This is a corrected version of Dispatch Volume 4, Number 32. 
Text was inadvertently omitted in the original copy.



REVISED COPY
US DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH
VOLUME 4, NUMBER 32, AUGUST 9, 1993
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
1.  Protecting U.S. Borders Against Illegal Immigration --
President Clinton, Vice President Gore, Attorney General Reno,
White House Fact Sheets
2.  Belarus Accedes to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
3.  Putting NATO Air Power in the Service Of Diplomacy in Bosnia
-- White House Statement, NATO Secretary General Woerner
4.  U.S. Policy in Somalia -- Peter Tarnoff
5.  Liberia Peace Agreement
6.  U.S. Policy on Recent Developments And Other Issues in the
Middle East -- Edward P. Djerejian 
7.  Containment of the Bosnian Conflict -- Stephen A. Oxman 
8.  Department Statements 
          Zaire
          Nigeria

ARTICLE 1:

Protecting U.S. Borders Against Illegal Immigration
President Clinton, Vice President Gore, Attorney General Reno,
White House Fact Sheets

President Clinton, Vice President Gore, Attorney General Reno
Remarks made at announcement of immigration policy, Washington,
DC, July 27, 1993.

President Clinton.  Several weeks ago, I asked the Vice
President to work with our departments and agencies to examine
what more might be done about the problems along our borders.  I
was especially concerned about the growing problems of alien
smuggling and international terrorists hiding behind immigrant
status, as well as the continuing flow of illegal immigrants
across American borders.

Following several weeks of intense efforts, including his
personal involvement in resolving the recent alien smuggling
incident with Mexico, the Vice President presented me with a
report spelling out what we might do.  I have reviewed that
report and ap-proved it.  We have spoken to Members of Congress,
including those who are here today and others.  

I want to particularly acknowledge Senator Kennedy, Senator
Simpson, and Congressmen Brooks and Mazzoli for all their work
on this issue over many, many years.  We're also in debt to
Senators Feinstein and Boxer for their aggressive work in trying
to deal with this growing problem, especially in the State of
California; and I want to state publicly how much I appreciate
the work the Hispanic Caucus has done to ensure that a balanced
approach is adopted in dealing with this issue.

The simple fact is that we must not--and we will not--surrender
our borders to those who wish to exploit our history of
compassion and justice.  We cannot tolerate those who traffic in
human cargo, nor can we allow our people to be endangered by
those who would enter our country to terrorize Americans.  But
the solution to the problem of illegal immigration is not simply
to close our borders.  The solution is to welcome legal
immigrants and legal, legitimate refugees and to turn away those
who do not obey the laws.  We must say no to illegal immigration
so we can continue to say yes to legal immigration.

Today we send a strong and clear message.  We will make it
tougher for illegal aliens to get into our country.  We will
treat organizing a crime syndicate to smuggle aliens as a
serious crime.  And we will increase the number of Border Patrol
personnel, equipping and training them to be first-class law
enforcement officers.

These initiatives, for which I am asking the Congress for an
additional $172.5 million in 1994, are an important step in
regaining control over our borders and respect for our laws. 
When I made a commitment to combat this problem on June 18, I
announced a plan of action.  This is the next step in fulfilling
that commitment. 

Some will worry that our action today sends the wrong
message--that this means we are against all immigration and that
is akin to America closing its doors.  But nothing could be
further from the truth.  Let me be clear:  Our nation has always
been a safehaven for refugees and has always been the world's
greatest melting pot.  What we announce today will not make it
tougher for the immigrant who comes to this country legally,
lives by our laws, gets a job, and pursues the American dream. 
This Administration will promote family unification.  We will
reach out to those who have the skills we need to make our
nation stronger, and we will welcome new citizens to our
national family with honor and with dignity.

But to treat terrorists and smugglers as immigrants dishonors
the tradition of the immigrants who have made our nation great. 
And it unfairly taints the millions of immigrants who live here
honorably and are a vital part of every segment of our society. 
Today's initiatives are about stopping crime, toughening the
penalties for the criminals, and giving our law enforcement
people the tools they need to do their job.

I'm also taking steps today to address the long-term challenges
of reforming our immigration policy.  I intend to appoint a new
chair to the congressionally mandated Commission on Immigration
Reform and to ask the Congress to expand the commission to
include senior Administration officials.  I'm also asking our
Attorney General, Janet Reno, and the U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service Commissioner-Designate, Doris Meissner,
to make sure the USINS is as professional and effectively
managed as it can be.  Under their leadership, I have no doubt
that it will be.  

With these efforts, I hope that we can begin a broad-based
national discussion on this important issue and move toward
significant resolution of the problems that plague all
Americans.  Now, I'd like to ask the Vice President to come
forward, with my thanks for his outstanding work, to discuss the
specifics of the initiative.


Vice President Gore.  The centerpiece of these initiatives is a
legislative proposal carefully drawn to protect the rights of
legal immigrants while allowing us to speed up the exclusion of
illegal aliens at ports of entry.  Right now, thousands of
aliens arrive each year at airports and other entry points
without proper documentation.  

What happens if, as they come off the airplane or off some
smuggler's ship, they request political asylum?  They're
entitled to a range of administrative procedures that enable
them to remain in the United States for many long months or even
longer.  Of course, some deserve asylum.  The facts show that
most do not under our laws.  Many never even show up for
hearings and immediately become part of the large and growing
illegal alien population.

The legislation we announce today will help bring this abuse of
our laws to an end.  It enables us to promptly exclude those
undocumented aliens who do not have credible claims for
political asylum.  At the same time, we provide protection for
those who genuinely fear persecution if they are returned to
their countries of origin, for the focus of our approach to
immigration must not be on closing borders but on opening our
hearts.  

In addition to the expedited exclusion legislation, we are also
proposing legislation aimed directly at the menace of alien
smuggling by criminal syndicates.  This measure will double
prison sentences for convicted smugglers.  It will make alien
smuggling a predicate for the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, or RICO, prosecutions.  It will authorize use
of wiretaps in alien smuggling investigations.  It will expand
our authority to seize the assets of smugglers.

These provisions will apply equally to organized criminal boat
smugglers as well as to the large-scale organized gangs of
so-called coyotes who bring thousands of illegal aliens across
our southwest border every week.

Now, how do we prevent the illegal entry of undocumented aliens
who have no reason to be in the United States?  We will
substantially increase funding for a range of administrative
measures.  It's time to make use of the full range of tools
modern technology provides.  For example, we will accelerate the
automation of U.S. embassies and consulates as quickly as
possible so they can better share information on people who
should not receive visas--terrorists, drug smugglers, and 
felons, for example.  We will also expand cooperative programs
with foreign governments and airline carriers to make sure that
improperly documented passengers are kept off airlines before
they leave for the United States.  

Finally, as a first step in slowing the flood of illegal
immigrants who circumvent our understaffed and underequipped
Border Patrol, we will significantly increase personnel, a kind
of more-cops-on-the-beat approach.  We will also give border
agents the best possible equipment and technology.  We're
providing $45.1 million for training and equipment and up to 600
additional Border Patrol guards.  That will improve their
ability to interdict and return illegal aliens seeking to cross
the border.  We will also increase and improve Border Patrol
training and review procedures to make sure that people they
apprehend are treated in accordance with the law.  

Now I'd like to ask Attorney General Janet Reno to talk a little
bit about the enforcement provisions in this legislation.


Attorney General Reno.  This is an important step forward in
dealing with what I believe will be one of the most critical
issues that we face in this decade:  how we maintain this
nation's tradition of immigration while, at the same time,
understanding and comprehending the burden that so many public
services have felt as a result.  I think we can do it, and I
think this whole effort by the Vice President is a first step in
recognizing the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service as a
true partner with the Department of State, with law enforcement
agencies, and with other national agencies to effectively deal
with the problem in a comprehensive way, not in a piecemeal way.

With respect to the Border Patrol, Senator Feinstein, Senator
Graham, and Senator Boxer have been saying, "When are you going
to get more people?"  And as I have said, we don't want to add
people if we can't add them effectively.  We've carefully
reviewed this.  We want to make sure that the equipment matches
the people, that they are properly deployed, and that they are
used in the most effective manner possible.

With respect to the penalties, we want to increase the penalties
for those who organize syndicates to smuggle people.  We want to
provide a full range of criminal investigative tools to do the
job; and I think as a step toward addressing this critical
problem, we have come a long way.  We have much to do, and what
it will require of all Americans is that we work together to
address this critical problem.

If I were to have seen the Dade County, Florida, criminal
justice system operate as the immigration and naturalization
system has operated too often in the past in terms of review
processes, I'm not sure it would have worked very well at all. 
We can do so much in terms of streamlining the effort and 
making it more effective while at the same time ensuring due
process for all people who are involved in the process.


Initiatives To Curb Illegal Immigration
Fact sheet released by the White House, Office of the Press
Secretary, Washington, DC, July 27, 1993.

The President announced today his intention to provide an
additional $172.5 million in resources in FY 1994 to strengthen
current enforcement programs to combat illegal immigration.  The
Administration's initiatives address illegal immigration
generally and alien smuggling and counter-terrorism
specifically.  They are designed for:

(1) preventing illegal entry into the United States;
(2) removing and deporting illegal aliens and alien felons
expeditiously; and
(3) strengthening criminal penalties and investigatory
authorities.

