. Signed at Cairo
May 20, 1993. Entered into force May 20, 1993.
Greece
Basic exchange and cooperative agreement for topographic mapping,
nautical and aeronautical charting, digital data, geodesy and geophysics
and related materials. Signed at Athens May 25, 1993. Entered into
force May 25, 1993.
Guinea
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling or refinancing of
certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States
Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Conakry June 24,
1993. Enters into force following signature and receipt by Guinea of
written notice from the U.S. that all necessary domestic legal
requirements have been fulfilled.
Japan
Protocol extending the agreement of June 20, 1988, on cooperation in
research and development in science and technology. Signed at
Washington June 16, 1993. Entered into force June 20, 1993.
Agreement amending and extending the memorandum of understanding of Oct.
13 and 28, 1998, covering cooperation in the field of earth sciences.
Signed at Reston and Tsukuba May 14 and June 24, 1993. Entered into
force June 24, 1993.
Mauritania
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts
owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the United States Government and
its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Nouakchott July 29, 1993. Enters
into force following signature and receipt by Mauritania of written
notice from the U.S. that all necessary domestic legal requirements have
been fulfilled.
Philippines
Agreement regarding the status of U.S. military and civilian personnel.
Effected by exchange of notes at Manila Apr. 2, June 11 and 21, 1993.
Entered into force June 21, 1993.
United Kingdom
Agreement concerning defense cooperation arrangements. Effected by
exchange of notes at Washington May 27, 1993. Entered into force May
27, 1993.
Uruguay
Agreement concerning the establishment of an Americas Fund and
Administering Commission. Signed at Montevideo June 25, 1993. Entered
into force June 25, 1993.
1 Applicable to the Kingdom in Europe. (###)
ARTICLE 6:
New Ambassadors
January-June 1993
Argentina--James Richard Cheek, June 16, 1993
Armenia--Harry J. Gilmore, May 18, 1993
Bosnia and Herzegovina--Victor Jackovich, May 17, 1993
Cameroon--Harriet Winsar Isom, January 4, 1993
Croatia--Peter W. Galbraith, June 24, 1993
France--Pamela Harriman, May 17, 1993
Guatemala--Marilyn McAfee, June 11, 1993
Honduras--William Thornton Pryce, June 14, 1993
Hong Kong--Richard W. Mueller, June 1993 (assigned Chief of Mission)
Ireland--Jean Kennedy Smith, June 18, 1993
Namibia--Marshall Fletcher McCallie, June 8, 1993
Russia--Thomas R. Pickering, May 13, 1993
Senegal--Mark Johnson, May 28, 1993
Slovenia--E. Allan Wendt, May 17, 1993
U.S. Mission to the UN--Madeleine Korbel Albright, January 27, 1993
U.S. Mission to the OAS--Harriet C. Babbitt, April 12, 1993 (###)
ARTICLE 8:
What's in Print
Foreign Relations of the United States
The Department of State has released Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1958-1960, Volume IX (The Berlin Crisis, 1959-1960; Germany;
Austria).
This most recent volume of the Foreign Relations series documents the
series of meetings hosted by President Dwight D. Eisenhower with Soviet
Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev at Camp David in September 1959 following
the failure of the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference, May through
August 1959. After each side had explained in detail its position on
Berlin, both the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that there
would be no fixed time limit for a settlement of the Berlin question.
Encouraged by this lessening of tension, President Eisenhower proposed
to his British and French counterparts that a four-power summit meeting
be held later in the year to discuss the problem.
Preparations for the summit continued up to the beginning of May 1960,
when the Soviet Union shot down an American U-2 spy plane. On May 15,
Khrushchev threatened to torpedo the summit conference unless President
Eisenhower apologized for the incident and promised to punish those
responsible. The President refused to give in to this ultimatum, and
the conference ended on its first day. The remainder of the year
witnessed a variety of Soviet efforts to limit Western access to Berlin.
The relationship between the United States and the Federal Republic of
Germany was close and characterized by frequent meetings between
President Eisenhower and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer on topics of mutual
concern. The relationship between the United States and the German
Democratic Republic, in the absence of diplomatic relations, was just
the opposite. The U.S. also had close relations with Austria,
continuing to be a major supporter of Austrian neutrality.
Copies of Volume IX (GPO Stock No. 044-000-02352-1; ISBN 0-16-038037-5)
may be purchased for $38 from:
Superintendent of Documents
PO Box 371954
Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954.
To FAX orders, call (202) 512-2250. Visa and MasterCard are accepted.
For further information, contact Glenn W. LaFantasie, General Editor of
the Foreign Relations series, at (202) 663-1133. (###)
END OF DISPATCH VOL 4, NO 33
To the top of this page
Index of Dispatch Magazine Archives 1993 Issues||
Index of Dispatch Magazine Archives||
Index of "Briefings and Statements"
Index of Electronic Research Collections
ERC Reference Desk ||
Alphabetic Index ||
Sitemap ||
ERC Homepage
Last modified: Jun. 3, 1999
Designed by: Lin Dou