Preventing Illegal Entry Into the United States

Increasing Border Patrol Resources--Personnel and Technology. 
The Administration is requesting an additional $45.1 million to
increase the personnel and technology available to the Border
Patrol for fulfilling its mission of protecting the land border.
 This increase will allow the U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service (USINS) to hire, train, and equip up to
600 more agents.  It will provide high-technology equipment,
such as sensors and low-light-level television, to improve
agents' effectiveness.  The Justice Department and USINS will
also review oversight of civil rights violations, and training
in this area will be strengthened.

Improving Visa Issuance Procedures.  The Department of State is
requesting an additional $45 million for FY 1994 (a total of
$107.5 million for both FY 1994 and FY 1995) to upgrade the
quality and extent of its ability to issue fraud-proof,
machine-readable visas and passports.  This will ensure that
they are issued only to individuals who have legitimate reasons
for entering the United States.  The State Department will:

--  Provide an upgraded worldwide telecommunications backbone to
support CLASS (the Consular Lookout Support System) and allow
consular officers to share critical information immediately with
USINS, FBI, and other government agencies;

--  Install an interim, computerized distributed name check
system to cover the 106 posts not currently on-line with CLASS;

--  Accelerate the worldwide implementation of the Machine
Readable Visa (MRV) program from 9 to 3 years to ensure secure
visa documents;

--  Make U.S. passports more secure by digitizing passport
photos and by installing an on-line computer system to ensure
that multiple passports are not issued to the same person;

--  Accelerate a complete, automated name check of all
non-immigrant visa applicants over the next 3 instead of 
5 years; and

--  Tighten internal consular control procedures to minimize
human error in issuing travel documents.

Extending the Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS). 
Customs and State will conduct a pilot program to locate IBIS
terminals overseas at selected posts.  This expansion will allow
the CLASS and IBIS systems to exchange data more effectively,
improve the name check data available for visa issuance, and
provide USINS officials with accurate lists of issued visas. 
Customs will provide $2 million for this expansion in FY 1994.

Working With the Airlines To Improve Security.  Working in
cooperation with the international airline industry, USINS and
the State Department will expand several effective programs to
improve the integrity of airport admissions.  These programs
will require an additional $12.7 million in FY 1994.  (USINS has
already budgeted $15 million for this program in FY 1994.)

--  USINS Pre-Inspection at Foreign Airports--USINS and the
State Department will expand pre-inspection of passengers
traveling to the United States on a pilot basis.  Currently in
operation in several countries, pre-inspection allows USINS
officers at overseas airports to examine travel documents before
passengers board U.S.-bound aircraft.  In a test recently
completed in London, the USINS intercepted 433 inadmissible
aliens.  Pre-inspection facilitated travel by pre-inspected
passengers by allowing them to bypass USINS on arrival in the
United States.

--  Carrier Consultant Program--As a complement to
pre-inspection, USINS will expand its program for training and
assisting airline officials overseas to identify and reject
travelers with fraudulent documents.  Through this program,
USINS officers move randomly among high-risk international
airports.  The USINS will make this ad hoc program permanent in
FY 1994, increasing the number of airports it visits and the
extent of coverage in those airports.

Curbing Visa Abuse.  The Departments of State and Labor and the
USINS will shortly publish a proposed rule change in the Federal
Register that will close the loophole standard for issuing B-1
visas.  B-1 visas allow foreign nationals to conduct business in
the U.S. on behalf of a foreign entity.  Such visas are being
used to bypass the more stringent requirements for H-1 visas,
which permit employment in the United States.  According to the
Department of Labor, such 
abuse is particularly widespread in the computer programming
industry.


Removing and Deporting Illegal And Criminal Aliens Expeditiously

Offering Expedited Exclusion Legislation.  This proposed
legislation, discussed in an attached fact sheet [see next
page], will allow for the expeditious removal of individuals who
arrive at our ports of entry with fraudulent or no
documentation, while ensuring the protection of bona fide
refugees; $31.2 million is required to implement this program in
FY 1994.

Undertaking Regulatory Reform of the Affirmative Asylum Process.
 As a companion effort to the expedited exclusion legislation,
the Department of Justice will undertake a comprehensive review
of the regulations governing our political asylum procedures. 
The Administration will devote $14.6 million in FY 1994, which
represents a doubling of current adjudicatory resources.  By
September 30, 1993, Justice and USINS will develop a plan to:

--  Reduce the backlog of 275,000 asylum claims filed by aliens
who are already in the United States; and

--  Promulgate new regulations establishing a procedure for
prompt and fair adjudications, which will allow USINS to keep up
with the demand.

The Administration will work closely with Congress and the
non-governmental community on this initiative.

Expanding the Institutional Hearing Program (IHP).  USINS will
seek to deport up to 7,000 more criminal aliens by extending the
Institutional Hearing Program, which currently operates in
federal prisons, to state institutions.  Through the IHP
program, USINS starts the deportation hearing process for jailed
alien felons while they are incarcerated so that they can be
immediately deported upon release.  This program will receive
$10.9 million in FY 1994 for USINS and the Executive Office of
Immigration Review.

Expanding Advance Passenger Information System (APIS).  Customs
and USINS will seek to extend the use of the APIS to all U.S.
and foreign airlines.  Through this system, Customs and USINS do
a computerized name check which allows them to determine which
passengers to inspect more closely upon arrival in U.S.
airports, while facilitating the inspection process for cleared
passengers.  The program currently covers only 33% of arriving
passengers.

Increasing Criminal Penalties and Investigatory Authorities

Proposing Legislation Against Criminal Alien Smuggling.  See
attached fact sheet [below].  The Administration is proposing
legislation to increase criminal penalties for alien smuggling
from 5 to 10 years with greater terms for jeopardizing life. 
The RICO statute will be amended to include alien smuggling as a
primary offense.  The bill also expands USINS' ability to
exercise forfeiture authority and permits wiretapping with
appropriate judicial authorizations.

Offering Rewards for Information Leading to the Arrest and
Conviction of Terrorists.  The Administration proposes to amend
the law to expand the purposes for which the Assets Forfeiture
Fund's annual appropriation may be used to include the payment
of awards for information related to acts of terrorism primarily
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.  The
Attorney General has the authority to pay awards for information
regarding acts of international terrorism.  This authority has
been delegated to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 
This will provide a permanent source of funding up to $5 million
for these rewards.


Funding Requirements

The President's immigration initiatives require a change in the
FY 1994 budget.  The total program represents a $172.5-million
increase from the President's April budget request to Congress.

User Fees and Other Sources.  Of this total amount, $87 million
would be financed through the following user fees and other
sources.

--  USINS User Fee Account--Language authorizing a $1 increase
in USINS inspection fees from $5 to $6 is included in the
Administration's legislation entitled the "Expedited Exclusion
and Alien Smuggling Penalties Enhancement Act of 1993."  This
bill also removes the exemption of fees on cruise ship
passengers.  Of the total additional fees raised, $25.5 mil-lion
will be used to finance programs announced today.

--  USINS Exams Fee Account--USINS will propose regulations to
increase USINS application fees for various immigration
benefits, such as naturalization and adjustment of immigration
status.  Of the total additional fees raised, $9.5 million will
be used to finance programs announced today.

--  Visa User Fee Surcharge--The State Department will seek
modification of its pending reauthorization bill to place a
surcharge on machine-readable visa applications to fund its visa
automation program.  The State Department expects to collect $45
mil-lion in FY 1994.

--  Other Financing--The Customs Service will provide $2 million
to fund the Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) pilot
program from its current FY 1994 budget.

The Administration is proposing an amendment to the law that
authorizes purposes for which the Asset Forfeiture Fund could be
used.  This will provide a permanent source of funding, up to $5
million, for FBI awards for reporting terrorism.

New Appropriations (Budget Authority) Needed.  The
Administration will seek appropriated funds to support the
remaining $85.5 million required to implement these initiatives.
 OMB will continue to work with the involved agencies, the
authorizing committees, and the appropriating committees to
ensure full funding.


Expedited Exclusion and Alien Smuggling Enhanced Penalties Act
of 1993
Fact sheet released by the White House, Office of the Press
Secretary, Washington, DC, July 27, 1993.

The President today transmitted to the Congress proposed
legislation entitled the "Expedited Exclusion and Alien
Smuggling Enhanced Penalties Act of 1993."  This legislation is
part of the initiative the President announced on June 18 to
combat the illegal entry and smuggling of aliens into the United
States.

The act would expedite the exclusion and return of certain
undocumented and fraudulently documented aliens who clearly are
ineligible for admission to the United States while ensuring
that persons who have legitimate asylum claims receive full and
fair hearings.  In addition, the act would increase the ability
of the USINS to prosecute alien smugglers and enhance certain
smuggling penalties.

To address the growing abuse of our legal immigration and
political asylum systems resulting from illegal aliens with
fraudulent documents and from alien smugglers, the act contains
the following reforms.

Expedited Exclusion and Asylum Reform

An alien indicating a desire to apply for asylum would be
subject to an expedited exclusion order issued by an immigration
officer if the alien:

--  Used or attempted to use a fraudulent document for entry
into the United States or to board a common carrier to come to
the United States;

--  Was encountered in international waters and then brought or
escorted to the United States by government officials or was
encountered in territorial waters and brought to a port of
entry; or

--  Used a document to board a common carrier and then failed to
provide the document to the immigration inspector.  This 
latter provision is designed to deal with the increasingly
common practice of aliens presenting fraudulent documents to
common carriers and then destroying or discarding them prior to
immigration inspection.

The alien would be interviewed by a trained asylum officer.  If
the officer or reviewing officer determined that the alien had
departed from a country in which he or she had a credible fear
of persecution or of return to persecution, that person could
apply for asylum in the United States.  If no credible fear of
persecution was found, the alien would be subject to an
immediate order of exclusion and generally could not apply for
asylum.  

Judicial review of an order of expedited exclusion would
be limited to review under a writ of habeas corpus.  However,
the Attorney General would have the discretion to permit an
alien covered by these new procedures to apply for asylum.

Enhanced Penalties and Law Enforcement Tools

Criminal penalties for alien smuggling generally would be
increased from 5 to 10 years.  If a smuggler caused an alien
serious bodily harm or jeopardized the alien's life, the penalty
could increase to up to 20 years.

USINS' authority to seize and obtain forfeiture of real and
personal property used in the smuggling of aliens would be
expanded.  Currently, USINS only is authorized to seize vehicles
and other conveyances.  Under the act, USINS could seize houses
used to conceal smuggled aliens and cash and bank accounts
representing money earned through alien smuggling.  Any property
which was derived from, or traceable to, the proceeds of
smuggling, transporting, or harboring aliens could be forfeited.

USINS would be authorized (with appropriate judicial
authorization) to intercept wire, electronic, and oral
communications of persons involved in alien smuggling. 
Currently, USINS does not have this authority and must rely on
other law enforcement agencies for assistance.

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO)
statute would be amended so that the crime of alien smuggling
alone would trigger RICO's penalty and forfeiture provisions. 
This use of RICO would enhance the government's ability to
curtail the use of fraudulent applications for visas and
passports and other fraudulent identification documents.

Conclusion

The Expedited Exclusion and Alien Smuggling Enhanced Penalties
Act of 1993 would attack the abuse of our legal immigration and
political asylum systems and the trafficking in human beings for
profit while also underscoring the Administration's 
commitment to protect persons with legitimate asylum claims.
(###)



ARTICLE 2:

Belarus Accedes to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
Statement by Department Spokesman Michael McCurry, Washington,
DC, July 23, 1993.

On July 22, 1993, Belarus formally deposited at Washington its
instrument of accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state.  Head of
state Stanislav Shushkevich presented the instrument of
accession to President Clinton at the White House during a
meeting in the Oval Office.  Belarus thus formalized its
approval of the NPT, announced on February 4, 1993, in
conjunction with the ratification of the START Treaty.  The
United States warmly welcomes this action by the Government of
Belarus, which confirms, in a legally binding manner, Belarus'
commitments to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. 
Belarus' adherence to the NPT underlines the continued vitality
of this treaty, which now has nearly 160 parties.  By this and
earlier actions, Belarus has made an outstanding contribution to
international efforts to strengthen regional and global security
and stability.  This action also strengthens the regime which
makes possible  international cooperation in the peaceful use of
nuclear energy.

The United States attaches tremendous importance to the NPT,
which is the cornerstone of the international nuclear
non-proliferation regime and is crucial to U.S. national
security.  The NPT's success reflects the overwhelming
international consensus against nuclear weapons proliferation,
as well as indicates broad support for the role of International
Atomic Energy Agency safeguards in verifying the treaty's
non-proliferation undertakings.  We believe that continued,
strong international support for the NPT will contribute to the
achievement of its indefinite extension in 1995--a goal to which
the United States attaches great importance.

Belarus' adherence to the NPT comes at a time when cooperation
on non-proliferation has become a central element in the entire
post-Cold War structure of international security.  Belarus'
action should encourage adherence by those members of the
international community who remain outside the NPT. (###)



ARTICLE 3:

Putting NATO Air Power in the Service of Diplomacy in Bosnia
White House Statement, NATO Secretary General Woerner

White House Statement
Statement by White House Press Secretary Dee Dee Myers,
Washington, DC, August 2, 1993.

We welcome NATO's decision today in Brussels to prepare for air
strikes against the Bosnian Serbs if they continue to strangle
Sarajevo.  At an emergency meeting of the North Atlantic Council
(NAC) in Brussels today, our NATO allies gave their support to
the American initiative to relieve the siege of Sarajevo and to
promote a peaceful settlement to the conflict in
Bosnia-Herzegovina.

President Clinton wrote to NATO heads of state and government on
July 30 to express his view that the Serbs' efforts to strangle
the city of Sarajevo--through continued artillery attacks,
military offensives, and cut-offs of food, water, and fuel--had
reached a critical point, threatening a humanitarian disaster
and undermining prospects for the negotiations.  He proposed the
use of air strikes, if necessary, to relieve the siege of
Sarajevo and to promote a peaceful settlement at the Geneva
talks--in effect, putting NATO air power in the service of
diplomacy.  Secretary Christopher wrote his NATO counterparts
the same day explaining the details of the U.S. initiative and
seeking the allies' support at an emergency session of NATO's
supreme body, the North Atlantic Council.

At today's NAC meeting, the allies confirmed the U.S. view that
the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and particularly in
Sarajevo, was unacceptable.  They warned the Serbs and other
parties to the conflict that NATO would take effective action in
response.  The allies specifically agreed to commence immediate
preparations to undertake air strikes against the Serbs and
other responsible parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina if the
strangulation of Sarajevo and other areas continues.  NATO's
military authorities were instructed to devise options for air
strikes on an urgent basis.  It was agreed that such strikes
would be carried out within the framework of existing UN
Security Council resolutions and in full coordination with
UNPROFOR in order to ensure the safety of UN personnel
performing their important humanitarian mission.  Military
authorities were also asked to draw up appropriate command and
control and decision-making arrangements.

Secretary General Woerner
Statement by NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner following
the special meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels,
Belgium, August 2, 1993.

1.  The North Atlantic Council held a special meeting this
afternoon to discuss the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

2.  The Council reaffirmed its support for the negotiations in
Geneva to ensure a cease-fire and promote a fair and viable
settlement acceptable to all parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina based
on the principles of the London Conference.  The alliance 
is willing to participate in implementation of such a settlement
under the authority of the UN Security Council.

3.  The allies regard the dire humanitarian situation in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and particularly in Sarajevo, including
repeated violations of cease-fires, as unacceptable.  They warn
the parties to the conflict of their determination to take
effective action in support of UN Security Council decisions. 
Since July 22, the alliance has been ready to provide protective
air power in case of attack against UNPROFOR in the performance
of its overall mandate on the basis of UN Security Council
Resolution 836.  The alliance has now decided to make immediate
preparations for undertaking, in the event that the
strangulation of Sarajevo and other areas continues--including
wide-scale interference with humanitarian assistance--stronger
measures, including air strikes against those
responsible--Bosnian Serbs and others--in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

4.  These measures will be under the authority of the UN
Security Council and within the framework of relevant UN
Security Council resolutions and in support of UNPROFOR in the
performance of its overall mandate.  For that purpose, full
coordination will be carried out with the United Nations,
including appropriate arrangements between the NATO military
authorities and UNPROFOR and consultation with UNHCR.

5.  The Council has accordingly tasked NATO military authorities
urgently to draw up, in close coordination with UNPROFOR,
operational options for air strikes, including the  appropriate
command and control and decision-making arrangements for their
implementation.

6.  The allies stress the limited, humanitarian purposes of the
military measures envisaged and urge all the parties to seize
this opportunity to achieve a viable settlement.

7.  The Council will meet again as soon as the NATO military
authorities have reported in order to review progress in the
Geneva negotiations and the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
especially around Sarajevo and the other safe areas.  The
Council will then consider, in consultation with the UN
authorities and taking account of any report from the
Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former
Yugoslavia, whether military action by allies referred to in
paragraph 3 is necessary.  Any such action by the alliance will
be dependent upon the future behavior of the parties to the
conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

8.  I have conveyed the conclusions of our meeting this evening
to the UN Secretary-General.  (###)



ARTICLE 4:

U.S. Policy in Somalia
Peter Tarnoff, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, DC, July 29, 1993

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, you have maintained a
long and steadfast concern for the situation in Somalia.  I
welcome this opportunity to discuss with you why we are in
Somalia today and why we should be steadfast in our commitment
to see that the UN mission there is a success.

Why We Are in Somalia
American forces are in Somalia today--3,000 logistical forces
under UNOSOM command and about 1,000 in the Quick Reaction
Force--because it is in America's interest to have them there. 
It is in America's interest to preserve the gains of the
humanitarian relief effort which began with Operation Restore
Hope and UNITAF, and it is in America's interest to ensure that
the UN's first multinational peace enforcement effort under
Chapter VII of its Charter is a success.

What Has Been Accomplished
The UN, with the leadership and support of the United States,
has accomplished a great deal in Somalia in a relatively short
time.

The famine is over.  Operation Restore Hope was launched in
December 1992 with one goal in mind--helping to establish a
secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in the
southern half of Somalia to end the man-made disaster which had
claimed 300,000 lives.  As a result, the U.S.-led UNITAF
operation that ended in May 1993 secured deliveries of
humanitarian relief to the most deeply affected areas of
Somalia.  While pockets of suffering remain, large-scale
starvation has been eliminated, death rates have dropped quickly
and dramatically, and relief workers have fashioned an efficient
structure for delivering aid that continues today.

We have revived the process of political reconciliation.  Out of
the ruins of a civil war, the UN encouraged a broad spectrum of
Somali leaders to join in a process to forge national
reconciliation, which led to the March 1993 Addis Ababa accords.
 These accords, which UNOSOM is helping to implement, required
signatories to observe a cease-fire and commit themselves to
complete disarmament.

Shortly after the signing of the UN accords, in passing
Resolution 814, the Security Council charged UNOSOM with an
ambitious agenda--nothing short of rebuilding a nation.  In
addition to the continued provision of humanitarian aid, UNOSOM
was tasked with the reconciliation of political factions, the
rehabilitation of the Somali economy, the revival of local
administration, the repatriation of refugees, and the
restoration of a local police force.

Despite the violence in southern Mogadishu, we have seen this
process begin to bear fruit.  In Kismaayo, where Belgian troops
are maintaining security, tribal elders are conducting peace
talks under UNOSOM sponsorship.  Measurable movement toward
reconciliation is taking place outside the capital.  Thirteen
district councils have been established so far by UNOSOM
officials.  Additional councils will be in operation shortly,
some in a number of formerly troublesome spots like Baidoa and
Beledweyne.

The United Nations organized its first multinational peace
enforcement mission.  It is an important accomplishment that the
UN Security Council organized UNOSOM II as a peace enforcement
mission with teeth.  Resolution 814 authorizes UNOSOM II to
assume a security enforcement role:  The resolution requests the
Secretary General to "assume responsibility for the
consolidation, expansion, and maintenance of a secure
environment throughout Somalia."  The force itself is truly
multinational.  A force of 28,000 troops is authorized, and
there are 21,000 troops from 27 countries now in Somalia.

In a world rife with humanitarian crises caused by armed
conflict, the authorization of such a force is a landmark
accomplishment which it is in our interest to cultivate, not
castigate.  UNOSOM is a model worth promoting.  While the costs
of America's contribution are significant, especially in these
times of fiscal constraint, we should welcome the opportunity to
advance our humanitarian values with limited U.S. military
involvement.  The United States provides 4,000 of the 21,000
troops now in Somalia.  If conditions permit, we expect this
number will drop to 1,400 by year's end.

Restoring a Secure Environment
This is fundamental to UNOSOM's--and Somalia's--success.  There
is no question that UNOSOM still has a long way to go in helping
the Somali people recreate a functioning government capable of
rebuilding civic society and preventing a return to anarchy and
starvation.  Maintaining a secure environment in a country where
a 2-year civil war has destroyed nearly all civil institutions
and services is a formidable task.  Unfortunately, this cannot
be accomplished either quickly or bloodlessly.

The process of nation building will take time:  Restoring order,
enabling a Somali police force to assume responsibility, and
permitting the district and national councils to develop will
occur slowly.  The UN anticipated UNOSOM's need for a credible
force by establishing it under Chapter VII, authorizing a
substantial complement of troops, and permitting rigorous rules
of engagement.  Indeed, the potential for violent resistance and
the need for military enforcement are essential differences
between peace-keeping and peace enforcement.  Peace enforcement
requires a combination of diplomacy and force.

For UNOSOM to accomplish its mission, it must restore a secure
environment, including the cantonment of weapons, so political
reconciliation can occur.  The Addis Ababa accords must be
respected.  The cease-fire and disarmament provisions of the
accords, which all parties agreed to in March, are a fundamental
prerequisite to reconciliation.  If a reversion to wide-spread
lawlessness is to be averted, and a civil society restored,
disarmament of all factional militias must be pursued fairly and
forcefully.

The UN Response to General Aideed's Attacks
General Aideed's unprovoked attack on the Pakistani
peace-keepers in Mogadishu on June 5 represented a fundamental
challenge to UNOSOM's mandate to provide humanitarian assistance
and foster reconciliation.  UNOSOM forces were acting within
their mandate--and enforcing an agreement to which General
Aideed was a party--when they were ambushed in a brutal,
premeditated attack.  Twenty-three Pakistani soldiers were
killed, and three Americans were wounded.

On June 6, the UN Security Council unanimously determined that a
violation of the Addis Ababa agreement and of UNSC Resolution
814 had occurred and adopted UNSC Resolution 837, which
reaffirmed the Secretary General's authority to take "all
necessary measures against those responsible for attacks against
UNOSOM, including their arrest, detention, trial, and
punishment."  The UN response was necessary and appropriate.  

--  If Aideed were to succeed in his attempt to throw the
disarmament and reconciliation process off track, we would see a
resumption of lawlessness and violence, a return of famine, and
the humiliation of United Nations and United States efforts at
peace enforcement.

--  All Somali factions must understand that flagrant violation
of the accords and attacks on UNOSOM will not go unpunished.  In
fact, from discussions with countless Somalis, we conclude that
the vast majority deeply regret the killings and strongly
support UNOSOM.

--  Retaliation was directed against the individuals
responsible--Aideed and his co-conspirators--and against
legitimate targets--the radio station he used to foment violence
against the UN and the locations where he stored weapons.  There
is no dispute with the innocent people of Aideed's sub-clan, the
Habr Gedr, who will remain a part of the negotiations on
political reconciliation.

--  Aideed and his armed thugs' brutal response to UNOSOM
efforts to restore order in Mogadishu--the ambush of UN
peace-keepers and the abduction and murder of Somali civilian
employees of UNOSOM--requires that UNOSOM use all necessary
means--diplomatic and military--to ensure that one faction's
rejection of peace does not undermine the success of the overall
operation.

Conclusion
UNOSOM has suffered from some lapses of political coordination
and from disagreements on command and control.  Given the
unprecedented nature of the operation itself, this should not be
surprising. 

These obstacles can be overcome.  UNOSOM and the Secretary
General are working with the support of the United States and
other troop-contributing nations to refine UNOSOM's internal
coordination arrangements.  A U.S. interagency team is en route
home after conducting an assessment of the current situation in
Somalia.  We expect that the team's report will provide us with
ideas we can share with the UN on improving UNOSOM performance. 
Although UNOSOM is a multinational UN operation, the United
States has, we believe, an important supportive role to play. 

--  We should continue to provide support and advice to the
UNOSOM leadership.

--  We should support UNOSOM efforts to restore order to
southern Mogadishu, including the use of force where this is
necessary and appropriate to enforce its mandate. 

--  We should support UN efforts to use multinational coalitions
for peace-keeping in troubled regions.

We have often said that we cannot always be the world's
policeman, that other nations must share the burden of
peace-keeping, and that we will play a leadership role in
helping make those efforts effective.  We must match our words
with deeds by supporting the UNOSOM mission.  If we succeed, the
burden of deterring would-be tyrants and warlords will be an
easier one.  If we fail, there is little doubt to whom the
demands for relief will be directed.  We owe it to
ourselves--and to Somalia--to help UNOSOM succeed.  (###)



ARTICLE 5:

Liberia Peace Agreement
Statement released by the White House, Office of the Press
Secretary, Washington, DC, July 28, 1993.

The United States welcomes the recent signing of the Liberia
peace agreement.  This accord holds the promise of finally
ending a destructive conflict that has racked Liberia, killed
over 100,000 people, and created over 0.5 million refugees.  We
have provided over $250 million in humanitarian assistance to
victims of the conflict and believe the new accord can put
Liberia back on a path toward political reconciliation, national
elections, and civil reconstruction.

The U.S. commends and continues to support the sustained peace
effort in Liberia by the United Nations, the Economic Community
of West African States, and the Organization for African Unity. 
Their joint effort has succeeded in bringing the Liberian
parties closer together and sets a model for conflict resolution
in Africa and elsewhere.

The U.S. urges the parties to the agreement to adhere strictly
to the commitments they have made.  The accord will only succeed
if they work in good faith with one another and with the
international community.  The parties can provide an early
signal of their commitment to the accord by cooperating fully
with the international relief agencies in the delivery of
humanitarian assistance, and we urge them to do so.  (###)



ARTICLE 6:

U.S. Policy on Recent Developments And Other Issues in the
Middle East 
dward P. Djerejian, Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs
Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, July 27,
1993

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, when
I was asked some time ago to come up to testify, we agreed to a
briefing on the full range of issues in U.S. policy toward the
Middle East.  I intend to fulfill that commitment, but I know
that you are very concerned about the recent developments in
southern Lebanon, so I will start my statement with some
observations about the current hostilities.  Afterward, I will
review the peace process, Iraq, and Iran and offer some further
comments on Islam and the U.S. policy on this subject. 
Following that, I will be pleased to answer your questions.

Renewed Fighting in Lebanon
We are very disturbed by the latest escalation of violence in
southern Lebanon and northern Israel.  The decision to cut short
Secretary Christopher's trip to Asia and Australia reflects the
gravity with which the Administration views the outbreak of
hostilities.   

We have held intensive discussions with the governments
concerned and have called on all the parties to exercise
restraint.  Secretary Christopher, speaking from Singapore,
noted that this violence is counter productive for the peace
process and said that we are working urgently with our Russian
co-sponsor to end this violence.

We deeply regret this latest outbreak of violence in southern
Lebanon and northern Israel.  The U.S. remains determined to
advance the peace process and will not be deterred by those
extremist groups who violently oppose peace.  Secretary 
Christopher has stated that Hezbollah has been an opponent of
the peace process and that we must not let the opponents of the
peace process undermine it.  We will continue to urge the
parties to resolve their differences through negotiations, and
we will do our part to contribute to a settlement.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, the violence in
southern Lebanon is yet another reminder of the urgent need to
achieve a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace in the Middle
East.  Let me now describe for you the status of the
negotiations.

Middle East Peace Process
As the Secretary prepares for his second trip to the Middle
East, I would like to give you our assessment of where we are in
the negotiations since my last appearance before the
subcommittee and to assess the prospects for progress in the
months ahead.  President Clinton and Secretary Christopher
continue to attach great importance to the search for
Arab-Israeli peace, and they believe there are real
possibilities for breakthroughs in 1993.  In the first instance,
it is essential that the parties themselves take the decisions
necessary to translate the promise of peace into a reality.  The
United States will continue to do everything it can to assist
them in the effort.  Our role continues to be one of a full
partner and honest broker with all the parties.

After a prolonged hiatus, the bilateral peace negotiations
resumed in Washington in May.  Secretary Christopher exerted
considerable efforts to create the conditions for the resumption
of negotiations, including intensive and frequent consultations
with the parties.  The visits to Washington of Prime Minister
Rabin, President Mubarak, and King Hussein also afforded
President Clinton the opportunity to explore the prospects for
peace and reaffirm his strong commitment to achieving progress
in the talks.

In May and when negotiations resumed in June, the Israeli and
Palestinian sides worked to narrow differences on a draft
declaration of principles which would guide their negotiations
on interim self-government negotiations.  Each side put forward
a draft.  They created working groups in which they debated the
concept of interim self-government and issues related to land
and water.  They also created a working group on human rights to
deal with the conditions on the ground.  The U.S. team spent
many hours in intensive discussions and debate with both sides
designed to think through the positions they had put forward and
to see whether ideas could be conceived to help bridge the
positions.

On May 12, the U.S. put forward a short political statement
which had two purposes:  first, to convey to Israelis and
Palestinians a sense of movement in the negotiations; and,
second, to try to capture areas of emerging agreement in the
respective Israeli and Palestinian positions.  When the parties 
reconvened in Washington in June, the U.S. team continued
working intensively with the two sides in an effort to narrow
substantive differences.  After nearly 50 hours of discussion,
the U.S. put forward a draft on June 30 which was broader in
scope and which could serve as a basis for further discussion
and elaboration between the parties.  

Since then, Mr. Chairman, we have been in almost constant
contact with the parties to hear their views and detailed
comments on the draft.  Our special Middle East coordinator for
the peace talks, Dennis Ross, and I traveled with our team to
the region several weeks ago to probe further for detailed
reactions to the draft.  We made clear that the draft is not a
statement of U.S. policy and that it is not set in stone. 
Rather, it is, and remains, a tool for the parties to use to
overcome differences and reach a declaration of principles. 
Secretary Christopher will intensify this effort during his
visit to the region.  We believe this is a practical and
workable way to proceed and look forward to detailed substantive
discussions with the negotiating parties.  

We have also been discussing with the parties the concept of
"early empowerment," that is, the early transfer to Palestinians
of significant powers and responsibilities even before formal
agreement is reached on interim self-government arrangements. In
our discussions, we have made clear our view that such early
empowerment is not an end in itself, nor a substitute for
interim self-government, nor a new interim phase.  Rather, it is
an opportunity for Palestinians to start building institutions
and preparing to govern themselves.  We also hope to attract
international financial support for this concept.  Indeed,
empowerment is the essence of interim self-government, and we
are encouraging all sides to take it seriously.

I have focused on the Palestinian-Israeli track, but I also want
to mention where things stand in the other bilateral
negotiations and in the multilateral discussions.  Syria and
Israel continue to negotiate over a declaration of principles. 
They remain divided over the core issues of withdrawal, peace,
and security, as well as over the relationship between bilateral
and comprehensive peace.  From our recent discussions in the
region with Prime Minister Rabin and President Asad, it is clear
that these differences, however deep, have not changed both
parties' fundamental commitment to negotiate peace.  This
sustained engagement by Syria and Israel is important.  Over the
past months, President Clinton has been in contact with the
leaders of both sides, and we believe that active U.S.
intermediation --in which we invest in and build on the ideas
and proposals of the two parties--holds real promise.  Secretary
Christopher will be pursuing this approach during his upcoming
trip.  

Jordan and Israel have nearly concluded work on a substantive
agenda, and experts from both sides continue their intensive 
engagement on issues ranging from the environment to banking. 
Lebanon and Israel have made some progress in narrowing
differences on the formation of a security subcommittee.  Both
sides have submitted drafts, and the Lebanese are now
considering the latest Israeli proposals made as the
negotiations adjourned in June.  Despite the escalation in
Lebanon, it is our intent to pursue these efforts with both the
Lebanese and Israelis in the weeks ahead.

Multilateral Negotiations
The multilateral dimension of the process is working well. As I
have noted before, the multilateral track is designed to
facilitate and complement the bilateral negotiations.  One of
the goals of the multilateral negotiations is to demonstrate
that peace will bring concrete benefits to all the peoples of
the region.  This includes not only the parties in the bilateral
negotiations but also states in the Maghreb (North Africa) and
the Gulf.  

Earlier this month, I had the privilege of co-chairing the
meeting in Moscow of the Multilateral Steering Group along with
the Director for the Middle East and North Africa from the
Russian Foreign Ministry.  Other participants were Israel, a
joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, Egypt, Saudi Arabia
(representing the Gulf Cooperation Council), Tunisia
(representing the Maghreb), the EC, Japan, and Canada.  Despite
our continuing urging, Syria and Lebanon have yet to participate
in the multilateral phase of the peace process.  They say they
will not attend until there is more progress in the bilaterals. 
I would like to point out that Israel and diaspora Palestinians
now participate in all the working groups, and the United
Nations is now represented in all groups as well.

The steering group produced a number of positive results. We
believe there is major symbolic significance in the group's
agreeing for the first time to convene two of its five working
groups in the Middle East region this fall--the refugee group in
Tunisia and the environment group in Cairo.  This is no small
accomplishment.  Leading the way in this effort, Egypt hosted an
intersessional workshop on arms control and regional security in
early July.

It is a further measure of progress that the group agreed on
language for the final statement to encourage badly needed
financial support for the Palestinians in the West Bank and
Gaza.  Namely, as part of its aim of stimulating regional
economic development, the steering group recognized the
particular needs of the Palestinians as they move toward interim
self-government.  The steering group also expressed its hopes
that additional funds will be made available to the Palestinians
to meet their current pressing needs and responsibilities and
those that might be assumed even prior to agreements reached
between Israel and the Palestinians on interim self-governing
arrangements.

The five multilateral working groups are making progress in
addressing some of the region's fundamental needs.  Let me
briefly describe some of their activities.

The Economic Development Working Group is engaged in a wide
range of activities, including infrastructure, training, and
tourism development.  Using a World Bank economic analysis, this
group is identifying priority infrastructure projects for the
region and the occupied territories.  

The Water Working Group has 12 separate activities underway,
including workshops, seminars, and on-the-ground studies of
water conservation, demand management, water sector training
needs, brackish water desalination, and enhancing water data
availability.

The Refugee Working Group is dealing with issues of family
reunification, human resource development--including training
and job creation--public health and child welfare, and social
and economic support systems.

The Environment Working Group has been holding workshops and
training seminars and discussing long-term projects dealing with
maritime pollution, wastewater treatment alternatives,
environmental management, and desertification.

The Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group is
furthering its work on confidence-building measures with the
challenging goal of enhancing regional stability by developing
expertise on arms control issues.

We view the robust activities of these working groups as laying
an important foundation upon which durable and cooperative
exchanges among all parties of the region can deepen and expand
in the future.  Indeed, such cooperative regional endeavors
would constitute an important element of the vision of peace
related to an Arab-Israeli peace settlement.

Before I move on to other topics, I would like to make an
important point about the continued U.S. commitment to the peace
process.  Two factors are key--that the parties themselves are
committed to the process and that the issues are amenable to
being worked out in these negotiations.  So long as those two
conditions obtain, there is a basis to make real progress, and
we are prepared to do our part.

Iraq

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, let me now turn to
Iraq and give you our assessment of the current state of
affairs.  The fundamental precepts of our policy on Iraq have
remained consistent from the beginning of the Administration. 
We seek Iraq's full compliance with all relevant UN Security
Council resolutions and with all measures taken by the coalition
to monitor and enforce those resolutions.  This is a 
long-term policy which keeps in check the threat from Iraq to
our vital interests in the Gulf region.  It is consistent with
our resources, broadly supported internationally and by key
regional states, and sustainable over time.  Our concerns
include not only a focus on physical threats to our interests
but a broader determination to see Iraq move, one day, to a
democratic future with a government which can live in peace with
its own people as well as its neighbors.  This Administration's
resolve against Iraq's lawlessness is and will remain
unwavering, as demonstrated by the strike against the Iraqi
intelligence headquarters in response to the attempted
assassination of former President Bush.  

I must tell you that we see no evidence that the government of
Saddam Hussein is prepared to comply fully with the UN
resolutions.  Iraq's initial refusal to allow UNSCOM cameras at
missile production facilities was in conflict with an absolutely
central provision of the resolutions requiring long-term
monitoring of weapons production capabilities.  This is found in
UN Security Council Resolutions 687 and 715.  There is no
alternative to Iraq's full compliance.  Without long-term
monitoring, all the work to date on weapons destruction would be
wasted.  I would add that this is an issue on which support in
the Security Council is very strong.  We intend to continue
close cooperation with our allies to ensure that the mission of
the UN Special Commission on Iraq is fulfilled.

In order to alleviate some of the suffering visited on the Iraqi
people by Saddam Hussein's rule, the U.S. supports the
implementation of Resolutions 706/712, which allow Iraq to sell
oil to finance the purchase of food and other basic supplies. 
The resolutions require that the UN control Iraq's overseas oil
sales and the proceeds from those sales to ensure that they are
used to fund humanitarian supplies and UN operations in Iraq. 
Under these resolutions, the UN would also monitor the
distribution of humanitarian supplies.  It is essential that the
implementation of Resolutions 706/712 not become a back door to
the lifting of sanctions without full compliance with all
relevant resolutions.  

The last round of talks with Iraq were recessed without result. 
We will be watching attentively to ensure that any agreement
fully meets the need for adequate monitoring of both the sale of
the oil and the distribution of humanitarian items to all the
people in Iraq, not just to supporters of the regime.  For
example, we believe that Saddam's continuing blockade of
northern Iraq is inconsistent with the requirements of
Resolutions 706/712, and must be lifted. Additionally, as agreed
in Resolution 712 and in order to maintain adequate monitoring,
we strongly support the use of the Turkish pipeline to transport
Iraqi oil sold pursuant to 706/712.

Our efforts to limit repression under UN Security Council
Resolution 688 continue and are consistent with our goal of
maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq.  In the south, 
the no-fly zone has prevented Iraqi air attacks and limited
large-scale offensive action.  Smaller-scale repression by
Saddam Hussein's forces continues as do efforts to drain
portions of the marshes and burn villages.  The situation would
be far worse, in our view, were coalition aircraft not
overflying the area on a daily basis.  In the north, Operation
Provide Comfort was recently renewed by the Turkish parliament. 
We welcome Turkey's action, which was taken by a large majority
and which demonstrates Turkey's ongoing support for the
coalition.

Our humanitarian concern for the people of Iraq is steadfast. 
In June, we participated actively at a conference in Geneva
which set priorities for international assistance programs.  We
continue to press our allies in the UN for creation of a
commission to investigate Iraq's war crimes and crimes against
humanity.  In the north, our goals are to prevent a crisis next
winter and to begin rehabilitation for the most destitute
population, impoverished by Iraq's relentless embargo of its own
people.  Our relief efforts were strengthened by the additional
$23 million appropriated in the Defense Department's
supplemental appropriation.  A part of these funds will go for
local purchase of crops to avert a shortage of grain this
winter.  We continue to support relief in southern and central
Iraq with consideration given to the need to monitor
distribution adequately.

In all of these areas we see the need for consistency, strong
U.S. leadership, and the maintenance of broad international
support.  We have that support.  The coalition is fundamentally
solid.  We will continue to enforce the UN resolutions and to
demand Iraq's full compliance, now and in the future.  At the
same time, we will continue to hold out the prospect of
cooperation and a lightening of burdens to a future Iraqi
leadership committed to a representative government that
reflects Iraq's diverse population and which is willing to live
in peace with its own people and its neighbors.

Iran

Let me now make a few comments on our policy toward Iran.  Our
differences with the Iranian Government grow from our deep
objections to specific Iranian behavior.  Those objections focus
on five areas.

First is Iran's quest for nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction.  We are working with our allies to develop a
consensus on multilateral controls on the export of sensitive
technology to Iran.  We are particularly concerned with
preventing Iran from acquiring the means to produce and deploy
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, as well
as ballistic missiles. 

Second is Iran's continued involvement in terrorism and
assassination worldwide.  Since 1988, Iran's record of 
assassinating political dissidents forms a consistent and
continuous pattern reflecting Iranian policy approved at the
highest levels.  Until it abandons support for terrorism and
terrorist groups, we will maintain existing unilateral
counter-terrorism sanctions on Iran.

The third area of Iranian behavior to which we strongly object
is its support and advocacy of violence to stop the Arab-Israeli
peace process.  Iran's efforts to mobilize extremist
groups--both Islamic and secular--against the peace process is
especially troubling.  Iran continues to call publicly, at the
highest levels, for the destruction of Israel.  The fighting in
southern Lebanon today has been a deliberate provocation by
Hezbollah, a terrorist organization which receives extensive
support from Iran.

The fourth aspect of objectionable Iranian behavior is its
threats and subversive activities against its neighbors.

Fifth is Iran's dismal human rights record, which is a matter of
continuing concern.

Our long-standing sanctions remain.  In addition, we seek
increased and focused bilateral and international pressure to
convince Tehran that it cannot hope to have normal relations
with the international community while acting against the norms
of that community.  We do not seek a total embargo or quarantine
of Iran.  Instead, we are focusing our efforts on those areas we
believe can have maximum impact on Iranian calculations of the
costs and benefits of their behavior.

We are taking active steps to support this policy.  At President
Clinton's suggestion, the Tokyo G-7 summit political declaration
for the first time alluded specifically to Iran's unacceptable
behavior.  When Secretary Christopher met with EC and Canadian
Foreign Ministers in Luxembourg in June, he reached an agreement
on the formation of a U.S.-EC- Canadian working group on Iran. 
I led our delegation in the first working group session on July
9 in Brussels, which began discussions on a common agenda for
future work.  We are also engaged in a parallel effort with
Japan.  On a separate track, we are pursuing efforts to reform
controls on sensitive technology exports.  Under Secretary Davis
recently began intensified consultations with G-7 states to give
this process new momentum.

Let me make our policy clear.  We do not seek to overturn the
Iranian Government nor to dictate the form of that government. 
We do intend to use extensive economic pressure to induce Iran
to change the behavior we find unacceptable.  Our focus is on
Iranian behavior.  This distinction is central to our efforts to
enlist key allies in efforts which complement our own.  It also
makes clear to Iran that changes in its behavior will serve the
broader interests of the international community and Iran's own
interests if it seeks to be a full-fledged member of the
community of nations.

Our policy does not exclude dialogue with Iran.  Indeed, it is
important that Iran understand us clearly on this point.  Our
offer of a dialogue with authorized Iranian representatives
remains valid.  We have no preconditions for such a dialogue. 
We have, however, made clear that we will bring our full range
of concerns to the table.  Until Iran chooses to respond to this
offer, we continue an indirect dialogue through the Swiss.  In
any case, normal relations with Tehran are impossible as long as
Iran continues to engage in its current behavior.

Islam and the United States

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude with a few words about a subject I
have addressed in the past before this committee but which
warrants our continuing close attention, particularly in light
of heightened public concerns caused by the World Trade Center
bombing and the attempts against other targets in the New York
area--that is, Islam and U.S. Government policy.

As Secretary Christopher, I, and other Administration spokesmen
have made clear, we view Islam with profound respect.  As a
civilizing force in history, it has enriched our own culture; it
is the religion of many American citizens.  We reject the notion
that a renewed emphasis on traditional values in many parts of
the Islamic world must lead inevitably to conflict with the
West.  We do not regard Islam as the next "ism" replacing
international communism.

There are certain manifestations of what some have described as
an Islamic revival which are a cause for concern.  But we need
to be clear about the nature and provenance of potential threats
to U.S. interests.  Otherwise, we may fall victim to misplaced
fears or faulty perceptions.

What does our analysis show?  It shows that, throughout the
Middle East and North Africa today, there is a widening debate
over Islam's role in societies seeking to cope with the
pressures of modernity.  What is striking about this debate is
its diversity from one country to another.

While we detect no monolithic, international effort behind
various Islamic movements, we are seriously concerned over
Iran's exploitation of Islamic extremist groups throughout the
region and over Sudan's role in supporting such groups in North
Africa.  Increasing coordination between such regimes and
extremist groups and their resort to terrorism needs to be
watched very closely.  In the last analysis, however, it should
be noted that social injustice--the lack of economic,
educational, and political opportunities--gives the extremists
their constituency in each country.  

The U.S. can and does have close relationships and dialogue with
states which describe themselves as Islamic and seek to govern
in accordance with the traditions of Islam.  Also, we 
have taken the lead internationally in a number of instances to
alleviate Muslim suffering--in Kuwait, in Somalia, and in
northern and southern Iraq.  Further, our efforts in trying to
achieve an Arab-Israeli peace settlement are based on a fervent
desire to bring peace and prosperity to all the peoples of the
region.  

But let me be clear.  We part company with those
individuals--and governments--who seek to advance their agenda
through violence, through terror, through intolerance, through
coercion.  Our quarrel is with extremism, whether in a religious
or secular guise.  And we will oppose it through all appropriate
means, whether it occurs on the streets of New York or
Mogadishu.  And I would join in the praise for the law
enforcement agencies which have thwarted acts of terrorism both
here and abroad.

Those who seek to promote social justice and broaden political
participation in the Middle East and North Africa through
peaceful means will find us supportive, as we have been
elsewhere.  But those who would use the democratic process
merely to achieve and monopolize political power will not find
us on their side.  As I have said before:  While we support the
principle of "one man, one vote," we do not support "one man,
one vote, one time."

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I would like to
close with a perspective based on my years as a public servant,
as someone with long experience in the Middle East, and as a son
of immigrants.  America's strength lies in its respect for law
combined with its tolerance of the customs, religions, and
practices of the many immigrants who have made this country
great.  These noble attributes attract people to our shores and
cause other nations to emulate our system.

We must never permit the actions of a violent minority of any
creed or origin to form our attitudes toward entire groups. 
While we must be vigilant in protecting our basic values and
democratic way of life, we also need to determine what we have
in common with other societies.  While there are important
differences, we and the vast majority of peoples of the Middle
East share common aspirations of peace, social justice, and
prosperity for ourselves and our children.

As the President and the Secretary have said repeatedly, we
cannot separate our foreign from our domestic policies.  The
success of our policies in the Middle East rests more than we
might imagine on the perception that the United States is a land
of vigilance wedded with tolerance, and firmness guided by
fairness.  (###)



ARTICLE 7:

Containment of the Bosnian Conflict
Stephen A. Oxman, Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian
Affairs
Statement before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, Washington, DC, July 21, 1993

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Co-Chairman, I want to thank you for the
opportunity to appear before this commission today to discuss
with you the potential for spillover of the Bosnian conflict,
and, more generally, the impact that conflict has had in the
Balkans.  As you know, prevention of a wider Balkan war has been
one of this Administration's principal goals.  

The Balkans are still the powderkeg of Europe.  If the present
conflict were to spread to Kosovo, or to Macedonia, or
elsewhere, the entire region could be destabilized.  Other
countries, including NATO allies, might be drawn into the
fighting, with grave consequences for European security. 
Finally, a wider conflict would set back the Balkan countries'
efforts to build democracies and market economies.

In my remarks, I will first discuss some of the ways in which
the present conflict could spread and why a wider conflict could
affect important U.S. interests.  I will then explain what steps
are being taken by the U.S. and the international community to
prevent the conflict from spreading.  Finally, I will describe
what we are doing to encourage the broader trends toward
democracy and free markets in this region.

Potential for Spillover
The potential for spillover flows from the ethnic geography of
the Balkans.  The Balkan nations are not homogeneous but contain
intermingled ethnic, religious, and national groups.  As the
Serbian nationalists constantly remind us, there are Serbs in
Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia as well as in Serbia.  There are
Hungarians in Serbia and Romania; there are Albanians in Serbia
and Macedonia; and I could give many more examples.

This ethnic tinderbox can ignite if political leaders fan the
flames of nationalism and irredentism.  Calls for a Greater
Serbia, for example, are founded upon the claim that Serbian
minorities can only be protected by union with Serbia proper. 
We believe that the rights of national minorities must be
protected and respected, and we oppose any attempts to change
national borders by force.  But our policy in this troubled
region must take account of the powerful emotional impact these
calls for ethnic solidarity carry.  Let me give you an update on
some of the situations where the conflict might expand.

Croatia.  The threat in Croatia does not come from spillover as
such, but from a possible intensification of the conflict
between the Croatian Government and the Croatian Serbs in the
Krajina, who now control approximately one-quarter of the 
country.  As you will recall, in 1991 there was fierce fighting
between the Serbs and Croats.  The international community has
been trying to mediate a settlement but without much success to
date, although international mediation helped to defuse, at
least for the moment, a potential crisis last weekend when the
Croatian Government rebuilt a bridge linking southern Dalmatia
to the rest of the country.

President Tudjman recently agreed to extend the mandate of the
UN peace-keeping force in Croatia for an-other 3 months.  The
situation remains extremely tense, however, and widespread
fighting could erupt at any time.

Kosovo and Macedonia.  Our principal concern in Kosovo is that
the Serbian Government might crack down violently, either in
furtherance of a program of ethnic cleansing, or in reaction to
provocative actions by ethnic Albanian nationalists in Kosovo. 
Fighting could also be generated by extremist Serbian
nationalist groups which have bases of operation in the region. 
Violence could lead to a flow of refugees into Macedonia,
upsetting and destabilizing that country.  Fighting in Kosovo
might also spread to Macedonia and Albania if combatants retreat
or seek refuge across the border in those countries or if ethnic
Albanians from the region seek to aid their brethren in Kosovo. 
Finally, we cannot totally discount the possibility of a Serbian
invasion of Macedonia on the pretext of protecting the Serbian
minority there.

However, the atmosphere in Kosovo today appears stable, although
tense.  While we do not believe that violence is imminent, an
unexpected incident could still trigger an eruption at any time.
 The number of potentially dangerous incidents has increased in
recent weeks since Serbia announced its intention to terminate
the CSCE monitoring mission.  I will talk later about our
efforts to reverse Serbia's decision and have the monitoring
mission continue.

Sandzak and Vojvodina.  Sandzak and Vojvodina are less
immediately explosive than Kosovo and Croatia.  However,
minority populations in both regions have been subjected to
Serbian harassment and intimidation.  For example, the Muslim
minority in Sandzak has suffered beatings and shootings at the
hands of local Serbian officials and paramilitary groups.  In
Vojvodina, a "quiet" ethnic cleansing campaign has been waged
against the ethnic Hungarian population.  Because the Serbian
authorities have replaced local law enforcement and judicial
personnel in Vojvodina with Serbs, ethnic Hungarians in the
region feel that they no longer have the protection of the law
and are vulnerable to threats and violence.

So far, the Serbs' activities in Vojvodina and Sandzak have not
been conducted on a wide scale.  However, in both regions, we
are concerned that the present activities are merely a prelude
to a more aggressive campaign of ethnic cleansing.  Indeed, many
members of the minority population in both regions have already
fled.

Any of these situations has the potential to lead to a wider
conflict that could more broadly affect European security and
American interests in a variety of ways.

--  Refugees may flee from wider violence to neighboring states.
 Already there are over 2.5 million refugees from the countries
of the former Yugoslavia.  A new flood of refugees would strain
the limited resources of the Balkan states and could have a
destabilizing influence.

--  Neighboring states may be drawn in to protect their ethnic
brethren directly or indirectly or may be tempted to take
advantage of the tumult to press territorial claims.  Broader
fighting in this region, which includes two of our NATO allies,
would be extremely dangerous for European security.

--  A widening of the conflict might deal a death blow to the
other Balkan nations that are currently trying to make the
difficult transition to multi-ethnic, democratic states.  I will
return to this point shortly.

--  If we are unable to prevent a wider conflict, would-be
aggressors, bigots, and extreme nationalists will be encouraged
to foment violence in other areas, and the credibility of the
U.S. and the international community may be damaged.

U.S. Actions
Because of these dangers, the U.S., acting unilaterally and
through international organizations such as the UN and the CSCE,
has acted on several fronts to prevent spillover.

In Kosovo, we have called upon the Serbian authorities to stop
repression of the Albanian minority, to avoid the use of force,
and to restore the region's autonomy.  We have also met with Dr.
Rugova, the Albanian Kosovar leader, to reinforce our publicly
stated opposition to full independence for Kosovo.  We are
providing $5 million in humanitarian aid to Kosovo for food and
other essential commodities.  We have warned Milosevic that we
are prepared to respond to conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian
actions.  We have inspired, supported, and participated in the
CSCE long-duration mission in Serbia-Montenegro.  Until
recently, there were 10 CSCE monitors in Kosovo, 4 of whom were
American.  As you know, in the Joint Action Program we called
for an increase in the number of monitors.  However, the Serbian
Government has recently indicated that it will terminate the
mission.  

The international community is convinced that the CSCE
monitoring mission should continue and the number of monitors be
increased.  The presence of the monitors has caused a
substantial reduction in human rights abuses, specifically
police harassment and brutality.  Because the monitors
investigate complaints swiftly and impartially, they defuse
tensions and prevent sparks from becoming fires.  The monitors
have also given the international community its own "eyes and
ears" in Kosovo to verify or disprove alleged abuses.  

You are probably aware that Secretary Christopher sent a message
to Milosevic urging him to extend the mission and to accept a
significant increase in the number of monitors.  The Secretary
told Milosevic that we viewed his failure to extend the mission
with the utmost seriousness.  Others, including Russia and the
EC, have made similar demarches.  The CSCE has met with
representatives of Serbia and Montenegro to press for the
mission's extension.  

We are also working with the CSCE to bring this matter before
the UN Security Council, because Milosevic's action clearly
increases the risk of a wider conflict in the region.  We will
continue to urge Milosevic to permit the monitors to remain as a
substantial contribution to lessening tension in the area.  If
he fails to do so, the CSCE will look for other ways to monitor
the region.

The CSCE mission has also been operating in Sandzak and
Vojvodina.  If the mission is terminated, the monitors in those
regions will also leave.  Our efforts are directed at getting
Milosevic to accept an extension of these monitors as well.  

Let me now turn to Macedonia.  

Several weeks ago, I had the privilege of briefing the Congress
on the President's decision to offer U.S. forces to augment the
UN contingent in Macedonia.  Deployment of these forces is now
complete.  Approximately 330 American soldiers have joined the
700 Nordic UNPROFOR troops already in Macedonia.

After a month of training, our troops will be rotated
periodically to the border between Macedonia and Kosovo to
monitor the border for destabilizing activity and to watch for
sanctions violations.  Based upon the current situation, we do
not believe that our troops face imminent hostilities.  Their
presence, however, should serve as a deterrent to a wider
conflict.

In addition, since September the CSCE has maintained a
long-duration mission in Skopje to defuse tensions and monitor
the situation on the ground.  The U.S. has provided the chief of
this mission since its inception.

In Croatia, approximately 13,000 UN peace-keeping troops have
been in place since mid-1992.  The mandate of these
peace-keeping forces was recently extended, with the consent of
the Croatian Government, for another 3 months.  While the
UNPROFOR troops have been unable to stop the fighting completely
or to bring about a peaceful return of Croatian authority in the
territories held by Croatian Serbs, they have succeeded in
limiting the fighting.  Nonetheless, armed conflict and shelling
continue from time to time, and the situation remains very
unstable.

Finally, we are encouraging the parties to the present conflict 
to reach a negotiated settlement.  A negotiated settlement
agreed upon by all the parties is the best way to end the
conflict and prevent it from spreading.  

Effects of the Yugoslav Conflict

As you noted in announcing this hearing, however, the Yugoslav
conflict has already had a major impact in other Balkan
countries economically, politically, and socially.  The new
democracies in the Balkans watch the bloody conflict in
Bosnia--which set out to be a multi-ethnic, democratic state
embracing Western values--at the same time that they themselves
are attempting the difficult task of becoming multi-ethnic,
democratic states embracing Western values.  The conflict in
Bosnia encourages the voices of intolerance and reaction
throughout the region; a wider conflict would endanger the new
democracies in the Balkans when they are most vulnerable.

Turning to the economic effects of the conflict, the Balkan
democracies which border on Serbia  deserve much of the credit
for the effectiveness of UN sanctions against Serbia and
Montenegro.  But their enforcement of these sanctions costs them
dearly--costs that their economies, which already suffer from
underdevelopment and the stultifying effects of four decades of
communism, cannot easily absorb.  The sanctions have deprived
them of traditional export markets and have isolated them in
varying degrees both from each other and from new markets they
are trying to develop in Western Europe.  And the huge profits
available to persons willing to violate the sanctions strain the
integrity of law enforcement institutions.

We are supporting the sanctions enforcement efforts of the
front-line states through the operation of sanctions assistance
missions under the auspices of the CSCE and the European
Community.  One hundred and eighty-seven customs officers from
26 countries operate alongside the local customs services to
oversee and advise on sanctions enforcement and to provide
technical assistance and training.  Twenty-seven of the monitors
are American.  The presence of the sanctions missions gives us
the ability to monitor and improve sanctions enforcement and
keeps the international community informed of problems.  The
missions' reports provided the basis for needed UN Security
Council action to strengthen and tighten the effectiveness of
the embargo.

Apart from the impact of sanctions, the Yugoslav conflict has
had other negative economic effects on the region.  The bitter
war in a neighboring country frightens away prospective foreign
investors from the Balkan democracies, which urgently need
outside capital to fuel the expansion of their emerging
open-market economies.  And national insecurity may impel the
new democracies to allocate funds to military use which they
cannot afford to divert from weakened public administration and
social services.

Fostering Democratic Development

The picture for these emerging Balkan democracies is not
entirely gloomy, however.  Notwithstanding conditions which
would have crushed the spirit of less resilient peoples,
Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania, and Slovenia have shown
dogged persistence in pursuing programs of political and
economic reform and reconstruction which have already made great
progress.  This is a face of the Balkans of which many Americans
are unaware.  But I believe it is central to long-term success
for U.S. policy in the region.

The Balkan democracies remind us of a number of important
lessons.  They show that democratic institutions are the best
means to channel ethnic, religious, and other conflicts into the
political process.  They demonstrate that democratic values and
institutions can take root and flourish even in places where
conventional wisdom discounts their prospects.  And they provide
welcome evidence that democratic development internally can
promote cooperative regional relations, even among historic
adversaries.  These lessons are applicable throughout the world.

The foundation of our policy in the Balkans, therefore, must be
to support the continued development of democratic institutions,
free-market economies, and open societies and, ultimately, to
integrate these nations into a European security system.  In the
immediate future, we intend to foster democratic development in
the region through the following mutually reinforcing means.

--  We will maintain our engagement and dialogue with the Balkan
democracies, both bilaterally and through the CSCE, to continue
to nurture the democratic and market reforms they have
successfully begun.

--  We will work to increase U.S. and European trade with and
investment in the Balkan countries.  The Administration has
proposed that Romania be granted most-favored- nation status, an
important step in helping that country's economy.

--  We will promote economic interdependence and integration
both among the Balkan democracies and between them and the West.

--  Through cultural and educational exchanges and by working
with non-governmental groups such as businesses and private
voluntary organizations, we hope to mobilize the immense
interest and resources present at the grass roots in America in
order to link the U.S. and Balkans together in a dense web of
relationships.

--  Finally, we will continue to use our assistance programs to
support our goals in this region.  Our principal means for
helping the Balkan democracies is the Support for Eastern
European Democracies Act, or SEED.  Since Congress passed the
SEED Act in 1989, we have provided over $150 million to Albania,
Romania, Bulgaria, and some countries of the former Yugoslavia
to assist them in developing democratic 
institutions, changing to free market economies, and improving
the quality of life.  For example, under the SEED program's
support for democracy alone, we have provided schoolbooks free
of propaganda, equipment and training for independent media,
support for new trade unions and political parties, and
technical assistance for parliamentary institutions.  We must
continue the SEED program to help these countries in future
years.  And we must also encourage our European allies to do
their part in providing aid and opening markets to the countries
of this region.

These policies can greatly advance our goal of bringing
long-term stability to the Balkans.  The best vaccine against
the plague of war is prosperity and democracy.  I want to
underscore the Administration's conviction that the Balkans
tomorrow need not look like Bosnia today.  The future will not
be dictated by the gun barrels of violent nationalists or
aggressors.  It is being made now by those individuals and
groups who are working with patience and determination for
democracy, open markets, and ethnic tolerance.  Working together
with international organizations, we hope to contain the present
conflict so as to permit these forces of moderation to triumph
throughout the region.  (###)



ARTICLE 8:

Department Statements

Zaire
Statement by Department Spokesman Michael McCurry, Washington,
DC, July 21, 1993.

We deplore the continuing crisis in Zaire and hold President
Mobutu responsible for a situation that puts at risk the lives
and welfare of millions of his countrymen and the stability of
an entire region.  Assistant Secretary Moose made our views
clear to an envoy from President Mobutu of Zaire, Mr. Ngbanda
Nzambo-ko-Atumba, during meetings on July 19 and 21.  The
purpose of the visit was to deliver Mobutu's response to a
letter from Secretary Christopher and to hear our reaction.  In
his response, President Mobutu blamed the opposition and the
high council of the republic for the continuing stalemate in
Zaire and the resulting human suffering, including severe unrest
in Shaba and Kivu provinces.

Assistant Secretary Moose informed Mr. Ngbanda that the United
States finds this response to the Secretary's letter totally
inadequate.  He stressed that U.S. policy toward Zaire has not
changed and that it remains clear to us that the only solution
to Zaire's crisis is a transition government accepted by all
major parties in accordance with the rules laid down by the
national conference.  The primary objective of the transition
must be agreement on a constitution, followed by free and fair 
elections on terms acceptable to all major parties.  It is also
abundantly clear to objective observers that President Mobutu
bears responsibility for the continuing political impasse,
economic deterioration, and human suffering.  We call on him
once again to allow the transition to proceed or bear full
responsibility for the consequences.


Nigeria 
Statement by Department Spokesman Michael McCurry, Washington,
DC, July 22, 1993.

The U.S. Government notes with deep concern the Nigerian
military regime's continuing refusal to release the results of
the June 12 presidential election and its suspension of the
country's transition framework.  The regime's repeal of the
decree establishing August 27 as the date on which power was to
be transferred to an elected, civilian leadership and its demand
that Nigeria's political parties organize and participate in yet
another electoral process are particularly troubling.

Each day brings new expressions of support for the June 12
election from leaders of Nigerian civil society.  Yet the
military regime refuses to heed the people's call for the
restoration of democracy.  The United States stands with the
Nigerian people and their efforts to express their sovereignty
and has concluded that it must take further substantive steps to
supplement those it announced on June 23.

On July 20, the Department of State convoked the Nigerian
ambassador to inform him of the U.S. decision.  He was told
that, because it is a military regime that is thwarting the
aspirations of the Nigerian people, our new steps are aimed
specifically at Nigeria's military.  The steps are:

--  Reviewing--with the presumption of denial--applications for
the commercial export of defense articles bound for Nigeria;
--  Restricting the remaining Nigerian military attaches' access
to the U.S. Government; and
--  Asking five Nigerian military officers studying in the U.S.
under the auspices of the International Military Education and
Training program to depart the United States.

The ambassador was also informed that additional measures are
under review and will be implemented if the civilian government
elected on June 12 is not in place in Nigeria by August 27,
1993. (###)

END OF DISPATCH VOL. 4, NO. 32

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